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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
ODOO'ISTIHSO
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Digitized by VjOOQIC
Digitized by VjOOQIC
I
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO
PART 1
AUGUST 5, 1921
Printed for the use of the Select Committee
on Haiti and Sanio Domingo
WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
1921
Digitized by VjOOQIC
iut^i.
HEARING
BEFORE A
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HAITI AND SANTQ DOMINGO
UNITED STATES^SENATE
SIXTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. RES. 112
A UTHORIZING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE .
INTO THE OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
*Ji:E TERRITORIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI
AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MBDILL Mccormick, lUinois. Ohairmnn.
PHILANDER C. KNOX. Pennsylvania. ATLEE POMBRENE, Ohio.
TASKER L. ODDIB, Nevada. WILLIAM U. KING, Utah.
V * Elisha Hanson, Clerk,
o
LIBRARY OF COHQHOB
DOCOMCUTS L>iVi3lON
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INQUIRY I^'TO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
FBIDAY, AUGUST 5, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
W ashing totiy D. C.
The coniniittee met at 10.30 o'clock a. ni., in the committee room, Capitol,
Senator Medill McCormick presiding.
Present: Senators McCormick (chairman), Oddie, and King.
Also present: Mr. Ernest Angell, representing the Haiti-Santo Domingo In-
dependence Society, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, and the Union Patriotlque d'Haiti; Mr. Stenio Vincent, representing
Union Patriotlque d'Haiti ; Mr. O. G. Villard, representing Haiti-Santo Do-
mingo Independence Society; Mr. Horace G. Knowles, representing the Pa-
triotic League of the Dominican Republic, and the deposed Dominican Govern-
ment; Maj. Edwin N. McC'lellan, United States Marine Corps, as custodian of
certain reports and correspondence taken from Navy and Marine Corps flies,
bearing on Republic of Haiti ; Capt. C. S. Freeman, United States Navy, as cus-
todian of certain correspondence and documents bearing on the situation in the
Domiolcan Republic.
Tlie Chairman. The committee will come to order. If It meets the judgment
ol the members of the committee, we might begin by receiving the memorial
which was brought to our notice at the last meeting, and any other matter
which Capt Angell has to present
STATEMENT OF MR. EBNEST ANGELL, 50 PINE STREET, NEW
TOBK, N. T., BEPBESENTING THE HAITI-SANTO DOMINGO INDE-
PENDENGE SOCIETY, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOB THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLOBED PEOPLE, AND THE UNION PATBI-
OTIQTTE D'HAITI.
The Chairman. Capt. Angell, will you tell the committee what memorials
and other matter you have to submit?
Mr. Angell. We have here copies of the so-calleil Haitian Memoir, and I
am going to ask the Indulgence of the committee to permit Mr. Vincent to
present that memorial, since he was Instrumental In Its preparation and holds
« high position In the unotDclal representation of his country. Mr. Stenio
Vincent Is the former minister of justice and Interior, and minister to The
Hague. He was president of the Haitian Senate at the time of Its dissolution
by the United States armed forces. '
The Chaibman. You may proceed, Mr. Vincent.
STATEMENT OF MB. STENIO VINCENT, NEW YOBK, N. T., BEPBE-
SENTING THE UNION PATBIOTIQXXE D'HAITI, FOBMEBLT MIN-
ISTEB OF JUSTICE AND INTEBIOB, MINISTEB TO THE HAGUE,
AND PBESIDENT OF THE SENATE, BEPUBLIC OF HAITI.
Mr. Vincent. Mr. Chairman and Senators, In the name of the Union Pa-
triotlque d'Haiti, which, with its branches in all the cities and villages of
Haiti* has at least 20,000 members, I have the honor of presenting to the Senate
commission of Inquiry into the occupation and administration of Haiti and
Santo Domingo by American forces a copy of the memoir which has already
been presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs.
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4 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
This memoir relates the conditions and circumstances in which the treaty of
September 16, 1915» was imposed upon the Haitian people, the violent meana
used to achieve this result, and the consequent position of the Haitian (govern-
ment, which has, in fact, lost the characteristics of a real Government.
Despite the violence with which it was imposed, this treaty has not been
carried out As regards the relations of the Haitian Grovemment to the treaty
officials, there is nothing to be added to the forceful declarations made by
Tresideut Durtlgiienave, which have already been made public and when the
memoir reproduces.
From the point of view of international law it is plain that the Wilson Oov-
emrnent had no right to order an Invasion of Haitian territory and to take
possession of that small and friendly country. President Wilson himself, at
almost the same time, proclaimed that "all the Governments of the Americas
are, as far as we are concerned, upon a footing of perfect equality and un-
questioned independence," and that •*no nation should seelt to extend its
policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left
free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered,
unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."
The only avowed pretext for intervention I find in the Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Navy for 1920. The Secretary wrote as follows :
" The crisis in Haitian affairs demanded immediate and energetic action on
tbe part of the Navy to protect American and foreign lives and property and
to vestore order throughout that distressed country."
But the fact is that while tragic events occurred in Port-au-Prince on July 27,
1915, resulting in the overthrow and death of President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam,
ttiroughout this affair the life of not a single American citizen or foreigner was
taken or jeopardized. No property was destroyed. And although there was
for the moment no Government, there was no burning or killing or robbing.
Qul^t was promptly restored and a committee of public safety assumed respon-
sibility for order until a new Government should be elected. It must be borne
in mind that there is not a single instance of an American or, indeed, of any
foreigner having been killed or molested in Haiti prior to the American occu-
pation.
Tlie truth is that the Wilson aclministration took advantage of the political
adventures of a weak and defenseless natitm and forced upon it an interven-
tion which, through the agency of the American minister in Haiti in December,
1914, of the Fort Smith mission in March, 1915, and of the Paul Fuller, jr.,
ttfission in May, 1915, had been long in preparation.
- It is sometimes alleged — most curious of all — that the Haitian people invited
the United States to straighten out its affairs. The facts are these: Toward
the end of 1914 the new Haitian Government was notified that the American
Government was disposed to recognize the newly elected Haitian President,
M. Davilmur Theodore, as soon as a Haitian commission should sign at Wash-
ington a '* satisfactory protocol*' on the model of the Amerk'an-Douiinican con-
vention of 1907. On December 15, 1914, the Haitian Government, through its
secretary of foreign affairs, replied :
" The Government of the Republic of Haiti would consider Itself lacking in its
duty to the United States and to itself if it allowed the least doubt to exist of
its irrevocable intention not to accept any control of the administration of
Haitian affairs by a foreign power.
The Haitian people never aske<l American intervention. The conditions of
the American occupation, as described in the Haitian memoir, have not l?een
such as to cause the Haitian people to change their minds. They ask, as that
memoir states:
First. Immediate abolition of martial law and of the courts-martial.
Second. Immediate reorganization of the Haitian police and military forces
and withdrawal within a short period of the United States military occuimtion.
Third. Abrogation of the convention, of 1915.
Fourth. Convocation within a short period of a constituent assembly, with
all the guaranties of electoral liberty.
In concluding this statement I beg leave to draw the most earnest attention
of the committee to the existence of martial law in Haiti, a fact which, unless
measures are taken to obviate the consequences, may seriously obstruct the
investigation. The entire Haitian people rejoiced to hear of the formation oT
this committee; it firmly believes that the task of justice and of truth is at:
last to be accomplished. But if it is to participate freely, it is important that:
every guaranty be given Haitian citizens. I hope that this committee wilt
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI ANO SANTO DOMINGO. 5
amni;e with the Government to do away with the serious inconvenience which
would result were martial law to continue during the period of an inquiry
into the abusea committed under the shelter of that law.
Senator Kino. Mr. Chairman, I presume that at a later date these gentlemen,
as well as others who may submit documents, will be available for cross-
examination, if the committee desires?
The Chaibman. I understand, Gapt. Angell, that it is your purpose to-day to
file such memorials as you have prepared, and after the committee has had an
opportunity to examine them to be prepared to submit to us a list of witnesses
whom you would like to have called?
Mr. Anoeli«. That is our intention, Senator.
We have here copies of the so-called Haitian memoir to which Mr. Vincent
has referred in his statement We intend to file with the committee now several
copies, which will be at the disposition of the committee.
(The memoir referred to is here printed in full, as follows :)
[The Nation, New York. Wednesday, May 25, 1921.]
Mkmoir on the Political, Economic, and Financial Conditions Existing
IN THE Republic of Haiti rNDca the American Occttation by the Dele-
gates TO THE United States of the Union Patriotiqtte d*Ha!ti.*
before miutary intervention.
The fact that Mr. Wilson's Government, in its military intervention in Haiti,
acted under the influence of certain big financial interests* will be shown In the
following account:
The National Bank of Haiti, founde<l In 1881 with French capital and in-
trnstetl from the start with the administration of the Haitian treasury, dls-
appearefl in 1910 and was replaced by a flnancial institution known as the
National Bank of the Republic of Haiti.
Like the old one the new bank was Intrusteil, untler certain conditi(»ns and
for the <luration of Its' contract, with the administration of the treasury of the
Haitian Government. But a part of the cai)ital stock had beon subscribed by
the National City Bank of New York, which became for the first time inter-
ested in the financial affairs of Haiti.
It was from this time on that financial control of Haiti be^an to be talked
of, and the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti immediately adopted a
new attitude with regard to the Haitian Government, never ceasing to create
difficulties for it.
On June 21, 1914, President Oreste Zamor left Port au Prince to check a
revolutionary movement which had broken out in the North Province. Dur-
ing his absence the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti, giving as a pretext
the moratorium decreed In France, the diminution of receipt as a result of the
European war, and the insurrection in the North, stoppe<l the execution of a
budget convention between It and the Haitian Government, which was drawn
up with the object of assuring, until September 30, 1914, the monthly and
regular payment of public expenses. In order to live up to its obligations, the
Government had to submit to the demands of the National Bank of the Repub-
lic of Haiti. It authorized the latter to dispose of an amount of $200,000
drawn from the funds applied to the redemption of paper money, and under
this condition the bunk resumed the regular adndnistration.
Because of Increasing difliculties with the bank, and lack of effective melius
for checking the revolutionary movement, President Oreste Zamor had to aban-
don the struggle. He refused the offer that was made to him of help from the
United States to keep himself in power, not wishing to compromise the Inde-
peiidence of the country, and resigned on October 29, 1914.
Meanwhile an active propaganda was being carried on, spreading the rumor
that the President had agreed to sign a treaty with the Unite<l States. This
rumor persisting, on October 26 Senator Lh^risson demanded an explanation on
this subject from the state secretary of foreign affairs, at the senate tribune.
The latter denied the existence of any negotiations with the United States, and
the senate unanimously passed the following resolution, which fully expres.sed
the sentiment of the country!
* This memoir was presrntPd to the Department of State and to the Senate Foreign
RelAtlooB Committee 'on May 9. i r\r\n\i>
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6 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
"The senate, after hearing the denial of the state secretary of foreiga
ofbiir9 of the existence of negotiations l>etween the national administration and
the Government of the United States, declares its satisfaction with his ex^laa»>
tions, condemns any l«lnd of a treaty, and passes the order of the day."
On Noveml)er 7, 1914, Senator Davilmar Theodore was elected Presldwit of
the Repuhlic in place of Oreste Zamor. From the very start he was conftroBted
by the same difficulties with the bank. Moreover, the United States Goverament
made as a condition for the recognition of the new administration of Haiti the
sending of a commission to Washington for the purpose of signing " satisfactory
protocols '* relating to various questions, notahly a convention for the control of
the Hait'an customhouses with the United States, modeled after the Dominican-
American convention.
On November 27 Senator Lh(^rlsson asked to lnteri)ellate the state secretary
of foreign affairs with regard to negotiations said to have been agrecnl upon
between the Governments of Haiti and the United States. On December 3,
through explanations presented to the senate tribune by Monsieur J. Justin,
state secretary of foreign affairs, it was learned that Mr. Ballly-Blanchard. envoy
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Uniteil States at Port au
Prince, had made proposals to the Haitian Government relative to a convention
for the control of the Haitian customhouses. M. Justin was hootetl by the audi-
ence, and even threatened, so strong was the national sentiment against anyth:ng
which might interfere with the indei)endence and sovereignty of the country.
On December 10, 1914, Hon. A. Ballly-Blanchard, American minister, had pre-
senteil to the Haitian Government a project for a convent on in 10 articles.
(See Appendix No. 1.) The United States asked In this project for the control
of the administration of the Haitian cu.stomhouses, and asked the Haitian Gov-
ernment to agree not to modify the custom duties in such a way as to reduce the
revenues, etc., without the consent of the President of the United States.
The Haitian Government, considering that the signature of such a convention
would have the effect of placing the country under a protectorate, and dreading
the discontent of a people particularly jealous of its independence, notifieii Mr.
Ballly-Blanchard on December 15 of Its regret that It could not accept the agree-
ment, In spite of Its friendly sentiments for the United States. On the 19th the
American minister replied that his Government would not insist upon the ques-
tion of the treaty.
Two days previous to this communication from Mr. Ballly-Blanchard, In order
to force the Haitian (Tovernment to accept the control of the customhouses by
systeumtically depriving it of financial resources, American marines carried off
the strong boxes of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti in broad daylight
and took on board the gimboat Machias a sum of $.500,000 belonging to the
Republic of Haiti and destined to be used for the redemption of paper money. In
his notes of Decenil>er 19 and 26, the state secretary of foreign affairs askeil him
in vain for explanations from the United States Legation regarding this military
kidnapping of the funds of the Haitian treasury. This amount is still In the
United States, where it was transported and deiK>sited in a New York l)ank.
In March, 191.5, similar measures for procuring control of the Haitian cus-
toms began again. This time an American commission landed at Port au
Prince. coraiKJsed of Messrs. Ford and Smith. Mr. Vllbrun Guillaume Sara
had Just been elected President of the Republic by the National Assembly.
On March 15 the commission got in touch with M. Duvivier, state secretary
of foreign afff^irs. After the usual compliments, Mr. Ford, president of the
commission, began to communicate to M. Duvivier the object of his mission.
It so(»n aiJpeared to the Haitian minister that the commission had no full
powers to negotiate. Mr. Ford readily admitted this; he declared, however,
tliat he was the personal friend of President Wilson and seemel to indicate
that he was authorized to speak in the name of the President of the Uniteil
States. M. Duvivier having shown him the objection to receiving communica-
tions from agents without due authorization the negotiations were broken off
and the commission returned to the I'nifed States.
Scarcely two months later, during the first two weeks of May, 1915, Mr.
I'aul Fuller, jr., arrived at Port au Prince with the ofticlal title of special
agent of the United States and envoy extraordinary and minister plenipoten-
tiary to tlie Government of Haiti. He was received on the 21st by the Presi-
d(Mit of the Repul)lic, to wliom he explained the oi)ject of his mission. Mr.
Fuller was heard with all the attention to which his official standing and the
Government that he represented entitled him. He was asked to submit his
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 7
proposals to the Haitian Government In writing. On the following day, the
22d, he addressed to the state secretary of foreign affairs a project of a treaty
in four articles. (See Appendix No. 2.) The preamble of the project con-
tained the following statements:
" Whereas It is the mutual desire of the high contracting parties that there
shall exist between an American minister plenipotentiary — thereafter to be
appointed — ^and the President of Haiti such an Intimate and confidential re-
lationship as will enable the American minister plenipotentiary to advise as
to such matters as affect the honest and efficient administration of the Qovem-
ment, the President of Haiti agreeing that he will follow the advice so given
to the extent of requiring honesty and efficiency In officials and of removing
those found to be dishonest and Inefficient; the President of the* United States
and the President of the Republic of Haiti have resolved to enter Into a con-
TMitlon for that purpose."
By the terms of the project presented by Mr. Paul Fuller, jr., the United
States agrees to protect the Republic of Haiti against any attack by any
foreign power, using for this purpose its military and naval forces. The United
States also agrees to aid the Haitian Government to put down any Internal
troubles, and to give it effective support by the use of American military and
naval forces within the necessary limits. Moreover, the President of Haiti
must agree not to grant any rights, privileges, or facilities of any kind with
regard to St. Nicholas Mole — not to concede^ sell, rent, or otherwise give up,
directly or Indirectly through the (Tovernment of Haiti, the occupation or use
of St. Nicholas Mole to any foreign Government or to any national or nationals
of a foreign Government
This project was examinetl In the most friendly way, and on June 2 the state
secretary of foreign affairs, M. Duvlvier, presented a counterproject to the
American envoy as a basis of negotiations. Regarding the question of St.
Nicholas Mole the Haitian Government acoeptwl unreservedly the draft pro-
posed by Mr. Paul Fuller. On the other hand, he asked thkt the first article
of the project should read as follows :
" The Government of the United States agref « to lend Its aid to the Republic
of Haiti for the conservation of Its Independeroe. With this object It promises
to intervene In order to prevent any intrusion by any foreign power in the
aflfairs of Haiti and to repulse any act of aggression against the country. It
will use for this purpose such forces of its Army and of Its Navy as are
necessary."
The Haitian counterproject also admitted the principle of a cooperation of
American forces to check internal troubles, but stipulated that these forces,
after cooperating with the Haitian troops in the reestablishraent of order,
should be promptly withdra\ni from the territory of the Ilopublic on demand of
the constitutional authorities.
The Haitian Government asked, moreover, that the United States Govern-
ment should promise to favor the entrance of American capital into the country
and to aid in the improvement of Haitian finances in such a way as to bring
about the unification of the public debt and an effective monetary reform. (See
Appendix No. 3.)
On June 3, In acknowledging the receipt of the counterproject of the 2d to
the state secretary of foreign affairs. Mr. Paul Fuller proposed, In turn, certain
modifications of the Haitian text. In a note dated the 4th the state secretary
of foreign affairs notified the American envoy of the acceptance of some of
the modifications proposed and the rejection of others. On the ^th Mr. Paul
Fuller acknowle<lge<l the rece'pt of this note without expressing any opinion
on its contents.
The discussion had reached this point. when it was learned that the American
envoy had suddenly left for the United States. The negotiations were not
resumed.
11.
LANDING OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN HAITI.
Treaty of September 16, 79/J.— On .July 27, 191.5. an attack was directed
during the night against the President's palace by a revolutionary group — a
group which milltantly representeii amid other mitagonisnis the overwhelming
sentiment against any pr»i*^l^ whicn tended or seemed to tend to the com-
promising of Haitian i»*flependence. On the next day President Vilbnin Gull-
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8 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
lAtime Sam, wounded in the struggle, abaadoned tlie palace and took refuge
m the legation of the French R^ublic.
On the morning of the same day the rumor spread through the town that some
political prisoners had been summarily executed in the prisons of Port an
Prince during the attack on the national palace. This terrible and deplorable
news was only too true. A great cry of grief arose from all classes of the
people and soon changed into indignation and anger. Agitation was increasing.
On July 28 the relatives of the victims, mostly young people, carried away by
grief, invaded the French L^ation,. seized the ex-President, who was thrown
into the street and killed. At the time when these confused scenes occurred
there was for the moment no government nor any kind of an organization
capable of preventing them. Yet there was no burning or robbing, and no one
except the ex-President and the ex-governor of Port au Prince, who were held
responsible for the execution of the political prisoners, met death through this
tragic Incident.
After this act of reprisal, quiet was promptly restored, and a committee of
public safety assumed responsibility for order.
Meanwhile, on July 28, the American cruiser Oeorge Washington, bearing
the flag of Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton, anchored in the harbor of Port an
Prinoe. No notice was taken of it, because it was generally believed that the
presence of this vessel had no other object than that of protecting foreign in-
terests if necessary, since Europe was at that time lounged in war.
On July 29, the population awoke to learn that the territory of Haiti was in-
vaded by American forces that had landed at the extreme south of the city the
night before. Hundreds and soon thousands of American marines occupied the
town and disarmed the surprised Haitians, who were comiiletely bowle<l over
by the terrible events of the last two days — and so the American forces did not
meet with any resistance from the population. Two weeks passed, during
which the landed forces succeeded in getting control of Port au Prince and its
immediate vicinity. Meanwhile other American troops had occupied the city of
Cape Haltien, in the northern part of the country. On August 12, 1915. after
numerous conferences between l«eading members of the Haitien Chamber and
Senate with the American naval Authorities, at the Unitetl States Legation and
elsewhere, a presidential election ^'fts held by permission of the occupation, ancl
M. Dartiguenave. president of the i^enate, was elected, the majority of the mem-
bers of the two houses agreeing to, support him. It was made clear that the
choice of M. Dartiguenave was essentially agreeable to the American occupa-
tion. He was therefore elected for a term of seven years in accordance with the
Haitian constitution then in force.
Two days after the establishment of the new government, Mr. Robert Beale
Davis, jr., American charge d^alTaires, in the name of his Government, presented
to President Dartiguenave a project for a treaty. (See Appendix No. 4.) This
project was accompanied by a memorandum, in which the President was
informed "that the State Department at Washington expected that the Haitian
National Assembly, warranting the sincerity and the Interest of the Haitians,
would immetlUitely pass a resolution authorizing the President of Haiti to ac-
cept the proiwsed treaty without raodiflcation." Since this request indicated
a certain ignorance of Haitian constitutional practice, as regards the negotia-
tion of treaties, the Government hastened to call Mr. Davis's attention to tlie
article of the constitution relating to this subject and showe<l him that the Presi-
dent of Haiti did not need special authority of the chambers to negotiate and
sign treaties with a foreign power. n
The American charge d'affaires, after examining the constitutional text,
readily acknowledged it and withdrew. Imagine the surprise of the Govern -
ment on receiving the next day a threatening Wte signed by the charg<^ d'af-
faires, insisting that the resolution indicate<l m the memorandum should be
passed by the Haitian Chambers, and setting lA the form of an ultimatum a
time limit within which that resolution must be piafsed.
To this demand the Haitian Government replied through the state secretary
of foreign affairs, M. Paul^us Sannon, that it vvasAgulded by the most friendly
disposition and was ready to negotiate a treaty with the United States, but
that rather than accept without moilitication the ^)roject presented it wotild
prefer to resign as a body.
By the occupation of its territory the Government, which had been deprived
of even its police power and which had none of the essential attribute.** at
authority, was in reality without Independence, without liberty of ar-tion. Its
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 9
existence and its working depended upon the Invading American forces,
equipped with all modern arnianients and now occnpyinj? the country.
While the negotiations were being continued laboriously as a result of the
determination of the American representative not to accept any modlflcations
In the project of the treaty, Rear Admiral W. B. Caper ton, commander in chief
of the expeditionary force of the United States, seized the customhouses of
Port de Palx, Cap, and St. Marc on August 24, driving out the Haitian officials.
And in spite of the repeated official protestations of the Government to the
American legation all the customhouses of the Republic were successively
occupied and thus came under the control of the officers of the United States
Navy. On September 1. 1915, President Dartigtienave solemnly protestetl in
a proclamation against this long series of violutious of law. which had just
resulted in the occiipation of the customhouse of Port an Prince. On the 3d
Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton issued a proclamation in which he declaretl
that he had assumed control of the Government and that the town of Port
au Prince (the seat of the Government) and its vicinity were under martial
law. (See Appendix No. 5.)
In face of the impossiblHty of getting certain modifications of the project
accepted two members of President Dartiguenave's cabinet, the state secretary
of foreign afCalrs. and the state secretary of public works handed in their
reaignatlcms on September 8, 1915.
The treaty was signed on the 16tb of the same month by M. liouls Borno,
the new state secretary of foreign affairs, and Mr. Robert Beale Davis, jr.,
American charge d'affaires at Port au Prince.
In reality the Government had been from the beginning to end oppressed
%y a series of violent acts. Apart fnmi the o<*cupatlon of its territory, the
eustonihouses. which were the chief object of the treaty, had been seized
manu milltari, and the funds belonging to the Haitian treasury and deposite<l
Id the National Bank of the Haitian Republic had been transferre<l to the
account of Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton by his orders.
The convention, after being ratified by the President of the Republic, was
sanctioned by the Chamber of Deputies on October 6, 191f>, and by the Senate
on November 11, 1915.
EXECUTION or THE TREATY.
1. Modii9 rivendi of Kovemher 29, 1915. — ^The convention of September 16.
1915, having been negotiated and ratifle<l by the Haitian Government and
sanctioned by the Haitian Chambers under the conditions and circumstances
set forth above, there was some hope that its extM'ution would soon bring about
the return to a situation which would naturally be cleared up by the rules
of cooperation and collaboration established between the two Governments by
this diplomatic instrument and by the fulfillment of the obligations entered
into by the American Government toward the Haitian people.
The Haitian Government, after the landing of the American troops, was
actually nothing more than a purely nominal government. It had neither the
power to enforce its authority nor finances. The American military authorities
had taken possession of the customhouses, had invaded the territory of the
nation, and, by the establishment of martial courts, had practically suppressetl
the Haitian administration of justice. The protests of the Government against
these acts of interference in internal politics had remnlned a dead letter. And
it was precisely " to put an end to these dlfllcultles and to obtain the liberation
of the territory that was formally promised'* that it had to "yield."' Conse-
quently pending the sanction of the treaty by the American Senate and the
exchange of ratifications the Haitian Government had to accept the arrangement
proposed by the American Government itself for the provisional execution of
the convention of September 16, 1915.' A modus Vivendi was signed at Port au
I*rlnce on November 20, lOlT). It .stipulated that " the convention signed on
September 16, 1915, between the Haitian Republic and the United States and
ratified by the Chamber of Deputies of Haiti on October 0. 1915, and by the
Senate of Haiti November 11, 1915, would provisionally go into full effect nnd
would remain in force until the vote of the American Senate was taken re-
garding the convention, leaving the methods of ai>plication of the trejity to be
decided at Washington between the Department of State and the Haitian
commission named for the purpose." (See Appendix No. 6.)
' Si»e Expose G4n6ral de la Situation de la R^publlque d* Haiti, annee 1917, pp. 5-6.
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10 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
At the 3ame time that this modus vivendi was signed it was understood be-
tween the two high contracting parties that —
1. The municipal administrations actually in the hands of the American
occupation should be returned to the Haitian Government after a special agree-
ment for each case.
2. The customs administration should be settled by an understanding be-
tween the state secretary of finance and the receiver general relative to the
elements of control of customs operations to be furnished to the Haitian Gov-
ernment and its participation in the appointment of employees according to the
terms of the convention.*
1-A. Municipal administrations. — The modus vivendi dealing with this sub-
ject was not carried out in any particular. The municipal administrations were
not restored to the Haitian authority, in spite of the formal promise which had
been made to this effect. As it had been understood that a special agreement
would be made for each case, the Haitian Government, in a memorandum dated
December 20, 1915, aslsed the legation of the United States to begin as soon as
possible the restoration of those of Port au Prince. (See Appendix No. 7.)
This memorandum, in indicating the procedure which it would be convenient to
adopt under the circumstances, added :
"This restoration necessarily involves expenses, and the means of meeting
them are a necessary i>art of this restoration. But as these expenses have actu-
ally been paid to the American occupation by Admiral Oaperton out of the funds
of the Public Treasury their future payment to the Haitian authority would
not be a new expense.
" Consequently the Haitian Government considers that in cases where the
details of the agreement will bring expense to the Haitian administration the
means for meeting them will be furnished from the funds of the Public
Treasury." *
On January 3, 1916, Mr. A. BalUy-Blanchard, the American minister, in re-
ferring to his note of November 29, 1915, and to the Haitian memorandum of
December 20, 1915, relative to the restoration of the municipal administrations
to the Haitian Government, informed M. Louis Borno, state secretary of
foreign affairs, that Rear Admiral Caperton, United States Navy, commanding
the forces of the United States in Haiti and in Haitian waters, had received
instructions to suspend action in the affair for tlie time being until the em-
ployees provided for In the treaty and the modus vivendi should be named and
ready to take office."
Thus, In spite of the modUB vivendi of November 29, 1915, proposed by tlie
Government of the United States (which provided for the complete execution
of the convention of Septeml)er 16, 1915, pending the vote o fthe American Sen-
ate), the Haitian (Jovernment was always confronted by the state of affairs
previous to the convention. And tlie Haitian Government, throuj^h the state
secretary of foreign affairs, stated to the American minister at Port an Prnce
tliat " such a situation could not last any longer without creating between tlie
two Governments a very serious equivocation which would not be pleasant for
either party." •
2-A. Custonis officials and employee**. — Since the constitution of the Haitian
Republic states clearly tliat the President of Haiti alone appoints and recalls
public officials, article 2 of the treaty of 1915 could only mean a niodltication
of that constitution when it states that the agents of c(mtrol designated by it,
namely, the receiver general, the financial adviser, and the assistants and em-
ployees of their offices — offices of collection and offices of payment — may be
Americans and subject ti> nomination by the President of the United States.
It was clear, therefore, that the other officials and employees of the public
adnilnistrati<m of Haiti, and particularly of the customs administration, must
be Haitians and appointed exclusively by the President of Haiti. This inter-
pretation was self-evident. In addition to the correspondence exchanged at
the time of the signing of the modus vivendi of November 29, 1915— corre-
spondence in which the Amerigan legation detennined the following point :
» CorresponcUnco Jntwofn M. 15aill,v-Blnj)charcl. American miniNtt»r to Port au Prince,
and M. Louis Homo, state hpcreti\ry of foreign affairs. See Exik>k6 G^ni^ral de la Situa-
tion (le la Rdpubliquo d" Haiti, ann<^e 1917, p. 14.
♦ Ibid.
* See communication of the American Legation, Report of M. Louis Borno, state secre-
tary of foreign nfTalrs. to the President of Haiti, vol. 1. pp. 'JIO, '2'2i), 2*J1.
•*See Keix>rt of M. Louis Borno, state secretary of foreign affairs, to the President of
Haiti, vol. 1, p. 221.
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 11
**{2) The customs administration will be settled by an understanding between
the state secretary of finance and tlie receiver general relative to the elements
of control of customs operations to be furnished to the Haitian Government,
and its participation in the appo.ntment of employees ac*cording to tlie terms of
the treaty " — tbe Interpretations referred to in the law of sanction for the said
treaty, dated November 11, 1915, which had been ofllclally transmitted to the
Government at Washington before the sanction of this same treaty by the
American Senate and the exchange of ratifications, contain the following expla-
nation with regard to article 2 :
•*B. The customs personnel is Haitian, appointed exclusively and directly
by the President of Haiti. The * assistants and employees * designated in article
2 are assistants of the receiver ; they do not make up the customs personnel.
They are assigned to the customs by the receiver's office and control the customs
operations."
Moreover, in a communication of September 16, 1915, addressed to Mr. R. B.
Davis, charge d*affalres ad interim of the United States of America at Port
au Prince, the state secretary of foreign affairs, M. Ix)uis Borno, recalled in the
following terms the si>eciflcatlons relating to this subject, which he had fixed
at a conference held the day before at the department of foreign affairs :
"With the sincere desire of avoiding from now on any misunderstanding
upon certain important points, I have drawn your attention to the following:
*♦ ♦ • (3) By the words "collect," "receive," and "apply," in article 2,
first paragraph, etc., the (Jovernment understands that what has been fixed by
those words is a service of collectorship (collect, receive) and of payment
(apply).* (See art. 5.) The receiver general and the assistants and em-
ployees to be appointefl by the President of Haiti upon the nomination of the
President of the ITnite<l States form a service of collection of all customs duties,
a separate department from the customs administration as such, which latter
consists in the storing, verification, and taxation of merchandise according to
the tariff. Consequently, the Haitian employees of this cn.stoms service will
depend uixm the exclusive apt)ointment of the President of Haiti."
Nevertheless, on this point also the modus vivendi remained a dead letter.
AI'TEB THE EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATIONS.
The formality of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of September 16,
1915, was carrie<i out at Washington, D. C, on May ^3, 1916. The regime of
military administration established by the American occupation nearly a year
before had now become definitely incompatible with the terms of the conven-
tion which established the rights and duties of the high contracting parties.
The question was, then, to keep the two (Jovernnients henceforth within the
limits of the rules containe<l in the convention. In the departments of public
administration which were not touched upon by the convention of 1015 it goes
without saying that exclusively American action could not rightly be imposed
upon the Haitian Government, however disposed it might be to accept a cer-
tain coofieration. But the legitimate and Judicial claims of the Haitian (iov-
ernnient met with no success. When the treaty became a fact. It had no more
eflfect In relieving the situation than the modus vivendi. The nmnicipal ad-
ministrations still remalne<l In the hands of the American military authorities.
In reference to the public works which the occupation had taken over In the
month of June, 1916, without any agreement with the Haitian Government, or
even the slightest warning to the minister concenied, the Haitian (loverunient.
protested to the American legatlcm and declare<l that It declined all responsi-
bility for any exi)enses against the Haitian State which might be incurre<l by
the occupation, whether for the iniblic works or for any otlier cause not justi-
fied by the convention;' whereupon a letter on this sni>.jcct from (V)l. Littleton
W. T. Waller, addre.sse<l to the American minister, was sent to the Haitian
Government, from which we quote the following paragraph :
"3. If. IIS statetl by the minister of foreign affairs, the treaty has been in
operation since May 3, 1910, I know nothing of it; I nnist rei'eive my informa-
tion thnmgh proper military channels before I can relax the cstai)llsiied rules
under which we have been oi)erating." *
'See letter of Jum» 28, 1916, Louis Borno. Report to tbe President of Haiti, etc.. vol. 1,
p. 227.
"Letter of .lune .10. 1916, from the oommaiuler of the expeditionary force. See Boruo,
Report to the President of Haiti, etc., vol. 1. p. 23 L
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12 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Thus it Is clear that the occupation, up to the end oft 1917. carried on all
public works, without any control by the Haitian Oov«mroent over the nature-
of the works, the manner of carrying them out, their expediency, or even the
amount spent on these works.* Twice, meanwhile, on January 3. 1916, and July
14, 1916. Mr. Ballly-Blanchard, the American mInlMer, officially declared that
the occupation would continue to operate the public works only until the offi-
cials designated in the treaty should be appointed and ready to exercise their
duties. Now, since in the month of September, 1916, Mr. E. G. Oberlin, United
States Navy, had been named engineer for the department of public works, ht»
had Immediately informed the said department that he was ready tOi enter
completely into the execution of his duties as specified In article 13 of the treaty
of September 16, 1915, and Into the regulations of the bureau of engineering.
Mr. Oberlln, after passing several months at the department of public works
without being able to accomplish anything, was recalled early In 1917 and re-
placed Immediately by Mr. E. R. Gayler, Unlteil States Navy. Nothing had
changed, that Is to say, the agents of the occupation had continued to operate
the public works without any participation by the department of public works.**
And the Huitiali Government wap justified In drawing the following conclu-
sions In said Expose G^n^ral de la Situation, etc., 1917. in the chapter on
foreign relations, and in the section dealing with the difficulties just describe<l :
" It can be said, then, that the treatj^ of September 16 has not been carried
out, and that this violation of the engagements entereil Into Ls due to the agents
of the American Government.""
When the first officials of the treaty arrived at Port au Prince in July, 1916.
and entered upon their duties, the question of appointments to the custmns
of the Republic which had come up at the signing of the modus vlvendi and
which had not yet been solved promptly arose again.
Mr. Addison T. Ruan. financial adviser, and Mr. Maunius. receiver genertd.
claimed that these appointments were subject to the nomination of the Presi-
dent of the United States. The Haitian Government malntaine<l that they de-
Iiended upon the exclusive designation of the President of the Republic of Haiti.
In spite of everything, the opinion of Mr. Ruan and Mr. Maumus was indorsed
by the Department of State ; whence it would have resulted, by adhering to the-
text which was the object of the controversy, that the most Inslgnlfioaut em-
ployee In any custjomhouse in Haiti whatsoever must be nominated by the Presi-
dent of the United States and appointed by the President of Haiti. " In fact,"
said the state secretary of foreign affairs of Haiti In a communication of March
26, 1916, to Mr. Bailly-Blanchard, American minister at Port an Prince,
" neither has the President of the United States ever presented such proposal Is,
nor has the President of Haiti until now been responsible for the appointment
of any of the Haitians actually employed in the customs admlnistratJon or In
the office of the receiver general. These citizens have been appointed in these
two administrations by the military occupation, without any participation by
the President of Haiti." And on this occasion the state secretary of foreign
affairs of Haiti drew the attention of the United States legation to n most
serious and unjust act. namely, the introduction intjo Haitian public adminis-
trations by the American occupation of various persons of foreign nationality
other than American, much to the prejudice of our compatriots.
The point of view of the State Department on this question of appointment
of Haitian officials in the customhouses of the Republic was accepted only
under the express reserve of recourse to arbitration by virtue of the arbitration-
treaty between Haiti and the United States of .January 7, 1909."
Par from stopping at these encroachments, which already constituted so
many violations of the treaty, far from consenting to the restoration of the^
municipal administrations just mentioned, the constant and willful tendency
of the American military authorities in Haiti has been, on the contrary, to
extend more and more the powers, either of the gendarmerie or the occupation
Itself, which was by the terms of the treaty purely temporary and provisional,
adding to them by assigning still other public functions. The serious difficulties
created at Port au Prince with regard to the postal and telegraph administra-
tions show clearly the nature of the procedure adopted to set the treaty aside
and to absorb in the most unjustifiable manner what was left of the national
administration.
» S« o Expost^ 04n6ral de la Situation de la R^publlque d' Haiti, ann^ 1917, p. 90.
w Ibid., pp. 90. 91, and 92.
» Ibid., p. 16.
"See oommunication of Mar. 26, 1917. Borno. Report to the President of Haiti, etc..
pp. 216, 217.
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INQUIRY IXTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 18
On Febraary 8, 1916, the State Department and the Haitian commission sent
to Washington in December, 1915, at the proposal of the United States Govern-
ment, had settled the terms of an agreement relative to the gendarmerie of
Haiti. The signing of this agreement had been postponed at the request of the
American State Department until the sanction of the treaty by the American
Senate and the congressional vote of a special act to permit United States
<riicer8 to serve in the Haitian administration. When this sanction had been
glren and the special act had been voted, the State Department, instead of
signing the agreement that had been drawn np and decided upon, proposed a
new one to the Haitian Legation at Washington, which had Just been invested ,
with the full powers of the Haitian commission recalled toward the beginning '
^ Jane, 1916. The new project, transmitted to the Haitian Government by
M. Solon M§no8, Haitian minister at Washington, contained an article 2, drawn
up as follows :
" • ♦ • The medical officers necessary for the sanitary measures provided
in article 13 of the treaty, the operation, management, and maintenance of the
telegraphs, telephones, the lighthouse service, and the postal service shall be
directed and controlled by the commandant of the gendarmerie."
Thu» luennt the turning over of the whole civil adminlKtrat on to an organiza-
tion whose exclusively military and i)olicing character had been determined
In the treaty of Septi'ml)er 10, 1915. The Halt an (k)vemment decided not to
accept this article. In the course of a conference held on August 3, 1916. at
the United States legation between Mr. G. Scholle, American charg^^ d'affaires,
Ool. Waller, commandant of the expeditionary corps, and Maj. Sniedley I).
Bntler, commandant of the gendarmerie of Haiti, on one hand, and M. EMiiiond
H^raux, secretary of state for finance, and M. Louis Borno, secretary of state for
foreign affairs, on the <»ther, the American charge d'affaires produced a text
which he «leclared was that of the State Department and which differed con-
siderably from the official text transmitted to the Haitian Government by M.
Sokm M^nos, Haitian minister at Washington. This new text read as follows :
"Article 2- The department of public health and public works, as prescribed
by article 13 of the treaty, the operation, the management, and maintenance of
tetegraphs, telephone, the light house service, and the postal service shall be
directed and controlled by the commandant of the gendarmerie."
Mr. Gustave Scholle declared that if within 24 hours the Haitian Govem-
meiit did not take official steps for placing under the control of the Haitian
gendarmerie the services indicated by this article 2, the United States legation
Would telegraph to the State Department not to sign the agreement on hand.
And Col. Waller added that If in 24 hours this step was not taken, he would
telegraph to Washington that the Haitian Government was insincere and un-
ttable. M. Ix>uls Borno asked Mr. Scholle to communicate to him in writing
the statement which he had just made. Mr. Scholle would not consent.
The situation was not improved and the pressure became more and more vio-
lent. In informing the Haitian minister at Washington of the verbal ultl-
BMitum which the Haitian Government had receive<l, M. Ix)uis Borno, secretary
of state for foreign affairs, said. In a cablegram of August 5, 1916:
" • * * Inform Immediately the Secretary of State of this state of co-
ercion. Say that the Haitian Government has decided to refuse all military
ilemands contrary to the convention. Do not fail to make clear and defend our
government's position. Meanwhile we are replying to the legation that since
negotiations are being carried on at Washington, you are deciding the quest i<m
with the State Department. Keep me constantly informed of your activities
and of results. Situation serious, demands speed and energy. Our government
stands firm and does not intend to yield to the new demands of the occuixitlon,
wWeh are supported by the American legation."
Finally an agreement was reache<l, signed August 24, 1916, at Washington, by
tlie terms of which " the operation, management, and maintenance of the tele-
graphs and telephones in the Republic 'of Haiti shall be under the control
tnd direction of the engineer or engineers to be nominated by the President of
the United States and authorized for that purpose by the Government of Haiti
In accordance with article 13 of the treat>' of September lf>, 191.5."
TTjIs agreement added to the convention by increasing the powers and
Wthority of the engineer or engineers designated by article 13.
Instead of simply keeping to the regime fixed by the treaty, the Haitian Gov-
enim«it was constantly obliged by the American officials to take unjustified
Initiatives. It was forced to accept the placing of American superintendents in
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14 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
charge of the postal service and of the iiiiiil8tr>' of public education, with salaries
equal to and in some cases even higher than those of the state secretaries.
At the municipal councils it was obliged to appoint so-called cooncil officers
who had, actuallj. the exclusive administration of the communes and absolute
control of municipal affairs. Including revenues and expenses. This state of
affairs, not provided for In the treaty, gave rise to regrettable conflictB. When
a council officer (American) was confronted by an administrator of finances
and provisional prefect (Haitian official) wishing to investigate the accounts
of the commune, as the law obliges him to do. It always ended either with the
forced silence of the Haitian official or with all kinds of difficulties which he
had to face simply because he was trying to do his duty. In this connection we
particularly desire to call attention to the case of M. Auguste Maglolre, ad-
ministrator of finances and provisional prefect of the district of Port au Prince,
and therefore appointed by law to verify the accounts of the communes in his
section. This high official, with no reason that could ever be found, was one
day brutally arrested and imprisoned by the American military occupation.
After 21 days of detention he was released without ever having undergone any
examination. He was again arrested, shortly after, and made to understand
that his difficulties would be over as soon as he should resign as administrator
of finances and provisional prefect of the district of Port au Prince. In fact,
he sent in his resignation to the President of Haiti and immediately was re-
lefised. Since then he has not been disturbed. It seems to have been too
attentive an examination of the accounts of the council officers for certain com-
munes of the district of Port au Prince that caused all his troubles. We think
that It would be Interesting, in an investigation, to determine this point and
others with similar Implications.
The treaty of September, 1915, in addition to the military officials of the
gendarmerie, provides for (1) a fincial adviser; (2) a receiver general of
customs, his assistants and employees; (3) one or more engineers of public
works; (4) one or more engineers for public hygiene.
The rights and duties of these officials are clearly determined by the treaty
or by spe<'lal agreements or regulations which determine the departments of
public administration in which they must cooperate with the Haitian Gov-
ernment. (Consequently, all other departments of the public administration
should have remained under the exclusive control of the Haitian GJovernment
But actually there is not a branch of public service in Haiti which has not had
to submit, at one time or another, to Illegal interference, often brutal, either by
the gendarmerie laying down the law to the Government or by the military
occupation, the absolute master of the situation.
Kven the Haitian department of Justice has not escaped serious traces of
tlielr domination. In fact. In the " Expose G^n^ral de la Situation de la
U<'»publlque d'Hatti, 1917," p. 15, a chapter Is found which presents the case as
follows :
'* The encroachments of American agents have been felt also In the depart-
ment of justice. In spite of all the protests of the department of foreign affairs
to tlie American Legation, these encroachments have not ceased. Great harm
has been caused both to the i)er8ons under jurisdiction and to the dignity of
the magistracy itself, whose decisions usually encounter obstacles on the part
of the agents from Washington. It is most necessary that such a state of things
cease at once."
By the terms of article 10 of the treaty of September 16, 1915, the gendarmerie
was created for the sake of preserving Internal peace, security of Individual
rights, and complete observance of the said treaty.
The maintenance of peace, which had been disturbed too often in recent
times, was one of the essential objects of American intervention, and It was to
obtain this that provision was made for an effective rural and urban gwi-
darmerie composed of Haitians, but organized and directed by American officers.
How has the Haitian gendarmerie, commanded by American officers, who them-
selves never acted except under orders of the American occupation, how has this
public forcv undersrtood and carried out the object of article 10 of the treaty?
The answer to this is the whole history of American intervention in Haiti.
Internal peace could not be preserved because the permanent and brutal
violation of indlvdual rights of Haitian citizens was a perpetual provocation
to revolt, because the terrible military despotism which has ruled in Haiti for
the last six years has not created and could not create for the Haitian people
that security which it was hoped the application of the treaty would bring
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 15
about ^unong other things, it \n sufflcieiit to call attention here to the system
of corr^, that is to say, forced unpaid labor on public roads, imposed for mil!-
fary purposes upon the Haitian peasant. This will give some idea of why the
gendarmerie, aided and encouraged by the American occupation, instead of
assuring r^pect for individual rights, caused the revolt known as the revolt of
fheCaeos, for the repression of which so many useless atnK'it'es were ctmimitted
hy the marines in our unhappy country. This gendarmerie, in spite of the aid
ot the marines of the occupation and the use of the most modern armament
(machine guns, military planes, armored ears, etc.), was never able, by purely
military methods, to contend with these uudi.<«ciplined and unarme<l bands known
as Caaw. Therefore it is ineffective. And if it is ineflfective it is because, in
si>lte of the repeated warnings of the Qovemment, the personnel which composes
it was not chosen as l| should have been. In fact, it contains men " wanted "
by the Haitian courts for criminal acts (robberies, murders, etc.). Examina-
tion of the archives of the ministries of the interior and of Justice of Haiti will
throw light on this subject
The same article 10 of the treaty of September 16, 1915, provides that " the
American officers of the gendarmerie wil^ be replaced by Haitians when the
hitter, after an examination by a committee chosen by the superior ofHcer in
charge of the Haitian gaidarmerie, are judged capable of carrying out their
dutieji effectively." This provision naturally Implied the establishment of an
officers* training school. But this officers' training school has never been
established. It could not be, for two reasons : .
1. As a general rule, the American officers of the gendarmerie are privates (in
the American Marine Corps) who have been made officers in Haiti, and who
have had nothing but a most elementary education, which naturally renders
thera incapable of any military training.
2. For this officers' school a special recruitment would have to be made, since
the rank and file of the gendarmerie, as it is, is composed chiefly of Illiterates.
After the voting of the treaty, a certain number of young Haitians, expecting
the early esitablishment of an officers' training school, enrol le<l themselves as
iitQdents. But the American military authorities, knowing well that the former
American privates who ha<l become officers in Haiti could not be converted into
military Instructors, put off, under one pretext or another, the cooperaticm that
was olTered them.
Ami this provision of the treaty, too, remained a dead letter. If the urban
swularmerle is incffertlve. the rural gendarmerie does not exist at all, despite
article 10 of the treaty. After the arrival of the Anierican occupation an old
(wjstabulary which had been serviceable and could easily have been imi>rove(l
and adapte<l to new conditions was abolished. It was not replace<l by any kind
of an organization, and so far the rural g«*ndarmerie has not been established.
The inj«eeurity In the country is such as to discourage the peasants, causing
thero to leave the country where they were bom and spent their entire lives
and to emigrate In large numbers to Cuba.
Here is the way with the customary reserve characteristic of official docu-
ments and their euphenitsms dictate<l by policy, In which the Haitian depart-
ment of the interior expre.sse8 its judgment of the gendarmerie :
" it renders to the country, if not all the services that might be expected of
it. at least those which its organization, still incomplete, i>ermits it. • • ♦ "
^ne of the greatest ctmcerns of the dei>artment is to assure complete and absio-
lute fk»curlty in the country. It is working there tenaciously, and hopes
shortly, with the active aid of the gendarmerie, to be rewarded for its efR>rts
and to nccomplish its alm.*» •
The President of the Republic of Haiti, in an interview with corresinrndents
of American newspapers (New York Tribune, Chicago Tribune, etc.) at Port-
au-Prince in November. 1920. expresse<l a niore precise and more categoricfil
CTiticlsra than that of the department of the interior: "The rural police," he
nU\. "which was abolished after the occupation, has not been. reorganized as
provided by article 10 of the convention and article 118 of the constitution.
The robberies and hisecurity In the country dlscourag** the jieasants in their
work; they emigrate in crowds to C^ba." *•
Official documents of Haiti clearly confirm that the treaty of September 16.
1915, has never been carried out by the American Government.
"Kxpoa^ G6a^ral de la Situation de la R<^publlque d'HaTtl, anii^. 1917, p. 76.
"£xpos^ G^n^ral de la Situation de la R^piibllque d'HaIti, 1017, p. 62.
"See L'Esvor. Port an Prince, Nov. 24. 1920.
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16 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
On January 13, 1916. more than a naontb after the moflua vivendl of NoTem-
ber 29, 1915, signed between the two Ooverumenta for the provisional execution
of the treaty, M. Louis Bomo, state secretary for foreign affairs, wrote to Mr.
BaiUy-Blanchard, American minister at Port-au-Prince:
"We are continually confronted with proct^edings antedating the conven-
tion. • • • The rule which the two high parties sanctioned by their signa-
tures is the only -one which ought to be applied. The Haitian Government
must, then, require the fullest application actually possible. ^^
By the exdiauge of ratiticatioUH which tmili place at Washington on May 3,
1916, the treaty had gone fully Into force. On June 5, 1916, the State secretary
for foreign affairs, in a communication to M. Solon ^I^nos, Haitian niinlsrer
at Washington, protested against the continuation of conditions which the
treaty should have ended. Asking that a copy of his communication be 8ul>-
mitted to Mr. Lansing, the Haitian secretary of foreign affairs stated, among
other things:
" Is it possible to permit the administration of the Haitian costoma and of
the Haitian national treasury to be carried on any longer without any control
by the Haitian Government? What Is the amount of the customs revenues?
Just what are all the expenses that are being incurred? What are the funds
at the disposal of the treasury? The Government, in spite of its repeated de-
ma nds« Is unable to say. Up to the present the occupation has not, for nearly
a year, supplied any report or any accounts. The Government has not the
slightest doubt regarding the absblute honesty of the American officers; this
lionesfy Is above all question. What it wants to have established is the abnor-
mal and disagreeable position of a Government which Is refused information
concerning its own affairs, and ev^i refused any knowledge of circumstances or
control of the situation. • • • '* "
On June 29, 1916, in another communication to M. Solon M^nos, minister to
Washington, the state secretary for foreign affklrs expressed himself as follows :
" ♦ ♦ * You can not do too much to keep the State Department on guard
against the usurping tendencies of the occupation. Do not spare any effort to
make the American CJovernment understand that the Dartiguenave Government,
which signed the convention, must necessarily be firmly bound to the success
of Its work; that it Is, therefore, strictly interested In supplying the greatest
and frankest cooperation to the Intervention, but within the limits of the con-
vention as faithfully interpreted. If it acted otherwise. If, now that this con-
vention has been proclaimed by President Wilson and Is in full force, the
Haitian Government permitted Its clauses not to be observed in the spirit
which dictated them ; tliat is to say, a spirit respectful of our rights as a free
State, If the military occupation can be permitted to invade all Haitian public
services, public works, and others — in violation of the clauses of the convention
which provide for the appointment of special agents, engineers, and others —
what would happen? The Haitian people, humiliated by this contempt for
solemn promises, would have nothing but hatred and repulsion for Anoerlcan
intervention. The Haitian Government which would accept such a situation
would find Itself generally discredited, to say nothings of the fact that It would
assume terrible responsibilities In the eyes of Its country,
" Keep in mind these ideas, Mr. Minister. They suffice for you to know what
solutions the Government will accept in the negotiations which are confided t»
you.
** Most especially I draw your attention to the necessity for putting an end '
to martial law. As long as there were any threats of revolutionary trouble,
unimportant as they might be. the Government said nothing about Its existence.
But it Is undeniably certain that nothing really serious and of a general char-
acter could be attempted now against the public peace. Therefore this martial
law which weighs upon the country has become utterly useless. Demand its
abolition with Insistence. ♦ ♦ * " *•
In a communication of June 28, 1916, the Haitian secretary of state for for-
eign affairs, stated to Mr. Bailly-Blanchard, American minister, at Port an
Prince:
" • ♦ * However strong may be our desire always to maintain perfect
harmony with the American authorities, a natural duty, higher than anything
^Toramunicntlon of Jan. 13. 1916. Report to the PrcBld«»nt of Haiti, by LouIh Borno.
secretary for foreign affairs, vol. 1. p. 222.
»^ Commnnloatlon of June 5, 1916 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 225.
>• Commiinkaitlon of Jnne 24, 1916, Loul» Bomo, Report to the President of Haiti,
Tol. 1, pp. 200-201.
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IIT^IinilT INTO OOCUFATIOH 07 HATH AND AAKTO DOMINQO. 17
k t>inds up — the duty of scrupulously watcbiug out for the observance of the
of the solemn convention which binds our two countries and which has
InTlB effect since the 3d of last March.
"The Haitian Government would betray its duty if, by its silence, it sanc-
the formal violations of this convention which have just been de-
,etc"*
As for the civil administrations which, against the will of the Haitian Gov-
iisilieot and contrary to the modus vivendi of November 29, 1915, still remained
ll ttsf bands of the occupation, the state secretary of foreign affairs, in a commu-
Son of July 17, 1916. made the following remark to Mr. Gustavo SchoUe,
§ d^aifaires ad interim of the United States of America :
•• ♦ ♦ ♦ Such an abnormal situation can not be indefinitely permitted.
ttMt the exchange of ratifications definitely did put the treaty into force, Uie
tittlan Government, as well as the Government of the United States, was
to adjust everything as soon as possible to the rules of the new regime,
aly sanctioned and proclaimed by the public authorities of the two
The occupation should have from that time on restrained its
atlitities and confined itself within the limitations of its military functions.
♦ • * But contrary to that, etc." "
According to the Haitian constitution (art. 80) the executive power must
tfbnlt annually to the two legislative chambers within a week of the opening
it die regular session a sort of general report covering everything of a political
m administrative nature that has been done during the past year. This
fPdal document is known as " ExpoF^ Gdn^ral de la Situation de la Republique
#BtIti.** Following are the comments found therein with regard to the non-
•BBODtion of the convention of September 16, 1915 :
'■••♦• It can be said that the convention of September 16, 1915. has
WH been carried out to date, and that this breach of promises is due to the
lints of the American Government. • ♦ * «
'*! deeply regret to state that the various matters which formed the subject
ttte last expose regarding the convention of 1915 are still unchanged. The
m differences still exist, and I should only repeat myself by relating them
li four excellency.
*l confine myself to giving you assurance that the department will continue
•l activities, convinced of our right and confident of the triumph of all that
ll J«st and fair."*
i## • ♦ My department is obliged to repeat what the Exposes of 1917
1918 stated with regard to the application of the convention of 1915.
only has it been impossible to solve the matters brought up after the
atlon of the convention, but, moreover, the vote of the budget of 1918-19
( rise to such difficulties between the Government and the financial adviser,
was supported by the chief of the military occupation at this time, CJol.
,j M. Russell, that the department of foreign affairs was obliged to address
jfrMte to the State Department at Washington •* to protest against the pro-
wlft^ which certain American ofl^cials considered themselves entitled to adopt
iMnutl us.
'•To this note the Secretary of State at Washington, Mr. Robert Lansing,
a few days later, saying to the Haitian Government that, * in view of the
' serious Implication of the general accusation against American officials in
contained In the above-mentioned note, the Government of the United
I desires the Government of Haiti to make a more precise and more detailed
fttion regarding the questions raised in the note of November 20, 1918.*
•To satisfjr this entirely Just demand of the Secretary of State the depart-
of foreign affairs collected in a memorandum all the facts pertaining to
I matters of which the Haitian Government had complained in Its note of
Qber 20 and sent it to our legation at Washington, with instruction for
[iabmlssion to the Department of State. It was submitted on February 14
Iby our charge d'affaires ad interim in Washington.'*"
tommonicatloii of June 28. 1916. Ibid., pp. 227-228.
rommnolcatloii of July 17, 1916. Louis Borno, Report to the President of Haiti,
1. pp. 233>234.
bid., p. 16.
bid., p. 7.
' Appendix No. 8.
! Appendix No. 9.
I Expose G«n«na de la SltaatJon de la Rtfpubllque d'Haltl, 1919, pp. 14, 15.
6220^— 21— FT 1 2 ^ T
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W 191
filonl
liicat
R
18 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SAKTO DOMINGO.
In November, 1920, it was the President of the Haitian Republic himself
who, in a strilcing declaration made to the correspondents of American newf^
papers who had followed in Haiti the naval court of inquiry presided over bj
Admiral Mayo, formulated the grievances of the Haitian <^vemaaent with
regard to the nonexecution of the convention of September 16, 1915.
After recalling the aims of American intervention in Haiti, such -as they
were indicated in the preamble of the treaty of September 16, 1915 ; that is tx>
say, (a) maintenance of public pence, and (6) establishment of the financai
on a sound basis and the economic development of Haiti, M. Dartiguenavt
ma^ ponits indicated subsequently. (1) As to the matter of general pead^
he had hoped that the commission of inquiry presided over by Admiral May»
would try to find out how the Americans charged with maintaining this peace
understood and accomplished their mission. M. Dartiguenave had grantad
his interview to the American journalist while the naval court of inquiry wai
being held at Port au Prince, and he had doubtless been unwilling, in coi»-
municating his opinions as chief of the Haitian Government, to appear to
exercise any influence on the work of this court. He received no report eltlifr
from the gendarmerie, of which he was legally commander in chief, or from tte
occupation. This is what he said on this subject :
*' ♦ ♦ • Article 103 of the Constitution, in the third paragraph, proiidw
that a law shall establish in the communes and provinces [Haitian] civil oft-
cials who are to represent directly the executive power. It is impossible f«r
the Haitian Government to have these civil oflicials, because the Americv
minister and the financial adviser have refused the appropriations, however
small, for salaries for these positions, in consequence of which the exectitii*
power has no special agent to report to him — the gendarmerie making no «-
ports on general conditions In the country, except to the chief of the occui«-
tion.
** If a paid oflicial report*? to the executive power, his salary is cut off U
indeed he is not arrested and tried by court-martial, whether he be jbcIjip.
a Government commissioner, or a mayor fmagistrat communal], and this hai^
pens in contravention of the law and articles 101 and 102 of the constltutioa*
Regarding the aid which the Government of the United States had 8olt«inl}
promised to the Haitian people for the improvement of their finances, Uitfi'
economic development and the prosperity of the Republic, the declaraliov
of the President of Haiti are as follows :
" • ♦ • No effective aid has been brought to Haiti for the develormt'o'
of its -agricultural and industrial resources, and no constructive measure hi>
been proposed, for the purpose of placing it<? finances on a really solid hasi^
" By the terms of article 2, paragraph 2, of the convention, the President «f
Haiti appoints, upon the nomination of the President of the United States- >
financial adviser who will be an ofliicial attached to the ministry of fiuam^
The adviser is, then, a Haitian ofllcial paid $10,000 (American gold) annsuV
by the Haitian public treasury. But in reiillty the financial adviser is
responsible to the Haitian Government On the contrary his actions indlr:4i
his purpose to subject it to his will.
*' Numerous facts show the onmipotence which the financial adviser an*
gates to himself. Nothing more strikinjjly Illustrates this than the confiHI
tion by the financial .idviser, with the support of the American minister, il
the salaries of the President of the Republic, the State secretaries, an4 ti
members of the legislative council, be<^ause the Government had refuse "
insert in the contract of the National Bank of Haiti (which is controllel
the National City Bank of New York), a clause prohibiting the importati
into Haiti of foreign gold coins, which the financial adviser wanted to
upon them. He also prevented the voting of the budget, contrary to tlie
vision of the Haitian constitution.
"Article 2 of the convention says: 'The financial adviser shall draw
adequate system of public accounting.' We are still waiting for this nt
tern which was to simplify the accounts of the State. In.stead of intr^
sucli a system, the financial adviser demanded the abolition of an old
institution, the audit office (chnmbre des coiuptes). In sp'te of all th
of the Government to reestablish this indisjiensable organization, the
adviser persistently refused to have it done ConsHpiently there is no
the Haitian people to control its tinanccs, wiiich are entirely in tlie ham
Americsm otficials of the treaty.
•'Article 2 of the convention says also: 'The financial adv'ser shal
increase the revenues.' The financial adviser has so far m'OiK>sed nd
5leJ
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INQUIRY IITTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 19
the Government to bring this about The only Qttempt he has made In this
direction was the project for the creation of internal taxes, which he presented
in 1918 and which he wanted the Government to pass wltbln 24 ho'irs. The
project was so crude and so badly drawn up that the Government had to refuse
this demand and prepare a counterproject better adapted to the customs and
financial resoun*es of the Hawaiian nation.
" It is about 20 months since this counterproject was returned to the financial
adviser for further conshleration ; we have heard nothlnu more of it.
'Article 2^ of the convention says further: *The financial adviser shall Inquire
into the validity of the debts of the Republic, shall keep the two Governments
infonued regarding all future debts, shall recommend improved methods of col-
lecting and applying the revenues, an<l shall make such re<»ommendations to the
state secretary for finances as are judged necessjiry for the well-being and
pnisjierity of the Republic. • • ♦.'
"\o inquiry- into the validity of our debts has been made.
" So improved method of c<»llwtlng the revenues has been recommende<l.
" No reconuuendation for the well-being and prosjwrlty of the Republic has
yet l)een made to the Haitian Government.
"The duties of the financial adviser, as defined in article 2 of the convention,
doubtless require a man of great financial experience. This es.«<ential consid-
eration does not seem to have had any weight In the choice of the financial
ailvistT. ThLs is proved by the unfortunate transaction which he put through
f<»r the Republic last year. In the face of directly contrary' instructions of the
Haitian Government. Three million American dollars were to be convertiul
into francs for Haiti's best Inten^sts." He converted them in October, 1919, at
a time when the value of the franc was lowering rapidly, the exchange l)eing
9 and a fraction franca for a dollar. Shortly afterwards the d<dlar was worth
17 francs. This transacticm involvetl the Ilaitlair people in a loss of several
millions of francs.
"Face<l with this Inertia on the part of the financial adviser, the Haitian
Government Is augmenting Its efforts. It is studying various measures and
preparing projects which it considers more likely to meet the numerous neiMls
of progress of the Haitian people. All its pleasures, all Its projwts encounter
the opix)siti(m either of the financial advtser or of the American minister, who
very often rejects them without examination and w.thout condescending to say
why.
"Now we come to the strangest phase of the situation from the point (»f view
t)f the Haitian Government. Ndt only have American officials done ntithhig that
nmUl have been done for the intellectual development and economic prosi)erity
of the country, but they opjK)S4» the Government's work in this direction. Nu-
merous projects for laws dealing with the finances, agriculture, public tHluca-
tiori, administrative and rural organization me<*t with either the direct opposi-
tion of the American officials or lie unanswered in the archives of the American
lA»gatIon.
"Particular resistance is made to projects dealing with the education of the
r)eople. such as for the preparat'on of teachers for primary eilucation, industrial
and agrir!ultural schools, secondary or higher education, and for the construc-
tion of school buildings.
"The Government does not pretend to believe that the projects which it
prepares are perfect, but s.nce they apprf)ximate the vital needs of the country
the Americjin officials ought to take the trouble to examine them, and if they
find that tbey are imperfect or bad, should propose nuxlificatioiis or substitute
other projects which could be discussed with the common desire to arrive at a
satjjfuctory .solution. In this way alone can a 'cordial cooperation' be oh-
tafBM, tnd only in this way ought it to be understood.
"1$ ft understood In this way? Never.
"When the financial adviser proposes a measure he understands that this
meafnirt Is to be adopte<l withf)ut any examination by the Government.
" Wh»n the Government does the proposing, the proposal is rejected without
oxatniution or modifications are made which it must a<'cept without discussion.
'*ABd it is always In the name of the Government of the United States that
the American minister imposes upon the Haitian people the least worthy de-
nuiodsof the American officials, who are paid with Haitian money. And if the
Gr^vermnent refuses to yield the worst humiliations are intlictf^l up<m It.
^T^r a payment of Interest on the d<'bt of Franoc, then due.
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20 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
" The excuse usually made in support of the rejection of Government projects
is the following : * There is n6 money.'
" Of coijrse there is always enough money for American use3,
" Here are two striking examples :
" Two cases of plague in New Orleans are reported. The financial adviser,
who was in Washington at this time, authorizes the appointment of two ' rat
catchers* — not for New Orleans, where the plague was discovered but for
Port-au-Prince, which was never troubled with this disease. He fixes their
monthly salary at $250 each, quite without any word to the Government
regwdless of any law or budget appropriation.
" But at the same time the financial adviser refused appropriations for three
associate professors from the University of France, who were offered to the
Haitian Government by the French Government for the Lyc^ of Port-au-Prince.
"Article 7 of the convention is drawn up as follows :
"All amounts collected by and in Iceeping of the receiver general shall be
used (1) for the payment of the salaries and allowances of the receiver general,
his assistants, and employees for the expenses of the collector's office, which,
shall include the salary of the financial adviser, salaries to be determined by a
previous agreement; (2) for the interest and amortization of the public debt
of Haiti; (3) for the maintenance of the police referred to in article 10, and
the balance for the current expenses of the Haitian Government.
" This article establishes the order in which the expenses of the R^ublic of
Haiti should be met by means of the custom duties collected from the custom-
houses by the receiver general.
"The expenses of tlie Government come larst of all, and include (1) salaries
of public officials other than those indicated in the first part of the article; (2)
expenses of the public works and hygiene administrations; (3) expenses for
material, office furniture, etc.
" It will be noticed that the expenses that come second are those relating to
the Haitian public debt, interest, and amortization. If these disbursements
were knowTi, the amount due the Government for its current expenses would
also be established, and the Government would be free to dispose of it. But
this has never been done, and for the following reason :
" To hold the Government in curb, to be able whenever it resists an unjusti-
fied demand to exert a pressure which will oblige it to yield, it must be kept
completely dependent upon the financial adviser and the receiver, general, so
far as finances are concerned.
" If it is a question of a new expense considered necessary by the Government,
which the American authorities do not wish to grant, the answer is: 'There is
no money — the* reserve funds must go toward the payment of the public debt'
'* Very often this same reply is made for regular expenses provided for in the
budget.
" In afiditi<^' pi the custom duties, there are other budget resources which
the convent!'' //;ltf(s left to the free disposal of the Government for its legal
expenses. 7 H financial adviser, supported by the American minister and the
military au; '^'^^tles who on this occasion resorted to martial law, demanded that
these fund ;**'» ^ turned over to him.
" In w//' y^ay the Government Is entirely at the mercy of the caprices and
of the arbil/ary will of the financial adviser.
" The State Department, absorbed, doubtless, in more important questions of
foreign policy or 111 Informed by Its official agents. Is deaf to our protests, or
simply upholds the position of the American authorities.
"We have been reproached by certain American newspapers on the ground
that Haiti did not pay Its debts before the occupation. This is entirely false.
In spite of all Its financial difficulties. Haiti has always lived up to her agree-
ments. The administration of the public debt was not susi)ended until after
^the occupation ; It was resumed at the beginning of this year, and Just at this
'^ime the Government Is insisting with the greatest energy on the payment of
Hie internal debt.
" Each year the American minister and the financial adviser reject the project
Of the Haitian Government for the application of the second paragraph of
article 116 of the constitution, which reads : ' The examination and liquidation
of the accounts of the general administration and of everything accountable to
the public treasury shall be carried on according to the method established J»3
law."
" T\\e examination and liquidation of accounts, according to Haitian law< was
carried on by an InsHtutlon of long standing, called the Chambre des OoJinptea
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mgriRY r^Tfi och^upation of haiti and santo domingo. 21
** Id conformity with article 2 of tlie convention, the Haitian Government is
nlrly d^mandin^ tlie adequate system of public accounting that the financial
■driser Is supposed to draw up in order to replace the audit office.
-All of article 2 of the convention is a dead letter. The financial adviser
i{bar«i it. He pays no attention to the urgent and necessary credits of the
Atitian Government establlsheil by law; he spends at will, regardless of any
law, obdgln^c the Government to ratify his acts.
**Tofluni up, the Haitian Government is under humiliating subjection through
hiHt of C(H)i>erati<m. Its efforts to collaborate in good faith are fruitless — they
u^seomecl and rejected. There does not seem to exist between the two pov-
fnnentK a reciprocal contract that tlie two parties must respe<!t."*
IMg conclusion of the important declaration of the President of Haiti regard-
iar rtie totfll failure of the American Government to execute the convention of
.SetiCember IB. 1915. is the i>oint of view of the entire Haitian people.
JUiriAI? FINA1VCS8 — THE FINANCIAL AID PBOMISED BY THE UNITBD STATES.
Haiti has always lived up loyally to her financial agreements One of the
RMDs given for American Intervention Is the breaking of these agreements.
At thoM of many other countries, Haitian finances have passed through critical
petiodB» but the leaders of the country have always been able to find the neces-
mrj Motion to the problems that confronted them.
For a long time Haiti has borne the weight of a heavy debt which has hln-
4«c4 hmr economic development.
By a royal decree King Charles X of France In return for 150,000,000 francs
as indemnity for the losses incurred by the fornjer colonists and payable In
five equal intallments granted to Haiti on April 17, 1825, an Independence
which the Haitians had conquered at the price of hard and bloody sacrifices.
In the continual expectation of the offensive return of the French and weary
of maintaining the country for more than 20 years in a .state of war, the
GoTemnient of President Boyer accepted the arrangement of the King of
France which stipulated these painful conditions.
By meani? of a loan of 24.000,000 francs, issued at Paris at the rate of 80
m oent and bearing 6 per cent Interest, to which was adde<l 6,000,000 francs
piid In specie by the Haitian treasury, the first Installment of the indenmity
wtspaid.
Bnt owing to the energetic protests of the Haitian people and the refu.sal of
the French Government to reduce this heavy Indemnity, the Haitian Govern-
nwit suspended the payment of the four other installments of the indenmity
with the clear Intention, however, of paying the annuities (in, erest and prin-
dptl) of the loan. After long and delicate negotiations the Government of
Louis Phillpi)e consented on February 12, 1838, to recognize the independence
«f Haiti bv treaty. At the same time a financial convent'on was slgnetl re-
ihidng the balance of the indemnity from 120,000,000 fran, i to 60.000.000.
The loan of 24,000,000 francs and the indemnity were kjtifwn as ** the douhl**
French debt." It was entirely paid ofl! In 1893. after 58 yeane
Soon after the first payments of the 30,000,000 francs tht aitian Government
foimd it^lf handicapped In meeting Its most urgent budg sul^xpenses. In 1820
it had to resort to paper money. The burdens Imposeil u\ the country were
too heavy; this was the beginning of all its troubles. Tlth<uatlon was barely
iMi to recover from the losses Incurred by the wars of Ulcito I)<uningo,"* the
• itr ^vlth the English, the struggle of the French agalnr^aiToussalnt-Louver-
ftrfif^ and the war of Independence, which starteil in 1802 itt^ ended with the
■■iti*tider of Rochambeau at Cap Haitlen In November, 18CssihThe plantation
kU dLnappeared. the towns and villages had been nears oiiH destroyed—
fly a hundred thousand Haitians liad lost their livi n the pitiless
ifle for liberty. Sugar and indigo, the chief exports of tnont*^land, bad n >
Mm markets In France, and there was not enough capital to-om've the sugr .-
toik Courageously the Haitian people undertook and intensl/e \> other forn s
*f ttltlvation, and in this way coffee, cotton, and cocoa becamqi ae principal
nets of the land. In spite of so many misfortunes the countcoii^ontinually
i sacrifices to live loyally up to Its agreements. Thus next q, ir the bal-
* rif the loan of 1875 will be paid off if the expected conditionsje ^ fulfilled.
•»»? L'EH»or. Port «ii Prlnro Nov. 24. 1920.
•f unner name of Haiti under the French rule.
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22 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
This loan, originally of 21,000»000 francft, consisting of bonds of 300 franc
denomination bearing interest at 5 per cent was to carry out the agreements
with France (French double debt) and to pay certain internal debts.
In 1922 the balance due will be :
Francs.
Capital 2, 513, 760
Interest 179. 778
Total 2, 693, 538
In the month of April, 1896, on the account of the Republic of Haiti, a loan
was floated at Paris amounting to 50,000,000 francs, nominal value, represented
by 100,000 shares of 500 francs, at 6 per cent a year, payable in 37 ytnirs.
The balance of this loan now outstanding, represented by 59.349 shares, is
29.674,500 francs. Its complete amortization will take place in 1932.
The loan of 1910 was autborize<l by a law of October 21, 1910. It was to
redeem the old internal debt and to provhle for 4;he final redempti(m of the
pai)er money. It was actually issued on February 17, 1911, but It iK'ai-s the
date of the year when the act was voted. Of its face of 0f»,iK)0,000 francs—
130.000 shares of 500 francs— only 47,000,000 francs were turned over to the
(rovernment by the banking syndicate and deprisited in the National Bank of
the Republic of Haiti. This loan bears interest at 5 per cent a year, and is
payable In 50 years. The amortization must take place either by means of
purchases at the Bourse de Paris while the shares are below par, or by means
of draft by lot, at their nominal value, when they have reached par. Intere.«:t
is payable semiannually by coui>ons of 12 francs 50, due May 15 and November
15 of each year.
The present statn*^ of this loan is as follows:
In circulation, 123,153 shares of 500 franfs ; that is, 61.576,500 francs.
The status of the triple foreign debt of Haiti was therefore on July 28, 1915.*'
as follows:
Lo(in of 1(^75. — The coupons due on July 1, 191T5. had been paid and the work
of amortization had been carried out.
Loan of JS9(). — The interest on the coupons due June 30, 1915, had been paid.
The amortization drafts for December, 1914, had been suspended, because of
the world-wide situation created by the F3uror)ean war. It was no more than
a delay. The necessary provisions had already lieen made for amortization.
Loan of 1910. — On this lonn, the interest had been paid and the amortization
carried out on May 15, 1915.
From the time of the landing of American troops on July 28, 1915, the mili-
tary occupation suspendcMl payment of the foreign debt of the Republic which
the Haitian Government had been able to carry on until then to the satisfac-
tion of its creditors. But not even the signing and execution of the treaty of
September 10, 1915, was to put an end to this state of affairs, which was so
injurious to the dP-dit of the country. This decision was even more incompre-
hensible when thett>fH*^*iJd funds for the payment of the interest and amortiza-
ti<m of this debt'^'nl accumulateil and were remaining unproductive in the
vaults of the Nat^dal Bank of the Republic of Haiti. It was not until last
year (1920) that ?^c.^ interest due was finally paid, upon the repeated demands
of the bondholde^iU almost all foreigners, and upheld by their resi>ective (Gov-
ernments. As f(i>aJthe internal debt, except for a partial payment made In
April. 1916, no \x iUnent of interest has been made up to now. In spite of the
demands of the j^ie dholders. Their voices were not heard for the shnple reason
that they were.^u arly all Haitians.
In a report ,4iotMarch 20, 1917, the consul general of the United States at
"^ Port au Princ/itStUl cm this subject: "It is unfortunate for connnerc»e that the
internal debtAdn? nf)t been adju.sted, nor the Intere.^t paid, this default having
resulted in ,«>" dicing sales very materially for 1917. Most of the bonds an*
, held by the verpie, who have been exi>ecting the interest to be paid as formerly,
thereby to-^ ^H their living expenses. The failure to do this has embarrasse.l
them ftnai'<*®.i'lly and will tend to diminish the sale of imported goods.'*"
Thus tJ^Jtjjrincipal obje<»t of the treaty, which was to place Haitian finances
on a soI?6 Ojasis, has not been fulfilled, nor has the financial aid which was
^cou
■* T>fttc» UUiAndlng of tho United States troops on tlu» Ilaltinn soil.
^ S<»r p;ijii^276, Annual Reiwrt of the Si'cTctary of tho Navy, 1920.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
lino OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 23
promised the United Stiites been effectively given. In fact, up to the present
time, the monetary circulation of Haiti Is still paper money, and instead of sub-
stituting metal money for it the financial adviser has fixed the Haitian pourde
at one-fifth of the American dollar, to the detriment of all those who receive
ir in payment for their work." A further resulting Injustice Is involved in
the fact that, in conformity with the budget of the Haitian Republic, certain
officials are paid In American gold and others are paid in Haitian money, no
rakulation being made in favor of these latter, in consideration of the d(»-
preeiatlon of rhls money in relation to the American dollar. Naturally, all
the officials from the United Statos are in the first category.
Xa another proof that no financial aid has been given to Haiti since the
signing of the treaty, it is sufllclent to bear in mind that since the year 1917,
acting npon the suggestions of the financial adviser, the Government has been
irymz to float a loan of several million dollars in the United States, and that
its efforts have been unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that the American
Oi)VHrnni»>nt realizes the urgent necessity of this loan for the Improvement of
Haitian finanoes.
In a report of October 14, 1920, addressed to the Secretary of the Navy, Rear
Admiral Knapp stated as to this projected loan :
•*To place the finances on a firm ba.ses in accordatice with modern ideas a
I ►an is ne<'essary * • ♦ and such a loan was the early confident anticipation,
^t only of the Haitian Government but of the American Government when
me treaty was concluded. Constant efforts have slnc^ been made to obtain
it and great disapi)olntment Is felt that its fiotatlon has so far proved im-
{•sRible." ••
The internal debt Is at present $2,278,886.20. I'p to .January 31. 1921, Interest
<lMe amounted to *7O5,:^0n.2.'i. There Is nee<led for the monthly payment of
interest on tbis debt only $12,514.93.
Flmtitiff flebt. — There is a floating debt which reaches an approximate figure
•'f M,420,920. It should be submitted to careful examination, so that It may
^^e rwluced and he rt^stored to Its real amount. Tho.se who are Interested are
waiting in vain for this to be carried out.
SUPPRESSION OF THE HAITIAN LEGISLATTHIE.
Immeiliately after the ratification by the Haitian chambers of the conven-
tion of September 16, 1915, the provLslons of which were not consistent with
rlie constitutifm in force, the question arose in governmental circles of a con-
^itntlonal revision. Legally this revision could he carried out only by the
Cbami^er of I>eputies and the Senate, meeting as the National .Assembly. Tn-
*teacl of following this procedure, which was establishe<l by the constitution,
the Government preferred to resort to a coup d'Ctat.
I'nder pressure of the American occupation President Dartiguenave, on
•Vprll 5, 1916. issued an unconstitutional decree dis.solvlng the Senate. The
'^me decree tran.sforme<l the Chamber of Deputies In a constituent as.sembly for
reTislns: the constitution. Another decree created a Council of State to be
ippolnted by the President of the Republic.
All these measures were Illegal and undemocratic. They substituted dictator-
Alp for constitutional government.
On April 7 the deputies and senators proteste<l against them, since the con-
stitution in force did not grant the President of the Republic the right of dis-
vdution. But the legislative building was closeil. and gendarmes were placed
there to keep out the representatives of the people. The latter turned to the
ftiorts, and on April 15 the civil court of P<)rt an Prince Issued two .luclicljil
•tecrees nuthorizing the deputies and senators to open tbe gates of the legislative
hnnding.
The two eminent Jurists, MM. Luxembourg Cauvin and Edmond I^espinasse,
^ho had ol)tained the decrees, went to Col. Littleton W. Waller, commanding the
United States expe<lltionary forces in Haiti, to make sure there would be no
obaucle to the execution of the decisions of the Haitian judicial authorities.
Wfthont hesitation the colonel replied that such a step would be considered as
t provocation to the American occupation. It was the occupation, then, tbat
fofln^ rlie entrance of the legal representatives of the Haitian people into their
litfMlfttlve building.
^JGB&llil!^ Xtfc/|MW^ m aNuvy. 1920, pp. 230-231
Digitized by VjOOQIC
24 INQUIRY INTO OCC^UPATION OF HAITI ANP SANTO DOMINGO.
Bat, still wishing to carrj' out their constitutional mandate, the deputies and
senators assembled in houses rented at their own expense. On April 17 and 18,
1916, they elected their committees, and on the 27th they opened the third
session of the twenty-eighth legislature in the regular way. The presld^it of the
Senate, M. Paul I.araque, received the following letter from Col. Littleton
W. Waller ;
Headquartebb United States Expemtionabt Fobce,
Port au Prince, Haiti, April ft, 1916.
My Dear Mb. Laraque : Replying |;o your verbal request for a meeting to-day,
I have the honor to inform you that this «in not be granted except under con-
ditions of the proposals of yesterday, accepted In writing, with the clear under-
standing that the general revision of the constitution is understood and agreed
upon between us.
1. The National Assembly constituent has constituent powers only, and upon
completion of their labors In revision of the constitution can not resume Il-
lative powers.
2. If the Senate declines to act In conjunction with the deputies, it remains
dissolved.
3. The acceptance of this agreement to be given in writing.
Hoping for an amicable settlement of this and other vexed questions.
With expressions of esteem and regard,
Sincere, yours, «
LiTTLBTON W. Waller.
Port au Prince. April *J7, 1016. Ajrreed and 8ul)s<Til>e<l to this date. President
of the Senate.
Answer:
Port au Priwce, April 2$^ 1916.
Col. Littleton W. Waller,
Chief of the United States Expeditionary Forces in Haiti.
Dear Sir: In reply to your letter of the 27th instant, containing proposals
regarding an amicable arrangement of the present crisis, I have the honor to
inform you that these proposals surprised and pained me, and are, I am con-
vinced, only the result of a misunderstanding.
The chambers are, In fact, most desirous of amicably solving the present
situation, for which they are not responsible. Although they have the law and
all public opinion on their side, their spirit is most conciliatory.
But they could not, under an>' condition, sanction any unconstitutional meas-
ure, or even less, act Illegally themselves.
On the other hand, the members of the present cabinet trample upon the most
elementary principles of our parliamentary rule, a rule which, while placing the
person of the President above all controversy, makes the cabinet responsible
to the chambers, and by these acts of aggression give rise to reports which are
injurious to the national representative body. Such procedure can not aid In
bringing about an amicable solution of the crisis.
The Government of the United States had let It be understood that it would
uphold in Haiti the constitutional government of the country and would have
Its laws observed.
The attempt to abolish the senate Is a flagrant violation of the constitution,
and constitutes consequently a revolutionary act, just as much as the decree of
the revolutionary committee of August, 1915.
It Is a question of finding out if the Government and the people of the United
States are now upholding this revolutionary act.
Like you, I am always hoping that it will be possible to arrive at a satis-
factory solution, since the senate is prepared to accept any proposal compatible
with its dignity and with respect for the laws.
Accept, Colonel, expressions of my highest esteem.
Paul Laraque,
President of the Senate.
On May 2, 1916, Rear Admiral Caperton had the following notice published
in the columns of the Matin and the Nouvelliste:
[Decree of Apr. 5.1
•'l^ein* Admiral Caperton stated that after having tried for the last three
weekn 4n the most friendly way, with the aid of certain neutral Haitian
patriots, to reach an understanding in the conflict of the Haitian Govewiment
oogle
nTQiriRY IXTO OCCUPATTON OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 25
it Is Impossible to find a basis of understanding that could be accepted by the
t\i-o parties to the controversy.
"Consequently, In view of the Impossibility of reconciling the Government
and the opposition, In spite of the conciliatory offers made by the Government
to the opposition, he has advised the officers of the chamber and the senate
which had been dissolved by the decree of April 5, 1916, tliat his full duty of
mahitaining peace and orfler in Haiti rendered It necessary for him to uphold
the decree of the constituted and recognized Government of Haiti."
The Haitian chambers protested against this intervention. On May 5, the
senators were assembling in their provisional quarters when an American
officer brutally ordered them to leave the place, threatening violent measures
to force thein to go. At the suggestion of M. Paul Laraque, president of the
senate, they met at hLs house, where they drew up a formal account of the
incident. (See Appendix No. 10.)
On the next day, May 6, the president of the senate and the president of the
chamber were summoned by Col. 'Waller. He told them that If they persisted
in assembling they would expose themselves to violent expulsion.
A few days before, on April 20, Le Constltutionnel, a paper edited by Deputy
Uon Louhls, had been suppressed by Capt. Alexander Williams, provost
marshal. The Government, supported by the American occupation, ha<l the last
word.
By a decree dated June 23, 1916, President Dartlguenave convokeil the Chani-
ber of Deputies as constituent assembly for August 14 ; but the deputies ab-
stained and refused to accept an unconstitutional mandate.
Discontent was spreading among all classes in the nation, deprived as they
were of their legal representatives.
On August 29, Col. Waller published the following declaration :
" Since the mission of occupation in Haiti is essentially a mission of pacifica-
tion, work, and progress, it is recalled that no political agitation will be tol-
erated which tends to provoke manifestations against the express declaration
of Admiral Caperton regarding the decree of April 5, 1916, and to compromise,
contrary to the terms and spirit of the convention, the stability of the Gov-
ernment of President Dartlguenave, which is the free expression of the vote
of the National Assembly."
As the authority of the Chamber of Deputies expired on January 10, 1917,
there had to be new elections.
On September 22, 1916, the President of the Republic published a decree
modifjing the electoral law and certain articles of the constitution relative to
the legislative power. He reduced the number of deputies to 36 and of senators
to 15; he fixed the date of the elections for January 15 and 16, 1917; and this
time he accepted the reunion of the two branches of the legislative body in the
National Assembly for the revision of the constitution.
The elections took place on January 15, 1917. The new chambers assembled
In April. On April 7, M. Louis Borno, secretary of state for foreign afCalrs,
received a communication from Mr. Ballly-Blanchard, American minister. The-
latter Informed him that after a careful examination of the project for the
constitution the State Department had several suggestions which It considered
obligatory and which could be submitted to the study and examination of
M. Dartiguenave*8 Government before any definite action was taken In this
respect by the legislative body. He stated at the same time that the sugges-
tions mentioned would be sent by cable. On April 11, the American minister
sent them to the secretary of state for foreign affairs. (See Appendix No. 11.)
On the 24th the secretary of state for the interior, in his turn, sent them
to the committee for constitutional reform appointed by the new National As-
sembly to draw up a project for the constitution. The committee had just
rtarted its work and had not made any report. It was justly astonished at
such suggestions, ai;id on April 30 the secretary of state for the Interior de-
clared that the project for the constitution in question was a work of the
council of state.
And the council of state, an unconstitutional body, had no authority to
present a project for the constitution.
On June 8 the committee laid before the National Assembly the constitu-
tional project which it had just drawn up and the discussion began. Since the
first days of the meeting of the chambers rumors of dissolution had been circu-
lating. No one wanted to believe them, especially since the elections had been
rapervised and controlled by American ofllcers. Ten days after the elections,
on January 25, an American squadron, commanded by Admiral JSfayo, anchored
sae
Digitized by VjOOQIC
26 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTG DOMINGO.
In the Bay of Port an Prince. The next day, January 26, Admiral Mayo, in re-
turn for the dinner that was g:iven in liis honor, gave a luncheon to M. Sudre
Dartiguenave on board the Pennaylvania, in the course of which the latter
received from Admiral Caperton, commander of the Pacific division, a radio-
gram as follows:
" I congratulate you, you and the Republic of Haiti, upon the successful out-
come of the recent elwtlons, and wish the country continuous prosperity. With
my best personal wishes for you and all my friends."
The sanie day, during a visit to the President of the Republic, Mr. Franldiii
D. Roosevelt, who was also on a cruise, made a speech in which he ?q)olie of tlie
interest of the United States for the sovereign people of Haiti.
Thus there was no reason to expect a new attemi)t against the legislative
chambers. The Haitian Parliament wishes, it is true, to give the country a
liberal cons'titutlon, an<l not an undemocratc work which would .sanction tlie
despotism of the (tovernment and martial law.
Early on June 19 the legislative builiiing was invaded by police under com-
mand of American oflicers. Without sliowing any agitation the dejiut'es and
senators tooic their seats and resume*! the discussion of the project of the con-
b'Mtution. The vote was still being tal^en when M. Andr^ (^hcvallier, general
.«iecretary of tlie gendarmerie, came to tell the PW sident of the Nat.onal Assem-
bly. M. St<»nio Vincent, that the chief of the gendarmerie demanded to s(v Ir'm.
Senator Vincvnt replied that since he was in session he regretted that he could
not leave for the moment. ^I. (Mievallicr repeated the connmmication a sei^ond
and a third time, and received the same reply. In the meantime, the gendar-
merie closed the entrance of the legislative l)uilding, preventing both the public
and the members of the National Assembly from going (mt. Seeing the im-
patience that was shown around him, M. Vincent made inqu'ries to determine
the cause of tlds strange action. Just then Rrig. CJen. Smedley 1). I>utler burst
into the liall. followed by American olRcers ai'uied with their revolvers, and
handed M. Vim-ent a paper, declaring that it was the decree of the President of
Ha ti wlif) proclaimed the dissolution of the legis*lative body. Senator Vincent
refu.-'ed to read it. He returned to his chair, and addressed the National Ass m-
bly, declaring that he would not read this act. which was lirought, not by u
regular agent of the executive power. I)ut by the cliief of the gendarmerie en-
tirely outside of his powers. In the face of the resolute attitude of the deputies
and .seimtors, who refuseil to act uixm such a document, the gendarmerie dei'ideil
to open the gates of the legislative building. The same day the editors of all the
newsjjapers were sunnnoned to the gendarmerie where they received a written
order to publish nothing whatever concerning the dis.solution of the chambers.
The next day, Gen. Butler had the archives of the two chambers searched, and
removed the rei)orts on the cunstitut'on Just voted.
On June 19. 1918. one year after the second dissolution of the Haitian Parlia-
ment, President Dartiguenave pronnilgated another constituticm, voted by a
.so-called plebiscite. Those who presided over this plebiscite were American
otiicers. They emidoyed force and thrt»ats to make the citizens vote.
Read this announcement, published l\v the Courier Hai'tien of November 8.
1920:
Repiblic of Haiti,
Port dc Paix, June 11, I9JS.
In accordance with the decree of his excellency, the President of the Re-
pulilic, published in the Mrmitor of May 8. last, all tlie citizens of the commuMe
of Port de Paix are asked to be present to-morrow at the Hotel Connnunal to
vote on the new constitution published in the Monitor of the same date.
Any abstention from such a solemn occasion will be consUlered an unpatriotic
act.
Maintenance of order will be assured by the gendarmerie, and the ballots will
be distributed by a member of the administration of finances opposite the voting
offices.
The polls will be open from 7 o'clock in the morning till 5 o'clock in the evening.
Herman H. Hannekrn.
Lt. O. (Pltaiii.
E. I.KSCOT,
Government Comml^Hwner, Northwest DiHtrict.
There was only one kind of ballot, bearing the word " Yes." For purposes of
deccf>Uon some l)allots were d stributed with the wcn-d " No," but they went to
certain j^ajd wn federates, in order to give the impression that the number of
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 27
opponents was insignificant. Spies kept watch over the ballot boxes. Certain
officials who, be ug obliged to vote, had turned In a negative vote, were dis-
missed from office. (See Appendix No. 12.)
The plebiscite is not one of the Haitian constitutional traditions. The con-
iJtltution of 1889 indicated the pix>cedure to be followed In case of revision of
the c<>n.<?titution. But the prescribed prwedure was not carried out. What
actually happened was that one so-called constitution was substituted for another,
ancT, to give it some appearance of verity, the plebiscite vote was invented.
THE NAVAL COUllT OF INQnRY IN HAITI.
^Yhen Mr. Daniels, I'nited States Secretary of the Navy, in order to calm the
emotion aroused in America by the terrible revelations of the press regarding the
acts of the American (K*cupation in Haiti, announced that he had insti-
tuted a naval court of Inquiry to throw light on this subject, the public might
Imve l)elievcd that it was tt) l>e genuine, although, according to certain news-
pnyiers, it was to be merely a case of " whitewash." In fact, the high officials
of the Navy Department who ctmiposed this court niight well inspire confidence.
They were Admiral Henry T. Mayo. Rear Adndral James H. <)liver, MaJ. Gen.
Wendell V. Neville, of the Marine (\)n)s, and MaJ. Jesst» F. Dyer, as judge advo-
(ure. The Haitians were the first to believe that a work of truth and justice
was at last going to l>e carried out.
Th s naval court of inquiry arr.ve<l at Port an Prince on November 8, 1920.
On the 9th It got In touch with the Haitian <iovernment, and on the same day
informed the Haitian public of the names of its members anti of the nature of
its mission.
" It had cr)me," It said, ** to investigate the way in which the forces of the
••ccuimtion had carried out their duty, in order to furnish the Secretary of the
Navy with complete information on this subject." The terms of this declaration
seemed to Imply a very broad mission, and the Haitians who were prepared to
testify before the naval court of inquiry' were anxious to know how It was
^olng to ]iroceed. But not a single rule was ever established for the inquiry
and no form of prcx!edure was indlcate<l. The court never made known where
it would hold Its sessions, on what days they wouhl take place, whether they
would be public, whether the court Itself would call In witnesses, whether the
people who were acquainted with the whole thing or who were victims of acts at
the bands of the forces of <K'cupation could go and testify frt^ely before the
H>urt. or what guarant'es of safety it offered to Haitian citizens who wishetl to
urove charges of criminal acts against officers who still had military authority,
knr)wing well the cruelty of martial law In the country for the past five years.
(See Appendix No. 13.)
November 11, the second anniversary of the World War annistice, was a
holiday, and when no newsjmpers ai>peared it was generally thought that an
announcement from the court of Inquiry w^ould Inform the public the next day
how it was going to proceed.
On Novemt>er 12, instead of the expected note, people were astonished to read
in a Port au Prince paper, the Nouvelliste, of the testimony of President
I>artlguenave before the court :
"From a visit by Mr. Wilbur Forrest, correspondent of the New York
Tribune [says the Nouvelliste!, we learn the news that the court of Inquiry
was to hold its first session on November 11, at 10 o'clock In the morning, at
the Dessalines Barracks and tliat his excellency M. Sudre Dartlguenave was to
testify."
No one knew anything about it. Now, It happened, according to the Nou-
telllste, that after this testimony Maj. Dyer, judge advocate, announced " that
tliere were no other witnesses for the present." and the session was adjourned.
Did this mean witnesses stmimoned by the court, or else persons who had
decided on their own initiative to go and testify? No one knew. In any case,
how could anyone else have gone to witness on that day when it had not l>e<^n
announced anj'where that the court of inquiry would hold its first meeting at the
Dessalines Barracks on November 11 at 10 oVlock in tlie morning, or that such
pePHons conld go to testify? But when the Nouvelliste aske<l the judge advo-
cate for his opinion on this subject Maj. .Tesse F. Dyer replied :
" So far I have no precise facts; everyone speaks of rumoi-s, and I am looking
for evidence. I am leaving for the northern towns, and hope to find this evi-
dence; and if no one comes with statements here in l*ort au Prime in all prob-
«l)i:ty the other sessions of the court will not be held here, but at the Cape,
where we shall go to hear the witnesses we can find in tiie t"^f^j^''Qt9^^"'^" *
,gi ize y g
28 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI .AND SANTO DOiilNGO^
So, after hearing but a Bingle witness, Maj. Dyer already had concluded
that there were no precise facts and merely rumors, and announced that he
was leaving for the north of the island, where he hoped to find evidence.
Nevertheless, as soon as the Haitians learned that the court or inquiry was
in session, and where it was being held, from all parts of the country thedemand
came to be heard.
From the following account of the work (?) of the court it will be seen that
all Haitians who had anything to say regarding the numerous cases of murder,
brutality, robbery, rape, arson, etc. — that Is, Haitians who wished to convince
the court of inquiry of " the way in which the forces of the occupation had
carr od out their iXxity in Haiti " — were systenmtlcally excluded. Many of
them have published in the press of Haiti the letters which they sent to the
court demanding to be heard.
On November 17 the court heard Col. Hooker, of the Haitian gendarmerie^
Mr. Harry Lifchitz, Mr. Daggett, Col. Little, Lieut. Lang, and a Haitian
gendarme named Adolphe Burgot.
Col. Hooker spoke chiefly of the attack of Port au Prince by the **Cacos " on;
January 15, 1920, declaring that all the victims of this unlucky day — tAi&t Is 66^
Haitians — were assailants (?).
Mr. Harry Lifchitz accused Lieut. Haskl Koflf of having killed a gendarme at
Cayes with a revolver, Lieut. Barrett of having killed a Haitian civilian at
Aquln, and ended his testimony by exposing the case of a woman who was
beaten to death at Saint-Louls-du-Sud.
Col. Little accused a naval pharmacist, Mr. Thompson, of hsAing murdered a
judge at Las Cahobas.
The other witnesses testified on the case of Lieut. Lang, accused of having
killed three prisoners with his own hand at Hlnche, making them go out of the
prison one at a time, firing a revolver shot In the back of each one.
On November 18 there was another Investigation of Lieut. Lang's case. The
court heard Mr. Grant, gendarmes Adolphe Burgot and Meratus. The two latter
confirmed the charges brought against Lieut. Lang.
On November 19 gendarmes Carmelus Monfiston, Petit Daubrave, Eugene
Jean, and Carius Absolu testified against L'eut. Lang regarding" the aiXalr of
the murder of the prisoners at Hinche. Gendarme Petit Daubrave awuseil
Lang of having killed, to his knowledge, five prisoners, detailing all the cir-
cumstances of these crimes. Mr. Daggett, who was hesitant during tl>e first
Investigation, reappeared on the scene and stated that Lang had killed some
prisoners. Th^m^ne Rouchon, former gendarme at Milot, declared that Lianjr
had killed the prisoner Teka with a machine gun under a mango tree.
On November 20 the court held a short session and heard the testimony of
Gendarme Slm^n Gabeau regarding the terrible circumstances of the assassina-
tion of the notary Jean Garnler, a peaceful citizen of Maissade, by Lieut.
Williams.
Lang asked to present a memorandum on his case, which he obtalneil, and the
court went Into secret sessions.
On November 22 the court continued Lieut. Lang's case. Then it heard Col.
Hooker, of the Haitian gendarmerie, who spoke In favor of Haskl Kolf, lieu-
tenant at Cayes, and Dr. Louis Gllle, who testified in his turn In favor of
Barrett, lieutenant at Aquln.
In the sessions of November 29 and 81 the court devoted Its time to new
testimony regarding the murder of the notary Jean Gamier, of Maissade.
And this was all. This naval court, which had been talked of In the United
States, probably at the suggestion of Mr. Daniels, as the greatest naval com-
mission formed since the one charged with inquiring into the conditions of the
naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, this naval court of Inquiry in reality Inquired
only Into the charges brought against Lieuts. Lang and Williams. Up till the
last mnute people thought It was going to Cap-Halten and various other towns
In the north of the island to continue the Investigation, especially since Maj.
Jesse F. Dyer had publicly declared so. Moreover, during the first two weeks
of November Admiral Knapp had gone to Cap-Haltlen and called the i>eople to
the Union Club, asking them to expose their grievances against the occupation
without fear of reprisals. At this meeting the principal i)ersonf^ges of the
town of Cap-Haitlen spoke: M. W. I..econte. former state .secretary of the in-
terior, spoke of the murderous regime in the prisons. M. Adh€hiar Auguste.
former ma>* or of the town wniativi nnt that tlut horrible svstem of the corv^
was the only cause of the uprising of the *' Cacos." M. L. Duvivler told of the
slaughter of Halt'ens in the streets hf Cap-Haitien durlng^ the night of Christ-
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i
1NQT7ERT TKTO OCCTJPATIC^N OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 29
mas, 1919. M. Charles Zamor expo^d great wrongs done by certain officers of
the gendarmerie, and M. Dacosta, ia merchant, denounced the abuses at the
(*4i{i-Haitieu customhouse. Other p^pie tried to make their complaints heard.
But Admiral Knapp announced that he himself had no authority to carry on tlie
ioTestigation ; that he had merely borne to prepare the way for tlie court of
inquiry ; and that all those who had complaints to make would soon have the
oppovtunity of 'being lieard before tliis court.
Judge Advocate MaJ. Jesse F. Dyer and Admiral Knapp had, then, both
MDDouneed. some days apart, the intention of the court of inquiry to go to Cap-
Haitien to continue the investigatioti. And yet the court did not go. Why?
lir. Daniels and the members of the n^val court of inquiry alone can explain this
mystery. >»^
Meanwhile, by November 26, tne Haitian public found out, in an indirect way,
tliat this investigation, announced with such flourisl^ in the United States, was
nothing more than a ^oke, unworthy of the American administration which had
smt it, and unacceptable to the great American people who demanded truth and
justice, and who, we are convinced, will want the trutli to be known and justice
to triumph at any price. In fact, in the course of interviews which tbok place
Itetween the editors of the Courier Haitien and the American correspondents at
Port an Prince it was alleged by one of them that the powers of the naval court
of Inquiry were so limited that they did not, in reality, permit it to make any
investigation. The Haitian people had no authoritative information on the
subject.
Nevertheless, when, on November 30, in the evening, the Niagara left the
waters of Port au Prince, bearing with it the naval court of inquiry, the news
<il its departure caused general surprise and profound indignation. To calm the
Haitians they were given to understand, by notices adroitly slipped into the
Deiwspapers, that the Niagara was going to coal at Guantanamo and that from
there the naval court of inquiry was going to Cap-Haitien.
On December 2 a group of Port au Prince citizens, feeling that the comedy
had gone too far and tliat it was unworthy to play with a whole people in this
way, sent a cablegram to the Secretary of the Navy informing him that the naval
court of inqulrj' had left without having fulfilled Its duty, that a number of
fDmpIflinants had not been heard, etc. Mr. Daniels hastened to reply, by the
following communication, published in the Courier Haitien :
<'ifizenH of Port au Prince,-^
Befwring to your communication relative to the naval court, I have directed
Tlce Admiral l^iapp to carry on any Investigation considered necessary concern-
ing the United States marines ; and all the cases that you may wish to have sub-
mitted tolilm.
SfeCBBTART OF THE NaVY.
Wabhiwoton, Decemher 2, 19t0,
Vain hopes I Admiral Knapp did even much less than the naval court of Inquiry,
in that he did nothing, absolutely nothing at all ; he never Informed the Haitian
im»ple of the new mission which had been confided to him, he never heard a single
witness, and he continued to enjoy his winter quarters In peace In the harbor of
Port au Ptince.
The behavior of the naval court of Inquiry in Haiti which we have just set
forth was even more surprising because the mandate of this court had been es-
Hbllshed by ^r. Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, as follows :
[Precept of the court of inquiry.]
" Di':pabtment of the Navy,
" Wa^hingtotu October 16, 1920.
"To: Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, United States Navy.
** Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the alleged Indiscriminate killing
of Haitians and unjustifiable acts by members of the United States naval
service, including those detailed to duty with the gendarmerie d'Haltl
against the persons and property of Haitians since the Amerlani occupa-
tion, July 28, 1915.
**!. A court of Inquiry, consisting of yourself as president, and of Rear
Admiral James H. Oliver, United States Navy, and Maj. Gen. W. O. Neville,
* Message retranslated irom the French.
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f
80 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HA^TI AND SANTO Do^i^.^.
f
United States Marine Corps, as atlditionjll members, and of Maj. Jesse F.
Dyer, Uuiteil States Marine Corps, as ju(jg:e advocate, is hereby ordered to
convene at the Navy Department. Washington, D. C, Friday, October 22. 1921),
or as soon thereafter as practicable, and thereafter at such places as may be
deemed necessary to inquire into the question of the conduct of the personnel
of the United States Naval Service in Haiti since the marines were lan:le<l in
that country on July 28, 1915, with the view to determining whether any un-
justifiable homicide has been committed by any of such personnel, whether jiny
other unjustifiable acts of oppression or violence have been peri>etrated apiinst
any of the citizens of Haiti or any unjust-flable damage or destruction of their
property has occurred." •• ^
According to the mandate of the naval t^'rt of inquiry, it was to make a
report on its findings and the degree of responsibility attached to each act, and
on all persons immediately/ or indlrec»tly resi)onslble for such unjustifiable acts.
And no report of this court has been published. The "Annual Report of the
Secretary of the Navy for 1920** contains all the reports on Haitian affairs
except the report of the naval court of inquiry. Would it not be a good idea
to publish this report in the interest of truth and Justice?
' The naval court of inquiry did not reply to the letters, often confirme:! by
follow-up letters, which were addressed to it by those who wanted to be hearl.
Certain complainants were obliged to resort to the press to make known the
wrongs of which they or their relatives were victims.
The Haitian people feel that if the naval court of inquiry has not fulfilled in
Haiti the broad mandate conferred upon it by Mr. Josephus Daniels, it is l>e-
cause it was face:l with charges of such a horrible nature that it thought best
to pass them over in silence. And this is why the tactics of the Navy Depart-
ment have been and still are to consider the " incident " as closed. This can
not be. The voice of truth and justice can not l>e stilled. The Haitian people
await with confidence an honest, impartial, and thorough investigation.
In Haiti numberless abominable crimes have been conmiitted. To g ve some
idea of their horror we cite only a few cases made public through the press
which the naval court di<l not feel the need to investigate.
1. Hanging of M. Clc^ron Lacroix, execution of L^on Morlcet, Wca. and
other persons in October and Noveipber. 1918, by Lieut. Lang, acts den(>unctHl
to the naval court of inquiry by M. Philocles Lacroix in his letter of October
20. 1920.
2. Execution of the P^ralte brothers by Lieut. Wallace at Mirel)alais in De-
cember, 1918. Here are the names of those shot: Philox^ne P^ralte, Eumian-
uel I*^ralte, P^ralte, jr.. and L^osthene PC^ralte.
3. Execution by the marines of Jo.seph Marseille and his two sons, ^lichel
and Estima Marseille, of Princivil Mesadieux, Baye section, district of Mireba-
*lal8; assassination by the marines of Guerrier Josaphatand one of his children,
aged 14, in his own house, acts denounced by IVI. Louis Charles, sr., December 8.
1920.
4. Arrest by an American officer, an<l mysterious disappearance of M. Char-
rite Fleuristone. former school Insr)ector at (Uiappelle district of St. Marc. He
was arrested in the first part of 1919, at the same time as MM. Jean Baptiste
and Clement Clerjeune.
5. At Marin, district of Mirebalais, in December, 1919, assassination and
mutilation of Joseph Duclerc, a respectable old man of 60. by marines and
gendarmes. After the crime they burned his cottage.
6. At the same time and in the same .section the .same group fired on a school-
teacher and wounded her in the mouth. She managed to escape. The marines
and gendarmes burned her house as well as everything that went with it. They
were accomrMinied by an American ofllcer, a lieutenant, whose name can be es-
tablished by an investigation.
7. Near Marin, at Collier, dstrict of Mirebalais. the same band cut the
head off a blind man named N^is 2.5 years old, and did the same thing to a
child who was with him, named Jules Loui.sville.
8. \\t Marin, at the same time, another group of gendarmes and marines a^-
sau^*»^l Matljieu Cadet, aged 55, in his house, shooting him. Although woundetl
in t "* sfiou tier, he was able to escape his assailants through a concealed dtwr.
Hirf**» Mrse was robbed and burned. The gendarme Joajiis took off a mule
be? J^fag to Mathieu.
_ nerlc.
verei^jjj^yjj Report of the Secretary of thf Navy, 1020, p. 315.
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mi/uWr IXTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 31
9. In Janaary, 1919, at Noailles some marines and gendarmes coniinp from
Beaurepos killed Jean Luc, an invalid. Torn from his house, firearms were
emptied Into his body. His house was robbed and burned.
10. On the same day the same band of marines and gendarmes suri)rised
f}sca Estinfil in his house at Caye-Beau with his young sons. They shot all
three, father and children. Then they robbed his house and burned it. Esca
was a great planter, and had a large quantity of coffee stored, and a gocxl sum-
of money ready for commercial transactions.
11. On January 25, 1919, at " Savane Longue," near Marin, a group of ma-
rines and gendarmes coming from Terre-Rouge, district of Mirebalais. killed
lion. Aur^ Bayard, who was ill in bed. They pulle<l him from his bed, and shot
him through and through. The house was robbed and burned. Then they forced
Mme. Aur^ Bayard, by striking her with the butt ends of their rifles, to take
the things that they had just stolen and carry them along with thenu It was
not until the next day that the poor woman could render her last services to her
husband.
12. On January 30 some marines and gendarmes, led by spies named N^is
fdes Grangers) and Aur6 Fleury (du Carrefour grand-mflt), killed a pregnant
woman in a place calle<l Thomaus. The cottage was robbed.
13. In December, 1919, some marines and gendarmes coming from Saut d*Eau
or Mirebalais arrived at the second section of the Crochus, district of Mire-
balais, and shot, at Beauvoir, Saint-F^lix Geffard, who lived with his two little
daughters aged 8 and 12 years. The territie<l children managed to escape the
shots of the assassins.
14. On the same day, at Beauvoir, the same band robbed the cottage of Tin-
bomnie Saint-Felix, then shot him and burned his corpse.
15. On the same day, at Beauvoir, the same band killed a respectable old
man name<1 Saint ime Vernet. His cottage was robbed. Then the band burned
the little village of Beauvoir,
16. No attention was paid to a denunciation by M. Paul Bayard, sent to the
na\al court of inquiry in a letter dated November 26, relative to the crimes
enumerated below, committed by the Haitian sergeant of the gendarmerie,
Maurice I^fontant, by the American captains, O'Neil and Verdier, and by the
American lieutenant, Rogers, at Montague, Goanau and Serin neighborhood,
district of Jacmel (a section where there have never been any of the so-callett
"Cacos") : (1) Thirty-eight houses burned; (2) assassination of Michael Jean
Kran(,ois, age 74 years — his house was burned ; (3) I'aul Bayrd, wounded by two
bullets, one in his thigh and the other in his abdomen — his house was burned ;
(4) assa.Ksination of Kn^lien Ladouceur; (5) Franc'sque Gabriel, wounded
by one bullet in the thigh.
17. Bodily tortures were inflicted by the American captain of gendarmerie,
fitzjrerald Brown, ui)on M. Polydor St. Pierre, clerk of tlie St. Marc police
fourt, in the prison of that town. He was arrested on .January 3. 1919, on a
false charge of theft, and was imprisoned for six months. Brown adminls-
tero<l the ** water cure " to him and burned his body with a red-hot iron ; to
say nothing of the beatings and other tortures which he inflicted upon him.
Sf. Pierre vainly begged a hearing from the naval court of Inquiry.
IS. Executions by night at St. Marc during the first months of 1919 in the
l<x'alitie8 known as " Grosses Roches " and ** Gros-Morne " by Capt. Fitz-
g*^rald Brown.
19. Hanging of Fabre Yoyo from a mango tree on March 13, 1919, at Pivert,
on property belonging to the Orius Paultre family of St. Marc; execution on this
same property this same day of two young boys of 14 and 15 years, Nicolas
Yoyo and Salnave Chariot, by Capt. Fitzgerald Brown.
20. Among the crimes perpetrated in the region of Hinche, Malssade, from
1016 to 1919, by Lieuts. Lang and Williams, acts little known, and denounced
l»y M. M^resse Wooley, former mayor of Hinche, on December 10, 1020, in
the Courier Haitien, are the following: (1) ^I. Onexll hanged and burned
alive in h^s house at Lauhaudiagne : (2) execution of Madame Kucharice
<'arlichon at Mamon; (3) execution ()f ^ladame Romain Brigade at I'Herr itto,
near Maissade; (4) execution of Madame Prevoit with a baby of a few mi'iths
at *^avane-il-Linguc " on her own property. *
^^^ladame Gamier, widow of the notary who was killed by Lieut, W* ins
at ^fcssade. told Jftdge Advocate Dyer privately, on November 27, Ij^ „ of
th^p^>oting of Madame Lumenesse, mother of eight children, by Hiie^^-jQ^^il-
>ing
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32 IKQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Hams of the Haitian gendarmerie. Madame Garnier's declaration was pub-
lished in the Courier Haitien of December 18, 1920.
22. Execution of Gen. Satil P^ralte, near the Canary, by Gendarme La-
martine Toussalnt, assisted by the American Lieut. Vernon, and ordered by the
American Capt Verdier, published in the Courier Haitien.
23. Arrest of Cadmus Bellegarde and cruelty inflicted upon him by the
American Lieut. Dukela on December 2, 1919, at Saut-d'Eau, district of Mlre-
balais. According to a complaint made l)efore a Haitian court, on Decem-
ber 8, 1920, and published in the Courier Haitien of February 9, 1921, Cadmus
Bellegarde accused Lieut. Dukela of having burned 10 of his houses and
stolen all of his property-, including 12 horses, 3 mules, 70 oxen, etc.
24. In a letter published February 22, 1921, in the Courier Haitien, dnteil at
Belladere, January 31, 1021, M. Caslmir, jr., gives the following list of Halt!an>i
executed at Belladere by certain officers and soldiers of the Marine Corps:
Gabriel Morette, Salnt-For Jean-Baptlste, Fr^sirus Duf resin, Elle Ladomate.
Bristoul Michel, AchlUe Vincent, Lorme Lorendou, Petlka Casian, Normelus
Salut-Charles, Adou Domlngue, Aritus Domlngue, Erlsma Barau, Ehelusma
Barau, Ocean Noisette, Surprilus Vllette, Salnt-Plerre Inflne, Monexa Chltry.
Salomon Suprien, Fleury Pierre, a small daughter of M. Raymond Dominique,
Lami Pinal, Lh^risson Pinal, Marcelus Joseph and his son, Georges Ledou,
Francisque Contralrle, Princy Lachai>elle, C^us Grandln, Jocelin, jr., Saint-Uma
Pierre, Elle Morette, Stiven Callxte, Barjon Charles, Dumome Vincent, jr., Juste
Glodln, Donll Cyrlaque. M. Caslmir, jr., gave also the names of 48 proprietors
whose houses and fields had been burne<l by certain olflcers and soldiers of the
Marine Corps In the commune of Belladere.
25. In a i)etition addressed on December 16, 1920, to M. Barnave Dartiguenave.
state secretary of the interior for Haiti, by the members of the League for t\w
I'ublic Good, at Cap-Haitlen, whose president is Pastor Auguste Albert of the
Baptist Church, which petition was published In the Courier Haitien on Feb-
ruary 26, 1921, we notice the following facts:
(a) In the prisons of Cap-Hattlen, during the years 1918, 1919, and 1920. more
than 4,000 prisoners died.
(h) At Chabert, an American camp, 5,475 prisoners died during these three
years, the average being five deaths a day.
(c) At Cap-Haltlen, in 1919, eight corpses of prisoners a day were thrown inti>
nhe pits.
{d) The mortality rate is just as high in the prisons of Port-au-Prince and
Gonaives.
(e) At Cap-Haltlen, out of 500 prisoners, the average mortality is four a day,
i. e., 24 per cent per month, or only 1 per cent less a quarter of this whole
number.
(f) Before American occupation and the seizure of the prisons by the Ameri-
can ofllcers the number of prisoners in the Cap-Haitlen prison did "ot exceed, on
an average, 40 a year.
(g) At this time the mortality rarely reached the number of four prisoners
a year.
The ghastly mortality in the prisons together with confirmation by survivors
reveals a record of atrocities, of brutality, and cruelty which defies description.
It Is a record for which it would be difficult to find a parallel.
CONCLUSION.
The Haitian Republic was the second nation of the New World — second only
to the United States — to conquer Its national independence. We have our own
history, our own traditions, customs, and national spirit, our own Institutions,
laws, and social and political organization, our own culture, our own literature
(French language), and our own religion. For 111 years the little Haitian
ligation has managed Its own affairs; for 111 years It has made the necessary
cIilRT^ for its material, intellectual, and moral development as well as any other
^ on — better than any other nation, becau.se It has been from the start abs<v
sau^^-^' ^^^^® *" ^^^ difficult task, without any aid from the outside, beai^M with
i,^ f long the harsh road of civilization the glorious misery of its beginnln^^-^And
j^jjj-n, \pne fine day, under the merest pretext, without any possible exj/. i^tioii
jj^i jusdfication on the grounds of violation of any American right or'/^, ^'res!.
nerlc^n forces landed on our national territory and actually t bo^/t^ the
verelj^ty and Independence of the Haitian Republic. ;
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INQtimY INTO OCCITPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 88
We have Just given an account of the chief aspects of the American military
^ occupation in our coxmtry since July 28, 1915.
\ It is the most terrible r^me of military autocracy which has ever l)een car-
ri^ on in the name of the great American democracy.
The Haitian i)eople, during these past five years, has passed through such
sacrifices, tortures, destructions, humiliations, and misery as have never before
been known in the course of its unhappy history.
Tlie American Government, in spite of the attitude of wisdom, moderation,
and even submission which it has always found in dealing with the Haitian
Government, has never lived up to any of the agreements which it had solemnly
entered into with regard to the Haitian people.
The Haitian people is entitled to reparations for the wrongs and injuries com-
mitted against it.
The great American people can only honor themselves and rise in universal
esteem by hastening the restoration of Justice — of all the Justice due a weak
and friendly nation which the agents of its Crovemment have systematically
abased.
Reparations are due for the human lives that have been taken and for the
property that has been destroyed or abstracted. An impartial investigation will
provide the necessary stat^nents and supply the basis for the estimates to be
determined.
The prefient political aspirations of the Haitian nation have been fbrmulated
I by the Uni<m Patrlotique, a comprehensive national association which, through
itB numerous branches throughout the country and in all levels of society, in-
dudee virtually all the Haitian people. The undersigned have been sent to the
United States by this association to make the will of the country clearly known.
The Haitian people are filled with peaceful sentitments, but there is no doubt
that they Intend to recover definitely the administration of their own affairs
and to resume under their own responsibllty the entire life of the country, with
fnll sovereignty and independence. They will never rest until they have ob-
tained them.
The salient aspirations of the Haitian people are summarized as follows :
1. Immediate abolition of martial law and courts-martial.
2. Immediate reorganization of the Haitian police and military forces, and
withdrawal within a short period of the United States military occupation.
a. Abrogation of the convention of 1915.
4. Convocation within a short period of a constituent assembly, with all the
jniarantles of Sectoral liberty.
But the Haitian people desire too strongly the friendship of the great Ameri-
oan people, and are too anxious for their own material, intellectual, and moral
development not to wish and bespeak for themselves the impartial and altruis-
tic aid of the United States Government. They have urgent needs, vital to the
development of the natural resources of the country and essential to the full
exi)an.Hion of its agricultural, industrial, and commercial activity. The satlsfy-
injt of these needs Is absolutely necessary for the continued progress of the
Haitian coramunlty.
Nothing would serve better to bring about the speedy reestabllshment of
normal relations between the two countries than the friendly aid of the United
States Government In the economic prosperity and social progress of the Haitian
Republic.
H. PAULfeus Sannon.
SxftNio Vincent.
Perceval Thoby.
[Outline of a draft pf a convention between the United States and the Republic
of Haiti.]
Appendix No. 1.
Legation op the United States of Amebica,
Port au Prince, Haiti, December 10, JOIJ^,
n fbeakble.
'I^-lbMfr^ States and the Republic of Haiti, desiring to confirm and
^re^tffelft tM amity existing between them by the most cordial cooperation in
•Pi.te their common advantage, and the Republic of Haiti desiring to
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84 INQUIRY INTO OCGUPATIOlSr OF HAITI AND SANTO DOICIKGK).
remedy the present unsatisfactory cdnditJon of its revenues and flnauces, to
check the loss of nuich of its revenues due in part to internal disturl)ances, to
provide against injudicious increase of its public debt, to inaugurate a mm-
prehensive system of public accounts and audits, to make adequate provision
to meet its exterior debts, to maintain tlie tranquillity of the Republic, to carry
out plans for the economic development and prosi>erity of the Republic and its
l>eople, to strenjjtben its cre<lit, and generally to tlx »uid maintain Its tlnances
uiion a Urm and stable basis, and the i:nite<l States l>einf; in full sympathy
with all of these aims and objects and desirint? to c<mtribute in all pro|)«r ways
to their accomplishment:
The United States and the Republic of Haiti, having resolved to conclude a
convention with these objects in view, have appointed for that purpose pleni-
lH>tentIaries, on the part of the United States and on the part of the Republic
of Haiti, who having exhibited to each other tlieir respective jjowers whi«h
are .seen to be full in ;;ood and true form, have agreed as follows:
1. The President of the United States shall appoint a general re<*e:ver, who.
with such aKsistants and employees as the President of the Unitwl States
may appoint or authorize, shall collect^ receive, and apply all customs duties
on Imports and exports accruing at the several customhouseB and ports of entry
of the Republic of Haiti ; and if he shall deem it necessary and expedient, or
if the Haitian Government shall request, the President of the United States
shall designate a Huancial adviser to the Republic of Haiti, who shall devise
an adequate system of public accounting, aid in Increasnig the revenues and
adjusting them to the exi)enses, inquire into the validity of the debts of the
Republic, enlighten both Governments with reference to all eventual debtK
reconnnend improved metliods of collecting ancl applying the revenues, uiid
generally exercise the functions of a comptroller of accounts.
2. The (ioverument of the Republic of Haiti will provide by law or appro-
priate decrees for the payment of all customs duties to the general receiver,
and will extend to the receivership all needful aid and full protection in its
execution of the lumers conferred and tluties imposed herein ; and the Uuite<l
States on its part will extend like aid and protection.
3. Upon the ap]K»Intmeut of the i-enerHl receiver, the Government of th^»
Republic of Haiti in cooiJcration with the general receiver shall collect, classify,
arrange, and make full ><tatenient of all the debts of the Republic, the amounts,
character, maturity, and condition thereof, the interest accruing, and the sink-
ing fund requisite to their final discharge.
4. All sums collected and re<?eived by the general re<*eiver shall be applie<l by
him first, to the payment of the salaries and allowances of the general rec-eiver.
his assistants and employees, and exi>enses of the receix^rship, including tlie
salary and expen.ses of the financial advLser, if one shall be appointed; second,
to the interest and sinking fund of the public debt of the Republic of Haiti;
and, third, the remainder to the Haitian Government for purposes of current
expenses.
In making these ai>plications the general receiver will proceed to pay salaries
an<} allowaucoH monthly and expenses as they arise, and on the first of each
{•alendur month will set aside In a separate fund the quantum of the collections
and receipts of the jirevious month found to be a fair contribution to the ulti-
mate sum riHpiiretl to UKH't interest and i)rovide the sinking funds.
5. The expenses of the receivership, including salaries and allowances of
the general receiver, his assistants and employees, shall not excee<l five ikm-
cent of the collections and receipts from custom duties, unless by agreement
of the two Governments.
6. The general receiver shall make monthly rc[)orts of all collections, re-
ceipts, and disl)ursenients to the appnipriatc <»tt1<vr of the Reimblic of Haiti an<l
to the Department of State of the United States, which rH|M)rts shall In* open
to insi)ecti<m and verification at all times by the api»roi>riate auth\>ritles of earli
of the said Governments.
7. The Rei>ublic of Haiti shall not Increase Its public debt except by previous
agreement with the President of the United States and shall not contract any
debt or assume any financial obligation unless the ordinaiy revenues of the
Republic available for that purpose after defraying the expenses of the Gov-
ernment shall be adequate to pay the Interest and proxitle a sinking fund for
the final discharge of such debt.
8. The Republic of Haiti will not, without the assent of the President of tlie
l;nlted States, modify the customs duties In a manner to reduce the revenues
therefrom ; and In order that the revenues of the Republic may be adequate to
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 35
meet the public debt and the expenses of tbe Government, to presen-e tran-
qnfllity, and to promote material prosperity, the Republic of Haiti will cooj)-
erate with the financial adviser, If one Is appointed. In his rei'ommenrtatlons
for luiprovHueut In the methods of collecting and disbursing the revenues and
for riew sources of needed Income.
9. The United States shall have authority to prevent any and all Interfer-
ences with the receipt, collection, or free course of the customs, or, with the
frpe exercise of any of the powers conferreil or duties Imiwsed herein upon
tlie receivership or with the attainment of any of the objec'ts comprehended In
this convention.
10. This a^eement shall continue In force for a i)erio<l of years from
and after Its ratlflcatU»n by the contrnctlnjr parties in accordance with their
respective laws.
Appendix Xo. 2.
Whereas the President of the United States of America and the President of
the Reimbllc of Haiti are animated by the desire to strengthen the bonds of
friendship between the two countries; and
WTiereas the high contracting parties realize the umtuul advantages wldch.
would lie In more Intimate crtumierclal antl linaucial relations ; and
Wherwis the President of the Republic of Haiti has expressed his sincere de-
sIpp and Ann Intention to guarantee the honest and efficient administration
of a government In Haiti according to the constitution and laws of that
Republic, government which will give expressicm to the will of the iieople
of Haiti, protect their rights and Interests, and respect international obll-
mtlons; and ^
Whereas it Is the mutual desire of the high contracting parties that tliere shall
exist between the American minister plenli)otentlary — thereafter to be ap-
pointed— and the President of Hiiltl such an Intimate and confidential rela*
tionshlp as will enable the American minister plenipotentiary to advise &»
to such matters as affect the honest and efficient administration of the
(rovemment. the President of Haiti agreeing that he will follow the advice
«o given to the extent of reiiulrlng honesty and efficient* in officials and of
removing those found to be dishonest and Inefficient ;
The President of the United States of America and the I'resWent of the
itepa1»i:c of Haiti have res(»lve<l to enter into a convention for that purpose
nnd have appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, to wit :
The President of the United States of America, the Hon. Paul Fuller, jr..
f'nited States commissioner with the rank of envoy extraordinary ami minister
plenipotentiary ;
The President of the Republic of Haiti, the Hon. Tlrlck Duvlvier, secretar>*
«f state for foreign relations ;
Who. after exchange of their full powers, found to be In good and due form,
liflve. In consideration of and in comi>ensatlmi for the respective concession and
«)agements made by e^ich to the other as herein recited, agreeil, ami do hereliy
-iiH'ee, as follows, to wit :
1. The Government of the Unite*! States of America will pn»tect the Republic
of Haiti from outside attack and from the a;;gression of any foreign iK>wer.
JiiMl to that end will employ such fc»rces of the Army and Navy of the United'
J'tates as may be necessary.
2. The Government of the Unitetl States of America will aid the Government
of Haiti to suppress insurrection from within and will give effective support
hy the employment of the arme^l forces of tlie t"nite<l States Army and Navy
to the extent needed.
3. The President of the Republic of Haiti covenants that no rights, privileges.
•»r facilities of any description whatsoever will l>e granteil, sold, leaseil. or other-
wise accorded directly or lndlre<*tly hy the (Jovernment of Haiti cop.rernlng
the mx'Uimtlon or use of the M<»le Saint-Nicholas t<» any foregn (Jovernment
or to a national or the natUmals c»f any other foreign (Jovenunent.
4 The President of tlie Republic of Haiti covenants that within six months
from tbe sifadng of this conventU>n the Government will enter Into an arbitra-
^Um agreement for the settlement of such clalros as American dtleens or other
forelgDen may have against the Government of Haiti, such arbitration agree-
mert to provide for the equal treatment of all foreigners to the end that the
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36 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AJID ftANTO DOMINGO.
people of Haiti may have the btiieflt of eompetitloii between the nat'onals of
all countries.
The present convention shall be ratlfle<l by the appropriate authorities of
the respective countries, and the ratification shall he exchanged at rort au
Prince, Haiti, as soon as may be after the day of , 1915.
In witness whereof we. the resi)ective plenipotentiaries, have signed the same
In duplicate in English and in French and have affixed our respective seals
at Port au Prlnc. Haiti, this day of May, in the year 1915.
[To the coDvedtioD project presented by Mr. Fuller.]
Appendix No. 3.
COUNTEBPBOJECT.
The President of the United States of America and the President of the
Republic of Haiti desiring to strengthen the bonds of friendship which exist
between the two countries;
The high contracting parties being convinced of the advantages they would
obtain through closer commercial and financial relations, considering that the
introduction of capital into Haiti would be sufficiently profitable, and that it
would be assured of all the necessary guaranties, and is recognised as indis-
pensable to the economic development of Haiti ;
The President of the Republic of Haiti, constitutionally elected, who has
shown by the acts already accomplished by his Government his sincere desire
to assure the country through complete and faithful execution of the laws of a
wise, regular, and honorable administration, capable of assuring as much pro-
tection as possible to legitimate interests, both national and foreign ;
The President of the United States of America, with views in harmony with
those of the Government of the Haitian Republic, and dis;K)sed to lend it all
the assistance and aid necessary to the conservation of its independence, and to
permit its free development ;
The President of the United States of Ajnerica and the President of Uie
Republic of Haiti have resolved to conclude with these aims a convention, and
have named for their respective plenipotentiaries :
The President of the United States of America, the Hon. Paul Fuller, special
envoy of the United States, ranking as envoy extraordinary and minister pleni-
potentiary ; I
The President of the R^ubllc of Haiti, Hon. Ulrick Duvlvler, state secretary
of foreign affairs ;
Who, after exchange of their full respective powers, found In good and due
form, have accepted and hereby accept what follows ;
1. The Government of the United States of America agrees to lend Its aid to
the Republic of Haiti for the conservation of its independence.
With this object it binds Itself to intervene to prevent any intrusion of any
foreign power in the affairs of Haiti and to repulse any act of aggression
attempted against this country.
It shall employ for this purpose such forces of the Army and Navy of the
United States as are necessary.
* 2. The Government of the United States shall facilitate the entrance into
Haiti of sufficient capital to assure the full economic development of this coun-
try, to improve within a very short period its financial situation, especially to
bring about the unification of its debt in such a way as to reduce the customs
guaranties which are affected by it at present, and to carry out an effective
monetary reform.
In order to grant to capital all desirable guaranties, the Government of Haiti
agrees to employ in the customhouses, as well as in collectors* offices and others,
only Haitian officials whose morality and capability are well known.
The lenders may be consulted regarding the choice of the higher customs
officials.
The Haitian Government shall also assure protection to capital and to all
foreign interests in general by the organization of a rural horse guard, Instructed
according to the most modem methods.
Meanwhile it may, if necessary, resort to the aid of the American Government
in order to check disorders and serious troubles which might compromise foreign
interests.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCtTPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 37
V
The Americaii forces which would. If the case should come up, cooperate with
Haltiaii troops for the reestabllshment of order, must be withdrawn from
Haitian territory at the first demand of the constitutional authorities.
3. The President of the Republic of Haiti agrees not to grant any rights,
privOegeSt or facilities whatsoever on the St Nicholas mole, nor to concede,
sell, rent, or otherwise permit, directly or indirectly, the occupation or use of
the St Nicholas mole to any Gk>Temment, to any national or nationals of any
QoTemmoit
4. The President of the Republic of Haiti agrees, within six months of the
ratification of the present convention, to sign a convention of arbitration with
the powers concerned for the settlement of pending diplomatic claims, which
convention of arbitration shall recognize equal treatment to all claimants;
that is to say, that no privilege for the profit of any of them shall be recognised.
The present convention shall be ratified by the competent authorities in the
two countriefs and the exchange of ratifications shall be made at Port-au-Prince
as soon as possible after the . Presented on June 2, 1915.
[Tpxtp Propose pnr Ja Luxation d«8 Etat8-Unl8 d'Am^rique Aout 1915.]
Appendix No. 4."
i memobandum.
En vue <le Tattitudc nmicale montr^ par le Oouvornement haltion, le Charge
irAflCaires par interim des Etats-Unis a regu instruction de rMiger et de soumet-
tre oflkieusement au Pr^ident de la R^publique d'HaIti, sans d61ai, le projet de
traits ci-joint de I'informer que le D^partenient d'Etat ft Washington croit que
r.\5sembl^ Nationale haltlenne, garante de la sinc6rit6 et de Tint^'^t des
haltiens, voudra voter IramMiatement une resolution autorlsant le Prudent
dHalti ft accepter aana modification, le traits suivant :
(Projet de ConventloD entre le« Btato-Unis et U R^publlque d'Halti.]
PBBAMBLB.
Les Etats-Unis et la R^publique d*HaIti, d^sireux d*affermir et de fortifier
I'amiti^ exiHtant entre eux par une plus cordiale cooperation ft des mesures
IMmr leur avantage commun, et la R^publique d*HaIti d^sirant r^m^dier ft la
situation de ses finances qui n*est pas satlsfalsante, emp^cher la perte de beau-
coop de ses revenus, due en partie aux troubles int^rieurs, prendre des disposi-
tioos con tre Taugmentation peu Judicleuse de sa dette publique, Inaugurer un
KTsttoe comprehensible pour Texamen et la tenue de la comptabillte publique,
faire provision sufflsante pour la service de ses dettes exterleures, malntenir
1« tranquil lite de la Republlque, executer des pro jets pour le developpement
^nomique et la prosperite de la Republlque et du peuple haltiens, eonsoi:der
«(m credit et en general asseoir et maintenir ses finances sur une base solide
rt stable, lew Etats-Unis sympathlsant entierement avec toutes ces yues et ces
objeta, et d^lreux de contr.buer ft leur realisation par tons les moyens con-
venables ;
Les Etatii Unis et la Republ'que d'HaIti, ayant resolu de conolure une con-
^mtlon ayaut ces objets en vue, ont nomme ft cet effet comme Pienlpotentiares,
Iw Etats-Unis, Mr. . et Haiti , Mr. , lesquels s'etant mutu-
rtlement communique leurs pleins pouvolrs respectifs trouves en bonne et due
forme, ont c^nvenu ce qui suit :
L Le President des E3tats-Unis nommera uu receveur general, qui, avec tela
aides et employes que le President des Etats-Unis pourra nommer ou autoriser,
recoavrera, recevra et appUquera tous les droits de douane tant ft rimportatlon
qu*^ I'exportation provenant des diverses douanes et i)orts d'eutree de la
RepQbliqae d'Halti. Le I'resideut des Etats-Unis desijoiera ft la Republlque
(I'HaIti un conseiller financier qui eiaborera un systeme adequat de eomptabilite
pablique, a:dera ft Taugmentation des revenus et ft leur ajustement aux
d^iwcs, enquetera sur la validite des dettes de la Republlque, eclairera les
•lebx 0<mveniements relativement ft toutes dettes eventuelles, recomniandera
"Thl« ia a tranalatlon into French, published at Port au Prince of the ori^nal Engli9*
I »«*xt. which la not now avaUable. r^^^^I^
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38 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AJTDvSAXTO DOMi::S^(M).
(les uwthodes perfeetionn^s iVeneaisHer et <!'«|Him(iiCT }^ revemin, et ea
Kwi6ral exerceni lea fotictioiiH cl'un ctmtrOleur.
2. Ije (fouvemeiijent de la U^publlque <l*HuUi pouiToIera iwr niie loi on
par nil il^tret approprie, a ce que le paiement de t<>us les droits de doiiane
soit fait ail reoeveur K^n^ral, et il act'ordera au bureau de la recette et au
conselller fluanoier toute I'aide et la protection n^ensaireH k IVx^ution des
pouvoirs qui lui sent conf^i^s et k raccompli.saeinent des devoirs qui lui sont
imposes par les presents; les Ktats-UniH, de leur cOt^, accorderont la m&ue
aide et la ui^nie protection.
3. A la nomination du conseiller tinamier, le (Jouvernement de la Republlque
d'HaIti, avec la cooit^ration du conselUer ftnnncler. collationnera, clnsseni.
arrangera et fera un relev^ complet de toutes les dettes de la Rfipublique, de
leur montiint, oaractei'e, 6cheance et condition, int^r^ts y aff^rents, et nnior-
tiKBement nficessaire k leur complet paiement.
4. Toutes les valeurs recouvr^s et encaiss^s par le receveur general seront
appllqu^es: premi^rement au paiement des appointements et allocations dn
receveur p^n^raU de ses nuxillnires et enii)loy^s. et les d^iienses du burejiu de l:i
recette comprendront les ai)i^dntements et les tl^i)enses du c(»nseiller flnandpr:
<leuxi^menient. ft I'lnt^rOr et ft ramortisseiuent de la <lette imblUiue de la
H^publlqiie <l'HaTtl ; troislt^niement ft IVntretlen de la ihiHcv vis^e ft rartlch*
huit et alors le reste, au Oouveniement lialtien pour les d^i)en8es counintes.
En falsant ces «p|)Hcatlons. le receveur jren^ral proc^^dera au paiement des
appointements et allocations mensuelles et des d<>penses telles quVUes se
pr^sentent. et au premier de cliaque mols, 11 mettra ft un' compte .sp^ial le
montant des rect)uvreinents et re<*ettes du mols pr(^c^lent.
5. Les d^j)enses du bureau de la recette, y c<mii)ris les apfxdntements et alloca-
tions du receveur j:6u(^ral, de ses auxillaireg et employes, ne devnmt pas d6|iasser
cinq pour cent des recouvrements et recettes i»rovenaut des droits de douane. jI
molns (Kune convention entre les deux (iouvernements.
C. Ix» receveur gfindral fera un rapiM>rt mensuel au fonctionnaire haTtien coin-
oblliration ftnancl^re ft moins que. les d^penses du Gouvernement d^fray^es. les
recettes et les d^penses ; ces rapports seront sounds ft Tlnsivction et ft la v^riti-
catlon des autorlt^ compCtentes de chacun des dits Gouverneinents,
La R^publlque d*HaTtl ne devra pas aujnnenter sa dette ni assumer aucune
obllj?atlon ttnancl^re ft moins que, les d^penses du (iimvernement d^fray^es, U*s
revenus de la R^publlque dlsponibles ft cette fln. solent sufflsants p<mr payer les
int^rfttfl et iwurvolr ft un nmortlssement pour .rextlncticm compb'^te d'une telle
dette.
7. lia R^publique d'Haltl, sans rassentiment du Prudent des Ktats-Vnis. ne
inoditlera i)as les droits de dnniie d'une facon qui en r^duise les revenus. et afin
que les revenus <le la R^publique solent sufflsants iM>ur falre face ft la dette
piiblique et aux d^i)enses du (Touvernement, |>our preserver la tranquillity* et
promouvoir la prosii^^ritf^ mat^rlelle. la Rt^iniblique d'Haltl c(Mn>^ivra avec le
conseiller financier suivant ses recommendations relatives ft ram^Iloratlon de>
m^thodes de recouvrer. de d^penser les revenus, et ft la cr^^ation des sources
nouvelles de revenus qui feront besoin.
8. Le CJouvernement baltien, en vue de la preservation <le la iwlx intMeure.
de la s^*urlt(^ des droits Indlvlduels et de In compK^te obsenance des dispositions
de ce traits, s'enpipe ft cr^r sans d^lal une police eftlcnce. compos^e d'haltiens.
(Vtte police sera or>;anls(ie par des amerlcains qui en seront les officiers. 4IA-
sljfnes par le Ooiivernement des Etats-T'nis <»t que le (touvernement bnttieji
nommera et rev(^tlra de I'autorlt^ voulue et n(V»essa1re, et soiitiendrn d»)ns Texer-
cice de leurs foncti(»ns. La police id pr^vue nura, sous In directbm <lu Oouverne
ment haltien, la surveillance et le contrfde des amies et munitions, des articU^
mllitJiires et du commerce qui sen fait dams tout le pays. I^es stipulations de
cet article .sont n<V-i*ssalres innir pr^venlr les luttes de*< factions et les d^sordres.
9. I^ G<uivernement d'Haltl convient de ne cutler aucune partle du terrltolre
de la R6publlque d'Haltl par vente, bail on nutrement. nl conf^rer jurisdiction
sur tel terrltolre ft aucune Puis.snnce on Couvernement etrangers. excepts aux
Etats-I'nis, ni sipner avec aucune autre puissance, ni autres puissances, nncun
traits ni contrat qui diminuera on tendra ft diminuer Vind^pendance d'Halti.
10. lie Oouvernement baltlen convient de sijrner avec les Etats-Unls un
protcK'ole pour le r^jilement, par arbitrage on nutrement. de t(mtes les re<*lam:i-
tlons p^cunlarles pendantcs entre les corporations, compapmles, cltoyens on
sujets t»tranpers et Haiti,
n. La R^publique d'Haltl d<>sirant actlver le develoi)i>ement de ses ressoiirces
naturelles. convient d'entreprendre et d'exC'CUter telles ^esunM* qui, dans
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INQUIBT INTO OCCTOPATION OF HAITI AST) SANTO DOMINGO. 89
]'<M'i"U)ii (lu (Jiuivenienieut ilf»s Ktats-Unis, penvent Otre n^cessalres an point
th^ vne de riiy^iSne et rte ravaBcenient de la K^publlque d'HaIti» sous la survell-
laiK'e et la direi'tion d'un on iiliisieurs InK^nleurs qui seront d^slgii^s par le
rrC'sident des Etats-Unis, iiouuij^s et nutoris^H k cvtte tin par le Gouvernenient
<rHsnri.
V2. Les Ktats-rnis aunmt autoritfi pour eiup^(h4?r toute ing^rence tlana Tac-
M.inplissenient d'un \H>iut (obj^'t) quelfonque eumprls dans cette convention;
lis aimint aussl l)ien le <lrolt'd'intervenir pour la preservation de rind^pendanoe
haitit'nne et pour le nialntien d'un (rouveruenient capable de prot6ger la vie,
In propri^t^ et la lil)erte Indlvlduelle.
1?.. Le prf^sent traits sera upprc»uv(^ et ratltl^ par les hautes parties conti-ac-
umteN foil formen lent ft leurs lols resj>eftive8, et la ratification sera ^hangee
♦in us la vllle de W'ashinjj^ton aus«ltot que possible.
14. I^ present traits* restera en force et vlgueur i>endHnt une dur^ de dl3C
anuees a partir du joiir de I'^elianj^e des ratifications, et en outre i»our une
imrre pericnle de dix ann^es tl la deniande d'une des parties.
En foi dequoi les Pl^nlpotentlaires out sign^ la pr6»ente convention en double
et y ont appose leurs sceaux.
AppENprx No, 5.
PROCLAMATION.
To the people of Port au Prince^ Haiti:
Information havlnjx been received from tlie most reliable sources that flie
present Government of Haiti is confrontetl with the conditions which they are
imnWe to control, although loyally attempting to discharge the duties of their
ri*spective offices ; and these facts having create<l a condition which requires the
adoption of different nieasurep than those heretofore applied ; and In order to
afl(»r(l the inluibltiuits of Port au Prince and other territory hereinafter de-
scriliert, the privileges of the (ioverninent, exercising all the functions necessary
for the establishment and imiintenance of the fundamental rights of roan : I
lu^ivhy, under my authority as commanding officer of the forces of the United
.States of America in Haiti and Haltlen waters, proclaim that marshal law
exijiis iu the city of Port au Prince and the immediate territory- now occupied
l»y the fowes under my command.
I further proclaim in accordance with the law of nations and the usages,
• u.stoms, and functions of my own and other Governments, that I am invested
with the ix)wer and responsibllty of government in all its functions and
hrnnehes throughout the territor>- above ilescrlbed and the proper admlnlstra-
ti(ni of such Government rny nuirtlal law will be provided for In regulaticms
ti> be issued from time to time, as re<iitired» by the commanding officvr of the
forces of the United States of America in Haiti and Haltlen waters.
The martial law herein pnK'biinie<l, and the things In that respect so ordered,
will not be deenie<l or taken to hiti^rfere with the proceedings of the constitu-
tional Goveniment and Congress of Haiti, or with the administration of Ju.stlce
In tlip courts of law existing therein : which do n<»t affect the military opera-
tions or the authorities of the (rovernment of the United States of America.
All the municipal and other civil employees are, therefore, requested to con-
timu' in their present vocations without change ; and the military authorities
will not interfei'e in the functions of the civil administration and the courts,
except in so far as relates to persons violating military orders or regulations, or
otherwise Interfering with the exercise of military authority. All peaceful
dtizens can confidently pursue their usual occupations, feeling that they will
l)e protecte<l in their personal rights and proj>erty, as well as in their projier
s«K-lal relations.
Tlie commanding ofllcer of the Unitetl States Exi)edItlonary Force, Col. Lit-
tltfton W. T. Waller, Unite<l States Marine Corps, Is emj)owered to issue the
necessary regulations and appoint the necessary oflicers to make this material
law effective.
Done at the cltv of Port au Prince, HiUti, this 3<l day of September. A. D.
\y. B. Capkuton,
Bear Admiral, United State.** Xai'ih
Cowiitanding the Forcet of the Vnited States of AmerUvi
in Haiti and Haitian Water$.
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40 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI ANfi ftilft^J DOKINGO.
Appendix No. 6. i
MODUS VIVENDI.,
Considering that, pending tbe exchange of ratifications of the treaty of Sep-
tember 16, 1015, it is ess^tial that a provisional arrangement be entered into
between the two Governments with a view to guarantee the working of the
administrative services, the repression of disorder, and the maintenance of
public peace :
The following Modus Vivendi has been agreed upon between the Haitian
Government and the Government of the United States of America, represented
respectively by Louis Bomo, secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Arthur
BaiUy-Blanchard, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.
The treaty signed September 16, 1915, between the R^ublic of Haiti and the
United States and ratified by the Haitian Chamber of Deputies on October 6,
1915, and by the Haitian Senate on November 11, 1915, shall go provisionally into
full force and effect from this date and shall be operated thereunder until the
Senate of the United States has acted upon the treaty, under reserve of the
details of the operation of the treaty to be arranged at Washington between the
Department of State and the Haitian commission appointed for that purpose.
Signed and sealed in duplicate, in the English and French languages, at Port
au Prince, Haiti, the 29th day of November, 1915, by the aforesaid representa-
tives on behalf of their respective Governments.
Louis Bobno.
A. Baiixy-Blanchabd.
Appendix No. 7.
memobandum.
» Republic of Haiti,
State Secbetaby of Fobeion Affaibs,
Port au Ptince, December 20, 1915.
The Haitian Government is ready to receive from the Occupation the munici-
pal administrations which it has taken over.
As it was understood that a special agreement would be made for each case
the Government asks to resume as soon as possible the administration of the
public services of Port au Prince, the water works, and the municipal services.
With this object the United States I^egation is informed that the water works
will be taken by Mr. Thomas Price, engineer, and the municipal administrations
by a commission whose members will be named later. The United States Lega-
tion will kindy inform the department of foreign affairs of the American oflieer
who will be in charge of returning the administrations to the agents of the
Haitian Government, that he Is to make out with them all inventories, accounts
of works needed, reparations, etc., in short, to carry out the details of the
agreement.
When the municipal services of Port au Prinqe are returned to Haitian con-
trol the same procedure shall be applied to the other communes; that is, the
department of foreign affairs and the United States Legation, respectively,
shall indicate one or more agents to make out the inventories or accounts of
works, reparations, etc., to be carried on under Haitian control, and the agree-
ment for each case shall be swit to the legation and to the department of foreign
affairs.
As for the funds needed to carry on the administrations, for reparations,
works, etc., the Haitian Government expects Admiral Caperton to supply them
to the Haitian agents designated for these works.
In fact, the revenues of the Government are collected by the occupation;
it has at its disposal only the amounts paid it by Admiral Caperton and which
are devoted to the necessities of governmental existence. They/ are not suffi-
cient to cover, among other things, tlie expen.se8 of the various waterworks and
municipalities, expenses which are now paid directly by the American au-
thorities.
The return of these services was the object of a formal agreement established
by the Appendix of the Modus Vivendi. This return necessarily Involves ex-
penses, and the means of meeting them are a necessary part of this return.
Moreover, these expenses are now paid to the American occupation by Admiral
Caperton out of the funds of the public Treasury; i|n paying them to the
Haitian authorities henceforth, it shall not be considereti a^ew expense.
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lETQITIBT IKYO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 41
Consequently, the Haitian Government considers that when the details of
the agreemoit charge expenses against the Haitian administration, the means
of meeting them shall be furnished to the latter out of the funds of the public
treftsury.
Inmiediate action on the part of the American authorities, in accordance with
0^ present memorandum, would be highly appreciated by the Haitian Govem*
ment.
Appendix No. 8.
Haitian Legation,
Washington, November 15, 1918,
In the name of the Government, go without delay, personally, and transmit,
In writing, the following note to the Secretary of State, personally: "Just at
the time when Your Excellency is addressing the Haitian GoTernment as the
Govemmait of a free and Independent nation. Just at the time when, thanks to
the power of the United States, the sacred principles of law, Justice, and re-
spect for small nations are triumphant in the world, the Haitian nation is prey
to the distressing and unjust tyranny of American officials who, contrary to
the treaty, are trying to impose upon the Republic of Haiti budget laws and
taxes, without examining anything i^*lth us, without recognizing the right of
the Haitian Government even to rectify evident errors, material and others,
made in their projects. The Haitian people are very sincerely determined to
bring about, with the aid of the American Government, all the reforms which
progress demands, but by means of the very cordial cooperation stipulated in
tbe treaty, of cooperation arising from examinations in common and not at alt
by means of imperative injunctions, announced without respect for national
dignity, and sometimes inspired by sentiments of a personal nature. In which
tt» superior interests of the two countries are not considered. Also^ the
Haitian Government is convinced that the State Department, which is incom-
pletely Informed regarding the actual situation in Haiti, will take careful
measures for the legitimate satisfaction of the Haitian nation, which has full
confidence in the noble Impartiality of the honorable chief of the State Depart-
ment and the illustrious chief of the Government of the United States."
Appendix No. 9.
Le Secretaire d'Etat pr^sente ses compliments au Charge d*Affalres ad
interim de la R^publique d'HaIti et a Thonneur d'accuser reception de sa Note
datCe du 20 Novembre, 1918, par lequelle, selon les Instructions expresses de
M» Gouvemement, le Charge d' Affaires a fait connaitre certalnes plalntes contre
le» actes des fonctionnaries am^rlcalns, en contravention avec le traits de 1915,
«itre le Gouvemement des Etats-Unis et le Gouvemement d*HaItl, et dans la
quelle le Gouvemement haltlen a exprim^ sa conviction que le D^partement
d*Btat Jugera A propos de prendre des measures pour donner satisfaction aux
dMrs l^times de la nation haltienne.
En addition aux accusations gto^rales du Gouvemement hattien touchant
" les vexations et la tyrannie injuste des fonctionnaires am^rlcalns " en Haiti,
le Di^pertement d'Etat note que le Gouvemement haltlen est de Toplnlon que le
GoQvemement des Etats-Unls n*est pas compldtement renselgn^ au sujet de la
Tale situation en Haiti. Conime suite A ces affirmations et en vue de la tr^s
sMeose port^ de Taccusatlon g^n^rale contre les fonctionnaires am^rlcalns en
HaW que la note plus haut mentlonn^ contlent, le Gouvemement des Etats-
Unfa dMre que le Gouvemement d'Haltl fasse une d^laratlon plus praise
«C phis detains en ce qui reganle les questions exposto) dans la note du 20
Xov«nbre, 1918.
Robert Lansing.
D#partement d'Etat.
Washington, SO Novembre, 1918,
^Vppendix No. 10.
PROTEST.
^^e, undersigned Senators, assembled In a hall on the corner of Peuple and
Dutes Destouches Streets, formerly Pav6e Street, temporarily taken over for
«w legislative work, because of the closing of the National Building for thf
PMt month by order of executive power, to prevent us from worklnR^there. j
Digitized by VjOOQ IC
40 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI A|R> aUTTO DOKINGO.
Appendix No. 6. {
modus vivendi., ,
Considering that, pending the exchange of ratiiletttions of the treaty of Sep-
tember 16, 1915, it is essential that a provisional arrangement be entered into
between the two Governments with a view to guarantee the working of the
administrative services, the repression of disorder, and the maintenance of
public peace:
The following Modus Vivendi has been agreed upon between the Haitian
Government and the Government of the United States of America, represented
respectively by Louis Borno, secretary of state for foreign affairs, and Arthur
BaiUy-Blanchard, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.
The treaty signed September 16, 1915, between the Republic of Haiti and the
United States and ratified by the Haitian Chamber of Deputies on October 6,
1915, and by the Haitian Senate on November 11, 1915, shall go provisionally into
full force and effect from this date and shall be operated thereunder until the
Senate of the United States has acted upon the treaty, under reserve of the
details of the operation of the treaty to be arranged at Washington between the
Department of State and the Haitian commission appointed for that purpose.
Signed and sealed in duplicate, in the English and French languages, at Port
au Prince, Haiti, the 29th day of November, 1915, by the aforesaid representa-
tives on behalf of their respective Governments.
Louis BOBNO.
A. Baiixy-Blanchabd.
. .otre liJxcfeUence prealable-
Appendix No. 7^rps I^^slatlf.
,,„^,^„^„^, Aon que dans les quelques prochatns
nUill^^ MEMORANlg^p^j^^g p^j. ^^^^^
I Veu Uier tf jLi* ''■■ *v -fc, <tre. les assurances d
^Id^rntion.
'?^H>rt-^
les assurances de ma haute* con-
^'*^ A. Bailly-Bijlnchard,
Miniiitre AmMcain.
LfiClATION 1)E8 EtATS-UNIS D'AMfeRTQUE,
Port (tu Prince, Haiii, 11 Avril, 1917.
S. K. MoiXsiKUu Lotns Bokno,
^vvr6t(Ure (VlJtat <fes Relntionft KHMeurcH.
M(».N8[Ki'u LK Minihtrk: Me r6f(iraut k ma note du 7 Avril relative ft certaines
suggeHtious tonchant le projet de la Nouvelle Oonst tut'on huitionne et ft mon
41 vis que la Legation sera it en iMmsesslon des suggestions en question ilans
quelques jours, j'ai Diiinneiir de dire que mon Gouvernement m'a charge Oe
iwrter ft Tattention du (iouverueinent de Votre ExceUence son d^sir de voir les
cliangenieiit*? snivants dans le dit i>ro.1et :
Art. 4. Les <^transrers jouiront do toutes les protect'ons aocord^s aux haitiens
sans exception.
Art. .1. La condition <le crinq unn^s <le residence seralt 6cart6e. L*intention
de faire le commerce et tie rOsicler sera it ajoutee ft la llste des entreprises pour
lesquelles la propr!^t(* imniobili^re jHJUt Atre acqulse. L'exception concernaiit
I'intervtMition <iiplonnitique *«enUt 6<*Hrt^e.
Art. 96. Les Secretaires d'Ktat ne recevraient aucun frals de repr^sentaticm
en plus de leurs indeninit^s.
Art. 97 ft 104 iuclus: I><» Conseil d'Etat n'est pas n^essaire, 6tant donn^
I'existence du (^orps I^g'slatif, et les d^penses y aff^rentes ne sont pas justifiCes;
ft oniettre tout ce qui s'y r^f^re des articles 81, 94 et autres.
Art 121. Des dispositions seraient pr^vues pour la poursuite des juges en
Cassation et des jujres d'appel de la ni^nie faQon que pour celle des Secretaires*
d'Etat.
Art. 131. Serait In : I/exanien et la liquidation des eomptes de TAdinin^stra-
tion jrenOrale et de tons autres oftices coniptables envers le Tr^sor Public seront
determines par la Ini.
Les articles 182, i:^3 et 134 seraient ecart^s.
Art. 140. Les etran^ers joulraient de toute protection accord^e aux haitiens,
sans exception, et en outre, il ne serait pas refuse le droit de re<*lamer des in-
demnities pour les torts ou pertes eprouves.
^This Is a translation Into Frpiuh of the oriRlnal English tptJT, whirk Is not now
''^'^»»^>»«*- gitized byCjOOgle
INQUIBY IFrO OCCUPATION OF HATH AND SANTO DOMINGO. 41
Comnquently, the Haitian Government considers that when the details of
tbe agreement charge expenses against the Haitian administration, the means
of meeting them shall be furnished to the latter out of the funds of the public
treasury.
Immediate action on the part of the American authorities, in accordance with
the present memorandum, would be highly appreciated by the Haitian Govern*
meat
Appendix No. 8.
HArriAN Legation,
Washingtony November 15, 1918.
In the name of the Government, go without delay, personally, and transmit,
in writing, the following note to the Secretary of State, personally : " Just at
the time when Your Excellency is addressing the Haitian Government as the
Government of a free and Independent nation, just at the time when, thanks to
the power of the United States, the sacred principles of law, Justice, and re-
spect for small nations are triumphant in the world, the Haitian nation is prey
to tbe distressing and unjust tyranny of American officials who, contrary to
the treaty, are trying to impose upon the Republic of Haiti budget laws and
taxes, without examining anything with us, without recognizing the right of
the Haitian Government even to rectify evident errors, material and others,
made in their projects. The Haitian people are very sincerely determined to
bring about, with the aid of the American Government, all the refonns which
progress demands, but by means of the very cordial cooperation stipulated in
Mno) Y>tr>.u0^iy^nas^tgn.ji rising from examinations in common and not at all
t^^rrorizeil and helpless to resisV/>ns, announced without req^ect for. national
ihitted, as most of thein W4^re bro sentiments of a personal nature, in which
<lt»wly wntcheil." '• -v^untrles are not considered. Also, the
*he State Department. wh« J' *
'tuation in ''•«•
Appendix Ncv^.r^
In a memorandum dated January 25, 191©. addressed by the Haitian secre-
ts n- of foreign affairs to the State Dei>artnient at Washington, in reply to Mr.
IU)bert I^inHing*s note of November 30, 1918, we quote the following passage:
"When tbe Haitian newspai^er lx» Nouvelliste announced on Novemlier 22,
1018. in most cautions terms and in a tentative way, the recall of tlie financial
adviser, even ending its notice with praise for President Wilson, the owner of
the rwper, M. Chnuvet, was arreste<l by the agents of the occupation, inipris?
<»ne<l. sentenced by court-martial to a fine of $800, and forced to suspend his
paper for three months."
For tlie enlightenment of all, we reproilnce the article from Tx* Nouvelliste:
MR. Rl'AN RKCALIJSD.
*• It apiiears that Mr. A. T. ttuan has been relieve<l of his duties as financial
adviser as a resnlt of difficulties with our Government. The recall of Mr.
Kuan affirms the sentiments of riglit and Justice proclaimed by President Wilson
jind which, as the eminent statesman has often repeate<l, must be tlie c'onipass
which guides the relations !>etween all nations, great and small.'* *®
"This time -also the mere announcement of th's change, although it is made
witliont comment, is sufficient to indicjite the nature of the unjust and dis-
tressing t.vranny practiced hy American officials in Haiti toward the Haitian
Iieople.*' **
In a c<»nnHunicntion dated April 5, 1919, ^fr. Charles Moravia, Haitian min-
ister to Washington, recallefl this .serious incident to tlie State De])artmeiit,
<1irp<-tinp attention to " * • ♦ the excessive severity of these provost courts
ordering punishments out of all prop<»rtion L the crime committed.*' As an
example he cited the (^hauvet case mentioned in the memorandum of the Haitian
<l<)vernment, dated F€»bruary 25. 1919. and presented t<» the State T>epartment
•HI Februarj' 14 of the same year. And he addetl, " thei-e are many others." *2
•Pastor Etom of thi» Prot^-stant I'hurch of St. Mark (Ualtl*. in thf N.»w York
UvruM. Ort. 2r». 1920.
*MtalIi'« oUFH.
" Sw lln!tt«D Blue Book. 1921. p. 4S.
•MMd.. p. 172.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
44 IKQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOldlNQO.
In reply to the communication of the Haitian minister, Mr. Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State, said, in reference to the Gliauvet case, in his communication
of October 10, 1919 :
" You refer to the * excessive severity ' of the gendarmerie or provost courts
and cite as an instance thereof the case of Chauvet In regard to this case, it
may be stated that the sentence is considered as in all ways a proper punish-
ment of the offense committed." *"
Union Patbiotique d*HaIti.
The Union Putriotique d*HaTti is a nonpartisan organization founded at
Port au Prince, November 17, 1920, to crystallize the national 'aspirations of
the Haitians for the return of their independence, maintained, until the Ameri-
can invasion, for 111 years. Every one of the 27 districts which constitute the
Republic of Haiti is represented, and the Union has virtually the unanimous
support of the entire Haitian people.
LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS.
Chairnum. — M. Georges Sylvain, lawyer, former envoy extraordinary and min-
ister plenipotentiary of Haiti in France and at the Holy See, and officer of the
Legion of Honor.
Oenerai Secretary, — M. Perceval Thoby, former charge d*aftaires of the
Haitian Legation at Washington, and former chief of division of the depart-
ment of foreign affairs, former Inspector general of the consular service.
Treasurer, — M. Moravia Morpeau. lawyer, manufacturer, and former senator.
Archivist — M. Ch. Rosemond, notary.
Members of the board. — MM. H. Baussan, lawyer, planter, former presi-
dent of the senate; D. Bourand, merchant, former secretary of the interior;
F. L. Cauvin, lawyer, former secretary of the Interior and of Justice; D.
Jeannot, lawyer, former secretary of the interior and of Justice; Lespinasse,
lawyer, former envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of Haiti In
France, former secretary of foreign afltoirs, of finance, and of Justice ; L. Liau-
taud, lawyer; Price Mars, professor, former envoy extraordinary and minister
plenipotentiary of Haiti in France; L^n Nan, lawyer, former dean of the
civil court of Port-au-Prince ; Paul^us Sannon, publicist, former envoy extraor-
dinary and minister plaiipotentiary of Haiti to the United States, former
secretary of foreign affairs; Ls. Ed. Pouget, manufacturer, former senator,
former charge d'affaires of Haiti at Berlin, decorated with the black eagle;
St^nio Vincent, former secretary of the interior and of Justice, former presh
dent of the senate, former resident minister of Hlatl In Holland.
Advisory Council. — MM. G. Boco, plaater, former secretary of -agriculture
and public works ; Victor Cauvin, lawyer ; F. Colcou, physician, president of the
medical board; V. Delbeau, teacher, former secretary of the Haitian Legation
at Washington ; Arthur Holly, physician ; Abel N. L^ger, lawyer, former secretary
of the Haitian legation at Paris; Clement Lesplnasse, planter and manufac-
turer; Alexander Lllavols. former head of accimnts In the department of
finance and publicist; A. Rigal, lawyer, former district governor; P. Salomon,
head doctor of the St. Fran<,*ols de Sales Hospital, former dean of the MetUcal
School, former secretary of public education ; F. Vlard, merchant, former sec-
retary of the Haitian legation at I^)ndon ; Constant Vleux. planter, coedltor of
the Courier Haltlen, former secretary of the Interior ; Is. Vleux, law>er, former
government commissioner at the civil court of Port-au-Prlnce ; S. Pradel,
lawyer, former secretary of the Interior and of Justice ; H. Dorsainvllle, lawyer,
editor of L'Essor ; Hyson, physician, managing editor I^ Matin ; F. Dlanibois,
lawyer, editor of La Renaissance; FrM. Duvlgnaud, lawyer, coeditor of tlie
Nouvelliste; J6r^mie, planter, former secretary of public education, of Justice,
and of the Interior; J. C. Dorsainvll, physician, chief of division of the depart-
ment of public education ; A. Pierre Paul, merchant, former deputy- ; Pierre
Eugene de Lesplnasse, lawyer ; Fleury Lavelanet, manufacturer, former commu-
nal councillor ; Florvll Nan, planter ; Jules Canal, manufacturer, former deputy ;
St Martin B. Canal, planter, former deputy ; R. Brouaxd, merctant ; llrt^
mond Carrl6, lawyer; H. Laventure, teacher; Edmond lloumaio, plMXMdK
« See Haitian Blue Book, 1921, p. 175. ^
Digitized byVjOOQlC
usv^iBY imro occupation of haiti and santo domingo. 45
uitd I liMiiinl, former senator ; Paul Laroque, lawyer, former Judge of tlie
murt of cassation, former president of the senate; T. Laleau, president of bar
of Port-au-Prince, former secretary of Justice; H. Brlsson, president of the
chamber of eoinraerce, former president of the commerce court at Port-au-
Prlnce ; V. Gen*als, lawyer, former charge d'affaires of Haiti in Cuba ; Florlan
Alfred, former chief of the communal administration; F. B. C^sar, manufac-
turer ; Yil Lubin, planter ; Ren6 E. Auguste, planter, former deputy.
Mr. Anqell. I have here a brief statement in the nature of an outline not of
*peciflc charges but an outline of charges which have been made and have
been laid, and a suggested scope of the inquiry for the committee, offered with
the idea that we will supplement that within a very short time by a list of
specific witnesses whom we think it will be absolutely necessary for the com*
mittee to call, in order that it may arrive at the facts underlying the occu-
pation.
That is all, gentlemen, that we have.
The Chaibman. The committee had better receive your outline and incor-
porate it in the record. It will not be necessary for you to read it, I think. It
will be available to the members of the committee and the press when filed with
tlie committee.
<The statement referred to is here printed In full as follows:)
On behalf of the Haiti-Santo Domingo Ind^[>endeiiGe Society and the UnioD
Patriotlqoe d'Ealtl and the National Association for the Advancement of
Cotored People:
We re9q;>ectfully protest to the Senate Committee of Inquiry Into Conditions
In Haiti and Santo Domingo against the present occupation of the Republics
of Haiti and San Domingo by the armed forces of the United States and
demand their withdrawal and the restoration of the two Republics to their
complete and absolute independence in accordance .with thei? previously exist-
ing constitution as soon as effective native civilian governments can be erected.
We make this demand in the name of Justice, liberty, and the sacred right,
uphrid by the outcome of the World War to a separate existence and com-
plete freedom of every small nation' and in accordance with our historic Ameri-
can traditions.
We declare that the pulling down by violence of these Republics was without
adequate reason, was unwarranted in American or international law, un-
called for by the then existing political conditions, and in direct violation of the
fourteenth peace point of the United States as enunciated by President Woodrow
Wilson, the guaranteeing "of political independence and territorial integrity
to greet and small States alike."
We declare that the American occupation of these lands has to date been
destructive and without fundamental constructive value; that no foundation
has been laid for the permanent rebuilding of these governments; that the
physical lmprov«nents made, such as the building of roads and the sanitation
of cities have been achieved at an Indefensible cost — in Haiti at the price of a
forced enslavement under the Corv6e, which the American conscience would
never have permitted to exist had it not been veiled by an impenetrable naval
censorship.
We declare that American domination of Haiti and Santo Domingo has been
accompanied by individual wrongs and militarj^ excesses accentuated by the
<Ilf!erence in language, race, and traditions, and that it has afforded completest
proof of the truth of Alabama Lincoln's immortal saying that ** No man is good
enough to govern any other man without that other man's consent"
We declare that the constitution and treaty forced upon the Haitian people
and the military regime imposed upon the Dominican people without even the
>(anction of a constitution or treaty are unworthy of the genius and the gener-
osity of the American people and tend to the establishment of perpetual pro-
tectorates involving the domination of the development of those republics by an
alien govemamnt at Washington.
We dedare that the efforts of the State Department to compel the Dominicans
to slfif A treaty ratifying and approving every official act of this Government
t<> to Mlllrty Uttwerthy of any righteously minded country ; we affirm the right
aMlMi|p0ople'to complete redress for any injuries committed by the military
l#ldare that the acts of this Government in Haiti and Santo Domingo
^ July 29, 1015, have injured our relations with the Central American and
Digitized by VjOOQIC
46 INQITIHY INTO OCC^UPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
South Aiiieiican UepublJcs, threaten serioii>Hy t« affect our trade with thos.*
countries, and liave ja'nvely intenslfie<l the dlKtrust of ttie Cuited ^utes by t\w
snuiller American nations.
A. RKPUBLIC OK HAITI.
Tlie memoir presented to the Senate Foreign KeUitious (Committee <m May 0.
1021, l)y the delegation of the Union Patiiotlque d'Haiti contain.s serious and
<|ocumented charjjes ajrainst American administration in that Reptiblicj which
re<iuire most searching? Investigation. These charjjes attaciv the motive of tlie
inter\ention, the maimer of the intervention, tlie Imposition of a treaty upon
Ha t*. the subsequent repeated violations of the modus viveu<ll Unixised I)y
Americjm forces Ufxni Haiti, the failure of the American r(^jrlme to pay interest
in Haitian debts which have never lief ore het'u defaulted, the suppression of
the Haitian legrislature by armed American ofticei's, the r#jrlme of uiartial hnv
and censorship, the failure of the Mayo court of inquiry to call Haitian wit-
nesses or hear tlie Haitian complaints. The memoir also lists 25 n^ases of
'* atro<'ities " alleged to have been conunitted by the American Jorces ^ith narnc^
and dates.
B, UOMI.NK'AN REPITBLIC.
As to the Dominican Hepubll<% we know of no single ooi iprelieiMi ve report
or memoir similar to" the Haitian memoir which summarizes Adequately the
various charges brought n gainst the iwlnclple and the methtni of the armed
Unltecl States seizure and continued (K'CU)latioh of the country. We respectfully
suggest, however, tliat the following simnnarj' of inqwrtant matters might pr<h
vide a workifig basis of inquiry. Charges have been made of »uch serious
nature as to warrant and demand a thorough probe by this committee of all of
these topics. t
1. Conditions in the I>oniiuIcan Republic, an independent sovweignty, and
status of that Government vls-ii-vls the Unite<l States prior to 1916: trade, coni-
mewe, and industry; jwlitical stability and internal order: the « public debt:
treaties; convention of 1007; re<*elversh!p of cust<ims: agreement of 1912.
2. i^aiidlntr of I'nltwl States armed forces. May. 1910: seizure of customs, etc.:
j)retext and character of this violation of neutrality of an Independent sover-
eign nation. f
3. Kxtjension of United States military rule, supplanting and superse<ling
Dcmnnlcan Government : immediate establishment of cenwu'ship; executive order
No. 1 removing secrotjirles of war and interior, declaring ineUgiblllty of Do-
miniinns to hold these offices, and vesting these offices in Col. ,T. H. Pendleton,
I'nlted States Marine C-orps: further executive lU'ders re])lacing other ndnfsters
l)y officers of the Vnited States Marine Corvks; exe<'utlve order Xo. 12, suspend-
ing elections; executive onler Xo. 18, .Tnnuary 2, 1917, susi)ending Dominican
Congress, exi>elHng Senators and deputies from office an<l stopping the salaries:
nttempted negotiation of new treaty ; charge that official salaries of President
Hud otliers was mnde conditional on Its acveptance: their refusal and exile:
assumption of executive, administrative, legislative, ami judicial ix>wer by
I'nlted States milit^iry forces'; " imcif1catl<m " ; total Pondnican and total Amer-
ican losses: the IVfacoris campaign.
4. Methods and procedure of I'nlted States ndlitary government: (a) censor-
ship decree of December. 1918: of I>ecember 2S, 1910: exwutlve order Xo. 885
(Jan. IT), 102(M "abolishing" censorship but prosrriliing articles "hostile to
(lie ndlitary government. Its policy, or Its civil and military officers"; system
of provost courts and martlrtl law; prosecuthais under these decrees, (b)
nlleged military exc«esses; Archbishop Xouel's charges; later Instances alleged:
lmprl.««onment for political offenses, (c) Allege<l administrative abuses and lax-
ity. (<f) Encouragement of Imndgratlon of cheap West Indian labor, (e) In-
crease of public debt; reduction of customs dues, (f) Xeglected reports and
leronmiendations of c<msulting commission of Domlidcans, api)ointed by Admi-
lal Snowden.
5. Alleged advantages and benefits of the ndlltlary occupation :
(a) Schools, (b) Roads, (c) Land law. (d) Measures, If any, to en-
courage trade and Industry.
6. Effect in Central and South America of ndlitary occupation :
(a) Publicity given imprisonment of Fablo Flallo. {b) Dominican mission
which pi*ece<led Secretary Colby's visit to South America. (c> Effect upon
trade.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 47
7. Proposals of the United States for M^ithdrawal of forces and termination of
military occupation; proclamations of December, 1920, and June, 1921; pro-
posed ratification of nil of tlie acts of the military government, validation of
kMO, etc.
CONCLUSION.
This preliminary statement is submitted as an outline of charges and as
suggesting tlie scope of inquiry. We desire respectfully to reserve tlie right to
alter, .imend, or supplement this statement.
Tpon the termination of the hearings of the committee we shall request the
I'livUege of ^tubmitting briefs ui)on Uie evidence adduced. We proi>ose, with
the consent of the committee, also to submit constructive proposals for the set-
ting up of native governments In these two Hepublics and the trtinsfer to
native governments of the governmental functions now exercised by the UnitiMl
States military forces by such means as shall enable the American Nation to
be (tf the utmost friendly assistance to these neighboring peoples in the fiee
and onfettered es^ercise of their sovereign independence.
Respectfully submitted.
HArri-SANTO Dominoo Indkpendknce Society,
By Oswald Oasrison Vellabd.
Nation Ai, Association fob the Ain'ANCEMKNT
OF COLOBED PbXIPLE,
By James Weldon Johnson, Secretary.
Union Patbiotiqite d'Haiti,
By Stenio Vincent.
Ebnebt Anqell, Counsel
Mr. ANGKr.u That, gentlemen, is a ;reneral statement of the position which
we assume. ITie brl*^»f wlilch, with your iK»rnilssh»n, I sliall tile to day, refers,
as ro the Ketniblic of Haiti, to the memoir introdu<*e«l by Mr. Vincent, as a
^mttlnulry statement of ciiarges which have l>een made, and which we are con-
vinced your rrommittt^ should investigate impartially and thoroughly, to the
eod that all the facts may be bnaight out.
As to the Dominican Republic, we call attention in this brief to the fact that
there Is, as fnr as we know, no comprehensive report similar to the Haitian
memoir, which adequately summarizes the various and collective charges which
have been made against the military seizure and occui>atlon of the Dominican
Republic and its coimtry. In this brief, therefoi*e. we outline the principal topless
under which charges have been made, and which we resi>ectfully suggest the
wmuiittee should investigate, and we shall be prepared, at your (H>iiven'ence.
st^ntlemen. to offer testimony, thK'umentary and by witnes.«;es, upon the princi]>al
topics set out in the Haitian memoir and in our suggested outline of matters
rpjsirding the Dominican Republic.
In order to be able to do tl^nt. it is obvious that we must ask the connnlttee
rt's|)e<^tfully to subiKcna witnesses. Many witnesses naturally will not appear
voluntarily, merely at our request. That hapjiens in every law case and in
♦'v^ry dis|>ured investigation. People are unwilling to come unless they are
ilirwtwl to ap|)ear. When they are directed to api»ear, then they ccmie and
twtify to all they know.
S«*nHtor Kino. Are all the witnesses you have in mind in the l'nite<l States?
Mr. Anokix. Not at all, Senator. There are many in Haiti and Santo Do-
iningr*. It would not be our suggestion, of course, that the witnesses now in
those countries should l)e brougiit up here, but. rather, that they should appear
before the committee when, as I understand, the committee or a subcomnnttee of
the (.-ommlttee goes there. We shall l)e prepared in a very short time to submit
to the committee a list of the witnesses whom we believe it is absolutely Indis
pensable to call in order to arrive at the facts. That is our sole aim here. t<»
»«4«t the committee In so far as we can to arrive at the facta.
Senator Kino. When would you produce the witnesses in the United States
before the committee? Will they need to be subi>fpnae<l ?
Mr. Anoell. Oh, yes ; some of them will need to be subpoenaed.
Senator Kino. How many are there in the United States.
Mr. Anoell. We have a tentative list of witnesses which comprises about 20
«• 25, I think. That will undcmbtedly have to be supplementetl, and some of
thosp names that we have on the tentative list we will cross off. hut we are
convinced. Senator, tiiat the only \\-ay we can arrive at the facts here ?s. for
Instance, to request y«»ur committee to call l>efore It a number of the naval
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48 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
and marine officers who have occupied important iWHltiouH in the administra-
tion of the American occupation there. Obviously th(i8e gentlemen are not
going to c!ome at our mere request. I say, obviously. I take it for granted
they would not. Tliey would require at least a suggestion from the committee
to appear. Other officers of the Government may turn up; former officers who
might have to be requested to appear here in order that we may find out, for
example, why the United States went down there and occupied those two
countries.
Senator Kino. When will you be ready to submit to the chairman a list of
the names of the witnesses in the Unite«i States whose examination will be
necessary to elucidate the facts in the case?
Mr. Anoeix. Certainly within a week, possibly within a very much shorter
time, if the committee absolutely needs it
The Chairman. I think a week will be time enough.
Senator Kino. Well, Mr. Chairman, I, of course, feel like we ought to sab-
poena any witnesses who refuse to come upon notification, after we shall have
been satisfied that their testimony Is necessary. I think the captain should sub-
mit a list, and then he an<l his associates tell us the materiality and pertinency
of their testimony, and if the committee believes their testimony pertinent,
we ought to subpoena them If they refuse to come.
The Chairman. Is there anything further. Captain?
Mr. Anoell. I think not, Senator. We hoped the committee would to-day
give us some Indication of when you propose to begin the actual hearings, both
here and in Haiti and Santo Domingo, If the committee proposes to go down
there, so that we can, of course, pr^mre accordingly.
The Chairman. Until we have examined the memorials and statements filed
to-day, I do not believe we could fix the course of the hearings, or. Indeed, until
the list of names of those whom you Intend to have called as witnesses has
been filed. These hearings do not follow a set program. We go forward as
fast as we can. Unhappily, we have other duties to occupy us.
Mr. Angell— Coming back to what we were discussing a moment ago, that
Is the question of the witnesses, you asked me to submit a list of the witnesses,
indicating the probable materiality of their evidence, and, If I understood
Senator King correctly, whether or not they would come voluntarily at our
request. For example, as one name that occurs to me right away, we shall
want to request the presence here of Gen. Barnett for examination. I under-
stand he Is on the Pacific coast. If we write to him and say, " Will you come? "
obviously he could not leave his assigned duties and would not come on.
The Chairman. If you have nothing further to offer, Capt. Angell, we will
now hear Mr. Knowlea
STATEMENT OF MB. HOBAGE G. XNOWLES, REPRESENTING THE
PATRIOTIC LEAGUE OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND THE
DEPOSED DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT.
Mr. Knowles. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: I represent the Patriotic
league of the Dominican Republic, and the deposed Dominican Government.
Senator Kino. The latter consists of whom?
Mr. Knowles. The President and chief remnants or remains of that Govern-
ment which exists to-day.
Senator King. You do not represent Haiti?
Mr. Knowles. No. Owing to the absence of Dr. Henrlquez from the city,
who arrived only this morning, an hour or so Tigo, we have not been able to
prepare on the part of the Dominican Republic any form of memorandum or
statement. That will be done, however, in the shortest possible time.
I would like to inquire, in order that these two cases may not overlap or
may not be treated as exactly similar, because the conditions and the actions of
our Government in each of those countries were entirely separate and distinct
from what they were in the other, whether, as a matter of procedure and
policy, the committee would not prefer to take up the one and go forward with
it, and then take up the other.
The Chairman. Perhaps after you have filed the memorial on behalf of your
clients the committee can decide whether to proceed with the Investigation into
the Haitian occupation first or the Dominican occupation. We have nothing
l>efore us at this time. When can we expect a copy of your memorial?
Mr. Knowlkr. When will the committee have another session?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 49
The Chaibman. I was going to ask the consent of the committee that the
Chair might receive that memorial and distribute it in advance of the next
meeting of the committee.
Soiator King. Surely.
The Chaibman. May we have that some time within the week?
Mr. Knowles. Yes, indeed.
The Chairman. Then I can receive it, and it can be incorporated in this
record, with the unanimous consent of the committee, and distributed to the
members for their information.
Mr. Knowles. I think we can present that to you, Mr. Chairman, either Tues-
day or Wednesday, at the latest.
Senator King. I think it is very wise that we, so far as possible, keep the
two cases apart, and yet I can conceive that there may be witnesses who are
here from a distance who may be required to testify on both cases. In that
event I would, of course, feel that we ought to hear the testimony distinct on
one case, on Santo Domingo, and then move over and take their testimony on
the Haitian case, so as not to be compelled to overlap.
Mr. Knowles. That is practical, Senator.
(Mr. Knowles subsequently submitted to the chairman the following statement
on behalf of the Republic of Santo Domingo :)
To the chairman and members of the Special CommUtee of the United States
Senate to investigate the occupation by and adntiniatration of the Urvited
States in the Dominican Republic,
Gentlemen : The undersigned, Horace G. Knowles, adviser and assistant of
the Dominican National Commission in the United States, respectfully repre-
sents to your honorable committee, that since 1844 the Dominican Republic
has been a sovereign nation, and its people free and independent, and in no
less degree than the United States, Great Britain, Prance, the Argentine, Chile,
or Peru, and it has been so recognized by all the nations of the earth. Since its
independence and until the invasion and armed occupation by the United States,
which began May 15, 1916, and has continued uninterruptedly since that date,
it has been accorded an unconditional place In the family of nations, and with
many of them, including the United States, it maintained diplomatic relations
of the pleasantest character, and with them It negotiated treaties of friend-
ship and commerce. It Is a member of The Hague International Court of Arbi-
tration, and it would have taken an active part in the late World War, along-
side the United States, of course, and probably would have joined the League
of Nations, had it not been deprived of its sovereignty, liberty, and right of free
tad Independent action.
In 1916 when the Dominican Republic was at peace with the world, while it
was a party to two existing treaties with the United States, and In direct viola-
tion to one of them, and without the Dominican Republic having violated in
any way the other; against the sovereign rights of the Dominican Nution; con-
trary to the everywhere recognized principles of international law; breaking
the pledges contained in the United States' own interpretation of the Monroe
doctrine; disregarding both tlie letter and spirit of a resolution proposed by
the Unltefl States at the second peace conference of The Hague, and then and
there adopted and being in full force since then and until now; contrary to. the
miqaestionable meanjng of No. 14 of the famous Wilson*s " Fourteen Points *' ;
and In violation of the Constitution of the United States ; President Wilson,
without the slightest attempt to appeal to or use diplomatic means, ordered
a part of the United States Navy to go secretly, and without giving any notice
whatever to the Dominican Government, to Santo Domingo and to land there
Its troops, to seize the Government, and proceed to subjugate the people.
Obedient to such instructions, partly in the handwriting of President Wilson,
and signed by him, without in any way either consulting or Informing Congre.ss,
without a declaration of war, an illegal, unprovoked, unjustified, and totally
mwarranted act of war was committed against the Dominican Republic and
to people, and for more than five years the United States Government has
nttintakied a state of war in that country.
Stealthily American battleships entered the roadstead of Santo Domingo City,
and mider cover of a score or more of long-range, big-caliber guns the American
admiral, with a large force of marines, landed on Dominican territory. That
was a paramount act of war. A little later the said admiral presented to the
62269— 21— FT 1 4
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50 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAiIi AND SANTO IK)MINGO.
Domiiiiean President, Francisco Henriquez y Cai'vajal, who had been duly
elected and formally inaugurated, a ready-made treaty, an exact duplicate of
the one that had Just been, by guns and bayonets, forced upon the helpless
Haitian Government and people, and which treaty destroyed completely their
sovereignty, took from them their liberty and indei)endence, and put the coimtry
under the absolute control of the United States Government. The Dominican
President, mindful of the sovereign rights of his nation and of his oath of
office, his promise to uphold the constitution and laws of his country and to
defend it in every necessary and possible way. Informed the admiral of the
reasons why he could and would not accept such a treaty. It might be argued
that the Dondnican Republic would be better off under the control of the United
States ; and so might Brazil, the Argentine, Chile, and Peru, and even England
and France. That was the object and argument, which is the corner stone of
imperialism, that the Germans had in mind in 1914. The Dominicans were a
sovei-elgn i)eople, no less so than the Hrazilians, Argentinians. Chileans, i'eru-
vians, the English, and French, and people of the United States, and they, as
would the others under the same circumstances, wanted to remain free and
Independent, and It was their right to do so. That country was theirs as nmcli
as this country is ours, and so long as they respected their treaty obligations
and In no way molested foreigners or their interests they had and have the
right to do what they please in and with it. That has ever been the American
policy, and never was It better exi>re8sed than by President Wilson.
President Henrlquez refused to accept the demands of the American admiral,
whereupon the admiral, acting, of course, under orders from Wa.shington, pro-
ceeded to use pressure and force. One of his first acts was to issue a pi*oclamd-
tion of occupation, and in which he announced hini.self as the military governor
of the Dominican Republic. The proclamation gave two alleged reasons for
the armed Intervention and occupation, the first of which was a violation of
the treaty of 19()7, which allegation was, has been, and is stoutly denied by the
Dominicans; and the second was to quell disorders and disturbances in the
country. At the time the proclamation was issueil and for several months prior
thereto there were no disorders and ab.solute peace relgnecl throughout the
country. Disorders, when occasionally they did mrcur, were of a purely political
character, confined to the natives, and never even in a single instance did they
involve foreigners or In any way affect the liberty, property, or i)erson of
Americans or other foreigners. Never has an American or other foreigner been
attacked or killed or his property injured or imperiled in that country. Never
in the history of the country has there been a disturbance comparable to the
one that occurrecl recently at Tulsa, a short tinje ago at Springfield and Boston,
and that occur with increasing frequency In Chicago, New York, and all the
larger American cities. In that country lynchlngs. burnings at the stake, and
tar and feathering, now pastimes In some parts of the United States, are un-
known and never practiced. Life and property are more secure in any part of
that country than they are to-day or to-night in Central Park or on Broadway.
New York, and the total lawlessness for a year throughout the Republic Is less
than that which is recorded in any one of the five lai-gest cities of the United
States In 24 hours.
In accordMiice with the iilnn of ilu' said prodanuition the President and his
ministers of st:Ue were t'orcctl out of office; the (Government treasury was
seized; the national (*on.t,'ress was dismissed; electl»)ns were prohihiteil; thou-
sands of marines were spre.-nl over tlie country ami with unlimited nuth(M*ity
over the natives; publie nieetin^cs were not perni tted; a eensoisliip of ton.iiue.
pen, press, mail, and telegraph of the severest k lul was establshed ; a reign of
intense terror was Inaugurated ; destmrtive bombs wen* droi»i)ed from air-
planes upon towns and liandets; evei-y home was searched for arms, weapons,
and implements; homes were bnrne<l ; natives w(»re killed: tortures and cruel-
ties committed : and " Kntcher " \A>yler's liorrible <-oncentration cauips were
established, and his brutal methods that did so much to bring about mir war
with Siialn were imitated. Repressions and oppressions followed in sueceJ^sion.
When protests were made the prot(»stants were fined heavily and also Impris-
one<l, and wlien resistance or defense ntten)i»ted ballets {\nd bayonets were used.
Criticism of the acts of the military government were not pennitted, nor the
use of any patriotic expressions allowed, and those who violated the order were
severely puidshed by fines and Imprisonment. Hundreds of C5ii»able native Gov-
ernment employees were dismissed and their families distressed in order to
make jobs for Incompetent men sent from the States, and to whom much larger
salaries were paid than to the natives, and the Donnnicans compelhKi to pay all
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. gl
tlieir traveling and iucid<^ntiil expejii<es. The Douiiniciin people have been
*• taxed without representation " and the money so raised expended rec^klessly
uml without in any way consultinp them. Their forelsm uidebtedness has been
ffrently increa^ted against tlieir protests and in viohition of the treaty of 19()7.
For five years tliis policy of suppression, reiiresslon, op])ression, and niaiad*
ministration has continued. In the ixiuutry protests were neither listene<l to
nor i)erniitte<l. The practically deposed President came to Wasliington with his
protest and the appeal of the Dominican people. He aske<l I'l-esldent Wilson
uiid Secretary of State Lansing for the courtesy of an audience, and not even
the courtesy <»f a reply to his formal but jxdite requc»sts was shown.
Tliat evidence may l>e productnl before your honorable committee to substan-
tiate' tlie foregoing statements the Dominican people charge against the United
States Government as follows :
1. That there was no legal ground for the invasion and arnunl occupation by
the I'nited States Government of the Dominicaa Kepublic.
2. That such invasion was in direct violation of (1) the (.Vaistitution of the
Tnited States; (2) existing treaties with the Uuite<l States; (8) a resolution
proposed by the United States and adopte<l by the third conference of The
Hngue Tribunal; (4) international law; (.j) the obje<*t and purpose of the
Monroe doctrine as dellned by the United States Government; and (6) of the
fourteenth of the " fourteen points " of President Wilson.
H. That excesses, abuses, <Tuelties, and nmrders were committed by the ma-
rines, the iieople terrorized and their homes burned.
4. That the orders issued and enforced by tlie military (Government were
imreasonable, cruel, an<l totally un-American.
•x That private rights were invaded, and i)ersonal and cor))orate property in-
j«re<l, damaged, or destroyed by the military Government or its agents, and
ffreat losses Incurred because of them and their ordei*s.
0. That the administration of the ndlitary Government has been incomiietent,
wasteful, and extravagant.
The Donduican people are profoundly Impressed and deeply gratified by the
Jietioij of the Unitetl States Senate in condng to tbelr rescue, and that it has
«»r«Ier«l a full, fair, and honest investigation of all of the conditions anteee<ient
to the occupation of the Dominican Republic and the acts of administration
of that countrj' during the occupation by the Unlte<l States Government.
With an abiding faith in the American i)eople and in those fundamental
principles of iiersonal liberty, •' ctmsent of the governed," resi)ect for the rights
of foreign nations, large or small, and inherent justice to all, that have made
them into such a large and magnificent nation, tlie Dominicans will appear
i^efore your connnittee with all the proofs and evidence they can produce to
enable you to ascertain the truth, the rights and wrongs of the subject matter
80 solemnly confided to you to Investigate and report to the Senate your con-
scientious findings and recommendations.
• HonACE («. Knowles.
Washisoton, August 12, 192!,
[ M(>inoriu]dain presented to the committee of the Sennte of the United States, named to
inveetlirate the Military Occupation In SantA Domingo, by Dr. Henrlquez y Carvajal,
W*shington. D. C, Aug. 12, 1921.]
On Xoveml>er 29, 1916, acting under instructions Issued by the President of
the United States, a captain in the Uniteii States Navy proclaimeil himself
uiilitui-j- governor of the Dondnical Ucpuldica, and declared that <!Ountry in
a state of military occupation by the forces under his connnand. Shortly after-
ward, through i)ersonal decrees termed " Executive Orders," the aforesaid naval
officer ejected from office the duly appolntetl oflicials of the Dominican execu-
tive, dissolved tbe national congress, forbade the holding of any elections, and
arrogated to himself all the powers which the Dominican ccmstitution Invests
in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government. Justifi-
cation for that astounding action was based on the tbe<iry that an existing
treaty, the Dominican-American Convention, concluded in 10()7, with the object
••f insuring a regular settlement of the external debt of the Donnnican Kepub-
Hc, empowereil the Government of the United States to wrest from the Dondni-
ttin people their sovereignty, and to install an appointet* of the American Gov-
enmient over their institution.s, with the same iwwer as comes from martial
law during a state of war. Acting on this tlieory, ** under the authority of the
<Jr)vernu)ent of the United States," according to the i)roclanu»tion of oct!upa-
lion. the ndlitary governor sul>sequently declared himself, in bis own woixls,
** supreme legislator, supreme judge, and supreme executor"; established a
62 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
regime of military force and oourts^martlal ; set up a rigid censorship of a public
and private opinion; reformed existing civil, criminal, and administrative laws;
levied public taxes, and increased the public debt, and generally assumed the
position of an rresponsble dictator over the population of a nation friendly to
the United States, which had committed no act of aggression against that
nation or her citizens, nor had been guilty, or even accused, of any breach of
international law, and against which a state of war had not been declared.
The undersigned, duly elected President of the Dominican Republic, has
never ceasecl to protest against the illegal suppression of Dominican independ-
ence and against the harsh ordeal of militar>' dictatorship to which his people
have been subjected ever since this unwarranted and illegal intervention tiM)k
place.
Now that there is in the United States a new administration, pledged by the
campaign declarations of its Chief Executive to right the wrongs done by the
Wilson administration in the Dominican Republic, and It being bel.eved that
the policy of the present administration toward the weaker nations of the
American Continent will revert to the honorable and traditional standards of
justice set by the founders of this great Republic, the Dominican i)eople, throuj^h
the medium of their rightful President, invite the urgent attention to this
international affair, affecting so vitally the happiness and the liberty of the
Dominican people and the honor and good name of the American Nation.
The reasons asserte<l by President Wilson for the intervention and occupa-
tion, as set forth in the proclaniat on of occupation issued by Cnpt. H. S. Knapp.
recite that the Dominican RejuiWic had violated article 3 of the Dominican-
American convention by havinj; Incnmsed its public debt without the consent
of the (}overnm(»nt of the TnitcHl States. The proclamation reads, in part :
** Whereas a treaty was concluded between the United States of America and
the Republic of Santo Domingo on February S. liK)7, article 3 of which reads:
* Until the Donrnican RejHiblic has paid the wliole amount of the bonds of the
debt its p\il)lic <lebt shall not be increastnl except by previous agret»nient betwei'n
the Doni nican (Jovcmment and the l'nlte<l Stat?s. * ♦ ♦'
•'Whereas the (iovernment of Santo Domingo has violated said article 3 on
more than one occasion ; and
" Whereas the Government of Santo Domingo has from time to time ex-
pla^'ned such violation by the necessity of incurring expense incident to the
repress'on of revolution ; and
" Whereas the United States (government, with great forbearance and with a
friendly desire to enable Santo Doming^ to maintain domestic tranquillity and
observe the terms of the aforesaid treaty, has urged upon the Government of
Santo Domingo certain necessary measures which that Government has been
unwilling or unable to adopt: and
" Whereas in ccmsequence domestic tranquillity has been disturbed and is
not now established, nor Is the future observance of the treaty by the Govern-
ment of Santo Domingo assnre<l; and
*' Whereas the Government of the United States is determlnetl that the time
has come to take measures to insure the observance of the provisions of the
aforesaid treaty by the Reiniblle of Santo Dom'ngo and to maintain domestic
tranquillity in the said U«'pnblic of Santo Domingo necessar>* thereto:
"Now, therefore. I, II. S. Kna])!). captain. United States Navy, connnandin?
the cru!S4»r f<»rce of the United States Atlantic Fleet and the armed forces of
the Un:te<l States stationed in various places within the territory of the Do-
minom Republic, acting under the authority and by the dirt*ct!on of the
GovernnnMU of the Ignited States, declare and announce to all C(mcemed that
the ReiMiblic of Santo Domingo is hereby placed in a state of milltar>' occupa-
t On by the forces under my command and is made subject to military govern-
ment and to the exercise of military law applicable to such occupation."
The •* necessary measures " as expressed in the proclamation of occupation
wh ch the Government of the United States "had urged u|Km the Government
of Santo r>omingo," and which the latter had "been unwilling or unable to
adopt,' were emlxHlied in a proposed protocol of a treaty similar to the one
which the Republic of Haiti had been compelled to accept under thre»it of
military occupation, called for the control of the Dominican treasury and the
Dominican Army and police and every Instrument of public authority by offi-
cials appointed by the President of the United States. Said officials were to
be pad by the Dominican Republic, yet held to no responsibility for their acts
before the laws or the authorities of the Dominican Republic; and inasmuch as
they were not subject either to the laws of the United States, they were to
«ijoy an unprecedented inmiunity and exercise an unlimited and irresponsible
/
INQUIEY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 58
power over the Dominican people. It Is clear that such appointees would
coatravene Dominican sovereignty, and the exercise of their dictatorial powers
w»uld mean the end of free government in the Dominican Republic and the
eect.on of an Irresponsible, dangerous, and despotic dictatorship over the
^miuican people.
On Decenil>er 4, 1916, the Dominican minister in Washington, acting under
Dstruclions received from the deposed Dominican Government, tiled a protest
\t the State Department and before the La tin- American legations against the pro-
ceedings carried out in Santo Domingo and the resulting attack on Dominican
sovereignty. The protest was based on the following general premises, forming
tlie statement of the case from the Dominican standpoint :
1. Far from having violated Article III of the Dominican- American conven-
tion, that covenant had been most faithfully obsered in all Its clauses and pur-
poses by the Dominican Government, and, whereas the service of the 1008 loan
was be.'ng met even in excess of the minimum sums provided in the treaty, no
pablic debt Increasing the liabilities assumed by the United States In connection
therewith had been created.
2. The Dominican Government denied that the Government of the United
States had any right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Dominican Re-
public, excepting as provided in the convention to lend their protection, In case
of necessity, to the officials in charge of the customs collections, wtich case had
not occurred and was not In any way at Issue. Nevertheless, the Dominican
Government was willing to offer to the Government of the United States every
substantial pledge In connection with their purpose to bring about the establish-
ment of public order in a permanent way, and to provide for an improved
national financial system. But, great and sincere as their desire was to satisfy
the Government of the United States In this respect, and to Insure for the
Dominican people the benefits of political and financial reorganization, they
could not be brought to accept measures involving a loss of national sovereignty,
and the forfeiture of the liberty and the safety of the Dominican people, such
as would result If they would agree to the treaty proposed by the American
Government.
Z. In the face of the accomplished fact of the military occupation and the
violent suppression of Dominican sovereignty, the Dominican Republic made a
formal protest to the American Government.
It can be said that the kernal of the whole matter Is to be found in the re-
fusal of the Dominican Government to accede to and sign a protocol of a pro-
tectorate, exactly similar to the one imposed on the Republic of Haiti, which
the Government of the United States had been trying to force upon the Domini-
can R^ubllc since November, 1915, providing for the control of the Dominican
anny and police by officials appointed by the President of the United States,
tantamount to the forfeiture of Dominican Independence and the suppression of
free ^vemment In the Dominican Republic. The Dominican- American conven-
tion Is a clearly framed covenant, entered Into for clearly defined purposes. It
is held by the President of the Dominican Republic that no Interpretation of its
rtauaes. however strained, could rightfully justify such a demand nor supply a
legal basis for intervention and military occupation in any case.
In order to ascertain the scope of the provisions contained In Article III of
the Dominican-American convolution, it is necessary to recall the circumstances
which hrougbt about its creation, and to examine the alms of the parties thereto
at the time of its conclusion. They may be summarized as follows:
Prior to the year 1905 the Dominican Republic had Incurred In a foreign
«lebt, arising principally out of loans contracted with creditors of different
nationalities. Owing to lack of development and ensuing scarcity of revenue,
the service of these foreign obligations was frequently Interrupted. Attempts
at emisoUdation brought no relief, until, in 1905, enormous arrears in unpaid
principal and Interest had accumulated.
In 1907 the Dominican Republic, desirous of sparing the United States a
possible cause of embarrassment In connection with the maintenance of the
M«jnroe doctrine, and at the same time, to give Its foreign creditors full con-
Mence In the solvency of the Dominican Government and Its ability to pay
the principal and interest of its national Indebtedness, entered Into a treaty
with the United States, after a provisional agreement between the Executives
of both nations had been in effect for two years.
The outstanding features of this covenant were :
(«) The-«onsolldation of the external debt of the Republic ;
(ft) The issue of $20,000,000 bonds of the Dominican Republic, applicable to
the canceDation of the public debt; JIC
54 INQUIRY INTO (HXTPATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
(c) The guaranty offered by the United States Ooveniiueut coverin;: liii
bond issue;
.1
((I) The sujien'isioii, by the I'nited States (iovemnient, of the customs c
lections of the Dominicnn Uepublie. which were liened In the transaction :
ie) The allocation of u ceitain proportion of the customs receiptn, colltnt*
by a receiver general, ai)iM)lnted by the President of the Unite<l States, for tl
ser\ice of the loan, as provided in the convention ;
(f) The delivery by the jreneral re<-eiver to the Dominican Government «»(
any suri>lus revenue**, after the provisions relating to the service of the h^aii
had l>een complied with, and the receivership exi)enses had been coveretl :
if/) Tile (iblipration. entered into by the Dominican Republic, not to increase
its iniblic debt, except by previous agreement with the Utovernnient of tlu-
United States, until the bond issue should be totally paid off.
The avowe<l motives of the military occupation rest on the interpretation of
the dau.ses dealing with the features cnib(Hlie<l Jn paragraphs {p) and if).
i-eading In their essential parts:
. " On the first day of each calendar month the sum of $1(K),(MX) shall be paid by
the receiver to the fiscal agent of the loan, and the remaining colliH'tion (»f the
prece<Hng month shall be paid over to the Dominican Oovernment. or applit^l
to the sinking fund for the purchase or redemption of bonds, as the Dominicnii
(iovernment may direct." (Art. I.)
" Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of tlie bonds of
the debt, its public debt shall not be increased except by previoas agreement
between the Dominican Government and the United States." (Art II I. >
The purposes of the clause contained in Article III, to the effect that the
Dominican Republic should not increase Its public debt without the consent of
the (tovernment of the United States, was as must be dear; first, to i)reveiit
any impairment of the security covering the liabilities assumed by the United
States through the treaty, the customs collections. Any incTease in the publii
<lebt of the creditor — the Dominican Republic — might originate claims affectinir
her principal asset, the customs collecticms. on which the giniranti»r — the Unit^* !
States — held a lien: se<'on<l. to prevent the Dominican Republic, while engatif^!
in the gradual cancellation of the existing foreign 'ndebteilness, to what tlien
api^eared to be the limit of her financial ability, from incurring in indiscrini-
nate borrowing, which might result in a potential menace to the Monroe (1<«-
trine.
The provisions were being faithfully complied with by the Dominica]i H«*
imblic as follows:
(a) The sums provicleil in the convention to tlie ends si)ecified in Article I
were being collected without hindrance or opposition by the general re(»eiver.
and applied by him as directed in the treaty : and cancellation of the loan was
procee<ling more rapidly than contemplated by the covenant.
The following excerpts from the report of the general receiver for the ywir
1019 will show how the situation stood in this respect:
Statement of sinking fund, Dominican Republic, $20,000,000, customs adminiX'
tration loan as of Dec. 31, 1919,
RECEIPTS.
From general receiver of customs, account calendar year —
1908 $331, 7.-)7. 50
1009 200,<XK>.Of»
1010 — 260. 82(). 9(»
1911 394,092/^4
1912 - 482, 772.-'
1913 782, 908. .'^4
1914 _ 207, OfiO. •>!
1015 r>93, 58a 1''^
1916 664, 644. jT
1917 1, 295V, 042. 7.^
1918 788, 668. o\
1919 846. 961. '^\
From interest allowed by fiscal agent 165, 623. ^j
From interest received on bonds purchased 1,294, 491. >^*'
Total 8.309.087.J«»
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INQUIRY IXTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 55
!
. I J DISBURSKMENTS.
. fr' ir .57,784,9r>0 customs administrations bonds purchased, par
f' value $7. 784, 950. 00
t'ess discount 341, 851. 14
I 7,443,098.86
lash balance (several Items) 865,939.13
Total 8, 309.. 037. 99
Total of assets in sinking fund 8, 813, 075. Ji9
The above figures demonstrate that when intervention took place tlie Domln-
ic-an Republic was fulfilling the financial obligations of the conveution in t^xcess
of the minimum stipulated : and that the sinking fund, with the excei)tion of
the year 1914 — owing then to commercial paralyzatlon resulting froiu the out-
break of the World War — kept steadily increasing.
ih) The Hominican Republic had not contractetl any new public debt, in-
'Teasing the liabilities uj^sumerl by the United States through tlie conveu-
\hm or impairing the security — the custonis collections — pleilgcnl to the service
of the loan.
.Vs provided i!i Artich» I of the convention, the general receiver paid over to
the Doiiiinican Oovernnieiit the surplus outs-tanding of every month's C(»IUH-tinn
.ifter all the charges and expen.*^cs provldetl for the service of the loan had
l>een met. There is no provision in the treaty determining the application of
these sums, and so far as the Government of the United States is concerned in
connection with the duties and liabilities assumed througli the treaty, what-
ever application the Dominion Government saw fit to make of these funds
would be legally and practically Inconsequential, as long as their aprdication
in no way Interferred with the duties of the general receiver and the service
of the loan, and as long as new obligations, increasing the liabilities assume<l by
the United States through the Dominican-American convention, were not
contracted.
The surplus thus received by the Dominican Government was generally
applied to current budget expenses. During different perlo<ls in the y(*ars
1912-1916 the Dominican Government was forced to suspend payment on the
rejnilar national budget in order to provide for the expenses incidental to the
♦'xistenoe of political disturbances. These conditions, however, in no way
luterfereil with the service of the loan or the customs collections, which were
being collected and applied by the general receiver, as specified in the con-
vention. But salaries and other internal public items thus went partially un-
paid, and a floating indebtedness, arising out of these arrears, principally on
«*rvices rendered by Pondnican citizens to the Dominican (Jovernnient, was
formed.
Tile Government of tlic United States on several occasions remonstrated
witli the Dominican Government over the crerition of these internal credits,
alleging that same were a " public debt " and that the Republic was tl'eriby
violating article 3 of the convention.
The Dominican (Sovernnient held that the internal floating indebtedness was
not n "public debt," whether legally or in tlie sense carried by the aim and
'vords of the convention, and that the spirit and the letter of the tn»aty in the
I»rfivis1on contained in article ^ directed the restriction therein included to
apply to a regular public debt, increasing the llnbilites assume<l by tht* United
States through the treaty or imimiring tlie securities tendered in tlie same by
the Dominican Republic.
It would seem that but little doui>t can be entertaine<l regarding the status
^>* the internal tloat'ng indel>te<lness and the inadequacy of its being con-
>=iderwl a puldic debt from a legal iK)int of view. All authors agree that a
puhllc (lel)t must bear a distinctive condition, the fact of its having l)een legally
<ontr<ieted or accepted by the State. A public debt is a contract debt, while
the imlehtHlnesfl Incurred by the Dominican Government toward Hs own citizens
was an occasional liability resulting from force majeure, .which prevented the
exwutive from making effective all the appropriations provided in tlie i)udget.
R»*garding the point, still more important, i)erhai)s, and more pertinent to
die purpose and ol)ject of the convention, as to whether the existence of these
internal credits increased in any way the liabilities assumed by the I'nited
States through that covenant, it seems absolutely impossible to argue success-
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66 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
fnlly any such contention. How could theee internal obligations, due in their
immense majority to Dominican citizens, constitute a menace to the Monroe
doctrine, which the convention was designed to safeguard in its integrity, or
impair in any way the guarantee offered by the United States to cover the
bond issue? They had not been and could not possibly become a cause for
action by a foreign Government. Their creation and existence had not inter-
fered and could not possibly interfere with the proper management and applica-
tion of the customs collections as provided in the treaty by the receiver
general.
The situation on its face does not seemr to have Justified the allegation made
by the United States Government to the effect that the Dominican Republic
had violated article 3 of the convention. But even had that claim been
established, there is nothing In convention, nothing in international law, and
it would seem, from the viewpoint of the Monroe doctrine, nothing in the
fundamental policy of the United States to Justify the violent action taken
by the American Government of invading the Dominican Republic, over-
throwing the constitutional Government, and suppressing its sovereignty as a
sanction for an alleged violation of a treaty clause and for the refusal of the
Dominican Government to subscribe to an unconstftutional protocol surrender-
ing the sovereignty of the nation, the liberty of the people, and the prlncii^e
of free government into the hands of appointees of the American Government.
How far the recent policy of the United States Government in the Dominican
Republic has strayed from the true aims of the convention and from the prin-
ciples and purposes pleading the American Government to conclude that
treaty may be Judged on examination of the following excerpt from President
Roosevelt's address to the Senate on the subject In 1905, when he submitted
the provisional protocol preceding the treaty :
" It can not be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States
has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of
any of Its southern neighbors and will not treat the Monroe doctrine as an
excuse for such aggrandizement on its part
" We do not propose to talte any part of Santo Domingo or exercise any
other control over the island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilita-
tion in connection with the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned
over to the Government to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part
of which will be distributed pro rata among the creditors of the Republic upon
a basis of absolute equity."
The mechanism provided in the treaty for the regular and unhampered col-
lection of the customs duties by the general receiver and their proper applica-
tion was designed to work adequately — as it actually and effectually did, under
all circumstances. Had the United States Government considered, at the time
the treaty was drafted, that military control of the Dominican Republic might
become necessary to insure the attainment of the object pursued — the settk-
ment of the foreign debt of the Dominican Republic — they would certainly not
have consented to assume the liabilities and responsibilities devolving upon the
United States through the covenant without securing by adequate provision
the right to that action. As a matter of fact, at the time the convention was
being drafted the Government of the United States had the opportunity to
satisfy itself that possible revolutionary disturbances would not interfere with
the management of customs collections by the general receiver as long as the
officials in charge of the collections received due protection in the discharge of
their duties, as was provided in the convention. This conviction was the re-
sult of experience, for during the initial period of the " modus Vivendi " the
supervision of customs collections and their application to a provisional fund
by American officials was carried out under a state of widespread revolution.
It is difficult to conceive that, with such an experience to build upon, the United
States Government should have neglected to obtain by provision the necessary
liberty of action, had the sound, evident object of the treaty been other than
to insure a regular settlement of the Dominican external debt, or had that
Government foreseen — as they could not fail to have foreseen if the case could
really present itself — that revolutionary disturbances might interfere with the
proper observance of the treaty. On the contrary, and as a result of their
experience, the treaty was made revolution proof through the placing of the
customs collections under the absolute control of the American general receiver,
and the granting to that official and to his subordinates of due protection by
both Governments.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINQO. 57-
The consequences of the violent and unwarranted action adopted by the Qov-
ernment of the United States in the Dominican R^ublic appear now in the
form of a dismal le^al situation. The constituted authorities of the Republic
were deposed, and the military government, whose authority originates in the
laws of war, has governed with dictatorial powers a people who were in no sense
at war with the United States, and against whom no legal state of war existed.
In the exercise of this singular authority the military government has over-
stepped even the broadest interpretation of the powers vested in such a govern-
ment by the laws of war, inasmuch as it has assumed to act for the Dominican
Republic in the performance of actions which only the people of that Republic,
in the exercise of their sovereignty, and through their legal representatives,
have the capacity to perform. Among the actions thus performed it is only
necessary to cite the api>ointment of certain diplomatic envoys and the con-
traction of public debts. Outside of this special phase, and always assuming
to act in the name of the Dominican Republic, the military government has V
promalgated and enforced taxation and legislation without the slightest repre- '
sentation of the people, without their consent, and in many instances indirect
opposition to their expressed wishes.
The substance of the whole situation is that of an illegal government, arising
oat of an illegal intervention — as the present President of the United States
characterized the Dominican occupation — suppressing the lawful Government
of the Dominican Republic, and has been promulgating constitutional legisla-
tion, in the name of the Dominican Republic, for a period of nearly five years.
That such proceedings should have been carried out under the authority of the
people of the United States, the pioneers and champions of free government
and liberty in the continent and throughout the world, adds only to the amaze-
ment of the case.
The illegal status of the military administration in the Dominican Republic
is 90 evident as to necessitate no elaborate discussion. The late administration ,
a few months before its end was made aware of it, and undertook to get out of
the trouble it had placed itself in.
The plan prescribed by the last administration on 23d of December, 1920,
for the prompt withdrawal of the American forces, which had occupied the
territory of the Dominican Republic, was repudiated by the majority of the
Dominican people in view of the conditions which were to be carried out
before the retirement of the American forces and the restoration of the Do-
minican Government, and this notwithstanding the positive declaration that
the time liad arrived when the American Government should divest itself of
the responsibilities assumed in the Republic. That plan was followed by
another announced by the present administration and published by Rear
Admiral Robison in Santo Domingo on the 14th day of June last. This new
plan indicates a period of eight months for the definite withdrawal of the
American forces and the restoration of a national Dominican Government; it
constitutes the military governor the provisional Dominican executive, giving
h\m the authority to promulgate an electoral law, to convene the people to the
elections, to name diplomats who will receive his instructions, to join with
the American Government In a treaty of evacuation, according to which the
Dominican Republic will obligate Itself (a) to ratify the acts of the military
government; (b) to agree to a loan of $2,500,000 to be applied by the mjlitary
government to complete certain public improvements; (c) to agree to a further
guaranty to protect the payment of the public debt in case the customs revenues
are not suflScient; and (d) to intrust the command and organization of the
public Dominican forces to American officials, who would form a military
mission, would receive compensation from the Dominican (Jovernment, be
under the authority of the Dominican President, but would be named by the
President of the United States.
This last plan has aroused a unanimous and formidable protest among the
Difflalnican people, who absolutely repudiate it, for they understand such plan
l» in conflict with the inherent rights of their sovereignty and iudei)endence.
Without touching on any legal premises, I must distinctly point out that the
demand to have the I>oniinican people consent to a control and command of
its armed forces by American officers would in fact create a fundamental
obstacle to the success of those aims of friendly assistance which, it is as-
sumed, the Government of the United States has toward the people of the
Dominican Republic.
This is not a proposition whose acceptance might depend on a more or less
tccnrate comprehension on the part of the Dominican people of the^ friendly
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58 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
purposes by which it is inspiretl. There underlies a question most vital to
the Dominican people, who long ago fonned their opinions and Intentions in
regard to this matter that so much concerns their nationul life, present aiitl
future. It need only be recalle<l that it was precisely because of this tlmt
In 1916 they chose to Inctu- — temporarily they were told It would be — the
painful trial of military occupation and military (jovernment rather thau
submit to the demand first made by the American (Jovemment upon tlie
Dondnican Uovernment and ])eople.
This same proiwsitlon, for the <'ontrol of the armed forces of the Dominican
llepubllc by Americnn officers, " appointed by the President of the Domlnicnn
Kerjubllc," but "on doslgnution or recommendation of the President of the
liilted States," is textually the Imsis of the treaty proposed by President Wil-
son's adndnistration to the Dominican Government in a note sent through the
United States I^egation in Santo rumiingo («i November 19, 1915, and Inter
sought 1>\ that same administration to be forced by military occupation \i\>ow
the Dondniran <Jovernnient ; ami it was this A-ery intervention that the present
<'hief l^xecufiv*' of the United States charged as "illegal," when outlining
before the American elertorate his contemplated governmental policies.
Tlie pr» ►position was rejecteii by President Jimenez's atlministration in
191.1, It was again rejected by my own administration in 1916, in the face of
the most ruthless iinancial and military coercion, sai<l rejection being the
muse of iiroclamation of military government in the Dominican Republic. The
I)enple at that time manifestwi in aft unmistakable manner that they i^refcrnnl
to suiter the consequences of that or any other act of force of the Government
of the Unite<l States rather than voluntarily divest themselves of their sov-
ereignty, surrendering by a treaty forced upon them the control and command
of their armed forces t«) foreign oiiirers. This pre<licament of the Ihiminican
peoi>le in this respe<'t has not undergone the slightest change or alteration
throughmit vbe five years of ndlitary occup«ti<m, and is the same to-day. If
there is any change, it is that the harshness, incompetency, and costliness of
the American nulitary goverinnent have only strengthenefl their determination
and confirmed them in their ai>prehension of the ills that would surely result
from such an arrangement as Washington proposed and tried to force upon us.
The refiisal of the Domlidcan Government, the President, his ndnisters of
stat«», and the national congress to accept the proposition was inspired by un-
challengeable motives of fidelity to the sacred trust committed to them and a
firm desire to uphold antl ])rotect the constitution of their country. Had either
the Jimenez adndnistration in 1915, or my own in 1916, yielded to the demand
of the Government of the United States, their officials would have been pro-
tecte<l and Icept in power by the Government of the United States through
the contemplated arrangement, but they would have become justly and pro])-
crly objects of execration by the Dominican people.
The motives, therefore, standing l>eliind this steadfast and h(mest conduct
on the part of the officials of two different and distinct Dominican administra-
tions, and which were so loyally aT>proved by the people even in the face of
untold hardships and suffering caused by the military occupation of their
territory, shonhl. it seems to me. connnand serious ccmslderation from all men
ir.sjared by the love of justice and patriotism. The opposition of the Dominican
peor>h*»tt» the (Jovernnient or rule the Ignited States sought and endeavored
to inip(»se ui>on them, was based upon two grounds: First, on an iidierent love
of liberty and independence such as insi)ired your forefathers to rebel against
the British: and seccmd, a well-grounded fear of countless Irremediable Ills
they would be coniiKdled to sufier as a con.sequence of the irrespcmsible jwwer
which such an arrangement would idace in tlie hands of foreign ofllccrs destined
to ride over them.
Such an apprehension, events have shown, was fully justified. The officers
called to exercise these extraordinary powers would be really placed above
every law and every effeitive contnd, <»ther than the distant, indirect, and totally
inade(iuate control which nnght be exercised over them by the Government of
tlie Unlteil States, Possessing themselves or controlling every material agency
of autliority, they could easily force the legal agencies to conform entirely to
their will, however arbitrary. The government of the Republic would soon l>e-
come a sad toed of their caprice ; the national institutions would f imction under
their dictation, and the i)eople would have no legal or nmterial recourse ojien
against this condition of vassalage, while their Government would either re-
nniin impotent to i)rotect them against any excesses of such foreign otlicers. or,
if perchance it wo\dd fall into weak or unworthy hands. iKmlght jaccept any
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INQUIRY IXTO OC'Ca'PATIOX OF PIAITl AND SANTO DOMINGO. 59
kind of tyranny in order to poriw»tmite themselves In [M)\ver (les(»ending even
to abuse of tlie laws and a prostltntkm of the public suffrape.
It is a universally adnilttHi Hoci}il axiom that no irresponsible a^ncy of
j:uverument I'an i-enialn in existence without ilegenerating by natural gravitation
into effective tyranny. The i>roiK)sition in question wotild sinn>ly resolve itself
In fact, if not in statute, in the i>erpetuatlon of an irresponsible nillitary r^j^Iine
in Santo I>oininj;o. Should any dou})t as to the propriety of the foregoing ass(»r-
riun Jirise, such doubt might !)e dispelletl by sin impartial ponderation of the ex-
«vsses comm;tte<l by the subaltern military authorities of <»ocupation in Santo
minilnj<o, omimitted while these subaltern oftif-ers were resjMinsible for their
(inuhict, not beft»re a native jrcn-ernntent. helpless to repress then), but bef«rre
tliHr oAvn senior offi<*ers, who were honestly l»e!it on having the laws and all per-
wnal and prf»perty rljrhts res|>ected. Tlu^se ex<'<*sses have been witnesse<l and
niniiiiented ui^m by imparfal Americains, and reco^niized by the authorities <»f
rlie occupation in a general order of Itcar Admiral H. S. Knapp, and in an
(itRdfil statement published by order <»f Admiral Snowden on January 9, 1920,
11 which it was specifically state<l that ** some std>altcrn military autlnu-ities had
t'Xj-wHled themselves to cruelty in tlieir measures of repression.'* Such ex<»esses
are fatally inherent to a military r^jfime and to the exercise of military su-
Iireniaoy in public administration. I liope I will not incur an indiscretion by
recalling in th.'s connection the condition of the Southern States of the I'nlon
when. Ht the termination of the (^Ivll War, tliey were subje<'te<l to ndlitary gov-
ernments; and th€»se were administered, It is adnUtte<l, by general officers of
national birth and unimpeachable character. No i)ossible excellence of per-
sonal conditions cim compensate or offset the blemishes and wrongs of a rCgime
of force. A regime of absolute (naitrol of the armwl forces of the Dominican
Republic by American of!i<i»rs, whatever its external characteristics, will in-
evitably degenerate into a regime of force.
I can not bring myself to believe that the Druninican i»eople merit in any way
such harsh and severe treatment, whatever be the friendly motives inspiring such
a iK)licy on the part of the T^nite<l States (Jovernment. Such a policy, further-
more, could not claim any other basis than the right of conquest, which the re-
IH'sjted prcmtmncements of the United Stiites Government aiul its international
IM'licy. recently expresse<l by President Harding and Secretary Hughes, seem to
(•"nflict in every way. The' fears expre.sse(l in regard to the future security of
American life and i)roperty in the Dominican Uepubllc can not, to my knowledge,
Ik* substantiated in one single instance of attack upon such persons or proiKjrty,
•T any other foreigners, prior to the intervention.
The Dominican ijeople, however, are willing and able to tender the most ef-
fwtive guaranties, not only in regard to the security of foreign life and property
»IK)n a cessation of the military occupation, but also in regard to a i)ernuinenr
MiI>pre8aion of political disturban(»es and the maintenance of public peace. I
M Inclined to believe that an unbiased consideration of the suggestions I am
about to submit will c<mvincc of the feasibility of harmonizing the interest of
tlie United States Government by obtaining sufficent guaranties for the mainte-
nance of public iK»ace in Snnto Domingo and in such a way as will not conflict
with the just asjdratlons of the Dominican people for the preservatiim of their
liberty and national dignity.
Sunuaarizing our views on the basis of the foregoing conslderatltms, we may
I'wince them to the following jiroposithms :
1. The restoration of national government in the I)<iminican Republic should
be (iirried out in such a way as to in no way imimir or restrict the sovereignty
•'f the Dominican people.
2. To this end the total evacuation of Dominican territory by the American
naval forces, now exercising control through a ndlitary government, should be
• arr.ed out as soon as said national government is duly const itute<l.
*i. Concurrent ui)on the prtH^e<lent conditions, the Dominican people should be
afwrded full opiwrtunity to freely reorganize their administration In accordnnce
^vitli their own c*<mstltution and their own laws, and within the unhampered
exercise of their sovereignty.
CONCl.rSION.
(A) The Dominican Uepubllc has always been, is, and desires to be a free and
iiHleiiendent nation that has always be<»n governe<l by its own laws since it was
(imstituted on February 27, 1844, a sovereign StJite and assumed its position
internationally. ' ^ .
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60 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
(B) The Dominican Republic has been and is recognized by the nations of
the world as a sovereign nation, self-governing and sufficient unto itself to
comply with its duties as a sovereign State. The recognition has been recorded
many times in treaties of peace, amity, and commerce entered Into not only
with the United States but also with the principal countries of the world. In
consequence of such recognition the Dominican Republic has figured equally
with the other nations, great and small, as an integral part with its voice and
vote in international congresses, such as the Second Peace Congress at The
Hague in 1907 and the Pan American Congresses called on different dates at
distinct points in the Americas on the initiative of the Government of the
United States or some of the Latin American Republics.
(C) The Dominican Republic has never subscribed with any nation any
agreement which would restrict Its capacity as sovereign State, nor established
to its prejudice any kind of subordination of its political organization or own
administration. The convention with the United States in 1907 alone demon-
strates the sincere desire of the Dominican Republic to pay its debts, and the
unlimited confidence which It had and maintains in the good faith and loyal
friendship of the United States. That convention granted to the United State*
the authority to control the Dominican customs service, with the specific and
exclusive object that each month there would be separated from the customs
collections a fixed sum to insure the payment of interest and amortization of
the public debt. During the 14 years under the convention the service of the
Dominican debt has never failed to be met with absolute promptness, and more»
by virtue of contingent receipts which might be and In effect have been in-
creased year by year, the debt has been liquidated to such an extent that not-
wit^tanding additional increases authorl^ by the American Government, it
will be entirely liquidated, according to the calculations made and published
by American officials, 33 years before the date of maturity stipulated.
(D) In no clause of that convention is the United States given the authority
to undertake any kind of intervention, much less an armed one, in Dominican
territory.
(E) The convention of 1907 does not accord any authority to the United
States to intervene in any manner in the Dominican Republic, and though on
the supposition that it might have been granted In the case of the failure of
payment of the debt, nevertheless, in no way would such Intervention be
explained when the payments, as the annual reports of the general receiver
show, has never failed to be regular, authentic, and publicly known.
(F) Neither does the convention of 1907 nor any other treaty made by the
Dominican Republic accord to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of any other nation the authority to intervene in the domestic
affairs of the Republic on account of political disturbances. The real cause of
these disturbances constitute a subject for deep study and concern for Domini-
cans,^ who for many years have sought as a remedy for this evil a new and
modern political and administrative organization which would suppress political
bossism and put an end to abuses of unscrupulous public officials and would
permit the establishment of a popular, responsible government of, by, and for
the people, capable of maintaining a broad program of peace, progress, and
greater liberty.
(G) The friendly influence of the Government of the United States can be
very beneficial to the Dominican people. It should not ^aspire to anything more
than to be useful in the development both commercial and Industrial and
economic and political. But a system of subjection sanctioned by the American
Government to accomplish these ends would only produce lamentable conse-
quences. Instinctively the Dominican people have rejected it, because it con-
stituted a threat against their national life. After having compared demon-
strated acts, Dominicans are Justified conscientiously in continuing to repu-
diate It
(H) Finally, the situation created in Santo Domingo after five years of mili-
tary occupation, with the destruction of the civil government by virtue of a
foreign military government which has acted without the consent of the people,
is anomalous, illogical, unjustifiable, and Indefensible.
It Is urged that an end be put to it, leaving the Dominican people alone and
free to reconstruct their system of government and to continue managing it
with their own laws, in their capacity of being free, sovereign, and Independent
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 61
STATEMENTS OF CAPT. C. S. F&EEMAK, TTNITED STATES NAVY,
NAVY DSPA&TMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C, AND HAJ. EDWIN N.
NcCLELLAN, UNITED STATES MABINE COBPS, HEADQX7ABTEBS
UNITED STATES MABINE COBPS.
The Chaibman. Capt. Freeman, you have a statement, I think, prepared at
the request of the Secretary?
Capt. Freeman. Yee, sir; the Navy Department has prepared two separate
statements, one on the Dominican Republic and the other on Haiti. They have
been prepared in different offices of the department, and approach the subject
in different ways. The Navy Department has had a very short time to make
np a statement for the committee, and consequently it was thought best by the
Assistant Secretary — the Secretary being absent from the city — to send down
the officers who have been mainly responsible for making up these statements.
I have a memorandum prepared on the Dominican Republic, and Maj. Mc-
riellan has a somewhat different document prepared on the Haitian Republic.
We are here simply to submit these ; and if the committee requires any infor-
mation in the shape of facts in regard to the Dominican Republic or Haiti we
are prepared to answer in regard to them, but we do not represent the depart-
ment as to its policy.
Senator King. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of Ma J. McCIellan whether he
prepare<l that statement in the light of this memoir?
Maj. McClellan. This statement was prepared at the direction of the Secre-
tar>- of the Navy, to include all the possible facts, from the date of the original
occupation of the Reppblic of Haiti in 1915 until the present time. It is just
a copy of documents and reports. In other words, it is not a compilation of
opUiions or anything like that. It has nothing to do witli any memorials or
anything else. It is purely an open, frank statement, as far as possible, from
the records of the Navy Department.
Senator King. Then you might want to supplement that after an examination
of the charges preferred in the memoir? I do not use the word ** charges ** in
any offensive way, but the charges which may be preferred by the Dominican
Oovemment
Maj. McClellan. I should say that the Secretary of the Navy would direct a
representative to prepare a reply, or to cross-examine and carry on every in-
vestigation necessary which is disclosed by the memorial.
Senator King. You would not feel, then, like withholding what you have this
morning until
Maj. McClellan (interposing). No, sir; it is for the benefit of the committee
in arriving at their conclusions on the facts.
The Chairman. Is there no summary of the occupation, no preface to the
Maj. McClellan. This is contained in chronological order. Senator. As a
matter of fact, it gives a brief history of the Republic of Haiti right from the be-
K'nning down to 1921. Everything is chronologically arranged. If the committee
<lesires, the Navy Department would be very glad to prepare a brief summary,
hut in view of the fact that this material was prepared in practically two
days, you can well see that one would not have the time to put the essential
points in any digest or any summary.
The Chairman. I suggest that since two different officers in the department
have prepared these records in two days, that they be prepared to file with the
committee next week such supplementary matter as in their judgment would
be useful to the committee; in the case of one, perhaps, a summary statement;
and. In the case of tlie other, perhaps, some additional documentary matter.
Senator Kino. I was going to suggest that that seems to me to be an immense
volume, much of which is wholly irrelevant and Immaterial.
Maj. McClellan. It Is all very relevant, so far as any investigation is con-
cerned. It shows the events, as well as the cause or reasons, historically, as
well as the expedients, at the time of the occupation in 1915. It is not an
argument, but merely the facts.
Senator King. Then if you had further time, you would not abridge that?
Maj. McClellan. Not at all ; I would merely supplement it with an index for
the benefit of the committee, as well as certain documents.
The Chairman. You have, of course, a copy of that in the department?
Maj. McClellan. I have copies, except of the last 20 pages. I wrote it so
hurriedly this morning that I could not finish it.
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62 INQUIRY INTO (H'CHTPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Tlie Chairman. Will you take that witli you for your convenience, and return
it to us with your index and summary, if that suits the other members of the
committee?
Senator King. I think that is a good suggestion.
(The matter referre<i to is here printecl in full, as follows:)
Hkaikh'arterk rxiTKD Statks Marixe Corps,
^ya8hmffton, Aiiyttst 15, J021.
Menun-juiduni for Senator Mc<'ormick.
Sul).J(H*t : Memorandum on the Kepuhlic! of Haiti.
Inclosure: 1.
1. In jH-c'ordauce with instructions received from the Assistant Swretary of
the Navy, there is transmitted herewith a short and concise report on the
Kepublic of Haiti, in place of the oriRinal and more voluminous report which
was (Jellvered to you by Maj. Mci^lellan on Au^nist 5. 1021.
John A. Lkjkink.
Major (ienvTttl^ Coutmandant.
[Memorandum on the R<>i>ublic of Haiti nropnred for Senate commltte«» appointed to
inquire into the occupation and adminiKtration of the Uepubllc of Haiti and the
Dominican Kepublic by the forces of the Tnlted State«.l
KARLY HISTORY OK THE RKPrHUC OF HAITI.
The west one-third of the island of Haiti forms the Ueiaildic <»f Haiti whle
the east two-thirds c(»mes within the boundaries of the Dominican Uepubllc.
Haiti was discovered by Columbus, who lan<le<l on tlie Mole St. Nicholas
iKK'ember 6. 1492. Slaves were lmporte<l into Haiti by the Spaniards as early
as 1512, and their descendants now reside iu the Uepubllc of Haiti. The treaty
of 10J)7 dlvide<l the island, the western part to France and the eastern part to
Spain. The treaty of 1777 flxwl the boundaries between the two div'sions. Tl)e
national convention of 1791 conferivd uimmi the fret^ nnilattoes all the privileges
of French citizens. The decn»t» c<»nferrlnjf these ripjhts beinp revoke<l. tlie
nmlattoes. ,1oine<l hy the plantation slaves, broke out in insurrecton. ami
turmoil last<^l for several years. A FrcnHi connnission proclaimed the aboli-
tion of slavery in 17n.'{. In 179r> France acquirtMl title to the entire island.
Toussaint I'Ouverture l>rouKht order out of the <'baos that hatl exlste<l since
1791 and then published, subject to the approval of France, a form of c<mstltu-
tional pivernment umler which he was to ^rovern for life. This step arouseil
the suspicions of Honaparte, wh<» sent Oen. I^ Clerc with 25,000 troops to thwart
the ambitlcais of Toussaint. I*e (^lerc reestablished slaverj-. After a lonjr
strujr^rle Le (Men* proposed terms, and Toussaint, inducnl by the most solenm
guaranties on the part of the French, laid down his arms. He was sent to
France, where, in 1803. lie died in prison. This treatment of Tcnissaint eause<i
the Haitians to believe themselves betra.veil by the French, ami they renewe<l
the strupfrle under the leailership of Uessalines. The French withdrew from
Haiti in 1803.
On January 1, 1804, occurred the dtM'laration of Haitian lndei)endence and
the restoration of tlie orljrinal name of Haiti. Since this date, a period of over
117 years, Haiti has nudntained her Independence without break, and this has
cau.se<l the Haitians to be imbued with the most intense of national spirit.
I>e.ssalines was nuuie ruler for life aufl later pro<»lrtime<l himself Emjieror. He
was assasslnate<l in 1800. Between 180() and l^K^ there was civil war between
the followers of <'hristoi)!ie and Tetion, and durinjr this period the Spaniards
reestal>lished themselves on the eastern part of the island. In 1818 Gen. Boyer
succee<led P(»tlon as ruler in the south, and after Christophers death in 1820
I'eunlted Haiti under one jrovernment. The entire island in 1822 nfmin came
un<lr one ruler when Boyer reconiiuercMl the east from the Sjwnlards. the name
Uepnl)lic of Haiti beinjr adopttnl. Boyer was driven into exile in 1843. In the
next year the eastern \M\vt of the island establislie<l itself as the Dominican
Uepubllc, and. except foi- a period of about four years, starting? \sith 1861,
when Si>ain reasserted her authority, has remained Independent.
Then followed Herard for the ftrst five months of 1844; Guerrler, who wa.s
4 1 riven out of oftice and then died : Pierrot, who was overthrown in Febniai^',
1846; Riche. who died suddenly in February. 1847; Soulonque, who ,^as at
first President, then Emperor, abdicating under pressure in January, 1859;
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 68
(•eflfranl, who servwl from 3859 to 1867 and who instituted ami developed
public Instrnotlon; Salimve. who was executwl by his countrymen in 1870;
Saget, who served out his full tenn of four years and peacefully retired.
Doralnque fle<l in 1876; Canal resimuHl; Salonmn was overthrown in 1888:
U^^tlme was forced into exile in 1880: Hyppolite fell from his horse and died
in 1896; Simon Sam tied in 1902 as a riotinf! mob threatened his life; Nord
Alexis fled in 1908; Antoine Simon fle<l in 1911: L(H*onte was blown up with
his palace in 1912; Auguste died of a slow and vicious 8icknes*«, pro!>ably
poison, in 1913; Michel Oreste fled into exile In January. 1914; Ore<ite Zanior
riilwl for only a brief i>erlo<l. February to October, 1914. his l)ein}2: a revolu-
tioimry government. retn»prade and ephemeral : Tlieo<iore was overthrown in
Jjinuary. 1915; Vilbrun (lUillaume Sam was umnlered in 1915; and Anally
we have the present President, PhllipiM- Sudre l>artijmenave. electeil in AuRUst.
1915.
Thus there have been 2 Kmi)erors. 1 Klnj; (ChristopheV. and 24 Presldentf*
who rose and fell during the history of Haiti.
THE I'NITKD 8TATKS CALLED VPOS FRKQITSNTLY.
From the days of the American Kevolution to the present the Unltetl States
l)as been compelled to keep a watchful eye ui)on the incidents in Haiti, and a
casual leading of the faft»s of the above-nanjwl rulers and the many reiwrts on
file In the Navy Department will indicate that naval vessels visited that island
in the Interest of the Haitians themselves, Americans, and other foreigners
innny times.
Without searching the records earlier than 1<S.'7 we tind that the United
States was called upon to scnci naval \essels to Haitian waters in the interest
t)f law and order, for the annual report of tlie Secretary of the Navy for that
year shows tlmt the Cyanc visittMl Cape Haitien for the relief of an American
v*»ssel and two American seamen seizeil nr>ou suspicion by order of the Haitian
(lovernment, and the Secretary's report for 18.19 disclo.ses that the Jirookiitn
pnieeeded to Port an Prince and Aux ('ayes to protwt United Stat(»s interest^
from suffering by the revolution then prevailing In Haiti.
The Secretary's report shows that naval vessels visited Haiti in 1S(MJ be-
cause "revolutionary movements and civil disturbances" threatened "to place
in jeopardy the lives and projierty of American residents." In the next yejir
tlie Secretary reported that naval a essels tuul vlsite<l Haiti, a country ** aftlicte^l
with perpetual discontent and revolution." Then follows visits in 1S(5S. 1S*;9.
1S76. 1888, 1889, 1892, 1902. 1903, 1904, 1905, 1JKX5, 1907. 1908, IJMH), 1911, 1912.
and 1913. In these years the trouble and disturban<*es in Haiti was of such a
serious nature that the Secretary of the Navy felt calle<l upon to connuent upon
the fact that warships had been sent there. No dr»ubt there were many times
during this period that interior disturbances afl*e<-te4l f<»reign interests without
the restraining hands of the United States.
CHRONIC CONDITIONS KKCrR IN 1014— KOIH NATIONS I.ANO.
The U. S. S. South Carolina arrivt^l at Port au Prince January 2S. 1914,
and found conditions so threatening to foreign residents and interests that it
l)ecame urgently necessary to land the entire marine guard, in company with
forces from the Lancaster (British), Condv (French), and Hrvmvn ((Jennnn).
The marines of the South Carolina returneil on board ship on the Otli <»f Feb-
niary. Returning to Poi-t au Prince on March 8. 1914. ])ecause of p(»liticai dis-
turbances, the South Carolina f(mnd it imperatively ne<M?ssary to remain in
that port until April 14. 1914. while the U. S. S. M'ontana was also statione<l
at Port au Prince from January 25 to Fel»ruary 13, 1914.
The U. S. S. Washington arrived at Cape Haitien on June 29, 1914, for the
purpose of protecting American and otlier foreign Interests and remained there
until July 8. 1914, when rt4ieved by the U. S. S. South Carolina. ()th(»r naval
\essels ser\ing In Haitian waters during the iMditical disturi>anc^*s of 1914
were the U. S. S. Xrw Jersey, U. S. S. Ceorgia, IT. S. S. Taeoma, U. S. S Vvtrrh
V. S. S. Nashville, U. S. S. Wheeling, and the U. S. S. Hancock, carrying the
Fifth Regiment of Marines.
The political situation in Haiti in 1914 was so uncertain that it o<*cupie<l
•tmsiderable time of the State Department.
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64 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
E>'ENTS LEADING UP TO THE PRESENT OCCUPATION.
Early In 1915 the political situation in Halfl was such that the State Depart-
ment became apprehensive for the safety of American and other foreign interests
therein, the American consul at Cape Haitien requesting that a warship be
sent there. In compliance with this request the U. S. S. Washington arrived at
Cape Haitien an January 23, 1915, for the purpose of investigating political
conditions, and left on the 25th for Port an Prince. It was during this month
that Theodore was overthrown as President, and in March was succeeded by
the most unfortunate Vilbrun GulUaume Sam. Shortly after the overthrow of
Theodore, on February 2, the Secretary of State authorized the Secretary of
the Navy to land marines and bluejackets to aid the American minister to
Haiti, if such action became necessary; but as events turned out no forces
were landed at this thiie, and Snm entered office as president.
During June, 1015, the French warship Descartes proceeded to Cape Hait!en,
as the French consular agent at that port was fearful for the safety of French
residents and interests, and upon the arrival of the Descartes a landing party
was sent ashore from rimt vessel. This force was withdra\yn on the 24th.
The U. S. S. Washington, with Rear Admiral Caperton on board, arrived at
Cape Haitien July 1, 1915, and on the 3d ostiiblLshed a field radio .station ashore,
and on the 9th landed marim^ from the U. S. S. Washington and bluejackets
from the Eagle.
On July 27, 1915. a revoUiticm broke out in Port au Prince that resulted in the
execution by the Haitians of a large number of political prisoners and the
death of the President of Haiti, Sam. at the hands of a mob that violated the
French Legation, in which Sam had taken asylum. Rear Admiral Caperton
Reported in part : " Dominican Legation violated Tuesday ; Gen. Oscar, chief of
arrondi.^^sement force, removed and killed. At about 10.30 a. m. this morning
French Legation invaded by a mob of about 60 Haitians, better class; President
(Tuillanme forcibly removed from upstairs room and killed at legation gate and
body cut in pieces and paraded about town. No government or authority in
city."
Upon the first reiH)rt Rear Admiral C^aperton, in the Washington, saileil from
Cape Haitien for Port au Prince, leaving the Kagle to attend to affairs at the
cape.
MARINES AND BLURTACKETS I^\ND.
Upon arriving at Port au Prince at 11.50 a. m,, July 28, Rear Admiral
Caperton immediately assumed control of the sltuaticm. Under orders of the
Navy Department, and in cooperation with the Department of State. Rear
Admiral Caperton, on the afternoon of July 28, 1915, landed a provisional
regiment of two battalions, composed of marines and bluejackets, under com-
mand of Capt. George Van Orden, United States Marine Corps, and occupied
Port au Prince. No resistan(^e was encountereil except some sniping at the
marines, which fire was returned, resulting in 2 Haitians being killed and
10 wounded.
The U. S. S. Eagle landed 20 men at Cape Haitien at the request of the
French consul on the 28th. The Descartes landed a small French force at
Port au Prince on August 2, 1915.
KEENFORCEMENTS SENT TO HAITI.
At the re<iuest of Rear Admiral Caperton an additional regiment of marines
^as sent to Haiti, arriving at Port au Prince on August 4, 1915. The U. S. S.
Tennessee arrived at Port au Prince on August 15, 1915, with another regi-
ment and (;ol. Littleton W. T. Waller, United States Marine Corps, who was
placed in command of all troops ashore in Haiti.
PROCLAMATION OF ASSURANCE.
Pursuant to instructions received from the Navy Department on August 7.
1915, Rear Admiral Caperton on August 10 Issued the following proclamation
to the Haitian people :
"I am directed by the Unitetl States Government to assure the Haitian
people that the United States has no object in view except to Insure, establish,
and help to maintain Haitian Independence and the establishment of a
stable and firm government by the Haitian people.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPAl'ION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 65
"Every assistance will be given to the Haitian people in their attempt
to secure tliese ends. It is tfce intention to retain United States forces
In Haiti only so long as will be necessary for this purpose."
This proclamation was also published at St. Marc, Haiti, on August 10,
1915, and on August 18 Rear Admiral Caperton requested the Ainerican
consul at Port au Prince to direct the several consular representatives of the
United States in Haiti to give out the above proclamation in their districts.
PBOCEDUBE ADOPTED TO ASSIST HAITI.
On August 10, 1915, the Secretary of State advised the American minister in
Haiti concerning the procedure which he should adopt for the purpose of
tssisting the Haitian National Assembly to elect a president of the Republic, viz :
First. That Congress understand that the Government of the United States in-
tends to nphold it but that it can not recognize action which does not establish
in charge of Haitian affairs those whose abilities and dispositions give assurance
of putting an end to factional disorder. Second. In order that no misunder-
standings can possibly occur after election it should be made perfectly clear to
candidates, as soon as possible, and in advance of their election, that the United
States expects to be intrusted with the practical control of the customs and
such financial control over the affairs of the Republic of Haiti as the United
States may deem necessary for efficient administration. Further, that the
Government of the United States considers it its duty to support a constitutional
government It means to assist in the establishment of such a government and
to support it as long as necessity may require. It has no design upon the political
or territorial integrity of Haiti. On the contrary what has been done, as well
as what will be done, is conceived In an effort to aid the people of Haiti in estab-
lishing a stable Government and maintaining domestic peace throughout tlie
R^nblic,
DABTIOUENAVE ELECTED PRESIDENT.
Election day, August 12, 1915, passed without disorder and Dartlguenave
was elected president, votes for president being cast by congress as follows:
Dartiguenave, 94; Cauvin, 14; Thezan, 4; Bobo, 3; 1 blank. Dartlguenave
was declared elected amidst enthusiasm and Immediately took the oath of office.
Following his election he spoke, stating that he had never been chief of any
faction, band, or group, and that he would govern solely for the benefit of Haiti,
according to the constitution and the laws ; be later expressed appreciation for
American forces, which, he stated, had made possible an election free from in-
timidation.
BXINFOBCEMENTS SENT TO HAITI.
Bear Admiral Caperton, on August 19, 1915, requested that an additional
regiment of marines of not less than two battalions of four companies each of
Infantry and an Artillery battalion with five additional officers for staff positions,
together with eight medical officers and hospital corpsmen and other equipment,
be sent to Haiti and that upon receipt of said reinforcements he stated he would
occupy the seaport towns in accordance with departmental Instructions relative
to occupation of customhouses. In compliance with this request the U. S. S.
Temie99€e on August 31 arrived in Port au Prince and landed Headquarters
Artillery Battalion and the First and Ninth Companies, and then proceeded to
Cape Haitien, where the Thirteenth Company landed on September 3. This
battalion had an enlisted strength of 318 men, armed with twelve 2-lnch landing
snns and t^vo 4.7-lnch heavy field guns, and sailed from the United States
Angust 26.
THE CUSTOMS TAKEN OVER.
The Navy Department cooperating with the State Department, on August
19. 1915, directed Rear Admiral Caperton to assume charge of the customhouses
at JacmeU Aux Cayes, Jeremie, Miragoane, Petit Goave, Port au Prince, St,
Marc. Gonaives, Port de Palx. Cape Haitien, funds collected to be use for
organization and maintenance of an efficient constabulary, for conducting such
temporary public works as will afford immediate relief through employment
for starving populace and discharged soldiers, and finally for supporting Dartl-
fwnave government
02269— 21— KT 1 5
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66 INQUIRY INTO OCHTPATION OF HAITI AND S^.XTO DOMIXGO.
On August 30, 1915. Hear Adminil Cai»ei*ton Informed the Secretary of the
Navy that he hatl orpinlzed customs service for the seacoust of Haiti wttb
Faynmster Charles ^lorris as administrator of customs, Navy pay and Irne
officers being apjMjinted as collectors of customs and captains of ports for the
different ports and that he could not occupy Aux Cayes and Jacmel until the
arrival of the U. S. S. Sacramento and requested that the arrival of that vessel
be expedited. On Aujnast 31, Rear Admiral Caperton Informed tlie Secretary of
the Navy that '* unless otherwise directetl will occupy and begin administering
customhouse at Port au Prince at 10 a. m., September 2.** The customhouse at
Port au Prince was taken over by the United States naval force on September
2,^the Haitian Government having been advised In tbe premises and the fol-
lowing notice was published in the newspapers and otherwise :
" For the protection of the Haitian Government and people and for better
safe guarding their interests, under the direction of the Government of the
rn:ted States of America, I have assumed control of the maritime custom?
service of Haiti.
*• The receipts from these customs will be collected by officers of the United
States Navy and will be applied to improving the condition of the Haitian
people and to the support of the Haitian Goveniment. Funds not so ex-
l>ended will be held in trust for the time being for the pe<iple of Haiti by the
Government of the United States."
THE TREATY.
As a result of the negotiations which had been carried on over a considerable
period of time between the American charge d'affaires and representatives of the
Republic of Haiti, a treaty of mutual amity for the purpose of remedying the
financial conditions and assisting the economic development and tranquility of
Haiti was signed at Port au Prince, September 16, 1915, subsequently ratified
by both the contracting parties, and proclaimed in the United States, May 3,
1916. The United States Government recognized the government of Darti-
guenave of Haiti on September 17, fired the necessary salute, and Rear Admiral
Caperton, accompanied by his staff, called on the President of the H«pubiic of
Haiti, his call being returned by the President of Haiti and his cabinet od
September 18.
In the following proclamation the President of the United States proclaimed
this treaty on May 3, 1916:
" Whereas a treaty between the United States of America and the Republic
of Haiti having for Its objects the strengthening of the amity existing between
the two countries, the remedying of the present condition of the revenues and
finances of Haiti, the maintenance of the tranquility of that Republic, and the
carrying out of plans for its economic development and prosperity was concluded
and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at Port au Prince on the 16th
day of September, 1915, the original of which treat5\ being in the English and
French languages, is word for word as follows."
The preamble reads in part as follows :
•*The United States and the Republic of Haiti desiring to c<»nfirui and
strengthen the amlt>' existing between them by the most cordial coai>eration iu
measures for their common advantage;
"And the Republic of Haiti desiring to remedy the present condition t>f it<
revenues and finances, to maintain the tranquility of the Republic, to carry out
plans for the econondc development and prosi)erity of the 'Republic and \u
People *
"And the United States being In full sympathy with all of these aims and
objects and desiring to contribute in all proper ways to their acconiirfi««li
ment" ; etc.
Article II of this treaty provides for the nomination by the Pi*esident of the
United States and appointment by the President of the Republic of Haiti of a
general receiver to sniH-rvlse customs, and of a financial adviser. Article X
provides for tlie establishment of the Gemlannerie d'Haiti, to be organised and
officered b^- Americans, nominated by the President of the United States and
appointed 'bv the President of Haiti. Article XIV provides tlmt should the
necessity occur the United States " will lend an efficient aid for the preservation
of Haitian independence and the maintenance of a govwmnent adeqtiate f^r
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 67
the protection of lif<e, property, and individual liberty," and furtliermore that
the United States and the Repablio of Haiti " shall have authority to take such
steps «« may be necessary to insure the complete attainment of any of the
(ihjwts «imprehen«led "In the treaty.
This treaty shall remain in ** full force and virtue for the term of 10 years,"
and " fnrther for another term of 10 years if, for specific reascms represented
by either of the hi|;h contracting parties, the purpose " of the treaty has not been
fully accompli sfae<l. Over five yeai's of this period has explretl.
MARTIAL LAW.
On August 30, 1915, Rear Admiral Caperton informed the Secretary of tlie
Navy and the Commander In Chief as follows :
^ On account increasing uneasiness Port au Prince, present Grovemifient con-
fr(intcd with conditions apparently unable to control, propagation by news-
papers and public men of inflanmiatory propaganda against Government and
American occupation, disloyalty to presHit Government of some Government
iiffidtls, and In order to better support tlie present Government I will to-
morrow, September 3, proclaim martial law In Port an Prince, Haiti. This
artion In accordance with American charge craffairea" Itear Admiral (^ai>er-
x*m further announced, on the same date, that he had l)een requestetl by the
I*resident of Haiti to establish martial law. Pursuant to the above information,
R«ir Adndral Caperton formally issued the proclamation of martial law on
5?epteniber 3, 1915, at Port au Prince, Haiti:
** PROCLAMATION.
* Information having been received from the most reliable sources that the
present Government of Haiti is confronted with conditions which they are
unable Uf control, although loyally attempting to discharge the duties of their
n^pective offices; and these facts having created a condition which requires
The adoption of dilTerent measures than those heretofore applied ; and in order
to afford the inliabitants of Port au Prince and other territory hereinafter
4l«»scribed the privileges of the Govemnient, exercising all the functions neces-
mxy for the establishment and maintenance of the fundamental rights of man,
1 hereby, under my authority as commanding ofiicer of the forces of the United
states of America in Haiti and Haitian waters, proclaim that martial law
♦*xists En the city of Port au Prince and the immediate territory now occupied
Uy the forces under my command.
"I further proclaim, in accordance with the law of nations and the usages,
nirtoms, and functions of my own and oUier Governments, that I am invested
with the power and responsibility of government in all its functions and
f»ranclM8 throughout the territorj^ above described, and the proper administra-
tion of such government by martial law will be provided for In regulations to
^•^ Issued from time to time as required by the commanding officer of the forces
of the United States of America in Haiti and Haitian waters.
"The martial law herein proclaimed, and the things in that respect so
"nlered, will not be deemed or taken to interfere with the proceedings of the
r«fi«titut]onal Government and Congress of Haiti, or with the administration of
justice In the courts of law existing therein, which do not affect the military
'i|»erations or the authorities of the Government of the United States of
America.
"All the municipal and other civil employees are, therefore, requested U*
'^Hitinue in their present vocations without change; and the military authorities
win not interfere In the functions of the civil administration and the courts,
«t<tT)t in so far as relates to persons violating military orders or regulatons,
'*r otherwise Interfering with the exercise of military authority. All i)eaceful
•■iti»iis can confidently pursue their usual occupations, feeling that they will
Ite protected in th^r personal rights and property, as well as In their t^roper
•^Itl relations.
**The commanding officer of the United States expeditionary force. Col. Little-
tan. W. T. Waller, United States Marine Corps, is empowere<l to issue the neces-
my itiTBUktions and appoint the necessary officers to make this martial law
"Done at the city of Port au Prince, Haiti, this Bil day of Sei^ember. A. D.
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€8 INQUIRY IXTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The commanding officers who had taken over the various coast towns in the
adjoining territory of Haiti were informed by Rear Admiral Caperton on Sep-
tember 21 that his proclamation of Septanber 3, relative to martial law, a(>-
plied to all the territory within their Jurisdiction, and appointed the provost
marshal and the provost judge for each said town and territory immediately
surrounding.
On September 4, 1916, the charge d'affaires, Port au Prince, reported to the
Secretary of State that all civil officials provided for by the treaty have now
taken their offices, and requeerted information as to turning over all Federal
civil administration at present conducted by President's orders to the Haitian
Government, in reply to which the Secretary of State announced that the time
had not yet arrived for the withdrawal of the naval forces in Haiti and the
termination of martial law, and that it was the desire of the department that
the present status be continued until such time as the gendarmerie has proven
itself loyal and efficient in all emergencies and the internal peace of Haiti is
thereby definitely assured.
On September 22, 1920, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy rendered a
legal opinion with reference to the status of the marines in Haiti, which is par-
tially quoted below :
" The military forces of the United States have not displaced the civil gov-
ernment of Haiti and established a military government of the United States
in that country, but are engaged pursuant to law in lending efficient aid to the
Republic of Haiti In preserving a republican form of government and suppress-
ing domestic violence. By treaty between the United States and Haiti, sipned
September 16, 1915, duly ratified by both Governments and proclaimed May 3.
1916 (39 Stat., 1654), one object of which, as stated In the preamble, was to
maintain the tranquility of the Republic [of Haiti],' It was provided (Art.
XIV) that—
** * The high contrncting parties sliall have authority to take such steps as may
be necessary to insure the complete attainment of any of the objects compre-
hended in this treaty, and should the necessity occur the United States will
lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian indei>endence and the
jnaintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and
individual liberty.'
•* Pursuant to the above treaty and upon recommendation of the State Dei»art-
ment expressly reciting the desirability ' that every effort should be made to put
the provisions thereof in operation with the least delay/ Congress enacted a law
which was approved by the President of the United States on June 12, 1916
(39 Stat., 223), and which provided in part—
*' 'That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized, in
his discretion, to detail to assist the Republic of Haiti such officers and enlisted
men of the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps as may be
mutually agreed upon by him and the President of the Republic of Haiti.'
'* Thereafter, on June 12, 1918, the Republic of Haiti adopte<l a new constitu-
tion, article 127 of which provided that —
" ' The present constitution and all the treaties actually in force or to be con-
cluded liereafter and all the laws decreed in accordance ^\ith this constitution
or with these treaties shall constitute the law of the country, and their relative
superiority shall be determined by the order in which they are here mentioned.'
" The treaty of 1016 above quoted was in force on the date of the Haitian
constitution, it having been expressly provided in said treaty (Art. XVI) that
• the present treaty shall remain In full force and virtue for the term of 10
years, to be counted from the day of exchange of rati flea t Ions, and. further, for
another term of 10 years if, for 8i)eciflc reasons presented by either of the \ns^\
contracting parties, the punwse of this treaty has not been fully accomplished."
Accordingly, the said treaty of 1916 was by explicit provision of the Haitian
constitution of 1918 declared to l>e * the law of the country ' : that is, the law of
Haiti, just as under the United States Constitution (Art. VI) the said treaty of
May 3, 1916, and the act of (.'ongress of June 12, 1916, enacted pursuant to said
treaty, are declared to be ' the supreme law of the land ' ; that is, the law of tlie
United States,
** In other woixls, the Unlteil States has guaranteed to the Haitian ReiniblK'
that it will lend efllcient aid in preserving government, and tranquillity in that
country, just as it has giv(Mi a similar guaranty to the States of this Union;
and Congress has given discretion to the President of the United States to
detail land and naval forces to enforce this guaranty in both cases uiwn mutual
Digitized by VjOOQIC
IXQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 69
agreement between tlie Pi-esident of the United States and the Government re-
quiring such assistance.
"The marine brigade Is now in Haiti by authority of law for the inirix>8es
of maintaining the recognized Government of that Republic and preserving
tranquillity, occupying in this respect a status substantially identical with that
which would exist should Federal troops be sent into a State of this Union
upon the request of the recognized government of that State for the same t>ur-
i^nse.
"Our military forces operating in Haiti, pursuant to the treaty anl the act
of Congress above cited, by mutual agreement between this Government and
the Republic of Haiti, for the purpose of suppressing armed uprisings and
maintaining the constitutional Government which has been recognized by the
President of the United States, have the same powers and duties as the mili-
tiir>' forces of Haiti in the administration of martial law in that country and
in the resort to the laws and usages of war. for the existing conditions of local
(liRtiirbance constitute, in the language of the Supreme Court. *a state of
«ar* — ^not a state of war between the United States and Haiti, but domestic
war which the United States, in the fulfillment of its treaty obligations, is
Dound to assist the Government of Haiti to suppress.
"That martial law in Haiti was originally established by the head of our
military forces in that country upon the request of the Haitian President is
shown by the official records of this department : an^l indirect reference to this
fact is also to be found in the opening paragraph of the proclamation of mar-
tial law.
"That the martial law thus established was not intended to displace the con-
stitutional Government of Haiti, but was In support of that Government, \»
expressly disclose<l by the following further paragraph of the aforesaid procla-
mation :
"'The martial law herein proclaimed, and the things in that respect so
:)r'Iere<U will not be deemed or taken to Interfere with the proceedings of the
constitutional Government and congress of Haiti, or with the administration
of justice in the courts of law existing therein, which do not affect, the mill-
tar>' operations or the authorities of the Government of the United States of
America.'
'• The al>ove-quote<l proclamation was issued on September 3, 1915. The mar-
tial law thus established has been continued ever since, with the consent of the
Government of Haiti, as shown by the numerous instances in which the Presi-
dent of that Republic has decorated members of our milit«r>^ forces and ex-
tendetl to them his most cordial expressions of appreciation for their services
to his country; also, the new Haitian constitution expressly provides (Title
VII) that ' all the acts of the Government of the United States during Its
Diilitury occupation of Haiti are ratified and validated.' Our operations in
Haiti have also been conducted with the express sanction of Congress since the
act of .Tune, 1916, above cited, w^hich placed entirely in the discretion of the
President of the United States the detail of such military forces of the Xavy
and Marine Corps to assist the Republic of Haiti *as may be mutually agreed
ui»on by him and the President of the Republic of Haiti.'
"Such beinir the status of our military forces in Haiti, engaged in adniinister-
ing martial law In support of the constitutional government, in a country in
which a state of domestic war exists, there can be no question that the military
^.>inmauder of such forces is authorized to take any steps necessary and sanc-
tioned by the laws and customs of war to meet the exigencit.'s of the situation.
Military commis.slons and provost courts are recognized instrumentalities of
niartial law. Recourse to such exceptional military courts is justified when-
»ver the civil courts are closed, or when necessary for the trial of offenses
against the military forces or violations of regulations require<l to make mar-
tial law effective. Otherwise, in the language of the Supreme Court above
quoted, * martial law and the military array of the Government would be mere
parade, and rather encourage attack than r^pel it.' In the proclamation here-
inbefore quoted, it was stated that upon this point that * the military authori-
ties will not Interfere in the functions of the civil administration and the courts
except in so far as relates to persons violating military orders or regulations, or
otherwise interfering with the exercise of military authority.' This depart-
aient's records show that the territory under martial law has been extende<l to
inclnde parts of Haiti not specifically embraced in the original proclamation;
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70 INQUIRY INTO OCX^UPATIOX OF HAITI AND SAXTO LK)MING<).
it does not, however, appear that the jurisdiction of mllitnry courts has l)een
enlarged so as to embrace offenses not. described in that proclamation, and then*-
lore the trial of such other offenses must properly be left to the civil courts."
THE SOrCAIXED C^^SOBSHIF.
The following order was promulgated throughout the Republic of Haiti on
September 3, 1915 :
•' Tlu* freedom of the press will not lie interfere<l with, but license will not be
toleratwl. The publishing of false or incendiar>' proi)aganda against the Gov-
ernn»ent of the rnite<l States or the (Jovernment of Haiti, or the publishing of
any false, indecent, or obscene propnpmda, letters signed or unsigned, or mat-
ter which tends to disturb the public i»eace will be dealt with by the military
courts. The wiiters of such articles and the publishers thereof will be held
resiwnsible for such utterances an<l will be subje<»t to tine or imi»risoninenr. or
both, as may be determine<l.'*
This ban was modified inferentially recently and with unfortunate r(*s«ults.
A paraphrase of a dispatch from the brigade conmuinder date<l January 0.
1021, to the Major (Jeneral Commandant follows:
•' Hush. 8608. Preshlent of Haiti sent me to-day the following letter :
** * Dear Monsikijr t.k <V)U)Nkl: Certain newspapers, relying uixm an impunity
which until now has been nssure<l them, for some time past have bc^en insult-
ing the officers of the geiKlarmerie an<l the tJovernment, sj^reading the most
insidious pro])aganda and causing uneasiness among the ])eople.
" * If we persist in viewing with indifference this state of affairs whicli I
(|ualify as Intolerable. I foresee that the military offlclals must expect to wit-
ness acts of a still more regrettable nature.
" ' I therefore address ni.vself to you. to whom Is intrusted the maintaining of
public securit>' and pea(*e, asking you tc» tsike all measures that aiv demandwl
by the circumstances.
** * In case you judge it is necessary to have them, the <TOverinneiit holds at
y(Hir disposition other facts, apart from the alwve.
*** Accept, Dear Monsieur le Colonel, the assurance of my sentiments of
cordial consideration.
" • DARTTGTT5N.KVE,'
'* Have replied, acknowledging receipt of letter and stating that I have taken
the subject matter under consideration. Prompt Instructions nonnested.
" John H. Ui.shkm.."
The following letter dated January 18. 1921, was written by the brigade
commander to the ( 'hief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, via the ilajor
(Jeneral (^immandant :
"1. In paragraphs 11 and 12 of the al)ove refereniv, copy attached hereto,
it was iM»inted out that the Haitian politicians had found a veritable gold mine
in the situation that had bt»en created for them during the summer months.
"2. Since the writing of the above rernu-t the political conditions In Haiti
have gradually been growing worse*. There have been several causes that have
contributed to this end. Among them may be named the following:
"(1) Tlie scurrilous and insulting articles that daily ap])ear in the press de-
faming the Haitian CTOvernment. the occuimtion, and the gendarmerie.
'*(2) So-called patriotic meeting and a.*<seniblies where unbridled tongues
give fortli vilifying words against the Haitian Government, the occupation, and
tin' g« M'larnifTie.
*Mv<) The lack ol' any attempt on tlie part of the Haitian (Government to put
a stop to such abuses and the knowle<lge that the nulitary occupatiim will not
interfere.
"(4) The knowledge of the peofjle that the Haitian courts would not supiH>rt
the Hnit'an Oovernment in any attemi»t to check abuses.
•*(.'">) The general dislike of the black man for the white.
"(0) The i)revjdent l>elief that the occupation will .soon be withdrawn and
Ihiiti left to her own devices.
"(7) The supjKU't (»f certain .«io-caUed patriotic .societies by i>ersons or urguni-
zatlons in the United States.
"(8) The present poor economic c<»nditioii of llie <ountry wh.ch has led to
uiany unem])loye<l.
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IKQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 71
'•(0) Aiul last, hut far from least, the InteiiMe rivalry unicmg the politicians
for tlie next presidency. The candidates are lininpr up and seelcinp by every
means to promote their own interests.
".H. The result of all this turmoil and license is l)ound to affect the military
Nltuation. Tranquillity continues to rei^n throtifchout the eutlre country, Imt
runioi-s regarding (•ontemplute<1 distruhaiices are daily becomiupr more numer-
♦Mis. It 1ft true that when run down nothlnsr i» found, but it is my opinion,
fimiKlwl on a knowle<lKe of the Haitian and an absolute knowledge of the mili-
tary sitmition in Haiti that, uulesH steps are shortly talcen to curb the license
now bein^ i)ermitte<l, local disturbances will occur an<l eventually the tran-
quility of tlie country will be a^ain disrupted.
"4. From a military I'olnt of view the situation can be kept well In hand
with tlie troops at my conmmnd, but life and property can be destroyed and
51 irfnenii condition of unrest created that will again necessitate active and
'orcpfui measures which, in my opinion, could well be avoided.
" 5. It is my opinion that the Haitian liovernment should be forced to oi^enly
r.dniit its inability to restrain the press and protect itself, the occupation and
the ^gendarmerie, from its im«ultinp and scurrilous remarks due to the Ineffi-
ciency and inadequacy of the Judiciary system of Haiti. Such admission has
already been made but not oi)enly. If so made it would throw the onus of
'^uch work on the military occupation, which could put in operation laws similar
to those now existing in the Dominican Republic relatini; to the press, freedom
«f speech, etc.
"6. I have deemed it my duty to make the above report, as I am firmly of
the belief that some action toward the bridling of the press should be under-
taken, and I desire, as a matter of self-protection, to present this opinion in
order that If such a condition is allowed to continue unabated and disturbances
'wor the military occupation will not be held responsible therefor.*'
On January 28, ld21, Rear Admiral Snowden, United States Navy, military
governor of Santo Domingo and military representative of the United States
In Haiti, placed the following Indorsement on the above letter :
•*1. A copy of the above-mentioned report has just come Into the hands of
the undersigned.
"2. I approve and support in the strongest terms the letter and advlw of
the brigade commander in Haiti and believe that the situation is critical as
regards the near future.
"3. The conditions are such as can not be permitted to ctmttnue and Is Im-
possible of control under the present policy of free and unlimited license as to
libel, defamation, and malicious propaganda.
"4. I can not too strongly urge tlie defense of the military forces from
malicious libel and propaganda by laws or orders permitting free sjieech but
not license.,
"5. It is a fact that the present i^oUcy of licen.«*e regarding propaganda, etc.,
here and in Haiti will before long no doubt use the power of the military forces
to control the situation at the expense of many lives on both sides, but measures
!«houl(! be at once taken to curb these attacks upon the military forces. In order
that a critical condition may not be brought about."
The Secretary of the Navy wrote as follows to the Se<*retary of State on
February 15, 1921 :
Referring to uiy letter of Fel>ruary 7, 1921 (P. r>. 2.'i8-6), in which I inclo8e<l
<o|)iej; of two confidential reports from the brigade commander of the United
States marine brigade In Haiti, T have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of a report from the military governor of Santo Domingo, who Is also the mili-
tary representative of the United States in H^iiti, In wh?ch he submits his com-
ment on the brigade commander's rciK)rt of .Tnnuary 18, 1921. which was one
<»f the repeats 8ubmitte<l in my letter, above cited.
i^artlculnr attention is Invited to the closing sentence of the governor's
'^tter, In which he states as follows :
* I have no doubt of the power c)f the military forces to control the situation
iit tlie expense of many lives on botli sides, but measures should be nt tnu^ tnken
to curb these attacks upon the military forces in order that a critical cimtlitioii
may not Ire brought about."
In the following dispatch to the commandant of the Marine Coi-ps, date Mny
17. 1921. the brigade commander requested autlH»rity to bring to trial certain
jienions;
"Special rush 8617 for Opnay Haitian press continues to publish s«nirrilous
and Insulting articles daily. These articles are untruthful, incemllnni; in char-
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72 INQITIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
acter, and seriously tend to disturb tlie peace in Port au Prince, creating a
condition of grave danger between the gendarmerie and marines and natives.
The Haitian Government should be forcetl to protect the officers and men of
tlie gendarmerie and occupation, or the occupation should be allowed to protwt
itself. The gendarmerie begin to feel that they are not being supported. It is
generally known, and has been state*! by the President, that Haitian courts
will not convict such cases, as trial must be by jury, and the juries are with
the people who.se passions have been aroused by unbridled press. Believe that
threat of trial or only one case would be sufficient to restore to normal condi-
tions. Earnestly recommend that 1 be authorized to try by provost court those
concerned in the publishing of falsehoods or articles against the gendarmerie
and occupation. Request early reply. 1640."
The following dispatch, dated May 24, 1921, was sent by the Secretary of the
Navy to the brigade commander :
" 8624. The proclamation of martial law as proclaimed on September 3. 1915.
and ratified by Haitian constitution reserved from the Jurisdiction of civil
courts of Haiti those things which affect the military operations or the authori-
ties of the Government of the United States of America. Agitation against
United States officials who are aiding and supporting constitutional Govern-
ment tending to undermine their authority and coupled with political agitation
looking to destruction of the constitutional government will lead to revolution
and anarchy with consequent destruction of life and property and prolonged
misery for Haitian people. Not only in self-defense of American forces but in
self-defense of Haitian Government and people such measures must be taken
as will suppre8.s such agitation and prevent return of violent disorders. From
the information before you, you will determine what action under martial law
the crisis demands and act accordingly, keeping In mind the Idea of action only
in self-defense of your command and Haitian Grovemment, and employing
processes of martial law only where your conservative judgment admits the
situation demands its exercise, and then restricting penalties to serve the pur-
poses of prevention rather than punishment. In respect to those who attack
the Haitian President and Government direct rather than through the American
forces, it would be advisable to have the Haitian President request you or
direct the chief of gendarmerie to proceed against them through the agencies*
of martial law which is nuilntalned for and in behalf of the constitutional
Government of Haiti. You would thereby have on record a statement of what
the Haitian state construes the crisis demands in the way of prevention in
order to preclude the engineering of domestic disorder and attempts to over-
throw the constitutional government by violence. In trials before military
commissions or provost courts the charge should cite the offense against the
military forces or the violation of a regulation adopted to make martial law
effective. Should there be insufficient regulations to cover the existing situa-
tion such should be promulgated. In the absence of appropriate regulations on
which to base a trial, those who, from the Information before you, you have
reasonable grounds to believe are concerned in unlawful opposition and the
encouragement of domestic violence may be arrested and held in confinement
until the exigency has passed and the constituted authorities are able to exe-
cute the laws, 1645, Sec. Nav."
In carrying out the above Instructions the brigade conunander on May 26.
1921, published the following proclamation:
Headquarters First PROvrsioNAL Brigade.
United States Marine Corps,
Port au Prince, Republic of Haiti, Mau 26. 1921.
To all inhabitant8:
The United States forces In Haiti are engaged in aiding and supporting the
constitutional Government of Haiti and are your friends.
By their efforts and those of the gendarmerie of Haiti peace and tran-
quillity have been established throughout your land, permitting you to cultivate
your gardens, conduct your business, and earn an honest living.
The only agitation that is being carried on in all Haiti is that undertaken by
a few newspapers in the large cities and by a few persons in so-called political
speeches.
This agitation, however. Is a menace to the condition of law and order that
has been given to you, and consequently it becomes necessary to Issue the fol-
lowing order under the powers and authority of martial law.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQXHRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 73
ORDEK.
While the freedom of the press and speeches are practically unrestricted,
2irt!cleB or speeches that are of an incendiary nature or reflec't adversely upon
the forces in Haiti or tend to stir up an agitation against the United States
officials who are aiding and supporting the constitutional Government of
Haiti, or articles or speeches at the President or the Haitian Government are
prohihited. Any offender against this order will be brought to trial before
a military tribunal.
John H. Russell,
Colonel, United States Marine Corps, Commanding First Brigade,
United States Marines, and United States Forces in Haiti.
On the date the above proclamation was published the President of the
Republic of Haiti wrote a letter to the brigade commander reading in part
us follows:
"I have this day received your proclamation dated May 26, 1921. It has
my full and entire approval, and I desire that it be given its full and entire
effect.
"Pray accept dear M. le Colonel the renewed expression of my best senti-
ments.
" DARTlCrKNAVE." .
On June 24, 1921, the following memorandum was prepare<l for the Secretary
of the Navy and the major general conmiandant :
MEMORANDUM.
"1. For some time past the American authorities In Haiti did not concern
themselves with the character of articles published in the Haitian newspai)ers.
A very small percentage of the population in Haiti is able to read, and as the
circulation of the Haitian newspaper seldom excee<ls a few hundred it was
considered that such newspapers would not exercise much Influence outside of
a few large towns, and they did not exercise much Influence until recently.
2. "Partly as a reflection of race disturbances and agitation iu the United
States, partly as a reflection of the late political campaign in the United
States, but principally owing to the characteristic which many Haitian writers
have of working themselves into a passion with little or no proi>ocation, free-
dom of the press was construed to be unlimited license to attack not only the
Government of Haiti and the American occupation, but also the personal
and private character of any American or any Haitian ofllclal.
•*3. Continued and unrestrained abuse of oflicers and men had a tendency to
destroy any friendly relationship between the marines and the native popula-
tion, and the attacks gradually assunieil more and more the nature of propa-
jranda toward a new revolution against the constitutional government of
Haiti and threatened to recall the condition of anarchy wliich had recently
Imm suppressed.
"4. A copy of the dispatch from tlie brigade counnander in Haiti quoting
from an article published in a Haitian newspaper, a copy of the order prohibit-
ing incendiary articles from being publisheil in Haiti, and a copy of the
department's dispatch to the brigade conmiander authorizing such action are
attached hereto.
"5. In interpreting the order the usual rules of Inteii^retation should be
followed and the order should be considered as a whole. Considered In such
wise, it is apparent that it is intended mit to prohibit constructive criticism
or the advocation of policies dfTerent from those advocated by the Government
of Hati, or to otherwise interfere with freedom of speech and press, but simply
to prevent the publication of articles or speeches which are in the nature of
propaganda calculated and intended to bring on a new revolution and a con-
dition of anarchy which, as stated in the Secretary's dispatch, will inevitably
lead to destruction of life and proi>erty and prolonged misery for the Haitian
people.
"6. So far as attacks on individuals are concerned, no action is intended
to suppress these unless they are slanderous or libelous. Charges made against
Amerlains. whether presented privately or publicly, are always properly investi-
gated, and no attempt to suppress such charges Is contemplated, except in
those cases where they are inspired by a desire to create disorder and are ba.sed
on nothing but an evil imagination.
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74 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OK HAITI AND SANTO l>OMINGO.
*• 7. In our own <*ountry we are not without exaiuplet^. nud re<*e4it ones, of
unfortunate riotiugs an<l killinjjs having r€»suUe(l from a failure of the proper
authorities to prevent the oultivation of criminal nioh violence. It is the ileaire
to avoid Buch violence in H«iti that le<l to tlie department's action in reHpe<?t
tA» thow in Haiti who uttemiit to stir up the evil and the ignorant to violeniv.
Thei*e is indoseil a quotation fi'om a letter from the Pre«ident of Haiti to the
bripide conunander fully approving the action fallen. It >v«s lar^ljr upon
the Fre«ident*8 urgent representation that the proclamation was is.sne<L
"S. In addition to the* ahove -menti<med inclosures there i« also attached an
(jxcerpt from a Haitian newsj)aper article which refers particularly to ex-
President Wilson."
The dispatch of the hri^rade connuander ceferretl to in the above memorandum
follows :
*'8()27. Reference your 8fi2,V1415. Courier Haitien published article April 10
on depature of Col. Hooker, in ])art as follows: * Man proposes, God disposes.
He did not think that he would leave Haiti st» soon. He did not think that he
would Ro without having executed his infanunis project apiiimt us.
" ' Par., 2. We wish you bon voyage, Ck)l. Hooker. As to the money that you
have taken from Haiti, as to the fortune that you have aunuased in the country
in violati<m of our i)oor peasants, the brave CactJs, y<m will not enjoy it your-
self, and for all the wrong that you have done to a,goo<U i>eacelul, and lianl-
working people for the sole purpose of enriching yourself at its expense, your
<hildren will pay to the fourth generation for this.
'* • P-\R. 4. Col. Hooker, the shades of Pierre Pinwle. of Saj Peralte. and of
such others that you have sent to their forefathers rejoice at your deimrtui-e
anil curse yim.
" ' P-\R. 5. With jMK'kets full of gold, depart hai)pily, but remember that there
is an einnent justice that so(»ner or later will make you pay for all the suffer-
ing that you have made the Haitien pe(H)le endure.
*' ' PAK. G. The cui*ses of the widows, the oriihans. and the bereaved llanc»'es
of your innumerable victims accompany you, Col. Hooker.'
'• P.\H. 7. Jolibois Fits editor sent paT>er to Hooker niarke<l, 'Copy of paper
with compliments.' Some days afterwards Hooker entered Cinema and si>okc
to (^hevallier. Jolibois wiis talking wth Chevallier at tli(» time and s-iluted
Hooker. Hooker told him he did not mind attaclcs on or criticism of his official
acts, but that he had i>rotected him, and that a pei'sonal attack was the act of
i\ pig. Ho(»ker then went to a theater and ntithing further oocurreil. I^mg
account of incident pid>lished in pai>er by Jol bois. together with letter and
cable sent. Summon ordering brigade inspector iuunedlately Investigated.
Jolibois' manner and demeanor as taken by Hooker, Jolibois in no way threatens
at any tme during evening.
"Pah. H. Officers and men of brigade and gendarmes were sent the Haitien
daily. Call ^larine Corps veritable Huns. Presence of marine alone permits
such insulting attacks, for under Haitian regime the editor would have been
imprisoned and papers would have been stopi)ed. Pinede died natural death
from Consumption and .smallpox. Hooker n»t in Haiti when Saul Peralte was
killed.
*' Pak. 0. In above attack Jolibois is evidently trying to stir up people against
occui)ation. Notice how he speaks of brave Cacos. PaiK»rs distributed and are
read to people by agents in interior. 1745."
The newspaper article referred to In the foregoing memorandunt that villifies
ex-Presldent Wilscm reads as follows:
[Extract from iirticle nppoarinff in I^b Annalos Cnimisej*. Capo Ilaltieii, IterAibllc of
Nniti. under diitc of Mar. 4, 1021.]
•' To-day in the history of Haiti the 4th of March is the beginning <)f a new era.
Mr. Harding, the defender of our cause and advm»ate of our rights, had entered
the White House as President of the Unlttnl States in place of Mr. Woodn>w
Wlls*)n, the man of baneful prejudices, who conspired against the existencv of
ou,r country with the complicity of a group of business men in America, such as
Messrs. Faridmm & Co. May he retire to private life followed by the maledic-
tions of Haitian people and may he be perpetually tormetited by remorse, that
canker of a guilty conscience, have a sad and tactituru ending, continually
gnashing his teeth, a prey to horrible bulhn'inations and believing himself to be
always pursued by the invisible specters of those of us who have died martyrs
to the cause of lllierty. Like Cain may he never find a resting place upon tlie
face of this earth and may he on his death bed eat * Les Excrements De Son
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 75
|se/ like the man who uo lonprer ha# faith In the tUvine mercy. This Js the
' that I wish for him and which will without failure come to him, for there
st8 that Heavenly Justice which never forj^lven the crimeK that have been
aitted against an entire nation.'*
l.ABGE FORCJE RIvgilRKl).
Hear Admiral Oaperton on March 13, 191G, reiKU'ted that the total shore
forces in Haiti amounted to not more than 1,700 enlisted nien, and stated that
it wsiK not consi<lere»l practicable to maintain military control of the ciamtry
with a smaller force.
On March 11, 1916, tlie Secretary of the Navy sent Rear Admiral Cai^erton
the following dispatch paraphrased as follows : ** Keliuquish no part of military
tnmtrol which you are nr)w exercising: in Haiti, nor without receipt of further
insrructit»n8 put end to martial law as now in force."
POLICY OF ITNITKD STATES.
During Decvmlier, 1910, the Secretary of the Navy in a disi)atch to Capt.
Knapp outlined the attitude of the United States Government toward tJie
(icAvifunent of Haiti as follows :
"* • • the Unite<l States policy has bi»en to supinirt I* res dent Ihirti^jue-
navp so lonfr as his conduct conforms to correct principles and to the agree-
laents between Haiti and the I'nited States. Any attempt to overthrow
t'resideut Dartlijrmjnave will not l»e countenanced, nor will any legislative action
aniinlling any decree of the l*resi«lent tluring the time when no legislative Issly
was in session l>e i)erndtted. On the other hand, the I'nite*! States will con-
!<ider such action to be the beginning of rcvoluth»n and disorder in the Ue-
puhlir. ♦ ♦ ♦ "
THE ELECTIONS.
The general elect i<Mis In Haiti were held on Januao' 16 and 17, 1917, without
any markeil disorder. Ccmsiderable repeating and other frauds were attempted,
Unt generally without success. Arrangement*^ for the election were apparently
thoroughly successful and the actUm of the (Hiiipation widely appreciated.
On April 21, 1917, the cabinet and national assembly met in apparently the
best of feeling with no friction i)resent. In a speech .Vincent, who presided,
stated that Hait'an i>eace was due to the Tnited States, and with her assistance
much progress would result. Following adjournment the entire cabinet called
m the commander of the first provisional brigade and assured him that they
<ie8ired America's continued assistance and wishe<l to cooi)erate.
The present situation with regard ti» elections in Haiti is summe<l up in the
following extracts from a report by the brigade ctanmander datetl April 4,
1921, reading as follows :
"In a study of the political situation in Haiti it must be ever borne in
Jiiinil that the Haitian politician rcjaesents but an infintesimal part of the
l»opulat:on of Haiti.*'
"The possibility of an clect'on being held next January 119221 for Haitian
'teputies and senators and the elei-tion of a president by the assembly in the
following April has serve<l to complicate an already involved political situation.
"Xiimerous candidates for the presidency have already announced them-
s^ves. In fact, the time is ain>arently propitious for the Haitian politician
and an.v Haitian, l>orn of a Haitian father, who has engaged in politics, has
«ny following and some money to si)end in advancing his cause nniy be con-
>^«lered to be in the field for the highest honors.
"The one outstanding fact that Is apparent through the midst of polit'cal
talk, which has now reached the boiling point, is the intense hatred of all
Haitian politicians for the existing (Tovernment. To their ndnds the <Iov-
«*niiuent must l>e changetl, they oire not how. in order to make room for
*onje one else to fill the presidential chair, and consequently they are united
against the Government.
"Recently an educated Haitian in northern Haiti, who a<lvoeate<l the with-
'^wal of the occupation, was asked whether if the occupatitm withdn»w he
would support the Government, the constitution, and the laws of Haiti. He
^\AM that if the occupation withdrew that, of course, the existing CJoveni-
iwnt must fall at once. When asked if another prt»sident was installe<l who
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76 INQriRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
was not to his liking he would support him or endeavor to overthrow his
Government, he could conceive of only the latter alternative.
'* The question that is heard on all sides is, ' Will the elections for the
assembly be held next January?* At present it is lui|V)Rslble to answer, as the
Haitian Government has given no definite reply to this question, which has
been asked many times.
" The question that one naturally asks is, Does the hnv re<iuire the holdinfr
of the elections for the National Assembly in January next? The ccmstitution
of Haiti strttes that the electi<in must be held on the lOtb of January in an
even year. The year shall be set by the President of tbe Republic in a decree
issue<i nt least three months before the meeting: of the primary assemblies. In
other words, tlie elections will be held when tlie President believes that the con-
dition of the country is such as to permit of it. Tbe question of holdinp the
election, therefore, lies entirely with the President, but next year a new Presi-
dent must be elected, or rather the time of ofllce of the present incumbent ex-
pires, and if there is no assembly who will elect the President? The Conseil
d'Etat was empowered by the constitution to act, for legislative purposes, in
tbe place of the assembly. This Council of State is, however, but a creature of
the President, as all its niembr*rs are apDolnted by him and it is reasonable to
expect that if so empowered it would reelect him. Has it the power to elect
a President? It is n)y understanding that tbe Department of tSate has already
stated that the f mictions of this body must be confined to legislative acts, and
under such an intcrju'etation it would unquestionably not have the power. On
the other hand, from my talks with Haitian Government takes the view that
the acts of the CJonseil d'Etat can not \ye confined to legislative acts only, but
that it has as broad powers as those of the National Assembly.
" If, on the other hand, the claim is upheld that the Conseil d'Etat has not
the power to assume electoral functions, and, furthermore, the President falls
to hold the elections in January for senators and deputies, bow, then, can a
President be elected, and under such con<litions would the present lncunil)ent
be Justified in remaining.
" These are all questions that here in Haiti are uppermost In the minds of
those closely allied to Haitian affairs, and at the present time it is dlflicult to
see how any of them can be settled without causing much discontent and feeling
among the Haitian politicians, of whom many are already sinking their small
fortunes in promoting their candidacies. It must be further remembered that
the Haitian politician has heretofore run the country — he has controllcHl the
mass. The Union Patriotique has among its members many candidates for the
Presidency, but if no election is held all these men will unite in a common
cause, and then we have a more or less organized body united against the
Haitian Government and against our efforts here if we support that Govern-
ment in its action.
" In addition, in the coast towns the newspapers are maintaining their
antioccupation and anti-Government attitude, and are almost daily publishlnt;
Insulting and vitriolic articles.
WAR DECLARED ON GERMANY.
On May .S the Haitian cabinet dec'lded to send the National A.ssembly a mes-
sage reoonnnendlng that war be declared on Germany. Much confusion re-
sulted. On May 5 the National Assembly received the President's message
reconuuending the declaration of war. This caused an attack on the cabinet
but the cabinet was sustained. On ^lay 12 the brigade couunander reported to
the State Department that the Haitian cabinet had decided to break diplomatic
relations with (Tcrmany and to hand the charge d'affaires his passport. War
against Germany was eventually declaredby Haiti on July 18, 1918.
VISITS OF PRESIDENT INTO COT 'N TRY.
On December 11, 1917, an automobile was driven for the first time over the
road from Gonalves to Cape Haitien. This was the first wheele<l vehicle that
had traveled this roa<l in 112 years. Having received a report concerning this
the Major General Conmiandnnt addressed the brigade commander as follows:
" My sincere congratulations to all who have been instrumental in doing this
great work."
On .January 3. 1913, the President of the Republic of Haiti with his party
left Port au Prince in an automobile at 4 a. m. and arrived at Cape Haitien at
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 77
7.50 p. m., making stops at Arcahale, St. Marc, Dessalines, Gonalves, Ennery,
Plaisance, and Limbe. On January 9, the presidential party left Cape Haltien
and returned to Port au Prince. The towns passed through were all decorated
and great enthusiasm was shown, clearly demonstrating the contentment and
happiness of the people. This was the first time in the history of the country
that a President of Haiti had been able to visit the northern cities of Haiti
without a protecting army at his back.
In a speech to Haitian people on April 15, 1920, the President of the Republic
stated that he, the President, had five years ago signed a convention with the
United States, that he was a Haitian and loved his country, and that he would
sign such a convention live times over if need be to clear up the brigandage In
Haiti. He further told them what a great and powerful country the United
States was, and that the white officers and men now giving them protection ^
and allowing them to pursue their work were men of the highest honor and
integrity, who were devoted to the interest of their country and were working
for the good of Haiti, and that it was necessary that the Haitians assist them
in every way. His remarks were well received and in the opinion of the brigade
commander had an excellent effect. This speech by the President was made
during a tour in which he made an extended trip through northern Haiti de-
livering addresses in many of the larger cities. The president was received
enthusiastically everywhere along the route and newspaper men who accom-
panied the party declared in their pai)ers that pacification was restored.
The President made excellent si)eeches and was greatly pleased at the results
of the trip.
THE CONSTITUTION,
It having been agreed that the new constitution for Haiti as amended by
order of the State Department should be submitted to the Haitian i)eople for
their vote on June 12, 1918. arrangements were made by Col. Russell for taking
care of any disturbances that might arise. In his report Col. Russell stated
that the voting polls were opened at 7 a. m. and closed at 5 p. m. At Port
au Prince all stores were closed, and although crowds were around the vot-
ing booths they were most orderly. Reports from all over the Republic soon
Indicated that the new constitution would be adopted by a large majority
vote and that no disorders would occur. In his report the next day, June 13,
1917, Col. Russell reported that the constitution had been adopted by an over-
whelming majority, up to the present time returns showed 69,337 affirmative
votes and 335 negatives. No disonlers during^ the day.
Shortly after the adoption of the constitution the President of Haiti stated
that he intended to call only such men to his assistance (in his cabinet) as
he knew to be capable, honorable, and disposed to assist him in the work of
reconstruction of the country.
THE CONVENTION WITH CACO CHIEFS.
Col. Waller on October 1, 1915, met the hostile Caco chief at Quartler Morin
JiDd an agreement was drawn up, signed by both sides, providing in part that
the Cacos would disarm immediately and turn in all arms and ammunitions to
the United States forces and return to their homes and not interfere with rail-
roads, telegraph, telephone. fr<mnnerce, agriculture, or other industries of the
country, etc. After the signing of this convention there ensued a i)erlod during
*olch conditions were veyy unsettled in northern Haiti. The Caco forces were
pattered over a territory of approximately 2,000 to 2,500 square miles, roughly,
^itiiin the territory included between St. Marc, Gonalves, Port de Palx, Cape
«aitlen. Fort Liberie, Hinche, tannery, the principal centers of their actlvi-
nes being Gonaives, Quartler Morin. Le Trou, Fort I^iberte district, and
hirt'^K ^i^'i^^I ^^6 district aUmg the border from Ouanamlnth to Carice was
In? troops of the former Government. It was understood that the disarm-
Cary^ the soldlers would take place at the same time as the disarming of the
veiv • ^^ their chief in the same district The (Jacos, however, proved to be
tion '^^iiicere in their attitude on disarming, which resulted in several opera-
IIj ® ^t some Importance during the month of October, 1915, chief of which was
therV^^^^ by the American forces on Fort Dlpitie and operations incident
0^^* which resulted In a considerable number of casualties to the Cacos.
the n ^^<:ot>er 27, Col. Waller left Port au Prince for Cape Haltien to conduct
pljjjT^^s^essary operations to subdue tr^e Cacos. Arriving at Cape Haltien the
^or the operations were somewhat accelerated by the continued attacks
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78 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
ou the marines at Bajon and tlie sniiiin? at patrols lH»t\veen (trantl UivVre
and Bajon. Purine November, 1915, these operationn were carrie<l ont and
Fort Riviere, the stnmjrhold of tlie Taeos was captiire<l Noveni!)er 17.
" CACO " DEWXKD.
In a report to the oonnnander of the cruiser squadron, Col. Waller jrave the
following definition of a " Ciwo " : " It must l)e explained that the Cacos havo
been the controlling elements in all revolutions. They were purchased l)y first
one candidate and! then another. Finishing: a contract witli one man, they,
having put him in power, would immediately sell their services to the next
aspirant to unseat the first."
ITNNECT-LSSARY yORCT-: PROHIBITED.
On Novenriier 2(> the S€»cretary of the Navy informe<l Hear Admiral Capertcui
that the department was strongly impressed with the number of Haitians kille<l
and felt that a severe lesson had been tauj;ht the Cacos and believed that «
proper control could be maintained to preser\'e order and protect InnoeeJit
without further olTensive operations. In reply Rear Adndral Caperton in-
formeil the Secretary of the Navy that all oi)erations except protective patrol-
ling had been suspended and that directions had been jjiven that ever>' effort
should be to prevent loss of life on both sides, that the exi>editionary force is
maintaining military control of the ports of entry of Haiti and undertaking
such other operations as necessary to preserve peace and order In the territory
contijruous thereto.
MODI'S VIVENDI ESIHODYINC} TERMS OF TREATY.
On November 11, 1915. the treaty was ratifie<l by the Haitian Senate after
miK-h dehiy, «nd on November 29 a modus vivendi embodying the exact terms
of the treaty was signed by i)lenii>(»tentiaries of the United States and Haiti
to establish some method of jirocedure while awji'ting exchange (»f ratifica-
tions. The modus vivendi, however, was not carrie<l out by the United States
at this time owing to ccmstitutional restrictions in the matter of appointing
ollicers as oflidals without congressional action.
THE GE>'DARMKR1K.
The AnwM'ican minister In Haiti on January 10 informed Rear Admiral
Caperton that the State Department on January S, 1910, had advised him
concerning the organization of the gendarmerie; that it had been agreed
between the State Department and the Haitian commission that "members
of the gendarmerie shall form the personal guard of the President of Haiti
and the gendarmerie shall be the sole police and military force of the country."
thereby al)(»lishing the palace guard as unnecessary.
On October ir». 1915, the Secretary of the Navy decided as follows:
"Article T, section 9. clause S. of the Constitution of the United States pro-
hibits any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States
from holding or acrepting any office, present, or emolument, or title from any
foreign State, unless Congress shall consent thereto. While oflftcers of the
UnitcKl States on duty in Haiti could not without the consent of Congress hold
{ IIi<-e. receive emolument, etc., under the Haitian Government, they are not
jirohihited by the Constitution or any law of the United States * from rendei-
;i friendly service' to that State, such as assisting to organize a gendarmerie.
(Sei» Op. 13, Atty. (Jen., 537, 5,S8.) However, at the iwesent date there is no
authority wliereby such officers could become officers in such a force by appfiiat-
ii.eiit fnnn the Government of Haiti."
On June 12. 191 (T, an act to authorize and eini>ower officers and enllste<l men
of the Navy and ^larlne Corps to serve under the Government of the Republic
of Haiti was enacted, as follows:
**Jfe it enacted by the S^enale ami Houne of Ret)rc»^ntativeg of the United
States of Ametiea in Congress assembled. That the Pivsident of the United
States be, and he is hereby, uthorlzed, in his discretion, to detail to as.«iist the
Republic of Haiti such officers and enlisted men of the United States Navy
and the United States Marine Corps as may be mutually agreed upon by him
and the President of the Republic of Haiti : Trovided, That the officers and en-
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INQUIRY INTO OC(*rPATION OF HAITI AKD SANTO DOMINGO. 79
listwl men m detailed be, iind they nre herebj-, authorized to wccvivt from the
Government of Haiti the stiid employment with compensation and emoluments
from the said Government of Haiti, subject to the approval of thv^ President
of the United States.
" Skc. 2. That to insure the continuance of this work during such time as
nmy be desirable, the President may have the power of substitution in the case
of the termination of the detail of any officer or enlisted mnn. ff»r any (rause:
Provided, That during the contbnmnce of such details the officers and enlisted
men shall continue to re<-e!w the ptiy and allowances of their ranks or ratings
in the Navy or Marine Corps.
'* Skc. 3. That the following inc rease in tlie United States Marine (^>rps be,
ttud the same is hereby authorize*!: Two majois. VI captains, 18 first Jieuttn-
ants, 2 assistant quartermasters with the rank of captain, 1 assistant pay-
master with the rank of captain, 5 (piartennaster sergcnints, .' first sergeants, 5
;ainnery sergeants, and 11 .sergeants.
*' Sec. 4. That the following increase in the Unite^l States Navy be, and the
same is hereby, authorized: One surgeon. 2 passed assistant surgeons, .i hos-
pital .stewards, and 10 hos|)ital apprentices, first class.
" Sec 5. That oflicers and enlisted men of the Navy and ^larine Corps de-
tniled for duty to assist the Kepublic of Haiti .shall be entitled to the .some
credit for su<*h service, for longevity, retirement, foreign service, pay. and for
nil other purposes, that they would receive if they were wrving with the Navy
or with the Marine (*ori)s/'
Marine and naval oflicers were lmme<liately appointed by the President of
the Republic of Haiti after nomination by the President of the United States
to officer and administer the Gendarmerie d'Haiti.
From October 13. 1915, to FebruaiT 1. 1916. the gendannerie acted in accord-
ance with instructions Issued by the expeditionary commander. On February
1, 1916, the following pi-odamation was issue<i changing those* duties from purely
police to include both militar>' and police and absolutely supplantecl the old
r^me:
*' PKOCLAMATIOX.
" Whereas the I*resident of Haiti and his cal)inet have decreed that on this
•lute the commandants of communes and the chiefs of sections are abolished,
and also that all military an<l police duties of the commandants of arrondise-
Dieats are taken away, it Is hereliy ordered that, from this date, all the mili-
tary ami iM)Iice duti€»s heretofore performed by tho.se olbcers he jK^rformed by
the Gendarmerie d'Haiti supported by the exi)e<liti<»nary forces under my
command."
Pursuant to this order, the gendarmes tlien in service were transferred to all
parts of Haiti, both in the large and small towns, appropriate increase made in
strength, and the gendarmerie took up Its duties under the following instructions
issued by the expenditlonary commander regarding its fimctions:
1. Preservation of order.
2. Protection of individual rights,
3. Protection of property.
4. Supervision of arms.
5. Prevention of smuggling.
6. Protect and report on conditions of highways and bridges. When so
ordered by the commandant of the gendannerie, the genedarmes mtIU require,
according to law, the proper inhabitants to alter or repair public highways and
bridges, and will supervise this work. At the request of the mayor of the com-
nnme they nmy, when ordered by the proper officer of the gendarmerie, under-
take this work.
7. Protect and report on conditions of the telegraph and telephone service.
When ordered by a commissioned officer of the gendarmerie, will have the
authority to censor all messages and to take charge of any station or oflic»e
when necessary for the good of the public.
8. Report on and supervise the use of the public lands according to law.
i). Protect and report on conditions of public buildings.
10. Collection of vital statiKtIcs. including the census, when ordered.
11. Report on and protect public irrigation works.
12. Enforce sanitary orders and regulations.
13. Report on and enforce regulations preventing spread of animal disea.sea
14. ReQort on and enforce regulations pi*eventing spread of epidemics.
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€0 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
15. Plenary control in time of great disorder following war, rebellion, earth-
<iuakes, typhoons, etc.
16. Control of prisons.
17. Issuance of permits for travel within the llepublic.
18. Agricultural reports.
19. Require all weights and measures to conform to legal standards.
20. Enforce harbor and docking regulations.
These duties have since been modified as follows :
On August 24, 1916, in an agreement between the United States and Haiti
the maintenance and operation of the telegraph and t^ephone lines were put
under the engineer of Haiti.
On January 4, 1917, the Secretary of the Interior issued an order that permits
for travel within the R^ublic were no longer necessary.
On May 31, 1919, the building, upkeep, and repair of roads were turned over
to the direct supervision of the engineer of Haiti.
With these exceptions the duties and functions of the gendarmerie are at
present as outlined above.
On August 24, 1916, the gendarmerie agreement (protocol to treaty) was
ratified by the United States, and on the same date the commandant of the
Marine Corps directed that the officers and enlisted men then serving be trans-
ferred out of the marine brigade and into the gendarmerie.
The difficulties with which the gendarmerie had to cope in the early days
were almost nuiltitudinous. The conditions, both urban and rural, the results of
over a hundred years' custom, were suddenly changed, and these changes were
manifestly not agreeable to the old officials replaced by this new organization.
On July 5, 1916, the municipal and rural police were abolished and the entire
policing of Haiti placed In the hands of the gendarmerie. This had to be done,
as each commune had its own " private " police which extended into the sec-
tions of the commune and through custom and law degenerated to such an
extent that the chief of section had the authority to require any citizen to
arrest any other and countenanced arrests of which he had no previous
knowledge.
The gendarme as a soldier has done excellent work not only under their white
officers but under their native noncommissioned officers as well. On many
occasions they have met and defeated greatly superior forces. From the date
of their organization the native gendarme has on no occasion deserted his white
officer.
The gendarmerie has direct charge of all the prisons and prisoners of Haiti.
During the past year the number of prisoners had increased, due to captures
made in the field. At each district headquarters there Is a main prison.
Each district and post have a " lockup.**
The following Is a list of district prisons, with a tabulation of prisoners on
hand, June 30, 1920, and the number confined and released during the month
of June, 1920 :
Districts.
On hand
June 30.
Confined
during
month.
Released
during
month.
Port au Prince.
451
175
289
113
171
126
190
173
387
491
20
132
34
305
97
116
147
54
100
279
267
155
111
74
85
254
827
263
80
113
IS
80
116
275
130
76
147
PetloDvUle -
198
Petit Qoave
2S1
JacmeL
139
XuxCayes
'.
100
Jeremle
: :
49
Mlrebalals
54
St. Marc
31S
Qonalves
292
Cape (civil)
l»
Cape (district)
96
PortdePalx
129
La Trou
15
PortChabert
32
Grand Riviere
72
Ouanamlnthe
243
Hinch«
95
Circa La Source
20
1
Total
3,471
2/748
2,881
Note.— This table Is practically the average number per month during the past year.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 81
At the larirer prisons, Port au Prinoo aiul Cain* Hnifieu. the prisoners are
taught a trade, and when their product is marketable tliey are given a i>eroent-
a^Tf* on their work. The money derived in this manner is jfiven to them on
release or may be allotte<l by them to their families if the term of conflnemeut
is for a long period. All the gendarme uniforms and the clothing for prlscmers
are manufaeturetl by prison labor. A garden is re(|ulre4l for pri.sons for the
l)etterment of the gendarme and prison rations. At Post (Mialiert, neaar Cape
Haitien, a pri8<m farm is in operation, giving healthy, open-air work to over
3iNj prisoners. Tlie idea of this farm Is in achlitlon to aiding the ration in cost,
to experiment as to the methods of cultivation, mostly in native prmlucts, and
to give the beuetlt of better methods to the Haitian general public, letting them
graphically .see the results. Gardens are also In operation at all i)osts.
Telegraph and telephone lines all over Haiti were put in working order and
kept up by the gendarmerie, assisted by the occuiwtUm until turnetl over to the
en^fiueer. Since that time side lines necessiiry for otficlal work were put In by
the gendarmerie (nainectlng (Mrca la Source. Hinche. Thomonde, Thomasslque,
Port de Palx, Valliere, etc., with the outer world. With the exception of the
bist two places the material was Ki>eclally ordered from the United States and
paid for by the gendarmerie. These lines are still kept up by the gendarmerie
imd held until such time as civil operators can be found to enter these localities
and take over. Lately the engineer has supplied necessary repair material
wheu needed.
With the exception of the larger seac^oast t(»wns the gendarmerie cooperating
\^ith the sanitary engineer of Haiti has suiJervision of the sanitary service
practically over the whole Island. Every gendarme post has a dispensary or
.«iinall hospital where, in the absence of the sanitary servi(*e, inhabitants receive
treatment free of charge.
Gendarmerie schools have been opened at all posts. This has been a god-
^nd to the enlisted man and is greatly appreciated by them. Reading, writing,
and simple figuring is as much as has been attempted so far.
The medaille militaire (Haitian medal of honor) was awarded to the follow-
ing officers and men of the Constabulary Detachment. This medal is awarded
for conspicuous conduct in the field :
Lieut. Col. P. M. Wise. First Lieut. J. W. Knighton.
Lieut CoL R. S. Hooker. Second Lieut. H. H. Hanneken.
Maj. J. J. Meade. Sergt. Joseph O. Vanhorn.
Maj. W. N. Hill. Corpl. Archie M. Ackroyd.
Maj. W. W. Buckley. Corpl. Clair S. Christian.
Maj. A. A. Vandegrlft. Corpl. Roger B. KirchhofP.
Cfjri»l. Eugene S. Jones. Corpl. Manuel E. Perry.
Oorpl. William R. Button. Corpl. Lew^is B. Puller.
Corpl. E. S. Winfrey. Pvt 1st Class M. F. Brown.
(>)rpl. H. R. Wood.
Lieut. Commander J. S. Helm, M. C,
r. S. N.
One hundred and five Haitien members of the gendarmerie received the
medaille militaire. The.«<e presentations were made at Port au Prince and Cape
Haitien by the president of Haiti wth appropriate ceremonies. Congressional
ine<lals of honor were awarded to Second Lieut H. H. Hanneken and Corpl.
AVilllam R. Button for the successful attack on the Charlemagne M. Peralte,
The present organization of the gendarmerie Is as follows :
Chief 1
Asjiistant chief 1
Dlrwtors, line 3
Director, quartermaster, paymaster 1
IHrector, medical ,_ 1
Inspectors, line 10
Inspectors, quartermaster 2
Inspectors, medical 2
^'aptains 18
<'aptain, inspector. Coast Guard 1
First lieutenants, line 23
First lieutenants, medical 3
Second lieutenants, line 39
62260—21— FT 1 6
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82 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Second lieutenants, niedioul 6
Second lieutennnts, nmehine gun 10
P'irst lieutenants, Omst Guard 3
Fir8t sergeants 19
Serjeants 112
Corporals 2iTl
Field musicians 40
Privates 2. 100
The pay of the enlisted personnel is as follows :
Per month.
First sergeants $25.00
Sergeants 20. 00
Corporais 15.00
Field musicians 10.00
Privates 10. 00
In addition to the above each gendarme is allowed 15 cents a day for rations,
(nothing is furnishetl as needed, and with the exception of a few articles, suoh
as belts, shoes, etc.. is numufactured in prisons. The term of enlistment for
the gendarmes is three years. The gendarmes are armed with the Springflel'J
rifle loaned by the Marine Coriw.
Without going Into detail the gendarmerie is a complete military unit, modele«»
after our own organizations, having its own transport, medical, quartermasti'r.
and commis-sary sei->'i(»s, post exchanges, etc.
Since the forma tl<m of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, the folliming-named otticei's
of the Marine Cori>s have been chiefs of that organization: Maj. Sme<lley D.
Butler, until May 1, 1918, when he was succee<led by Maj. Alexander S. Wil-
li am.s, who served as chief until relieveil by Lieut. (>)1. Frederic M. Wise on
July 19, 1910. Lieut, (^ol. Wise was relieved by Lieut. Col. Douglas C. Uc-
Dougai nu April l.\ 1921.
CORVEE.
Soou after the American occupation (»f Haiti it was realize<l that good r(>atiJf
between the principal towns were a military necessity, for, due to the chaotA*
conditions prevailing in Haiti as a result of the almost incessant revolutions,
there were no roads in Haiti outsiile of the towns and cities, and communication
between these points by land was almost impossible. The main trunk road fruui
Port au Prince to Cai)e Haitien was Impassable for wheeled tratfic and required
from two to three weeks to make the journey by animal.
I»y the word " corvee " is meant a system of enforced labor on roads. In
Haiti such a system has formetl a part of the law for many years, but prior to
the American occupation it had not been enforced for some time. By the corvee
system, men living in a district were required to work on the main road or artery
in that district a certain number of days during each year. The Haitian Gov-
ernment was without funds to employ labor for n»ad work or, in fact, for any
public work. It was heavily in debt to the extent of .si)me $31,000,000, and the
United States was trying to rehabilitate it. Naturally the first act of the Unltei!
States was to enforce law and order and obtain peace thnmghout the land, ami
in order to accomplish this good roads were essential.
By authority of the President of Haiti, the law (Code Rural, sec. 3. Ch. V.
arts. 52 to 65) requiring the inhabitants to do a certain amount of work on
the roads was enforced. This was known as the corvt»e.
The gendarmie of Ha ti, which was formed soon after the American occnpa-
tl(»n, acting for the Haitian Government, put into effect this old corvee hiw.
Under this law the road to C'ai)e Haitien was begim in October, 1917, and li»-
ished about December 31, 1917. W^hen this road was comi)leted the system con-
tinued, and although legal gradually fell from favor. The " membres agricol"
ami " magistrats communeaux." the Haitian olficials who kept the lists of worl%-
men and made out working details, saw a valuable source of income and took
advantage of it. Persons who did not wish to work could buy immunity, ami
the consequence was that to a great extent the same man, those wb<i could not
pay, were chosen f(»r work over and over again. An attempt to remedy this
was made by the is.suance of certificates to the workmen signed by the liH'al
gendarmie ofticer, made upon the completion of each man's work. It was ru-
mor(*d that these certificates were destroyed by the Haitian ofllcials unless bribes
were forthcoming, but it was difllcult to obtain proof on account of their ln>i(l
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INQUIRY INTO OCCrfPATlOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 88
over the iieople. This, coiipled with the fact that in some cases laborers were
held overtime and worked out of their immediate localities, was the reason the
corvee system t>ecame obncixious to the people. The corvee was discuntinued on
Octolier 1, 1918, and forbidden in any form, but unfortunately thnm^li a mis-
iuterpretation of this order the corvee continued in the Mai8sa<le-Hinche dis-
trict for a while after this date. In order to make abscdutely certain that this
discontinuance was complete the followluj? proclamation was published on
Au^iist 22, 1919:
'ritizens of Haiti:
*• Tlie time hjis chuuc to lait a stop to fnrilier l»loods]ie<1. It h«s been necessary
to list* stern measures t<i repress the disonlers in the north, and with the rei'ent
arr.val of militaiy engines we am use even sterner metluHls, but I hope, with
yniir helj>, to l)e able t<» abandon surh means. I ask your assistance, and I ask
you to have faith in the good intentions which the l*resi<lent and people of the
riiitcHi. States of America entertain toward your country.
"The corvee has been done away with entirely. Work on the roads is en-
tirely voluntary and will be paid for daily. The workmen will be free to come
aud go when it pleases them ; they shall be paid for the hours they work. Any
injustices committed by native or American officials should be reixirted to
-VnK»rican military officials, and justice will be done and the offender punished.
"It is the desire of the American i>eople to establish security and prosperity
Ml this c*ountry. It can not be done while the bandits burn and i)illaK^. All
^mmI inhabitants should ^ve the greatest assi.stiince to officrers and men of the
mrupation in suppressing the banilits. All natives who have l)een forced to
join these thieves and bandits masquerading under the name of cacos, if they
(l(»slre to resume their peaceful farming, have but to report to the American
in i:tary officials, assure them of their iieaceful intent and future loyalty, and
H full iiardon and all iM>ssible [)rotection will l)e granted. This protection is im-
I"»ss}!)ie If the c<mntry i)eople continue to support the bandits calling themselves
cnnis.
*' I i)ersonally prom'se you that the llnite<l States (iovernment only desires to
irivt* to the citizens of Haiti m^'urlty and prosperity and the enjoyment of
lil)erty, ef|uallty, and fraternity."
The following quotation from rejKirt of Hear Admiral H. S. Knapp, dated
October 14, 192<), to the Secretary of the Navy, gives valual)le informatl<m con-
<vrning this subject :
"."ki. One of the matters undertaken by the gendarmerie was the opening up
••f HMuls for wheel traffic, t'nder its auspices a roatl over 250 miles long was
oFH'ueil up from a point west of Port au Prince to Cape Haltien in the north,
ami. iudee<l, to Ouanamiuthe in the northeast, on the Dominican border. This
was a great achievement for the progress of Haiti, whose roads capable of tak-
ing wheel traffic had therefore been a negligible quantity. The road was
Iniilt across the mountains for a considerable portion of its length and, in view
of the fact that the gendarmerie is not by its organization provided with engi-
neering talent, the achievement is all the more remarkable. In addition, other
nmds were built by the gendarmerie inti> the interior. The criticism of these
n»a(ls has been made that they were built for military purposes. That they
sprve a military use is perfectly plain ; but the critics, if they will take pains to
inform themselves of the onlers when the roads were built, will find that the
stress laid on their building was to oix»n up the country for the l)enefit of the
inhabitants. The President of Haiti in public speeches has expressed high ap-
pnH>iation of the value of the roads constructed by the gendarmerie.
"56. These roads were built under what has come to be described as the
'corvee system of labor.' The Kural Code of Haiti c<mtains a law relating to
Mu* maintenance and repairs of public highways, of which a copy has already
been sent to the department in another communication. This law provides in
article .>4 that—
"Tublic highways and communications will be maintaine<l and repaired by
tlic inhabitants, in rotation, in each secti<ai through which these roails pass
and eaoh time repairs are necessar>'.'
"Similar hiws exist in the T'uited States, but the word 'corvee* Is not
UM*il in their connection. Article ."»3 of the same law provides that —
"'Highways, public and private roads are placed un-ler the supervision of
the authorities and agents of the rural i)ollce.*
" Other articles provide for the calling out of the necessary labor to main-
tain and rei>air the roads. The gendarmerie, after its organization, replacwl
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84 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND 8ANl:0 DO
the rural police mentioned in this law. which went into effect January 1, 1865.
and still remains ui)on the statute hooks. In applying the so-called corvee
system the gendarmerie was acting under an existing law, and did so under
an order of the President of Haiti.
"57. As at first applied, the inhabitants of the sections through which the
road passed offered no objections, but quite the reverse, and the general senti-
ment was very favorable to the construction of the road, which In places wm
not new work but conslste;! of discovering and mending the old roads which
existed at the time of the Fi*ench in Haiti before independence, but which had
become overgrown and in places entirelj* lost The through road to the north
was hailed on all sides as a signal mark of progress. As time went on, how-
ever, an abuse crept In; the Inhabitants of other sections than those through
which the road passed were forced to work on the roads. This undoubtedly
created grave discontent, which was reflected In the attitude of the people. I
find no authority in the Kural Code for taking the Inhabitants from one sec-
tion and making them work in another section, but I am convinced from what
I have heard that this was done. The laborers worked under the supervision
of the gendarmerie and hence were under military control. When not author-
ized by the Rural Code this was unjustified by law, and the whole practice,
even legally administered, was a drawback to the development of the gendar-
merle Itself In Its true function as the police agency of the countrj*. The
ranking officers of the gendarmerie at that time are not now in Haiti, and
what has just been said must In Justification to them be qualified by the state-
ment that I have not been able since being here to ask any presentation of
the case from their jwlnt of view. I am only able to state my conclusions, as
far as I can reach them, from such investigations as I have made .since my
arrival in Haiti.
" 08. At the Instigation of the senior officer of the occupation In Haiti, the
I'resldent, on October 1, 1918, directed the discontinuance of the use of the
K'orvee system on the roads of the Republic, and the commanding officer of the
gendarmerie Issued an order In compliance with those Instructions. Even
then, however, the employment of corvee labor did not cease every^^'here.
The order of discontinuance did not mention, in at least one instance, a road
where corvee labor was then employed, and the local commanding officer took
the legalistic point of view that his section was not included under the terms
of the order. However legally cre«te<l. the effect was unfortunate. As soon
as the fact did l)ecome definitely known in Port au Prince that the order w*rs
not being obeyed steps were at once taken to stop all corvee work. In «h»
or two Instances it did not cease then. For this the local officers in immediate
charge, and especially the department commander of the north, in whose juris-
diction this disobedience of orders occurretl, are responsible and blameworthy.
The corvee is now nonexistent in any form. The law, however, has not been
repealed, and It still may legally be put Into operation by the* Haitian Govern-
ment. I personally believe the law to be a good one if legally administered.
" 59. The roads that were built by corvee labor are Invaluable to the progress
of the country. Had they been built In strict accord with the law, a ver>* praise-
worthy achievement wfuild have resulted, with no reproach of Illegality, or
even of overstepping the law, whirh reproach now seisms to attach to a public
work of such high value in itself."
GEN. LEJKUXE INSPECTS AND IS SATISFIED.
On October 4, 1920, Jilajor General Commandant John A. Lejeune concluded
a report to the Secretary of the Navy with this paragraph :
" During my tour of inspection in Haiti I found the marines to be in a highly
efficient condition. Their health, except for some cases of malaria, was excellent.
Their discipline was superb and their morale high. As I inspected the detach-
ments located at isolated points far in the interior of Haiti, I was filled with
admiration of their fine appearance and efficient condition. My heart was filled
with pride to see these splendid men giving to their country and the Republic of
Haiti such intelligent, zealous, efficient, and courageous service. I feel that the
American people have every right to be proud of their representatives who are
now wearing the uniform of the Marine Corps in Haiti."
THE MAYO COUBT OF INQUIRY.
The Secretary of the Navy, under date of October 16, 1920, convened a court
of inquiry, conerlstlng of Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, as president, Rear Ad-
miral James H. Oliver, and Maj. Gen. Wendell C. Neville, as additional membei*.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 85
and Maj. Jesse F. Dyer, as jiulj?e a<lvoc^te, to iiiqnUv into the alleged IihUs-
crixDlnate killings of Haitiane and other unjustifiable acts by members of the
United States naval qprvice, including those detailed to duty with the Gendar-
merie d'Haiti, against the persons and property of Haitians since the American
occupation, July 28, 1915. The inquiry was completed on October Id, 1920, and
the findings of the court follow :
FINDING OF FACTS.
1. The court finds that two unjustfiable homicides have been committed, one
each, by two of the personnel of the United States naval service which has
served in Haiti since July 28, 1915, and that 16 other serious acts of violence
have been perpetrated against citizens of Haiti during the same period by in-
dividuals of such personnel.
2. The court finds further that these offenses were all isolated acts of in-*
dividnals and that in every case the responsible party was duly brought to trial
before a general court-martial, convicted, and sentenced.
3. The court has found no evidence of the commission of any other unjustifi-
able homicides or other serious unjustifiable acts of oppression or of violence
against any of the citizens of Haiti or unjustifiable damage or destruction of
their property caused by any of the personnel in question.
In view of the fact that the only unjustifiable acts found by the court to
have been committed are those wherein disciplinary action has already been
taken and where no further proceedings could be had in the matter, the court
has not deemed it necessary to report further upon the question of responsibility.
CONCLUSIONS.
Referring to paragraph 2 of the precept, it is the conclusion of the court that
there have been no proper grounds for the statement that ** practically indis-
criminate killing of natives has been going on for some time " as alleged in
the letter from Brig. Gen. George Barnett, United States Marine Corps, to
Col. John H. Russell, United States Marine Corps.
Referring to the amendment of the precept calling for the conclusions of the
court as to the general conduct of the personnel of the naval service in Haiti
since July 28, 1915. the court does not consider that the siuall number of Isolated
crimes, or offenses that have been committed by a few individuals of the
service during the period in question are entitled to any considerable weight in
forming a conclusion as to the general conduct of such i)ersonnel. It was in-
evitable that some offenses would be committed. However, considering the con-
ditions of service in Haiti, it is remarkable that the offenses were so few in
number and that they all may be chargeable to the ordinary defects of human
character, such defects as result in the commission of similar offenses in the
Tnited States and elsewhere In the best regulated connnunitles.
The general conduct of our troops of occupation can be fairly judged by the
results of that occupation.
Now, for the first time In more than a hundred years, tranquillity and
security of life and property may be said to prevail In Haiti.
The Haitian people themselves welcomed the coming of our men and are
imwliling to have them depart.
The establishment and maintenance of tranquil conditions and then of se-
curity of life and property all over the Republic of Hnltl has been an arduous
and dangerous and thankless task. That task our marines have performed
with fidelity and great gallantry.
The court can not refrain from recording Its opinion of much, and that the*
most serious part, of the reflections which have been made uixm the officers
who have served In Haiti.
The outstanding characteristic of those ofllcers. from the brigade commander
down, has been their sympathetic attitude toward every step that would lead
to a betterment of the country and to improvement in the physical, mental, and
moral conditions of the pfipulntlon.
With slender resources and inadequate administrative authority, they have
aoci^raplished much, where anything more than .suppression of organized in-
surrection seem impossible.
The above remarks apply with particular force to those officers and enlisted
men of the Marine Cori)S who have been serving as officers of the gendarmerie
of Haiti. r^^^^I^
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86 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF H.UTI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
After n careful study of the matters in issue; Imse^l not only upon the evi-
tlence in the i"eoor<l, but also upon other orifrinal and reliable sources of in-
fornmtion, and the court's own observations wlille in Haiti, tl» court repmi^
the charges which have l»een published as ill considered, r«ifrettaWe, and tiKM--
i>ujrhly unwarranted reflectlong i)n a portion of the United States Marine (\>rpF.
whicli has i>erforuie(l ditticult, dangerous, and delicate duty in Haiti hi a
manner which, instead of calling for adverse criticism, is entitled to the highest
commendation.
The record of the proceedings of tliis twenty-tirst day of the Inquirj- was
read and approvetl, and the court having tinisheil the Inquiry, then at 11
o'clock a. m. adjourne<l to await the action of the convening authoritj-.
LITERACY AND EDUCATION IN HAITI.
Illiteracy In the Republic of Haiti has been conservatively estimated to b»
at from 95 to 98 per cent. On December 3, 1020, Major General Commandant
John A. Lejeune, signed the following Indorsement to the Secretary of the Navy,
the subject of fhe ndoi'senient reading "Carrying out the terms of the treat)
between the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti by organliinii
and administering an educational system (including primary) for the Republic
of Haiti " :
" 1. This correspondence is forwarded with the strongest approval and ex-
pressing the opinion that It will not be until the United States seriously
assumes the duty of educating the Haitians and pursuing such duty to a 8ati«»-
factory conclusion that the pacification and occupation of the Republic of Haiti,
which has been so successfully accomplished, will bear fruit; and further,
that the law of the United States, and the treaty proclaimed May 3, 1916. will not
only permit but requires the performance of this duty.
**2. Under the provisions of the net of June 12. 1916 (39 Stat.. 223), tli^
President of the United States is authorized in his discretion, to detail to assist
the Republc of Haiti such officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine
('ori>8 as mny be mutually agreed ui>on by hlni and the President of the ReimWio
of Haiti, and personnel so appointed are authorized by this act to accept such
employment with compensation and emoluments from the Republic of Haiti,
subject to the approval of the President of the United States.
"3 The above-mentioned law was enacted solely for the purpose of carrying
into oflfect the terms of the treaty between the United States and the Republic
of Haiti proclaimed May 3, 1916, and while up to the present date Its pro-
visions have been exerted mainly for the carrying out of Articles X and XIII
of the treaty concerning the gendarmerie and engineers, it is in no way re-
stricted in its operation to those purposes, and it contains adequate authorlM-
tion for the purpose of detailing personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps to
initiate, organize, and administer a system of education for the Republic of
Haiti.
" 4. While the subject of education Is not expressly mentioned in the treaty,
as is the Gendarmerie d'Haitl, sanitation, etc.. nevertheless important provi-
sions of the treaty can not be carried out unless the United States and the
Republic of Haiti, by protocol or separate agreement based on certain general
provisions of the treaty, agree to have education (including primary) In the
Republic of Haiti administered in a manner similar to that prescribed in
Ar&de X of the treaty for the preservation of domestic peace by the gen-
darmerie. While such action might be based upon moral grounds or upon the
expedient of following a path necessary to the rehabilitation of Haiti, it is
believed that the treaty contains sufficient and adequate authority upon wWch
to proceed. Surely such an Injection of assistance by the United States into the
internal affairs of Haiti should be less criticizable than that in matters pertain-
ing to the armed forces of the Republic through which sovereignty Is usually
maintained.
*• 5. In effect, the tivtity was negotiated and ratified l)y both States for the
purpose of assisting in the * economic development and prosperity ' of the Re-
public of Haiti (preamble), for the * efficient development of its agricultural,
mineral, and commercial resources and In the establishment of the finances
of Haiti on a firm and solid basis' (Art. I), to 'promote material prosperity'
(Art. IX) for the 'development of Its natural resources' (Art XIII), and for
the 'sanitation and public Improvement of the Republic' (Art. XIII). None
of these can be accomplished unless the education of the Haitian people,
beginning at the bottom, is made possible by the assistance, contemplated by the
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 87
••«. Particular attention Is invitwl to Article XIV providing that the Unlteil
States of America and the Republic of Haiti shall have niithority to take such
step5< 118 may be necessary* to assure the * complete attainment of any of the
objects comi:/ehended in this treaty,' and also to the words of the preamble
rwiding that * the United States being in full sympathy with all of these alms
and objects and desirous to contribute In all proper ways to their accomplish-
ment.'
"7. Without considering what might have been avoided by the inclusion of
au article in the treaty providing for performance of this serious duty, or that
the United States might have anticipated a failure on the part of the Haitian
(Government to efficiently and satisfactorily perform this duty of e<lncatlon, tlie
fact confronts the United States at this time that the duty has been uniHM*-
fonned and also that it is highly improbable that unless the United StPtes
<1<H»H assist, the Republic of Haiti will never evolve to such a self -sustain in;?
Htatus that the irnlted States would be justified in withdrawing. An occupa-
tion of a foreign country, though best-intentione<l, is doomed to failure If it
be^'lns and ends in a military phase.
"8. At the present time the effort of American officials, including Marine
Corps and Navy personnel, have been limited to moral suasion and to influenc-
ing the Haitian olficials and Haitian public opinion toward administering an
f-ttirient system of e<lncntion. and tlu^se efforts, llniittMl as they are, have failed.
"9. It might be remarked that the treaty was not negotlatcnl primarily for
the purpose of permitting the United States to conduct indeflnltely those ac-
tivities included within the treaty phrase of * alms and obj<»cts,' but rather for
the education of the Haitian people and thus enabling the Republic of Haiti to
bwome a self-sustaining and 'going' State. The act of taking over certain
functions of the Government was a mere incident in the course of events con-
templated by the treaty, the final of which being that of turning back a prac-
tically perfect governmental machine to a people educatetl and capable of ad-
ministering and maintaining It level with an efficient standard.
"10. The United States may install the most excellent road system, It may
cstuhlish the most efficient (Jendarmerie to maintain domestic peace and police,
it may puice sanitation uiwn a healthful basis, it may assist in the economic de-
velotiment and prosperity, and may arrange the finances satisfactorily, but if
^lic Haitian peorde thenwelves are not elevated by education to the plane on
wliich the people of an average modern State dwell, no iwsitive and enduring
l^onelit will have been conferre<l upon them, and the (K-cupation will have been
in vnln, unless they have been educated to the degree that they are able to con-
•iiHt their own affairs unaided by an occupying force.
" 11. In conclusion, the recommendation of the brigade commander, approved
by Rear Admiral Knai^p, is approve<l, that a protocol or separate agreement he
arranged with the Republic of Haiti, providing for the administration of educa-
tional matters, indud'ng primary education. In a manner similar to that outlined
in Article X for the (gendarmerie."
The SeiTetary of the Navy in forvvarding the above to the Secretary of State
placed on it the following Indorsement:
■• This corresjMm<lence is forwarde<l with the strongest approval of the Navy
Dt'imrtnient. The opini<m of the Major (4pneral Oommandant, * It will not be
until the United States seriously assumes the duty of educating the Haitians
»nd pursuing such duty to a satsfactory conclusion that the pacification and
fMvuiwition of the Republic of Haiti, which has been so successfully accomplished,
will l)ear fruit,' is concurred in.
"The Navy Department will be i)leased to assist In such manner as may be
poj'slhle and i»ractical)le in establishing and administering an efficient educa-
Uonal system fm* the RepiUdlc of Haiti with the object of enabling that Republic
to rparh such a self-sustaining status as will justify the I'^nited States in with-
♦Injwing its military forces therefrom."
TWO INTKRE8TTN0 LKTTERS.
The Se<Tetary of the Na\'>- and the Major General (Nnnmanrlant of the Ma line
^'•HT« frequently receive letters praising the work of the naval service in the
UepuliMo of Haiti. The following replies by Gen. Uejouiie to two of tliese let-
t<M-s. date*! Xovemb<»r 1.^ and 10. 1920. respectively, are of interest :
" I was partii'Ularly interested in your statement, wliich I believe is a correct
'<»nrhision, that the few irregular acts on the part of mar ncs toward the
Hntiaiis werp the acts of individuals and not a part of the policy^stablisjied
gitizedbyCjOOgle
88 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
by those in poKiti«ms of resiwnslbillty, and that the responsible officers linw
always been deeply clia^riued by the occasional failures <»f their subordinates
to carry out not only their definite orders and instructions but the principles to
which all civilize<l i)eople8 are devoted.
"As far as the participation of the Marine Con>s in these affairs is concerned,
it not only must but is satisfied to stand on its re<*ord, even though such reiMml
has been niarrwl by the occasional unauthorized acts of Individuals, and there
is not the slightest desire to evade responsibility for any incident. Every gen-
eral rvile of normal human conduct has an iK'caspional variation, and the gen-
eral rule of a successful administration of Haitian affairs, from the Marine
C^»rps point of view, has I am sure been proved by the exception. rnf(»r-
tunately, the almost consistent success of the marines* goiKl work has been
smothered by the publicity accorded the exceptions.
" Your reference to the illiteracy of the Haitian i)eople, w^hich you estimate
is from 95 to 98 per cent, is quite pertinent, and I believe that it wHll not be
until the United States seriously assumes the duty of educating tliem and pur-
sues such duty to a successful conclusion that the pacification of the Republic
of Haiti, which has been so successfully accomplished, will bear fruit.
** Upon my recent visit to both of these countries, I found the military situa-
tion and general condition to be excellent in so far as the Marine Corps was
responsible, and ycmr words and those of many others who have been kind
enouph to express themselves to me would indicate that the general American
public will in the end undoubtedly take this viewpoint and accord to their fellow
Americans, w^ho have so unselfishly taken up this work, a degree of praise and
vindication which will compensate them for the unmerited criticism caused by
the delinquencies of a few individuals."
" Thos<* parts of your letters which refer to sanitation, and its Improve-
ment under the o<vupation. to the roads bult, to the ixditical condition of
Haiti, and to the improvement in Haitian finances proved very interesting to
me. I was particularly Interested in that part of your letter which outline^!
the duties of the United States tx) be: First, * to put down rebellion, obtain all
arms and ammunition, and to restore order In the country ' ; second, * to pro-
vide sanitation ' ; third, * to form a government for the Haitians which wouM
be stable and secure*; fourth, 'to ascertain, adjudge, and liquidate the debts':
fifth, ' teach the Haitians how to govern themselves * ; and sixth, * turn the
Government over to the Haitians for their own governing when the Haitians
were capable of self -government*
** I am sure that the great majority of .Americans will agree with your con-
clusions that the purpose is evident that the United States desires to give to
Haiti a permanent, stable and safe government, and In the meantime an»i
while working out its destiny to educate the Haitian so that he may take over
the management of that government when he is able to do so."
SKCRETARY DEXRY VISITI HAITI.
The Secretary of the Navy on March 27, 1921, arrived in Port au Prince,
and on the same day, in company with the American minister, called on the
President of the Republic of Haiti. The Secretary afterwards In.spected the
marines' and gendarmes' posts in Haiti and crossed the border into the Do-
minican Republic on March 30, 1921. Secretary Denby, upon his return to
the United States, expressed high praise of the marines' work in Haiti.
OFFICERS IN COMMAND.
Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton, commander cruiser force, was senior naval
officer present from July 28. 1915, to July 19, 1916, when he was relieved by
Rear Admiral C. F. Pond, who in turn was relieved by Rear Admiral H. S.
Knapp on November 22, 1916.
Since March 31, 1917, these naval officers have held the designation of mili-
tary goveiTior of Santo Domingo and military representative of the United
States in Haiti. When the revolution broke out in the Dominican Republic in
May, 1916, Rear Admiral Caperton proc(»e(led to the city of Santo Doininpo
and assumed control of the situation. From that date on he and his succes-
sors resided in that city and despite the above-m<*ntioned title could, if ne<>
esslty, exercise but little direct control over Haitian affairs.
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INQUIRY IXTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO 1X)MING0. 89
Renr Adiuirnl Thomas Snow.den on February 25, 1919, relieved lieail Ad-
miral Knapp, and remained in command until relieved by Rear Admiral S. S.
Kobison, June 2, 1921.
The following-nametl officers of the Marine Corps have been In command
of the First Provisional Brigade, United States Marine Cori>s, ashore in the
Kepublic of Haiti, since the formation of that brigade; Col. Littleton W. T.
Waller, until November 22. 191C, when he was relieved by Col. Ell K. Cole.
Col. Cole was relieved by Col. John H. Hussell on November 28. 1917. Brig,
(ien. Albertus W. Catlin on December 7, 1918, relieve<l Col. Russell and
was succeeded on July 15, 1919, by Lieut. Col. Louis McC. Little. Lieut. Col.
Little WHS relieved on October 1, 1919, by Col. John H. Russell, who is at
pre^nt in command. Since May, 1916, these officers have virtually been in
control of naval affairs in the Republic of Haiti, In view of the demands made
upon the time of above-mentioned naval officers by Dominican affairs.
This memorandum practically contains no reference to military operations.
Such Is unnecessary, except to state that the marines successfully carried out
the major mission assigned to them by the Navy Department that acted in
accordance with the requests of the Department of State. This major mission
was the military one of pacification and the maintenance of peace and order
in the Republic of Haiti.
In addition to having so thoroughly completed their military mission, the
marines have done everything legally within their power to assist the Haitian
people and their Government. It would take many pages to adequately de-
scribe the constructive measures they have carried out. Handicapped by a
total absence of any express control over education, judiciary, agricultural,
ptc, systems, they have done what they could through Informal and persuasive
methods. The gendarmerie Is a monument to the military, administrative, and
executive efficiency of the marines. They pay all the Haitian civil employees
coming under their jurisdiction and there is yet to be any malfeasance in such
tluty. They have built roads, administer the telegraph and telephone systems,
assist In agricultural matters, hold schools for the gendarmes, and so on.
The contrast between the ordinary natives and the native gendarme Is so
marked that any observing American is thrilled with pride In viewing the
superior condition, both physically and mentally, of the latter. When it is
realized that the mission of the marines In Haiti is first the pacification and
maintenance of order and the constitutional government, the success achieved
by him in these matters beyond the military Is remarkable and encourages
those Interested in Haiti to believe in the ultimate succes.s, of the occupation.
INVESTIGATION BY SENATE COMMITTEE.
Three Haitian delegates (H. PaulCnis Sannon. St^nio Vincent, and Perceval
Thoby) who visited Washington on May 0, 1921, witli tiie purpose of present-
ing memorials to President Harding, the State Department, and Congress, de-
manding the withdrawal of tlie I'nlted States military forces, the Itumedlate
abolition of martial law and courts based on It, abrogation of the convention of
1915, and the convocation of a constituent assembly, issued a copy of the me-
morial on May 8. 1921, in which were rei)eated such charges against our mili-
tary forces as cause<l an Investigation to be made by the Navy Department
through the medium of the Mayo court of inquiry In 1920. On May 9, 1921,
Secretary of the Navy Denby stated that the Navy Department welcomed any
investigation that Congreas might en re to make. " The Marine Corps did a
splendid work there as humanely as It was possible to do It," Se<Tetary Denby
is quoted as saying, ** and the Naval Establishment fias functione<l In Haiti In
a manner seldom equalled by military occupation anywhere.*' When he visited
Haiti recently on a tour of ins|)ectlon he saw evidence on every hand, Mr. Denby
said, to convince him that the c(mtinued presence of American marines on the
island was desirable.
The first meeting of the Senate committee, of which Senator Medill Mc-
Cormlck is chairman, was held on August 5, 1921.
THIS MEMOILVNDUM IS BUT A SYNOPSIS.
The foregoing is but a brief and synoptical sunmiary of the events occurring
In the Republic of Haiti. In order to as<'ortain any desired det^iiLs, the annual
r^eports of the Secretary of the Navy, reports of the Major General Corn-
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90 INQUIRY INTO OCCrPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
iimiulant, partkularly those of iiens. Lejeuiw ami Harnett, the various reiwirts
of Keur Aclmiral H. S. Knapp, and the flies, records, and archives of the Navy
Department and Marine Corps should be consulted.
Capt. Freeman. This matter I liave is with regard to the Dominictm Repuhllt*.
The Chaibman. Will you leave that with nsV
<Japt. Freeman. Yes, sir.
The Ohaiumax. Any additional nmtter that you care to present next week
we will be glad to have.
Senator King. Do you mean to say that is the case of the Navy with respect
to the Dominican Republic?
('apt. Fbeeman. I do not mean, Mr. Senator, that it is a case, because we
are not making a case. It is a statement of the facts. It is simply an attempt
to state the tiu-ts in relation to the occupation ami adndnistratlon of the
Dominican Republic.
The Chairman. Let me snjrffest that I do not conceive tliat the committee
ought to address itself t(» the coiwideratioii of a case. This inquiry is prettj'
broad in its hcoih.
Senator Kino. 1 used the word "case" as a sort of generic (orm. The pre-
sentation of the facts as they consider them to be is what I meant.
Capt. FrjcKMAN. That is what it is intended to be — a sununary of the facts
in regard to the o(;cupation and subsequent administration of the Dominion
Republic to date.
Senator King, l^pon reading the presentation by Mr. Kuowles and those
whom he represents would it necessitate a revision and a review or a supple-
menting of this document? If so, it occurs to me. if yon have got to file
another, that you better keep this until you can bring It down to date. Of
course I am only saying that in the interest of saving the exi>ense of printing.
We do not want to print two statements.
The Chairman. I think we want their statements independently of one
another In the first Instance. We will receive your statement If there is no
objection.
(The matter referred to is liere printed In full, as follows:)
OlKK'IAl, nOCTMKNTS AM) <()UHKSI»()M)KN(K OX I»OMlM("AN ItEPlMU.lC.
Thore Pre in ]»rl!it availal)]e for distribution tho following volumes trentmg
In part or In who'o of the Dominican Republic:
Annual reports of tlie Secretary of the Navy, 1916. 1017, 191<S, 1919, 1920.
Attention is especially invlte<l to Appendix D of the Report of 1920.
Santo Domingo ; Its Past and its Present Condition. Prepared by members of
the military government of Santo Domingo.
Report on Economic and Financial Conditions of the Dominican Republic
Lieut. Commander Arthur H. Mayo, Supply Corps. Ignited States Navy.
Report of Department of State of Finance and Commerce of the Dominican
Republic, 1910-1919, with Estimates for 1920. Lieut Commander Arthur H.
Mayo, Supply Corps, United States Navy.
In addition there are available In the flies of the Navy Department:
Seven bound volumes of correspondence covering Santo Domigan affairs
during the years 1905, 1906, 1911.
Collections of executive orders Issued by the military governor of Santo
Domingo.
Quarterly reports of the ndlitnry governor of Santo Domingo.
Records of military comniissious and other military courts held in the
Dominican Republic.
Special repents and general correspondence relating to the Dominican
Republic.
[Memonindum on Dominican Repnl>li<* prepared f(»r Senate committee ap-
pointed to in(iu:re into the occupat on and administrat (m of the territories
of tlie U(»pnblic of Haiti and the Donnnican Republic by the forces of the
United States.]
Navy Dkpartment.
Office of Naval Operations.
M^ashinpton, Auffti»t J. If^iL
The Dominican Republic, occupying the eastern two-thirds of the island of
Haiti, was proclalmefl <m February 27. 1844, and the present flag of the R«*-
public was raised. This Inception of the present Republic represented a suf-
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY IXTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGC 91
ivsst'ul rev(»lt apaiust the tlitMi Haitian (black) ruler of the Span sli-siK»akinf?
survivors of a ser os of wars an<l upriH'.njcs extendlnj: over the beginnlnj: of
the nineteenth fentnry. A ronstitut on, niodeleil after our own. was prounil-
;:ated in Noveuilier. 1844. and the c«anniamlinR general of the Dominican army
was elected president. He reKi^ne<l in Aujfiist, 1H4S. in the face of a tlireateneil
revolution an<! two 8Uc<-essJve i)residents were in power during; the next 18
laontlis. The third president of the Ueimld c was the first to serve a fall term
of office. Followinjr his administration, revolution succeeded revolution in
seenilnjrly endless si^pience. These civil quarivls of the I>ondnicans. nter-
sjierseci with wars with Haiti, hnnijrht alaait an occupati<»n of the Itepuhlic
by Span?sli troo])s from 1.S<)1 to l^'u*. When the Span sh troops were with-
dniwn, followinj; a two years* rev«»lt ajri'lnst their rule, an<l it Is to be noted
that the I>om*nl<!aii people actually fought ajrahist the Si)anish c)<*<'Upation. after
bearing with it from March. 3.Sr>l. to Au;.nst. 1S(*>3. the revolutltnuiry .stru^trles
fi>r jKilitical power con fi hum I and have marked the history of the ciuuitry up
until its occuimtion by United States forces.
The steps leadin;; up t(» the i>reHent occupation by UnlttHl States forces may
be traced back to 15)04. The culmination of more than a half centur>' of
revolutions was a hoiH»less piling; up of the public debt aud ultimately. In 1904,
the default of the entire interest on this debt. Nejrotiations were entered into
which resulte<l in arrangements belnj; made to liquidate the ilebts owed the
United States by pledfriuj: the custondiouse receipts of some of the larjrer ports
as se<'urity. Ou October 20, 1904, an American ajjeiit was, by a;::reement with
the IKaninican (Jovernment, placed in char;re of the customhouse at Puerto
IMjita.
Fore'sn nations, notinj: the success of this jdan, bejrau to exert pressure with
a view to securiuj? the payment of their debts throujrh ctmtrol of certain custom-
liouses pled^d to them. Forei^i intervention becominj; Inmilnent, the Pondnl-
caii Ooverninent applietl to tl»e T'nited States for ass' stance, nnd, in February,
inuT). the protocol of an ajrreement luHween the United States and the Dominican
Uopul)lie wa.s appi'oved, providinfr for the collection of the Dominican customs
revenues under the direction of the Uniteil States, and the sejrre}j:ation of a
siicclfied portion toward I he ultimate payment of the debt. This agreement
went into effeit on April 1, lOO*!, and continued as the modus vivendi until
»ui)erseded by a new fiscal treaty ajrreed uinm by the United States and the
n«nnlnican Uonjjress, an<l takinj^ effect on Auffust 1. 1907. The provisions of
This fi.scal treaty still apply and require that the customs revenues of the Ile-
I'ubllc be cH)nected by a ^'eneral receiver (if Dominican customs, apiK)inte<l by
tU^» President of the Unite<l States, and that a ixu'tion of the income be s(»t
nside by him for the service of the bcmd issues nmde by the D<unini<»an Gov-
ernment for the defrayment of the public del)t.
Although the political lea<lers c<mld no lonjrer count on (-aptured custom-
lwiu»»s to ;jive them an iinm»«diate llnanclal return on their revolutionary activi-
ties, revolutions nevertheless contlnue<l. This unsettled condition of the coun-
tn- necessitate*! the mniiitenance of a considerable naval force in Dominican
wnters, in order that our assistant c<»llectors of custcans mi;dit not be at the
mercy of irresiJonslble. mol>s or bsuids of irrej^ular trooi)s. Durinjr lOO-l an
average of 11 vessels, mostly of the j:md>oat and cruiser type, was continuously
maintained In Dominican waters throujihout the 12 months of the year. This
f<irce was a source of ccaisiderable expiMise and constant concern to the Navy
r>epartment. The numl»er of vesst»ls ilecreased in subse<iuent years, as the
namtry pradually accepted the i<lea of American customs receivers in Its jiorts,
but the repeatetl revoluthms and disturban<es continued to prlve concern, and
our naval vessels In Donnidcan waters were a familiar si^ht until after the
establishment of the occupation. N<iw, visits of strictly military units are very
rare, naval communication with the Uepublic beinjr largely ccaifined to tran.s-
ivorts and cargo vessels.
While it may be admitted that conditions improved somewhat in the Dominl-
cjin Uepublic after 1(105. it may be well to Indicate the almost continuous con-
dition of turmoil and agitation, which existed even after the prize of office
.yielded less financial return than when all of the revenues of the Republic
were at the disposition of the Govennnent. As a result of a revolution. Gen.
Carles F. Morales becauie I*resident on June 19, 1904. It was during his ad-
ministration that the collection of Donnnican customs by American agents
began. Naturally, the " outs " strongly opposed this method of assuring tlie
l»a.\Tnent of the public debt, and the agitation against Morales finally rejiche<l
such a violent stage that he fled the ctumtry to save his life. He returned ulti-
Digitized by VjOOQIC
92 INQUIRY IXTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
mately, and resigned on Januarj- 12, 1906, the vice president, Gen. Ramon
Caceres, assuming tbe presidency. Caceres completed liis term of office and
was reelected on July 1, 1908.
There followed various uprisings of political malcontents and a border clash
with Haiti also occurred. Then on November 19, 1911, Caceres was assassi-
nated by political conspirators, and Senator Eladio Victoria was designated
provisional president by the National Assembly (both houses of tlie Bomini-
can Congress). On February 27, 1912, he was duly elected constitutional
president, but the method of his election was contested l)y opposing factions,,
and uprising began throughout the country. When it became evident that the
Government could not control the situation, the United States Government
offered its good offices. As a result of joint negotiations, the Dominican Con-
gress convened, accepted the resignation of Victoria, and designated Monseigeur
Adolf o A. Nouel, archbishop of Santo Domingo, as President. The archbishop
appears to have recognized the hopeless state of the Government, due to the
Inability of the professional politicians to accept anything except personal suc-
cess in the shape of appointments and patronage. He therefore resigned and
left for Europe. He has since returned and continues his labors as a public-
spirited citizen.
The Dominican Congress filled the vacancy caused by the resignation of
the archbishop by designating Gen. Jose Bordas Valdez provisional president.
He assumed office on April 14, 1913, with a view to serving out a one-year term.
His assumption of office was the signal for another revolution. Again a United
States commission came to Santo Domingo. The agreement then arrived at
provided for the resignation of Bordas, and the Dominican Congress desig-
nated Dr. Ramon Baez, son of a former president, as provisional president on
August 27, 1914. The agreement also provided for the general election of a
constitutional president, and the popular elections which followed resulted In
the reelection of a former president, Juan IslQro Jimenez.
Through this series of uprisings and revolutions we come to the situation that
confronted the United States during that delicate period when, with a World
War gathering headway, the usual international checks and balances were all
awry. The Dominican Congress needed money. The customs receipts were in
the liands of the United States. The internal revenues were undependable ami
might, and very generally did, fall into the hands of a local political chief at
any time. The granting of an increasing number of foreign concessions, there-
fore rei)resented an easy means of acquiring quickly the needed ready money to
finance the mushroom goverrmients. (Terman and Britisli influence iwssesse^l
considerable streiigtli in the country, the former doubtless preponderant. The
Dominican Repul)llc would prove a military base of importance for commerce
destroyers if it could be involved in the European struggle. Tlie whole influ-
ence of our country was being thrown on the side of preserving neutrality and
preventing a spread of the Euroi)ean quarrel to the Western Hemisi)here.
Fortunately the election of Jimenez, wlio took office on December 5, 1914, was
followed by a brief period of comparative caUn in the Dominican Republic. The
elements of disorganization were present, however, awaiting favorable opi>or-
tunity for expression. In April, 1916, Gc»n. Desiilerio Arias, secretary of war.
executed a coup d'etat, deposed Jimenez, and seized tlie executive power. At
this point the United Statps Government intervened and with the con.^ent of the
rightful though deposcil President, Jimenez, landed naval forces on May 5, 191()»
and pacified Santo Domingo City, the capital. Jimenez then resigned, and the
council of ministers assumed control of affairs.
During June, 1016, United States naval and marine forces were lande<l at
various points in the country with a view to putting an end to the rebellion still
being actively fostered under the leadership of Gen. Arias. A short and de-
cisive campaign of about two weeks was conducted by the marines under the
command of Col. Joseph H. Pendletcui in the north of the island, which resulted
in the quelling of organized opposition and the occupation of tlie principal north
coast ports, Thereafter the important interior points of the country were tK-cu-
pied without serious difliculty, and peace was restored, except for the operation
of bandit bands.
Meanwhile the Dominican Congress convened, following the resignation ot
President Jimenez, and designated as iirovisional president Dr. Federico Heiiri-
quez y Carvajal to serve for a period of six moutlis. It is to be observed that
the Dominican constitution of lOOS, which is still in forc<\ did not provide for a
vice president, the motive doubtless being to avoid the temi^tatlon afforded to
the Incumbent of that office to do away with his chief and establish himself h"
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*
INQUIRY INTO 0C(/ :i,OF HAij:TI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 93
iwwer. The Dominican o^ ^ ovides, however, that the Oonpcres-s shall
designate by law the per«i«i» .^ . ^ .c office of the presidency in case of the
incapacity, resignation, removal, or death of the President, and the secretaries
of state (council of ministers) are obliged to convoke the Congress for this
speclflc purpose immediately when the vacancy exists.
Our infemational relations were now rapidly approaching a critical stage.
It was highly desirable to have peaceful conditions close to our own bound-
4iries, and the United States Government therefore stipulated that a new
treatj' be drawn with the new Dominican Government guaranteeing the main-
tenance of law and order and further assuring the payment of Dominican
Unanclal obligations. This treaty was in reality the price of recognition, and
Dr. Henriquez refused to accede to the terms. Thereupon the United States
authorities refused to pay over any of the revenues of the Republic. There
l>eing no surplus in the treasury, Government salaries ceased throughout the
Republic. This deadlock continued from early August, 1916, until late Novem-
ber of the same year, w^hen, all efforts to induce the Dominican authorities
to conduct their Government in a manner conducive to the maintenance of
internal peace and to the satisfactory conduct of foreign relations having
proved of no avail, the United States Government on November 29, 1916,
proclaimed a stattf of military occupation of the Dominican Republic by the
naval and marine forces of the United Stntes and made the Republic subject
to military government. The proclamation of occupation, prepared in its
essentials in the city of Washington, was issued by Capt. H. S. Knapp, United
States Navy, commander cruiser force. United States Atlantic Fleet, and over
his signature, and was in the following words :
*' KKOCLAMATION OF OCCUPATION.
*' Whereas a treaty was conclude<l between the United States of America and
the Republic of Santo Domingo on February 8, 1907, Article III of which
reads :
" * i:ntil the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds
of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agi'ee-
nient between the Dominican Government and the United States. A like agree-
ment shall be necessary to modify the import duties. It being an indispensable
<?ondition for the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive
demonstrate, and that the President of the United States recognize, that, on
the basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like
character during two years preceding that in which it is desired to make such
moditlcation. the total net customs re<»eipts would at such altered rates of
duties have been for each of such two years in excess of the sum of 12,000,000
United States gold ' ; and
** Whereas the Government of Santo Domingo has violated the said Article III
on more than one occasion ; and
"* Whereas the Government of Santo Domingo has from time to time explained
such violation by the necessity of incurring expense incident to the repres-
sion of revolution ; and
^'Whereas the United States Government, with great forbearance and with a
friendly desire to enable Santo Domingo to maintain domestic tranquillity
and observe the terms of the aforesaid treaty, has urged upon the Gov-
ernment of Santo Domingo certain nec.*essary measures which that Gov-
ernment has been unwilling or unable to adopt; and
"Whereas in consequence domestic tranquillity has been disturbed and is not
now established, nor is the future observance of the treaty by the Govern-
ment of Santo Domingo assured ; and
'*Wl\.ereas the Government of the United States is determined that the time
has come to take measures to insure the observance of the provisions of the
aforesaid treaty by the Republic of Santo Domingo and to maintnin the
domestic tranquillity in the said Republic of Santo Domingo necessary
thereto :
"Now, therefore, T. H. S. Knapp, captain, United States Navy, commanding
the cruiser force of the United States Atlantic Fleet, and the armed forces of
the United States stationed in various places within the territory of the Republic
of Santo Domingo, acting under the authority and by direction of the Govern-
ment of the United States, declare and announce to all concerned that the
Republic of Santo Domingo is hereby placed in a state of military occupation by
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i
94 INQUIRY INTO OC'CUPATKl ^^ATTl AND SANTO DOMINGO.
the forces under my command, and is made subject to military jrovemment and
to the exercise of military law applicable to such occupation.
" This military occupation is undertaken with no immediate or ulterior object
of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic of Santo Domingo, but, on the
contrary, is designed to give aid to that country In returning to a condition of
internal order that will enable It to observe the terms of the treaty aforesaid,
and the obligations resting upon It as one of the family of nations.
" Dominican statutes, therefore, will continue in effect in so far as they do
not conflict with the objects of the occupation or necessary regulations estsb-
lished thereunder, and their lawful administration wiil continue In the liand?
of such duly authorized Dominican officials as may iie necessary, all und*»r tlw*
oversight and control of the United States forces exercising military Governraent.
"The ordinary administration of justice, both in civil and criminal mattprs.
through the regularly constituted Dominican courts will not l>e interferetl with
, by the military government herein establis-luMl : but <*apes to which a nienilMT
of the United States forces in occupation Is a party, or in which are involved
contempt or <leflan(*e of the authority- of the mllitniy govenuiient. will he tried
by tribunals set up by the military government.
" All revenue accruing to the Dominican Government, including revenn*>»
hitherto accrued and unpaid, whether from custom duties under the terms of the
treaty concluded on February 8, 1907, the receivership established by which
renm ns In effect, or from internal revenue, shall be paid to tlie military govern-
ment herein established which will. In trust for the Republic of Santo Doniiiipo,
hold such revenue and will make all the ])roper leijal disbui*sements therefrom
necessary for the administration of the Dominican Government, and for the pur-
poses of the occupation.
"I call upon the citizens of. and resident*?, and sojourners in Santo Doniinjjo.
to cooperate with the forces of the United States in occupation to the end that
the purposes thereof may promptly be attained, aivl that the country may 1m»
restorefl to domestic order and tnuiquillity, a\u\ t«) the prospeiity that can be
attained only under such conditions.
" The forces of the United States In occupation will act in accordance with
military law governing their conduct, with due respect for the personal and
property rights of citizens of and residents and sojourners in Santo Domingo,
upholding Dominican laws. In so far as they do not conflict with the purpof^es
for which the occupation Is undertaken.
" H. W. Knapp,
" Captain, United States Navy,
" Comtnander CruUer Force, United States Atlantic Fleet.
•* U. S. S. * Olympia,' Flagship,
" Santo Dominoo City, Dominican Rkpubuc,
" November 29, lOier
22. Thfe military government established under Oapt. (later Rear Admiral)
Knapp as the first military governor of Santo Domingo has continued in force
throughout the Dominican Republic ever since. It suffered, however, an unex-
pected evolution almost at its Inception because of the refusal of the leading
Dominican authorities to function with but under it, as called for in the terms
of the proclamation. The situation which develoi>ed is perhaps best expressed
in the words of the military governor as follows :
"After the issuance of the proclamation of military government, I waited for
some days to see if the members of the provisional government would In any
way cooperate with the mllltarj- government in carrying on the ordinary ad-
ministration of affairs. The hope that I had In this direction proved to be
unfounded, and I was assured by persons most familiar with conditions here
that I could expect no assistance of the kind. I established the offices of the
military government in the Government palace. Upon taking possession, it was
found that the President and all of the members of the cabinet had come to
their ofl[lces after the proclamation of military government, had cleaned out
tlieir desks, and had not since appeared in the Government palace. It was an
evident case of desertion. Under the circumstances, as the affairs of government
had to go on under intelligent administration, I placed the several departments
of the Dominican Government in charge of officers under my command.
" This action was forced upon me by the attitude of the members of the
Dominican Government. It did not appear possible to get Dominicans of the
proper caliber who would accept these high administrative offices, for they
were afraid of the criticism that they would receive from' their own people.
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INQUIRY IXTO OCC'I'PATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 95
I conld not force Dominicans into office, but I was able to direct officers under
my command to assume these duties. The action taken prevented the utter
disorganization of governmental administration. There were, moreover, some
particular reasons why it was necessary to have some of the cabinet offices
promptly filled. It was desirable to begin as soon as possible public works,
which had been interrupted by the state of turmoil that had existed, and by
the arrangements under the treaty of 1907 the necessary funds required the
signature of Dominican officials before they could be withdrawn from the
Guaranty Trust Co., of New York, which is the depositary of the Dominican
loan.
'• The result has been most fortunate. Unforeseen as the action taken was to
me when I came to Santo Domingo, looking back. I now consider that it has
helped enormously in the progress of the objects for which the occupation was
undertaken. The American officers have been administering their departments
with a high degree of intelligence and zeal, and, of course, witli Integrity and
freedom from affiliations here that have never been questioned in tlieni, but
could not have been counted upon with Dominican officiaK Had Dominicans
remained in office. I should Imve had to have their actions constantly observed
in any event: but the advantage of having officers actually adminlsteriiip:. in-
stead of obsen'ing and checking the adniinist ration of others, has bei»n evident.
Not only is this true from the point of view of the military government but it
is true also from the point of view of many disinterested Dominicans. I liave
myself been asked, almost begge<i, by Dominicans not to disturb the existing
order of things for a long period ; not to think of putting Dominicans in these
offices, but to continue the administration of affuirs through the American offi-
cers, whose work is giving such great satisfaction to all disinterested ixM)ple
aud whose presence in the responsible Dtnuiuican offices is resent€»d only by
the class which has brought the Dominican Government to ^he h)w plane wliicii
lias made It a reproach. I can not claim any prevision leading up to my action,
but I regard that action, taken by force of circumstances, as the most fortunate
thing that could have hapi)ened.
*' The .sessions of the Dominican Congrt^ss. by the constitution in effect, begin
on the 27tii of February, which is the day celebrated as the anniversary of
independence. The sessions last for 9() days, and may be prolonged for 60 ilays
more. Kvery two years tlie terms expire of one-half of the deputies and one-
third of the senators. Upon the advent of military government there were calls
for election which had been issued by the late provisional government to fill
these vacancies. The holding of elections at that time was out of the question
in the minds of all persons whom I consulted, including Dominicans themselves.
I therefore issued executive order No. 12 on the 26tli of December, 1916. after
I had had sufficient time to familiarize my.self with conditions and to receive
reports from the marine officers in the m(n*e distant i>arts of the country, none
of whom believed in the elections being held. The executive (H'der liiet the
approval of all who wi.shed well to Santo Domingo.
" In view of the fact that a quoi-um of the Congress did not exist, owing to
the constitutional termination of the services of certain of the senatoi's and
representatives, and to the. fact that elections were forbidden in the interests
of the general jmcificjition of tlie country, th«' existence of (Joiijirrpss became of
no value to the countiT; on the contrary, it was represenled to ine. and I con-
curre<i in the conclusion, that it wouhl be unwise to leave the country witli the
anticipation of an early filling of the c(m;ii'cssional vacancies with the subse-
quent elections that should he held. I. therefore, on January 2. su^i)en(led the
<'ongress and likewise suspendwl from office senat<u*s and deputies whost' terms
had not expired. Like the order susjiending elections, that susi>end ng the <'on-
;:ress met with almost universal ni)pidlmtion. as :i measure that would iio far
to removing disturbing political agitation.
"For some time before the advent of military government, there had been
sitting in Santo Domingo a special constituent assembly under the auspices of
the provisional government, which the rnite<l States ha<l refused to reeoirn ze.
This constituent assembly finished its work on the very day that military
trovemment was proclaimed, and shortly thereafter the new constitution aj*
peared in print. I refused to recognize it and the calls for eltvtion that wen^
iHSued in accordance with Its provisions. ITie propose<l constitution is a dea<l
letter, except for such value as It may have when a recogniwd ciaistitutional
assembly shall meet in the future.*'
With the failure of Dcunlnicans <»f sufficient education to cooperate witli the
military government, the administration of the Dominican Uei^ublic and the
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96 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
destinies (if the Domii»ican people passed entirely into the hands of tlie Unitwl
States Government. The situation was without prece<lent. To witlidraw meant
anarchy. To remain meant the aceeptancje of undivided responsibility for tht*
functioning of a nation wliicli. l)asically the United States recognized as a
sovereign i)ower. Some worlsing doctrine was essential upon wld<?li to base
our conduct of affairs. It was found in the thought that the military Govern-
ment admiidsters the government of tlie Dominican Republic In trust for the
Dominican people, in whom, in tlie words of article 13 of the Dominican ctm-
stitution. •* sovereignty is vested solely."
If the small political class, constituting i)erhaps about r> iK*r cent of the
population, and the remaining persons of some degree of e<lucation, con.stitulliij;
at most another 5 per cent, would not or could not unite to contribute to the
nulltary Government that small measure of cooperation which would serve auto-
matically to sht)rten the occupation and restore the absolute and unqualifiwl
sovereignty of the Dominican State, then it behooved the military Goven)ment
to produce out of the people of the Republic a personnel who could be entrusted
with the lawfxd and Just administration of a modern civilized sovereign jwwer
in the family of nations.
With this end in view and In the hope meanwhile that actual contact with
honest administration might produce enlightenment and a desire to assist In
the ndnds of that small i>ercentage of the popidation, qualified mentally, ilf not
morally, to conduct affairs of state, the military Government proceeded to
establish complete jieace throughout the Republic, and began an intensive sys-
tem of public instruction, iniblic works, and himest control of finance.
The government of the Republic is adndnlstered by the military Government
In accordance with Dondnlcan laws, except as it has been found necessary to
modify or 8upr»lement them by executive orders. The general policy of adminis-
tration is set by the Department of State of the T'nited States, acting through
tlie Navy I>epartment. The general iK>llcy being outlined by the Department of
State, the Navy Department indicates this poll<*y to the military governor who
applies It in his administration of affairs. The Navy Department does not
interfere with the details of administration, leaving all such nmtters to the
determination and initiative of the military governor. Through his quarterly
reports and special ciUTcspondence to the Navy Department, together with a
consideration of his executive orders, copies <»f which he submits for information
ui)on issue, the Department Is enabled to doterndne whether the policy outlined
by the Department of State Is l»eing carricfl out by the military governor. Maj<)r
questions are referre<l to the Navy Department by the military governor for
c<msi<leration. and, as such (piestions usually Involve nmtters of policy, the
opinion of tlie Department of State is sought. Occaslonnlly situations deveh»p
in which a change of iiolicy appears warranted. At such times, a more or le<s
considerable Interchange of correspondence occurs, followed by a retuni to
normal conditions, when the Intercourse between the military governor and the
Navy Department Is confined to routine reports on accompllshe«l facts. In this
maimer, the closest cooperation and coordination exists between the Navy
Department and the military governor, without the Navy De])artment beinjr
an atlndnlstratlve agency and with the military governor left with a fre*» hand
under the guidance of policy dict:ite<l by the De]mrtment of State. This metlnKl
of carrying on the ndlltary government in its relations with the United States
Government has pnulucinl excellent results, and the occa.'^lonal lapses from It
that have produced slight confusion at times have pi*(»ved Its efficacy as an
established i>ractlce.
INITI.VL E8TABU8HMEXT OF PEACE.
Owing to the custom of jail deliveries upon the outbreak of every revolution,
the country was overrun with criminals of all classes, many of them of the most
hrutal kind. To this custom is attributable the system of brigandage In the
Dondnican Republic, which continuously worked against the improved condi-
tions in the country, the so-called bandits robbing and murdering their own
people while avoiding the military authorities. Under the military government
this banditry has been practically wiped out, although there exist still certain
vagabonds or highway robbers in the eastern section of the country. The mill-
tar>- forces occupied the country with garrisons in certain cities and outposts,
with a system of patrols to insure the maintenance of peace and to protect
inhabitants against the attacks of ne'er-do-wells. Under this system the country
is receiving the blessings of peace and is progressing as never before in its
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 97
history. Fully 95 per cent of the people avail themselves of the peaceful oppor-
tunity to pursue their callings, the remainder being revolutionary and obstruc-
tive politicians incapable of any fruitful work.
UiRm tlie reuuiius of the old (iuardia Uepubliciuia has been erected an effi-
cient constabulary, which is Uitended to police the entiro Uepubiic and to be
the (inly military force in the country uinm the turning over of the Government
to its own rei»resc^utatives. This organisation has been vastly improve<l and is
still undergoing an evolution to i)erfe<*t it and to make it an object of pride
tu ail law-abiding citizens. It is the purpose to have this constabulary cover
the entire Republic and to absorb all police functions. At present a large num-
her of its oflicrers are United States citizens, selected from the Marine Cori>s
and elsewhere, but it is hoin^d to bring the force to such a high state of etfi-
cieucy that Dominicans of goocl families will be glad to be ideutitied with it.
TNTEBIOB ADMLNISTBATION.
Before the occupation by the United States, the laws of the Dominican Re-
public provide<l for a division of. the country into 12 Provinces, for each of
which there was a governor appointed by the executive power. Communica-
tion by road between the various sections of the country and the capitals of
the Provinces was practically nonexistent. This condition fostere<l the growth
of an undue power on the part of the governors of the Provuices, who exer-
cised within their resjiectlve jurisdictions practically complete control over
th»* public forces, the iwllce, and other governmental agencies.
The weakness of the central government, combined with the lack of proper
means of communication, frequently resulted in defiance of the authority of
the central government by the provisional governors and the consequent Illegal
abuse of power.
The military government has succeeded in reducing the iwwer of these semi-
independent governors to the status of proper civil governors with limited
govemniental functhms. The governors now, instead of being oppressors of
people of their Provinces, as was so frequently the case under the old regime,
are able assistants of the military governor tlirough their efforts for the etluca-
tion of the people, and they are exerting much influence toward good govern-
ment generally.
The communes into which the Provinces are divided are governed locally by
the ayuntamientos, or boards of aldermen, which formerly were electwl, but
since the occupation have been upi)olnte<l by the military governor. The former
system permitted of many abuses and much misgovern ment, particuhirly
through lack of accountability to any authorltv higher than their own.
Great improvement has been made in municipal administration through laws
issued by the military (fovernment. One of these hiws ctmstitutes a commission
form of local govennnent through the reductitm in the number of members of
the aldermanlc boards, a change which has produce<l umch greater efficiency in
the conduct of municipal business.
Vexatious lo<*al taxes have been abolished and the financial affairs of the
nnuiicipalities have been put ui>on a sound basis, while the control of tlie cen-
tral government by means of an auditing system has removed many of the
old opportunities for defalcations and misappropriations of funds. Certain
handicaps have been encountered because of the lack of suitable personnel
among the Dominicans to carry on the local governments, but the contrast for
the better is marked between the old careless and inefficient and frecjuently dis-
honest local governments and the present Aymntandentos, which endeavor to
act for the good of their communes.
FINANCES.
When the United States intervened in the governmental affairs of the Do-
minican Republic there were six months' salaries of all government officials
unpaid. Supply bills of the various departments of the governments had mit
been settled for long i)erlods. The employees of the (lovernment and men^hants
were demanding the payment of their just claims. A floating in<lehte<lness con-
sisting of claims of all descriptions had been created to the amount of approxl-
nmtely $ir»,0(K).000 in direct disregard of the terms of the American-Dominican
convention of 1907. The cash balance of the Government was nonexistent, since
the Government account with the dep(»sitory was overdrawn In the amount of
$14,234.63.
62261>— 21— PT 1-
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98 INQUIRY IN-TO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Instances were found where officials who had certified their right to salaries
had not been within 30 miles of their work or office and had never occiipietl the
positions designated, except in name. Pay rolls with a dozen or more names
were found that had been receipted in the handwriting of one individual, and it
was also found to be the custom with the heads of some offices to obtain the
salaries of all of the employees of their office and to pay the employees such
part of their salaries as was deemed fit, the head of the office retaining the bal-
ance for his own use. Other pay rolls were found pledged by the head of the
office to local speculators who had purchased them for trivial amounts and were
loudly demanding payment. The whole fiscal system was found to be honey-
combed with graft The vast majority of officers were dishonest and the records
were found to have been deliberately falsified in hundreds of cases. Officials
charged with the collection of internal revenue, with disbursing funds, and with
the receipt and custody of supplies were receiving ridiculously low salaries, and
graft had become so much a part of the system that practically all officials took
toll of the funds passing through their hands, or accepted bribes, turning their
backs to permit others to commit similar breaches of their trust.
The military government had organized the collection of the Internal reve-
nues of the country, and under honest and efficient management the collections
have increased from an average of $700,000 prior to the occupation to about
$4,000,000 annually. The cost of collection of internal revenues had dropped
from 14 per cent in 1915 to about 5 per cent. In order to adjudicate the multi-
tude of claims presented to the Government there was appointed In 1917 a
Dominican claims commission, which continued in session for about three years.
A total of 9,038 claims were filed, amounting to $19,960,513.48. Awards were
made by the commission on 6,287 of these claims, to the amount of $4,292,342.52.
Many taxes existed, especially communal taxes, which bore unfairly upon the
poor and acted as a drag to business in general. The military Government ha.s
eliminated the majority of these taxes and has established a tax on property,
which has been successfully administered.
A tariff comml.sslon was appointed to make a study of the tariff and make
recommendations for a downward reduction. The ccmsent of the United States
Government was secured to this revision of the tariff and a new tariff was
placed In effect on January 1, 1920. Under this new tariff, transportation
media, agricultural machinery and tools, industrial machinery, building ma-
terial, and, In general, articles necessary for the development of the Republic
have been placed upon the free list. The rates of duty have been greatly
reduced on articles of necessity where the re<luctions would assist in lowering
the cost of living. This tariff revision resulted In an Increase in importations,
which, although entering the country at reduccKl rates, have resulted In record
customs collections due to the increase in the volume of importations.
Criticism has been made from time to time of the fact that it has been found
necessary to borrow money and thus nominally increase the bonded indebtedness
in the face of the increased prosperity of the Republic known generally to exist.
This condition is brouglit about by the terms of the various loan agreements.
If the Dominican Government, in the person of the military governor, could
slow up the redemption of bonds, this course would certainly be followed. The
money paid against the defrayment of the Dominican national debt, as repre-
sonte<l by Its bond issues. Is obligatory under the loan terms. As a matter of
fact the Dominican Republic, under the military government, is a victim of
overprosperlty. In general the loan agreements provide for the payment of a
fixed sTini annually plus a percentage of the amount by which the customs rev-
enues of any year exceed another fixed sum. It is apparent from this general
statement that increased prosperity represented by increased amounts from
the. customs revenue does not and can not re<lound to tlie immediate advantage
of the Dominican Government. In other words, surplus customs revenues go,
in the main, to the retirement of bond issues before they are due rather than
to ai>ply to expenditures wholly justifiable for tlie good of the i>eople and the
country, and warranted by the revenue returns. Nee<Uess to say, this condi-
tion of affairs is only temporary under existing conditions. It is at present
evident that the $1U()00,0(K) customs administration loan made in 1908 will
be paid off by 192."), instead of 19.58 ; that is. 88 years before it is due. The
$4,000,000 bond issue of 1918 will be paid off about the end of the next cal-
endar year, instead of in 19HS; that is, about 10 years before it is due.
The Went ,S2,.">00,(K)0 short-term l^ond issue will be paid by June 1, 1925. The
short ttM-ni and consequently high rate of this last bond issue results from the
basic stipulation that its life be limited by the duration of the term of the pres-
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INQUIRY I^^^TO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 99
ent receivei. jj^i ;renernl of customs, which expires with the flual payment of
the |20,000,0(X> loan of 19()8.
At the present writiu;: the Doni'nioan Republic, in common with other West
Indlftn governments, is suffering from the decided slump in the sugar, coffee,
and cacao markets. This set-buck can be only teniporary in character, and Is
(Ine to trade conditions over which the military government of the Dominican
Rejmblic has no control.
Tlie diligent conserving of public funds has permitted more than three and
a half million dollars to be assigned from the surplus for appropriations for the
]uillding of roads, schools, public buildings, and port improvements. Every effort
is being bent to the completion of suitable roads which will open much-needed
communication between all parts of the Republic and permit of the develop-
Djent of the Interior.
Tlie customliouses, wharves, and other properties of the State were found
to be in a deplorable condition. These properties have now been placed in
gocKl condition. Wharves have been extended and warehouse facilities In-
creased at practically all the ports. This work is still being continued.
The military government has been obliged to contend against a standard of
honesty In the Republic, which, in so far as Government funds were concerned,
was decifledly low. It is onl^' by continual watchfulness, constant supervision,
and frequent and efficient inspection that considerable losses in Grovemment
funds can l)e avoitled even now. Some small losses have been suffered, but
the general graft, dishonesty, and inefflclency with which the former treasury
orgimizatif»n was honeycombed have been almost wholly ellminat<Hl.
BOADS AND OTHEB PUBLIC W^OBKS.
The military government is carrying on an extensive road-building program
with the intention of connecting all the roads of the Republic. These roads will
at the Siime time op<'n up and facilitate the development of large areas of very
fertile country. Previous to 1916 there were only about 65 kilometers of good
roads in the entire Dominican Republic. Since November, 1916, there have
been constructed more tlian 150 kilometers of new macadam roads, 7 large
steel bridges, 8 large concrete bridges, and many wooden bridges. In addi-
tion there have been more than 150 kilometers of second and 300 kilometers
of third-class roads constructed in various parts of the country. Five large
concrete bridges are being constructed and will be finished before the with-
drawal of the occupation. The most ambitious as well, as the most important
road now under construction, is a highway of about 290 kilometers, extending
from Santo Domingo city on the south coast to the cities of La Vega, Santiago,
and 3iIonte Cristi on the north coast. This road will shorten travel time between
Santo Domingo city and New York by four days, the time involved in the
steamer trip around the eastern end of the island. Another important road,
which will be finished before the withdrawal of the occupation, is that from
Santo Domingo city to San Pedro de Macorls, connecting the two most ini-
IKirtant ports on the s<mth coast. This road is 70 kilometers long.
The military government has constructed a new- customhouse at Santo
iHimingo city, and has plans for the Improvement of the present wharf and
rtreclglng of the channel. The same kind of work has been carritMl on at San
Pedro de Macorls, where two new reinforced concrete piers are nearing com-
pletion. At Puerto Plata, on the north coast a modern reinforced concrete
pier was completed a short time ago. A modem water supply system has
been Installed in the town of Azua, near Santo Domingo city, and plans are
under way for an excellent water system in the capital city itself.
Along the coast the lighthouse service has been improved and maintaine<l and
new bnniers Installed everywhere. A lighthouse tender has been purchased
and place<l In service. The former Government-owned dredge has been docked,
repairHl. and maintained In operation. A new dredge, the Yaque, has been
I)urc\asefl and is in use.
Repairs and alterations have been made to numerous Government buildings
which were in very poor condition. These buildings have been made serviceable
and sanitary Improvements installed.
Two steel radio towers 150 feet high have been erected at Santo Domingo
City and a radio station has been placed in operation. Many new school build-
ings are under way, and provision has been made for the expenditure of about
$160,000 more to complete construction.
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100 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND'saS^iP^^^^I^^^-
POSTS AND TE1.E0HAPHS.
\gl>*
111 place of the paralyzed condition of the mail and telejn"aph service, due to
disorders existent when the military occupation took over the administration
of affairs, the poat-oflice and telephone system has been unified an<I placed under
civil service. Twice as much business has been handled as formerly and such
lmiM)rtant changes made In the systems that the time required for the delivery
of mail across the Island has bt^en reduced to 4 days instead of 10 to 14 days.
A trunk telephone line from Santo Domingo City to the northern const has
been undertaken. C^lty telephone systems have been established In Santo
Domingo City, Le Vega, Santiago de los C^aballeros, La Romana. San Francisco
de MacorlH, San Pe<lro de Macoris. Monte ('ristl, and Puerto Plata. A topo-
graphical survey of the Dominican Republic is being made and will be well
advanced before it will be necessary to discontinue it due to the prosiiective
withdrawal. This topographical survey has lieen accompanie<l by the making
of a land survey for the purpose of "properly delineating and marking the
boundaries of land under various owners.
On account of the richness of the Dominican Republic In minerals it has
been found necessary to promulgate orders to stop exploitation of the mineral
wealth, which was not being carried on in good faith, and a new mining law
has been promulgated covering mining concessions. A law for the conservation
and distribution of water in arid and semiarld regions has been promulgated
and Is in operation.
It has been the endeavor of the military government to build up and Improve
all means of conmumlcati<m between the various sections of the country, to
Improve the numerous ports, and to maintain and better the conditions of navi-
gation aids, to modernize all construction, and to open the interior of the Re-
public to a higher civilization..
AonrcuLTrRE.
Hef«re June, 1917. nothing had been done in the Dominican Republic along
the line of modern agriculture education. Since then e<lucational work has
been lnstitute<l and has expande<l awl Improved c<inslderably, until at present
there are between 30 ami 40 Instructors In various sections of the country-.
In order to focus this work and provide the necessary places for experiments
"With various crops. Hn agricultural exi^erlraental stat'on has been established
near Santo D<milngo City, with a ground area of about 150 acres. The follow-
ing structures have l>een placed in oiieration: Barn, bangalow. silo, dipping
tank, and propagation house. A veterinarian and an animal husbandryman
have been employetl to irni^rove conditicms of the stock. Pure-bre<l pouHry,
horses, cattle, and hogs have been Imported. At the same location there has
l>een constructed an agricultural college, with a view df educating one Domi-
nican from each Province yearly, In order to fit them for agricultural instruc-
tors and managers of agricultural enterprises. Two agricultural experimental
substations have !»een established. On-hards of American fruit trees have been
planted and appear to be doing well. I^emcmst ration plots are being worked
on various farms, with a view to showing by practical physical demonstration
the best agricultural metho<ls.
A forestry law has been promulgated with a view to protecting the soil from
erosion and thus conserve the forests and the natural b**auty of the country.
T^aws have been establishtMl prohibiting the imiKirtation of ccK'onut seeils in
onler to protect the Republic from the Intniduction of the destructive bud rot
disease present in the other Antilles. A similar law has been issued coverinjf
the importation of cotton seeds. The Agricultural Review, a (}<»vernmeut pub-
lication, Is publishwl monthly. It contains information of value to agricultural
interests and has a free circulation of about 3,000.
JI'STICE AND PRISONS.
During the militar>' occirpatWm of Santo Domingo there has not been one eas»*
of corruption of a judge, nor has any venal act upon the part of a judge l)eeii
reported. Many reforms have been made in the judicial organization with a
view to exjiediting the trial of offendei-s.
Ramshackle and unsanitary prisons liave been repaired or relmilt and new-
ones constructeil. A nuMU^rn penitentiary is now in course (d* constniction
>\luch will accoiumtnlate TUK) prisoners. Two correctional schools for boys of
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INQUIRY f^'-R) OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 101
tender age Iiave \weu establishetl. In these two schools manual training Is
taught and the ininateH are traluetl iu earpenteringr, tailoring, and slioeuiakinj:.
At the time of the occupation only civil marriages were recognized by law,
and the judges, who had a nionojioly of the buniness, charged such high fees for
uiarriages that many of the p<»orer classes could ill afCord to have the ceremony
performed. Executive orders issued by the military government have corrected
tlii« evil, and hundreds and i»erhaps thousand of persons who have openly lived
as husband and wife without ever enjoying a civil ceremony have now taken
advantage of the inexpenshe cost of nwrriage and have thereby iu many cases
legitimatized their children.
PIJBUC INSTRUCTION.
Before the refonns initiated under the military Government, public educa-
tion in the Dominican Republic was very ineffective. There was great confusion
in regard to the law on the subject, and for several years practically no school
law was recognized. Piimar>' education was for the most part confined t©
schools with one or two teachers in the most important towns. There were no
rural sdiools. Town schools deserved the name only when they were in
the hands of private teachers. The usual salaries of teachers in primary
«diools ranged from $8 to $9 a month, and, under favorable conditions, were
not paid more than eight or nine months In the year. There were no more than
18,000 pupils In all schools, although statistics of these times are neither constant
nor reliable.
One of the first acts of the military Government was to form a commission of
prominent Dominicans to report upon conditions then existing regarding educa-
catlon, and to formulate recommendation looking to their Improvement and the
eetflblishment of a system of education that would best serve the interests
of the people of the Republic.
This commission sat for almost a year, and prepared and recommende<l the
following draft of laws:
1. Law on compulsory school attendance.
2. I^w for the direction of public schools.
3. General studies law.
4. University law.
0. Law on theological seminary.
6. Organic law on public education.
7. Law of school revenues.
The first six laws were promulgated with very slight modification by the
military Government and now constitute the school code of the country.
There were until recently about 1,500 teachers of all classes in actual senlce.
It has been temporarily necessary to consolidate certain of the schools and the
«hities of certain of the teachers, on account of the decrease in Internal revenues
due to unfavorable economic conditions which have prevailed more or less
throughout the West Indies: This situation will undoubtedly be of compara-
tively short duration, although it has been made the subject of unfavorable
criticism of the military Government. It may be pertinent to remark at this
poiiit on the peculiarly vexatious character of such unfavorable criticism. The
statement is made that schools have been closed by directlcm of the military
Government. This statement is wholly true. It is added that the military
Government is depriving the children of the Dominican Republic of their right
to an elementary education. In so far as the temporary closing of certain
schools is concerned, this statement is also true. The presentation of these
t^o isolated facts, however, wholly Ignores the Increase of school attendance
during the military occupation and the vast Improvement in school conditions.
The rural school-teachers draw a salary of from $55 to $75 a month, as
apainst salaries of $8 to $15 before the reform. Graded school-teachers draw
salaries of from $60 to $100 a month, as against salaries of from $20 to $40
before the reform. Summer schools are provided for the teachers and cer-
tificates are required for all teachers. The capacity of the teaching force has
been one of the surprises of the development of the schools.
The school attendance has increased from about 18,(K)0 to more than 100,000
in all .schools. The increase in tlie school population is not due to the <'ompul-
sory attendance alone. It is a (^nsequence of the more efficient school work
of the teachers, as well as of the greater attraction in the schools for the
pupil*? and a better social condition resulting from the o«*cupation.
Before the reform, schools were invariably locate<l in dirty, ndserablc^
quarters. A school usually consisted of a room of small siJ^^ ^t^*h»f\\9l^^
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102 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
three board benches for the pupils mikI a broken chair for the teacher. At
present the schools are workhig In the l)est houses of every town, and schools
are now neat, pleasant places, although It has been necessary to maintain the
schools very largely In rentecl bulldinps until the pro^ani of construction of
schoolhouses has been complete*!.
There is a recognized drawback to this otherwise favorable review of tlm
school situation. Although efforts are made to employ competent teachers and
certificates of qualification are requiretl of them, there is a lack of thorough
school Inspection and an absence of definite infoVmation as to the actual
progress of the pupils as a whole under the opportunities affordwi them. With
time, this drawback would undoubteiUy disapi»ear, under the present adminis-
tration of aflfairs.
SAMTARY AND PUBLIC HEALTH CONDITIONS.
Upon the esUiblishment of the military government, sanitary and public
health activities in the Dominican Kepublic were almost entirely lacking. A
sanitary law was in existence, but little or no attention was paid to it Cities
and towns were dirty, elementary sjiuitation was neglected, and the few
hospitals in the country were in a sadly neglected state and totally inade(iuate.
There w^as no real attempt toward di.sease control.
A new sanitary law has been i)romul gated, creating a national departiuent
of sanitation and beneficence. This law centralizes the administration of sani-
tation and public health matters and the practh-e of medical professions under
the control of a secretary of state for sanitation and beneficence and places
this department on a level with the other departments of the Government.
The secretary is asslstietl by a national public-health council, an advisory body
of representative Dominicans.
The country Is divided Into j^anitary districts, each district being in charp*
of a district sanitary ofllcer innnediately responsible to the sein-etary. Domini-
cans are appointed to all ix>sitions of responsibility under the department of
sanitation and beneficence wherever practicable.
A national leper colony and leprosarium is being completeil. Inadequate
charity hospitals and orphanages have been i-eorganizeil under tlie general
direction of the department of sanitation. Existing hospitals are being en-
larged, and plans for several new hospitals are being completed, A series of
small dispensaries for the treatment of the poor throughout the country Is a
feature of the sanitary administration.
Under the military government, there has been established an adequate na-
tional sanitary organization for the administration of sanitary and public
health affairs, including numicipnl .sanitation, hospitalization, quarantine, the
practice of the medical inofession. the .sale of drugs, national and municipal
charity work so far as the public? health Is concerned, the compilation of vital
statistics, and the control of disease. The training of personnel under this
organization is going forward, with a view to making secure the future saiii
tation and public health of the country as a whole.
GENERAL COMMENT.
It has been pointed out that, following a long period of turmoil hi the
Dominican Republic, during which the United States repeatedly offered its good
oihces with a view to straightening out affairs and preventing foreign inter-
vention, the United States (rovernment directed the occupation of the country
and Its administration under military government by forces under the immedi-
ate supervision of the Navy Department. Tlie Navy was assigned the task of
carrying on in the Dominican Republic under policy outlined by the Unitwl
States Government and has continued to do so until the present time, when an
endeavor is being made to accomplish a withdrawal of the military govern-
ment In accordance with the terms of a proclamation issued on June 14, 1921, in
the following terms :
" PROCLAMATION.
"Whereas, by prochnuation of the military governor of Santo Domingo, dated
December 23, 1020, it was announced to the people of the Dominicau Re
public that the Government of the United States desired to Uiaugurate the
simple processes of its rapid withdrawal from the responsibilities assumed
in connection with Dominican affairs ; and
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IXQ INTO OCCUPATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 103
» Y '
" Wherei*^ it is necesisary that a duly constituted governnieut of the Dominican
Republic exist before the witlidrawnl of the United States may be effwtive.
In order that the functions of Government may be resumed by it in an
orderly manner.
*'No\v, therefore, I, Samuel S. Robinson, rear admiral, United States Navy,
military governor of Santo Domingo, acting under the authority and ])y
direction of tlie Government of tlie Uiiiteci States, dwlare and announce to
all concerned that the (iovernment of the United States proposes to with-
draw its military forces from the Dominican Republic in accordance with the
, steps set forth herein. It is the desire of the Government of the United
States to assure itself before its withdrawal Is accomplished that the Inde-
pendence and territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic, the mainte-
nance of public order, and the* 8«»curlty of life and property, will be ade-
quately safeguarded, and to turn over the administration of the Dominican
Republic to a resiK)nsible Dominican Government duly established in ac-
c*ordance with the existing constitution and laws. To this end, It calls
ujHm tlie Dominican people to lend to it their helpful cooi)eratlon with the
hope that the withdrawal of the United States may be completed, if such
cooperation is given, In the manner hereinafter provided, within a period
of eight months.
"The executive power vested by the Dominican constitution In the President
of the Republic will be exercised by the military governor of Santo Domingo until
a duly elected and proclaimed i»resident of the Republic shall have taken
office and until a convention of evacuation shall have been signed by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Dominican Congress.
" Within one month from the date of this proclamation the military gover-
nor win convene the primary assemblies to assemble 30 days after the date of
the decree of convocation In C(»aformity with articles 82 and 83 of the con-
stitution. These assemblies shall proceed to elect the electors as prescribed
by article 84 of the constitution. In order that these elections may be held
without disorder and In order that the w^ill of the Dominican people may be
freely expressed, these elections will be held under the supervision of the
authorities designated by the military governor.
"The electoral college thus elected by the primary assemblies shall, In ac-
cordance with article 85 of the constitution, proceed to elect senators, depu-
ties, and alternates for the latter, an<l to prepare lists for the Justices of the
supreme court of justice, of the appellate courts, and the tribunals and courts
of the first instance, as prescribed by article Sf) of the constitution. The mili-
tary governor, performing the functions of chief executive, will then appoint,
ill accordance with article 7i:^ of the constitution, certain Dominican citizens
as representatives of the Republic to negotiate a convention of evacuation. In
order that the enjoyment of individual rights may be Insured, and in order
that tlie peace and prosperity of the Republic may be conserved, the said con-
vention of evacuation shall contain the following provisions:
"1. Ratification of all of the acts of the military government.
"2. Validation of the final loan of $2,:'>00,()00, which Is the minimum loan
required in order to complete the public works which are now in actual course
of construction and which can be completed during the period required for
the withdrawal of the military occupation, and which are deemed essential
to the success of the new Government of the Republic and to the well-being
of the Dominican people.
"3. Extension of the duties of the general receiver of Dominican customs,
appointed under the conventhm of 1907, to the said loan.
"4, Extension of the powers of the general receiver of Dominican customs
to the collection and disbursement of such portion of the internal revenue of
the Republic as may prove to be necessary should the custom revenue at any
time be insufficient to meet the service of the foreign debt of the Republic.
"5. The obligations on the part of the Dominican Government, in order to
preserve peace, to afford ade<iuate protection to life and property, and to
secure the discharging of all obligations of the Dominican Republic, to main-
tain an efficient Guardla Nacional. urban and rural, composed of native* Do-
minicans. To this end It shall also l>e agreed in said convention that the
President of the Dominican Republic shall at once request the President of
the Unltefl States to send a military mission to the Dominican Republic
f'harged with the dutj' of securing the competent organization of such Guardla
Nacional, the Guardla Nacional to be officere<l by such Dominican officers as
may be competent to undertake such service conditions, and for sijch time as
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Tf
104 INQUIRY INTO OCCrPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO I^mIN'^^*
may be found neoessjiry to effect the efficient organization wltii Ameriean
officers appoints! by the President of the Dominican Republic upon nomina-
tion of the President of the Vnltefl States. Tlie expenses of said mission will
be paid by tlie I>oniinican Republic, and the said mission will be invested by
the Executive of the Dondnion Re|)ubllc with proper and adequate authority
to accomplish the purix»8^ above stated.
"The mllltiiry governor will thereupon convene the D<nnlnican Congress In
extraordinary session to confirm the convention of evacuation referred to
above. The military governor will then assemble the electonil college for the
piiri>ose of electing a President of the Dondnicjin Republic in accordance with
article 85 of the constitntlon. and shnultaneously officials other than the
Senators and deputies elected at the first convocation of the electoral college
will be installed in office. The Dominican President so elected will then take
office in accordance with article 51 of the constitution ui>on this ratification
of the convention of evacuation, at the same time signing the convention of
evacuation as confirmed by the Dominican congress. Assuming that through
the cooperation of the people of the l)<mdnlcan Republic a condition of peace
and good order obtains, the military governor will transfer to the duly elected
Preshlent of the Republic all of his authority and the military Government
will cease, and thereupon the forces of the Unlttnl States will be at once
withdrawn.
" The further assistance of the advisory commission appointed under the
proclamation of December 23, 1920, being no longer required, it is hereby
dissolved, with the expression of the grateful appreciation of the Govemroent
of the United States for the self -sacrificing service of the patriotic citizens of
the Dominican Republic of whom It has been composed.
" S. S. ROBISON,
" Rear Admiral, United 8tat€S Nary,
" Military Governor of Santo DonUngo.
** Santo Domingo, Dominican Rkpubijc.
" June U, 1921,"
(Whereupon the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the
chairman.)
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HAITI AND SANTQ DOMINGO
UNITED STATES SENATE
SIXTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. RES. 112
AUTDORIZING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE
INTO THE OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE TERRITORIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI
AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
PART 2
October 4 to November 16, 1921.
rrinird for the uae of the Select Committee
on Haiti and Santo Domingo
\v.\siii.\<;Tr)N
<!OVKItNMi:NT I»ltlNTIN<: OITirK
Digitized by VjOOQIC
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MBDILI4 Mccormick, IlUnols, chairman.
ATLBB POMERENB, Ohio.
TABKBR L. ODDIB, Nevada, WILLIAM H. KING, Utah.
BuBHA Hanson, Clerk,
II '
LIBfVkRY OF C0NQfU38
«*£CCIVCO
DOCUMENTS DiVi3lON
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION AiND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington^ D, C.
The committee met pursuant to adjournment at 10.30 o'clock a. m., In the com-
mittee room, Capitol, Senator Medill McCormiclc presiding.
Present: Senators McCormicli (chairman), Oddie, and Pomerene.
Alao present : Mr. Ernest Angell, representing the Hati-Santo Domingo Inde-
pendence Society, tlie National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, and the Union Patriotlque D'Haitl ; Mr. Horace G. Knowles, represent-
ing the Patriotic League of the Dominican Republic and the deposed Dominican
GoTemment ; and Mr. Roger L. Farnham, representing the National City Bank
of New York City.
STATEMENT OF MB. BOQEB L. FABNHAM, VICE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL CITY BANK, NEW YORK, N. Y.
The Chaibman. Mr. Farnham, will you please give your full name?
Mr. Fab N HAM. Roger L. Farnham.
The Chairman. Give your connection with the National City Bank and your
business.
Mr. Farnham. Vice president National City Bank, New York.
The Chairman. And your business interests are those of the Bank in Haiti?
Mr. Farnham. Yes.
The Chairman. You may go to any length you choose on that subject.
Mr. Farnham. As to the position of the bank, you mean?
The Chairman. How does It come that the bank is interested In Haiti, or the
National Bank of Haiti, and to what extent is it interested?
Mr. Farnham. In 1910 the old National Bank of Haiti was reorganized in
connection with a new Government loan taken ^y some French bankers.
Senator Pomerene. Was that a private bank?
Mr. Farnham. Yes; that w^ a private bank, which had had a contract to
act as treasury of the Haitian Government. But due to some internal difficulties
and bad management, the bank had practically failed, and it was reorganized
with strong group of French bankers behind it, and in connection with that
leorganlzation a new contract was made between the Haitian Government and
the bank, under which contract the bank was to make certain annual loans to
the Government, for purposes of the budget, and It also was to act as the treas-
ury of the Government, receiving all revenues — not collecting any, but receiv-
ing them — and paying out all disbursements for account of the Government
Senator Pomerene. That was prior to 1910?
Mr. Farnham. No ; I am reciting the subject of the 1910 contract
Also under that contract the bank was to be the bank of issue of the cur-
rency of the country.
For some reason. Senator Knox, who was then Secretary of State here, in-
tervened in the matter, and objected to the contract as it originally was drawn,
saying that It was very onerous to the Haitian people, and also he felt that
some American banking Interests ought to be represented. He did not favor
the preponderance of Blench Interests, and at his request several bankers from
New York visited Washington and discussed the matter with him. The result
105
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106 INQUIRY INTO OCC'VPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOiaNGO.
was that the National City Bank of New York, Messrs. Speyer & Co., Hall-
garten & Go,, and Ladenburg Thalmann & Co. each became subscr.bers to
2,000 shares of the capital stock of the company, which Is a French organiza-
tion operating under a French charter.
The capital stock was 40,000 shares. Out of that the National Cit>' Bank
acquired 2,000 shares, and the other interests, respectively, 2,000 shares eacli.
Those shares represented 125 francs paid in, the par value l>eing 500 francs.
At the same time the (Jerman bank, Benliner Handel Oelselschaf, acqulwl
2,000 shares.
The changes which Senator Knox, then Secretary <if State, brought about
in the original <'ontnict, were qu te to the benefit of the Haitians. From that
time on the bank lias been conducte<l as a French institution, with, I thlnli.
three Americans on the board of directors, but the practical management of
the bank was from Paris. The American directors hatl practically little to dt».
The iMink has lt« prlnciml office In Port au Prince, and nine branches or
agencies throughout the countrj-.
That situation continued until the time of the American Intervention in
Haiti In 1915 or perhaps a short time before that, when, because of the World
War, the French people were so taken up with matters at home that they
asked the American directors to assume the management of the affairs of
the bank, and from that time on the active management has been from New
York rather than ftom Paris, although the board was contlnueil in Paris and
was consulted from time to time.
Shortly after the European war broke out Secretary of State Brj-an. in sev-
eral interviews, suggested the advisability of the American interests acquiring
the French shares in the bank, and makitig It an American bank. That sug-
gestion was repeated from time to time, and after some extended conferences.
I think in 1917, just before the United States entered the war, the National
City Bank purchasd the stock held by the other three American parties, Hall-
garten, Speyer, and Ladwiburg Thalmann, so that that gave the National City
Bank about 8,000 shares of stock in the bank, out of 40,000 shares.
Senator Pohebene. At 500 francs per share?
Mr. Fabnham. Yes; par value, of which 125 francs had been paid in. The
stock of the bank never was Issued, never has been issuetl. An lns<Tiption \vas
made on the books of the bank in Paris, stating the fact of the subs<»riptlon.
and each participant was issued a certificate.
Senator Pomebene. Well, your subscribers were without the eviden<-e-
Mr. Fabnham. Except in the form of a certificate.
About a year and a half ago. after several suggestions froni the State I>e-
partment, negotiations were entered Into, with the result that the National
City Bank purchased all the assets of the French institution.
Senator Pomebene. Including the (lerman interests?
Mr. Fabnham. All, yes, all of the assets. Under the circumstances. Senator,
It was rather difficult to buy the stock. At a shareholders' meeting held In
Par's, where all the shareholders were rei)resented — and there were about
6,000 shareholders of the bank altogether — It was voted to accept the offer of
th National City Bank, which was $1,400,000.
Senator Pomebene. I^t me understand that. I>o I understand yon to say all
the shareholders? Does that Include the German shareholders whi) were
there?
Mr. Fabnham. Yes; all shares of the German bank had been seized by tlie
French Government, and the French Government acted in that matter.
The Ohaibman. Who was Secretary of State at that time?
Mr. Fabnham. At the time we made the offer for the assets?
The Thaibman. Yes.
Mr. Fabnham. I think Mr. Lansing. The bank paid $1,400,000, the under-
standing being that the assets would be transferred to a new company which
the National City Bank would create; the French company would be dis-
continued, the charter surrendered, and the money would be distributed to the
shareholders. That has not been carried out because It has been impossible
to obtain from the Haitian council of state Its approval for the transfer of the
contract between the Haitian Government and the French bank to the new
organization. The Haitians agreed to do it. Their minister and representa-
tives went over the matter here In Washington at the State Department and
signed their assent to the transfer, requesting that the new corporation, if
we could see our way to do it. should be a Haitian corporation rather than an
American one, and we complied, and drew up an organization in Haiti, under
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 107
the same title as now exists, the Banque Nationale Republique d'Haiti, but
up to now it has been impossible to get the approval of that Govenimeut to
the transfer of the contract, and so we are continuinR the bank under the
actual ownership of the National City Bank, but under the French charter,
jiiid with the French officials and directors remaining as they have been. Mr.
Poiraon, the vice president of the Banque Unon Parisien, is president and I
am vice president. The board is eiiually divided between French and Ameri-
cans. That is the only interest the National City Bank has in Haiti, and all
that it ever has had.
Senator Pomerenf.. Y(*u are continuing your operations down there Just as
lieretofore.
Mr. Farnham. We are continuing operations as a bank; yes, sir. We have
carried out the obligations of the contract ; from time to time we have made
advances to tlie Haitian Government, so that the obligations of the Govern-
ment to the bank to-day amount to $1,733,154. I forget the exact cents.
Senator Pomerene. What are your assets?
Mr. Farnham, That we hold a note of the Haitian Government for, which
is at the approval of the State Department here, and bears the signature of the
American financial adviser. That note is due and payable on the 31st of
December of this year. It was made two years ago.
Senator Pomerene. What are the total assets. of the bank?
Mr. Farnham. Of the Haiti Bank?
Senator Pomerene. Yes.
Mr. Farnham. We have just had an examination made. They are approxi-
mately a million iind a half, with the note of tlie Haitian Government.
Senator Pomerene. In addition to that?
Mr. Farnham. No; including that.
The (vHaibman. Perhaps I might ask here, in order that the information
might be in the record, what other banking institution is there In Haiti, and
1)0 w many branches has it?
Mr. Farnham. The lioyal Bank of C'anada, a British bank, is there. It
lias an office in Port au Prince, one at Aux Cayas, nnd one at Cape Haitlen.
Tlie Chairman. What relation. If any, Is there betw^een the National City
Hank, its stock hob lers. and the railways built under the so-called McI>onald
ccmtiesa ons?
Mr. Farnham. The National ('ity Bank dl<l not have an<l never has had any
interest in that railroad except a loan of J|>5<)0,()00 made to the contracting com-
pany building the railroad, the bank rwelving as colhiteral for that loan.
$870,000 and some t>d<l, of the bonds of the raih'oad company. That is the
only interest the National City Bank has ever had in the railroad. The rall-
nmd was financed by a syndicate gotten up by W. R. Grace & Co., and the con-
trol of the capital stock of the railroad is with that syndicate. In that syndi-
crate — the Grace Syndicate, so-callwl — rme of its subscribers is the Etlielbui'ga
Syndicate, mi English instituthm which owns 50 per cent of the (!apltal stock of
the railroad, so that the ownership of the railroad Is divided iHiually lK»twetui
the English interests and a group of Americans. I think there are 112 In the
American group. The stock never was Issuetl to the public. It has always
heen held by the group.
The Chairman. That was one of those English interests which ma Ives a
business of investing in the enterprises and utilities of undevelope<l countries,
I take it?
Mr. Farnham. Yes.
The Chairman. Will you indicate where this railroad is on the mat)?
Mr. Farnham. The railroad runs from Port au Prince, following practi<'ally
that retl line out to tlie shore there, and from here out to that point, St. Marc.
It runs from Gonaives to a place calle<l Ennery; and from ('ape Haltien to a
place called Bahon. It is In three sections. The original plan was to bring
it way down here into this country l indicating on map], and so on below the
Artibonlte River, until it got to St. Marc, but that is practically an Impossible
proposition on account of the mountains. It can be brought over the moun-
tains here at Bahon, and come in through here, and the engineers have been
trying to find some way to get across this range of mountains here.
Senator Pomerene. This is all Greek to me. You say there are three sec-
tions. Are they not connected?
Mr. Farnham. No; not at all. They were built at the same time. One
section was started here and another section here. [Indicating on map.]
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108 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Pomerenr. Now, you say here and here. Will you indicate it for the
record?
Mr. Fabnham. From Oape Haitien to Bahon. From Cajie Haltien, on the
north, it goes south to n point called Bahon 37 kilometers; and from Gonaive^.
on the west coast — that Is another section — Inland and eastward 33 kilometers
t<» Ennery ; and from St. Marc, also on the west coast, south to Port au Prince
102 kilometers.
Senator Pomerene. What are the several industrial activities which sug-
gested the building of these roads In those particular sections or localities?
Mr. Fabnham. In the Gonaives-Ennery section of the road the idea was to
reach some coal deposits inUind. The coal was thought to be valuable. It is
not, because it is nothing but lignite and of a rather poor quality at that The
remainder of the line, from Cape Haltien to Bahon and from Port au Prince to
St. Marc, are the two ends, if you please, of what was laid out to be a
through. line from the north to the south. They pass through a country which
could produce sugar cane In large quantities, bananas, and cotton. There Is no
cultivation In Haiti, as we understand the term.
Senator Pomerene. Are the climatic and soil conditions there such as to
make It a reasonable competitor of Cuba?
Mr. Farnham. Well, In a small way. The climatic and soil conditions are
quite all right for sugar, cotton, coffee, and cocoa. There Is an abundance of
labor, after it Is educated. The area susceptible of that sort of cultivation, of
course, Is sonie\yhat limited compared to Cuba. It Is generally thought by those
who have Investigated the situation that sugar can be made in Haiti as cheaply
as in Cuba after the natives have been taught how to handle the cultivation of
the cane. The same applies to cotton, cocoa, and coffee. At the present time
the cotton and coffee grows practically wild. It was brought there In the days of
the French, but for the last 100 years it has just taken care of itself. It propa-
gntes itself; there is no cultivation. There are no plantations. The only cul-
tivation tliat you see as you go through the country is here and there small gar-
den patches, which are cultivated by the women, of beans, sweet potatoes, and
ynms. There is no cultivation of bananns, no cultivation of cotton ; and the
sugar cane which you see growing practically all over the country in the fertile
parts, the valleys and plains, is a propagation of what was put there by the
French. The country is susceptible of a good deal of development, but it will
require capital, and it will require some time to educate the Haitian to become
a good laborer.
In recent years a number of Haitians — several thousand — have been taken over
to Cuba during tjje sugar season to work in the fields. They are fair laborers.
They can not match up with the Jamaican in the fieMs nor with the Spanish
Gallego. If you sit on your horse In the cane fields In the cane season, as I have
done, and watch two Gallegos working together and two Jamaican Negroes and
two Haitians, you will see the piles of cane cut by the two Gallegos and the two
Jamaicans grow almost twice as fast as the t^le cut and thrown by the Haitians.
They seem to lack the muscular strength. I know that in the construction of this
railroad In Haiti, where we had them as laborers, the American foremen, who
had previously been on railroad construction In Mexico and all up and down
South America and In the T'nited States, told me — and I saw myself, too— that
they reckoned four Haitians were necessary to do the work of -one good Irish
track hand.
The Chairman. I^t me ask, Mr. Farnham, Is that possibly
Mr. Farnham. Thry were very weak, and they had no food.
The Chairman (continuing). A matter of nourishment?
Mr. Farnham. Nourishment almost entirely, and Ignorance In handling mat-
ters of that sort.
Senator Pomerene, Naturally, they have the physical strength, have they?
Mr. Farnham. Generally speaking, I should say no. The women are all
strong, big, husky persons. The majority of the men are rather light and small,
underfed. They seem to lack the physique.
Senator Pomerene. How do you account for the difference between the sexes?
Mr. Farnham. I do not know, but it is observable as soon as you go among
the people, particularly in the country. The men are rather light in weight, and
they do not seem to have the stamina. They can not stand up under hard work?
Senator Oddte. Is there anything in the climate?
Mr. Farnham. I think the climate has something to do with it, but still in
Santo Domingo, which has practically the same climate, or in Panama, which
has even a worse climate to work in than Haiti, the Negroes there work satis-
factorily.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 109
Senator PoMiaiENE. That statement surprises me very much. I am not dlsput-
hig It at all. Do you mean to say that the women are actually or simply relu-
tlvGly stron^r than the men?
Mr. Farniiam. On the whole, I think they are actually stronger. The women
perform the labor In the gardens ; they do all the marketing; they think nothing
of tramping 50 miles to market, carrying on their heads almost unbelievable
loads. You win see a woman driving two or three burros, and she will be carry-
ing on top of her own head more than any one of the burros. They will walk all
night, many of them very fast They will walk as fast as a good horse will
walk and carry that heavy load over the island. They come Into the market
place at Port au Prince two or three times a week, particularly on Saturday,
probably 5,000 or 6,000 women, who have come in from all directions. You will
see some at the other principal towns like Cape Haitien and St. Marc. Fifty
per cent of them have carried on their own heads what they bring to market.
Senator Pomeuene. In doing this work in the construction of the railroads,
is that done by the women or the men V
Mr. Faknham. The men. The women would not work at that. You can not
get a woman to work cutling cane, but they will pick coffee and cotton, they
will work in the garden, they will cultivate their garden stuff. I think if you
should see a group of women and a group of men you would immediately notice
the difference in their physique, their whole set-up.
The Chairman. Mr. Farnham. I think the committee would be interested to
liave your impression of political and economic conditions preivding the occu-
pation, and the incidents of the occupation, and ail events and conditions sub-
sequent to the occupation.
Mr. Farnham. Well, I would like to preface what I would say by the state-
ment that what I know of this country is gained by trips on horseback through
tlie Interior. I have made in Haiti seven trips on horseback, one of 33 days
and one of 30 days and five of a fortnight each. I have made two in Santo
Domingo, one of 34 days and another of 17 days, on the trail. I went with a
party through Santo Donringo, and usually there have been two or three men
with me on the trips through Haiti, and we have gone very well equipped,
because we had saddle horses brought there from Wyoming and American
pack mules. We had two horses apiece, so that we rmle one In the morning
and one in the afternoon, which permitted of pretty fast riding. In that way
we have covered all of Santo Domingo and all of Haiti, except these two arms.
That portion I have not been in. I have sailed around the coast of the arms,
but I have not traveled over them. But I have been over practically all the
rest of Haiti and Santo Donrlngo on horseback, and it is from these trips
that I have been able to observe conditions.
My first trip was made in June, 1911, in Haiti. In 1913 I made the first
trip through Santo Domingo and In 1918 the second. At that time — I am speak-
ing now of 1911 — and from then until the American occupation in Haiti, it was
almost a condition
Senator Pomebrne. What was the <late of the American occupation in Haiti?
Mr. Farnham. July, 1915. The country was in a state of almost continuous
revolution, one man trying to succeed the other as President and so get control
of the treasury.
Senator Pomerene. You are speaking of Haiti, not of Santo Domingo?
Mr. Farhham. Haiti. In |liat time I think there were seven Presidents.
The Chairman. In four years — from 1911 to 1915?
Mr. Farnham. Yes. Simon was President in 1911, and went out on the 1st
of August that year, and so on. There were seven Presidents up to the time
of the American occupation in July, 1915. During that period, in riding
through the country one saw very few men. They were either in the Govern-
ment army or in the revolutionary army, or hiding out in the hills to escape
botli. The majority of them were engaged in the latter occupation, keeping
out there with their families. The cultivation, such as it was, by the women
was considerably limited, and between either the revolutionary army or the
Oovemment army a great nmny small villages were destroyed, the houses
burnt up, the people killed, and every sort of an outrage which you may im-
•ghie going with a movement of that sort.
It was under those conditions that they attempted to construct the Haiti
ndlroad, but revolutionary conditions l)ecame so bad in 1913 that the man-
agement suspended the construction of It,, and in 1914 they had to suspend
operation of the sections which had been completed, and no trains were op-
erated for nearly a year — until after tlie American troops landed there. Then,
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110 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
at the request of the commanding officers, the road was put in somre operation,
with an occasional train, which gradually increased until conditons permitted
the normal daily operation of trains.
The Governments which followed each other were revolutionary Governments,
each one getting the country into debt more deeply. I think that was the situa-
tion which the Americans found when they arrived there, following the killing
of the last President, Sam.
As to Santo Domingo, the conditions there, you should understand, are quite
different from Haiti.
The Chaibm.\n. Let me submit this to the menil)ers of the committee: It
seems to me that we had better ctmflne the witnesses to one subject. If we
attempt to consider the conditions and the problems in both countries simul-
taneously, I think we sliall be in great difficulties. Will you just address your-
self, therefore, Mr. Farnham, to the question of Haiti?
Mr. Far.nham. I think that is all I can say about that. The business of the
country was in control of the Germans, 90 per cent of It.
The Chairman. The commerce?
Mr. Farxham. The connnerce of the country, both the import and exiKirt
business. The German ships controlled the shipping. No other vessels went
there, with the exception of an occasional ship from France, of the French
Transatlantic Line. They liad a vessel which called there about once a month,
sometimes once in two months, but outside of 4;hat the traffic was in the con-
trol of the Hamburg-American Line, and the German merchants worked in
conjunction with that line. They profited considerably through the i*evolutlons.
They loaned money to the would-be presidents to finance their revolutionary
movements at what resulted in a profitable rate of remuneration to them.
In 1917, when we went into the war, Haiti declared war also on Germany,
and the Germans were forced to leave the island. Their proj)erty was con-
scripted by the Haitian Government and placed in liquidation. Some two
months ago that ban was lifted and practically all the Germans are back in
Haiti, they have resumed their old business, and the property and funds which
were taken from them then are now being returned to them, their buildings,
lands, stores; together with some $2,000,000 cash, which was realized from the
sale of certain goods taken from their stores.
There are two or three half-German, half-Haitian houses in the countr3\ one
English house, and in the last two or three j'ears two or three American in-
dividuals have opened up business there, but they are small.
The country has been served during the war by the Panama Stejunship Line,
which passes practically by the door, going back and forth to the canal—
the diversion in and out is rather small — and that has rendered a weekly service
which has been very necessary to the c^mntry for both passengers and mail,
freight, and merchandise. An effort, I understand, is being made to dl.scon-
tinue that service. I think it is very desirable
Senator Pomebene. An effort by whom?
Mr. Farnham. I do not know. I understand the Shipping Board have some
control over it. A petition is now being circulated for everyone interesteil to
sign to have the Panama steamship service to Haiti retained. Personally, I
think it should be. I think it is very desirable to have an American steam-
ship line going into that country?
Senator Pombrene. Has the German service been continued there, or re-
newed again?
Mr. Farnham. No; not yet. I understand it is to be. I was infornuMl ii
week ago by one of the former employees of the Hamburg- American I4ne that
it is now attempting to resume their service from New York to Haiti and
through the Caribbean.
The Chairman. Did not the Hamburg-American Line, in a sense, dominflte
that entire island trade?
Mr. Farnham. Yes; before the war they did. They practically made the
rates for the whole Caribbean, for all the American Hues and all other lines.
The Chairman. With headquarters at St. Thomas?
Mr. Farnham. They had a big coaling station there; yes; but they served
Venezuela, Panama, Jamaica, and Haiti. They laid out a certain district,
which they monopolized to themselves and fixed rates.
S(»nator Pomerene. Y'ou have spoken of the National City Bank's interest
there, and of the Canadian bank. Did the Germans have any banking Interests
there?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. Ill
Mr. Farnham. No, sir. Quite a number of Oernmn houses were private
banlkS themselves. They practically did their own banking business. Very
few of the Germans did business with any outside bank. Tliey shipped their
goods by the German line, and their mall was handled in the same way, and
their drafts went out in the same way. The only thing they did with the
National Bank of Haiti prior to the American inter>'entlon was to obtain from
the bank frtmi time to time as they wanted them the necessary paper gourde,
which was the money of the country, of the denomination of 20 cents, nominal
value, and then when the crop season would be over they would change these
jTOurdes back to dollars. The gourde is a paper bill about the size of our dollar
bill, in denominations of ones, twos, tens, and twenties.
Senator Oddie. You mentioned some Influence that Is being brought to bear
to have the Panama steamship service discontinued.
Mr. Fabnham. Yes.
Senator Oddie. I would like to know a little more about that.
Mr. Fabnhah. Senator, I can not tell you very much about it myself. Two
or three times it has been reported that the Panama steamship service was to
be withdrawn from Haiti and to be substituted by the Royal Mail Steam Packet
Co. For some years that comimny has maintained a service through the Carrl-
bean, particularly to Jamaica and some of the eastward Islands, but more
recently they have operated ships from Nova Scotia to Haiti and to Santo
Domingo. That service seemed to come about after the establishment in EUiiti
of the Royal Bank of Canada. I do not know if this is true, but it has been
reported to us by our representatives in the Island that the English bank
offered loans to Haitian merchants on c(mdition that they would buy Canadian
goods rather than American goods. It is a fact that the ships from Nova
Scotia brought out fish, cotton goods, and supplies of that sort which are used
in Haiti, and would take away coffee, cocoa, and logwood. Whether they
intend to put on a regular service in the event the Panama service is with-
drawn I do not know, but a week ago I was advised by a former employee of
the Hamburg' American Line that they soon expected to resume their service to
HaiU.
^nator Oddie. Who is pressing to bring about the withdrawal of the Panama
ships?
Mr. Fasnham. I could not tell you. Senator,
Senator Oddie. I wondered what interest was dominant in that effort.
Mr. Fabnham. I do not know. That service is a very good one. It is regu-
Itr, and I think the rates probably are more favorable to the Haitians than
previously the country has enjoyed.
Senator Pombbene. You have spoken of the interest of the National City
Bank. What other substantial Interests are there in Haiti?
Mr. Fabnham. Th^e are two only. A group of Americans organized a com-
pany about three years ago to undertake to develop a plain located about here
(indicating on map] in cotton, and they put Into cultivation, I think, some
2,500 or 3,000 acres. Instead of using the Haitian cotton, which Lb a long staple
and very tough sort of cotton, and which the Island originally grew, they
brought seed from the United States. Whether that was responsible for what
happened I do not know, but the whole thing was a failure. The cotton did not
grow. It would grow that high [indicating] and then proceed to die. They
sprayed it, they did everything, but they could not cultivate It.
Alongside of it they had a small tract of Haitian cotton which grew. I think
they gathered about 100 bales from that, but their 2,500 acres of cotton raistnl
from the imported seed, I think, died, and they have practically abandoned for
the time being their plants there. I understand they Invested altogether nearly
$1,000,000. They acquired a very large tract of land, and they brought tractors
and breaklng'Up plows; they brought a great deal of machinery Into Haiti.
For the time being they are doing nothhig.
Th«^ was another company formed. In which the Germans, who originally
controlled the entire property, participated. That was called the Haitian-
American Sugar Co. That was organized by some Americans, In conjunction
with certain Germans in Port an Prince. That company acquired the stock
of the electric light company of Port au Prince ; also a small, narrow-gauge
railroad running from Port au Prince out to this lake, about 30 miles; also a
tramway in the city, the wharf at Port au Prince, and they were also to build,
and did build, a sugar mill about a mile and half from Port au Prince. They
have there a very fine mill. I think it has a capacity of about 200,000 sacks
of sugar.
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112 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
They undertook to get sui^ar cane from the plains of Cul-de-Sac, which 100
or more years ago under French management was a very productive terri-
tory for sugar. They had some difficulties with the natives, and were unable
to get a sufficient supply of cane, and their affairs went badly and did not work
out. About nine months ago the company went into the hands of receivers,
and about eight weeks ago the property was sold at a receiver's sale in New
York, and it was bought in by several banks that had loaned money to tke
enterprise and were interested. I believe they contemplate reorganization
when conditions get a little better.
Senator Pomerenr. What is the total of the American investment in Haiti?
Mr. Farnham. It is rather hard to answer. Senator. As to the bank, I have
told you. As to the railroad, the so-called Grace syndicate paid in practically
all of its underwriting obligations, $2,225,000. The cotton enterprise at the
north Involved about $1,000,000. What was put Into the Haitian- American
operation by Americans I do not know. They claimed to have assets alto-
gether of about $12,000,000, but I rather doubt that.
The Chairman. What did they sell for at the receiver's sale?
Mr. Farnham. $650,000 ; but that was a mere nominal figure. It was bought
in by the banks, with the understanding on the part of the court which. appointed
the receiver that a reorganization would be effected and that all subscribers
to the original company would be given an opportunity to participate.
Senator Pomerene. What did the German interests amount to, in your
judgment?
Mr. Farnham. In Invested capital I should say a relatively small amount,
representing Investments only In buildings at the different ports and in lighters
and a wharf. The Germans built this wharf at Port au Prince. I think that
cost them about $275,000. Perhaps in the railroad, the tramway, and the ele^
trie light company they had invested $1,()D0,000.
The Chairman. They were primarily merchants and middlemen?
Mr. Farnham. They w^ere merchants and middlemen. You see, before the
American occupation, and before the treaty and the new constitution of Haiti,
foreigners could not own any land. That was prohibited. Some of the Ger-
mans marr'ed Haitian women In order to get land, but the amount of lapd
they acquired was relatively small, ajid was of no importance. They bought
the products of the country and exported thent, and they Imported cotton goods,
eatables, etc. They did their own banking business. They speculated In
gourde.s, and they made considerable profit out of financing revolutions. They
were not landowners, in the proper sense of the word. Through a marrlaise
or some association with a Haitian woman they would own a few houses in
one town or another.
Senator Pomerene. They were rather exploiters?
Mr. Farnham. Yes.
Senator Pomerene. What have you to say about the British and the amount
of their Interests there?
Mr. Farnham. Nil. ^
Senator Pomerene. And the Canadians?
Mr. Farnham. Nil.
The Chairman. Outside of the bank.
Mr. Farnham. Yes; outside of the Canadian bank. The American-Foreign
Banking Corporation openetl a bank there and carried it on for a year and a
half, but that is closed and discontinued.
Senator Oddie. Who were the Americans interested with the Haitians in
the Haitian- American Corporation?
Mr. Farnham. I could not tell you. Senator. A private banking house m
Chicago, by the name of Breed, Elliott & Harrison, and some others, were
interested in It, and I think the preferred stock of the company was sold gen-
erally to the public, more in the Middle States, I think in Illinois and Indiana,
than In the East. I think the bulk of the preferred stock of that corporation
was sold in those States.
Senator Pomerene. Who was it that first took the Initiative which led up to
our sending our marines into Haiti?
Mr. Farnham. I think we went in there primarily because the French hart
already stepped In and taken possession. When we went in there the French
had sent a warship and troops and had landed at Cai>e Haitlen, on account of
the revblutionarj' conditions, and were in possession, administering the affairs
of the city.
The Chairman. I think the Navy Department has covered that.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 118
Mr. Farnham. And on account of that situation we sent Admiral Caperton
out there. He di^laced tlie Frencli occupation. Later they landed their troops
at Port an Prince at the same time we did, and those troops remained there
until a treaty was negotiated six months later.
Senator PoibiEBENE. How many troops have we down there now?
Mr. Fabnhah. I could not tell you.
The Chairman. That is all in the record. We should like very much to have
Mr. Farnham give us his impressions of the occupation and its administration
of the country.
Mr. Farnham. My impressions on that. Senator, will have to be confined
to just what I saw there.
The Chairman. The occupation has continued now nearly six years. There
was a period of what we might call pacification, and there was later a period —
Ji thinlj you nilf^ht designate it
Mr. Farnham. I would like to mention that before the American occupation
there were no roa^ls in Ha'ti ; there was only one way of going about, and that
was by hor8el>ack, anywhere and everywhere. There were a few automobiles
that had been intro<luee'l ''nto Port au Prince, but they could not go outside
of the town. AU travel was either on foot or on horse all over the country.
The idea of this railroad was to effiect some means of communication l>etween
the north and south. Before the roads were built travel was very tiresome
and tedious. You had to go over mountains, swim rivers, and It was a very
difficult trp, particularly in the rainy season, when it was almost impossible
to pet through.
After the American occupation, and the country had become qu>ted down,
there was some discussion by Government officials at this entl about road
building and improvement, but there was no policy, and there was nothing
except talk. In the meanwhile the marines started in and built a road so
that it was pos.sible to go from Port au Prince through St. Marc to Oonnlves,
ami overland to ('ape Haitien easily In 12 hours. It was a wonderful road,
beautifully done.
Senator Pomerbne. How is that done; by what means of locomotion?
Mr. Farnham. Automobile.
Senator Pomerene. What is the distance?
Mr. Farnham. Well, that road, I would say, is- about 140 miles.
Senator Pomerene. Was that <lone by the Americans, at their expense, or
was it charged to the Halt en Government?
Mr. Farkham. That was done under the d rection of the marines, with their
own engineers, and by Haitian labor.
Senator Pomerene. Who paid the labor?
Mr. Farnham. That labor was handled under a law of Haiti which pro-
vWes that all men can be conscr pted for three days at a time to work upon
the roads, and it was under that law that the actual labor was performetl. The
marine engineers laid out the lines, and did all of the engineering work. It
was supervise I by maHnes. The labor was by Haitians.
Senator Pomerene. Then the only cash outlay would be for overhead ex-
penses, substantially? , ^ .
Mr Farnham. I was told— whether it 's true or not I have no means of
knowing— that the entire cash outlay for that road wa# something under
1250,000, covering the outlay for powder and dynamite, for in some places they
had to blast, and for the material necessary to make some small britlges. I am
Inclined to think that is perhaps true.
Senator Pomerene. It costs $250,000 to build about 5 miles of road in the
United States
Mr Farnham. Anv i)erson who had traveled the country before and subs^
qtiently went over that road and saw the sort of road that was built could
have nothing but commendation for the mar nes. It was a great piece of work.
The Chairman. Have they built other roads?
Mr. Farnham. Yes; they have made other roads there, but I on?^<^»"*"«Jv]f
file main road through to the north. They have built something like 1«0 ^ j?s
of other roads indifferent parts of the island, and very good roads ^J^^f^l
ad I that they are wide enough for two automobiles to pass, and the> are o\er
the mountains some 4.000 feet above the sea and down again
Senator Pomerene. Am I to Infer from your statement that ^ »»»^ /^**y J^«'*
this law for conscr pting labor for road building they had never operated undei
it until the marines took hold of it? m,^^^ ^«ro nn rn«d^
Mr. Farnham. No; the Haitians had built no roads. There were no roads,
only trails ; that is aU, bridle paths. ^.^.^.^^^ ^^ GoOglc
114 INQUIRY INTO OCX^UPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Oddie. How many miles Is the main road?
Mr. Fabnhah. I think about 140. I may be in error, but that is approxi-
mately the distance.
Senator Oddie. In figuring the cost of tliat road, labor
Mr. Fabnham (interposing). The labor was paid nothing. The officers
adopted generally the i)lan which was adopted in the construction of railroads.
They fed the men — gave them meals such as they probably never before had
had. From my observation in many places it was difficult to drive the men
away from .the work. They were taken for three days and then told to get
out. A large percentage said they wanted to stay in the camp and work.
There have been statements made that men were abused and shot, and that may
be true — I do not know — ^but I was up and down that trail quite a hit during
the construction at infrequent periods, and I saw nothing of that.
Senator Pomkrene. I>i(l you hear of it while you were there?
Mr. Karnham. Only in one case. I heard they had a gang of prisoners in
one si>ot that were pretty bad, and that they had had to shoot two or three
of them that triefl to run away. I rode into one place one afternoon, and I did
see some men that were marked off as prisoners, I saw men with hand-
<uffs tucked in tlielr belts working away with the rest. The thing that
attracted my attention was the handcuffs hanging to the belts. I think the
marines had a very difficult time when they first went in there: there is no
doubt about it. The Haitians had all sorts of rifles, good, bad, and indifferent.
They were out in the woods. They were l>ossed by various military chiefs
who did not want to lose their positions.
Senator Pomebene. Haitian chlefii?
Mr. Farniiam. Haitians entirely — in the Haitian Army. And so iu the early
part of the invasion there was a good deal of sniping and bushwhacking on
the part of the natives. Before the American occupation there was never
any danger to a white man who traveled in the country. I have been through
while the revolutions were on, and a white man was not molested. If he kept
out 'of the mess himself and minded his own business he was jierfectly safe.
Senator Pomebexe. The white men felt perfectly free to travel across the
country?
Mr. Farnham. Yes. There were not many white men in the country. Before
the American occupation I dOubt if there were 75 white men in the whole
country — ^straight whites. There were some mulattoes; but, including the Ger-
mans, I doubt if there were over 75 white men in the entire country of Haiti.
After the American occupation many of the Haitians seemed to turn against
the whites, and all white men looked alike.
Senat(>r Pomerene. After the occupation?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomerene. To what do you attribute that?
Mr. Farnham. I think that the natives were aroused by the talk of the
chiefs and the military generals to believe that the whites were going to mal?e
slaAes of them again. That was the usual cry; and that the Haitians would
have to resist the marines if they wanted to get rid of them, otherwise they
would be made slaves. That is tlie fear that is uppermost in the minds of all
Haitians, as ignorant as they are.
Senator Pomerene. What portion of those people can read and write?
Mr. F"arnham. I (}pubt If out of the two and a half million there are 50,000
that can read or write. They speak an unknciwn i)at<)is ; I df» not know what
it is. I remember that on one of my trips through the island I had an English-
man with me who had lived for many years in South Africa, in the Oon?o
country, and spoke Kaffir. He tried it on the natives, and all of the old people
.seemed to understand it, and could talk with him, and he had never been in
Haiti before. He noticed many peculiarities of the people, which he said were
the same as those of some tribes on the West ('o:»st of Africa. The Haitians, as
you probably know, were brought from Africa to Haiti. As late as 1800 they
were bringing them in as slaves.
Senator Pomerene. Who?
Mr. Farnham. The French, who occupied the island and controlie<l it in those
days. It was the French who developed the coffee, sugar, and indigo industry
In^Haiti. They had large plantations there, and Haiti producefl in those days
great quantities of sugar, but in the revolution of 1804 those were all destroyed.
Senator Pomerene. Are the literate and the educated class pure blacks?
Mr. Farnham. Of the educated class the majority of them are. A few of the
mulattoes are well educated. There are perhaps 250 or 300 men in the whole
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island who have had a very superior educatioD abroad. Tliey are very higlily
educated, members of the French bar, some of the English bar, some educateil
at Oxford, and others at eilucational institutions in France. They Iiave lived
abroad and have acquired the polisli of the Europen ; they are very well read
in literature; they are pretty Rood diplomats, very cunning, and a considerable
number of them are absolutely untrustworthy ; I mean thev do not stick to
what they agree to.
Senator Pomebene. Arfe they lenders in tliese revolutionary movements?
Mr. Fabnham. They are leaders. The country, up to the time of the Ameri-
can occupation, bad been at the mercy of that small coterie of intellectuals who
had kept themselves in power l)y means of revolutions, and who had control le<I
tlie finances of the country and profited out of the revenues. The bank, which -
is the treasar>' of the government, was compelled, of course, to honor the
order of the secretary oU the treasury, whoever he might be, nor could we
question payments directed by him, although we might realize that they were
not really payments which sliould be made. The arrangement, of course, left
tlie treasury* at the mercy of the politicians. They did observe their foreign
obligations; they always met the interest on the outstanding bonds in France:
they usually took care of their budget, until 1912, when they began to run
behind and spent money faster than they were taking it in. Their income in
normal times should be between $6,000,000 and $7,000,000 gold, United States
money. Just from their customs. There was and is no other Income, no method
of taxation.
Land titles are without value. In the city of Port au Prince, Cape Hatien.
and one or two of the other important points, I think the titles to city property
are good, generally speaking, but when you get out in the open countrj*, outside
of these cities, there are no points of survey. There evidently has been no
survey of the island in 100 years. It is difficult to locate land, as desc*rlbe<l
by the property owners. People will offer for sale hind which they claim to
own. If you ask if they have a dee<l, they will say ** yes," but when they haml
it t(» yon it is usually a letter from some general who has takei\ their horse
or pigs or other valuables, and in substance it says, " You can live where you
are as long as you want.'* That is a literal translation of the paper they call
a deed.
The CuAisiiAN. That is from the general <rarromlissementV
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir.
The CHAniMAN. Mr. Farnliam, I wish you wouhl sjieak <»f the work of paci-
fication and the policy of development of the occupati(»n.
Mr. Fabnham. I never knew of any policy. Senator. .1 think that is the
trouble with Haiti.
The CHAiRMAif. When the work of pacification was complete — and that was
about when, in your Judgment?
Mr. Fabnham. In 1918 Haiti was as quiet as a churchyard — practically
disarmed.
The Chairman. We had been there three years?
Mr. Fabnham. And the relations, as far as I could obser%*e, between the occu-
pation and the natives were very good. The people who were educated, one
and all, were awaiting the announcement of some plan of development — some-
thhig which would bring about the construction of roads or bring in American
capital to develop the sugar industry or cotton industry under the occupation.
No plan seemed to be forthcoming. The men who were in charge of the mili-
tary occupation all were awaiting it. and they did not know what to do. Many
of them had programs which they worked out themselves, or thought out but
they were powerless to put them into effect. I think it was due almost entirely
to our failure at that time — and when I say our failure I mean the failure of
the United States Government — to present some well-defined plan for the devel-
opment of that country that led to the renewal of revolutionary conditions.
The war came on; they could not export their commodities; there were no
ships ; they had no money ; the best people were really hungry, and they wer©
bard put to it to get enougli to eat — ^people who were theretofore well to do—
and they appealed to the American officials for something, but the American
officials could do nothing.
The Chaibman. What form did the appeal take, if you know? Was there
any formal memorial?
Mr. Fabnham. No ; I do not know of anything of that sort, but I know that
individuals and groups did go to the financial adviser at that time, Mr. Ruan, I
believe, and to the American minister and others, asking that something be done
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116 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND BANTO DOMINGO.
to give employment to the people of the country — something which would take
the place of the ordinary exports and the funds derived therefrom which had
stopped. I was informed that representations repeatedly were made to Washing-
ton of the whole situation, with the request that some plan of development be
given them. Personally I called on the Secretary of State at Washington two
or three times and suggested that something of that sort should be done and
done rather promptly. It was not done, and the fallen Haitian military leaders
began to talk to the ignorant countrymen
The Chairman. We were pursuing a policy of watchful waiting?
Mr. Fabnham. Yes. They led the countryman to believe, and rightly, that he
was much worse oif than before the American occupation ; that the occupation
hadx not brought any benefits to him, except perhaps the death of some of
his relatives in the early days, and out of that grew conditions which were
worse than prevailed when we first went in. Now, the country is again quiet
and again disarmed, and we have conditions to-day in Haiti practically the
same as they were in 1918, peaceful, the people being ready for some compre-
hensive plan of development. I think before that can be carried out some
change will have to be brought about in the Government position. There is a
dual government under the treaty which it seems to me makes impossible any
progress there. Nothing can be done by the United States officials.
The Chairman. There is no central, responsible authority to be found?
Mr. Farnham. No. The representatives of the United States, the financial
adviser, the military commanders, and the American minister can do nothing
without the consent of the Haitians, which they do not get, and the Haitians
on their part can do nothing without the approval of the financial adviser, and
it is a deadlock, and has been so so ever since the treaty was put into effect. I do
not! believe the American officials are to blame for the failure to do something.
The Chairman. Now, if you would care to do so, will you fix responsibility
for the failure ta develop and to apply a policy In Haiti?
Mr. Farnham. I would not to do that, Senator; I do not think I can. I enn
only say that no policy was forthcomng.
The Chairman. Was it in Washington or Port au Prince?
Mr. Farnham. I think It was In Washington. Port au Prince had to wait
on instructions from Washington. I think that the officers at that time In
command — ^and they were all strangers to me ; I never met any of them until
I met them in Haiti, men like Gen. Butler and Gen. Cole, who were then in
command of the military, and some of the engineers — I think they went just
as far as they dared go to do something in the way of progress and development
I think, in building 4hese roads, they acted on their own initiative. I never
understood that instuctions about that came from Washington, They wanted
to have the people occupied at something. Gen. Cole approached the officials
of Xhe railroad company to see whether a resumption could be had of the
construction of the railroad, but that was impossible, due to the financial sit-
uation.
Senator Oddie. Is -there any trouble or lack of unity among the Haitians;
that is, in regard to supporting their President?
Mr. Farnham. In doing what?
Senator Oddie. In supporting their President.
Mr. Farnham. I think there are the usual political difficulties that there are
in every country.
Senator Oddie. Nothing serious now?
Mr. Farnham. No. Of course, each man thinks he ought to be president
and would give a good administration. It is the usual political situation.
Mr. Oddie. Well, the present President, then, is as strong as any man could
be there?
Mr. Farnham. I think so, under the circumstances. I do not see what any
man could do more than this man has done. There has been for the last year
a well-<lefine(l position on the part of the President and the members of his
cabinet and the leading politicians against the American occupation. I think
they were aroused to that by the writings and talk of certain people who
thought the Haitians were being abused and that the Americans had no busi-
ness to be in Haiti. Of course, that would be a popular topic with the Haitian
I)olitlcians, because If the Americans got out they would at once come In con-
trol of the funds of the country again : hut I feel confident that If the Americans
do leave, there would be no development of the country by the Haitians. It
would be left just where it was before wo went there. The people are not
sufficiently educated yet to take up. of their own initiative, any development.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 117
Tbey have not the money and they have yet to learn agriculture, as we under-
stand it, and the politicians have no Interest in doing that sort of thing.
(Whereupon, at 12 o*clock noon, a recess was taken until 3 o'clock p. m.)
AFTER BECESS.
The committee reassembled at 3 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
recess, Senator McCormick (chairman) presiding.
The Ohaisman. You were saying, when the hearing was suspended, Mr.
Famham, that the Haitians knew nothing of agriculture, as we understand it.
Has anything been done under the occupation to teach them?
Mr. Fabnham. Not that I know of. I know of nothing that has been
definitely undertaken in Haiti since the occupation commenced to develop
with the natives the agricultural resources of the island or to seriously
develop schools or educational methods. The only schools that I know of in
the island are those maintained (and existing before the occupation) by
the Jesuit priests, the French priests in the island. At some points they
have schools, and they are undertaking to teach the Haitian children. They
receive a very small amount of money annually from the Haitian Govern-
ment, which they apply to purchasing books and materials for those schools —
an exceedingly small amount.
The Chairman. Is anything being done to encourage the Haitians to work?
Is he any more secure in the possession of his property or his savings* than
he was before?
Mr. Farnham. Well, he is not now liable to have what he has taken away
from him, as under the old rule. Before the American occupation there was
a military government in vogue throughout the island. The generals were
divided into the generals d'arondissement and the generals de la place. In
their respective districts they were all powerful. They controlled the people
as absolutely as if they were czars. The majority of the people did not know
who was president and had no Interest in it They were interested more
particularly in who might be, under some revolution, the general de la place
or the general d'arondissement, and how much that general might take away
from them of their property. In traveling through the country it was neces-
sary to have a pass, which you presented when you arrived at each place
where there was a body of troops.
The Chairman. Was that true for the Haitian citizen as well as the
foreigner?
Mr. Farnham. All Haitians had to get a pass to travel. You had to present
yoar pass to the officer at that place, tell him whence you had come, and
abont how long you would stay, and where you were going. In the majority
of cases the officer was unable to read your passport. Frequently they
would hold it upside down and pretend to read it and hand it back to you,
but if you gave them a little compensation that was all that was necessary.
Those generals controlled practically everything in their districts when the
construction of the railroad was commenced. During the first year it was quite
cnstomary, when the men who worked for the construction company received
their pay, for the general of that vicinity to be on hand with troops and
seize those men as soon as they were paid, put them in jail and take their
money away from them, and on Monday they would bring them back to work,
all tied together with ropes, and deliver them here. We appealed to the
President to break that practice up, because it was difficult to get men. After
they had been robbed in that way two or three times they would not work,
and we were all the time having to obtain new men. But the appeals to the
President at Port au Prince were without avail. It was some time before the
practice was given up, and then it was very largely due to the activities of
the people in charge of the construction work.
The market women, in passing these places of residence of the commander
In the country districts, usually had to give np some of their coffee and
some of their cotton as a toll, and frequently, after selling their produce in
the town, they would have what they purchased in part taken away from
them when they went out I have frequently seen one woman driving a
whole lot of burros on the return trip, while the other women of the party
were making a detour through the woods with what they had purchased, in
order to avoid the military posts.
In Port au Prince, up to 191f». if you wante<l to go out after 6 o'clock at night
and wanted to take dinner with a fr'end, for example, you had to get a pass
to go from your house to his. You were stopped at every street coEner by the
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118 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOAtlNGO.
military. Tliat was so in every town of tlie island. Tliere were military guards
Ii<j8ted at the comers always all night. That custom persisted up to the time
of the American occupation.
The Chairman. Now, let us go back a little, Mr. Farnham. In what sense
did Senator Knox secure the modification of the terms of the bank contract in
favor of th eHaitians?
Mr. Fabnuam:. As I was not present at that time, but was in £urope, I can
simply state what I was informed. The terms of the loan were rather exces-
sive in favor of the bankers. My understanding is tliat Senator Knox caused
a modification of the terms, so that the bonds brought to the Haitians a larger
return. Also I think he succeeded in having reduced the charges which the con-
tract provided the bank should make for the service renderetl to the Hait.an
Government. I was informed by some of my associates who took part in the
conferences that he caused modifications to be conceded by the French bankers
which were very considerable to the advantage of the Haitian Government
The Chairman. I want to turn for a moment again to the question of the
corve6, to learn if you have anything to say with regard to the policy which I
think subsequently was attempted by the department of taking men away from
the neighborhood in which they lived, and to what extent that practice created
trouble.
Mr. Fabnham. I can not answer that from personal knowledge, Senator. It
is only hearsay. I was told that the practice had obtained to some extent, and
that inen from the south were carried to the north, and vice versa, but that is
a matter of hearsay only.
The Chairman. Do you know anything about the charge that the men work-
ing under the corve^, when they attempted to escape, were shot?
Air. Farnham. That is a matter of hearsay ; I do not know of my own knowl-
edge. At the times when I was in Haiti, when I was along that road I saw
none of that. I would say, however, in that connection that my observations of
the work were during tlie regime of Gen. Butler. The people in our employ in
Haiti have informed me that after he left the island to go to France in the war
a good deal happened under his successor that did not occur under his admin-
istration.
The Chairman. Who was his successor?
Mr. Farnham. A naval officer.
'Hie Chairman. Williams?
Mr. Farnham. William, yes; I do not know what his rank was. I think he
was a marine officer; I am not sure. I could not tell you about him. As I
recall, his name was Williams.
The Chairman. It has been reported that under Alexander Williams there
were abuses in the administration of the corve€ which did not obtain under
Butler.
Mr. Farnham. That was the report that came to me from our employees in
the office.
The Chairman. Were they specific abuses?
Mr. Farnham. No; the shifting of men from one part of tlie island to an-
other, the abuse of some of the men by the minor officers in immediate charge
of tOiem, and I have heard that some of them, trying to get away, were shot;
but. as I say, that is not a matter of my personal, direct knowledge.
The Chairman. In your judgment, were the roads, and especially the prin-
cipal highway, of commercial as well as military value?
Mr. Farnham. That they built?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Farnham. Yes, Indeed; they facilitated very greatly the. travel between
the north and the south, which theretofore was confined to the few people who
could make it on horseback and by the rather infrequent passage of steamers
around the coast.
The Chairman. Do the peasants avail themselves of these roads in great
numbers?
Mr. Farnham. I have always found it so when I have been on the road-
market women traveling to market and coming back, and quite a number of
people on foot traveling from one point to another in the interior of the country.
One road in particular I think has been of very great advantage to the people
in the Interior; that is the road from Port au Prince across the plains of Cul-
de-Sac, over the mountains to a place called ^^lirebalais, which was almost in
accessible before that road was built. People had to come down the Artllwniti*
River to St. Marc, and then down the coast to Port au Prince, rather than niak.'
that Journey across there. ^ .
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 119
The CuAiBMAN. The road, of course, was built out of Haitian funds?
Mr. Fasnham. That is my understanding ; such expenses as were incurred.
The Chaibman. What were the circumstances under which Secretary Br>'an
suggBBted that Americans acquire the French shares in the banl:; did that
suggestion come directly to the National City Bank?
Mr. Fabnham. Yes; because — well, it came, in the first instance, to Mr.
Werhane, who at that time was vice president of the bank, and myself, in a
conference which we had one day with Secretary Bryan, in which he expressed
the view that it would be rather advantageous to the country if the banking
interests of the island were American rather than French, and asked why we
did not undertake to acquire control of the bank. There was some discussion
of the suggestion, and from time to time thereafter the matter was brought
up in conferences which we had with the Secretary on Haitian matters in
general. The idea seemed to be to eliminate, so far as possible, European
influ^ices in the island.
The Ohaibman. ' As I remember It, you testified that $1,400,000 was paid
for the assets of the bank remaining in the hands of foreign owners?
Mr. Fabnham. No, sir; if you will pardon me; we paid $1,400,000 for all
the assets of the bank, that purchase price to be distributed to the shareholders.
The Chaibman. What were those assets?
Mr. Fabnham. The asests were all the property of the bank, including the
real estate. The bank owned its building in Port au Prince, and at two or
tbree other places in the island.
The Chaibman. That included the Government note?
Mr. Fabnham. It included the value of the Qovemment contract.
The Chaibman. No ; I meant the sum* due the bank from the Government of
Haiti, which is now maturing in December?
Mr. Fabnham. No; the $1,400,000 Included all assets, including the money
in bank, receivables, the property of the bank, loans outstanding, which were
considered good, reserves in Paris, and the reserve in New York. The bank has
very few deposits.
The Chaibman. Did they at that time include the sum due the bank from the
Government of Haiti?
Mr. Fabnham. Yes. I think, perhaps, I may have answered wrongly to your
question before. I had it in mind during the recess when Senator Pomerene
spoke of it. The amount due the Government was included in the assets.
The Chaibman. I am Just trying to make clear to thyself the probable value
of the assets for which you paid that sum.
Mr. Fabnham. Well, I think I ansvveretl that this morning, $1,500,000. We
paid practically what the bank was worth. Senator.
The Chaibman. Well, the bank was worth $1,500,000, and the note of the
Government of Haiti amounted to $1,000,000?
Mr. Fabnham. To-day its assets are worth $1,500,000.
The Chaibman. You do not include among the assets that note, then, which
amounts to $1,500,000?
Mr. Fabnham. Yes; including that, and then deducting the liabilities of the
bank, we will get a net worth of $1,500,000. We had to assume practically all
the liabilities of the bank in purchasing it. You see, the bank is owing now,
and has to pay — ^In fact, is paying out, $2,000,000, which it holds for the ac-
count of the Germans in Haiti. We had also to pay the cost of creating the
new currency of the bank, as provided under the contract.
Tbe Chaibman, When was the interest payment on the foreign debt sus-
pended, in 1914 or 1915?
Mr. Fabnham. In 1914, on the interest. They defaulted on the payment of
the amortization, I think, about 1911.
The Chaibman. On the amortization?
Mr. Fabnham. Yes, sir; the sinking-fund charges on one of the issues.
You see, there are three loans outstanding, the last one being a loan of 1910.
Tbe Chaibman. Did they begin to default on the interest before the occu-
pation?
Mr. Fabnham. They were actually in default. - The bank loaned them the
money to complete that payment in 1914.
The Chairman. They were in arrears?
Mr. Fabnham. They were in arrears. They had not the money themselves.
The Chaibman. Has any of the interest on the debt been paid since the
occupation?
62209— 21— PT 2 2
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120 INQtJIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Fabnham. Yes, sir ; under Mr. Mcllhenny, who has applied some of the
Income to the payment of the interest I think, if I recall right, it was brought
up to the Ist of January last. I know we transferred and converted into
francs $3,000,000 United States money, which was sent to Paris and applied to
the payment of the interest and arrears, and I think some other sums also
were transferred for that purjwse.
The Chairman. What about the payment of the interest on the internal
debt?
Mr. Fabnham. I do not believe that has been taken care of.
The Chairman. When was the default on that begun?
Mr. Farnham. I am inclined to think that on some of that internal debt,
on some of those bonds the default took place in 1913 on the first issue, and
subsequently on the other Issues.
The Chairman. The Government had ceased payment of the internal debt
before the occupation, then ? '
Mr. Farnham. That is my recollection, sir.
The Chairman. Do you care to say anything of the capacity and qualifica-
tions of the Americans in Haiti, whether in the diplomatic service or the
office of the financial adviser or the collector?
Mr. Farnham. I do not think it is my province to make any criticisms.
Those officers whom I met in Haiti in those capacities were all strangers to
me. I knew none of them until I met them in the positions they held. My
feeling, speaking of them as a group, is that they did the best they could, in
view of the conditions with which they were confronted under the treaty, in
the absence of any definite policy to be pursued. They always seemed to me
to be drifting and waiting for some plan to be presented to them, along which
they should proceed. Their hands practically were tied because of the neces-
sity of obtaining the approval or consent of the Haitian administration to
everything they proposed to be done.
The Chairman. In connection with the recalcitrancy of the Haitian Govern-
ment, is there anything you can tell the committee about the dissolution of
the Haitian Senate?
Mr. Farnham. I could not. I was not there when it occurred, and all I
know is hearsay statements by people who were there. I think the situation
was told fully in the newspapers at the time.
The Chairman. As you remember those newspaper accounts, were they sub-
stantially accurate?
Mr. Farnham. Well, generally speaking, I think they were correct There
were some extravagances in them.
The Chairman. If I understood you correctly this afternoon, In your Judge-
ment there has been no policy established here in Washington?
Mr. Farnham. So far as I ever heard of.
The Chairman. And nothing has been done for the economic rehabilitation
of the country?
Mr. Farnham. Not that I know of.
The Chairman. Or the establishment of schools generally?
Mr. Farnham. No, sir.
The Chairman. Nor for the development of agriculture?
Mr. Farnham. Not that I know of. I would say that Gen. Cole — I think It
Is General, or Col. Cole — who was first in command, and subsequently CoL
Rus.sell, now in command of the marines, «nd Mr. Mcllhenny all had projects
of that sort. My understanding is that they sent them to Washington as sug-
gestions for which they would like to have had approval so that they could
proceed to carry such ideas out, but, to the best of my knowledge, no approval
was forthcoming, and certainly nothing has ever been done there.
The Chairman. The Government has done nothing to develop the capacity
of the Haltien people for self-government, locally or generally?
Mr. Farnham. Not so far as I know.
The Chairman. I wonder if you would not be willing to send to the com-
mittee from New York any suggestions which you might care to make for a
constructive economic and political policy in Haiti?
Mr. Farnham. Well, I would be glad to do so.
The Chairman. I would like you to think over that.
We were talking this morning of the railroad, which is now in the hands of
a receiver, is it not?
Mr. Farnham. Yes.
The Chairman. And you are the receiver of the railroad?
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* INQXTIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 121
Mr. Pabnham. Yes, sir.
The (^HAiBMAN. Are yon the president of the railroad, too, Mr. Famhain?
Mr. Faknhak. I was president of the railroad company; yes, sir. I took
that in order to look after the interests of the bank in respect of the loan made
to the coiistniction company.
The Ghaibman. Were you originally the president of the railroad ?
Mr. Fabitbam. No, sir.
The Chairman. It was only when the financial situation became hazardous?
Mr. Fabnhaic. I think at the commencement of 1913, if I recall rightly, I
was made president of the railroad.
The Chairman. Was it in tinancial difficulties tlien. as far l>ack aa. then?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir ; It had been exi)eriencinp a pood deal of trouble in the
oonstniction. The Haitian Government had refused to deliver the definitive
holds on such portion of the work as had been completed. The money pro-
viaed by the bunds had been exnausteri, and the syndicate had l>een called
upon to furnish money through the underwriting which had been uiMlertaken.
My i)osition in resi>ect of the railroad is one of a representative character, in
80 far as l)eing president and dirt»ctor is concerne<l. I have no personal interest
in it. I have no perscmal investment in Haiti of any kind, in anything, and never
have had.
The Chairman. Is the contract l>etween the Haitieu Government and original
concessionaire available?
Mr. Farnham. Well, you mean the present railroad? The original railroad
was commenced, I think, away back in 1905, and
The Chairman. You were sjieaking of the bonds which the
Mr. P.\rnham. Well, yes ; that contract I have in New York.
The Chairman. Could you send us a copy of that?
Mr. B'arnham. Yes, sir.
The Ch.\irman. What was the security, which the bank had for this advance
to the construction (»ompany?
Mr. Farnham. The definitive bonds of the railroad coinijany, bearing the
guaranty of the Kepublic of Haiti to pay the interest and sinking-fund charges
whenever this railroad was unable to earn the same.
The Chairman. How much in bonds was the Haitian Government obliged to
put up as security for that credit?
Mr. Farnham, The construction company deposited bonds of the value of
^878,000, I think. I can give you the exact figure later, Senator.
The Chairman. For a loan of half a million?
Mr. Farnham. Y'es, sir.
The Chairman. And Is lialf a million the sum they advanced?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Is the Government in default now on those bonds, or on the
interest on those bonds?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir. They paid two couiions, and after that they were
in default
The Chairman. In this connection, who is Mr. Lind?
Mr. Farnham. He was a telegrai)h lineman employed by the construction
company at the time they were erecting the teleplione and telegraph line of
the railroad company. Subsequently, he did general work for the constructi(m
company, and at the time the construction work and operation of the railroad
was 8nspende<l he was. maintained there, after the forces were dismissed, as a
sort of watchman, with headquarters at St. Marc. He was for the time being
in charge of the property of the construction company. He was there at the
time the American occupation occurre<l and had general charge of the prop-
erty at the time the resumption of the railroad service took place. He con-
tinued, I do not know how long, Senator, a few months, and then it was advis-
able to make a change, and he went out of the employ of the company.
The Chairman. At the time he left the employ of the company what work was
he engaged in doing for the company?
Mr. Farnham. He was engaged, in general, in looking after the operation of
the trains. He was not a railroad man at all, but we could not get anyone to go
there at that time to do that work.
The Chairman. What was he a sort of c»pernting suix^rlntendent?
Mr. Farnham. Yes: without that title. It seemed advisable to make a change
in his position at the time it was done.
The Chairman. I do not want to press for the reasons for his dism'ssal.
Mr. Farnham. Well, I think the high olRc'als of the American occupation felt
that a change in the management would be desirable, I think there was a lack
122 INQITTRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
of cooperat!on. Mr. Llnd nnd the resident mannjrer In Cape Halt'en. the north-
ern pet't'on, Mr. Woolard, both r<K»eived very expliflt instnict'ons when the
American oecupaton c'cunnienced to cooperate In every way and to afford all
facilities for the officers and the troops, and to put themselves practlctdly at
the dfpposal of the officials of the occupafon. and to not ha^^le over any point
at all hut to do what was wanted, and If there was a difference of opinion it
would he dealt with Inter on. Mr. Woolard was able to observe those ^nstnic-
tions very fully, hut Mr. I-ind did not seem to be able to comprehend them.
It was a matter of temperament, I think, more than anything else.
The Chairman. I want before we adjoiini to touch aga^n upon the dniun-
stanees of the landing of the marines. You 'ndicnted this morning that the
landing of Aufercan naval forc»es had been pre<ip''tate<l by the landlnjs of
French forces first, prior to the landing of our forces?
Mr. Fabnham. Yes; the French had landed at Cape Haitien. A revolntion
was on In the north.
The Chairman. What oc<»aslon had they to land? Were they French nation-
als or French interests?
Mr. Farnham. There have always been, snce I have known the countr>' j>ny-
way, more French i*eople and more French capital engaged In commercial pur-
suits in Haitt at and around Cape Haitien than in any other part of the island.
There are probably, too, fewer Germans there than at other points 'n the
island, and it was, T think, largely on account of that pre<lom'nance of French
interests and because the revoluti<m at that moment was prevallng in that
vicinity. Cape Haitien, that the French landed at that place. They landed a
force of men, and practically took iwssesslon of the whole stuation. with the
resalt that peace was restored, the revolutionists were driven out to the coun-
try, and things were going along in normal fashion in Cape Haitien.
The Chairman. Prior to the landing of any American force?
Mr. Farnham. Yes sir.
The Chairman. Did American forces land them at Cape Haitien, or only at
Fort au Prince later on?
Mr. Fabnham. No ; Admiral Caperton was sent to Cape Haitien, and he oat-
ranked the French capta'u or the French officer, whoever It might he, and the
French withdrew on board their ship, which, my understanding, did not }fo
away; they s'niply tcMik their men on board ship.*
Te Chairman. After the American forces had landed?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did the French land at Port au Prince later?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir. My understanding of that is that they landed there
before the Americans. I was not present at that time in Haiti, so I am giving
you the reports made to me by our railroad and bank people who were there.
The Chairman. Since we have discussed the landing at that time, can you
throw any light upon the landing of the marines from the Machias at Port au
Prince on December 17, 1914 — that would be prior to the occupation — an^ their
removal of a sum of money from the bank vaults in Port au Prince to New
York?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir. We had in the vaults of the bank at that time a con-
siderable amount of gold. There had been repeated demands upon the part of
the Haitian Government for further loans from the bank, which demands had
been refused, and there were threats by the various officials of the Haitian
Government that they would raid the bank and take that money. Those rumors
or threats had reached Mr. Bryan — ^how I do not know — who was then Secre-
tary of State, and he requested some of us to come to Washington and discuss
the matter with him. Mr. Werhane, the then vice president of the Haiti Bank,
and myself came here, and after a long discussion of the whole situation it was
arranged that at least half a million dollars should be brought to New York.
The Chairman. Out of how much?
Mr. Farnham, I think we had then about a million dollars there. We had to
retain some in the island. We had thought some of transferring it to Jamaica
ourselves, but there was no way of getting it over there at that time.
The Chairman. Was that the gold reserve of the gourde circulation?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir ; it was a part of that.
The Chairman. Now, under the terms of the contract with the bank, was that
gold reserve the property of the bank or of the Government?
Mr. Farnham. It was held by the bank in trust for that particular purpose.
The money had been derived from the sale of the bonds Issued by the Haitian
Government In the loan of 1910, to the specific amount of $2,000,000, or 10,000.000
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 128
francttf which was set aside under tlie contract for tlie purpose of retiring, the
old pa|)er money under a law of retirement to l>e enacted by the Haitian Con-
gress. Such a law was not enacted promptly. In fact, I think it was about
1913 when it was passed, and the bank was instructed to commence the retire-
inent of tlie old pafier gourdes, and for that purpose, If I recall rightly, of tiie
92,000,000 we sent $1,000,000 in gold to Haiti.
The Chairman. The bonds had been sold in New York?
Mr. Farxham. No; In France. No issue had ever been brought out in New
York, but all in France. The retirement had proceeded for <mly a very small
amount when a new government came in power, and they stopped the retreat,
as it was called.
The Chairman. The retreat of the money?
Mr. Farnham. Yes; and the subsequent Government ordered it commenced
again, and then countermanded its order, and it was in those times when tbe
demands were made upon the bank for further loans, and we refused those after
a consultation with the State Department here.
Tbe reason the money was brought from Haiti to New York in a warship was
because it was impossible to obtain insurance upon it in the small ships of tbm
Dutch Line which were then operating. It was after presenting that situatlOB
to tlie Secretary of State that it was arranged that the Machias, I think it was,
sboald bring the money to New York. It was brought up and placed on deposit
in New York and held there for the account of the retreat, in which it subse-
quently was employed. The Haitian officials did carry out their threat finally
to raid the bank. The then minister of state, I think it was, the minister of
foreign affairs, led a detachment of troops one day to the bank and they broke
in. The man in charge managed to close the door of the large vault, but the
soldiers obtained $62,000 in gold from the cash drawers and went away wttih
that
Tbe Chairman. What was the attitude of the resident director of the bank,
whose name was Desrue?
Mr. Farnham. Well, Mr. Desrue had been employed in the bank for quits
awhile. What do you mean by his attitude?
The Chairman. Weil, I see in a report by M. Louis Bomo that he attributes
to Mr. Desrue the information that the removal of the Treasury to New York
was unnecessary.
Mr. Farnham. Well, Mr. Desrue, I do not imagine, knew anything about it
until he received instructions to deliver the money to the officers of the ship.
llie Chairman. What was his function in the bank there?
Mr. Farnham. He was at that time acting manager of the bank. He was in
charge of the affairs of the bank at that time.
The Chairman. Did he remain there in charge for long afterwards?
Mr. Farnham. No ; he was succeeded by a new manager whom we obtained, a
Mr. Scarpa. Mr. Desrue is now acting assistant manager of the bank. He is
9tiU in the employ of the bank.
The Chairman. Subsequently, the bank, acting through Monsieur Casenave
and yoursrtf, under date of the 10th of July, 1916, made what agreement rela-
tive to the reserve?
Mr. Farnham. That was an agreement which was arrived at after about a
year's discussion here, participated In by the officials of the Haitian Govern-
ment, who were sent here for that purpose, in an endeavor to reach a new and
final agreement covering the retreat of the old money, the issue of new bills for
the bank, and an adjustment as to the amount which had been so far retired.
and how much of the money had been used for that purpose. There were some
other considerations also.
The Chairman. You made that agreement?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir; that was entered into.
The Chairman. Has it been carried out?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Has the money been retired and the new issue made?
Mr. Farnham. Practically all of it; yes, sir. There is a relatively small
aoMinit of the old money remaining outstanding.
The Chairman. You agreed at the same time to return the sum carried to
New York?
Mr. Farnham. It has been done, together with all the accrued interest
thereon dmring the time it was up here, a part of the time 2^ per cent, a part
of the time 3 per cent.
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124 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Ohaibman. Now, I think before we conclude we ought to try to cl«ur
up the charges which are made in Haiti relative to a monopoly of the impcat
and export of gold, and perhaps foreign exchange. Can you throw some light
on that, Mr. Farnham?
Mr. Fabnham. Well, I iiersonally did not talce part in those n^otiatioos
concerning the matter you refer to. That was attended to by Mr. Allen, at
that time one of the vice presidents of the City Bank, and who for three years
had been manager of the bank in Haiti. I think there has always prevailed
a misunderstandiug about that. The paragraph wliich the Haitian (Government
objected to in the monetary reform agreement, as it was called, was not
intended to give the bank any monopoly of the sort described. The bank never
has had that monopoly, except in so far as you would find it in the fact that
it was the only bank in Haiti until the advent of the American- Foreign Banking
Corporation, and subsequently tlie Royal Bank of Canada. Nothing had
operated during the life of the bank to prevent the Glerman merciiants from
bringing in gold if they wanted to or ^shipping gold out, and they did. You
could have brought gold into the country, or I could or anybody. Some dealt
with the bank and others bnmght in and shipped out their own currency.
, In this connection — and, if you please, I am giving my own understanding,
because at tlje time I did not participate in tlie matter^ — ^Mr. McElhenny and
some of the other officials who were then representing this Government In
Haiti felt that It would be advisable to have some sort of a control of the
amount — not control, but a means of knowing. If you please, the movement of
any considerable amount of gold in or out, and in that connection Mr. Allen
prepared a paragraph, which was inserted in the agreement and which we
subsequently modified. In its changed form it ^as referred to the State
Department, and I know quite a number of those merchants and others who
had misunderstood the original paragraph and opposed it in its then form
did give their approval to the amended form. Under the modified form any
other banks could have brought in gold, and they could have shipped it out The
Haiti Bank would have purchased bills on responsible banks in New York
at the prevailing rate of exchange plus the ordinary commission of the bank,
which was what it had always done, or what the Royal Bank of Canada would
do, or what the American-Foreign Banking Corporation would do.
The Chairman. Mr. Farnham, Mr. Allen Is now in New York?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir. He resigned from the National City Bank last
November, I think, to become the president of the American-Foreign BanWng
Corporation, where he now is.
The Chairman. What are his initials?
Mr. Farnham. John H.
The Chairman. Is there anything else you have to say to the committee?
Mr. Farnham. I think not.
I would, however, like to answer one question you asked me concerning the
future of Haiti. I believe that Haiti can be made exceedingly productive to
certain lines — sugar, coffee, cotton, and tobacco. I think that the Haitian can
be taught to become a good and efllcient laborer. If let alone by the military
chiefs, he is as peaceful as a child, and as harmless. In fact, to-day they
are nothing but grown-up children, Ignorant of all agricultural methods, and
they know nothing of machinery. They must be taught. I think that if a policy
could be put Into eifect in Haiti, which would give the people, the younger people
particularly, the children, opportunities for education; establish for some
years a direct and complete control over the finances of the country, handled
under a budget, I think it would be but a few years before Haiti would be
able to take care of all her obligations out of her revenues, and have a su^
plus left, and I think it would become, considering its relative size, as pros-
perous a country as Cuba has proven to be.
The Chairman. At various times in the past you made suggestions to the
State Department for the development of a policy. Were those specific? Were
they formal, written suggestions, or only in the course
Mr. Farnham. No; they were made, on two or three occasions, at the
request of the President, through Mr, Bryan. They went to Mr. Bryan at
his own request.
The Chairman. In writing?
Mr. Farnham. Yes, sir. I do not know whether they are In the department,
or whether they were passed on to President Wilson, but on two occasions I
was requested to prepare a paper of that sort
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IKQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 125
Senator Oddie. What are the sanitary conditions in Haiti?
Mr. Pabnham. Now, in Port au Prince and in the principal towns they are
fair. The buildings and houses lack sanitary appliances, as we understand
them, almost completely, but the streets in Port au Prince, the principal
streets, have been paved.
The Chairman. Is that true of St Marc and Cape Haitien, too?
Mr. Fabnham, Yes, sir ; the streets of Port au Prince have been paved, some
ol them, and some of the principal streets of St. Marc and Cape Haitien and Auix
Oayas have been macadamized, and all are swept and kept quite clean under
the supervision of the military.
Senator Odwe. Have the conditions along that line been improved since
the American occupation?
Mr. Fabnham. There was not any such thing before. The only thing which
existed before anywhere was in Port au Prince, where about a year, I think,
before the American occupation some contractors had undertaken the pave-
ment of some of the streets in Port au Prince. Thdt work was suspended at
the time of the American occupation and resumed some months later under the
sopervi^on of Army or Navy engineers, and a considerable amount of work
has been done there. The noticeable change, however, is in the small towns,
which were very filthy, and with nothing at all approaching sanitation. Now,
the atmosphere is different and the streets are clean.
Senator Oddie. What has been done since the American occupation in re-
gard to the public health?
Mr. Fabnham. Beyond the measures I have just described, I know 6f nothing
particularly. I do not know just what could be done. The people live all over
the country. They live in little shacks which are pretty dirty. The people
themselves, the Haitian country people, are very clean. They spend a con-
siderable portion of their time in the rivers and streams washing themselves
as well as their clothes.
Senator Oddie. I mean in regard to combating disease.
Mr. Fabnham. I think very little. Until this smallpox outbreak of a year
apo, it has been quite some years since there has been any epidemic in the
island. Last time it was yellow fever. I think that was 12 or 14 years ago.
The United States marines have charge of the sanitation there, and they employ
Haitians in cleaning up the streets and keeping them clean.
(The witness was thereupon excused.)
(Mr. Angell thereupon presented the following list of witnesses, whom he
suggested to the committee should be called during the course of its hearings : )
Admiral W. B. Caperton United States -Navy.
Hon. Josephus Daniels, Raleigh, N. C.
Hon. Robert Lansing. Washington, D. C.
H. R. Pilkington, P. W. Chapman & Co., third floor, 115 Broadway, New York
City.
E. J. Lind, 3604 Broadway, apartment 4, New York City, telephone Audubon
3574.
H. R Tlppenhauer, 723 Seventh Avenue, New York City.
Max Zuckerraan, 110 Crawford Street, care of E. Levy, Roxbury, Mass.
C. A. Burrows, 253 Belgrade Avenue, Roslindale, Mass.
James W. Johnson, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York City.
Herbert J. Seligman, care of James W. Johnson, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York
(Sty.
Rev. L. Ton Evans, First Baptist Church, Port Matilda, Pa.
Gen. George Bamett, United States Marine Corps, headquarters Department
of the Pacific, San Francisco, Calif.
(Jen. Smedley Butler, United States Marine Corps, Quantico, Va.
Rear Admiral Knapp, United States Navy. <
Col. Littleton W. Waller, United States Marine Corps.
Roger L. Famham, vice president National City Bank, New York City.
John A. Mcllhenny, financial adviser Haitian Government, care of State
Department, Washington. D. C.
Balnbridge Colby, 1315 F Street, American National Bank Building, Washing-
ton, D. C. ; 32 Nassau Street. New York City.
John H. Allen, president American-Foreign Banking Corporation, New Yorh
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until 10,30 o'clock a. m. Wednesday
October 5, 192L)
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INQUIRY IiNTO OrrUPATION AiND AMLNISTRATION OF HAITI
A^D SANTO DOMINGO-
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committef: on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D, C.
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m. pursuant to adjournment, Senator
Medill McCormick (chairman) presiding.
Present : Senators McCormick, Oddie, King, and Pomerene.
Also present: Mr. Ernest Angell, representing the Haiti-Santo Domingo In-
dependence Society, etc.
Mr. Angell. I request the privilege of the committee of being allowed to put
questions directly to witnesses called before the committee. In making this
request, I do so because I feel that it is probable that as to many of the wit-
nesses it is only in this manner tliat the essential facts can be brought out,
because I have made a detailed study of the situation, and in many cases have
had long and detailed Inteniews with the witnesses; know what they will
have to say before the committee, and, without any reflection whatever upon the
«*onmiittee, in many of these instances the members of the committee have not
had the opportunity to talk with the witnesses beforehand, and can have only
the most general idea as to what the witnesses will testify, so I therefoi^e
request that privilege.
Senator Pomerene. In whose behalf do you appear?
Mr. Angell. I appear on behalf of the Haiti-Santo £>omingo Ind^>endence
Society, the Union Patriotique d*Haiti, and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. I appeared at the first hearing, and have
been at all the hearings, in fact, and submitted on behalf of these organizations
the Haitian Memoir, and an outline statement of the joint position assumed by
these several groups.
The Chaibman. I suggest that the committee consider Capt. Angeirs request
at a later time and make its decision.
Senator Pomkbene. Yes.
(The following papers are copies of memorandum, sworn aflldavits, and
letters to President Harding, ex-President Woodrow Wilson, ex-President Theo-
dore Roosevelt, Senator Hitchcock (then chainnan of Foreign Relations Com-
mittee), and letters subsequently written the Hon. Josephus Daniels, Secretary
of the United States Navy, by Hon. T. Ch. Moravia, consul general of the Re-
imblic of Haiti at Washington, D. C, with replies of Second Assistant Secretary
A. A. Adee, of State Department, in behalf of then President Wilson, from
Secretary Daniels, etc., showing the strenuous and persistent efforts made
through ofiicial channels of Government of late administration for over two
years so as to right the wrongs of same in the black Republic of Haiti, ajid
earnest appeals made for interviews and the appointment of a commission to
carefully investigate the conduct of American forces in Haiti and by the
Republic's first official spokesman the Rev. L. Ton Evans until at last brought
Haitrs sad and scandalous conditions, with the approval of the late Theodore
Rooeevrtt, to President Harding and the national Republican council at Wash-
ington, D. C, with the result of present Senate committee (commission) ap-
potDted by President to investigate the occupation and administrations of the
territories of the Republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo by the forces of the
United States.)
127
Digitized by VjOOQIC
128 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Chestnut Avenue, Kingston. Pa., October i, 1918.
Hon. WooDBow Wii^ON,
President of United States.
Dear President: May I re«<pectfully request a brief Interview re Haiti
affairs, that I hope will lead to th» appointment of a eommission to thoroughly
investigate conditions there?
The present situation is very bad, and I have faithfully pledged to the
leaders of this little nation, irrespective of creed or politics, that I will not
merely see you but assured them the ^loment matters are placetl before our
Pres'dent a commission will be granted to go carefully into these serious aod
grave Haitian affairs.
I have Just forwarded a memorandum addressed to you, sir, to the care of
my friend Dr. T. Jesse Jones, of the Government Bureau of Education, and
containing brief sketch of self, with relation to Haiti grievances complained of,
with recommendations.
The names of Dr. Moton, Dr Dillard, Dr. Brink, Hon. Geo. Foster Peabody,
Father Curran, Dr. Jesse Jones, and Admiral Caperton, or men of such high
type are suggested as members of this commission, not merely to make a care-
ful and thorough investigation of present wrong but from the evidence produced
at the inquiry, so as to formulate a simple and satis^factory plan for the
future development of this Negro republic along the lines of treaty, and \n
light of " war ideals."
Having come directly to the States, and mainly for this purpose, I shall
profoundly appreciate such an interview at this time, and, if agreeable, briug
Dr. Jesse Jones, and Dr. Brown (president of my own missionary board) with
me whenever convenient for you to see us next wet»k or at least before my
return to Haiti this mouth.
I am most anxious for the sake of our President and our Government that
everything shall be satisfactorily adjusted and real constructive work of de-
veloping Haiti shall as so(m as possible be proceeded with on treaty lines.
as understood and explained by our President.
I have purposely, refrained from making any public references to these
serious and sad conditions In the Black Republic In preaching or public ad-
dresses, and thus far have kept from Negro convention, and for same shall not
attend forthcondng race congress (though invited) at Washington this month;
for the Iteration of the cruel and brutal scenes, as I have personally wit-
nessed them, will Immediately " fire " not only an audience of Negroes but white
Baptists of both North and South and Protestants of America generally, which
at this critical period we are anxious to avoid, sincerely believing (as I have
repeatedly assured the leaders and Haitians) will be immediately and effec-
tively remedied the moment matters are brought to your personal attention and
grounds furnished to justify such action on your part.
As I am leaving for Baptist conventions In North Carolina, where wife and
self shall speak on conditions of Negro womanhood In Haiti, and where we
expect to meet Dr. Brown, a reply addressed to him there will reach me Satur-
day or Monday. Praying God to spare your valuable life, etc., and for Christ
and Haiti.
Note. — ^As requested, Mr. Tumulty replied in behalf of President, that my
letter was handed over to Mr. Lansing to be dealt with, directing me to direct
all further communications re Haiti to Secretary of State. All further efforts
both with Lansing and Tumulty in behalf of poor Haiti proved of no avail. —
L. T. E.
National Tbaining School, Lincoln Heights,
}yaHhin{/ton, I), r., October 18, 1918.
Hon. Gilbert M. Hitchcock,
Chairman of iS>enute Committee on Forciun Relatione.
Dear Sir: While appreciating the brief interview given me on Wednesday
re serious conditions in Haiti, and denmnding urgent attention of the Govern-
ment, I wish to state that the following morning Mr. Stabler, an Assistant Sec-
retary at the State office and In charge of Haiti affairs, and after my presistent
ain>eal (and even threat of bringing matters before Senate and Congress) at
last fixed Monday morning, 11 o'clock, to go carefully with me into these
matters.
As I understand that this very official it was who made complaint to my mis-
sionary board, absolutely niisunderstocMl my potiition, and therefore grossly m-s-
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 129
represented my attitude to tliese Negroes, demand ng of them my being recalled
from the black Republic ou account of my Christian activities (without defining
those activities) has now granted me the opportunity sought (though posi-
tively refused me by the Negro committee of the Lott Carey Mission Board),
you will umlerstand I am sure under these circumstances the reasonableness of
your excusing my placing these facts before you, with evidence substantiating
same, for consideration of yourself and Senate Foreign Relations Committee
until after this interview (official) with above Secretary Stabler.
Should he. and the State Department fall to attend at. once to this urgent
matter, and call the special attention of the Piesident to same, then it will
be my duty as an American citizen, not to say a Christian m'ssitmary, to come
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, through you as chaiiMnan, with
a v.ew of having this special commssion immediately appointed, and see that
the recent treaty made by our own Government is scrupulously carried out, and
that in the light of our present *' war Ideals " proclaimed at this moment through-
out the whole civilized world.
Our civilized, humane, democratic United States Government, with a Chris-
tian President, and at a moment we ourselves are champion ng the sanctity of
treaties and liberties and rights of small nations in I^^urope and Asa must itself
lie absolutely freed from the very insinuation, not to say the oi)en charge now
made in Haiti and by Haitians all over the.r Republic, of actual insincerity and
a desire and attempt to repudiate our solenm treaty obligations at this time in
the black Republic.
I have myself personally and persistently maintained that all mistakes,
blunders, if not something worse (crimes and treachery on the part of officers
of marine both in Haiti, backed by some in Washington), which have caused the
strong reversion of feeling in Haiti's present attitude toward our President,
(lovernment, and everything American, and which are back of these insinua-
tions and charges are without the knowle<lge of President or resiwnsible United
States Government, and, furthermore, the moment these are directly and offi-
cially brought before them the whole business will receive Immediate atten-
tion and everything adjusted.
Thanking you for interview and interest, I have the honor to remain, sin-
cerely yours, and for Christ and Haiti.
(Prepared at reqaest of Sf^nator Hitchcock, chairman of Committee on Fore!^ Rela-
tlona, of the Govemment; and also Mr. Stabler, of the Latin-American section of
the State Department, to latter of whom It was submitted Monday morning. October
21, 1918, for presentation through Secretary Lansing to the President.]
Memorandum to the Hon. Woodrow Wilson. President of the United States,
RE Present Situation in Haiti, Showing Some of the Causes of Discon-
tent; WITH Recommendations and Request for a Commission to Carefully
Investigate the Matters Complained of and Pltrther Formulate a Simple
Plan for the Development of the Black Republic Along Treaty Lines,
IN the Light of War Ideals of Our Government, Particularly as Set
Forth by the President Himself at Washington's Tomb the 4th of Jltly
Last and Since.
preamble.
Though as an American citizen and a Christian missionary, naturally moved
with sympathy for Haiti and its over 2,000,000 Negroes at this time of suflfer-
ing and distress, and looking to the Ignited States for redress of their griev-
ances ; and while assuring y>ou of the genuine gratitude, shared by every loyal
and patriotic Haitian, both educated and uneducated alike, that Admiral Caper-
ton landefl his American marines at Port an Prince, thus rescuing their politi-
cally torn and revolutionary bleeding Republic from the iron grasp and selfish
greed of Germans, who for years had financially and murderously exploited
them by aid of Berlin money and ammunition; and expressing our deep appre-
ciation of the splendid work already done in Haiti by our "American occupa-
tion," and under exceptional (European) war conditions, the Lott Carey Mis-
sionary Foreign Baptist Board and myself, as its missionary and superintend-
ent in Haiti, are at the present moment, and Just when our Christian President
and civilized, humane, and democratic United States Government are cham-
pioning the "sanctity of treaties," liberties, and rights of small nations, still
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130 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
iu(»re anxious, if possible, ^Ye shall ourselves be perfectly free from every
suspicion, not to say insincerity, and charges of a desire to " repudiate ** even
our own treaty obligations either in Haiti or any other part of the world.
I have therefore respectfully but resolutely maintained that whatever mis-
takes, blunders, or, indeed, something worse, committed by officers, gendarmes
(native police), and other representatives we have in Haiti, causing the re-
version of feeling throughout the whole black Republic against our President,
our Government, and everything American, which is positively the case; such
mistakes, blunders, etc., have been actually committed without the knowledge,
therefore without the sanction or authority, of either our President or respon-
sible United States Government ; and, indeed, moreover, I added, that when such
are properly brought to the direct attention of our Government at Washington
a fair and thorough investigation will he at once made and matters adjusted,
for in the expressed language of the treaty Itself —
** The United States, as well as the Republic of Haiti, desire to conform and
strengthen the amity existing between them by the most cordial cooperation
in measures for the'r common advantages, to maintain tranquillity of the Re-
public to carry out plans for the economic development and prosperity of the
Republic and its people."
' As showing my own position, relation to, and interest in Haiti, the following
brief statement regarding myself may be necessary :
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH.
Horn and educated In Wales: graduated in 1887 from Haverfordwest Bap-
tist Seminary, specializing in theology, philosophy, and political economy, as
well as securing the London scholarship.
I w^as ordained the same year at the new and growing Barry Dock as a
missionary-pastor, and where I also soon b€»came the organizing secretary of
the Barry and District Gospel Temperance Council, embracing the religions-
social as well as temjierance activities ; in fact, of all the evangelical churches
and friendly societies of that s^tion.
This brought me into personal touch and active association with Christian
leaders and social reformers of Britain, many of whom, such as Hon. Donald
Maclean, chairman of committees in the British House of Commons; Hon. D.
Lloyd-George, prime minister and secretary of war of Great Britain (both of
whom I have been privileged to instruct in fights against booze) ; together with
the late Sir Sam T, Evans, president- judge of Britain's prize war court, I
count as personal friends.
The latter also defended me before Lord Mercy, of Titanic and Lnsitania
fame, in a libel case, which drew considerable attention at the time, and when
plaintifT pleaded guilty to prostituting his public position, misappropriating
public funds, and had to quit all civic and public offices and leave the town.
(Lord Mercy commended the valuable service rendered by the writer to the
community through exposing dishonesty in high public offices.)
In 1891 my Barry church allowed me to travel in the East, visiting Egypt,
Palestine, Asia Minor, Turkey, etc. ; and in 1892 I accepted the position of gen-
oral missionary of the Jamaica Missionary Board in Haiti, but in two years,
owing to serious illness of wife, returned to Wales and settled again at Barry
Dock.
Early in 1902 resigned to accept First Baptist Church, Edwardsville, Fa.,
when among other letters of commendation was one from Mr. Lloyd George.
Believing In a republican form of government, I took out citizen papers while
in Pennsylvania, but in 1908, after resigning this charge, and speaking through-
out the churches of Wales on Haiti and Its people, as well as here in the States,
I returned as field secretary to the Black Republic.
While in Jamaica in 1910, In behalf of Haiti, and after personally investigat-
ing the religious and social as well as economic conditions there and seeing
the abject state of East Indians (coolies), called contract laborers by white
planters (and corporations), but better known as "scabs" in this country; and
liow" Jamaica wjis being depleted of its own Negro sons of the soil, who (through
this species of slavery ) were forced in thousands to Cuba, Panama, and States
for work or starve In their island home, I took up the matter with the British
Government and through the parliamentary secretary of the Labor Party in
the House of Commons.
With the aid of the Anti-Slavery Society (London), and after circularizlo?
300 Welsh, Irish, Scotch, as well as English members of the British Parlia-
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IKQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 131
ment, inclmllng Prime Minister Asqulth, George, and others of the cabinet, as
well as the King, and setting forth some very startling facts, substantiateil by
official figures (colonial) and documentai-y evidence, the Government (in spite
of the so-called findings and recommendations of their recent royal commis-
sion to perpetuate the unjust, immoral, and cruel system in the West Indies)
by an "act in council" very soon compelled the governors of Jamaica and
Trinidad, etc., to pass at once legislation curbing those (British and American)
white planters and fruit growers who Insisted on having cheap coolie labor.
The Labor Party further got the GcAernraent to prohibit the exploitation of
their East Indian British subjects as serfs and slaves. (Sir Lewis Harcourt,
Britain's Secretary for their Colonies, wrote thanking me in Haiti for furnish-
ing his Government with these facts.)
In 1911 I not only represented Haiti at and took public part in the World's
Baptist Alliance in Philadelphia but was privileged that same year to bring a
petition to the States from Haiti signed by late President Lecont^, Hon. J. E.
Leger (for years representing Haiti in Washington and at Berlin), with nearly
3,000 leading Haitians, such as senators and ex-senators, deputies and ex-depu-
ties, judges of all the courts, inspectors, generals, Haitian employers of labor,
etc., earnestly praying Messrs. Rockefeller, Carnegie, and others of our Ameri-
can philanthropists to establish in Haiti a "national industrial college" on
'Chrl.«itlan bnsls, such for Instance as Hampton and Tuskegee.
This was deposited for some time here in Washington at the Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace (through victory) Bureau, under the care of
I>rs. Scott and North.
President Simon and his Government at the time, who heartily 'supported
this "noble project" as they called it, promised 300 acres of land for this
purpose: also practically all the civic councils in the Republic passed resolu-
tions and officially wrote thanking me for my deep interest in Haiti and their
people and ♦expressing sincere hope that my mission to the States in their
behalf would be crowned with success. (Dr. Furniss, our United States min-
ister at Port an Prince, and our American Consul Livingston at the Cape, en-
thusiastically indorsed the petition and gave highest commendations. )
While pleading with our Negroes of the South during 1912 to come to the aid
of their own race in the black Republic, the present Lott Carey Foreign Baptist
Board heartily responded, and to their credit it decided to undertake the evan-
seiization of this field, and for this purpose sent their president. Dr. C. S.
Brown, and Dr. A. M. Moore to visit the Republic. The white Baptists of the
States contemplate to cooperate with our board after the war.
In November of last year Mrs. Evans and myself again left the States to
labor as superintendents, etc., under our I-K)tt Carey Board in Haiti.
SPECIAI, GRIEVANCES.
Having appealed repeatedly to our Government for aid and protection to Haiti
and its people, and as representative of Haiti*s Presidents more than once during
the Roosevelt, Taft and the present administration, I therefore not only rejoiced
we had at last come to the rescue of these quiet, kind-hearted, and helpless people
from Teutonic tyranny, but I was deternrined to assist our "American occupa-
tion" as far as possible (and proper for missionaries) in our work.
Tliough however delighted at the generous terms of the •* treaty " which
from the commencement I understood in the light of the official declarations
of our President. I have during the last seven or eight months in Haiti been
disappointed and saddened by what I have been an eyewitness of, apart alto-
mher from the evidence of others, as to the deliberate and ruthless violations
of the ** treaty," both in spirit and letter, to wit :
1. The forcing of a new constitution upon the people, under military pressure
of armed gendarmes (native police) of the American occupation, on the 12th
day of June last, and so as to change the land clause in favor of the white and
foreigner, and accomplishing this by methods which would be declared in the
States and all civilized countries as both illegal and fraudulent
The hitelllgent Haitians connected with the Government, or American occu-
pation, who in fear and trembling were compelled to vote, be dismissed, or Im-
prisoned if they refused, very aptly described these humiliating proceedings as
" thrusting a dagger into the very heart of their ow^n Negro Republic."
2. The closing on two separate occasions of Senate and Chamber of Deputies
at Port au Prince and turning out by military force (gendarmes) under the
occupation of the Haiti people's only representative bodies; then locking the
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132 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senate and Chamber doors against them, exactly as the late Czar did with the
Russian people's Duma; and while friendly to our United States GovemnJent
and favorable to our American occupation merely, it is said, because tliey pro-
tested against and opposed (as Illegal and unconstitutional) to change what
tliey felt to be the vital clause in their constitution, namely, the withholding of
land from the white foreigner and American speculator.
Haitian judges who declared this to be Illegal are said were either driven
out of office or imprisoned, or both, aqd In spite that under the old Haitian
constitution foreigners (white and colored) could hold real estate in Haiti on
same terms as in District of Columbia — that Is, by becoming Haitian citizens.
See " Haiti, Her History and Her Detractors," by the late Hon. J. N. Leger,
Haitian minister for yeaM in Washington.
3. The taking through force and much brutality, leading frequently to mur-
ders by Ignorant, Immoral, and drunken " armed gendarmes " in the employment
of our " occupation " of innocent men and women ; even members and native
preachers from their simple homes, small habitations, at their work, and going
to their business, as well as on the way to divine worship — cruelly roping thera
tightly together and marching same as African slave gangs to prison, etc.
The writer and others were eyewitnesses of this Sunday morning of last
June, and present at the occupation doctor's treatment of the wounds caused
through such brutal handling, unhealed for many weeks and months, after
which the white American doctor said was very frequently the case.
It is only fair to state, however, that owing to the terrible amount of liquor
and taffla drinking among white and native officers and gendarmes of the
" occupation,*' Col. Russell (to whose attention I had called a few specific
cases) has lately and as a protective measure issued a proclamation prohibiting
under heavy penalty the sale of such to their men In uniform. This prohibition
should now be made to extend to the whole Republic, and applied to both white
and black.
4. The arresting of natives in large numbers (again by force) at their homes,
on their small farms, and making them work on new roads miles away under
" armed gendarmes," and for merely a gourde (20 American cents) a week, and
w^ithout food, as affirmed by the natives and corroborated by the gendarmes.
The reason given is twofold — the failure of our United States Government to
make the necessary " loans " to enable the " occupation " to pay a proper wage,
and an illegal construction placed by American representatives on an old law
(or custom) called corvee; requiring natives (fanners) to give so many days a
year to repair roads opposite their own habitations.
OTHER REASONS GENERALLY ALLEGED.
These serious frictions and cruel treatment of natives which excite the pas-
sions, leading to resentment and murder, are said also to be the result of the
frequent changes made by the United States Government as to their officers in
Haiti since Admiral Caperton and his marines landed In the Republic three
years ago ; and that in and for most of such appointments subsequently made
the Roman Catholic Church, through the Pope's special delegate at Port au
Prince, and the American capitalists now in Haiti, are largely responsible.
Entangling alliances of such character and diverse interests can neither
strengthen the position and add to the power and efficiency of our American
occupation (whose Influence and official authority in Haiti should certahily he
paramount), nor can they inspire the confidence of either the Haitian Govern-
ment or its people, in fact, In the pure and impartial administration of affairs,
our own President and Government stand for, and we have officially pledged
to give Haiti after years of exploitation by European filibusterers and un-
scrupulous and dishonest speculators.
The influence of the Pope's white delegate and the white priests on Haiti's
black Presidents, cabinets, etc., has always been something akin to that of
Rasputin, the monk, on the late Czar and Czarina, plus the corporations which
have invaded the Black Republic, and one of which boasts of unlimited capital,
with stockholders close to the United States Government, and therefore has the
right of way in the Black Republic.
This one claims in Haiti to supply the United States Government with oil
for their airplane fleet, etc., and its representative in our Republic^ writing to
the " Pan-American Magazine " last year, admits " that soldier and sailor In
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 133
Haiti and Santo Domingo switch from soldier to anything from blacksmith to
superior court judge," and in another number of the same magazine be per-
emptorily demanded " that article 6 of the Haitian constitution, which specifies
that no foreigner (which Is entirely false, as shown already by the late Hon.
J. N. I^ger) may own land, must be repealed."
B£COMMENDATTONS SINCEBELT X7BGKD.
After a very careful observation, frequent consultations with Presidents and
leaders, both educated and uneducated, Catholics and Protestants alike, white
and black, including officers of our American occupation, and those even next
to President Dartlguenave at this moment — and especially since Haiti, I ke every
other country, must in the main, educationally, industrially — as well as reli-
giously, be gradually developed by its own trained Negro son«> and daughters
under sympathetic, experienced, and efficient American leadership — I have no
hesitation therefore in suggesHng the following to the earnest ccmsideratlon of
our President and Government:
(o) That in the spiritual interests of the Protestant and Catholic churches,
and Indispensable to honest and efficient admlnistratton, both should be officially
and financially separated from the Haitian Government exactly as in the United
States.
At present the Protestant churches receive a small subvention (appropria-
tion) to aid their missionaries and pastors' salaries of something like $4,000
annually; while the Catholic Church, altogether and Including maintenance of
the Roman Catholic College to train white priests for Haiti in France, draws
probably $150,000 to $200,000 yearly from the coffers of the bankrupt Black
Republic (now through the hands of the United States general receiver),
though the constitution of the Haitian Republic strictly stipulates that all
churches, whether Protestant or Catholic, in Haiti are equally free. The old
concordat is defunct several years ago, and the Pope, a foreign potentate, and
as such has no right to make any contract with the Haitian Government, nor
vice versa. (See Art. XL, on p. 8 of treaty.)
Articles VIII and IX, on pages 6 and 7 of treaty, not only make no provi-
sion whatever for the financing of either Protestant preachers or Catholic
priests, nuns, etc., but emphatically prohibits the diversion by the American
geaeral receiver in Haiti, and appointed by our United States Government, of
»ny portion of the revenues collected by him for any such purpose, and more
especially In the financial condition the Haitian (Government is in at the present
moment (See above articles of treaty.)
(h) The United States Government shall itself, or jointly with Rockefeller,
Carnegie, and other such known foundations, and in accord with the prayer
of petition referred to deposited at Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Bureau, establish in Haiti a " National Industrial School," with such a
man as Dr. Moton or Dr. T. Jesse Jones at the head, and under a joint board
of Americans and Haitians appointed by our President, and for the training of
the Negro manhood and womanhood for educational, Industrial, and even re-
HgiOQs leadership In their own Republic.
(c) That our Government shall also see that when Haiti's new public in-
Btruction scheme is introduced, free, compulsory, and under present changed
conditions — English made equally as essential with French and the Bible, or
such selections thereof as agreeable to both Protestant and Catholic — is read
ilally, the above industrial college shall become incorporated as an important
and basic part of Haiti's educational equipment.
id) That small native ownership of land shall be created by the United
States Government and " loans " nmde on simplest terms, and through a special
department of above ** Industrial school " conferences and exhibitions shall be
annually planned at convenient centers to encourage and teach the small farmer
to cultivate his habitation along scientific lines and to the best advantage.
(e) As contemplated by the treaty between the Unitetl States and Haiti,
" the material, agricultural, and Industrial," as well as the educational develop-
ment of the Black Republic shall be initiated by, financed througli, and super-
vised under the United States Government, and neither delegated to Individuals
or corporations who may have officials of the Uniteil States or the Haitian
Ckjvemnnents financially interested therein. (See treaty. Art. Q, and p. 4.)
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134 INQUIRY INK) (KXn'PATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
(f) Now that Haiti has declared war, Germans interned, our United SUtes
Government ahiall grant us our full share of all necessaries by way of food at
the lowest price ; make generous ** loans '* to enable our occupation to proceed
witli its constructive program, and give all their Haitian laborers not less than
a gounle and a half (30 American cents) a day. All forced labor (except in
case of prisoners and known criminals) to be at once abolished among these
quiet and peace-loving people. (Maintenance "by the United States" of t
government in Haiti adequate for the protection of life, property, and indi-
vidual liberty. See treaty. Art. XIV, p. 9.)
ig) Consistent with the sacred principle of ** religious liberty " and in the
interest of sane Christian efforts and efficient missionary work among the
Negroes of Haiti, all tendencies to multiply' sects should be discouraged, and
the evangelical churches now in the Republic be encouraged to (voluntarily)
cooperate or even unite where this can be done In the interest or gospel troth
and New Testament life and conduct.
(h) Finally, and with a view of speedily adjusting matters in Haiti, con-
vincing the people of the sincerity and absolute " good faith " of our President
and Govemnaent, I respectfully but strongly recommend that a commission be
appointed with authority to hear evidence, protect witnesses, whether civilians
or employees of the Haitian Government or our own occupation, and also com-
po.sed of gentlemen who will make a fair and thorough investigation into pres-
ent conditions, but will further be able to formulate a satisfactory plan for
the future development of the black republic along treaty lines, and in present
light of " war ideals " as expressed by both our President and Secretary of
State. (This commission is especially demanded by the Elaltlan people.)
To this end I, therefore, suggest the following names: Hon. MaJ. Foster
Pea body, Massachusetts; Dr. T. Jesse Jones, Educational Bureau, New Tork;
Hon. G. Moton. Tuskegee, Ala.; Dr. J. Dilllard, Virginia; Dr. Gilbert N. Brink;
Dr. Gambrell. Texas : Father Curran. Pennsylvania ; and Admiral Caperton, of
the United States Government, who first landed marines In Haiti.
Our President and Government, as well as any commission of such able,
experienced, and highly qualified persons commanding the Implicit confidence
of both our Government and the American people, can rely not only that th»
I^tt Carey Baptist Foreign Board and myself, as Its representative in Haiti,
' but all the Protestant and Haitian Catholic leaders alike throughout the Re-
public will render every assistance possible so as to adjust matters amicably
and satisfactorily, maintaining, for Instance, our American Ideals, present Influ-
ence and power among the dyilized nations of the world, and at the same
time dev**loping long-neglected Haiti and Its people into a model Negro Re-
public, and cementing them as mentioned In the treaty in the closest bonds
of amity and brotherhoo<l to us as an United States sister Republic. I have the
honor to remain.
Sincerely and loyally, yours, ami for Christ and Haiti,
L. Ton Evans.
(A civilian possessed with expert knowledge of the Republic and bearing
about tlie same relation to Secretary of State as Col. House does to the Presi-
dent, should prove an invaluable aid to the state ofiSce In handling the Haitian
problem. )
DisTBioT OP Columbia, to toii:
On this 30th day of Ck!tober, 1918, before me, the subscriber, a notary
public In and for the District aforesaid, personally appeared Rev. L. Ton
Evans, an American citizen, residing at St. Mark, Haiti, being superintendent
of missions, and made oath in due form of law that facts stated herein with
exception of those under section 2, In the memorandum submitted to President
in re of grievances of Haiti, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief;
and those under section 2 of the same will be attested to before a commission
asked to be created by the President, and under the United States Govemmenfs
protection and by leading persons In Haiti.
L. Ton Bvanb.
Subcribed and sworn to before me.
[seal.] Chablbs S. Cunky,
Notary Public, District of Columhia.
My commission expires June 13, 1923.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 135
peace through \lctory.
Carnegie Endowment for International 1*kace,
Xo, 2 Jacksofi Place, WashingtoHy D, C, October /8, 191^.
This is to certify that in the fall of 1912 the (Rev.) Dr. L. Ton Kvans, m^u-
eral missionary ami etlueational superintendent of the Baptist Mission in
Haiti, left in my hands a petition signed by some 3,000 leading and influential
citizens of that island, praying for the establishment in Haiti of a " national
normal and industrial college,'* similar to Tuskegee and Hampton, on n Chris-
tian basis.
This remarkable petition remaine<l in -the hands of the endowment for some
months, aiid after consideration by the executive committee of the endowment
was retumeil to Dr. Evans, who, unfortunately, lost It while traveling in the
city in company with Dr. T. Jesse Jones (commissioner of education).
S. N. S. North,
AasiMant Secretary.
A numl)er of copies of the above was ordered to be printed by the executive
couimlttee of the *• National Race Congress " at its Wednesday meeting, Octo-
l)er 23, so as to further inform itself with a view to taking some definite action
in bringing this Important matter before the President and i>ur Government
for the protection of their own people In Haiti.
I>ei'artmknt of Statk,
^yashhtffton, November 2, 1918.
I>r. L. Ton Evans.
226 ChCHtnut Street, KiuffHton, Pa.
Sir: The ilepartment has received your memorandum ui>on (Hmditions in
Haiti, presented on October 21, addressed to the President of the Uniteil states,
and wishes to Inform you that It is receiving the serious consideration of this
department as well as of the various other branches of the Government con-
cerned.
The dei)artment will be pleased to communicate with you at a later date after
the careful study of the matters contained In your memorandum Is K»rminate 1.
I tini. sir, your obtMllent servaut, for the Secretary of State.
Alvey a. Adee,
Second Assistant Secretary.
tcop:
thi
»y of letter to Hod. Hitchcock, chairmaD of Foreign RelatioDs Committee, pleading
rough him for an iDtenrlew with President Wilson, and presentation of petition
(momorandum) urging the appointment of a commission re Haiti affairs.]
Senatk Office of Forktgn Relations,
Nor ember 2, 1918.
Dear Chairman HiTcHaKK : Accompanying ths note is the memorandum
proraisefl at cmr previous interview, and setting forth the seriinis conditions
in Haiti.
Yesterday, while again at the State Department, I haude<l a c<>i)y of same to
private secretary of Mr. Ijuis ng; he assured me it would be given the Secre-
tar>- of State the same evening. It was also given Mr. Tumulty, for presenta-
tion without fall this morning to the President, and promised to be informed
to-<lay as to whether an interview wouUl be alloweil in reference to appoint-
naent of comm'ssion for investigation of affairs in the Black Uepublic.
As you have undoubtedly seen the statement made through the Associated
Press by ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, to the effect that the Haiti Republic
as such is nonexistent to-day, which is true in substance and in fact. I must
resitectfuUy urge your Immediate attention to this important matter.
l am anxious, if possible, to prevent this from becoming a political party
affair, and so can not believe that either our President or our responsible
Unitetl States Government actually know the real facts, which by military or
political officialism have been persistently withheld from President Wilson and
Government, though I sent a registered letter last June direct from Port au
Prince, Haiti, to President at the While House, setting forth these things.
(Also another regi8tere<l letter was forwanled by same mall to ex-Presldent
Theodore Roosevelt at Oyster Bay. )
02269— 21— PT 2 3
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136 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Can you therefore at once and before Monday secure this interview ami get
our President to promise to consider the matter and appointment of said com-
mission to thoroughly and carefully go into Haitian affairs, and—
1. With such promise of commission, to invest same with iwwer to call wit-
nesses, pay necessary expenses of same, and give these our United States Gov-
ernment adequate protection.
2. Give immediate notification of appointment of commission both in French
and English, in the Monitor (Haiti Government's official dally) and all other
Haitian papers.
3. Finally, that some such person of the legal status of ex-Justice Charles
Hughes be counsel or chairman of same, so as to guarantee that every phase
of and matter referred to shall be impartially and thoroughly gone into, and so
that our President and responsible Government shall be cleared from every
suspic.on of insincerity, and especially the serious charge (in Haiti) of a
desire on their part to repudiate in the Black Republic the sacred obligations
of their own solemn treaty, made and ratified by the Uniteil States and Haiti
Governments, through their representatives, May, 1916.
Sincerely yours, L, Ton Evans,
General Superintendent of Haiti Baptist Mission.
Note. — Though subsequently waited upon Senator Hitchcock, at his Senate
chambers, accompanied by a strong delegation of white and colored ministers,
representing northern and southern wh.te Baptists; National and Lott Carey,
colored Baptist conventions, chairman of Race Congress, Colored Methodist
Church, with chairman of Washington Baptists, etc., pleading for this com-
mission, we failed to move the Senator.
Senate Fobeign Relations,
Washinffton, /). C, November 2, J918.
Hon. Theodore Roosevelt,
Ex-President of the United States,
Deak Colonel: Am writing to heartily thank you for your reply sent after
me here, and to my letter sent from Port au Prince (Haiti) to Oyster Bay,
setting forth the terrible conditions In poor Haiti consequent of the foolish
and criminal blunders of the American occupation.
Your own statement this week, issued through the Associated Press, namely,
that Haiti, under the United States treaty, has completely lost her Negro
Republic as such, and such an exposure by you, as the black man*s real friend,
will bring joy and hope to thousands In Haiti who will read this.
As I anticipated in my letter to you from Port au Prince (immediately
after my Interview with Col. Russell and earnest pleading with him not to
rape poor Haiti's constitution the following week, but to indefinitely postpone
the fake voting and allow me to cable President Wilson to at once send a
committee of investigation here, which reason I gave for inclosing a copy of
my communication to President Wilson), the latter was intercepted by either
military officialism and profiteering politicians of the occupation in Haiti or
certain members of the administration who determinedly and wickedly with-
hold the sad conditions In the Black Republic.
As seen in inclosed copy of letter to Senator Hitchcock, It's now up to
President Wilson and the administration. If they refuse to appoint the
commission and Immediately and efficiently act In the matter, then I will
see Senator Lodge and insist on bringing it before Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and Congress and the great American public.
Sincerely thanking you for your interest, for Christ and Haiti.
L. Ton Evans.
[Reply and indorfMMnent of suggestion to bring before Senator Lodge and Senate If
chairman of Foreign Relations declines finally to act and President refuses to appoint,
the demanded commission of inveKtijratlon.]
The Kansas City Star,
Office of Theodore Roosevelt.
347 Madison Avenue^ November 2S, 1918.
L. Ton Evans,
New Howard House, GOO PennsyJvwnia Avenue, WasJUngton, D, C.
My Dkar Mr, Kvans: I thank you for your letter. After what you have
nlroady done, the sn^jrestion you yourself make is certainly as good as any-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 137
thing I can offer. In fact, In the face of the conditions which exist and yon
onre described, I do not really know what else to suggest.
. FalthfDDy, yours,
T. Roosevelt.
Wyoming, Pa., Ma4'ch 27, 1920..
Hon. SECKtTARY DaNIELS,
United States \ary. District of Columbia.
Deab Secbetabt: Inclosed memorandum and sworn affidavit submitted
through Latin America, and State Departments, and Senator Hitchcock to
President Wilson, October, 1918, with present folder will show the serious and
criminal conditions now in vogue in Haiti consequent chiefly to blundering,
brutal, savage, and murderous methods adopted most unfortunately by our
American occupation, nullifying and directly repudiating both in spirit and
letter the sacred treaty made between great and powerful United States
Government, on one hand, and small, weak, and helpless Black Republic on the
other.
Though Second Assistant Secretary Adee, of State Department, in the name
of President acknowledged receipt of this memorandum, etc., with its earnest
l»rayer for the immediate appointment of a special commission to thoroughly
investigate matters, and the Government solemnly assured me in Secretary
Adee*8 letter that prompt measures were actually then be.ng taken by all de-
partments interested in Haiti affairs, and conditions "were at the moment
under serious consideration " that were set forth in said memorandum ; and
further, that the United States Oovernment would notify me offlclallv of the
result of their investigations.
Over 17 months have elapseil since above assurance, with not a word from
the Oovernment.
In the meantime, however, conditions have been allowed to grow rapidly^
worse, as stated in the ** folder,** and these suffering, oppressed, enraged, and
terror-stricken people, as evidenced even by riots between marines and gen-
darmes, not to say the more frequent and daring raids by so-called bandits, or
Caoo, daily growing in strength and numbers as well, and having the sympathy
more and more of the moderate, intelligent, and educated and better class of
Haitians, who have lost respect for and confidence in our American occupation
on tills account.
With our influence, therefore, on the wane, and our prestige and iK)wer all
but gone, and our motive and integrity as a democratic, civilized, not to say a
Christian nation (and as i>ointed out in memorandum) suspecte<l and im-
pugned (in 1918). it is no wonder that the staff correspondent of the New York
World, who. visiting Haiti a little over a month ago, should state:
** It should be remembered that there are many highly educated and substan-
tial dtisens of Port an Prince (and he might add In other towns and cities of
the Rq)ubUc) who are no more Cacos than Henry Cabot Lodge is a Hudson
daster. who none the less desire a complete change of administration and the
ending of the present occupation.** ( See Literary Digest, Mar. 27, 1920, p. 52. )
So. under this brutal, bolshevistic American rt^gime, and owing to this crimi-
nil neglect and willful refusal of said departments at Washington to officially
and effectively fimctlon after acknowledging receipt of direct and definite in-
formation re wmditlons, and the responsible United States Government's official
amurance. they were then (October, 1918) actually dealing with the situation;
It was not surprising that consequently the white drinking portion of our
-Vnierlcan officials complained of and their gendarmes should become more
daring and defiant in their barbaric treatment of the poor natives, and even
more cruel and inhuman toward the whites (both American and Euroi)ean).
Therefore, with these conditions in Haiti, under the complete political and
military domination and control of the United States Government marines, ami
in Hplte of the emphatic terms of the treaty, drawn up and ratlfle<l in Washing-
ton by our President AVIlson and United States Senate, in May of 1916, gimr-
anteeing the Integrity of the Negro Republic as such, and ample i)rotection to
individual liberty, etc.; on my own return to Haiti in December of 1918 (two
months after the official assurance was given me by the State Department, and
on which assurance I relied), it was not at all surprising to have my private
«tndy inunediately and ruthlessly invaded by armed native police without notice
or warrant at the imperative and imperious command of one of these white
inarin** officers of the American occupation.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
138 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
After arrest I was paraded under heavy armed Negro guard through the imb-
lie streets, cursed and threatened with being shot, etc., by enraged, ai^r^tly
intoxicated white American marine officers, then driven to prison ; when I was
thoroughly searched and ptioto of my wife and two boys, photo of Pregideot
Wilson, with Mr. Adee, of the State Department's official letter (and assuring
me of tlie United States Goveniment's investigation into cruel, barbaric, and
murderous conduct in Haiti, etc.), were all with other articles — money, testa-
ment, glasses, etc. — all taken away, thence thrust into a dark, small cell,
and strictly contined behind a thick door, the heavy bar drawn with a thud
behind me, and a constant armed guard kept day and night, and no member or
any other i)ers(»n dare visit or see me.
Within this strictly confined and guarded old French small cell, narrow, and
with hard, bare floor, without stool nor chair, half starved and literally gaspini:
for air in a close tropical climate, I thus spent 13 longest and darkest days and
nights of my life, amid the yells and groans of about 180 half-clad Negro men
and women, and some bal>es, prisoners, beaten, bruised, and at times battered
or starved to death by native officials commanded by a stem, drunken marine
officer of the occupation, often away a whole day, with no food provided for
prisoners, most of whom were marched like slaves ever>' morning under armed
guard to do cor\'ee work some miles away.
Every moment amid this hideous surroundings and expecting myself to be
pounced upon and beaten to death or violently dragged forth from my small,
dark dungeon before a ** firing squad ** like the British nurse, Edith Oav^, by
the Huns at Brussels (for these poor Negro armed officers dared not disobey
the white marine aiptain at the risk of their lives, when enraged like a madman
under the Influence of liquor).
After being here 11 days in this condition, physically tortured and mentally
agonizing, the St. Marc, Negro high court, feeling that such barbarity disgraced
and scandalized Haiti, for never did the Haiti Government arrest or imprisoD
even native Christian ministers, not to say white missionaries and American
citizens, so the high Negro court commanded bringing the prisoner at once for
trial.
I was informed by the Negro judge advocate, the natives unknown to myself
(Catholics and Protestants) had employed to defend me at this court, after-
wards that every charge completely broke down, the high court declaring the
arrest and imprisonment illegal and unwarrantable; demanded my immediate
liberty, with ample protection; further decreeing that I be paid substantial
damage in lieu of sufferings caused and torture and agony endured.
Wherefore, Mr. Secretary, and as I understand you to be the officer hi su-
preme command and directly responsible to the Government for affairs in Haiti,
I respectfully request an interview in reference —
1. Question of indemnity decreed by judgment of Negro high court of St
Marc for illegal imprisonment, etc., by white marine officer of the United
States after notification and warning.
2. The matter of appointment of special commission, as demanded by the
memorandum presented, and composed of such competent statesmen as therein
suggested, with Hon. Charles Hughes or some one of equal status as chairman,
to thoroughly investigate Haiti affairs and formulate a simple plan to develop
Haiti according to treaty.
Though pressed to bring this matter before Senate in 1919, and again on
landing in New York from Haiti, April of last year, I have persisted so far
in believing in the sincerity of the present Government, in spite of constant
insinuations and bitter criticisms of the administration, but at last must respect-
fully insist on approaching the I*resldent, through you, re my own illegal im-
prisonment and the apiwintment at once of a commission.
In my patient effort to see the President before resorting to the Senate or
appealing to the American public, I have had the indorsement of Haiti's edu-
cated and Intelligent leaders; native and white missionaries of the Black Re-
public ; the Hon. T. Ch. Moravia, present minister of the Haiti Government at
Washington; and even the late ex-President Roosevelt wrote me not long
before his death that I try every possible mean.s to reach President Wilson
direct before bringing this matter before either Senate or Congress and the
American people, stating, " I can not think of any better plan and more honor-
able than the very one you pursue," though previous to this Roosevelt, this
real friend of Haiti, whose untimely death, much lamented in tlie Black Re
public, Issued through the Associated Press, as seen in the Washington Post of
Ckitober 23, 1918, ** That the Haiti-Negro Republic under the Democratic admin-
istration, and in spite of their treaty to the contrary, had become nonexistent,"
wliicli is perfectly true in substance and in fact. —
IXQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AN)) SANTO DOMINGO. 139
To save, therefore, more cruel sufferings and prevent further rutliless bru-
tality and wanton bloodshed! by either white or colored, the restoration of
order, and establishment of peace and jrood will, which aUuie can bring pros-
I)erity and plenty to Haiti, actually restore the lost influence, prestige, and»
if possible, confidence and power in and of th«» United States and the American
Nation as humane and a civilized people, if not the greatest civilizing and
Christianizing nation in the world to-day.
Hence I pray that this final attempt will prove successful, amid other press-
ing duties, to interview the President and lead even yet to a satisfactory solu-
tion of the two questions mentioned.
In case we are, however, denied and finally driven to the Senate, and a
«l)ecial Senate connnittee or commission be appointed, then an exhaustive
inquiry will be held, when not only Col. Uussell, Brig. Gen. Catlln, Gen. Wil-
linins, of the Haiti (Gendarmerie, the two American corporations, with cer-
tain administration oflicials here at Washington, will be sununoned and care-
fully examined witli a view at last to right poor Haiti's wrongs and remove
the stain and disgrace now upon our own flag.
Tims Haiti in all probability will help finally settle both the fate of the
present treaty with Euroi)e as well as the fate also of the Demwratic adminis-
tration. If I trow not at the forthcoming general election, and by the Ameri-
csin people themselves. To avoid this I sincerely hojie you and the President
will grant this interview.
Yours, for Christ and Haiti.
L. Ton Evans.
The Secretaby of the Navy,
Washington, May i, 1920.
Mr. L. Ton Evans,
Wyoming, Pa.
My Dear Mr. Evans : I have received your letter and will be pleased to see
you at such time as you may suggest. The Navy Department has been very
much interested in the work In Haiti and is doing all it can to secure the best
possible conditions.
Very truly, yours,
JosEPHus Daniels.
The SECBE'rARY of the Navy,
Washington, September i, 1920.
Mr. L. Ton Evans,
Wyoming, Pa.
My Dear Mr. Evans : I am in receipt of your favor of August 27, and write
to say that I am having a study made of the situation in Haiti, and when this
Is received I will let you hear from me.
Sincerely, yours,
Josephus Daniei^.
This letter of August 27 expressed the missionary's plan to come at once to
Washington for the interview as per Secretary of Navy's letter of May 1, 1920,
that conditions in Haiti were growing worse, and that delay meant not only
oppression and brutality but more murder of innocent Haltiens. Since his
May reply the Navy Secretary hurriedly dispatched Gen. John A. Lejeune to
Haiti to Inquire and immetl lately report up to date. Mr. Daniels, according
to promise, sent copy of Lejeune's report to writer, but put off the personal
Interview.— L. T. E.
The report of Gen. Lejeune was officially forwarded to Mr. Ton Evans, and
is as follows :
Headquarters United States Marine Corps,
Washington, October i, 1920.
From: The Major General Connnandant.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Report of the military situation in Haiti during the period July 1,
1920, to date and report of my inspection of the First Brigade, I'nlted States
Marines, stationed in the Republic of Haiti.
1. Pursuant to your verbal instructions, I am submitting for your Informa-
tion and consideration a report covering the period that I have held the ofl^ce of
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140 INQriRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Major General Coimnjindant I"nite<l States Marine Corps, concerning the condi-
tions affecting' the military situation in Haiti.
2. The area of Haiti is approximately 10,000 square miles. The country is
Tery mountainous. Between the preat mountain ranges lie densely populated
river valleys of extraordinary fertility. Haiti is, therefore, exceptionally well
adapted for the activities of handit bands. In fact, throughout the history of
Haiti banditry has been prevalent, the bands being recruited from released or
escaped criminals and from tlie class of men who prefer to live by robbing the
industrious, peaceful people in the valleys rather than by earning their bread
by their own labor. Banditry has been one of the greatest evils which the
Haitian people have had to c<mten<l with, not only because of the actual injury
done the people by tlie dtiiredations of the bandits but also for the reason that
the bantlit l>ands have formed the nuclei! of the so-called revolutionary armies
which have so fre<iuently devastated Haiti and drenched its soil in blood. The
mission <»f the marines stationed in Haiti is the suppression of banditry and the
maintenance of in^ace and tranquillity.
3. All reports received at -lieadquarters United States Marine Coii>s since I
have been on duty as Major General Commandant have indicated that the
bandit situation was steadily improving, and that conditions from the Marine
Corps iK)int of view were very {satisfactory. However, in order that I might
be fully informed in regard to Marine Corps affairs, it was deemed advisable for
me to visit Haiti and make a personal insiiection of the marines on duty there.
I accordingly proceeded to Haiti early in the month of September in company
with Brig. Gen. Smedley D. Butler, who assisted me in my inspection.
4. The marjies in Haiti are commanded by Col. John H. Russell, an able,
just, and humane officer. 1 found, during my insi)ection, that not only hajd he
handled tlie l)andit situathui in a masterly manner, but that he had l.ssuod
the most comprehensive histructions requiring a kindly treatment of the in-
habitiuits by our own men, and that his subordinate officers were enforcing his
instructions in a loyal and conscienthnis manner.
DIARY OF EVENTS.
September ^, 1920. — 6.15 p. m., arrived at Port an Prince, Haiti, and immetli-
ately diseml)arke(l.
Srptvmhcr .7, tiUO. — 9 a. m., conferre*! with brigade conuuaniler and members
of his staff" at l)rigade headquarters. 11 a. m., received all officers statione<l ia
Port au Prince. In the afternoon, conferred with the financial adviser to the
(government of Haiti and other officials of the Marine Ct>rp« conc<»rning condi-
tions in Haiti.
Scittrmhcr d. /.9.^^>.— Forenoon, reviewed aiul ins]H'cted the battalion of tin*
Haitu'n g<*ndarmerie stariontnl in Port au Prince; insi»ectetl the battalion of
marines also stati<a»e<l in Port au I'rince, tlie marine barracks, the barracks
of the gendarmerie of Haiti, the gendarmerie headquarters, the national peni-
tentiary of Haiti, the Marine Corps depot of supplies, radio statUai, aviation
station, and the naval held hosiatal. Called on the American minister.
12 noon, called officially on the President of Haiti, and was reivived by hiui
and his entire cabinet. Tlie President nuule an address in which he eulogize<l
the work of the marines and of the gendarmerie in Haiti, and expressed his
gratitude t(> the Marine Corps for having maintained peace and tranquillity
in the Republic of Haiti. I replied to the address. The President then
decorated Brig. (Jen. Butler with the Medaille Militaire of Haiti on account
of his distinguished service to Haiti in organizing, e<iuipping, training, and
commanding the gendarmerie.
Afternoon, the American minister returned my call and I conferred with hiui
and the officers of the first brigade of marines and the gendarmerie concern-
ing conditions in Haiti.
ScptemlH'r 7, 1920. — (> a. m., left Port au I*rlnce and proceeded by automohlie
to Mirelialais and Ia\h Cahobas, at which places I ins|)ected the Marine Con>**
garrisons and camps and the detachments of gendarmes and their barracks.
At both i)laces we were receive<l by large delegations of Haitien <*itizeas
headed by the local oflScials, who made addresses expressing their great apprecia-
tion of the splendid work done by the marines in nuiintaining peace and goo<i
order, thereby permitting the industrious and peaceful people of Haiti to culti-
vate their farms and conduct their business without molestation. I replied to
each of these » ddresses, and greeted personally each member of the delegations.
6.15 p. m., returned to Port au Prince,
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 141
iSeptcmber 8, 1920. — Continued conferences with officers, the ftnimcial advisor,
the American minister, and with Haitien citizens.
Septewber P, 1920.— 5 a. in., left Port an Prince by automobile for San Michel
via St. Marc, Gonaives, and Ennei*y: ln8i>ected all gendarme poHts at towns
en route. 6.30 p. m., arrived at San Michel.
September 10, 1920. — 7 a. m., left San Michel for Maissade and Hinche. I was
received at each place by large delegations of Haitian citizens headed by local
officials and French priests. Inspected Marine Corps and gendarme posts at
Maissade and Hinche and the small detachments of marines en route. The
delegations of citizens above referred to expressed their appreciation of the
good work that was being done by the Marine Corps and the Haitian gen-
dariuerie in maintaining peace and good order. 5.30 p. m., returned to San
Michel. 7 to 10 p. m., conducted investigation of affairs in Haiti, ccmferring
with former officers of the gendarmerie.
September 11, 1920. — 7.30 a. m., inspected marine detachment and camp at
San Michel. 11 a. m., left San Michel for Cave Haitien via Ennery, Plaisance,
an<l Limbe, ins|)ecting gendarmes and the gendarm posts en route. At 4 p. m.,
arrived at Cave Haitien.
tieptember 12. 1920. — ^9 a. m., inspected marine detachment, camp, depot of
irappUes, radio station, naval tiehl hospital, detachment of gendarmes, their
barracks, and the Haitian prison. 11.30 a. m., received a delegation of promi-
nent citizens of Cai)e Haitien and conferred with them concerning the condition
in that section.
Afternoon, recelve<l all Marine ('orps officers stationed at Caiie Haitien.
September 13, 1920. — i a. m., left Cape Haitien for Onanaminthe via Quartler
Morin, Linionade, and Le Trou. InsiHHtetl all detachments of gendarmes en
route, the prison farms at Poste Chaubert. and the marine and gendarme de-
lachnieuts at Onanaminthe.
At 10 a. m.. having completed my inspection of the First Brigade Unitetl
States Marines, we left Haiti, crossed the Massacre River (boundary between
Haiti and Santo Domingo), ami began the inspection of the Second Brigade
United States Marines ami the Cuardia Nacional of Santo Domingo.
DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST BBIGADE.
The force of marines in Haiti, consisting of about 1,350 men. Is organized
into a brigade of two small regiments, the Second and Eighth. The Eighth
Regiment In stationed in southern Haiti and the Second Regiment In the north.
One battalion of the Eighth Regiment Is quartered in Port an Prince, the head-
quarters of the regiment is near Mirebalals, and the remainder of the regiment
is campetl at Mirebalais and Las Cahobas, with small posts along the road to
Port au Prince. The headquarters and one battalion of the Second Regiment
are located at Cape Haitien and the remainder of the regiment is stationed at
San Mldiel, Hinche, and Maissade, with small detachments at Thomonde.
Onanaminthe, and at points along the roads from Hinche and Maissade to
Cape Haitien. Brigade headquarters and the aviation squadron are located at
Port au Prince.
For tactical purposes the forces of both regiments in the interior of Haiti
are commanded by the commanding officer of the Eighth Regiment. This ar-
rangement is necessary in order to secure coordination in putting down bandit
bands. The Second Regiment Is commanded by Col. Randolph C. Berkeley and
the Eighth Regiment by Lieut. Col. Louis McC. Little. Naval field hospitals
are located at Port au Prince and Cape Haitien.
SUPPLY.
The troops in the field are supplied by means of railroads, motor trucks, and
pack trains, motor trucks being utilize<l wherever the roads are passable, and
pack trains over trails. In spite of great difficulties, due to almost impassable
roads, high mountain ranges, and rivers swollen by tropical rains, the troops
are well supplle<l.
I found the rations anil other supplies to be up to the standard. There were ,
no complaints, except at Hinche, where there was a temporary scarcity of
fresh beef in the country.
THE MILITARY SITUATION.
I found the mllitarv situathm to l)e in excellent condititm and a state of
peace and tranquillity' prevailing throughout Haiti. We traveleil through the
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142 IXQUIRY INTO OCC^PATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
couutrj' withi)ut a jfuard and found no evidences of hostility on the part of the
natives.
The marines and gendarmes stationed in tlie interior of Haiti seiid out visit-
ing patrols in command of officers. Tlie patrols visit all sections of the coun«
try, not only to prevent banditry but also in order to assure the natives tbat
they will l)e protected from depredations by bandits.' This has had a very
beneficial effect, and throughout Haiti we found the natives busily at work
cultivating their farms and carrying their produce to market.
There are now no large bandit bands in existence, the only menace to security
being a number of small bands who hide in the mountains and live by stealing.
These bands are being gradually (lisi)er8ed. One of the most encouraging
circumstances connected with the bandit situation is the fact that many
former bandits have voluntarily quit the mountains and gone to work.
A short while ago a small patrol of gendarmes engaged in a skirmish with
one of these bands and dispersed it, and Louisnord, the la.st important bandit
leader in Haiti, was killed.
Until banditry has been completely stamped out, however, it is essential
for the welfare of Haiti that the present dlsimsition of Marine Corps forces in
the interior should not be changed.
RELATIONS UETWKEN THE MARINE CORPS AND THE CIVIL POPULATION OF HAFTI.
In my inspection of marines I conferreil with large numbers of Haitian
officials, including the Presidwit and his cabinet, with Haitians not holding
any official positions, and with French priests. I found that there existed
throughout Haiti a strong sentiment of gratitude to the marines for the work
that they were doing for the welfare of the Industrious, peaceful, and law-
nbldlng Haitian people, and that, on the whole, very friendly feelings existed
on the part of the Inhabitants toward the marines. There have been^ of course,
some cases of 111 feeling between Individuals. For Instance, while I was In
Port au Prince two marines, while walking along a city street at night, were
severely stabbed from behind by Haitians, who succeeded in making good
their escape, and I found in the guardhouse there several marines who had
been tried by court martial for engaging In brawls with Haitians. Affairs of
this kind are, of i-ourse, very regrettable, but are, nevertheless, unavoidable,
and are liable to occur at any place at home or abroad where troops are
stationed.
The French priest at Hinche, with whom I had a long conference, stated
that he had been stationed there for 13 years, and that conditions at Hhiche,
which had been a center of bandit activity, were better than they had ever
been during his ministry in Haiti, and that the officers and marines now
stationed there were doing all in their power to cultivate good feeling and to
gain the confidence of the Haitian people.
In visiting the various posts I invariably made inquiry concerning the rela-
tions between the marines and the population, and found at each place that the
commanding officer, acting under the instructions of Col. John H. Russell,
the brigade commander, was insistent that the men under his command should
treat the inhabitants In a Just and kindly manner. It was easy to see by the
manner and actions of the thousands of people we met in the towns and on the
roads in the interior that a very kind and friendly feeling exists toward person?
wearing the uniform of the United States Marine Corps.
GENDARMERIE D' HAITI.
The Gendarmerie d'Haiti is a force of 2,500 Haitians, officered chiefly by
commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps. This force is the
sole police and military force authorized by Haitian lawi^. It polices the to^vn8
and country districts, and is therefore a combination of municipal police and
rural constabulary. It also has charge of all Haitian prisons and jails. I
made careful inspection of tlie detachments of gendarmes, their barracks, and
Haitian prisons, and at all places visited found the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, which
is now highly commanded by Lieut. Col. Frederic M. Wise, to be in a highly
efficient condition. It was most gratifying to see the soldierly bearing, neat-
ness, and efficient performance of duty on the part of the gendarmes ; also the
immaculate cleanliness of their barracks and the prisons of which they are to
charge. The condition of the national penitentiary at Port au Prince and the
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INQUIRY INTO OCCa'PATION OF HAITI AND SA^NTO DOMINGO. 143
prison at Cape Haitien is espet'iully deserving of the higliest i»omniendation.
The officers and men of the Marine Corps, who command the gendarmerie, in-
formed me that there had not been a single case of disloyalty to their officers
on the part of any member of the gendarmerie since this organization had been
t-stablished, and that they felt i)erfect confidence in the con rage and loyalty of
the Haitians serving in its ranks.
DrsCIPIJNE, CONDUCT, HEALTH, AND MOBAT^ OF MABINE CORPS FORCES.
During my tour of inHi)ei'tion in Haiti I found the marines to be in a Iiighly
efficient condition. Theii- health, except for some cases of malaria, was excel-
lent Their discipline was superb and their morale high. Aa I inspected the
detachments located at isolated points far in the interior of Haiti, I waiS filled
with admiration of their fine appearance and efllcient condition. My heart
was filled with pride to see these splendid men giving to their country and to
the Republic of Haiti such intelligent, zealous, efficient, and courageous service.
I feel that the American people have every right to be proud of their repre-
sentatives who are jiow wearing the uniform of the Marine Corps in Haiti.
John A. Le.teune.
SAYS HAITIANS APPROVE Ol'R ACTION.
My dear Secretary Danhxs: When about to mail you my letter to-day I
came across in this morning's New York Times what purports to be a reply
to Senator Harding, as to conditions and cruelties in Haiti, etc.
After a careful reading of quotations from oflicial statements or report of
Oen. John A. Lejeune's hurried visit made after my first letter to you in
March, I find they fall to touch the vital points.
Nevertheless if a report of the admlni.stration's own official, specially ap-
pointed by yourself (since, if not directly through my own letter to the Navy
Dejmrtment six months ago) as the new direc'ting head of the Marine Coi'ps
Kince June 30, 1920, in Haiti, and as having so recently assume<l oflicial duties,
fan be relied upon, I am certainly glad to learn that at last our officials
(whatever may be the attitude of the gendarmerie) are beginning not only
to understand the Haitians, but the actual meaning of their own mission and
that of the United States Goveniment's real purpose in the Black Republic.
I candidly state that had I not been anxious from the commencement (three
years ago) to keep entirely out of party iwlitics In missionary and Haitian
matters, that I still, in .spite of the strong criticism and severe condenmation
of President, Secretary of the Navy, etc., firmly believed that you both sincerely
wished to right all the past and present wrongs committed under this adminis-
tration in poor Haiti. I would certainly, after reading this morning's statement,
have immediately wired a most startling reply through the Associated Press
and at once directed my steps to Marlon and the headquarters of the Republican
Party, disappointingly convinced that further efforts on the part of Haiti and
myself were utterly futile and a mere waste of time.
If therefore Secretary Daniels means to have this interview at once, and he
and our President are prepared to act, as suggested in my previous letter and
present appeal herein attached, will you then please send prompt reply by letter
or wire?
I still remain, sincerely, yours, etc.
L. Ton Evans,
Bwthyn, Wyoming County, Pa., October 6, J 920.
BwTHYN, Wyoming County, Pa., October £, 19tO*
Hon. JosEPHUs Daniels,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.
My Deab Secbetaby : After what has Just transpired through the public press
from Marion, as well as from Washington, I must respectfully insist on the
promised official Interview with you (and the President) not later than this
coming week, and as stated in letter of March 27 last in reference to —
1. A substantial reparation from the United States Government as decreed
by Judgment of Saint Marc high court (Haiti) in January of 1918 (an
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144 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
abstract official copy of which is In my possession) and as previdusly stated
confijequent of my illegal arrest and imprisonment witli malicious intent causing
such physical torture, mental agony, moral and financial damages ; from which
I have suffered since, as borne out by the four medical certificates forwarded to
my annuity board, of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland, in London,
and which board has recognized my claim (as member thereof) in lieu of
services rendered as Baptist missionary in and cruel treatment endured on
the foreign mission field of Haiti, under my own American flag; and while
strictly confined, deprived of nourishment, etc., for 13 days and 12 nights in a
small, narrow dungeon, momentarily expecting (like the Negro prisoners)
to be either set upon and clubbed to death, or violently dragged out before a
firing squad like Edith Cavell, the British nurse, only in my case at the stem
comnl&nd of an American white officer, in collusion and conspiracy with other
drinking and drunken officials of my own United States Government, and
representatives of our President Wilson, under what can be termed the mad,
savage, and murderous regime pursued by the American occupation in the
t)lack republic.
It should be pointed out that previous to this, a proclamation of Secretary
Daniels (of the United States Navy) faithfully signed, and publicly and
officially issued, both in English and French, by Col. John H. Russell, United
States Marine Corps, commanding United States forces ashore in Haiti, bad
been scattered throughout the republic, supposed to be observed and strictly
enforced in the interest of the morale of our own boys ; all officials, including
general officers and members of gendarmerie (native armed police) for
•decency as well as essential to official discipline, the military authority and the
moral efficiency of our United States Government's American occupation servlw
in Haiti ; but forsooth this was spurned, and flouted by many if not most
officials members of Marine Corps, and especially (If not following example
of their superior officers) the gendarmes.
Seeing therefore that the Haiti rum (if not the Haiti brand of Uonianisni)
demoralized, stupefle<l, and brutalized the supposed better educated and
superiorly civilized white American soldier and civilian exactly (only worse
through tropical heat, and other climatic conditions to which the whites were
unaccustomed) the same as they did their less fortunate Negro brethern, I
respectfully, and most earnestly pleaded with Col. Russel at the time of the
issuance of this pnwlamation (owing to the degrading, and constant fatal
■effects of alcohol upon white and black in our midst) to apply its operation to
all throughout the Haiti Republic, and forbid the manufacture, and Importation,
as well as the sale of liquors of all kinds.
Above proclamation reads as follows:
"The sale of intoxicants to persons of military and naval forces of the
United States in uniform is forbidden throughout the Republic of Haiti, from
and after July 20, 1918. A violation of this order will be considered inimical
to the Interests of the United States, and the offender will be liable to trial
before a United States milltarj' tribunal.
" Done at Port au Prince, Republic of Haiti, this 16th day of July, 1918."
This official interview (or confidential if preferred) is immediately now re-
quested, furthermore —
2. For the purpose of a guaninteo from our own President of the appolntnteut
at once by hlni of a special conimlssion of some such Chrstlan statesmen, negro
Hlucational t xi)ert8, military, legal, and religious representatives as Hon. .Tallies
H. Dillard, Virginia; MaJ. Moton, principal of Tuskefree, Ala.; In*. J. B. Gaiu-
brell, president of southern Baptists, whose convention of .3.0()(MKM> mem-
bers decided to evauffelize Haiti throu;:h breakdown of small, inetficient, ami
incompetent negio connn.ttee (Texas) : Hon. (Jetn-gc* Peabody. philanthropist.
New York; Dr. (Tilbert X. Brink, education secretary of Latin America, Pliila-
deli>hia. Pa.; Dr. Thomas .lesse .lones, author of standard work on the traiulnjr
institutions for colored and nejrro industrial schools, oflicially indorsetl by
United States (Joveruinent. Washiiifittui, D. ('. ; Uev. J. J. Curran, well-known
Uonian Cjitliolic social and temperance reformer, IVnnsylvan'a ; Dr. Robert K.
Speer, president of Latin-American cooperative iii'iss.onary connnittoe. New
York; Admiral Caperton, riiite<l States (iovernment's oflicer of present admin-
istration, who first landed the marines in Haiti, July, 191.'>; with, as clurriaan
and lepil advis^T of same, (Miarles E. llu«hes, ex-Justice of the Unitetl States
Supreme Court; and s<> .ms to carefully and thoroughly investljj:ate Haitian
nffairs and fornmlate a siini»le plan whereby to develop the ne^ro republic and
its people accordint; to the treaty made and sjrned by President Woodrow Wil-
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IXQUIKY INTO OCCl'PATlOX OF HAITI AND SAKTO DOMINGO. 146
son's representntivt' on th«» one part luid n*i>!vsoiitntlve of tin* Haitian Ueinibli<'
on the other in Wasliin^rton, D. i\. May, VMil
This i» exartly as requestwl by Haiti, as tar as this little nation lias \)een
I>enn!ttefl to express Itself through me as its representative, and clonfan<le<l In
that meiijoranduni presented the President through Mr. Tumulty and Mr. Uohert
Lansing through his eontidential clerk, two years ago, atid expressly prepare<l
in a tyi)e\vritten and printed form setting forth the grievances of Ha.ti, with
recoumiendations, at rwpiest <»f Senator Hitclicock and one Stabler, sivretary
of the Latin-American section of the State Department, in charge of Haitian
affairs, as well as the recpiest of the executive conuiuttee of the American negro
rare congress at its duly couvenetl meeting in the city of i Washington, !>. (\.
October 23. 1918.
The alM>ve sei-retary of the Latin-Anft?rican section of the State I)ei)artinenl,
liowever, thought it a part of his (ioverinnent ottic'al duties and as a diidomat
in siH»<?ial charge of Haitian affairs, and while Mrs. Kvans and myself were
absent on the Haiti ndssion field, with no knowledge of what was going on nor
any opixjrtunity to defend ourselves, to enter with others into collusion with
negro members df our Haiti c<mmiittee in North Caroliiui, Hichmond, and Bal-
timore, it seems, not only to deliberately and falsely uusrepresent us and our
work in Haiti, but to take further mean advantage of our morally weak and
intellectually in4'omi>etent negro brethren of above nrissiouary comm'ttee by
secret intrigue and political, if not also by finan<*ial, influence to abruptly, with-
out the knowledge or consent of the I^ott Carey Colorecl Baptist Convention or
its general foreign mlssionaif^ board, and without absolutely any chance of
investigation, to cut off our small, irregularly paid salaries at the moment I
was pihing on the hanl, bare floor of an old French negro slave i>rison cell
in a tropical country, literally gasping for a breath of air.
On learning that my tyi>ewrltten copy of memorandum and petition in behalf
of Haiti, in spite of urgency and the i)ersonal pronnse of se<-retary of I^i tin-
American w»ctlon. etc., to present it innnediately to the Sei-retary of State and
for the Pres'dent. still remaliie«l In his own office tu* j)lgeonhole<l 12 flays after,
I at once handed another and a printed copy (»f menirorandum. including a duly
sworn affidavit to facts contained therein, through Mr. Tumulty at the White
Hoase for l»res"dent, with another printed copy, etc.,* on same day through his
confldent'al clerk to Mr. Lansing at the State I)ei)artment, and also fundshed
several c<ipies to Senator Ilitchcok. for members of Senate Foreign Uelations
Committee, of which he was cluiirman, on the d.-iy I interviewe<l him at the
foreign Senate chambers, with a delegation of some 12 CUiristlan ministers^
< white ami coh»re<l) and representing national negro Baptist conventions, Lott
r'arey negro c<mvention; colored Methmlists; white Ihijdists (Norlh and South),
Baptist ministers and Baptist associations (white) of District of Columbia, fe<l-
eral council of the Churches of Chr st in America, as well as the president of
the negro nuv congress, pleading with him to arrange an interview with the
President.
The Hon. A. A. Adee, on November 2. 1918, wrote acklowleilglng receipt of
memorandani directed to President, as stated in previous letters, and in which
he officially informed me that the grave conditions set forth therein " were ac-
tually at that moment " (of his writing) " receiving the most serious con-
sideration of the Department of State, as well as all the other branches of the
Government directly concerned in Haiti."
He further assured me that the department would connnunicate with me
at a later date, "after the careful study of the matters contained in memo-
randum." Though now two years have passed not a single word has been
received from either Mr. Tumulty or Second Assistant Secretary of State as
to the result of the Government's own so-called private and ofllcial investi-
gation, if indeed such an " investigation " was ever seriously contemplated, not
to say undertaken.
Hence this deliberate and criminal neglect in a matter of vital and urgent
importance in a close island of the Caribbean Sea, and touching our honor as
a Nation, and directly affecting the life and death of thousands of helpless
Negroes, pointed out at the time in memorandum, and this flat refusal of
President to appoint conunission to thonmghly investigate, or the responsible
departments of the administration themselves to take action after giving an
official assurance to do so, thus allowing things to take their own course and
drift from bad to worse is directly responsible not simply for the continuance
of those drunken and brutal white and colored officials of the "American
occupation," referred to in the said memorandum, in their innnoral and bar-
baric conduct unchecked. (^r^r\n]i>
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146 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
But tiiiB deliberate and criminal neglect is responsible for their encourage-
nientt and their growing more daring and defiant in their brutality and sav-
agery, with consequently more murders among whites as well as blacks, and at
last culminating in the infamous " official conspiracy " of illegally invading a
private study, without summons, arresting, street parading under armed guard.
imprisoning, inhumanly treating with malicious and murderous intent of a
white civilian American citizen and a Protestant and Baptist missionary.
Such indeed was the disgrace and scandal at this high-handed, arbitrary,
brutal attack of "American occupation " officials, unheard of and unknown De-
fore in the history of the Negro Kepublic, even in the bloodiest revolutionary
period, and such tl^e moral shock, profound indignation, and bitter re^sentment
of the natives that the Negro high court of St. Marc felt compelled, for hu-
manity's sake, to at last interfere, call a session extraordinare, and demand
(though in so doing they risked their job.s, and even their own lives, the
** occupation '* officials being supreme) that the white American officers bring
the United States citizen and Baptist missionary at once from his confined cell
so as to be legally tried, with the result stated, that on examination every
trumpery charge completely broke down, the officers of the "American occupa-
tion" Implicated commanded to immediately set fi-ee the missionary, and
what remained of the little raped and robbed Negro Republic called upon to
protect him and his Christian work, the court adding that for the grave in-
justice done and cruel suffering inflioted the Haiti law decreetl that on demand
a substantial indemnity be paid.
I have sincerely believed and stoutly maintained, Mr. Secretary, for clase
on three years, a.s you may see from the uieni(»ran<lnm in yimr po>>sessi<)n —
(1) That our President and administration at Washington would welcome
real facts and correct and true statement as to exact conditions in ixwr
Haiti ; that you would not hesitate to move for an imimrtial investigation, as
I told Senator Hitchcock when pleading with him to see the President more
than two years ago, by a competent commission, and that the very moment such
unjustifiable blunders, wrongs, crimes, political frauds, military atrocities,
slamming of senate and chamber's doors in face of people's representatives, as
late Czar to his sorrow did with the Russian people's duma, not indeed to
mention the further infamous rape of the Negro constitution and putting up
of a figurehead and a puiipet Negro president by the responsible "American
occupation " a? a bluflC and blind, but immediately seen through and resented
as an insult by rank and file, as well as intelligent and educated Haitians, were
proven and shown beyond a doubt to have been the real causes of the complete
reversion of feeling toward the "American occupation," hatred for the United
States (government, and actual contempt for our American flag you would
have instantly aOted.
Is it not sad indeed to have to state that after nearly five years of the "Ameri-
can occupation" operations in Haiti, under (mr 1 XMnocratic- administration,
the people of the little black republic sincerely and firmly believe that the real
mission of the United States Government and the American people there is to
reestablish slavery in their midst once more ; abrogate and annul the work of
Toussant Loverture (their Washington and Lincoln), Just exactly as in the
nineteenth century Napoleon, then the terror, tyrant, and bloody Kaiser of
Euroi)e, which France, treacherously tried, but ignominiously failed, after a
waste of millions of dollars, nn<l a loss of 40.()00 of their proud, profligate
soldiers, who were as much killed by the negroes' rum, the negroes' yellow
fever, as by the negroes' sword, and which apparently Almighty God had suni-
moned as powerful allies to assist these despised, and inferiorly equipped blacks,
in their gallant, righteous, and then successful struggles for personal liberty
and national independence over 100 years ago; and .lu.st as Americans under
George Washington a few years before had successfully fought to break away
from the conservative oppression and the Tory tyranny of old England and its
then proud and Prussian King.
(2) It was my own firm belief furthermore, based upon Pivsident Wilson's
own address at Washington's tomb July 4, 1918. a careful study of his fourteen
points, and his courageous and unflinching stand against Germany and central
powers; with the principles he and our Representatives in Congress enunciated
and declared, echoed by the whole American Nation, on our entering into, as
well as throughout the World W^ar, which, by the way, with his photo from
Philadelphia Ledger, with Washington on one side, and immortal Lincoln on
the other, I had prominently hanging up in my study down in Haiti, not to
mention his present attitude on the European treaty and League of Nations, to
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IXQriRY INTO OC'CUPATIOX OF HAITI ANT) SANTO DOMINGO. 147
which the whole Democrath* Party is ooiiuiiitte<l niul morally our whole Aineri-
cun people. In fact, and in some form or another —
That the President and administnitiou would therefore seize on the first
jwssible opportunity "to indignantly repudiate" all such acts, not merely in
his own behalf and the (;(>vernimmt, but in behalf of the whole American people,
and immediately proceed in a statesmanlike manner to carry out the recom-
mendations of said commission, appointed by himself, and in this black republic,
closely bound to us by a sacred treaty — he wouhl witlumt hesitation apply these
nrii principlci*. he rijjhtly insisted that Germany and all Euroi^e, and indeed
the world, should be made to adopt by he himself establishing at the close of
the war a civil occupation in Haiti, through at once re<>pening of senate and
chamber of deputies, and by also the complete restoration of the rajied consti-
tution.
Moreover, that he would in the spirit, and according to the wording of the
;ienerous treaty, have initiated with indorsement (after due explanation) by the
Haitian senate and chamliers, such industrial, economical, fls<»al. and educa-
tional reforms as would at once win the implicit confidence of the natives, and
absolutely convince these Negroes, whom we must not forget have been per-
sistently and systematically deceived, betrayed, explolte<l, and plundered for
the last 100 years by Europeans, and so-called white friends, under religious,
commercial, and phinalthropic pleas, and pretenses, consisting of priests, poli-
ticians, profiteers, if not a few Protestants, unfortunately, but Invariably some-
where back of their revolutions, for which Negroes themselves are blame<l.
And that our United States Government would sh(»w as stipulates! In our
sacred covenant, that we are in Haiti first, last, and all. the time to protect
the negro republic as much indeed from the horde of American land grabbers,
white and colored, as from (^erman, French, Dutch, or even British and Irish
UDscnipulous and dishonest spe<'ulators. thus proving beyond the shadow of a
doubt to Haiti, America, and the whole .world — that our iniHHion in the small
black republir U mjne other than humane and henrvolent, as a {treat eirilizing,
if not Christianizing, \ation to honorablu eurrj/ out the terms of our generous
and honestly meant treaty.
If, however, I am seriously mistaken in my estimate of our President aittd
absolute sincerity of his administration, and that after two years of persistent
flenial. shown by the silence of Hitchcock, Tumulty, and A dee, the Navy De-
imrtment, in complete charge of Marines in Haiti, as well as gendarmerie, and
through you as Secretai*j\ will further delay or decline to listen to present
and final ap|)eal In behalf of Haiti, and now also for myself, then as a duty to
myself and family, and more especially to these nearly 3,000,000 Negroes, who,
with their leaders, are alhsolutely gagged while their country Is pillaged, their
constitution raped, and iHH)ple butchered by hyphenated Americans who as
officials feign represent our own (iovernnient and llberty-lovlng nation, who
l)elleve in a squarq deal, I shall now have to comply with the personal advice of
my illustrious friend and sincere friend of Haiti, the late ex-President Theodore
Koosevelt, revered and never more lamente<l In the black republic than at this
moment of their dire distress, and given me in his last letter from his New
York office in Madison Avenue November 2, 191S. on the eve of my own last
and never to be forgotten visit from the States to my old missionary field of
Haiti. This advice was, that after falling in my efforts with President Wilson
and his administration, whose duty was to right their own Democratic wrongs
in Haiti, then to immeillately approach the Republican Party, who with such
leaders as Root, Hughes, Taft, IiO<lge. Knox, .Tohnson, and, say, Harding, would
not fail me and the Negroes of Haiti the numient they were given the oppor-
tunity.
Should I now therefore, bo compelled to direct my Haiti appeal to Marion I
shall no doubt be welcomed by Senator Harding, Republican nominee for the
prosidencj', and also the Republican- leaders if it were only as an eyewitness of
the heartless, criminal, and scandalous rape committed upon this, small, help-
less Negro Republic by her big neighbor and wealthy, strong sister Republic of
the United States, official ly bound by a sacred treaty, signed and ratified in
Washington during this World War May, 1916, and in which treaty the present
administration solemnly pledged. If necessary, to use the United States powerful
fleet and whole Amvy of Uncle Sam to jealously protect and safely defend her
a^rainst all nations, etc.
They will be also glad to greet me as the only one American citizen doing
missionary work there, and privileged on the spot, and therefore before the
raiKi was committed, to strongly protest in my own behalf, and even in behalf of
British and French white protestant Christian missionaries of Haiti, not to
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148 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
mention the broken-hearted ex-senators, ex-deputies, weeping judges of "Ameri-
can occupation," with ex-Judges, lawyers, doctors, Negro preachers, and natives
in general, and with whom I came in contact everywhere throughout the whole
Republic as a missionary superintendent.
All my endeavors to reach the President at Washington and so as to save us
as Americans from this great humiliation and prevent us from being called a
Government of hypocrites and termed a Nation of traitors, classed, indeed,
with Germany and her now ex-Kaiser in that nefarious rape of Belgium, an-
other small country, and under so-called military necessity, viewing their own
treaty as a mere "scrap of paper," were all at that time, as they have been
since intercepted, before the censorship was applied to Haiti, and purposely and
most deliberately and determinedly frustrated by either incompetent or
profiteering officials, or both, in Haiti and at Washington, with the sad condi-
tions and disgrace herein described as the logical and inevitable result, and as
truthfully set forth by Senator Harding in his Marion address.
As l)eing the oldest white missionary, as well as then the only American
citizen laboring in the black Republic, and who for years had used his influ-
ence with our United States Government and in behalf of Haiti presidents, and
the Republic's leaders during Roosevelt's, Taft's, and the present administra-
tion, and visited 2^Ir. Adee at our State Department more than once so as to
beseech Uncle Sam to cou^ to Haiti's rescue and act the part of a big brother,
as the late President Theodore Roosevelt and Gen. Wood, under the Republican
administration, for instance, did in Cuba. I therefore felt not only proud of the
1916 treaty, but had unflinching faith in the integrity of our President Woodrow
Wilson, and sincerity of our responsible Democratic administration this treaty
would be live<l up to. Hence, the first intimation, followed by an announcement
In the Monitor, Haiti's official paper, that the •* American occupation " proposed
to radically change the constitution of the Negro Republic personally startled
me and of course caused a moral shock throughout Haiti and de<'lared as illegal^
immoi*al, and dishonest everywhere.
At first I thought it a foolish, though senseless, hoax, but when assured by
Intelligent, excited, and half-frenzied natives of Its truth, then I declared that
any such document proposing to take negro lands and give to whites, etc., must
have been inspired at some German headquarters in New York or Chicago, and
by hyphenated Americans with Berlin money at the back of It. It was decidedly.
I thought, the work of persons jealous of our "American occupation," who were
determined not merely to kill our (then) American growing Influence in the
black republic, but, in fact, intriguing with the enemy (the Unite<l States had
by this time Joined Britain and the Allies in the war), the overthrow of Presi-
dent Wilson, and the downfall of his administration.
I immediately, therefore, as a loyal American, left Sr. Marc, our home in
Haiti, for Port-au-Prince, from where on the '5th of June. 1918. and having been
first officially denied the opportunity of cabling the White House, Washington.
I sent a registered letter to President Wilson, explaining the consternation la
Haiti, respectfully demanding postponement of so-called " voting " on new con-
stitution, with an appointment by him of a committee to at once investigate
matters so as to avoid this public and national scandal, but this registered letter
was Intercepted by the President's own private sei'retary, or at the State De-
partment.
Anticipating this, however, from reliable inf(>rmatlon to hand, as to relations
between officials in Haiti and at W^ashlngton, witli certain financial projects in
the island, I sent also another registered letter the very same day to ex-Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt at Oyster Bay. N. Y., inclosing therein a copy of that
written our President, with my special reason for adopting this unusual course.
The latter was safely recelve<l at Sagamore Bay, and a courteous reply duly-
arrived.
Definite information conveyed in this, with additional evidence supplied,
though it failed to move Senator Hitchcock, etc., enabled ex-President Roose-
velt in his criticism of the 14 points, etc., to emphatically declare through
the As.«?ociated Press, as appeared in Washington papers October 23, 1918 —
*' That the Xegro Republic of Haiti was nonexistent under the Democratic
administration, in spite of their treaty," and which the (ii»vernnient at Wash-
ington dared not then nor since his death to deny.
All the.<?e letters and copies of other communications in Haiti and with Gov-
ernment I have in my possession, including photograph of President, my wife,
and two little lads, with Hon. Adee's official acknowledgment of memorandimi,
and assurance of the Government's investigation, " serious consuileration " of
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 149^
sad conditions in Haiti, etc., wliich were on me wlien arrested, paraded through
pablic streets, under armed guard, but taken' from me in prison when searched,
aad thrown into my cell at the stem command of United States* white captain of
the "occupation."
I have also the photograph of the negro judge advocate, the poor natives un-
known to myself had engaged to assist in my defense at the aforesaid high
court, but whom like the rest was too terrified to attempt to visit my strictly
confined cell for fear of being shot.
I have, in addition to these, a photograph of myself surrounded by native
Christians, which was taken in the far interior, and four days after my re-
lease and with my prison-grown beard. I was en route for the cape (extreme
north) driven midnight of same day the high court set me free (and by same
white captain, under threats of using military force, and in a small boat), to the
open Caribbean Sea, for another trial, with probable Imprisonment before me, if
not this time certain death.
When the capital of the north, Cape Haiti, was at last reached, having been :
warned never to preach in that section, threatened to be shot by a white,,
excited, and intoxicated American officer who, ignoring and sneering at Secre-
tary Lansing's official letter, and another of an American captain of that section,
wildly raved like a maniac, and before the terrorized native Christians, who
accompanied me to his American headquarters, openly cursed God, Christianity,
declaring Christian ministers and missionaries to be imposters and hypocrites.
I foond that the "malicious conspiracy" of our American official drunken*
crowd had suddenly c<41ai»ed.
This poor Negro judge, forced, like others, by the officials, assured me and
my witnesses there was absolutely no legal charge brought against me, and that
he had just been communicated with to drop everything. My own presence
with British, French (white), and native witnesses, and the St. Marc's high
coort judgment must have evidently filled the conspirators with consternation,
confusion, and fear, if not shame.
Unless this reproach upon the honesty, veracity, not to say honor, of our
American people, which I sincerely sought to prevent, but through American
officialism absolutely so far failed, is now immediately and irrevocably eradi-
cated and w'ped out forever, such treacherous conduct can not fail to recoil
npon our whole nation, as, for instance, the betrayal of those negroes of the
CJongo Free State, Africa, recently was revisited upon Belgium; and even the
capture and banishment of Napoleon to St. Helena by the British swiftly and
inevitably followed his own treachercms treatment of Toussaint, " the Moses
of Haiti and Savior of the Blacks," for in the inspiring words of this great
African chief and noble as well as gallant general, to Brunet, his French captor
(as he bound him in chains on transferring him from the frigate Creole to the
French man-of-war, the Heron, off Cape Haiti, the beginning of last century,
to be sent to his cruel and shameful torture and death In the south of France),
lioverture said :
"You may Indeed to-day cut down the tree of the negro's liberty and inde-
riendence, but the roots are so deep and profound that the trunk will soon sprout
and grow again In Haiti."
In closing this statement and further reiteration of present sad conditions,
and making my last appeal in spite of the startling published admission and most
damaging confession of your late Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Hon. Frank-
lin Roosevelt (cause of my suspicion June 5, 1918, and justifying my own
writing to ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, as well as President Wilson), and
further, the fact that our President and the administration's present term of
office and exercise of power are about to expire, to be followed, possibly by a
Republican (Jovemment, I still confidently believe that if the President and
yoarseK will only respond to poor Haiti's cry. Immediately act and seriously
and courageously undertake to right the Republic's wrongs along such lines
as set forth herein and as pointed out two years ago In the memorandum pre-
seated, not only law and order will be at once established, but real peace and ab-
•^iute confidence will also follow throughout Haiti ; yes, including the mountain
fastnefwes where the supposed Cacos are said to dwell, etc.
This would not fail to secure for President, yourself, and administration
(and oor whole American Nation) the undying gratitude of these misunder-
stood and maligned but kind-hearted negroes, and even the sincere admiration
of the whole civilized and Christian world.
Allow me to add that as a pioneer missionarj- with over 25 years of unique ex-
perience in Haiti: with an intimate acquaintance of these negroes of every re-
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150 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
lipioiiK creed and political ijersuasiou throughout the Republic (which I have
ajrain and a;?aiii tiiaveled through by day and by night, even in times of revo-
lutions, without either a revolver or a knife) and as an American citizen
and missionary lecturer on " Haiti's past, present, and future," givai thousands
of times in churches, ministers' conferences, colleges, associations, and con-
ventions in States (North and South), England, Wales Jamaica, Cuba, thus
internationally known among Baptists and leading evangelicals, to finally be-
seech you to heed Haiti's imperative demand for justice at the hands of the
United States.
I have sincerely desired and earnestly praye<l you might give me the op-
portunity, pleasure, and delight, not only to defend, but applaud, from Maine
to the Pacific and from Dakotas to Gulf, as well as In other lands (from pulpit
and press), President Wilson and his administration's sound, constructive, if
not regenerative work and creation in fact of a peaceful, prosperous, and
model negro republic in land of I^)verture, superstitious, priest-ridden, illiter-
ate, distracted, politically exploite<l, revolutionary torn, financial and morally
bankrupt only a few years ago. thus showing the world the potential future
of the whole Negro race.
Yes: if, by your present prompt action I am indexed now peruiitte<l. it will l>e
a pleasure in describing Haiti as the unfortunate man referretl to by Christ
in the parable, waylaid, rolibed, and bleeding from every iwre, l>etween
Jerusalem and Jericho, to express also my joy, that while others pas8e<l by on
the other side, in the Providence of a merciful (iod who created of one blood
all nations, it was our own wealthy, strong, and powerful Unlteil States Gov-
ernment and great American Nation under Christian leadership of courageous
and competent statesman. President Wilson, which came along an<l playe^l the
rOle of good Samaritan.
Whether my prayer will be answere<l. and desire gratlfietl now, and Haiti's
bleeding wounds shall be healed, or this waylaid black republic shall be further
plundered and butchered, is, therefore, now up to you and President, sir.
Sincerely, yours, for CinMst, Haiti, and humanity,
L. Ton Kvaxs.
The Skcrotaby of the Navy,
WaMhinffton, October iS, J920.
:ilv Deak Sir: In the absence of Secretaiy Daniels, I wish to acknowledge
receipt of your letter of October 5. Upon the Secretary's return to the city I
will bring the matter to his attention.
Very truly, yours,
KnwAun K. Kiutton, Private Secretary.
Mr. L. Ton Evans,
JUvthyn, Wyoming, Pa.
STATEMENT OF KEV. L. TON EVANS, WYOMING, PA. (AND LATE
OF HAITI).
The Chaikman. Mr. Evans, will you give your name and address?
Mr. Evans. My name is L. Ton Evans.
The Chairman. Your address?
Mr. Evans. Shice returning from Haiti my residence is at Wyoming, Pa.
The Chairman. Your puriHjse of vocation in Haiti?
Mr. Evans. I have been pioneer missionary and field secretary of the Baptists
of the United States.
The Chairman. In Haiti?
Mr. Evans. Yes: in Haiti, and for, altogether, 28 years either in Haiti or
si)eaking and pleading in behalf of Haiti and the Haitian people throughout the
United States and in England and Wales.
The CHAHtMAN. Were you In Haiti during the years inuuedialely i)rece<lini:
the occupation?
Mr. Evans. Yes; many years before.
Tlie CHAUiMAN. During the years imme<liately preceiling the occupation?
Mr. Evans. I left at the beginning of 3912, and again returned with mv familv
in 1017. * .
The CHAHtMAN. And from 1917 until when were you in Haiti?
:Mr. Evans. From 1017 to April of 1019, when I returned to the States.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 151
The Chairman. Then your knowledge of conditions prior to the occupation
terminated in 1912, or three years before the occupation took place?
Mr. EvANB. Personally, yes ; but early in 1912 I had a long private interview
with the late President I..econte at the palace in Port au Prince, and brought
several requests from him to our State Department here at Washington, but
the d^>artment failed to act.
The Chairman. Let us go back to the period prior to your departure in 1912.
How long were you in the Republic of Haiti consecutively before you left
in 1912?
Mr. Evans. I was there from 1908, though I made a short visit to Jamaica
and officially as delegate to Baptist World Alliance in Philadelphia in the
meantime.
The Chairman. Until the year 1912?
Mr. Evans. Until 1912 ; but as superintendent missionary I frequently visited
the States and other countries, churches, and societies, returning again to
Jaemel, In the southeast, where I resided, though as field secrtary and superin-
tendent my work took me all over the Republic.
The Chaibman. How many missionaries were under your direction as super-
intendent, or how many missions, let me say?
Mr. E>ANS. Well, altogether, we had over 1,000 members at that time in
something like 16 churches, 12 mission stations with 8 missionaries and 20
native preachers or assistants, and In addition 15 or more teachers In our day
schools.
The Chaibman. How many American missionaries were under your super-
vision in Haiti?
Mr. Evans. Eight I was the only American citizen, however, among all
Protestant ministers at that time in Haiti. Several of these native mission-
aries and one white French citizen ^vere educated here in the States.
62269— 21— PT 2 4
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152 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 153
" The 15 church buildings are of stone, or in Spanish walls, comfortable, and
free of debt, but the two marketl ♦ not ftiiished. St. Marc, tlie larj^est Protesumt
church on island, has $200 debt with $200 more addeil in v»ui*<'liasing a valuable
lot adjoining for parsonage and wonmn's training school. This, witii $100 to
complete church (now 25 years in building), makes total iiidebtc4lne?<s .*p500, t>r
'2JM gourdes.
•*Tlie 6 wattling-built and covertMl witli brush ro4>f linve sitles roveivd with
mud, whitewashed within and without, conf<tructed by tlie vciluiitary labor of
the people of the immediate section, anxitms for a place of worship and the
preaching of the evangel in their midst They are In all country places, and
mark the first stage of the cause, and as such serve their purpose well ; they
are replacetl by substantial churches as the mission progresses, nnd funds
come in.
" Of the 9 with mark t 7 are merely wattled-made houses ,or huts, small and
inconvenient, and simply meant for temi)orao- us<\ and as yet really i)rea<liing
stations.
"Since the burning down of our substantial and comfortable churches at the
important towns of Portdepaix and Cape Haiti, with a population of 7,0<K) and
30.000 or more, respectively, the few believers now in the f<n*nier worship at
the native preacher's own home, while the latter hold divine worsliip and their
preaching service in a house whose rent is paid for by the Haiti Government.
"To command the respect of all classes of Haitians, and Government repre-
sentatives and other Americans coming here just Baptists must have substantial
churches and comfortable Christian homes in the cities and towns ahuig the
i-oast These and a parsonage are essential for a mi98ionar>- so as to be inde-
pendent and devote himself whole-heartedly to aggressive evangelism, and
making it absolutely unnecessary to (X)mprom:se the board, denomination, as
well as church and himself, by accepting Government ai<l of any kin<l."
Senator Pomebene. Black were they?
The Chairman. Were they native Haitians?
Mr. EvAXs. Native Haitians; yes.
The Chaibman. Negro citizens of the Rei)ublic?
Mr. EXans. Yes; of the Republic, but educated some of them at the Bai^tist
Theological Seminary, Newton Center, Mass. — New England.
The Ch AMMAN. Will you tell the conuuittee, in your own way, briefly, your
estimate of the Government of Haiti during the years from 1908 to 1012; the
(X>ndition of public order, the security of the Haitian citizen in his i)erson and
hi his property. The administration of justice and, in short, the various asi)ects
'»f the Haitian (lovernment state?
Mr. E^'ANS. I am sorry to say that ctm<liiions were far from satisfactory. In
fact there were periodical political disturbances, which at tines culminated in
bloody fights, and followed by devastation of the country, discouraging the
people, all but crushing their native aspirations, and hope of ever becondng tit
to take their place among surrounding nations. It is but fair to add, however,
that I found the people of Haiti, a simple, innocent, peace-loving, if not the
most kind-hearted I ever met with. During all the yeai's sjient there, and I
frequently traveled night and day all over the country, even the most <nit-
landish. alone and without a guide, and never carr'ed any weai>on. even <luring
the exciting peri (mIs of revolutions. Once only did the natives make an attempt
to attack me. an<l then It was through my own aggressiveness in penetrating
into the mysteries of devil worshii) — vo<Klooism and the tiemon dance ; the
voodoo pri<*st. known as papa-lol, who actimlly le4l in what appeared to be a
ferocious attack, has been long convertnl. and many of his followers, while the
papa-loi has l)een one of our faithful assistant preachers in that section f<>r
.vears.
Back of tliese revolutions to my own knowledge, and c<nnmonly known through-
oot Haiti, has always been the white man. and the white man's money, and
among whom have been at times British, American. French, and other Euroi)ean,
hot chief among these the last 20 years has been a strong German element, I
regret to say. I brought these conditions, with main causes of the political dis-
turbances, during 1902, by means of a letter before President The<Mlore Roose-
velt—which I shall put In the record — and came to Washingtcm again during
l*re8ldent Taft's and the beginning of President Wilson's administrati<»ns.
specially pointing out this fact, and urging fmr (tovernnient to come to Haiti,
and Haitians* defense.
Merchants throughout Haiti, the nmjority of whom are (Jermans. have been
all along acting either as consuls, or vice consuls of their European, (Jovenn-
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154 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
ment, hence are in Haiti unfortunately in this dual capacity. These aiv really
the invisible but potent political forces back of the Haitian revolutions.
HAITIAN CIVIL WAU.
MorxT Vkhnon, Euwahdsvili.k, Pa., August 20 ^ 1902.
I»resi(1ent Koosevelt.
Sir : I beg very respectfully to call your special attention to a matter from
political and humanitarian point of view is of urgent Importance, viz: The
]>resent revolutionary war that is now being waged in north and south Haiti,
and causing such misery and suffering not to mention cruel bloodshed by
assassination and murder.
The barbaric methods adopted to establish certain political parties in power
and which are ^uch frequent occurrence both in Haiti and Santo Domingo,
and among peoples of the same race, religion, and language are not by any
means initiated by the masses, but are simply the work of a few greedy office
seekers who subordinate and sncriflce the public welfare to their own personal
and sordid interests.
For many years past these revolutionary movements, bring disaster and
desolation to the conntry in general and people In particular, mentally and
morally, by denying necessary security for life and property, thwarting per-
sonaJ enteri)rise and legitimate developments along commercial lines, thus com-
pletely crushing national aspirations to rise in the march of progress and
civilization, although as a race they have now been politically free for more
than 100 years.
These constant upheavals, fraught with so much ruin and loss of life, and
which the island seems utterly unable to resist, are the work as already stated
of a few natives, mostly refuges, residing In Jamaica and France, and aided
by European and American money lenders, who financially support and other-
wise fomented them. Amnuinition for such purpose is smuggled in from above
two places, where these plots are planned and hatched by Europeans, especially
Germans.
While rejoicing at your Government's prompt action in dispatching a gunboat
to aid American citizens in the north (Cai)e Haitian), yet from high ^wlltlcal
as well as humanitarian reasons, may 1 str6ngly urge upon you also the ad-
visability of extending the same protection at least for life to the defenseless
natives thenmelves here, and In other cities along the coast, where they are
left at the mercy of these unscrupulous, unprincipled avaricious and murderous
luauraders whose one desire is to get a firm grip hold of the small Republic^*
purse strings so as to enrich themselves and few following at the expense of
robbing the whole conuuunity, and keeping the eountry In abject poverty.
Should you be able to offer this protection and to safeguard the Island
from this policy of rapine and plunder long persued by dishonest political ex-
ploiters, I can assure you, sir, tliat hundreils of thousands of the sons of Ham
throughout that region would feel forever grateful to the United States, look
at such benevolent interposition as nothing less than a godsend, the dawn
of long looked and much prayed for <lay of deliverance and the inauguration at
last of a new era : after many years in a state of ixilitical and moral sul>-
jugation, worse, if possible, than that of slavery in olden days.
in advising and urging this immediate Interference I am by no means in-
sensible to the delicate nature ot the task, and certainly some of the apparent
risks which sudi a procedure involves.
Yet is it not innnoral. <-niel, yes criminal, that poor Haiti, like the man of
old who fell among thieves on the highway to .Jericho, robbed, wounded, and
bleeding froiii every ^jore, .should be severely left alone in her blood to pine and
die, simply for fear of being misunderstood or of arousing the suspicion and
jealousy of some other nation? Such risks are certainly more imaginary than
real.
If this gi'eat conmionwealth that without a single moment's delay rushed
\o tlie aitl of Fort I>e France recently, showed its practical sympathy with and
gave its generous help to the sorrow-stricken inhabitants of Martinique and
SI. Vincent, were again, and in this case, to play the part of the Good Samari-
tan, and with ov without the cooperation of England act as guarantors or
guarantor for order and gocnl government, and see that the laws governing
elections, as stipulated by the Constitution, were rigidly enforced, you would
further merit the unstinted prai.^e and unbounded admiration of the civilized
world.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 155
It is quite patent to all that those who now pretend to rule Haiti are politi-
cally as well as morally utterly unfit ; and that the sad and heart-rendhig state
of affairs in that island constitutes a serious menace to the best interests of
England and the States, which, if continued, must reflect discreditably upon
these two great powers so immediately concerned in the Carribean Sea.
The practice of appointing storekeepers and merchants who do business with
the natives, and who so often benefit financially by these internal troubles as
official and semiofficial r^resentatives of foreign Governments, is neither calcu-
lated to inspire confidence in the inhabitants nor likely to add to oflicial ef^-
ciency in the discharge of their duties to their respective governments.
The cost of supervising the island, as suggested, if thought practical, might .
be easily borne by Haiti itself, seeing the advantages derived from such a
course. The expenses would be more than saved by disbanding the present
army (for should the States safeguard the shores from invasions by foreign
powers and political filibusters) so that the men can go home to cultivate their
grounds and otherwise develop their country — a small number only retained
merely to police the interior and preserve law and order in cities along the
coast*?.
In addition to the immense benefits bestowed upon these Republics, such as
placing the race in a position to work out Its political and social salvatioUr
this great Commonwealth would once more demonstrate to the world at large
her posifon in the forefront of governments, which seeks to use her great
power and mighty influence not to add territorial possessions and increase her
wealth, but for something higher and nobler, viz, to protect the weak against
the strong, to establish law and order where now chaos and terror reign su-
preme, to encourage honest industry, to further national progress, yea, to de-
velop and advance the truest and best form of civilization.
An expression of sympathy with above object and appeal, and especially of
hearty willingness, with or without the cooperation of England, to take im-
mediate steps in this matter so as to save further suffering and prevent blood-
shed, will be esteemed a great favor.
In behalf of hundreds of thousands of neglected and downtrodden negroes
of Haiti.
Yours, very sincerely,
L. Ton Evans,
Field Secretary and Baptist Pioneer Missionary in Haiti.
Mr. Evans. While dealing with this phase of the question in fixing respon
sibility I should point to the committee, how intelligent, educated Haitians,
and there are quite a number of smart and bright persons among the better
class, with a touch of French ix>liteness and some refinement after years of
training in the schools, colleges, and universities of Paris, return to their
island home with changed ideas and altogether different, and in many respects
higher aspirations. Their education and classical training in Europe makes
them dissatisfied with conditions in Haiti, and properly so.
The Chairman. Now, if you will not go too far afield, Mr. Evans, what is the
bearing of the education of these Haitians on the machinations of the foreigners
when incited to revolution?
Mr. Evans. The direct bearing of it is this, that being discontente<l with
cfmditions in Haiti, and moved with a strong desire and newly enkindled
patriotism as the result of their training in Paris and contact with Europeans,
and having nothing special to do in poor Haiti they become an easy prey to
foreigners, and the white man with political intentions and profiteering desires,
to be used and exploited by them under the pretence that an overthrow of the
president and change of government will result, and, indee<l, is inevitable to
the bettering of conditions and development of the Black Republic.
Senator Pomerene. Do I understand you to mean that they become the prey
of these foreign elements?
Mr. Evans. Exactly so, through their dissatisfaction with Haiti's very low
and backward condition, and often a burning love for their countr>% with desire
for the betterment of Haiti, mostly inexperienced, unsuspecting the white
foreigner*s motive, and that they merely meant to exploit them and their country
and get a firm grip of the Kepublic^'s purse strings — customs.
Senator Pomerene. I take it that your thought is that those foreigners are
there for the purpose of exploiting rather thnn for the improvement of the
country?
Mr. Evans. I would not like to put it in that way in reference to all for-
eigners. There might have been other motives nt first, but seeing a fine op-
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156 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SAKTO DOMINGO.
portuiiit.v for <*xi»l<)itation anion;:: these ^(kmI natiirod, innocent, impoverislwl.
yet unskllle<l. tlion^li somewhat eihicated iMMiple. these foreifjners, and espeoinlly
Germans, have been ea^rer to take- full advantage of it, also opposinpr by every
means and actually stultifyhi}: Haiti's efforts to disentanjrle itself from Ger-
mans, and their intrigues when discovered, so as to ally itself with the Uniteil
States and sei»k our (rovernnuMit's closer friendship and jrcMHl will and |»ractical
encourajjemeut aiul prote<*tlon to develop their own rich res<mrces. being j;h»-
Kraphically their closest iiei^hlMU*, in fact.
The Chairman. Mr. Evans, are these foreigners who foment revolutions
accustomed to make monetary advances to revolutlcmary generals at usurlons
rates?
Mr. EvANH. Yes, sir ; most decidedly.
The Chaikman. Selling arms?
Mr. Evans. That is so.
The Chairman. In .sliort, tliey have a direct la'ofit In inciting revolutions?
Mr. Evans. Absolutely so, and In constantly fomenting political disturbanceH.
For instance, in August of 1911, when returning from the World's Baptist
Alliance, which I attended as Haiti's representative, and took part and held
that year at Philadelphia, a German banker from Haiti sat next me at the table
on the boat. In conversing about the recent revolutions . of 1910 and 1911,
which I had seen and gone through, and describing to him the terrible conditionH,
sufferings, and bloodshed, this German banker answered, though not himself
in Haiti, that he actually knew more about them than I did. Boastingly he
added : ** I financed them from Berlin, as well as the previous revolutions, ami
furnished ammunition, and have been staying In Germany several yeem
arranging these matters." Remembering the devastation and murder of my
friend the Rev. George Angus, a British subject and missionary from Jamaica,
through stray shots of revolutionists fomented and financed from Berlin, I
jumped to my feet, denounced his cowardly, cruel, and murderous G<»rman mis-
sion, adding, he should have been made to face the Haitian cannon, and first
to smell his own German powder from the barrel of the Haitian gun. I fait
ashamed of his mean, despicable, and. Indeed, devilish acts, then hiding him-
self and his crowd, while the poor, helpless, and deluded Haitians, forsooth,
bore the whole blame and were cailled " assas.^ins " and " cutthroats."
There is also jealousy and a growing hatretl against the United States in-
creasing interest and influence in Haiti and the Caribbean Sea, which interest
and influeni'e are always recognized and backed up by England, to the bitter
chagrin of Germans and their supporters in Haiti the last decade.
The Chairman. Mr. Evans, I do not tliink we need to go so far afield.
Mr. Evans. But is it not too bad that these Negroes should be made to bear
the whole blame and painted everywhere as brutes and savages, if not a nation
of cannibals, through the cowanlly and gree<ly exploitation of the white ninD
and his money?
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Evans, we want all the facts rather than opinion.
During those four years preceding your departure in 1912 what was the comll-
tlon of the Haitian i^easant, his relation to the general de la pla<»e and the
general d'arondlssement ; did he get justice in the courts?
Mr. Evans. I believe they did. I heanl very little complaint. Whenever I
had an occasion to go to court the Haitian judge showed ability and Imiwir-
tlallty. Ofllclals of the court and other Government departments, in spite of
occasional delays, were Invariably polite. Being privileged as a Christian
missionary and an American citizen, I was given a free pass, hence I was never
bothered with ordinary officials about " permits " to travel, and of which they
were somewhat strict on account of the said revolutions. I put in the reconl
. a copy of one of these free permits, signed by the secretary of the interior and
member of Haitian cabinet.
[Liberte. Egallte. Fraternite.]
REPXTBUQTTE D'HAITI.
Port au Prince Je 2S D6cembre, 1911, an 10 8me De Vlnd^pendanoe,
Lb Secretaire d'Etat,
au D6par lenient de VInt&ieur:
Accorde, par les pr^sente, permls au Hdv6rend T. Ton Evans, Secretaire Gfo-
4raldela Mission Baptlste pour Haiti de voyage Librement vans toute T^ntendne
de la R^publlque.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 157
Les aiitorit^ civilt» et militaires sout InviteH A lui i)rC»tes aide et protei-tion au
Fait (i Port an Prime le 28 I>(k-enibrc. 1911. an 1<» S* de rind^poiHlance.
Einigista & le 8ec-i*eraire d'lOlat <le riiitf^rlenr et <le lat Police CJ^n^rale, le 23
D^c-embre. 1911. an 10 S** de rind<ii)eiHleiic*e. an No. 461.
I^E Chef de Division.
The ('HAiisMAN. Tell us tlie lot of the i)easaiit. What is his relation to the
general d*arondIs.sement and ^♦'"t'ral-da-la-plaee? Is he free to j?o where he
willV Are his taxes justly levitnl, and so on'i
Mr. KvANs. Taxes? There are not many taixahle things in Haiti.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. KvANs. There are not many articles taxed in Haiti. Imports are the
diief source of i-eveiiue. These financial arranjrenients of tlie Government did
not come within my purview. As I have said, the in^litical conditions obligated
theni to l)c strii-t as to permits for traveling within or for leaving the Republic.
Though discouraged by revolutions to raise crops, I found the peasants ^of ten
thrifty, and certain sections of the Ueiniblic showed lul)or and skill with* some
gO(Hl cro[»s. As a whole, however, and considering tlie richneas of the soil, in-
.stability of government, and no market, Haiti is in a very backward condition
industrially. To prevent revolutions and encourage the cultivation of this
rich land. I came again and again to our State Department at Washington urging
our (Joverument to protect Haiti and act tlie big brother to this weak and de-
fenceless little nation.
For this rea.s<m the petition signed by nearly 3,(XK) Haitians, including Presi-
ileiits Simon an<l Lac(»nte and all leading Haitians of the Republic, was gotten
up and presented to se<'retary of Carnegie's international peace bureau and
of the Rockefeller Foundation praying for a normal and Industrial college for
Haiti and on Cliristian basis like Tuskegt^e. A copy of this will be placed in
record.
The granting of largt* cHincessions by way of plantations and the land for
railroads to the American contractor Macdonald by President Simon was an
honest endeavor to oi»en up the <-ountry for industrial cultivation of the land
on a large scale by Haitians and for Haiti's benefit, but under leadership of the
white man with naKlern implements-
This was defeatcnl through the German propaganda in starting a revolution
ami tlie overthniw of President Simon and his government in 1011. The Ger-
mans persistjwl that Simon had " sold Haiti to the Unite<l States."
Senator F'omekenk. Who was this railroad contractor?
Mr. KVANK. Mr. Macdonald. of New York. It was freely said in Haiti that in
addition to sub.se<iuently fomenting and financing this revoluticm which finally
ousted President Simon, a sum of not less than $350,0(X) of German money was
actually spent in bribing senate or house memliers or both, at Port au Prince so
as not to ratify the said contracts. In his heroic endeavor to put down this re-
bellion and emphatically contradicting the Germans' propaganda, I saw the age<l
President in actual teai-s and all but broken hearte<l, as he told me if the United
States Government had come to his aid the Government and so the railroad
and plantations would have bet^n saveil. If not thousands of Haitian lives.
Senator Pomekknk. As I uinlerstood you, you used the exi>ression " sold to the
Unite<l States." What did you mean by that?
Mr. Evans. That the Haiti Republic had l)een hande<l over to tlie United
States Government and iKH>ple for a consideration, and that President Simon
had l)etrayed the Haitians.
Senator Pomekene. That the Preshlent did?
Mr. KvANS. Yes; that Antoine Sim<m, the then President of the black Re-
public, had done it. This, of course, was revoluticm propaganda of the German
element — to arouse the natives to rebel aganst and overthrow their President —
and it 8ucceede<l, whereas he had done the best possible thing under the circum-
stances ti> open up industries, and, as he said, to secure labor, with fair pay tn
the natives. These ctmtracts and land to Macdonald were to revert to the
Haitian Government after a number of years.
Senator Pomekene. I think I misunderstood you at first. You mean they said
he had sold Haiti; is that it?
Mr. Evans. Yes; it was a willful misrepresentation of the actual truth by
these German propagandists, playing on the sentiment of these quiet, ignorant
people, who have a buraing passion, however, for their own Negro republic.
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158 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOAONGO.
Tbe Chaibman. You started to tell a while ago of a message which President
Leconte gave you. What message was that?
Mr. Evans. It was that if he was to have a stable Government, and be con-
tinued in the executive office to carry out the urgent reforms he had actoally
commenced, and those he contemplated, "he must have the close friendship,
practical help, protection, and encouragement of the United States Government,
whose interests were paramount in Haiti and Central America.*'
Clnclnuatus Leconte had spent sonxe years at Washington as Haiti's chief
consul, could speals English fluently, and, in my opinion, was the best educated
and cultured Haitian, with a practical turn of mind, that ever sat in the presi-
dential palace at Port au Prince.
I put in a quotation in the record, from one of my circulars, written June
of 1912, and referring to Leconte's election as President and consequent bright
prospects at last for Haiti politically, educationally, and religiously;
THE RADICAL CHANGE IN THE HAITI GOVERNMENT.
"America and the outside world, and even 90 i)er cent of the Haitians them-
selves, are at present ignorant as to the magnitude of the change, in &ct,
transformation, which has recently taken place with the coming in of the new
Government, and that in the most unexpected and providential manner. The
second revolution of last year was started by the savage Calcos, or snake wor-
shippers and devil devotees near the Dominican frontier in the nortli and out-
of-the-way part of the Republic. In reality it was a case of Satan casting out
Satan.
" President Leconte and his ministry represent the intelligence and energy of
the country. There is to be found to-day in palace and cabinet not only a high
type of civilization but an atmosphere of refinement, which, if wisely and firmly
directed, backed up by a fearless policy and sympathetic and efficient support of
our United States Government, and the blessing of God, must ere long effect
a beneficent change throughout the country, long neglected, with its nearly
3,000,000 poverty-stricken but withal kind-hearted people.
" It is really Haiti's first civil government. The next few years, therefore,
are fraught with tremendous consequences to this land.
" Yes ; the psychological moment has come, and which many have looked hope-
fully and anxiously forward to, and some of us even fervently prayed God
for the last 10, 15, and 20 years. There must now be no time lost in coming
to our help and rescue; for the uplift of Haiti means actually the lifting
up of the whole Negro race. For reasons partly geographical, political, and espe-
cially providential, the true character and capacity of the African for self-
government, etc., will be judged by what the black man Is really in his own
independent Republic of Haiti."
Senator Pomerene. Without going into details, and the chairman objects to
opinions rather than facts, and I do not care to pursue that further, but you
statetl that this German banker in Haiti told you that he financed the revolu-
tion?
Mr. Evans. Yes, sir; I did.
Senator Pomerene. Have you any other evidential facts which would support
your conclusion that he or other Germans were financing that revolution?
Mr. Evans. It was common knowledge In 1910 or 1911, perhaps both, that
something like $350,000 of German money had been spent to prevent the con-
firmation or ratification of the Macdonalds contracts and land concessiona
Ex-President Simon, who still lives in Haiti and can be called before this com-
mittee, was in consequence compelled to threaten the use of force so as to
bring the senate or house together for the purpose of ratification.
Senator Pomerene. •You regard him as entirely loyal to Haiti's ambitions,
etc.?
Mr. Evans. I believe so ; many — in fact all the Presidents who seek to bring
in reforms are powerless because of the German Influence In the past.
Senator Pomkrene. Is that true of President I^econte?
Mr. Evans. Indeed, even more so than In President Simon's case, because he
was better educated, had filled Important offices, and knew the United States
and American people. If not also Germany and Germans, better than any Presi-
dent before or after him at Port au Prince.
Senator Pomerene. Were any of these Presidents that they have had down
there since your own acquaintance with Haiti under the domination or control
of these German propagandists?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 159^
Mr. EJvANS. I would like to explain here, so that the committee may really
understand the difficulty and impossibility for any Haitian President alone
and unaided by the United States, England, or France to withstand the power-
ful, ruthless, and murderous (German propaganda at Port-au-Prince and Cape
Haitien in the past. Leconte at one time was absolutely dominatetl by these
Germans, and was put up by them for the Presidency, and made a strong candi-
date, and was all but elected several years ago. He was again their candidate
in 1911 against Simon, but, having at last seen through the German intrigue,,
refused to head the revolution and become candidate, and only reluctantly con-
sented at the last moment, seeing the serious peril to himself of blank refusal,
behig under, no doubt, special obligation to this controlling and financing
German power.
During our interview at the presidental palace, alone, discussing, in view of
the backward condition of the country, his — I^econte — responsibility as Haiti's
newly elected President, how we in the United States, with Britain, looked for
a real change in the conduct of Haiti affairs, and, indeed, that the time had
arrived, unless we saw a decided improvement — the United States Government
had for years felt a grave responsibility re Haiti and could not put off much
longer the demand for a stable Government with, indeed, a higher civilization
and a more humane conduct of political and public affairs — we would be
compelled to act. I assured him, however, that there was absolutely no truth,
as I had assured Simon and Haiti's responsible leaders, in the statements made
by Germans and others, namely, ** That we coveted an acre of Haitian terri-
tory," which, if we did, we could have had the two Republics, in fact 20 years
aj?o with Britain and France's unanimous consent and hearty benediction, but
this was not American policy.
He believed implicitly what I said, expressed his strong desire and determl*-
nation to proceed with improvements, but stated he would be helpless against
the Influence mentione<i, and then his last wish was that I Immediately return
to Washington to urge the Government to assist and stand behind him.
The Chairman. Is this President Leconte to whom you refer, or is it Simon?
Mr. Evans. I am now referring to the late President Leconte. At his special
request, I came to Washington and had an interview with Second Assistant
State Secretary Adee, but nothing was done, I deeply regret to say.
The Chairman. What year was this?
Mr. Evans. The beginning of 1912. In requesting that a capable i>erson be-
at once sent to Haiti in an unofficial capacity, altogether apart from our Ameri-
can minister or Unite<l States consul in the black Republic, yet close to the
Secretary of State and irniteil States President, and one that would have a
freer access to Haiti's President than any diplomat, Mr. Adee termed what I
suggested as new diplomacy and expresseil a d<mbt as to whether the black
President would really be willing to receive such. I replie<l that President Le-
conte had expressetl iv ver>' similar doubt as to the United States President and
our State Department, adding that unfortunately we forgot that white as wHl as
colored were not free from suspicion. Though no one was sent from Warti-
Ington, I>?conte starte<l to reform — matle voodoo dances and orgies illegal;
reduced the army to one-third or one-half; and raised the type standard; built
the present fine barracks occupied now by our marines at Port-au-Prince. As
anticipated, he was assassinated with others, and palace blown up. The leaders
In Haiti have but one opinion as to how it was done. In 1912, not long after
that, I left for Washington.
The Chairman. Now, Mr. Evans, after your departure in 1912 you did not
return again until 1917. Tell us of your impressions as to conditions in Haiti
on your arrital in 1917 and give us any facts regarding the occupation which
you think might be useful to the committee.
Mr. Evans. Before answering this question, may I briefly explain?
The Chaibman. Certainly.
Mr. Evans. Between 1912 and 1917. though away from Haiti, I was in con-
stant correspondence with the churches and our missionary brethren there
without any censor, which, however. I have had since my coming from Haiti
in 1919 to date, and in my position as honorary field secretary. Thus, for in-
stance, I was kept in close touch with affairs in Haiti by this means and what
appeared in our American press. For instance, finding that our Government had
landed the marines in Haiti, and preparing a treaty with the Negro Republic,
1 wrote to President Wilson, inclosing a number of my references — one from
Right Hon. David Lloyd-George — offering to resign my church at Lansford, Pa.^
•nd as an American citizen and Christian missionary with long experience for
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160 INQUIKV IXTO (KHHPATrOX OF HAITI AND SAXTO DOMINGO.
the purposi* of iviuleriiifr assiHtnnce to our (Jovornnu'nt l>.v explalninj: to lead-
ing; Haitians the moaning of apiiarent " invanion " so as to av(»i<l Kerioiis aiis-
iinclerstandinjr, l)loocly conflicts, if not open rebellion, ami pr(»ve winally Ijelpfnl
to officers of American marines as to tlie Haitians liiemselves. A copy of this
letter is handed liere for the re<-ord and is as follows:
l('opy of h'ttor to I'rfsld«*nt Woodrow Wllnon, I'nltiMl Rtati^.1
Laxsforp, Pa.. September i, /.9i5.
TTf»n. WooDROw Wilson,
Pre-sldent of the United Staten,
Dear Phksident: I propose next week to visit Washinj?ton, I>. C. so as to
see the two native young women T brought a few years affo from Haiti, and wlio
have just pi-nduated at the National Missionary Training School for Colored
Young Women on Lincoln Heights, D. C.
I am very anxious to have tlie honor of a brief interview on this occasion in
reference to Haiti, either Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Frday of next
week, and at o time most c'onvenient to the President, especially seeing that the
present is the most momentous ihm'umI in tlie history of the black Republic (since
the disci>very of the island i)y (\dumbus) and the i)eople, under the generalsbii)
of the brave, noble, and Immortal Touissant L'Overture (Haiti's Lincoln and
George Washington in one), secured for them both emancipation from siaverj-
and political independence from France and Najjoleon.
Hundreds of thousands of Haitians, if notkindeefl the rank and tile of the whole
Republic, wlien the high motives and benevolent intentions of our Unitetl States
Government and the true meaning of the present step become clearly and
thoroughly undei-stood, will sincerely thrtnk God and the present administra-
tion, through you, sir, for establishing a protectorate, thus actually at last
coming to Haiti's rescue and saving her from cruel and savage bloodshed,
etc., peipetrated by a few selfish, professional, and corrupted i>olitlcians exploited
by certaUi Europeans and " hyphenate*! " Americans residing In Haiti, an?l
ostensibly German bankers, merchants, etc., but filled with wicked jealousy and
bitter hatre<l (unfortunately) against our (iovenunent. and the natural and in-
evitable growing intluence of this (Miristian and humane nation in the Gari!)-
bean Sea and throughtmt Gentral America, if not. indeed, the whole civilize<l
world at the present moment.
Inclosed * will show the President my own present and past relation to tlie
black Republic and its people, as well as the " raison d'etre " in ask'ng for tlie
honor of a short interview at this Important juncture.
For Christ and Haiti.
Yours, sincerely,
L. Ton Evans,
Hrmoraip Forcifw S-^hetarp, etf*.. to H a itmfismonarff Council.
P. S. — Though a native of Wales, and claim among my personal friends and
associates in so<-ial, moral, and religious work there the Right Hon. David
Lloyd-George, M. P., Sir Sam. T. Evans, president-Judge of Great Britain's
war prize court, etc., .vet I am a full-fledged American citizen, without either an
" if " or a •' hyphen."
Mr. Tumulty replied in lielialf (»f the T*resident. reciuested'me to write fullv,
ratlier than hnve an interview with Mr. Wilson at that time, and which I imme-
diately did. tliough it amounted to notliing. Tn fact, my candid opinion is that
neither my first nor second lettei- went further than S«H'retary Tumulty.
With the committee's permission. I shall rend a page of my reiJort sent from
Haiti in 1918 to my missionary committee in the States, showing, on landinj;
and looking arounci. both my surprise and deep ap]>reciatlon of some of the
good work of our American marines.
The Chairman. T wonder if you might not give that to the stenographer for
incorporation in the record.
Mr. Evans. Yes.
Tlie Chairman. Tt will be unnecessary to read it. .Tu.st give it to him, Ii
y(m will?
Mr. Evans. May T re;id a few paragraphs before I liand it over for tlie
record ?
The Chairman. Yes.
• __ _ _ __
» Tliofcp nK'unt rof«Menc<'B as to character and work In Haiti, etc.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 161
(Mr. Evarus thermipoii rwid wrtain portions of rei>ort reforred to, which is
Ii<^re printed, as follows : )
HAITI BAPTIST MISSION KKPORT FOB 1018»
After an enjoyable voyape from New York, and in spite of war, submarines,
nv., we landed safely in Haiti TiianksRivinj? Day, November 29, last year, and
w^re welcomed back by all the churches and friends, and none more heartily
than by late Judge Orius and family (whom we mourn and miss). Letters and
vires of welcome also came from pastors and friends from all over the Republic.
l»OIJTirAL AND SANITAKY KKVORMS, WITH PJKACE AT LAST.
The first thlnjj which struck me as soon as we laiuleil and looked around was
the complete change wrought through the coming of our American occupation.
The general appearance in this little filthy town and all towns and cities in
Haiti, though from nestling l>etwt^n the hills and shaded by the broad banana
leaves and stately palm and coconut trees have a i)eautiful tropical appearance
from aboard of steamers, away at sea, are on closer acquaintance proverbially
dirty, yet since our marines have been here things have greatly improved by
way of well-swept roads, free of decaye<l vegetation and mosquito-breeding
stagnant pools, etc.
What, however, surprised and pleased me most was the order and quiet, with
pleasant and placid faces of natives, instead of suppressed feelings, anxious
fears, and sad c*ountenances, with exciting looks; the running here and there;
then the sound of doors and shutters (there are no glass windows in Haiti)
suddenly banged and bolted, followe<l by shots and bullets, no one seemed to
know from where, in fact ; then cries and wild shrieks of women an*! small
children rending the midday as well as the midnight air — I well remember in
old revolutionary days. As the result, such a calm and growing confidence
among the natives themselves as the result of the occupation compels me to
thank Gwl, and I am sure tens of thousands of others here all over the Republic,
do 80 in silent gratitude, both to the Almighty as well as the United Stiites Gov-'
ernment, that at last (at the earnest bidding of the British consul general and
French minister in Haiti) Admiral Caperton landed our American marines that
day at Port-au-Prince, and thus rescue poor, jwlltically and revolutionary torn
and bleeding Haiti from the selfish and sordid greed and iron grasp of Germans,
who financially and murderously exploited this country and people for many
years with Berlin money and ammunition.
Great, indee<l, as abovt' reforms have Ihhmi, I saw actual- transformation In
prisons and hospitals (calleil hospices by the Catholics), and .so yrmr super-
intendent will quote from his re<*ent lettiM- to chief of hygiene department of
the occupatlcm:
"Mrs. Kvans and myself take quite an interest hi our little St. Marc Hospi-
tal, as we do in our local calabash (prison), and often go around the sick of
the one and conduct religious .services on Sunday afternoons in the other.
•We can not but notice the contrast betwe«»n things to-day and years ago
due to your efficient work.
•This is particularly true of tlie .Tacmel ])ris<»n and hosi)ital which on my
recent tour south as superintendent I had the privilege of visiting in c-ompany
with our marine captain and doctor.
"These reforms alone, in interest of health and humanity, proved what a
godsend has been the friendly intervention of our Government (so far) along
these lines in Haiti.
"May I respectfully ask whether you contemplate changing the name of
hospice into city or general hospital, so as to make them equally as accessible,
pleasant, and agreeable to Protestants and Catholics, alike, and seeing they nn»
malntainwl by the Government, aidetl by local and general public?"
Sickly Protestants could not be persuaded to go to the hospice. There was
a fundamental objection which I desired to remove, If po.ssible, now that the
United States Government operated them.
Senator Pomebene. This was a rei)ort made by you to whom?
Mr. EvAX.s. To my Negro missionary committee in the States, and show them
jMiOie of the bles.*<ings brought to Haiti through our friendly intervention as an
T'nited States Government, and for all of which there was then a profound
f Haling of gratitude.
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162 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Pomerene. Do you discuss the following conditions there, do you.
and the revolutionary conditions?
Mr. Evans. No; but there seemed to be such misunderstuudiiig, if not mis-
representations, in the States, and even a bitter feeling among American Negro
Baptists, al)Solutely ignorant of real conditions in Haiti, through the German
fomented and financial revolutions — to any Ivind of United States intervention,
that I felt it my duty as an Amej-ican and a friend of 3aitl, as well as a
Christian missionary, and by way of an introduction to my first annual report,
to correct these misunderstandings and, if possible, remove certain prejndlcM
which colored as well as white folks sometimes are afflicted with.
My criticism of the Unite<l States Government and the Democratic adminis-
tration is not that they intervened in Haiti when they landed marines under
Admiral Caperton, neither to the treaty our- Government negotiated and signed
with the Haitian Republic, which guaranteed the Negro republic's integrity,
protection, the liberties of the Haitians, and undertook to develop Haiti educa-
tionally and Industrially by constitutional means and civilized and hunnuie
methmls. My criticism and personal protest has been that the United States
Government, either through its responsible departments at Washington or the
American occupation In Haiti, or both, and under the late administration,
closed the Haiti Senate and House of Representatives through United States
armed force, and as if this was not sufficient, again by threats, military force,
and "fraud," "raped" the Haiti constitution in absolute violation of said
treaty, and, as stated in my memorandunor presented to President Wilson, in di-
rect repudiation of our own treaty obligations.
This latter and most fraudulent act clinched the nail in the coffin of our
American reputation and Influence In the Black Republic and with the
Haitian people, as well as aroused and embittered the feeling of intelligent and
loyal Negroes, and even white Americans, throughout the country against the
occupation.
According to Haiti's request, as expressed through Laeonte and others and
the generous terms of our treaty, we assumed a friendly mandate and under-
•took to act the big brother.
Senator Pomerene. That is, they wanted us to be the guardian angel; is
that it?
Mr. EJvANS. No; something more than mere protection of life and liberty,
important as that is. They expected, and as stipulated in our treaty, that they
should have the full benefit of the United States money, the best American
brains, as well as that of our experience in civilized government, if not In a
steady and strong Christian statesmanship ; but our conduct in Haiti, as de-
scribed, has largely verified German predictions concerning us, namely:
" The moment the American Government puts its foot down in Haiti, whether
under the plea of having land at Mole St. Nicholas for a coaling station or the
pretense of an Invasion by Its marines at Port-au-Prince, to save ruthless mur-
der during a revolution, and in spite of any treaty they may negotiate, their
one purpose is to conquer Haiti, take away the island, and bring them all back
to slavery."
Haitians have no means of Judging motives, only by methods, and the real
purpose of the United States Government and the American people these 90
or 95 per cent illiterate Negroes of Haiti— judging by the slamming of their
senate and chamber's doors, the putting out by military force their Haitian
leaders, the rape of their constitution, and roping and driving of their fathers,
husbands, and brothers to prisons and marched about as slaves, and beaten
down and shot without due process of law — absolutely believed to be exactly
what the Germans and others had told them. We can not help being Judged
by our official representatives whom we send to the Black Republic and else-
where.
To correct this impression and expose and refute the base falsehoods as to
American policy, I have for years carried an old copy of the New York Out-
look with me all over Haiti, containing an article by late ex-Presldent Theodore
Roosevelt, beloved and now mourned in Haiti, on the United States policy, ex-
plaining It in English, French, and patois, and pointed to the Cuban Republic In
verification of Mr. Roosevelt's reassuring message to Haiti and Latin America.
The following declaration of ex-President Wilson to Congress on our entrance
Into the World War on the side of the Allies I had also hanging in a prominent
place in my study, and read and explained repeatedly to leading Haitians who
bitterly coujplahied, and oven wept, saying, ** We have lost our Republic mi'^'
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 163
aiouary," when I couuseled them to be patient and wait until we brought the
facts before the responsible United States Government and they were known
to the great American people. It Is as follows:
"WB HAVE NO SELFISH ENDS TO SERVE, WE DESIRK NO CONQUEST, NO DOMIMOPf.
" We are, let me say again, tlie sincere friends of the German people, and
Lilian desire nothing so much as the early ree^stablishmeut of intimate relations
of mutual advantage between us, however haril it may be for them for llie time
being to l)elleve that this is spolcen from our liearts.
" We have borne witli their present Cfovernnient througli all tliese bitter
months, because of their friendship, that friendship exercising a patience and
forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall happily still
have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our dally attitude and action
toward the millions of men and women of German birth, and native sympathy,
who live among us ami share our life, and we shall be proud to prove toward all
who are in fact loyal to tiieir neighbors and to the (government in the hour
of test.
'* It is a distressing thing and an oppressive duty, gentlemen of the 04mgress,
which I have iierformed In thus addressing you. There are it may be many
months of fiery' trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead
this great, i>eaceful people Into war — into the most terrible and disastrous of
all wars — civilization Itself seeming to be in the balance.
" But the right Is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things
which we have always carried nearest our hearts — for democracy, for the
right of those who submit to authority to have a voice In their own government,
for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right
by such a concert of free i)eoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations
and make the world it.*<elf at last free." (United States Congress on Apr. 2,
1917.)
From my readhig and study of the treaty we entered Haiti solemnly ple<lgeil
to help place her and her people eventually on such a civilized basis as to
enable her to enter the circle of surrounding civilized and progressive nations,
and nothing should be permitted to cause us to deviate from this puriwse and
play into the hands of Haiti's foes if not also the enemies of the Unitetl States.
The Chairman. Mr. Evaas, I do not believe the committee can go so far
afield. We have got to hold to the facts you observed there, and not to the
expression t>f opinion or the history of your efforts in defense of the United
States.
Mr. Evans. The puriH>se of our (Jovernment going to Haiti is one thing
while the violation of the treaty and the con<luct of the American marines and
gendarmes in the islAnd is another. These sliould not be confused, .so I felt
justified in explaining this in the report to njy missionary board.
The Chairman. I understand this part of your report to your board has
been given for the record. Now, let us come bade to what you saw on your
return to the island.
Senator Pomebenk. At what time?
The Chairman. In 1917 and thereafter. For exam|)le, if you care to si)eak
of the amendment to the constitution ; the dissolution of the Parliament or
the corvee, any one of them, the committee will he glad to hear you.
Mr. Evans. I will say that tbe (•(►rvee business was brought to my attention
not long after I returned. It was an old custom in Haiti, but never I tlilnk
a law. It is customary in backward countries for farmers, or those who have
their small habitations or small hohllngs in Haiti, once or twice a year to
devote two or three days or so to help repair roads opposite their own farms.
Tlie occupation in Haiti, however, int(»ntionally or ign<»rantly put a new
and altogether an errone<>us meaning to it by actually turning it into an in-
strument for oppressina: and torturinir the Haitian people, and exciting their
passions, and apparently some times for no other purpose than to provide them
with an excuse to beat, if not shoot them down. Excitable gendarmes in the
Vnited States marines' employ and often, umler inttuence of liquor, when ar-
resting, roping, then drving along ri»a<ls, an<l mountains as gangs of African
slaves rather than as citizens of the Haiti Republic, whom the great American
Government l)y a sacred treaty, had otiicially pledged to prote(!t, were very
often roughly and brutally handled, for no native could be expecttnl to volun-
tarily submit to such humiliation. From what 1 have seen and heard I verily '
l)elieve that more have met their deaths through the corvee thus illegally
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164 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
practiced, vvillfuUy or ignorantly, by nia lines and gendarmes and acquiesced in
by those in supreme command and at Washington than were killed in open con-
Ilict with Cacos, if it was not indeed the chief cause and mainstay of Cacoisni.
Senator Kino. Who did this?
Mr. Evans. The American <K*cupMtion.
Senator King. Who?
Mr. Evans. There was a captain or lieutenant at every town or village
tbn)ughout Haiti in official charge of these gendarmes (Negro soldiers), armed
and chosen by these white marines of the American occupation. Many of these
marines, and probably most of the gendarmes, were f(nid of drink. The latter
under official orders of the marines would catch, arrest, and roi>e the natives
and drive them to prison, and from prison to work on the roads, and under
.such conditions often cruelly deal with them.
The last Sunday of June, 1918, going on Sunday afternoon from Gros Morne*s
.service toward Jacmel, In the far southeastern part of the Republic, I met
several gangs, altoghter i)erliaps 6(1 or 80 or more, and In charge of gendarme
officials who rode along side and well armed. On Inquiry from the gendarme
officers, I was informed that these were paid 1 gourde or, in American money,
20 cents a week ; without any food. It is therefore to imagine how such ill-
paid, ill-fed native driven to work like these, many miles away from homes
and families as there were, become unen«jy, irritated, and even revolt, which
invariably means death.
The Chairman. Will you irive si)eclfic instances of ill treatment that you
saw j-ourself?
Mr. Evans. I have repeatedly seen ill treatment. Both in and outside of
St. Marc, perhaps 2 or 3 miles on the way to Gonaive, I have seen in the gangs
at work men, for merely turning the head and without the slightest i>rov()ca-
tion as far as I could see struck until actually stunned. Prisoners- from St.
Marc working around the gendarme ban'acks, almost opposite where we lived,
I have seen on week days and on Sunday unmercifully striking the poor native,
and I have walke<l on and Intervened at times on my way to church with my
family.
The (^iiAiiiMAN. Struck by whom?
Mr. Evans. By gendarmes, and at times a boss, the nmrlne officer, would
appoint as overseer over the natives, who would be a robust Negro.
The (^HAiBMAN, Who dealt the blow, a marine or a gendarme?
Mr. Evans. By the gendarme or the native boss. The marine officin* himself
would seldom be seen with the corvee gangs. The jnarlne captain or lieu-
tenant would generally be at his headquarters. The marine chief at thU tim«*
in St. Marc woul?l be either Capt. Kenny or Capt. Brown. They would have
several of these gangs in two, three, or more places alonjj the roads, in special
charge of armed geiularmes.
The Chairman. The man who dealt the blow was a meml>er of the Haitian
gendarmerie organized by the marines; Is that right?
Mr. Evans. Yes; exactly so. He would be under him and receive his orders
from him as chief of the occupation for that district.
Senator Pomerene. But a black?
Mr. Evans. Yes; they would be natives.
Senator Pomerene. You do not mean to say that our marines used violence?
Mr. Evans. Yes; though I myself never actually saw this. Of course 1
would not expect our marines and white officers of the American occupation to
use any violence in my presence or that of any other Christian m ssionary.
They give the orders and see they are carried out. They supervise, receive
reports, and are responsible. It is quite possible that gendarmes at times,
unless deterred from utter fear of being shot, do certain things on their own
initiative.
Senator King. Mr. Evans, we will devote our attention to fixing the respim-
sibility, and if you will lim't yourself to that and answer the questions we
will get along.
Mr. P^VANs. I have already stated that marines are seldom with corvee gangs,
and would not personally if they were guilty of violence in the presence of a
missionary. They mostly are at headquarters and give orders. I am anxious
to aasist the committee to ascertain real facts.
Senator Pomerene. You sni<l these workmen would get 20 cents a week in
American money?
Mr. Evans. No; but that the natives receive<l an t^uivalent to our 20 cents in
value. They would be paid in Haitian money, which would be then 1 gourde.
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IXQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINCiO. 165
Senator Pomerkne. Paid by whom?
Mr. Evans. By the UnlttMl States general receiver, thrortgli tlie Anierimu
txvupatiou's marine officers.
Senator Pomerene. Well, I know, »)Ut did tliat money come from the Haiti
(Jovemment, or from the Un ted States forces?
Mr. Evans. I understand that all moneys in Haiti come through the hands
of the United States general receiver, who pays everybody through the occupa-
tion, or the American marine officers, and even the Cntholic archbishop, bishops,
priests, etc.
Senator Pomkrene. Well, it was stateil here yesterday that most of these men
were called in for a few da^vs, and stnyetl voluntarily because of the goo<l food
they got.
Mr. E>AN8. That is absolutely wrong, speaking generally. This might be
so with a very few who act as bosses, or overseers under the gendarmes on the
roads, or in gaol, but false as to the majority of corvee men and roped gangs
referre.l to.
Senator Pomebene. Let me ask you a further question, because we do not
wimi any misunderstanding as to the facts. Is the committee to understand
that the money which was paid these men for their work was money ra!sed
by the Haitian Government by taxation?
Mr. Evans. I can only reply that I understand that every dollar in Haiti,
whether American loans, imports, or local taxes, come directly through the
hands of America's general receiver.
Senator Pomebene. But they were Haitian funds, were they, raised by the
Haitian taxpayers or by the Haitian importers?
Mr. Evans. I do not think this is so. Referring to the food question, I saw
while m the prison at St. Marc these men, working under the corvee, lined
up in front of my cell and driven out about 6 o'clock in the morning, often
with nothing but a little coffee, marched under armed guard to work miles
away, then brought back to prison, carefully searched, and compelled to wait
from about 4 until nearly 6 without being fed ; a few times when the captain
was said to have gone drinking, with keys, if not money, there was not a
scrap for any.
The Chairman. Was this at St. Marc?
Mr. Evans. Yes; at St Marc. I have seen these men here struck with such
force by the gendarme officer, and for the merest trifle, until they would fall
like logs. Many for want of food fainting and at times falling their full
length on the hard floor of the prison yard. Whether once members of the
corvee gang or not I can not say, but I have actually seen dead bodies covered
with vermin exposed and naked for days — one wpuld be obliged to pass,
with men and women, and some of latter with babies — ^lylng around.
Senator Pomerene. Let me ask you, because I want to get the facts just
as they are, and I have no interest in this matter at all. You speak of these
men behig struck, and you said they were struck by Haitian gendarmes.
Mr. Evans. Yes.
Senator Pomerene. Are we to undei*stand that this method of discipline was
encouraged or fostered or directed by the Ajnerlcan marines, or was that a
general methoil of attempting to enforce discipline?
Mr. Evans. Certainly, I am sorry to say. It was owing to the low type of
)?endarme8 so often employed by the marines, and again through the want of
proper discipline, if not in some cases the immoral and drunken habits, inex-
perience, and ignorance of the native language by the American captain or
lieutenant in charge, though probably there are improvements since the
varions inquiries recently made and publicity and exposure through the press.
Senator Pomerene. Well, can we infer from what you say that the marines,
or the American occupation, has been in any wise responsible for this condition?
Mr. Evans. Positively. There has been a sad neglect, even recklessness. In
the choice of these gendarmes by marine officers, in view of the great author-
ity and i»ower of ** life and death " given them In various sections of Haiti ;
and again there has been a criminal laxity on the part of the general and
chief of gendarmarie d'Haiti at Port an Prince and his subordinate officer
at Cape Haitien in not demanding regular reports of all activities and strictly
supervising same. Where there has been care taken, proper discipline exer-
cised by an intelligent, experienced, right-living marine officer, there has
been no trouble with gendarmes and no friction between these native officers
and the people. Whisky (taffia) and women have been large factors in the
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166 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
demoralization of many marines, but most so of the type of gendarmes these
marines employed.
Senator Pomerene. Mr. Evans, we all agree that such a condition ought not
to exist, but suppose the marines were withdrawn now; If the Haitian
gendarmes were using these brutal methods with our marines there, what
likely would happen If there were no marines there In the way of treatment
of these workmen?
Mr. Evans. I think my statement at the opening and in my memorandum to
President Wilson In Octob€fr, 1918, and how I came to Washington urging our
own United States Government to assume a friendly mandate over Haiti and
act the big brother Is a proof that I am not in agreement with some of the
witnesses from Haiti and some of our own American people, that our marine
should be taken out and our Government be prepared to withdraw from the
Black Republic. This would be an admission of failure to carry out our
treaty and a certainty that it would not be to the real interest of Haiti itself
for years to come. My firm belief is, now that there is no danger with Ger-
many, and as one of the results of this Senate committee inquiry the American
marines should be reduced to about 220 and their personnel of a higher typ<*
and, with all other departments, a civil occupation replace the military, through
which the marines and a higher type and best natives as gendarmes function
under its strict supervision.
Senator Pomebene. Mr. Evans, that does not directly answer ray question. I
^m trying to get your idea as to what would happen.
Mr. Evans. I do not exactly know .
Senator Pomebene. In the treatment of these men
Mr. Evans. I can only express an opinion
Senator Pomerene. By the Haitian gendarmes, in the event that our i>eople
were not there.
Mr. Evans. I can onl^' express an opinion ; and my opinion is this : Th.it
under responsible Haitian authority, who would exercise fairly good judgment
In the choice of their gendarmes, supervise their conduct, and speak their
language, that it could not. Indeed, be much worse than what I have 8e<*n in
some cases under many American marines.
Senator Pomebene. Now, let me ask you another question. How many in
stances of this brutal treatment have you seen?
Mr. Evans. In the discharge of my work as superintendent missionary and
visiting our mission church on Gros Morne and on the way to Jacmel and
southeast of the Republic in company with our native pastor and other assist-
ant poachers Sunday morning the last of June, 1018, I saw, for instance,
women decently dressed on their way to the Baptist mission church (the onlv
Protestant church near by in that section) actually stopped at the headquarters
of the native gendarmes. Immediately after and going the opi)osite way, saw
two groups of natives, and Including native members and native preachers
who had been caught, roped tightly and cruelly together, and driven like slaves
toward the same calabash. Then I saw our native missionary turning back,
and, galloping toward me, shouting, ** Missionary, missionary, come quickly."
I at once hastened to se<* what was the matter, that he and others were so
excited, and at once liberated the women, who came along to church. When
told by the native (excited, if not lntoxicate<l) corporal they had committetl
no crime and there was no charge brought against them, I demanded they
should be freed and permitted to come back with us to the House of God.
This he sternly refused to do and forcibly drove them along like cattle. Where
they were put and what becanie of them, I do not know.
From the common talk of those mountain people, and what I witnessed.
I believe that many are caught, arrested, and roped thus on Sunday, as well
as during the we(»k, not merely for the "corvee," but for the sake of graft
and extortion of money, when some would be let free again on payment of 2 or
3 gourdes.
As soon ns we reached .Tacmel, about perhaps 40 miles or so away, I paid
a visit of inspection to see tlie prison and hospital, with our American occupa-
tion's chief officer and white doctor (of the occupation), I was startletl to see
two or more prisoners with their arms like jelly or raw beef and being treated
by our American doctor.
As he was putting the salve on their arms, while I stood watching him. and
the captain by my side, and unable to understand what this meant, and forget-
ting what I. saw the previous Suiulay on Gros Morne, I turned around and said,
"Why, Captain, have you some kind of an epidemic here in Jacmel?*' "Oh,
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INQUIBV INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 167
DO,** answered the captain, **it is the roping business connected with the
corvee." While walking with the said doctor to see the new hospital, I asked,
"How often do these cases occur such as you treated just now at the prison?"
** They constantljr occur,'* replied American marine doctor, adding, " I am heart-
ily ashamed of them. It is a disgrace to the United States, and to us all as
American people." Such was the appreciation of these poor, suffering natives,
aod the comfort and ease ministered by this sympathetic, humane, medical
officer, that they were ready to drop on their knees and actually kiss the feet
of the doctor.
I mentioned to the marine captain of gendarmes at Jacmel what Rev. Nosirel
Lherisson, the native missionary, and myself witnessed the previous Sunday on
going to our mission church on Gros Morne.
Senator Kn^o. Who was the captain?
Mr. E\'ANs. It was something like Capt. Williams, or Williamson, if I remem-
ber welL A well-built officer, genial, and, I should take, a high type of a marine
oflker, and well spoken of by the Baptist native pastor and others. The captain
voluntarily informed me, though a nominal Catholic in the States, he regularly
attended the Protestant church, and much enjoyed the preaching of this native
Haitian, whom he praised as a good man, doing excellent Christian and educa-
tional work in that town and section, only somewhat hampered for lack of
proper means adding that he became so interested in his efforts that he had
written requesting the Government to present its unused plot of land for Rev.
IJierisson to build and enlarge his boys* school.
In reply to my question, " Gros Morne Is iq the Leogane district, and not that
of Jacmel, so you should see Lieut. Kulp, who when he gets the facts will no
doubt take steps to remedy the matter.** I thanked him for this information
and after a few more days busily inspecting our rural public schools for the
native children in the far Interior many miles from Jacmel, I returned to Port
An Prince, on my way tmck to St Marc.
Meantime, however, Sunday came, while still at Jacmel (first Sunday of July,
1918), when as an ex-pastor and missionary I presided with this native whom I
had ordained some 25 years before. As the result of the faithful work done,
and growth of church, and missions all around, something like 700 and even
more attend the communion service the first Lord's day each month. These
come the Saturday for Saturday evening conference, 20, 30, 40, and even from
50 miles away, report converts, candidates for baptism, sickness, death, or any
misconduct among members, which are all carefully attended to before they
partake of the sacred rite of Lord's Supper the following Sunday.
The native pastor pointed out the fewness of the men present, less than one-
half the usual number, and when I asked the reason why, ** Oh, the * corvee * of
our American marines,** was the answer, as he shook his head. *' Missionary,**
he added, " it grieves me to see the present condition of my country under the
* occupation.* ** These men, husbands, fathers, and brothers are mortally afraid
to leave their little homes, even on Sundays, to attend their church. For if seen,
tbey are in peril of being caught, arrested, roped, roughly handled, and driven
u described like slaves to prison, to work many miles from home, and for two
and three weeks and more without their families knowing anything about
thttn, whether dead or living.
I saw a number of letters written on old scraps of paper in the native patois,
asking their pastor to excuse them, and telling him their distress and why
compiled to hide from the gendarmes as if they were ravaging wolves or a
pack of blood-thirsty bloodhounds haunting every hill and valley, chosen by and
in the employ and officered by American marines of my own United States
Government, solemnly pledged by treaty to protect the liberty, limb, and life
of the natives of Haiti
I insert in the record a copy of one of these notes to the Jacmel missionary
pastor, penned, no doubt, with a trembling hand and in native-made ink by this
JJegro assistant preacher, and so faint that it can not all be decipheretl, hence
can only quote a part, expressing sadness of being thus deprived of the means
of grace and begging dear pastor to pray that this reign of torror and death
may soon come to an end :
" La Vallee de Jacmeu
•*Le cher Pasteur P. N. Lhkbisson.
** Moif CHEE Pasteub : Je vous prie votre bonte si*l y*apo8Sibble en vous de me
fUre troove un penni entre les mains les autorites. Car je trouve des miserables
legars le travo.** etc. ; here it becomes too Indistinct to continue.
«22e9-^21— pt2-
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168 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
While in Haiti I expect the committee's permission to call Pastor Lherlsaon.
with some of these native preachers, us well as those from Gros Mome, to
testify in reference to the grouiis ropeti and driven as slaves, and providing
this committee asks onr President to Issue a proclamation, to be inserted, Id
English and French, in the Monitor and all other Haltiun papers in Haiti, in-
vlting the natives to testify freely before this committee investigating affairs
In the Black Republic, and guaranteeing ami>le prote<»tion of the United States
Government to same, with heavy penalty for intimidation and threatened re-
prisals, whether made by iVraerican occupation corporation or priests of the
Roman Catholic Church (in pay of American niarine«).
The Chairman. Give us what other matters you may have to put in the
record. Is there anything more you would like to say?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; I wish to add that crossing rivers and high mountains (Gros
Morne), and as directecl by the marine captain of Jacmel, I came to the little
town of Ijeogane, on the plain, to see IJeut. Kulp. and stayed that evening and
partook of this genial marine's hospitality. On being informed of the brutal
conduct of his Gros Morne gendarmes, and names of our witnesses, he faithfully
promised to Immediately attend to this serious matter.
I am prepared, however, to show this committee that Gen. Alexander Williams,
chief of the whole gendarmie of Haiti (and said marine officer Kulp's superior in
command), deliberately interfered and prevented the lieutenant of the I-ieoganp
district from discharging his official duty of investigating these brutal and
criminal charges brought against the Gros Morne gendarmes, who with others
should be demanded to appear before you gentlemen.
Not finding Gen. Williams at the headquarters of Gendarmerie d'Halti in
Port-au-Prlnce after my leaving I^ieogane next day, I returned by train home
to St. Marc, after my missionary tour of Inspection of church, missions, and
schools throughout the southeast section of Haiti and, owing to a proposed con-
ference In reference to a national uonnal and industrial college I was arrang-
ing to be held at the Haiti bureau of public instruction, with our American
superintendent of public instruction, the Haitian inspector, to which we Invited
Col. Russell (in supreme connnand of United States marines, etc.), Gen. Wil-
liams, Dr. Maclean, Dr. Laroche (Haiti National Ouncil), Dr. Livingstone
(United States consul), Oipe Haiti, etc., and my planning to leave with wife
and children on a visit to see my missionary committee in the States, as well
as seek an interview with President Wilson and Secretary Lansing at Wash-
ington, I wrote the following letter to Gen. Williams :
St. Marc, Haiti, July 11, 1918.
Gen. Williams,
Chief of the Gendarmerie iVHaiti.
Dear General: I have already called the special attention of your Lieut.
Kulp, of Leogane, to what must be termed not only an undue interference with
the rights of the Haitian peopie, and es|)eclally Xhe quiet and orderly members
of our Baptist Mission Church on Gros Morne, while on their way to public
worship and to particularly attend holy connnunlon service, but the inhuman
and brutal if not savage conduct of his gendarmes (In the Gros Morne section),
as witnessed by myself, our ndssionary pastor, Rev. Noslrel Lherisson (Jacmel).
and many others on the Sunday morning of June 30, ultimo.
For fear, therefore, that Lieut. Kulp has not been able to see to this matter,
and act in a definite way with a view to at least the dismissal of these gen-
darmes as totally unfit to serve " our occupation " In any capacity really, and
whose conduct actually and naturally filled the Haitians generally with fear
and dread, and righteously Inflamed them and engendered hatred against the
gendarmes themselves, and moreover against our American occupation through-
out Haiti and even indeed against our United States Government and Presi-
dent, which must not be permitted to go on.
What I personally saw this early morping. not only the stopping of two
brethren and two quietly and decently dressed native sisters at the headquar-
ters of the gendarmes* corporal, while going to the house of God, but the catch-
ing, nrrestlng. and roping in a cruel manner, If not barbaric, groups of men.
who were made to march like a pack of slaves, brigands, or murderers (among
whom were some of our native preachers), and whose arms I have found after-
wards (and under treatment of our own white me<lical men of the occupation)
a whole mass of jelly, etc., which reminded me of brutal slavery with savage
treatment practice<l by unfortunate Belgium a few years ago in Africa.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 169
And this, forsooth, though we are in Haiti, and wliere to-day these people
ire Slippered to be under the civilized, humane, if not Christian Government of
the United States and the protection of our American flag.
It is generally believed and openly said by the inliabitants of Gros Mome
and Jacroel sections that many of these drinking and lowest type of gendarmes
of our occupation continually arrest, rope brutally, and treat these poor
innocent people for the mke of dishonestly extorting money from them, who
when they pay 2 or 3 gourds may be set free.
I made a careful inquiry on Gros Morne this Sunday morning (June 30)
and, 80 as to make sure as to whether the so-called prisoners had conunitted
any crime or there were serious charges of wrongdoing brought against them,
and being assured .by the native corporal there was absolutely nothing, 1
dismounted from my horse and demanded they should be set free and allowed
to accompany me and Lherisson to our mission church that morning. This
wag peremptorily refused by this excited and apparently intoxicated corporal,
tbongh his fellow gendarme tried to persuade him to do so.
For this reason, therefore, may I ask you to see if Lieut. Kulp has been able
to take any action, and if not will you call his attention to It and dismiss them,
especially the corporal (right away) as Irresponsible savages, unworthy and
unfit for their important positions.
It is believed and stated that the gendarmes of the sections mentioned are
heavy tatfia drinkers (native liquor), most immoral, ruffians, etc.. From their
conduct that day, and more esi>eclally that of the corporal (Desselus), his
wild gestures, excitement, etc., from Influence of alcohol or other evil spirits,
I am personally confirmed of the truth of all they say.
On my return to the States (if possible within a few weeks) In order to
report the religious, moral, and social conditions to my missionary Baptist
boards, practically representing 3,000,000 Negi-oes, morally backed by 5,000,000
more white Baptists of the North and South land of the United States, and partic-
ularly interested in our Haiti mission Just now, I shall therefore be Indeed glad
to be assured by you as chief of our gendarmerie that Lieut. Kulp, on whom I
called last week, and who faithfully promlFed, has acted, and that these men
have been dismissed even as unworthy of such Important i>osltlons and authority
under our marines.
As chief of gendarmerie over Haiti (knowing of the sufferings cause<l by
gendarmes through drink and abuse of power), I shall be glad If you Impress
upon these gendarmes through your marine officers that on no account they
should deliberately Inflame these poor people and prejudice them against our
occupation, and at this time create hatred and wrath toward our United States
Government.
No doubt our (American) folks there celebrated the Fourth in a manner
worthy of our noble traditions and the flag, which to-day flies over our brave
boys fighting at this moment In the trenches of Europe with British, French,
etc., for the sanctity of treaties, liberties, and rights of small nations like
Belgium, Servla. and even this little Black Republic of Haiti.
Yours, very sincerely,
L. Ton Evans,
Baptist Missionary SupeHntendent.
Returning to Haiti on the 18th or 19th of December, 1918, after said visit
to the United States and Washington, when I pre.sented the memorandum to
i*residfnt Wilson, Secretary of State Lansing, and Chairman Hitchcock, of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, setting forth conditions In Haiti, and
praying for a ]^)eclal conmilsslon of inquiry, and found my Negro missionary
committee Intimidated If not threatened by certain officials of State Department,
in collusion with Marine officers In Haiti, who intercepted If not confiscated my
private and official letters, demanding, it seems, my Immediate recall on
account of my Christian and educational activities In behalf of these poor
Haitians, I called that very day at our American occupation's headquarters to
pay my respects to Brig. Gen. Catlln, who had succeeded Col. John H. Russell
as the United States Government's chief In supreme command of all marine
and land forces In the Black Republic, giving him a copy of said memorandum,
dwwlng him Hon. A. A. Adee's official reply In behalf of the President and
Secretary of State, assuring me after the strict Investigation the Government
was supposed to be then carrying on (through Gen. Oatlin, Geih Williams,
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170 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MaJ. Welles, etc.) in the Black Republic, Mr. Adee would Immediately further
communicate with me.
At the close of this interview with Chief Catlin, a very amiable gentleman,
who thanked me for calling, and information and explanation given, he informed
me that Gen. Williams (who was seated vdth Brig. Gen. Catlin when I entered
the office that morning) wished to see me at gendarmerie headquarters befoie
I left for St Mare.
The following letters to Gen. Williams and Brig. Gen. Catlin refers to that
interview, the Gros Moume scandal, and Gen. Williams's special Interest and
activities through Haitian courts to uphold and vindicate a drunken American
Marine officer who liad been disciplined by Col. Russell and in the interest ot
military discipline and United States occupation efficiency in Haiti.
BiJBBAXJ OF THE SUPEUNTKNDENT OF PUBUO INBTBUCTION,
Port au Prince, Haiti, December 20, 1918,
Gen. Williams,
Chdef of Oendarmerie d'Haiti.
D^AB Sir: Referring to yesterday's conversation (at your request to me,
through Brig. Gen. Catlin), I herein inclose quotation from letter I wrote Judge
Obas, Cape Haiti, on July 10:
*' I received mandate requesting me to appear to be questioned about some-
thing purported to have been uttered by me about somebody. I shall be glad
for definite information as to person and specific (exact) nature of complaint
or alleged remarks.
"As United States citizen, and general secretary of American Baptists in
Haiti, I am entitled to this definite Information from you and your court I
must say, however, that as I plan to leave with my wife and family if pos^le
on the Panama boat the end of this month on official business with my board
and Interview our President at Washington, it will be impossible for me to be
at the cape the time you mention."
(Here is reference to propose Dillard's conference with superintendent of
public instruction, etc.)
"After this definite Information requested has been received, I may arrange
what steps to take, and when I return, sometime In October this year, when
you can expect me at the cape."
(The Cape Haiti and court are In the north under direct control of Maj.
Welles, marine officer next in command to Gen. Williams, under whom the
drunken marine disciplined by the colonel was still employed by the occupation,
and which major is officially held for Insubordination and directly responsible
for the wholesale murders in the north and perpetuation of corvee, etc.)
Having therefore learned for the first time through you yesterday, and not a«
requested In July from Judge Obas. in my letter, that the supposed complainant
is the late occupation's marine officer at St. Raphael, and seeing (as already
stated to you at your office) that Col. John H. Russell, supreme commander of
United States Marine Corps and land forces ashore in Haiti, has left for the
States, my own judgment Is that In the absence of said Col. Russell this matter
can not be properly and legally entered into at the present time.
Again, inasmuch as Col. Russell and myself alone were present at this per-
sonal and private official interview, and therefore the only two persons who can
testify as to what exactly passed and was thereat said, entirely in the Interest
of the United States service In Haiti, as well as In the Interest of the moral wel-
fare of the said officer of St. Raphael, himself, for which the colonel thanked
me, and with all respect for you and Judge Obas (Cape), It is still my further
and firm judgment that this matter does not come within the jurisdiction of
our Haitian court.
Of course, If you yourself (personally and officially) wish to insist on forcing
the said judge to take up the matter In spite of the facts pointed out, then, and
under protest, I shall go cheerfully and submit to attending the court, but in
order to arrange for my witnesses from St. Raphael, Dondon, Grande Riviere,
Trou, and may be from the Cape, and so as to prove beyond a doubt tliat at a
given date, etc., said officer was under the Influence of liquor, and further
justify an American citizen and a Christian missionary laboring in Haiti for
the social, moral, and religious welfare of both white and native, together with
the course I felt It my duty to take in my personal and private interview with
the supreme head of our American occupation in Haiti at the time, and with a
view to save both our United States service as well as the said marine ofDcer
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INi^UIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINUO, 171
himself, If possible (thus vindicating Col. Russell's action and subsequent send-
ing forth the proclamation prohibiting all liquors to be sold marines and
gendarmes of the Uniteed States Government), hence must ask Judge Obas and
the court to grant reasonable time, with name and definite complaint given in
meantime, say until the middle of February, if not the last week of that month
(being expected the arrival of Dr. Dillard by any boat).
I am responsible only for what transpired between me and the colonel, for
which service he thanked me. Though as a Christian missionary I advised
moral suasion, I know not the military method Col. Russell (who naturally
knew more about his marine officers, and may be their drinking habits than
pnyone else) felt compelled to take in this particular case or the military dis-
cipline he imposed. It would be presumption on the part o* a Christian mis-
sionary therefore to criticize him.
This drinking habit among marines and gendarmes is well known in Haiti,
and so increased as to jeopardize in fact the work of the occupation and become
such a menace to the United States service in Haiti that CJol. Russell himself
on the 16th day of July. 1918 (exactly three days after my writing Judge Obas),
felt it necessary as officer in supreme command of all marines and land forces
operating in the black Republic to Issue a proclamation absolutely forbidding
the sale of intoxicants to all men in uniform, under a very heavy penalty.
On seeing this proclamation, I wrote to immediately thank the colonel, and
praying in the Interest of all he would extend the same to include both wjiite
and native civilians throughout Haiti.
Under these significant and serious circumstances, therefore, I can hardly
believe that such an important officer of our United States Government, as the
chief of the whole gendarmerie of Haiti, through personal forcing and display
of official activities of such matter as upholding and actually vindicating the
drinking and drunken habits of a marine officer under you and Maj. Welles
of the Cape, thus permitting yourself to go on record as sympathizing with
those whose conduct is termed by said proclamation as directly inimical to the
Interests of the United States, thus in so doing contradict, oppose, and condemn
CJol. Russeirs discipline, and officially do what you can to defeat the efforts
of four superior officers and in supreme command, as well as Secretary Daniels
of the United States Navy, to save the morale of the boys and secure military
efficiency of the American occupation.
You have no doubt received word from Mr. Stabler (Latin American depart-
ment of our Government) as to presentation of recent petition (of which In-
closed memorandum is copy). I may add that the State Department has re-
plied not only of receipt of same but that the United States Government,
through a department interested in Haiti, are seriously considering matters
set forth therein. An official request may soon be made for leading Haitians
to visit Washington, therefore, and previous to appointment of commission.
Dr. Dillard of the Rockefeller Foundation is expected in January or be-
ginning of February to survey Haiti and confer with Haitian leaders an(J our
(JoTemment officers refoundlng of an industrial school, such as referred to in
memorandum.
I deeply regret the attitude you thought fit to assume yesterday toward the
very serious affair on Gros Morne last June, brought to your attention and
marine officer Kulp. When Informed that my presence Is required at Cape, and
as American citizen will claim the presence at court of our United States
consul, Dr. Livingston, to whom I have an official letter from Secretary of
State Robert Lansing, etc.
Yours,
L. Ton Evans.
A copy of above, with following explanatory note, was also sent Brig. Gen.
Catlin:
Bureau or Superintendent of Pubuc Instruction,
Port au Prince, Haiti, December 20, 1918,
Gen. Catun,
Chief of the American Occupation in Haiti,
t>EAB General : As officer in supreme command of our United States Marines
tJKl military forces and successor of Col. John H. Russell, I feel that I ought
to send you inclosed copy of my letter to Gen. Alexander E. Williams, whose
Jttitude, of course, and language as an officer of our occupation when I called
Thursday at your request entirely took ine by surprise
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172 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
I naturally put this down to some grave misuuderstandiuf; on his part as to
my own standing, and long and close relation with Haiti, our responsible
Unite<l States Government, as well as to our own oirupatlon, but it Is most
unfortunate that this should happen in a person liolding such responsible and
honorable a function.
The inclosed letter makes reference to your worthy predecessor, Ool. Russell,
and explains itself, and again calls attention to the arresting and roping of our
native members, etc., on morning of last Sunday, June, this year. I respectfillly
called the attention of Lieut. Kulp and the general to this. Unless inquired
into and given the satisfaction demanded, it msy have to be investigated hy
another connuittee or commission and when witnesses shall have a chance to
testify. »
I sincerely thank you for the interview Thursdtiy morning and information,
and earnestly hope that such a gallant officer, who has seen distinguished
service at the front and he1])ed In bringing about the glorious victory for
sanctity of treaties, lit)erties, an<l rights of small nations like Haiti, etc., will
be spared many years to serve our flag with same ability and unswerving
loyalty in the trying climate of this black republic.
For Christ, Haiti, and humanity.
L. Ton Evansl
PROCT^VMATION ISSl'ED RY COL. JOH.N H. RUSSELL.
The sale of Intoxicants to {tersons of military and naval forces of the United
States in uniform Is forbidden throughout the Republic of Haiti, from and
after July 20, 1918. A violation of this onler will l)e considered Inimical to
the Interests of the Unlte<l States, and the offenders will be liable to trial
before a United States military tribunal.
D<me at Port an Prince, Republic of Haiti, this 16th day of July, 1918.
John H. Russell,
Colon eh United States Marine Corps,
Commanding Inited Staten Forven ashore in Haiti.
Senator Pomerene. Ih he In charge of the marines there?
Mr. Evans. No; Gen. Alexander Williams was the chief of the whole gendar-
merie of Haiti (the native armed iwllce), seeing the great authority and power
placed in the hands of the gendarmes all over the Republic, this was really one
of the very most resiK)nslble positions In Haiti, hen^'C he Is rightly blamed for
the low, drunken, and ferwious type of gendarmes under his Marine officers
all over Haiti, and for the lack of discipline, brutality, resulting In the killings,
both of prisoners and Cacos in the calabash (jail) and In the bush. Such
officers as Maj. Welles ((:ai>e), ('apt. Brown (St. Marc), (lapt. Kenny (Mas-
sade), Lieut. Haug (St. Raphael), etc., were under him. If not apiwlnted by
him, and chief of the American nccupath^n would In most cases be obliged to
act through this (Jen. Williams in the event of punishing drunken marine
officers.
Senator Pomerknk. Let me ask you just one questloiL You can answer it
generally, I think. You said you have been there for many years.
Mr. Evans. Y^es.
Senator PoMi-aiENE. Twenty-eight years, did you say?
Mr. Evans. Altogether ; laboring In and for Haiti.
Senator Pomerkne. And, of ccmrse", you were there for many years before the
American marines entered?
Mr. Evans. Exactly so.
Senator Pomerene. And you luid the opportunity of observing the treatment
of the Haitians by their Hatian offi<'ers, superiors, etc.?
Mr. Evans. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomerene. Just as y(m had the opj)ortunity of observing their treat-
ment since 1017 in the way that you have described here. Now, were these
people treated more cruelly while we were there than they were before or Is
there any difference In their treatment? What have you to say, compara-
tively?
Mr. Evans. I readily admit that a certain typt* <»f Haitians, unless scma'times
^watche<l and cautlon'e<l, when elevated to certain iwsltlon, maybe love «»f
authority, and In many cases overzeal nnd devotion for his white employer,
suffers s(»mewhat fron/a swollen head, nnd overrides his duty and goes beyond
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 173
his authority, and especially this Is done when they think it pleases the white
man.
This is a special reason for a higher type of Marine officers, sober, intelligent,
sympathetic, yet firm, strong in moral fiber, ii\ith knowledge of men and faith in
the black race, and his ability and readiness, to resixind when treated " with a
little of the milk of human kindness." During all the years spent in Haiti,
and with all my traveling and mingling with these folks, I have seen little of
real barbarity and cruelty among them and have never seen women actually
fighting or two men stripped and pounding one another. There has often been
yelling and wild demonstrations and terrible threats.
Marines have told me through Haiti that when properly treated and firm dis-
cipline exercised, and they come to understand the language of the natives
and, moreover, show them a little of the higher educational and Christian civi-
lization of the United States, and true American homes — there is seldom if
ever a friction. We need more of our Marine officers — generals and colonels— *
sent to Haiti, imbued with a true missionary spirit and a real Christian opti*
mism .
Senator Pomebene. Well, am I right in drawing this inference from your
statement here, that your thought is that the American marines should stay
there and control the cituation, but they should have men in control who
would use more humane methods In controlling these men; is that your idea?
Mr. Evans. No; not exactly. It is that our United States Government
should stay in Haiti, but not the marines as such. My demand is for a civil
occupation composed of some of the most intelligent, broadminded, experienced
Jurists and Christian statesmen we have in the United States, in cooperation
with and supervision of ttie Haiti Government, can freely function ; and some-
thing like 200 of high type marines, and a gendarmerie composed of the most
intelligent, cleanest, and best Haitians, subject to the civil authority, will
suffice for protection.
Senator Pomerene. Well, I used the expression "United States marines"
inadvertently ; I meant really the United States Government or its representa-
tives. Is that your idea?
Mr. EvAifs. Emphatically so. For Instance, President Laconte and President
Simmon (who immediately preceded him), and for reasons already given this
committee the latter and his government were ruthlessly overthrown ; and the
former, after only being in office a year, with brightest pros|)e<ts and just 8tarte<l
most important reforms, when behold he is fatally struck down by the hidden
hand assassin (soon after my own return in 1912), as well as such intelligent,
educated natives, if not Christian statesmen, as (Jen. Firmiu (who wrote a
French life of late President Tliewlore Koosevelt, much admired and greatly
mourned in Haiti); ex-Senator Dutrevllle Lamour, ex-attoniey general of the
Republic; Voltaire Donmiond; ex-tleputy Dr. Nerva (5lMni.se. Hon. J. N. I^ger.
for years in Haiti legation at Washington (author of Haiti, Her History, Her
Traducers). as well as leaders, If not rank an<l file, of Haiti to-day, sick and
tired and even heartily ashamed of these iwlitical disturbances and devastat-
ing revolutions, moreiiver have for years sincerely felt (l)ecause of these Ins'di-
ous and powerful influences and political and profiteering Intrigues Invariably
operating through the financial an«l officially allied ( witii the Haiti (iovernnient )
Roman Catholic Church and her Euroiiean French -si)ea king priests as agency
and shield) that their only hoiie was in a close alliance and real union with
the United States, and that their political, Industrial, educational, as well indeed
U8 their spiritual, salvation can only be reallze<l through their strong govern-
ment's protection and their generous Christian philanthroi)ists* practical sup-
port and efficient leadership for many years to come.
This conviction was unl%*ersally and most sincerely and enthusiastically ex-
pressed in their following prayer and iietition to the Rockefeller, Caniegie, and
other believers in and lovers of the ra<*e in America early In the year 1911, and
i-eads thus in French:
RECESS rr£ UBOENTB D'UN college normal KT industrial a HAITI. APPEL DIRECT
DE8 PBINCIPAUX HAITIANS, AUX PHILANTHROPES. AVX AMIS 1)E LA RACE NOIRE, ET
A TOU8 CEUX QCI, EN AMERIQUE, CROIENT A SON DEVELOPPEMKNT INTELLECTUEI.,
MORAL, PT INDUSTRIfX.
Nous sousslgnes, natlfs d*Halti, sans distinction de croyances religieuses on
de partis politlques, en vue de considerations patrlotlques les plus elevees et
dans le but d'assurer Vavancement moral et religleux alnsi le progress Indus-
trils et sociaux de notre chere patrle.
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174 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Par ces presentes nous in%itons et solllcltons respectueu semen t les amis sin-
ceres et genereux de rinstruction et de notre race, tela que Thonorable J. D.
Rockefeller, I'honorable Andrew Cnrnef^e et autres — soit separement ou con-
jointenient — d'etabllr dans cette ile un college normale et industriel dans le genre
de Tinstitut de Tuskegee aux Etats-X'nla, preside par le distingue amrl et membre
de la race — Dr. Booker T. Washington.
Nous sonnnes convalnous que si Haiti, dolt s'elever parmi les Republiques du
Nouveau-Monde et remplir dlgnement sa destinee, ce sera par le moyen et a
Taide de nobles Institutions telles que le college normal, et industriel ou sera
donnee a nous jeunes et inlelligents compatriotes une education saine, pratique
eflPective que leur permettra de remplir avec distinction les plus hautes fonctions
que con fere le droit de citoyen de cette Republique.
Ce sera nonseulement un des plus puissanys facteurs dans le developpement
de la race-le garanti d'une paix durable, et d^une prosperite permanente
mais conuno nous le souhaltons ardemment, ce sera aussi la mise en pratique
autant que la theorie, la realisation du haut Ideal de rimmortel emancipateur
Touissant TOuverture, le George Washington de la Republique noir.
Nous, donncms Tassu ranee formelle aux donateurs ci-dessus designs ainsi
qu'a tons ceux repondront au coeu des i)etltionnaires en etendant leur bien-
faisance a Haiti, qui ce serait grand honneur pour notre gouvernement (1
Pouvoirs publics) d'avoir le privilege d'accorder une portion de terrain con-
cenable, au centre de Tile, pour Tetablissment du college, comme une preuve
de mon appreciation des efforts, faits pour Teducatlon des flls et des filles
d'Haiti.
L*etablissement d'une telle institution dans notre pays placera notre petite
mais heroique nation dans une eternelle obligation en vers ses bienfaiteurs et
nous attachera beaucoup plus par les liens de sympathie et de bonne volonte a
notre soeur-la granted requblique etollee.
Cette petition en faveur de notre pays, dont nous voulons servlr le hauts
Interets, est fait par rintermedinre du Rev, L. Ton Evans, missionaire evange-
lique des Etnts-Unis, actuellement au milieu de nous, qui pendant des annees,
a montre un reel et profound luteret dans le developpement et le progres de la
republique et qui a beaucoup voyage sur terre et sur mer plaldant en favenr
de la cause religleuse de ce Oays parmi plusieurs nation.
18 Janvier, 1911, et 108 erne de I'independance Cap-IIaitien. Haiti.
The English rendering of above petition and prayer of nearly 3,000 Haitians,
or practically the leaders of the whole little black republic (as one voice) for pre-
sentation to trustees of Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations and Bureau of
International Peace, in New York, and at Washington by the United States
Baptist missionary In 1911.
TRANSLATION.
Haiti's urgent n(H»d of a normal and industrial college. A national and direct
* appeal by native leaders to America's philanthropists and friends of the
Negro, and believers in his intellectual, moral, as well as industrial develop-
ment.
We, the mndersigned natives of Haiti, irrespective of religious creeds and
political parties, and simply from the highest patriotic considerations and in
the interest of the mental, moral, and religious improvement of our country-
men and the industrial and social progress of our beloved island home, hereby
invite and respectfully solicit the generous and sincere friends of education
and tlie Negro race, such as Hon. John D. Rockefeller and Hon. Andrew Car-
negie and others, either separately or jointly, to establish in our land a normal
and industrial school something on the line of Tuskegee Institute in the United
States, presided over by our distinguished friend and member of the same race.
Dr. Booker T. Washington.
If Haiti is to rise among the Republics of the West and to fulfill in a worthy
manner, each and all of us whose names are Ix^low are convinced that this
can only be achieved through such noble institutions as a normal and indus-
trial school which shall give a sound, practical, and efficient training of head
and hands, as well as of heart, to our most promising young men and women
so as to prepare them for the noble and responsible functions of civil and
Christian citizenship In this Republic.
This will prove a most potent agency in the development of our race and
materially help in securing a lasting peace, which must precede prosperity.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI ANDSANTO DOMI-NGO. 175
which we most devoutly desire at this moment/ and thus enable us some day
to fulfill in practice and by deeds the splendid theories and noble and inspiring
ideals of Haiti's immortal emancipator, Touissant L'overture, the George Wash-
ington of the Black Republic. '
We furthermore assure the generous donors herein named, or whosoever
shall respond to this sincere prayer of the petitioners and extend their bene-
factions to Haiti, that our Government will deem it the greatest hohor to be
privileged to make an adequate grant of suitable land in the most central part
of the island for the express purpose of such an industrial school and as a
practical proof of our profound appreciation of the efforts of Americans and
true friends of our race for the uplift of our own sons and daughters.
The establishment of such an institution in Haiti will place this small, a
once heroic little nation, under a lasting obligation to the benefactors, actually
link us together in a close bond of unity, sympathy, and good will to our rich,
strong, big sister Republic of America more than anything else could.
This sincere request and the petition of practically our whole little nation,
Khich we seek to serve in various capacities, is made through and brought to
the United States in our behalf by our friend the Rev. L. Ton Evans, Evan-
gelical Baptist missionary of the United States, laboring here in our midst,
and who for years lias shown deep and profound interest in the welfare of our
Bepublic and people and has traveled much over sea and land pleading the
religious and educational claims of this country in different lands and among
different surrounding Christian nations.
The original and copper plate like petition was written (French) at Dondon
in extreme north by a young native craving for education. It was started at
the cape, and following oflicial letter, with official seal, and written and signed
in behalf of council by the mayor of that little towTi of Saint Raphael (all three
in the so-called north Haiti-Cacos district), and a specimen of such official
indorsement from practically all the towns and mayors through Haiti, express-
ing delight at the step taken, and sincerely praying for the success of the noble
project and safety of missionary' voyage and speedy return to them :
Liberte, Egalite, fraternlte. Republlque d'Haitl.
Saint-Raphael, le 8 Avril. 1911 an 108me de rindependance. No. 69 Saint
Pierre Mllien Jn. Francois. (Magistrat Communal de cette commune.)
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
UiitionaiTe Evanpelique des Etats-Vnia, en Villc.
MoRsiEUB LE MissiONAiKB : Votre petition que j'ai lue avec beaucoup d'atten-
tion, et que j'al fait lire par tons mes adminlstres, a produit un reel effet sur
TeRprlt des uns et des autres se sont empresses de la signer avec moi.
L'idee de fonder une ecole normale, industrielle a Tlnstant de Tinstitution de
Booker Washington en Haiti, est de plus louables etant donne que cette insti-
tution fera un bien Immense au triple developpement — moral, industriel et
intellectuel d'Haiti, et de la race noire.
Combieu cher mlsslonaire serious-nous heureux si cette idee pourrait etre
applandie par le Rockerfeller, et Carnegie philanthropes qui alnient tant le race
noire.
A ces deux grands hommes, nous vous prions de presenter nos respectheuse
Pulsse dieu benir vos efforts et faire reussir votre vaste et philanthroplque
project
Pulsse dieu vous accompagner dans votre route et vous ramener en bien aux
Etata-Unis. Bon voyage cher mlsslonaire, et recevez je vous en prie.
Mes respectueuses salutations,
LeMaglstrat CJommunal,
S. P. M. Jn. Fbancois.
Ngtb. — Strange this man to-day, if alive, was termed a rabid so-called Cacos^
brutally treated by marines and cast without trial into Cape Prison.
Letters of hearty Indorsement from American minister. United States con-
sul, and white European employee of Haitian native labor in the Black Republic
Ave years before American occupation, etc. :
*At the time this petition was written, carried around all over the Republic, mostly on
lM>rM)ack, wading tnrough rivers, and mud saddle deep, climbing rocky mountains, and
teeeDding deep ravines (a most daring adventure), while poor Haiti was plunged Into the
liloody rerolotion (tlirough Germans) of 1910 and 1911.
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176 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
AiciaucAK Lboation,
Port au Princcj Haiti, April 28, 1911,
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
General Missionary in Haiti,
My Dear Rev. Evans : I am indeed very pleased to learn that you ns an
American Baptist missionary are endeavoring to establisli a normal and indus-
trial college, a long felt want I can assure you, in HaitL
I have carefully looked over all your documents and am agreeably surprised
to note the apparent interest so generally, if not enthusiasUcally, manifested
toward your plan by leading Haitian officials. I sincerely trust your laudable
efforts will succeed.
Yours, truly,
H. W. FUBNISS,
American Minister.
American Consular Sbstice,
Ca4^ Hatian, Haitiy May 6, 1911, .
The undersigned has great pleasure in heartily commending the work now
being undertaken by Pastor L. Ton Evans for the establishment of an industrial
school in the Republic of Haiti. There is probably no place in the world
where such an establis^ent would be of greater utility or where it ought to
produce greater results.
The extraordinary energy and indefatigabiilty of Mr. Ton Evans, as well ai
his good faith and philanthropic abnegation, eminently qualify him to take
the lead in such an enterprise.
C. M. Washington,
American Consul
Compaonie Haitienne,
Port de Paix, Haiti, February IS, 191L
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
General Secretary of Haiti Missions, Port de Paix,
Dear Mr. Ton Evans: As directors of the Compagnie Hatienne and em-
ployer of a large number of Haitians on our railroad and in the log-wood bnal-
ness since many years, allow me to express my very deep interest in the proposed
normal and industrial college you seek to establish in the island.
From my intimate knowledge of this country, I believe that the scheme- tliat
you propose is a most excellent one, and can not but produce the best possible
results in the social and industrial development of both country and people.
Such an institution will further help materially to change the present polit-
ical and unsatisfactory social conditions and insure real permanent peace and
good will throughout Haiti.
I therefore most sincerely, Mr. Evans, wish you every success in th!s laudable
effort of yours in the uplift of Haiti.
Yours, verj' truly,
J. Abbqo.
A Huitiau graduate of a theological seminary at Newton, Mass, who attended
Baptist World Alliance at Philadelphia, Pa., in 1911, with his superintendent
missionary, and Interviewed at the time by a Pennsylvania paper, referred
as follows to the benefits of an industrial school, effects of such on revolutions
and eacolsni. and eagerness of native young people for training, and in reply
to ** What do you know about Superintendent Ton Evans in Haiti, and how do
the natives look ui)on his proposal of a normal and Industrial school?" said:
" We look at him as Haiti's best friend, and no man ever was more highly
esteemed and enjoyed the confidence of the people than Missicmary Evans; In
fact, we look at his coming as Go<rs answer to our prayers. The moment we
heard of his project of a normal and industrial school to teach my countrymen
the value and dignity of honest labor, and divert the Haitian mind away from
revolutions and iiolitics to the cultivation of their rich soil, we at once fell in
love with the idea, and thougli in the midst of a terrible revolution I and a
few others inspired by his undaunted courage and incessant efforts associated
ourselves with him and gave him what support we could.
*' Yes, I am certain that a large number of the best young men and women
all over the Republic now eager for an education and practical training such
as given at an institution of this kind would immediately enter. In addition
to the benefit to us in the way of training for useful vocations in life, develop-
ing our Industries, a gift of such an institution by the United States Goveni-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. ^177
ment, or the Messrs. Rockefeller and Carnegie trustees, would be a standing
reminder to us of your Christian generosity and practical good will and cement
Haiti former to the Ualted States Government and people, and for these reasons
all Haiti is praying for brother Ton Evans* success in this undertaking."
Thi» pastor and professor who has taught young men successfully for years
at the Cape is one of those whose appropriations has been withheld by the
American occupation nearly three years ago.
IPittBbnrsh Dispatch Apr. 1, 1918.1
Haftians Ask School Fbom Fund.
lev. l. ton evans presents petition to cabneoie endowment for peace — hi«
graphic recital — spent tears among devil worshippers and believes in
THEIR FUTURE,
Rev. L. Ton Evans, pastor of the Welsh Baptist Church in Chatham Street,
htB Just returned from Washington, D. C, where he presented to the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace a petition signed by 3,000 natives of the
Black Republic of Haiti, urging the great advantages which would accrue by
foonding at Port au Prince a normal and industrial college, modeled somewhat
after the famous Booker T. Washington Institute at Tuskegee, Ala.
The money involved in realizing such a project is about $3,000,000, and the
direct result announced by its promoters would be the stoppage of the in-
terminable series of revolutions by diverting the native mind from the military
system of government and intrigue into industrial groovea It is argued that
Haiti is the richest field for development of the republican ideas in the world.
Thou^ occupying only one-half as mucHi of the island as Dominica, its popula-
tion is twice as great. The natives own their own soil, have most fertile fields
for sugar and cotton production, and the fiscal affairs and State debt are
solely demoralized by chronic grafting of military oflicials taught In a long,
persistnet military system, and for which German propaganda, aided by other
influences, were largely and directly responsible.
BEUEVES IN HLS PLAN,
Comparatively a modicum of Pittsburgh people know of the notably energetic
work of Rev. Jdr. L. Ton Evans here in recent months since his return from Haiti,
ttM>ugfa he is known internationally among Baptist organizations. His absori)-
ing enthusiasm, his nervous and unfiagglng recital of the situation there, his
thorough conviction of the feasibility of his plan and his elucidation of it by
speech and tireless gesture, hold the listener like the ancient mariner did the
wttWlng guest, but with no tale of the Flying Dutchman and the albatross. He
iir now 50 ye^rs old, bom in Ban*y, Wales. Hi« folk were rich brewer>' people,
but be gave up his large patrimony to become a Baptist missionary. He first
went to Haiti as a field secretary- 18 years ago. Then he came to Wilkes-Barre
and wag pastor of a Welsh church at K«lwardsville near by. There six years
ago the Negro Baptist Missionary Society found him and sent him back to Haiti.
Seldom Is one encountered more ebullient with his theme and scheme. In
Ws sacred calling he Is a promoter unrivaled, but his facts and experlen(*e«
leave no suggestion of doubt. At Washington he saw Alva A. Adee, the real
<liplomat of the State Department, and outlined to him this plan of transform-
ing Haiti from a Republic of turmoil into a stable government. When nearly
the whole of Port-au-Prince en mass turned out to pay honor to the highest
official of the United States Government — next only to their I*resident — his
official speech and encouraging words, with his special visit, removed much of
the deep-seated prejudice against Americans, the result of the United States
traOucers and this Government's seeming aloofness from these people. He
Ims fears of President Wilson changing for the worse the attitude toward
the American Republics to the south. He asserts that the system of conducting
l>oniinican finances has been a great success and something like it should be
proposed to the Haitian ofllcials, but not with any notion of coercion or terri-
torial aggrandizement.
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178 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
SEND CIVILIAN TO HAITI.
Talking on this latter branch in his rapid-fire style, he unfolded his other
strildng thought of this Government sending some civilian to Haiti to remain
for a time and to convince the authorities and the people that the United States
has no ulterior aims against it, that the concessionaires, who obtain franchises
there and stir up trouble, are not the American Government Rev. Mr. Evans
belongs to that amiable class who would fight for peace. During the loany
years he labored all over Haiti he learned the perversion of the national U^iny
by the military control. He alluded to the expenditure of thousands of dollars
by the natives to give Secretary Knox only a two days' entertainment and
vouched for the vast benefit accomplished by that brief visit some months ago.
It was through this so-called purchase, but really a gift, said the ex-Haiti
missionary, that the United States previously with only 800,000 square miles
of territory, without an outlet to the Pacific Slope, and Pacific Ocean, soon
emerged from comparative obscurity right into the forefront of the nations of
the world, or, in the words of our own United Stated Minister, Livingstone, at
Paris, iranieiliately after closing this astonishing deal (the black man of Haiti
compelled Napoleon to make for fear Britain might sweep down through Canada
and immediately annex it) written to President Thomas Jefferson: "From this
day the United States becomes a first-class power, and this without the flash of
a gun and the clashing of swords. There will be no tears and sorrow, but ages
of happiness to countless human beings."
The donation, therefore, of this normal and industrial school to Haiti by the
great wealthy American Government as a recognition of what Touissant
L'overture in the providence of God did to more than double our map by one
stroke of the pen is urged by Rev. Evans as a matter of honor and debt of grati-
tude at this^time to poor Haiti.
He says the Haitians are the kfndest people in the world. About 10 per cent
have some book education, largely in the classics through the French language.
But " education," as its derivation implies, is the bringing out from a man the
useless and inserting the practical. Nearly all the people are illiterate. They
speak a French patois. The State religion is Catholic, but the utmost freedom
is permitted to other sects. But underneath the outward pretensions of Chris-
tianity or some faith higher than savagery is the proneness to devil worship.
Therein lay his own chief physical danger, for the natives were imbued with
8ui)erstitions and often could be incited to waylay him in his journeys.
LIVE SACBinCES MADE.
He told many instances where only his self-reliance saved him from harm.
But all this wild dancing and sacrificing, even of a little child to appease an
angry devil god, is now giving way to the longing of the people for the substance
of the Christian faith. Teaching the gospel was the dire necessity in Haiti
They called h'm " negre blanc." the black white man, and revered him and gave
him a bodyguard of pompously uniformed generals. The vineyard is ready for
cultivation.
Rev. Mr. Evans some years ago took back with him to Wales a Haiti native
girl and had her with him as he talked about the Haiti missionary field. He
finds the United States more sympathetic and its people fuller of push. This
girl and another one he has now in a school in Washington City being educated
for missionaries. Her name is Christine Francois, and she is a cousin of a
former Pres'dent.
As Rev. Mr. Evans chatted at his home, 3202 Craft Place, yesterday, with
a volume and velocity that astonished for its not ending in fatigue, he men-
tioned the historical fact of the debt owed by the United States to HalU. It
was the defeat of Napoleon by Toussaint L'Overture and his black forces at
the end of the eighteenth century and their securing escape from ^^JJS
slavery that compelled the emperor to sell to Thomas Jefferson the 1,200,OW
square miles he held in the United States for about 2 cents an acre (4).
In his native land Mr. Evans knew well Lloyd-George, the British chancellor
of the exchequer, and like him he has always been an insurgent. He insl^
that If the Haitians could be made to believe that the United States is actnally
without designs upon them, and is willing to aid wherever it can, revolutions
would stop and peace and prosperity succeed the constant internecine slaughter.
He knew the recent Presidents well, and said that La Conte was a splenoW
character, but too highly cultured to become a leader of the people. He objects
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 179
to any nse of the " big stick," but he does not want this Government to abso-
lutely withdraw all its guardian interests. The president of the Carnegie En-
dowment Is Senator Elihu Root, who himself has visited the tropical Americas
and is a jioted advocate of more amicable relations with them.
JOURNEYING THROUGH HAITI.
It is intensely interesting to hear Rev. Mr. Evans describe his journeys all
through the interior of Haiti on horseback, eight relays having been used.
His native band of missionary assistants are proving successful In the work of
evangelization. On one Sunday afternoon he had the privilege of carrying out
all the instruments, such as tom-toms, troughs in which the soup is served to
the demon god, rattles, and other voodoo utensils, and reducing the pile to ashes,
and later he assisted in tearing down the altar or houndfort of the devil god.
Once he held services near where a devil dance was progressing with the
natives foaming at the mouth from the liquor they distil from the sugar cane.
The papaloi or priest of the voodoo cult brandished a big stick, but the rest
realized that all their Incantations were without avail on the Christians. The
signers to the petition are among the best citizens of the Republic — senators,
judges, etc.
After 10 years of Interviews and a busy correspondence on the subject of a
national, normal, and industrial school, the sincere prayer of Haiti has not been
answered, otherwise probably our Government would not have entered the
Black Republic, and many thousands of Haitian lives saved. There are indica-
tions, however, that even the blood of these Negroes has not been shed in
vain, and that soon through the present competent Senate committee Investiga-
tion either the United States Government Itself, or aided by the Rockefeller and
Oamegie Foundations will come to the rescue. The following letters will show
empathy and will be of Interest :
Carnegie Foundation,
For the Advancement of Teaching,
.Veto York City, August 28, 191 L
Mt Dear Mr. F3vans : I acknowledge the Interesting letter of August 26, with
its copies of your petition, as well as letters of Messrs. Abegg, Furniss, and
Livingstone, I shall be glad to see that your letter Is brought to the attention of
President Prltchett when he returns to the city. I shall be glad to see also,
that your letter to Mr. Carnegie is sent to his secretary.
I return herewith your letter of introduction from Dr. MacArthur, president
of the World's Baptist Alliance, and suggest that It would be helpful for you
to communicate your plans also. If not already done so, to the General Educa-
tion Board, 17 Battery Place, New York City. This Is one of Mr. Rockefeller's
foundations which has given such aid as you hope for.
Very truly, yours,
Clyde Da vies. Secretary,
L. Ton Evans, Esq.,
Edicardsville, Pa.
[The conatitutioDal coovention of the State of New York, Albany, 1915.]
Clinton, N. Y., September 27, 1915.
Dear Sir: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 1,
addressed to me as president of the Carnegie Endowment of Peace, in reference
to the establishment of a national normal and industrial school in Haiti, and
I have been glad to lay it before the executive committee of the endowment for
consideration at its next meeting. I would suggest that you correspond with
Dr. James Brown Scott, secretary of the endowment, 2 Jackson Place, Wash-
ington, D. C, regarding the petition which you wish to present In this con-
nection.
Very truly, yours,
Elihu Root.
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
FUnt BaptUt Church, Lansford, Pa.
Senator King. Was the situation when the American troops went there such,
In your opinion, as to Justify our Intervention?
Mr. Evans. Certainly ; as I have before stated. But to wait for this blood con-
flict and regrettable revolution, and the manner the situation was handled by
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180 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
those at Port au Prince, and State and Navy Departments at Washington,
by a stealthy landing of American marines during the cover of night below the
city, etc., made It appear more like the invasion of Haiti (to most Haitians)
by a foreign and alien power, looking for a mere excuse for annexing their
island, than a friendly lnter\'entlon. It was a deplorable blunder in diplomacy',
and in my opinion and on this very account justified the bitter resentment
shown, and in spite of Admiral Caperton's disavowal of any other intention
but to "protect Americans, Europeans, and even the lives, and property of
Haitians " — the criminal additional blunders If not more than blunders, as will
be shown to this Investigating committee, before we are through, of slam-
ming their Senate and Chamber doors In the Haitians' face, raping their con-
stitution, and resurrecting the corvee, with oppressive If not murderous Inten-
tions— by the American occupation, officially backed up by Washington, Intensi-
fied this bitterness, and at last convinced the Haitians, that what Admiral
Cai^erton said — and possibly he sincerely meant — was a mere cloak to dominate
Haiti, crush their national spirit. If not lead them back to slavery.
To avoid all this, I specially wrote offering my services to President Wilson
In Haiti, and as much for our American Chiefs guidance as for the pacifica-
tion and securing the confidence and hearty cooperation of the Haitian people
with our Goveniment*8 real purpose In the Black Republic, to protect life and
otherwise help Haiti.
Senator King. For the preservation of life and for protection of property?
Mr. Evans. Yes. But the methods adopted then and subsequently, almost,
Indeed, ever since, have been most incompatible with this motive of preserving
life and protecting property and liberties of the i>eople. which made me offer to
give up my church to go back immediately to Haiti, knowing the seriousne.^
of the situation.
Senator King. I wish yau would not make explanations, but answer my
questions. 1 want to get through as soon as I can, and get the facts. As I
recall, there w-as revolution, assassination and bloodshed, which was quite
extensive In the island at the time we Intervened?
Mr. Evans. I am as anxious as the Senator is to get through, but I take it
that this c(mimittee Is appointed to thoroughly Investigate not only facts as
to entering Haiti and present conditions under American administration but
with a view of better understanding these, what actually led up to them even
though it does take a little time, and to suggest a real remedy. Yes; I have
seen In the American press the description of the deplorable and heartremllns
conditions you mention when we Intervened.
Senator King. But when you returned you verified that?
Mr. Evans. Yes. The British consul general as well as several other trust-
worthy oflicials and Haitians told me the whole sad story, which then when
I read the account in papers here, and ever since in my opinion amply Justified
our interv^ention. My criticism is, that we did not go to the rescue of Haiti
20 years ago, assume a friendly mandate and act the big brother to defend
this liepublic and help these people irrespective of any apparent offense given
Germany and other minor European countries at the time; and in which act
of befriending Haiti, and the Haitian people (as 1 wrote President Roosevelt in
1902), Great Britain, and France would have gladly supported us, as their
consul generals after serious consultation at this time and in view of the sad
affair referred to especially urged the United States to send their admiral and
marines at once to Port au Prince, which at last they did, and for which I
thanked God.
Senator Kino. Have the marines, since they have been in power, made im-
provements in the island in the way of sanitary improvements, the building
of roads, etc.?
Mr. Evans. I have made special reference to this important phase of their
work in my missionary report and shown my profound appreciation of the
cleaning up so much nee<led, and did this with a view of removing, as stated,
the prejudice against our American occupation among colored brethren and
others in the southland and on my own missionary committee, for instance.
Senator King. Did you ever see any of the marines themselv&s do any of
these acts of brutality of which you have been speaking, or were these acts
committed by the blacks who were in charge of the corvee system?
Mr. Evans. You mean personally committed by the white marine?
Senator King. Yes.
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IKQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 181
Mr. Evans. I think I have answered this question before to Senator Pom-
erene. It is not likely that marine officers will actually beat or kill a native
in the presence of an American, and a Christian missionary like myself, more
than the average gendarme would. The marines who officer these gendarmes
give the orders, which prpbably most of them receive from Maj. Welles (in
north) or the major at Port au Prince, and these two from the chief of the
Haiti gendarmerie, Gen. Williams at headquarters, who Is directly responsible
not to the Haiti President but to Col. John H. Russell, who is the United States
Government's chief of Navy marine and land forces operating in Haiti and
the official head of the American occupation.
I have repeatedly seen marines and officers drinking and drunk at Port au
Prince, Cape, and St. Marc ; have heard them boastfully speak of their killing,
or, as they termed it, bagging cacos on shooting expeditions to the north;
have seen in prison (day I left) a Haitian carried and laid on his stomach
with his back one mass of Jelly, attended by a native doctor's assistant and
another, who informed me that it was done by the United States marine
captain in another drunken craze of his. I have heard two marine officers
of the United States Government, apparently intoxicated, and in the presence
of Christian natives and others in a mad rage, cursing religion, preachers,
and missionaries, and damning myself for my efforts in giving the Gospel,
seeking to educate and morally and Industrially uplift " damned niggers of
Haiti," with their fists clinched, and again aiming to take their revolvers and
shoot me, stating they opened and Intercepted my letters and taking an oath
they would crush me, and then hurried me off to prison.
A St. Marc captain was court-martialed while I was there for kicking
and brutally treating (It was alleged) his British Negro housekeeper, while
another captain at St. Marc was alleged while I was there to have taken three
Haitians from prison and without due process of law made them cut their
graves and then had them shot, the bodies rolling into these holes. The
Iieople were horror-stricken. A member (in mourning) at our church in the
Tape informed me (confirme<l by pastor and others) that her two brothers,
by order of Maj. Welles in conmiand, after being tortured by water cure in
prison, were taken out at night and without process of law also made to dig
their own graves and shot into them, and neither this sister nor her aged
Christian mother were inforineil as to spot. I hardly, however, believe all
said about either marines or gendarmes and the diabolical butchering of natives
attributed to them, and sincerely believwl all over Haiti, by those driven almost
hysterical by methods and brutality of marines and gendarmes of the occupa-
tion itself very largely.
Senator King. I asked you if you had ever seen any marines commit any of
these acts of brutality as to which you have Just testified.
Mr. Evans. Yes; those that I have here specifically mentioned, and the
others personally infonmMl can Ik* verified by credible witnesses in Haiti.
Marine officers as a rule give the orders; gendarmes have to obey their
commands.
Senator King. When I was In Haiti over a year ago I talked with a good
many men that were working on the road — ^natives — and they told me that they
sought employment because they got better wages working for the Government
on the roads* than they did from the natives, and they got better wages, low
as they were, than they e%'er got before.
Mr. Evans. This was more than a year after I had left, and through my own
efforts, writing Secretary Daniels, of the T^nitetl States Navy, and that of
others as to the corvee curse, relaxing conditions of labor, if not advancing
pay especially around Port-au-Prince, where Senators, Congressmen, and Ameri-
can leaders dropi>ed in on way to and from Panamo — what you say may be
true; but certainly it was not so In 1918 and beginning of 1919. I quite under-
stand that the impoverished natives were not able to compete with the United
States (Jovernment either In amount of labor or In pay.
Natives would work for food rather than starve. All bread, etc., was in the
hands of American occupation and their Marines, and woefully mismanaged
with us at St. Marc, and probably somewhat similar in other parts, unless
they were fortunate to have sympathetic, businesslike, efficient Marine officers
who knew how to properly distribute American flour so as to keep the folks
contented rather than leave it sikjII at the customs. We ourselves went months
without seeing a morsel of bread, without knowing conditions of World War, an<l
no efforts whatever at informing the Haitians through Washington or any other
United States Government publicity bureau, as I couiplaine<l at Washington's
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182 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPAXION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
headquarters. The people of St. Marc, if not the masses through Haiti, thoaght
this withholdiDg of breadstuff and other vital articles of food, no ships coming
in from Germany and other European countries, was a part of the United
States program to subject, if not to crush, Haitians ; hence laid all the blame on
the American occupation.
Senator King. What was the fact as to whether they got better wages from
the Government than in private employment?
Mr. Evans. My reply to the previous question largely answers this. The
relaxing of conditions of labor on roads at Port-au-Prlnce, possibly a little better
pay in 1920; and the fact that German merchants who formerly had control
of Haiti business had been interned, with piles of logwood lying about the
wharves everywhere in Haiti, hence scarcely any employment for natives, would
partly account for this.
Senator King. Is it a fact that they did get better wages than they did in
private employment?
Mr. Evans. No; It was simply 20 cents (American money) a week, and
without food, as the gendarme officers and others informed me at Jacmd in
June of 1918, and around St. Marc that year and beginning of 1919, It was
absolutely false unless a distinction was made In favor of Port-au-Prlnce and
for reason stated.
The Chairman. Mr. Evans, distinguish In your replies between the perio;!
of the corvee, which terminated in 1918. I think, and the period which followed
after abolishment of the corvee, when the laborers on the roads were paid.
Mr. Evans. If the following special recommendation of mine In the memo-
randum which I presented President Wilson and Secretary Lansing in October
of 1918, was carried out and explained and emphasized on my return to Port an
Prince to Brig. Gen. Catlln, December of that year, and a copy of which I
handed each of you this morning (see p. 4, and sec. — ) :
" Now that Haiti has declared war, the Germans at last interned, our United
States Government shall grant us our full share of all necessaries by way of
food at the lowest price; make generous loans to enable our occupation to
proceed with Its constructive program, and give all Haitian laborers not le«
than a gourde and a half (30 American cents) a day. All forced (corvee)
except in case of prisoners and known criminals to be at once abolished among
the quiet and i)eace-lovlng people, was faithfully carried out by our United States
Government through brigadier general during 1919 ( not 1918) , when Senator King
visited Port au Prince. Very likely what you say Is true, and tVhat you relate
Is the fact; and if so, I am glad the memorandum helped to at last abolish
forced. In fact slave, labor of our Government at this time, at least around
Port au Prince and further Increase wage.
** I understand, however, from Gen. Barnett's report to Secretary of the
Navy Daniels that it was through his own Imperative command to Brig. (Jen.
Ctttlln that he abolished the corvee October of 1919, or 5 months after I left
Haiti and 12 months (nearly) after specifically pointing out to the United
States Government at Washington, and to Gen. Catlln at Port au Prince,
Haiti, this grave Injustice. And that even then throughout the whole of the
north under Maj. Welles, as in some other sections, it was defiantly persisted
in and Haitians promiscuously killed as tlie result of these revolutionary
methods and insubordinate conduct of Marine oflftcers of the United States
Government filling some of the most responsible positions under the American
occupation In Haiti. I beg to Insert the following In record In reference to
Cacolsm and conduct of Maj. Welles and his marines :
CORBOBORATION OF llSMOaANDUH STATEMENTS TO THE t7NITED STATES QOVEB5MENT
AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOBEION BELATI0N8 DIBECT FROM HAITI, AND SHOW-
ING CAUSE OF CACOISM THEOUOHOUT THE NOBTH.
Further evidence re the tearing of treaty, the rein of terror, and bloody
bolshevism by white United States oflicers and their armed native police
(gendarmes) under them in Ebiitl at this moment, which has made our United
States Government a by-word and disgraced the Stars and Stripes In the Black
Republic, now aroused with indignation and writhing under present cruel
regime.
A Baptist missionary, with 25 years* experience In Haiti, French citizen and
white, writing from the northern section of the Republic recently to (general
Superintendent L. Ton Evans, and after referring to appalling spiritual need
of the people, the lack of laborers, and financial support, adding:
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 183
"I most highly estimate yonr persistent labor and incessant toil and pain
in b^alf of Haiti and real love for these oppressed people and greatly admire
your faith and sincerely pray for your success at this time in this supreme
effort of yours to get white Baptists to talte hold of this Important field.
"As you are now in the United States pleading with the Government at Wash-
ington to appoint a commission to malte a thorough investigation into the inter-
nal affairs of Haiti and cause of present unrest, disturbances, and murders
here, it may add to your already strong testimony and as further proof of the
absolute necessity of such commission that you be informed that since you left
for the States months ago bands of Cacos have appeared again at Hinche and
throughout that section, armed with Mauser guns (they say) and making ter-
rible trouble in that part of the island. This new and native uprising it Is em-
phatically stated is directly due to the bad administration and cruelty of
American marine officers.
"Though I can not personally prove it (as eyewitness), yet judging by the
general situation (and as no one knows better than yourself) I certainly be-
lieve that this is the real reason back of these present troubles. Some say
that this movement is a part of the German intrigues against the United
States. This may be true to some extent, but the real truth is that if the
American officers themselves, with those inunediately under them, adopted a
different method, shov^ed more wisdom and humanity in their administrative
policy, and endeavored to conciliate the Haitians and gain the love and con-
fidence of these Negroes so as to make them feel that the United States is their
protector and the "American occupation " with its officers are their true friends,
the Haitians themselves would never turn against and oppose them, even if our
Negtoes in Haiti were supplied with all the money and all the guns that Ger-
mans could furnish them.
"You can use this argument not only for the appointment of the proposed
commission, but for a complete change of the present r^g^e in Haiti (that
l8 the establishment of a civil occupation), but do not g^ive my nama There
is absolutely no fear on my part, but it is somewhat difficult to personally and
positively prove some of these things. We can not, however, count on the
Haitian people themselves (unless amply protected by United States Govern-
ment) to declare the truth as regard, the great Injustice and cruel sufferings
tbey have to endure under the American occupation, for fear and dread on
their part that the moment they do so they will have to suffer even more
prosecutions, imprisonment, hard labor, if not something worse, as soon as
the Senate committee is gone and these officers of the occupation remain in
Haiti"
"This is perfectly true, for when the commission (even) of investigation
is gone the American officers in Haiti will Immediately persecute, illtreat, and
brutally abuse all those who have dared to testify or denounce them. My own
case is precisely the same as theirs. Apart from all this our missionaries, as
w^l as our work here, will be looked upon — that Is, Protestants and protestant-
ism or evangelicalism — as the American occupation's worst enemies. We shall
be compelled as the result to endure greater suWerings and oppressions than
ever, and every possible obstacle will be placed In our way by American officers.
The Roman Catholic Church and her priests (now financially sustained and
supported through the American occupation, therefore its servants and slaves)
will be more in favor than ever with them.
"However, as you yourself are a true American citizen, white and with
many years of experience in Haiti, and expert knowledge of its people before
ts well as after the coming of the American occupation, you have more
liberty and a better right both to speak and to act than any of us here, and
who are already looked upon with strong suspicion, if not Indeed counted as
enemies, and simply for the reason that we preach the Gospel, and of course
show disapproval of every Injustice and tyranny, and even condemn the spirit
and often unbearable prejudice that some white people (especially from
America) persistently show toward these natives. I really believe that this
terrible prejudice and abominable hatred of certain unconverted, dominating.
If not Intemperate and Immoral, Americans have a great deal to do with the
actual bad situation throughout Haiti. In writing thus to you, dear brother
Evans, and supporting your plea at Washington by furnishing present Informa-
tion as to moral, sodal, and political reformation absolutely needed In this
Defected and suffering Black Republic, you must not therefore think that I
C22e&— 21— PT 2 6
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184 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
am quite converted to your opinion that the political, eilucntional and indus-
trial and economic reforms your own President and Ignite 1 States Government
may brng about in Haiti, and according to that splendid treaty you attached
so much imi)ortance to and feel so proud of. can really regenerate Haiti ami
its people apart from the Gospel ♦)f the blessed God, and through His word
which we both believe and preach, etc."
This white anl exi)erience<l brother, laboring. 20 years solidly in nortli
Haiti and the center of so-called cacoism, will testify if called at the Cope.
Senator Kino. Then the evils of which you siwik were conflnetl witbin a few
months, or confined to a limited period?
Mr. Evans. I had two years and five montlis of the corvee, which was p^a^
tlced all over Haiti, causing serious frictions, indescribable brutality every-
where, and arousing a strong feeling and bitter hatred against the occupation,
marines, and United States throughout the whole Republic; until this unbridled
passion and unchecked recklessness and rutblessness of our marine officers filled
Haitian prisons, and the shooting of prisoners dragged out of their cells at
night, without pretence of trial, and killing of cacos by the thousands could no
longer be smothered, and official reiwrts held back and absolutely suppressed
and falsified — the marine scandal in Haiti and the atrocities perpetrated under
and by the American occupation in the Black Republic was exposed and
shocked the whole Nation, if not the civilized world.
The Chairman. It is set down in the report of the Navy Department that in
violation of the orders of the commanding officer the corvee in the remoter parts
of Haiti was continued. I think, therefore, before we conclude this momlni:,
we ought to ask Mr. Evans about the framing of the new constitution and the
objections to it. I think that will be Interesting.
Mr. Evans. May I hand the following for the record from the report to my
missionary committee of Negroes in North Carolina who had, like American
officials at Washington and of the occupation in Haiti, become deflected from
their original plan and purpose and had' become more interested oflkially,
if not financially, in the sugar corporation (which has grabbed sonoetblng
like 200,000 acres of the best land of the Haitians) than In the salvation of
souls and education of their own Negro people, and therefore never read it
placing instead an elaboratecl and illustrated American sugar corporation
" prospectus " on the table, while pushing aside the official report of their mis-
sion, account of work done under exceptional difficulties, and paying no heed to
the crying spiritual needs of oppresseil. Imprisoned, and murdered natives.
The part of the report dealing with the new constitution is as follows:
Annual Repobt Submitted to Lottt Cabby Haiti Mission aby CoviMnTEE at
Washington, D. C, for Year 1918.
(By L. Ton Evans. Baptist missionary superintendent of the Ix)tt Carey CoDTention,
St. Marc, Haiti.
SUDDEN CHANGE AND REVERSION OF NATH'ft FEELING IN HAITI, AND REASON WHT.
Through the feeling of gratitude to God, our President, and United States
Government and American people for restoration of complete order and estab-
lishment of real peace throughout the whole Republic, great sanitary and other
special Improvements, was both genuine and general and shared by all classes
alike, including the most loyal and patriotic Haitians, who naturally love thdr
own little country and flag as we Americans love the Stars and Stripes.
It was indee<l a pity, yea worse, a political calamity if not a moral tragedy,
that just at the moment when our leaders and people here were recovering from
the shock of an apparent invasion by American armed marines under the cover
of night, and beginning to seriously question the truth of German merchants,
fllibusterers, and exploiters, whom through various channels have for years per-
sisted in poisoning these natives and Negro mind against the United States
and everything American. That Uncle Sam*s desire for Mole St Nicholas
was only a guise, for the purpo.se of a foothold on Haitian soil, to annex the
Republic with its rich land and lead them back eventually to slavery with its
horrors, in spite of their heroic struggles and bloody sacrifices under the
immortal L*overture for their freedom and independence some 115 years ago-
To our astonishment and consternation, however, and with the suddeness ot
an earthquake violent jolt, or as if a German airplane passing over Haiti had
actually dropped a bomb from the clear blue sky right down upon a vast hat
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IXQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 185
hidden i>owder magazine ut Port au Priuce, not merely changing, l)ut completely
reversing ami actually revolutionizing everything over night a« it were.
Behold, one great but sub<lue<l cry from one end of the Republic to the other,
even the most remote — ^American deceit ! American treachery ! ! — the occupation
is going to forcibly change our constitutlim so as to give our riglu»st and best
lands to American con^orations and white wealthy profiteers, and force us again
as slaveH to work, exactly hh we were warneci by our German friends, tliey
would do the moment they put their feet on Haitian territory.
Personally finding out therefore what your RUi)erinten(lent at first tliought a
stuitendous Iduuder in diplomacy by an anmteur p(»liticinn, or a raw inex-
perienceil official around the State and La tin- American departments, or some one
close to the President at Washington, totally ignonuit of the sacredness of treaty
obligations and the seriousness of metldliug with a nation's constitution, was
but a clever scheme ami <leeply-laid ph)t of certain newly-forme<l corporations
of the United States, boasting of unlimited wealth, with stoclcholders within the
administration who had followed the American oc*cui)ation to the Blaclc Re<
public in the twentieth century, much like the Spanianls and pirates came in
the wake of Columbus in the fifteenth; and unless their grab for land and
greed for gold is spee<lily checked, it will result in same barbarous and dis-
astrous end, when iKwr colored Carib Indians were robbeil and perished at the
hands of stronger wliite Europeans.
On thus seeing our treaty, pledging protection to the Negi-o Republic, people's
liberties, and rights, undertaking to agriculturally, minerally, if not e«luca-
tionally cultivate the soil and develop the Negroes, for Negroes, and by Negroes —
ruthlessly Ignored and openly repudiated, and that hundreils of thousands of
acres of the best lands were already taken or being neg(»tiate<l by two of these
<H>rporations by the aid of, if not through the American occupation, caused
this bitter reversion and serious opposition to, and anger against, and hatred
toward, the United States.
And more especially that this betrayal of Haiti and cruel rape of their con-
stitution as now proiM)se<l, ctuning so soon after American Marines had dis-
armed Haiti soldiers, disbanded their army and the Republic's senate and
house of representatives had been slammed in- their face, as the Russian Duma
was by the late Czar, against the Russians, and that these imlitlcally and
financially bankrupt Negroes felt utterly helpless, daring not to openly discuss
these vital matters, nmch less to publicly protest for fear of imprisonment as
suspects, or being instantly shot »s rebels against authority and enemies of
the United States.
Your superintendent therefore felt it his personal and im|)eratlve duty as an
American citizen and a Christian missionary and representative of the millions
of white and coloreil Baptists of the United States, to step into the breach,
and under these conditions an<l as mediator, to at once hnsten to Port au Prince
so as to have a quiet talk and si)ecial interview with (^ol. Russell, the able
and genial military chief of our occupation.
Failing to obtain an American official Engll.«ih copy of tlie propased new
constitution, with change of the vital clauses re land, etc., from either our
American legation, or the colonel at the occupation headquarters. I resi)e<!t fully
suggested to the military chief (who pleaded ignorance as to its origin) and
asserte<l that I had certain knowledge as to the real Interests back of the
present propaganda, and averred that neither President Wilsim, at Washington,
nor our Negro President Dartlguenave of Haiti, had absolutely anything to
do with this new constitution movement ;* and after pointing out the very
serious change already cH>me over Haiti, and arousing, and embittering of the
Haitians, how the mere announcement of the intention of the occupation to
force this, had stirred the wrath of this little nation, I earnestly appealed,
therefore, to the colonel (rather than seemingly put coals on already klndle<l
fire) to postpone the so-calleil voting until we could wend to, and hear from
President Wilson.
»l»reaident Dartlguenave of Urtltl, practically elected by the United States President,
and pnid through the handa of the Fnlted States* Keneral-reoolver In Haiti his salary,
was mad<> iforclbly and under his own name the instrument for proclalnilni? the snld
fake election and the Issuln}; of the French copy of tho new constitution Un- publi-
cation in Le Moniteur Wednesday. Mny 8, 19 IS, and since transpired rewritten at the
office of the Pnited States Navy Department. Washington. I>. i\, and a fact that
must have been within the personal knowledge of both Col. Russell and Pnlteil States
Minister Blanchard, who were conniving together by this method to deceive the Haitians,
Mind the American people, and to shield the United States Navy officials and tbose
ttack of them.
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186 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
•
This, Col. Russell said, either he could or would not do, wherefore your
superintendent asked permission for him to cable directly to Washhigton, to
defer Indefinitely the fake voting and ask that a small commission to Investigate
be at once sent as I had possession of facts the United States Government
and United States people should, and would know.
When the colonel declined also this, stating he would proceed with the elec-
tion^ so called, the following week, and, as announced by President Dartlgoe-
nave, I expressed profound regret to him that it should be thus made to appear
to these Haitians that our American occupation — whose mission in Haiti
was plainly set forth In the treaty to tranqulllze the natives, strengthen the
amity existing with a view to create Implicit confidence between Haiti and
the Unlteii States and not to stir up opposition and strife — was, after all. an
instrument of American financial Interests now operating In the Black Republic
The colonel and marines were determined to serve these financial interests at
the expense of Ignoring, openly and ruthlessly violating the United States Got-
emment's solemn and sacred covenant obligations to these Negroes, hence
taking a mean advantage of their utter helplessness In the hands of the
American occupation.
Under these peculiar and most painful and treacherous conditions it became
my imperative duty, as a Christian missionary and an American with more
than 25 years' experience in and working for the moral, social, and Industrial
as well as religious welfare of Haiti, and one who had endeavored to champion
their Individual and national liberties and legitimate rights when attacked
by Europeans and Germans, hence now to protect and defend them from
being robbed and exploited by the American occupation and under our own
Stars and Stripes, solemnly pledged by treaty to protect the integrity of the
Negro Republic and defend the rights and liberties of every Haitian.
As a true American, therefore, who scorns ofllcial treachery and military
fraud upon a black and helpless little nation, your superintendent in taking
leave of the colonel and chief of our United States marines at Port au Prince,
respectfully assured him that this whole matter would be brought directly
before President Wilson, In spite of obstructing and profiteering olficlallsm,
and that probably both of them would meet face to face at Washington or
before a commission of Investigation when this proposed voting on the s(H»1J«J
new constitution would be declared a military farce and a political fraud.
In taking this stand, I added, If absolutely necessary, I would bring Haiti's
case before the nearly 8,000,000 white and colored Baptists of the United
States, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ In America, the Federa-
tion of Labor, and, finally, to the great American people so as to remove for-
eVer this foul blot from off the folds of our hitherto stainless flag.
Your superintendent, however, assured the chief of occupation that he would
strictly refrain from any kind of agitation In the Black Republic ; tliat he
would personally submit to the colonel there and, moreover, use his efforts
and Influence and that of their native preachers and Christians, to loyally, as
far as possible and proper for missionaries to do so, to maintain law and
order and add to the authority and efficiency of American occupation in their
faithful attempt to discharge their duty to the United States Government and
to the Haitian people according to the spirit and letter of the signed treaty.
The day of so-called voting (sic) arrived, and passed off quietly enough
on the 12th of June, 1918; and when thousands, of course, throughout the
Republic (considered, nevertheless, but a very small fraction of the real voting
power of Haiti), and nearly all of whom were in the ofllclal and financial
pay, and in some way or another employed by the American occupation, and
weekly receiving their salaries or wages through the hands of the United
States official receiver in Haiti.
This Is true from Haiti's present figurehead Negro President. ex-Presldent
Legitime, chairman and members of national council (and Illegal and uncon-
stitutional substitute of the American occupation, created so as to usurp the
functions of the Negro Republic's senate and chambers), Judges, magistrates,
commlssaires (mayors), clerks of customs, post-office servants, gendarmes,
school Inspectors and teachers, employees of castor-seed, sugar, and railroad
corporations, etc., employed aro»nd courts and prisons, to the remotest man
who received pay and was under control of American armed marines ta
Haiti, with one exception ; that is, the European Roman Catholic archbishop,
bishops, priests, freres, and nuns in Haiti and professors and faculty of the
Haiti Roman Catholic college for training of white European priests; and,
though on poor bankrupt Haiti pay roll through American general receiver,
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 187
directly against the stipulation of the treaty, were rounded up, carefully
watched, and presumably cast at least one ballot
The processions of voters (sic) few literate, with 95 per cent illiterates, and
employees of corporations in whose sole Interest the occupation was acting that
day, resembled funerals as to their silence and solemnity if not in their
mournful character, all over tlie Republic, and as they passed along like
sheep, with broken hearts, into Haiti's courts of justice — but transformed that
day through the whole country and by the American occupation into slaughter-
houses for to slay both the Negro constitution and the treaty of President
Wilson and the United States Government.
Each voter (sic) was watched with an eagle eye, and guarded by the poor
native gendarme (Negro police) who were everywhere in evidence, and
specially officered by American marines of the occupation for this special 'occa-
sion, and consisted of American generals, colonels, majors, captains, and
lieutenants, not to mention American-paid Catholic archbishops, bishops,
priests, and other civilians^ who were around and presence and influence
requisitioned, for no risk must be taken.
As there possibly might still linger in the mind of a poor black Haitian gen-
darme, though trampled and all but crushed, a ^ark of true patriotism, which,
at the remembrance of the Immortal Touissant L'Overture, might chance kindle
into a burning ilame and cause another conflagration. Thus, each court had a
special white marine officer in supreme command, but for the sake of perfect-
ing the farce, there were Haitian dummies sitting handing out the slips at
the box which received it, and a dummy Haiti commissaire sat alongside of
the American marine officer.
On entering the court a small white paper, stamped w.th police adm nistra-
tion, bearing date June 11, 1918, and with the French word oui (yes), was
placed In the trembling hands of the native, who was signed (no word spoken)
as to slip or anything else, to the box directly under and In front of white
American marine and dummy native assistant, who sat on a dais.
The bundle of pink slips with the French non (no), curious enough and most
significantly showing the fraudulent nature of this whole scandalous business,
remained on the other side of the table tied together, the poor native in charge,
as well as so-called voters, knowing these packets were meant for mere show ;
for even if cut lose their terror-stricken brother Haitians dared not refuse the
oni (yes) and ask for the non (no) at the risk of being imprisoned and shot
as an enemy of the occupation and foe of the United States Government.
Thus, terrorized and helpless to resist, these people sorrowfully were made
to slavishly and tremblingly submit, as brought In from small country villages
ind mountain sides, guarded and closely watched every step and turn by armed
native gendarmes, under strict supervision of marine officers.
This comedy, or rather rape and indeed tragedy, is best described by the in-
tdligent, heartbroken natives (nearly all of whom except those mentioned ab-
stained in face of being blacklisted, imprisonment, etc.), as follows:
" We were compelled to-day by the United States Government to take a dag-
ger, then forced by the military occupation to plunge it into the very heart of
oar own Negro Republic ; and so that, like Pilate of old, they might wash their
hands and say hereafter that Haitians themselves actually did the slaugh-
tering."
Hence, June 12, 1918, will be remembered in Haitian history as the day their
Negro Republic was not merely raped (as President Harding described It) but
indeed assassinated and buried through the heartless betrayal of the United
States (^vemment, under the Democratic administration, with its Christian
l*re8ident, Woodrow Wilson, to the everlasting humiliation and shame of every
American, and accomplished by a method surpassing the most cowardly, de-
<"*Ptive, and diabolic conceived and practiced by the worst Hun In the World
War.
In spite of the disarming of the Haitian soldiers, the disbanding of the Negro
army, the closing of their Senate and House of Representatives twice, and
which are at this moment under lock and key (and what no other little nation
would have slavishly submitted to and tolerated on the part of our own United
States Government), these Haitians patiently endure<l this national humilia-
tion, hi f^ce of the treaty, with a flickering hoin? that such would soon end,
there would be a turn in the tide, and a change for the better until April of
1918,
And until the rumor suddenly was heard, that rapidly spread like wildfire,
the occupantion I.<* actually going, by the same American military force, to rob
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188 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Halt! of her constitution, so as to give our lands to foreigners, speculators, and
corporations of the ITnited States ! Hence the sudden change and the bitter
reversion of feeling which followed, as described in my report to misslontry
committee, which I expected to take prompt action at Washington with Prert-
dent Wilson and State Department, until I found they also had been caught
and captured by Haiti corporations and made even an attempt to exploit tl»eir
missionary superintendents also.
I felt the disappointment and humiliation all the more In having, as stated.
done all in my power to foster a friendly feeling toward the United States for
over 20 years ; urged our Government in Roosevelt, Taft, and beginning of
Wilson's administrations to assume a friendly mandate over Haiti and act the
big brother toward these people; and therefore, being personally and partly
responsible for the fact of our Government's coming to Haiti, though not respon-
sible for the time n<>r the manner of the seeming invasion of the Black Republic
by the armed American military marines.
I therefore feel convinced that this committee, in its thorough investigation
into Haiti alTalrs, ns I urged upon the so-called " Haitian navy court " in ray let-
ter to Hon. Josephus Daniels, anxious to get the whole truth, make an investipi-
tion Into the following to get back of marine s<'andal and occupation failurei>-
1. Into the nature and extent of the alliance between marine officers of the
United States at Washington, as well as In Haiti, with American corporations
which followed the '* occupation '' to the Rlack Republic and the European special
delegate of the Pope (a foreign potentate who dictates the appointments of
Haiti ministers In Jamaica, Washington, etc.) sent to Haiti during the present
American occupation; with the archbishop, bishops, priests, friars, nuns, etc,
of Roman Catholic Church, and all of whom are paid their salaries like officers
and members of American marines and the native gendarmes — only they, like
marines, receive theirs In American gold, and not like Haitians, in gourdes—
from American loans to the little Black Republic and directly through the hands
of the Unlte<l States, flnancinl receiver ; and
2. Further, must determine what influence and power .such alliance with
corporations and close relation of the Catholic Church with* the Haiti so-called
Government and the American occupation of the United States Government as
now existed — from the time we entered — In the Black Republic of Haiti has
been resptmsible for the appointments of American marine officers to and re-
movals from Haiti— under guise of promotions, etc. — ^under the present occuim-
tlon ; for the demoralization (through constant interference, etc.) of the United
States marines from their usual high standard of military discipline and moral
efficiency ; and for the deflection also of the administration at Washington or
officers of the Navy Department, as well as the American occupation on tiie
island, from the high purpose of the United States Government's special mission
in Haiti, according to specific terms of our treaty, to apparently serve financial
interests and sectarian ends by withholding all appropriations from Protestant
day schools, change of constitution, etc.
As I wrote to my Negro missionarj' committee (in that report) I here empha-
size "That unless (rape of c<mstitution already described) this torpedoing by
an American submarine of a small and friendly Negro Republic craft (it sol-
emnly undertook to protect, succor, and help) unexpectedly. In Haitian waters,
and without warning, and absolutely without provocation, for It had neither
gun forehead or aft for either defensive or offensive purposes (having been pre-
viously and forcibly di.smantled) and the Unite<l States President and (5overn-
ment immediately * disavow * and * repudiate * such action, and declare same a^
piratical and the work of irresponsible hyphenated Americans, restore the con-
stitution (with senate and chambers) thus remove the blotch from the foWs
or our American flag, then in words of the Hon. D. Lloyd George, British Prime
Minister, at the great Queen's Hall, London, and had Britain and the whole
British Empire not gone Immediately to the defense of Belgium and honestly
and honorably filled their treaty obligations with that small nation, so in the
case of Haiti, disgrace and dishonor will cling to our United States Government
and the great American people dowTi the everlasting ages.
A man named Da vies, chief of one of the American corporations, swaggering
a great deal in Haiti and with our occupation demanded this change of the
Haiti constitution, and had already written articles In the National Geographi-
cal Magazine and other Journals months before declaring (In the Interest of biii
corporation, etc.) that Haiti's ancient constitution must be rewritten, and moro
especially the clause re lands.
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nrQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 189
Furthermore, in an interview I had with him at the Cape April, 1918 (daring
my tour among the native churches), when he seemed to nnfojd his plans, add-
ing tliat his corporation had unlimited capital, his own salary more than
that of President Wilson, with stockholders if not directors from within the
United States Government, thus the occupation was practically at his and his
corporation's command ; that they had the right of way in Haiti ; and that he
was then contemplating taking over the mail from the Haitian Government,
etc. This was said in presence of an educated native missionary.
Hence the announcement in the Moneteur, Haiti so-called government, but
really official paper of the American occupation, and under the name of
Haiti president, at once brought to my mind the Cape Haiti interview and the
financial interests behind the American occupation, and working through either
or lK>th the Navy and State Departments of the United States Government at
Washington, compelling Col. John H. Russell to change the Haiti constitution
and rob it of its vital and protecting proviso, and so arouse and further em-
bitter the feelings of Haitians whom he describes in his report to Gen. George
Bamett, major general commandant United States Marine Corps, at Washing-
ton, **Are a very hysterical people ; like children, they believe every rumor and
completely lose their heads, and in consequence are very liard to quiet."
S^tor PoMERENE. Who is this Da vies?
Mr. Evans. He professes to be the financial head, if not also the brains, of
an American corporation which has already secured — aided by Haitian courts
in the hands and under complete domination of American marines — many thou-
sands of acres of the choicest lands in Haiti, mainly for the purpose and adver-
tised all over the Republic of raising castor seed and supplying the United
States Government's airplane fleet with oil, etc.
The Chaibhan. I heard that he resigned the presidency of the corporation
to become a Congressman.
Mr. Evans. I submit for record a digest of my notes made of interview with
this H. P. Davies, and brief quotations from his articles, which I hope will
prove as illuminating to the Senate committee of inquiry as they were to me as
to himself and corporation's intentions In Haiti, which he affirmed with a view
<mly to make money, irrespective of the treaty or welfare of the Haitians, and
disclaimed emphatically that neither himself or his corporation had the least
idea of any philanthropic purpose such as to assist In educating industrially
or otherwise the Haitians. Thi^ Davies, if in Congress, and in this country,
or Haiti, should be summoned to appear before this committee.
(Notes of Interview with H. P. Davies, official head of castorseed corpora-
tion in Haiti, with certain quotations cited re constitution, and comments of
editors on United States treaty with Haiti.)
The reading of articles written by Davies, with the interview Saturday after-
noon, April 20, 1918, taken with nie to my apartments and ponder fills me
with dismay as regarding Haiti and the future of these poor Negroes, In spite
of the splendid treaty, if the American occupation in the Black Republic, and
even the Latin America, Navy or State Department, are to be exploited by
this and other corporations. I felt determined to watch the future develop-
ments, not merely for sake of Haiti and Haitians, but chiefly the integrity and
honor of the United States Government and that of the whole American people,
and our honesty and veracity In just going into the World War with the Allies,
because of the Kaiser's tearing of the treaty with little Belgium. I shall spare
no eflfort, I said, to prevent the repetition of Germany's crime against Belgium
by the United States Government and people (through these unscrupulous
corporations and with the aid of United States Marine officers) against weak,
bankrupt Haiti, whom we are pledged before the world and God by a .sacred
covenant to protect and assist.
Therefore, In a letter of April 27, that year, when writing my board on con-
ditions, spiritual degradation, illiteracy, friction, and cruelty often culminat-
ing in deaths. I referred to impending attack upon the constitution, urging
my board — ^jointly with northern and southern Baptist leaders — to immedi-
ately see President to absolutely prevent this disgrace and shame. I wrote :
••We have sad cases of immorality and drunkenness here among members
tnd even officers of Marine Corps. Through lack of restrictions, either as to
vice or Intoxicants, ttie demoralization and even the fatal eflPects of alcohol in
this tropical climate in Haiti, worse among whites than blacks, Is somewhat
appalling. Why is it you make no efforts there to secure for our marines a
I. M. C. A. branch and give me the necessary authorization to do Cltrlstlan,
■odal, and temperance work among them?" r^^^^l^
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190 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
Again : " Many marines feel that everything is so quiet In Haiti, and they
are tired of walking about doing nothing but carry the gun all day long unless
they start a scrap among themselves — and so leave to go to France. These
marines should be exchanged every six montlis. It's cruel to keep these young,
raw lads, some two and three years in this tropical climate and with such
appalling temptations and degrading surrounding influences."
Further, " Though we have some excellent officers and others, and good work
has been done on the roads, sanitation, etc., that are much appreciated, they are
sadly hampered here by the lack of " loans " and the perverting influence of
the Roman Catholic Church fastened to the Haiti Government, and, of course,
our occupation, making honesty, not to say efficiency, impossible. These, with a
wealthy corporation boasting of stockholders within the Government depart-
ment at Washington and controlling influence over our occupation — heckling,
deflecting methods — and motives, must eventually, if not doing so now, actu-
ally defeat our very purpose as United States Government in Haiti."
Says H. P. D., the official head of the castorseed corporation, in utterance
defiance of the plain English of the treaty :
" This article 6 of the constitution of Haiti, which specifies that no foreigner
may own lands, must be repealed or amended." Yet he admits that this article
was introduced when Haiti gained Its Independence, and continues through
the years to be the one definite thing in the constitution which appealed to
every Haitian, and, above all, was understood by all the people.
As showing the complete domination of courts. Judges, magistrates, etc, but
specially meant as compliment to young, inexperienced, often raw American
marines, and tlieir gendarmes, H. P. D. writes In March nmnber of Pan Amer-
ican Magazine (1917) :
•* It Is fortunate for Haiti and Santo Domingo and for the United States also
that the solution of these problems, or at least the practical administration (sic)
of the affairs of both of the island's Republics, has been placed in the hands of
our overworked and little appreciated Marine Corps. Soldier and sailor, too,"
does not begin to express it. I have seen marines in Haiti and Santo Domlngt
switching from soldier to anything — from a blacksmith to a superior court
judge, etc.
Fearing that your superintendent had taken a too rosy view of the treaty and
Interpreted Its language too generously, and that it did not actually mean that
the United States Govermuent, after all, were by its good offices aid the Haitian
Government in the proper and efficient development of Its (Haiti) agricultural,
mineral, and commercial resources, and in the establishment of the finances of
Haiti on a firm and solid basis for the sake of Haiti and Haiti people; but
through American corporations with persons like H. P. D. 'at the head, with
United States Government officers as directors and stockholders, and absolutely
in the financial Interests of white Americans, were in the minds of both Presi-
dent Wilson and United States Senate, as well as Haitian Government, while
negotiating and ratifying and signing above treaty. Hence I quote what two of
the leading Americans, in two of the first-class American magazines, and neither
Christian missionaries or corporations promotionists say at the very time the
treaty was made:
The New York Outlook for March 15, 1916, thus comments on treaty between
United States and Haiti, as follows :
"Tlie treaty as a whole represents the furthest extreme (In liberality and
generosity) which we have yet gone in — the big brother attitude, with regard
to the small neighboring Latin-American nations.
" Of course, the success of financial and constabulary arrangements in Haiti
will largely depend upon the character of the men our Government will choose
to fill the various offices."
The Washington, D. C, National Geographical Magazine for August, 1916*
said thus about the treaty :
*' By this treaty the United States practically underwrites a loan of sufficient
amount to settle all the legitimate debts of the country and to finance the begin-
ning of its developments — opening up Its mines, putting its agriculture on a solid
basis, and otherwise preparing to make it a region of plenty that nature has
equipped it to be.
"This new departure probably will Insure peace, quiet, honest administra-
tion, and, if it does, Haiti (not American corporations) certainly will go for-
ward as few small countries ever have."
This is why, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I asked Col
Russell to postpone said so-called voting, allow me to cable President Wilson and
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 191
ask for a commission to investigate matters, as I felt be ought to Icnow what
was going on both in Haiti and around him at Washington ; that the Senate
and the American people should also know.
Mr. Angell. Just to explain possibly to you gentlemen who have not read the
record here — I heard Senator King say he had not read it — merely by way of ex-
planatiOD, which I think will give a little light on what Mr. Ton Evans is saying,
the old constitution, which is in the record here — I am not testifying or add-
ing anything — the old constitution had a prohibition clause in it against the
ownership of land by any alien. Only Haitian citizens (colored or white)
could own land. Exactly, for instance, the same as here in the District of
Columbia, where United States citizens alone are entitled.
The new constitution, so called, however, as stated in the memorandum to
this committee by the Navy Department, and appearing on page 7 of the record,
part L of these hearings, the new constitution, which was amended by order
of the State Department, provided specifically in Article V that the right to
own real estate (lands) be open to any person, corporation, citizens or not of
Haiti. That Is what the new constitution Is about.
Mr. Evans. So I submitted resi}ectfully to the colonel, adding how deeply I
regretted hLs refusal to postpone this so-called voting and allow me to cable
the White House. In all military matters, I added, I took off my hat to him
M chief of the occupation, but in constitutional matters, question of honest and
honorable observance of treaty, and our moral and *legal obligations as a
Government, and our great American people, to live up to the spirit and letter
of that sacred covenant ; or the right of military occupation, to tamper with
and tear up a constitution, as they were tearing up the treaty — with my educa-
tion, knowledge, and experience I respectfully declined to submit to any mili-
tary or other governmental authority.
I therefore took leave of the colonel, saying we should meet before a com-
mittee or commission either in Washington or Haiti, when not only the in-
fluence and power deflecting the motives of our American occupation, but
actually defeat the great purpose of their coming and staying in Haiti, would
be found out: Haiti Senate. Chambei's, and constitution restored to them; and
this part of the American marines' work and methods condemned.
On leaving the headquarters of the American occupation I turned into an
office on the way to station ere boarding my train to St. Marc, and convinced
that all this H. P. Dalies had told me concerning our United States Govern-
ment and the American occupation in Haiti was only too true, and sent a reg-
istered letter to President Woodrow Wilson, setting forth the facts, with an-
other registered letter to Ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, with a copy of my
letter to President, and reason why it was inclosed to Oyster Bay.
As expected, the former was Intercepted by Mr. Tumulty, or In either of Navy
or State Departments. Ex-President Roosevelt replied, and sent me other
letters.
The so-called voting took place June 12, 1018, precisely as announced. I have
already described at length from missionary report. Inserted herein.
Senator Pomebene. June. 1920?
Mr. Evans. No, Senator ; June 12, 1918, and 8 or 10 days after my visit to
Port au Prince and Col. Russell.
Senator Pomerene. Who was conducting that election?
Mr. E\'AN8. The American occupation, though they endeavored to make it
appear that the Haitian Government, which, of course. Is absolutely false.
Senator Pomebene. You mean by that these marines?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; American marine oflScers and members of the United States
Marine Corps, the Haitian officers of the occupation, for there is absolutely
no Haitian Government, acted as dummies and a mere cover ; you could see
their spirit crushed, and sat silent and mummy-like alongside of marine, who
was supreme.
Senator Poherene. Do I understand from your statement that these native
citizens were intimidated so that they would not vote against the adoption of
the new section of the constitution? Is that the fact?
Mr. Evans. Yes: mo.st emphatically so. They were terror-stricken, or, as
Col. Rnssell himself admits in his report to Gen. Barnett, referred to, "They
were scared by rumors, and become almost hysterical with fear " of imprison-
ment of being' clubbed to death, or shot down by gendarmes and marines, besides
the proclamation of the American occupation — through the Negro President of
Haiti-~announclng the so-called voting, the following notices were i)ut up at
*>«>th8, or In Haiti at the courts of justice (sic) and signed by American marine
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192 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
officers — who have power over life and death In the Black Republic that no
American in the. United States can possibly realize — and read, as the spedmen
below :
intimidation and threat.
Republic of Haiti,
Port-de-Paix, June 11, 1918.
In accordance with tlie decree of His Hxcellency, the President of the Re-
public, published in the Monitor of May 8 last, all the citizens of this commune
of Port-de-Paix are asked to be pre^nt to-morrow at the Hotel Communal to
vote on the new constitution, published in the Monitor of the same date. Any
abstention from such a solemn occasion will l>e considered an unpatriotic— that
is, anti- American occupation — act. Maintenance of order will be assured by the
gendarmerie (under chief, Gen. Williams. American marine officer), and the
ballots will be distributed by a member of the administration of finances (an
American marine officer) opposite the voting offices, etc.
Herman H. Hannekin,
lAeutenant gendarmerie d*Ha4ti, American marine officer.
E. Lescot,
Oovemment Commissaire, Northwest.
At St. Marc and other places, and if after voting and in celebration of death
of the old Haiti constitutiou safeguarding their Republic hitherto, were
allowed to indulge in all the voodoo dances and orgies they wished that night
by order of the occupation and American marines, as an inducement to vote, etc.
All the pink slips with non (no) as stated in my report were tied up, and
only the white slips with oui (yes) were loose and handled on the table before
each of those that were driven in, and one of each given to the committee with-
out a word spoken by either the Haitian so-called voter (sic) without looking at
the word (even though nearly all were too illiterate to know what it was) and
stood for if he did look, walked directly in fear and dread toward the box he was
pointed to and disappeared through the back door, glad the painful performance
was over.
On my return from the court at St. Marc, and met by my wife, who asked how
things were, I replied, ** God forbid that I should ever witness anything of this
kind again. Until this shame and disgrace is wiped off by our United States
Government we shall never be able to put out our Stars and Stripes again in
Haiti."
Senator Pomerene. How many polling places were there?
Mr. KvANs. I believe there was a polling place at every little town and village
throughout the Republic.
Senator Pomerene. Where was the polling place that you are describing now?
Mr. Evans. St. Marc, where I was stationed.
Senator Pomerene. Was there just one polling place in the city?
Mr. BiVANS. That was the only polling place in St. Marc, which was a town
of 5,000 or 6.000 people, with some 12,000 to 15,000 or more within a radius of
10 or 12 miles perhaps.
Senator Pomerene, Do you know what the condition was at the other polling
places?
Mr. Evans. I did not make it my special business to go outside of St Marc
to see, for if I did this would have been construed as antipatriotic, or rebellion
against constituted authority and possibly meant death. I felt my own life
almost safer in Haiti before the occupation came than with a certain class of
unscrupulous, drunken, brutal. American mnrmes who seemed half crazy. I
made inquiries, however, from others in various towns I visited as superintend-
ent missionary, and from what information I received from most reliable
sources — the conditions were exactly like at St Marc, including the voodoo
dances and Immoral orgies, if not much drinking.
Senator Pomerene. Well, in a general way?
Mr. Evans. Generally speaking from information given me, yes; the condi-
tions were alike everywhere, but evidence on this and other points will be
forthcoming in Haiti.
Senator Pomerene. What was the vote at St Marc; what was the result
there?
Mr. Evans. There was no means of knowing. The natives- felt no interest
whatever, as It was known from the announcement by the occupation (through
Dnrtlgenauve). that whatever the American marines did no one dared to oppwe
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 193
or eveo question. All slips were taken to Port Au Prince, and published there.
It was looked upon as a mere farce, and lowered the prestige. of the United
States among Haitians, who seriously think, and even Europeans, and indeed
Americans, who felt that the American occupation had gone the limit, and made
itself a laughing-stock, and looked contemptible. No votes were reckoned to my:
knowledge at either town, but all taken in charge of American marines to Port
Aa Prince.
Senator Pomerene. No, no; when the votes were counted what was the result
of the election at that place?
Mr. fi^'ANs. Ail were taken to Port Au Prince, and published there, but
whether they gave numbers supposed to be cast at each town, I know not, and
like others cared little, as I became disgusted, and felt disgraced that such was
possible in the name of the United States, and by anyone who called himself
an American!
Senator King. Sixty-three thousand for, and two hundred or three hundred
asainst in all the island
Mr. Evans. You mean the Republic, Senator. They might have published the
vote as 1,000,000 as 63,000 there is no one to contradict or to explain for the
American marines managed the whole business. I do not believe that any pink
^ps were put in by Haitians, and that out of shame certain marines cast in n
couple of hundreds. This is the belief in Haiti.
I denounced it then, and denounce it more still to-day, as the greatest mock-
ery I ever saw in my life, and never thought we had Americans and marine
officers that could sink so low before these gendarmes, and poor Haitians, whoso
respect, implicit confidence, and highest admiration should be the aim of every
miUtary officer and true American who despises anything like hypocrisy, and
Koms deceit and fraud.
Senator Pomkrknr. What part did these e<lucated Haitians take in this elec-
tion?
Mr. E>'AN8. The great majority, apart from those who happened as stated —
to he officially and financially connected with the occupation, so-called Haiti
Government, sugar, and castor-seed corporations, , sch(x»ls, courts, prisons,
customs, railroads, etc., abstained and kept clear of the voting place, though
in 90 doing they ran the risk of being blacklisted, run into prison on slightest
suspicion, or provocation, etc.
Had they gone, they would have asked for the pink slip with non, which
voomU] have decided their lot with the occupation. It was a hard and trying
situation, but many wer*» heroic enough to stand the teat, whatever has been
the consequences since.
If the occupation and American marines were In the employ of Germany
and receiving their pay from Berlin, they could never have gone about wreck-
ing the reputation, and ruining the character, and destroying the growing in-
floence of the United States Govemmet, more successfully than by the blunder-
tag, brutal, fraudulent, and even murderous conduct of marines and gendarmes
for the lack of moral discipline, knowledge of human nature, common sense,
and tme American patriotism of the Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt type.
Senator Pomkkene. Under the Haitian law, how many voters would there be
in the Republic?
Mr. Evans. No one can say positively, for there never perhaps has been a
real census. Its mere guess work.
Senator Pomerene. What portion of the votes was cast?
Mr. Evans. You say about 63,000?
Senator Kino. 09,000.
Mr. Evans. The people of Haiti, small as that number is, believe not the
published figures, though seeing how many the occupation had gathered by
tending their gendarmes around, and the ftict of their being dominated by fear,
and loss of little pay they had, and positions held — It may be near the truth.
Senator Pomebene. We will assume it is so. What portion Is embraced In
thee9,000?
Mr. Evans. Of the total population?
Senator Pohebbne. No; of the voters?
Mr. Evans. The real population of Haiti, is put down as 2,500,000.
The Chaibhan. Tou can figure the adult males.
Senator Pohebenb. Probably one In five?
The Chaibman. Two and a half million, roughly.
Senator Poherene. There ought to be in the neighborhood of 400,000 or
0001,000 votes then.
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194 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Evans. I should say something more like 400,000.
Senator Pomebenb. That is, if males alone voted.
Senator King. Most of the people reside out In the hills and in tlie brash,
do they not?
Mr. Evans. Yes; most of the people are living in the country; and only
way you can have any idea, is on Saturday their market day, when you feel
astonished at their number filing in from brush, and narrow lanes t)ent If pos-
sible on reaching the market as early as they can, and when business is over
about 1 or 2 o'clock latest, unless in the very busy cotton or coffee seasons —
they quietly hasten back to their husbands, children, and homes, so that the
market places are all cleared again In the early afternoons.
Senator King. I was told when I was there that three-fourths of the popula-
tion lived out of the cities.
Mr. Evans. Yes, that is true; at least three-fourths.
Senator Pomerene. How was this amendment proposed? What was the
modus operandi down there? Is it proposed by Joint resolution of the Con-
gress, similar to ours?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; precisely, so I understand, and from the time their consti-
tution was first adopted; but their «enate and chambers had been abolishefl
by the American occupation and members forced out and doors locked by
armed American marines, and us a substitute for the Haitian Congress the
same American occupation created — illegally, of course — what is called a na-
tional council, which, with the Haitian President, functions at tlie dictation
and direction of the American occupation, through the marines. This is why
the Haitian courts and Haitian people — quite apart from the fraudulent
methhods adopted re voting, intimidation and military force — declare the so-
called new constitution as both illegal and unconstitutional ; but most all of
judges of said courts were dismissed, if not some Imprisoned, for daring to
invalidate any procedure of American marines, whose knowledge, however, of
either law, constitution, or treaty in Haiti, if not also resi>ect, has lieen of a
somewhat negligible quantity and fundnmentally lacking.
Senator Pomebenk. But was there at that time?
Mr. Evans. No; not at this time, nor some two years before. Their parlia-
ment was closed in April of 19 IG, whereas the American occupation's tirst offi-
cial notification or decree — through their Haiti President — announcing the new
constitution dates May, 1918. On page 25 of the record of hearing l>efore select
committee on Haiti, etc., part 1, this paragraph appears, showing the vigorous
protest made by the Haitian Chambers against this annihilation process, as
follows :
" The Haitian Chambers protested against this intervention. On May 5,
the Senators were assembling in their provisional quarters w^hen an American
(marine) officer, brutally ordereil them to leave the place, threatening violent
measures to force them to go. At Uie suggestion of M. Paul Laraque, the
President of the Haitian Senate, they met at his house, where they drew up a
formal account of the incident." (See Appendix No. 10.)
Senator Pomerene. How was this amendment proposed, by what function-
ary?
Mr. Evans. It was done by the sauje functionary, that does everything in
Haiti, the American occupation, through the marines, but with Haiti President
acting — under force — as medium to blind and bluflf the Haitian people, and
deceive the re.sponsible United States Government, and people.
H. P. Davies, official head of castor-seed cori)oration in Haiti, boasts to be
a functionary acting behind the American occupation, and last October a
re.«?ponsible official of the Uniteil States Navy Department at Washington
publicly boasted that he was the functionary who changed the Haiti constitu-
tion, so there must be a conspiracy of many functionaries concerned in the
proiK)sing, and illegal, unconstitutional forcing of the new constitution as well
as back of the mock voting.
Haitian intelligent and educateil leaders and business men all over the
Republic saw through all this, and deplored and despised such procedure.
Senator King. Was there just one article involved in the amendment to the
constitution?
Mr. Evans. While there were minor modifications or adjustments necessary
to meet new conditions, which the Haitians themselves would gradually ami
in a regular and constitutional way have made with little patience, and if the
American military showed less intolerance and bounce, the main and vital
article which the American occupation and other corporation functionaries in
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 195
Haiti and at Washin^on (acting together), was that concerning the land,
which to the Haitians was the very heart and life ot their constitution.
These are the exact words of H. P. Davies, official head of the castor seed
Haiti corporation, in his magazine article he gave me to read and study at
Cape Haiti in April of 1918, and as showing his emphatic (and that of his
corporation) policy in the Black Republic when demanding this change:
" This article 6 of the constitution of Haiti, which specifies that no foreigner
(that is^ colored -or white person unless a Haitian citizen) may own lands, must
be repealed or amended."
Though admitting the vital importance of this one article and the very
heart and life of their constitution as follows, he persists In above demand :
*That this article was introduced when Haiti gained its independence and
continues through the years to be the one definite thing in tlie constitution
which appealed to every Haitian and above all was understood by all the people."
Senator King. If you will just answer without explanation we will get along
better. I asked you If that was the only point involved in the election.
Mr. Evans. I have already answered that no doubt there were minor points
which could have been adjusted through the Haitian Senate and Chambers, regu-
larly and constltutionully, but that it was the land part of the new constitution
which aroused, embittered, and actually transformed the somewhat friendly
feeling Into that of opposition, anger, and hatred against us.
Senator Kino. What was done?
Mr. Evans. As I have alreatly repliwl to Senator Pomerene and stated before,
tlie question of land was the vital point demanded by H. P. Davies and his
corporation, and according to his imperative demand, and that of the castor-seed
corporation, and as Davies predicted to me would be the case two months pre-
viously at his bureau in Cape Haiti, the ** occupation," on advice from Washing-
ton and through the Haiti President, announced that a new constitution would
be submitted to the vote of the Haitian people, on June 12, 1918, and in which
proposed new constitution this objectionable article, re lands, would be changed
to suit of course this castor-seed if not also the Haiti Sugar Corporation, and
said voting would be arranged, conducted, and guarded under strict super-
vision of the armed American Marines and their gendarmes.
Senator Kino. You say that this article originated in the Navy Department?
Mr. Evans. I say it originated with Davies and his corporation, and if what
he claimed that there were directors and stockholders (In his corporation) mem-
bers of the United States Government and administration and within the Navy
Department at Washington, then Col. Russell received his instructions from the
Xavy Department, for these are the words of A.ssistant Secretary Frnnklin
Roosevelt, of the United States Navy, which finally settles not only the com-
plicity but oflicial origin of the new constitution with the complete change — in
fact, total elimination — of the old constitution's land clause (Art. VI) :
"You know, I have had something to do with the running of a couple of little
repobllcs. The facts are that I wrote Haiti's constitution myself, and If I do
say it I tliink it is a very good constitution."
This remarkable statement was wired all over the United States and caused
astonishment and amazement among millions of Americans, but cleare<l up at
last the mystery to me, aud in Haiti, as to whom were directly and officially
responsible for this betrayal of confidence and perpetration of such a crime
against this little helpless nation — this admission nmst have been known to
tnembers of this committee.
Senator King. Have any advantages been taken of this provision in the new
institution by Americans to acquire lands?
Mr. Evans. Yes; and In my judgment a very unfair, unjust. If not mean,
advantage. The castor-seed corporation, with its claim of abundant wealth
and financial relations with members of the United States Government at Wash-
ini?ton, through directors and stockholders, and by contract to furnish oil to
the United States Government's airplane fleet, would have the right of way to
tlie largest and best of the soil throughout the Itepublic, and probably amount
to a considerable area of this Republic.
The Haiti sugar corporation, 1918, to which my own secretary of my Haiti
^'eJ^ro missionary committee transferred his interest and affections, now, I
h«ir, in the hands of the receiver, and boosting this corporation In Lott Carey
Missionary Herald for September, under his own name, and for Negro specu-
lators of North Carolina, etc., says :
"This corporation has 130,(X)0 acres of excellent sugar land in the plains of
l^OCTln, which Is said to be the richest land on the continent with a soil of
12 ft depth, besides a 20,000-acre tract of 15 miles north of _
196 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
•* Cheuj) }abor. — While Cuba Is paying for labor $2 a day. ami more at pres-
ent, Haitian laborers are only paid 20 cents a day. and In that Is included a
raist* of over 5() per cent over what was accnstonieil to be jriven labor formerly,
etc.'*
This neprro specuhitor and l)oo8ter forgot to add that living had gone up 150
per cent since American occupation.
These are the two main corporations, and It la stated that these lands are
got through the special aid of the American occupation, who control the Haitian
courts and judges, etc.
Senator Kixg. Were no Americans holding land in Haiti prior to this con-
stitutional amendment?
Mr. Evans. There might have been a few Ainericans, just as ther«» were
many foreigners holding individual properties, and even land for their own
purpose, but no corporations or American on large scale to my knowletlge,
and it would be somewhat futile for an individual or native Negroes to compete
in Haiti, at least during the last administration, if what Davles alleged is true,
that these had United States Government officials as directors and stockholders.
I should have addefl that under the old constitution and previous to our
American occupation there was no difficulty whatever for individuals settling
in Haiti to own property. The Haiti Government, whose constitution stipu-
lates that Protestant churches are equally free with Roman Catholic there,
have always been only too glad to grant land for schools or colleges to American
evangelical and missionary societies to educate and, morally and religiously,
develop the Haitian people, as the following from President I-.econte, whom
I visited at the palace, to his secretary of state, whom I wished to talk with
concerning land for Bible training and Industrial seminary and school, in
anticipation of the coming of secretary of Baptist Home Mission Board, and so
for the same purpose the map of the Island was given :
" Le President de la Republiqve d'Haiti, au Hon. ./. N. Leger, wiwi cher Secre-
taire d'Etat.
** JMntroduls volontlers aupres de vous le Rev. L. Ton Evans, Secretaire
General de la Mission Baptlste Evangellque pour Haiti, qui desire prendre
contact avec vous et vous entretenlr de choses qui concemant sa Mission et son
voyage dans le Pays.
* Sincere compliments.
" CtT'S. L.EC0NTE.
'* Palais National, 22 Xbre, 1911.
"All Sre. d'FAat de Reh Exterieurs.'*
" Le President de la RepuhUqtte d'Haiti au Secretaire de la hiMtrnetion PHbltQue
d'Haiti.
•• Envole au Reverend Ton Evans, la carte de Tile d* Haiti, avec Texpresslon
de ses melHeurs voeux pour le plein succes de ses nobles pn»Ject8 et se« souhalts
de bon voyage.
"I^ 29, Decembre. 1911.
'* Cxrs. Lecontk."
Roth in his own handwriting, and a few months before he was ruthlessly as-
sassinated because he refused to be exploited and turn over the customs to Ger-
man and other white speculators and political profiteers.
Senator Kino. You have answered that they did ; were they Americans?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; some most probably were, though I came, chiefly years ago
and through the southern and southeasterii part of the Republic, in contact
with English, French, Dutch, and German Europeans, There was no outside
corporation, to my knowledge.
Senator Pomebene. I^et me ask you another question, Mr. Evans, a preliminary
question. When were you last in Haiti?
Mr. Evans. I left there in April of 1919.
Senator Pomerenb. And you have not been there since?
Mr. Evans. No.
Senator Pomerene. Suppose the question arose and was presented to the
Haitians as to whether or not we should continue our occupation down there
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 197
temporarily, until their Government could be completely or^nlzed and put
upon a substantial footing, what would be the result of such a vote, in your
jad^nnent?
Mr. Kino. Were the (termans, French, and other nationalities other than the
Haitians owning? land In Haiti prior to this amendment?
Mr. E^'AN8. Yes ; small holding for their own fanrlly puri)oses.
Mr. King. But there were holdings?
Mr. E\'ANS. Oh, yes.
Tlie rnAiRMAN. I^t me ask Mr. Kvans weiv these holdings in their own
names? Did they have title in their own names?
Mr. EvAN.s. No. I understand that many merchants and others would live
with native women, perhaps of e<1ucation and maybe secretly married, and
through whom the property would be held.
The Chairman. That was quite a common practice, was !t not, among the
merchants other than Americans who were down there?
Mr. Evans. Yes; unfortunately, when this was done without a legal marriage.
I do not know, however, a single case of an American living with a Haitian or
cok)red woman, with the exception of some of the captains and lieutenants of
American marines, in the gendarmerie, and mofet of who in these cases were
English-speaking negro women from surrounding i.slands living In Haiti and
able to assist the white American with the native through the French pato*s,
which something like 90 or probably 95 per cent of Haitians speak.
Some of our American marine officers in the gendarmerie live in the Roman
Catholic presbytery with the priests and assist him in Roman Catholic Church
matters, thus by such alliances giving the Idea, which is generally believed
aDK)ng the illiterate inhabitants outside of the many thousand professing Prot-
estants and Protestant adherants, that the Ignited States Government. Presi-
tlent, and people are Roman Catholics.
Mr. Angell. At this point may I introduce into the record the articles of the
two constitutions covering.the holding of land, that will give, so far as the record
i« concerned, at least a basis for Mr. Evairs's testimony. I will give the stenog-
rapher the original French text of Article VI of the constitution of 1889, which
was hi force until this constitution was brought forward for adoption, the
translation of which is as follows. The original French text Is as follows *
**Nul, s'il n'est haitien, ne i^eut etre proprietaire de b'en fouciers en Haiti.
« qnelque titre que ce solt, ni acquemx aucun Immeuable."
** No person who Is not a Haitian can be proprietor or <»an own an interest in
real estate in Haiti, by whatsoever title, nor acqu're any real estate.**
Article V of the new, change<l constitution of 1918, concerning which Mr.
Kvans has Just been testifying and told this committee Its origination through
a certain Mr. H. P. Davies and the ITnited Statt»s Navy Department at Wash-
ington, reads in translation as follows:
"The right to own real estate is granted to a foreigner res'dlng In Haiti and
to companies (corporations) organized by foreigners for the needs of their
dwellings, of their agricultural, conmiercial, and industrial enterprises, and of
wlocat^on. This right shall cease at the end of the period of six years after
the foreigner shall have ceased to reside in the countrj'. or shall have ceased to
<*ondnct the operations of such companies*' (corporations).
The original French text of above changed article reads :
**Le droit de propriete inmiobiliere est acconle a Tetranger resident en Haiiti,
«*t anx 80<»:etes formes par des etrangers i>our les besolns de leurs demeures. de
leurs entreprises agricoles, commerciales, industrielles, ou d'enseignment.
"Ce droit prendra fin dans une periode de cinq annees apres que Ttranger
anra cesse de reslder dans le pays ou qu'auront <H»sse les operations de cos
compagnles.**
Mr KvANS. At present disapi)olnte<l, with bitter feelings due not only to be-
InR robbefl of their senate, their chambers, and esi)eclally what is dearest to
them in th^r constitution, and resentment of their l>etrayail, the brutality and
nmrders due to the mistaken and cruel working of the corvee, the overwhelming
majority would, in my opinion just now. be for the l'nite<l States to clear right
oat, which 1 would profoundly deplore, not simply for the sake of Haiti; It
Would be a humiliating confession on our part of failure to carry out our
solemn treaty obligations, which is a most serious matter for the United States
«t the present moment, about to enter into conference with the civilized nations
«f the world, negotiate treaties, etc. We must not think of shirking our duties
to Haiti and the Halt'an people, and can not thus humiliate ourselves before
the world.
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198 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
If this Senate committee results lu some cleaning out among our American
marines In Haiti, change the nrilitary into a c'.vll occupation, give reasonable
guaranties that the treaty will be honestly and honorably carried out directly
by the United States Government through competent, broad-minded, educated,
and even Christian statesmen of this country, possessed with faith in the Negro
and imbue<l somewhat with a true missionary spirit, and all this carefully
explained to the Haitians, the whole of Haiti would demand us to stay.
Senator Pomerene. Well, am I to infer now that your belief is that the pres-
ent state of the Haitian mind Is that we should get out?
Mr. Evans. Yes. The Haitians in many respects are children, easily led and
easily aroused and driven into almost hysterics with fear and terror. I fear
that many Haitian leaders, as well as the mass of the Negro inhabitants, lo<^ at
the cruel and criminal. If not insane, blunders of the American occupation.
Officials at the Navy, if not the State Department at Washington, as to senate,
chambers, and constitution, not to mention the brutalities and murders by
drunken, half crazy marines and gendarmes, which some, ignorant of the situa-
tion in Haiti and the real character of the Haitian, seek to defend and a ftew
un-American persons go so far as to justify, are looked upon not as the doings
of individuals, members of corporations, and conspiring and profiteering officials
but as the fixed policy of the responsible United Stat<^ Government and Ameri-
can people who never meant from the beginning to live up to their own treatj.
Hence, if the result of this careful and thorough investigation will mean
not merely an honest confession of our criminal blunder at a time we were so
absorbed in the World War, and the indignant repudiation in the name of the
United States Government, and the great American people, of all these blun-
ders, brutalities, and killings, and a readiness on our part to make an adequate
reparation to Haiti, we would be allowed. If not requested, to remain to finish
the job we undertook, and once more lift our heads.
Senator Pomerene. Suppose we were out of there now.
Mr. Evans. It would be an admission of incompetency and absolute failure
on our part as a Government beipre Haiti and the world, and can not for that
reason, if nothing else, be supposed for a moment.
Senator Pomerene, Suppose that we were to leave the island now and oth«
foreign influences were eliminated entirely, what would be the result to the
people of the island?
Mr. Evans. In my firm opinion based on a careful study of and years of
experience with white and colored, both in Haiti and elsewhere, and my
knowledge of psychology of the white and black man, Haitians would gradually
go back to their former position under the dominating and domineering In-
fluence of European merchants, politicians, and Roman Catholic priests, who
they are utterly Incapable at present to resist. If these were entirely elimi-
nated and the Haitians left alone, with merely efficient Bible training schools
for native preachers and teachers, and an industrial school similar to Tuskegee
and on a Christian basis, I believe it would soon develop Into an ideal Negro
republic, and astonish America and the world.
Senator Pomerene. Assume that we were to withdraw entirely and that no
other foreign nation was to step in there, what would be the result to the peo-
ple from the standpoint of law and order and a civic government? In other
words, could they maintain law and order down there and a proper civic
government?
Mr. Evans. Seeing that Haiti has already had over 100 years of an independ-
ent, free Republic, often seriously Interrupted, it is true, by political dis-
turbances and even bloody revolutions, In the main fomented and financed by
white men; that during the last decade quite a number of young Haitians
have had sound, practical educat'on here in the States, and having among
themselves many experienced, intellectually, morally, and even spiritually
strong Protestant and a few Catholic leaders, their prospects would be bright^
than ever from the standpoint of law, order, and chic government.
If the United States, however, protected the Island from foreign invasion
and political filibustering of white and colored, supervised Haiti elections and
finances, and aid in the establishment of normal and Industrial college, Haiti
without fail would gradually but surely work out her own redemption, and
quietly take her place among civilized, progressive, peaceful nations. Still, my
firm belief Is that we should remain In Haiti for some years to render her
such aid as specified or, better, to carry out our treaty, through a civil occu-
pation.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 199
Senator Pomebene. What do you mean by years to come — 3 or 4 years or
40 or 50 years?
Mr. Evans. Teu or 25 years, under efficient and sympathetic American pro-
tection ana leadership, but not a day longer than we can help it under present
military occupation after what has transpired.
It may help to malce clearer to the committee if I again briefly quote from
that 1918 missionary report. It is the following :
'*The invasion of the Black Republic by certain American capitalists was
naturally to be expected, much like the Spanish pirates and French slave
traders followed in the wake of Columbus five centuries before* but unless Uncle
Sam bestirs himself, wakes up, and strictly carries out his treaty and pledge to
preserve Haiti's integrity, the Haitians' liberties, etc., the result to-day will
prove as disastrous to the Negroes of the black Republic as to the C^rib Indians,
in those far-off days when piracy and buccaneering were rife in Hlspanlola.
" Whatsoever a president, government, or nation soweth, that also they will
reap in the just providence of God, and the timely warning should be heeded
by the United States. In his Social Aspects of Foreign Missions, Dr. Faunce,
of Brown University, says :
" ^Already incalculable harm has been done by the sudden influx of the white
tuan and forcing of his ideas among the weaker peoples. In Haiti, for instance,
the entire native population (about 1,000,000) died out within 40 years because
of the ruthlessuess and brutality of Spanish misgovern men t. The atrocities
wrought by the white in the Kongo, driving the black to produce rubber, are
still fresh in our minds, as it should be to-day to the Belgians. Africa has been
pobbe<i for centuries, of Its treasures, flesh, and blood, to satisfy European and
American greed.'"
While European and German politicians and profiteers exploited the Haitian
fJovernuient and customs, they were wiser than to meddle with senate and
chambers of the i)eople or attempt such a stupid and mad thing as the rape of
Haiti's constitution, for instance.
Senator Po&chxene. Is Gen. Williams in control there now?
Mr. EvANH. No ; I think he has left at last.
Senator Pomerene. Who has succeeded him?
Mr. I-Xans. I do not know; this has bt^en since my return to the States.
The Chairman. Col. Russell.
Senator Pomerene. Col. Russell?
Mr. Evans. Excuse me; Gen. Alexander Williams was the general over the
ppndarnierie of Haiti (native arme<l police), and un<ler Col. John H. Russell,
f'ol. Russell is head of the American occupation and chief in supreme conmmnd
of American marines and the gendarmerie of the republic. It is imjiortant to
have the two departments quite distinct in mind.
Senfitor Pomkhkne. He is there by our appointment, Senator McCormick?
Who la there representing this Government?
Mr. Angetx. Yes ; he Is at the head of all. as Mr. Evans said.
Mr, Evans. Tliere must be no confusion between the marine and the gen-
♦larme; they belong to different departments under the American (K'cupatlon.
The marines are about 800, perhaps, in number, most of whom are stationed at
Port an Prince, with about one-fourth at Cape Haiti. Very little if any disorder
or brutality are nllejred against these, with the exception of a scrap now and
ag;ain with the g<»ndarnies at Port au Prince. In fact, the marines have bit-
terly complained they had hardly anything to do, as everything was so quiet.
The gendarmes, or armed native i^olico, are scattered in companies all over
the republic, and each company has either a white captain or white lieutenants
as (»fflcer in sole charge, who also are called American marine ofTicers.
Most of the charges of l)rutality and killings, both in all prisons as well as
rml*^r n>rv(»e, and the so-called Cacos, are against these marine officers over
tlu» gendarnies and their gendarmes, chosen and cnnimanded by them, all of
whom were under Gen. Williams. Like the confuKion between Navy and State
Hepartments at Washington, there has l>een friction and confusion and a great
deal of jeji lousy between these two departments and the two sets of marine
officers, and through lack of definite policy they often overlaijped, consequently
had an injurious effect upon moral as well as military discipline, and seriously
at times handicapped the work of the occupation.
The Chairman. Before ycm leave, Mr. Evans, let me ask in reference to your
nllusion to the paiia-loi at the beginning of your testimony: in your judgment 's
voodoo'sm general in Haiti?
02260— 21— pt:
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200 INQUIRY INTO OCCITPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOBONGO.
Mr. KvA?c8. It |8 noth!nff like whnt It iisecl to be, for instance, niien I landed
nt Jaomel in the sooth, some 28 years n^o. This reform, if not revolutiofmry
cliange, is due chiefly, within a radius of 40 or 50 miles around Jacmel us wedl as
in sections throughout the northeast, to faithful work of tlie native OhristiaD
missionary, the native small schools, anil the sincerity and consistency of the
dally life and conduct of the native Christians and converts (croyaiis) them-
selves.
President Leconte during his short tenure of the presidential ofllce adopted
some strict measures and made the voodoo dances, orgies, and sacrifices illc^jral :
hence helped to put down most. Some of our better-class American marine
oflScers of gendarmes have also informed me of using their influence in same
direction.
Twenty-nine, twenty-five, and twenty years ago, and even fifteen, one could
not travel 2 or 3 miles without hearing the tomtom, but of late years, and
especially is this so in the Oros Mbme section and Jacmel, one can trav^ days
together without hearing a sound, nor see the effect of taflla. To me the gcwpel
and educational work have protluced if not a very high intellectual tyi>e cer-
tainly a high moral and spiritual character among tlipse once voodoo debauched,
low, superstitious Romanists and witchcraft devotees, gamblers, and voci
fighters, and the remarkable stories they have to tell, evldencetl by their honest
and clean lives has been cheering and Inspiring.
I have had the Joy of burning tomtoms and the whole imraphernalia nned
by papa and mama lois after conversion, and Lherlsson, our excellent native
missionary at Jacmel, has again and again brought donkey loads of demon-
worshiped implements to be publicly burned In town amid great rejoicings of
the Christian believers and to the confusion. If not consternation, of priests,
who irafortunately neither teach nor believe In real regenerating power of tlie
Christian religion.
Senator Pomerene. Are you going back there as a missionary again?
Mr. Evans. Possibly I may ; for after 20 years of correspondence, interviews,
pleadings, and praying our northern Baptist convention home mission society
through its religious-education department has just decided to enter Haiti so
as to establish In the most central position in the republic a Bible and theo-
logical seminary, with an Industrial department to efficiently train native
preachers and Christian workers right on the Haitian soil, and I may be re-
quested, perhaps, to accompany the secretary on his survey tour about the
time this committee goes to Haiti.
The committee may be interested to have Inserted here In the record, and as
showing the native*s eagerness for education and further religions eqniimient
and assistance by a powerful missionary organization in North America to
enable them to devote their time and energy entirely to preach the GkMspel and
give Christian teaching to fellow Haitians, a copy of the petition I brought to
New York in 1909 to above home mission society ; that is. two years before I
had the honor of bearing the petition and earnest prayer of nearly 3,000
Haitians, Including President Simon and President Leconte (who followed him),
to Messrs. Rockefeller and Carnegie, re the national normal and Industrial
college. This petition reads as follows :
Haiti Evangelical Baptist Mission, a cry from Macedonia, or pra.ver of native
brethren of the black Republic :
We, the present missionaries and native assistant preachers, express our
great joy at the Interest which is being created in this dark and needy island
and evangelization of our own superstitious country, steeped In Romanism,
witchcraft, and voodoolsm (demon worship), through the efforts of our friend
and brother, L. Ton Evans, who left his church in Pennsylvania to serve Christ
and help us to give the Gospel and religious education to the black republic.
Having no support from any missionary board or society, we are compelled to
engage ourselves in some kind of secular occupations to struggle along, and
which takes most of our time and energies to the hindrance of €k>spel and
educational work, and so as to carry the evangel Into dark sections all around
us clamoring for the light and word of truth.
For the sake of reaching these hundreds of thousands of perishing souls,
the social and moral uplift of our dear country, and for Christ, we therefore
most earnestly appeal to the American Home Mission Society, through our
beloved brotlier. Ton Evans, field secretary, to undertake this mission field,
so near your American shores, and yet so far away from your American civili-
zation and your Christian privileges.
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IKQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 201
We are fully convinced that our brother's desire to establish In Haiti, in
coimection with a Christian mission and Bible school and seminary for train-
ing native preachers, there should be also a normal and Industrial school,
patterned after Tuskegee, which would prove a blessing in the mental, moral,
and manual emancipation of our young people, and give solidity and perma-
aency to the mission.
Lucius Hypolite,
Port an Prince,
P. NO8IBEL Lherisson,
Jacomcl,
Metellus Menard,
8t Raphael.
C. Jean-Jacques,
Cape Haiti,
Akbbose Mars,
8t Raphael,
T. V. EUSTACHE,
Dondon,
Elie Mark,
Tron,
DUHAY Pierre Alexis,
MUot,
DUTREVILLE L AMOUR,
Trou,
Nkkva Ghousss,
Jacmel,
Orious Paultre,
8t, Marc.
Samuel Black,
8t, Marc.
Alcius JOLICOEim,
Jacmel.
Hbrnb Guyot,
Port de Paix.
Joachim Edouaro,
Orande Riviere.
Elie Phelix Cadet,
Dondon.
Osiris Lamour,
Trou.
Senator Pomerene. Who has succeeded you there?
Mr. Evans. There is no white man in my place. A good colored brother
from the Southland, without any experience In Haiti, or knowledge of either
tlie French nor patois I understand, is acting for the same colored missionary
committee. The Negroes of Haiti and native government have more confidence
In the stability, courage, and efficient leadership of the white man than In
tbdr own race. Besides a colored brother whether from the States, Haiti, or
sarroonding British Islands, feels somewhat handicapped in working along-
side of a European white priest, or In reaching Americans whether from the
North or South.
For this reason, when specially appealed to years ago by a delegation of
clergymen of the United States Episcopal Church as to their appointment at
Port au Prince of a successor to my old friend, the late Negro Bishop Holly,
I advised them to send a sympathetic, broad-minded, white clergyman or
bishop, which they did. Haitians are peculiar people, kind and even affec-
tlcHiate, whose confidence and esteem are easy to win by sober, moral, sympa-
thetic, unprejudiced Christian white men, whose leadership they will follow
and implicitly trust.
The Chairman. We can not go Into these philosophic considerations of the
Haitian character, interesting as it is, at this time.
Mr. E^vANS. At the request of Senator Hitchcock, then chairman of Foreign
Relations Committee, and Secretary Stabler, of the Latin American department
hi charge of Haiti affairs of the United States Government. I was aske<l in
1918 to state grievances of Haiti and my recommendations, and among those
given on pages 3 and 4 of memorandum and a copy of which I have given
members of this committee, is this as first and most vital before there can be
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202 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
any effec'tlve and CHjiistructlve work clone by eitlier the Haiti Govemment* or a
United States milltjir.v or civil ocoupatlon In the black Republic :
After a verj^ careful observation, frequent consultations with Presidents
and leaders both educatwl and uneducated, Oithidics and Protestants alike,
white and black, including officers of our American tx'cupation, and those next
to President Dartiguenave at this moment, I have no hesitation in stating that
essential to the spiritual Interests of the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches
and their work* hi Haiti, and indispensable to honest and efficient and also
stable government In the black Republic, there must be an absolute, that Is,
an official and financial separation, between them and both the Haiti Negro
governmentt as well as any American occupation there, exactly for Instance as
we have It In the United States.
The Chaibman. How Is that the responsibility of the American Government?
Mr. Evans. How does It come?
The Chairman. How is that the responsibility of the American Government?
Mr. Evans. In this way. The Government of the United States, In the
preamble of the treaty made with backward, and bankrupt Haiti, and one of the
very main reasons for our Intervention with these people, states : " The United
States and the Republic of Haiti, desiring to confirm the amity (not enmity)
existing between them, by the most cordial cooperation (not domination) in
measures for their common advantage; and the Republic of Haiti desiring to
remedy the present conditions of Its revenues and finances, to maintain the
tranquillity of the Republic, to carry out i>lans for the economic development
and prosperity of the Republic and Its people."
That Is, we have solemnly undertaken to place Haiti finances on a solid
basis, and to give an honest, and efficient administration to the black republic
and thus deliver them from dishonest politicians of their own, and the horde
of white profiteering foreigners who have been fattening upon them, diverting
Haiti Government revenues essential to the working of the Republic, spread of
education, among the Illiterate inhabitants, and other progressive reforms.
My point is, that while Haiti Government, and United States Marine officers
pay annually something like $100,000 If not altogether about $150,000 (It is
Impossible to find out the correct amount) from Haiti int(*rnal or customH
revenues, and (before the occupation) Haitian officers, but since Marine officers
of the United States, become paymasters of archbi.shop. bishops, priests, nuns,
etc., of the Roman Catholic Church, not to mention pay additional amount
toward the maintenance of the palace of this foreign potentate (prince of
another professing sovereign) their presbyteries, and churches* upkeep, it
becomes absolutely impossible for these United States Marine officers to loyally
serve either our Government, or the best interests of Haiti and thus carry
out the main purpose of our going to the black republic as explicitly and
most emphatically si)ecifled at the beginning of the treaty.
Again —
1. The old Haitian concordat, made l)etween the cabinet (not the Haitians)
and the Vatican at Rome is something entirely outside of the Haiti constitu-
tion.
2. This concordat, made about 1860, was for 50 years; has expired there-
fore for several years and never renewed. Hence If It had any apparent
legality in the past It has none to-day.
3. The Haiti Government and framers of the Haiti constitution, never antici-
pating such an unholy alliance as that of religion with the State, very em-
phatically, however, and in case such might be attempted, provide against
sudi in "stli)ulating that all churches are equally free in Haiti, and this still
remains unchanged. Therefore, an officially and financially State religion,
sucli as the Roman Catholic, is (in the black Republic) Incompatible, irrecon-
cilable with, and alien to the spirit of, and illegal with the Haiti constitution.
4. Moreover, and in the present financial condition of Haiti, and the inability
of either the nntive j:(»vernment, or the American occupation, after functioning
six years on the Island to make any provision for the education of Haiti's
children but withhold appropriations from excellent Protestant schools within
the Republic on the ground of lack of money, demands that this alliance at once
cease.
Furthermore, Article V of treaty says: . «
"All sums collected by the general receiver (of United States Government)
shall be applied — ^ ^, , , .^^
"First. To the payment of the salaries and allowances of the general recel\ei.
his assistants and employin^s. and expenses of the recelv^hlp, including the
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMIN(K). 203
salary and expenses of the financial advisor, which salaries will be determined
by previoiis agreement.
" Second. To the interest and sinking fund of Haiti ; and
"Third. To the maintenance of the constabulary (gendarmerie) referretl to
In Article X, and then —
"Last. The remainder to the Haitian Government for purposes of current
expenses.'*
I therefore respectfully submit that this committee is authorized and ex-
pected in its present investigation to find out the causes which have contributed
to the present failure of American forces in their operations in Haiti in the
lijdit of the treaty, and why no effort has been made to encourage education by
way of inaugurating a system of public instruction.
The Chaibman. Well, Mr. Evans, that has nothing to do with the occupation
Senator Poiucrene. Let me ask one other question. Are women as a class
down there stronger and more vigorous than the men?
Mr. Evans. Probably many if not most are. The home life, generally speak-
ing, excepting that of the educated Haitians and the Christian natives in the
interior as well as towns, have little or no home attractions but their little
children and husband for a woman. This being so, women and young girls,
of course, work out on their habitations (little holdings) and they mainly carry
the stuff to market They are the buyers and sellers, and seem to be natur-
ally gifted that way from early childhood.
Senator Pomerene. That does not exactly answer my question. I am speak-
ing of them physically now.
Mr. Evans. Of course, physiscal exercise in the oi)en fresh air would naturally
make them look and feel healthy. They are the children of nature and en-
joy freeilom in dress and their habits of life, which are most primitive, and
as the result of this, generally speaking, they appear to be healthier and
stronger in most cases, and even more active.
Senator Pomerene. Then you agree with the statement that was ma<le here
yesterday, that the women are more vigorous physically and healthier than the
men are, and have more physical strength?
Mr. EX'ANS. Yes. Probably in most cases they are, though we have seen in
Haiti, smart vigorous men of a very fine physique.
Senator Pomerene. How jibout the men? Are they, as a class weaker than
the women?
Mr. Evans. The men do as a rule the heaviest work on their little holdings
and watch the home and children, while the women are attending to selling
and buying for the family.
There is not so much to encourage the men either in towns or country. They
often talk politics — that is, about government affairs, and feel interest and
Umg for changes for the better. I mean the better educated and thinking
portion. Many resort to gambling, such as coi'kfiglitiug and card playing
more I fancy for the sp*>rt, diversion, and excitement in them than really for
the sake of cheating, or anything like robbery, or taking mean advantage of
one another. The cockfighting and the gambling like voodooism and witchcraft
are gradually disappearing and dying out as the Gospel and education are
qnletly spreading, though no country has ever been more neglected and
crimhially lgnore<l than Haiti and its people by the Protestant and evangallcal
missionary, and Christian education boards and societies of Europe and the
United SUites.
Haiti, has never had any real contact with the United States until now
though 80 near. There has been no opening for markets, and encouragement
for small cultivators.
Senator King. The fact is that without outside capital and outside infiuence
there Haiti Would soon revert to a condition of almost barbarism, would it not?
Mr, Evans. No; I could not say that. I have seen more real barbarism and
hmtallty, and read more of stabbing, lynching, and murder in Great Britain and
the United States than I have ever seen or known In Haiti. And also of
drunkenness, than among the natives of the Black Republic with all their capi-
tal and education and culture.
With American Christian eiluititlon and Industrial teaching and sympathetic
and efficient leadership Haiti, in my opinion would soon advance, and ere long
create its own capital. There are thrifty people there, kind hearted and most
generous natures you can find anjruhere among colored or white.
White employees of Haitian laborers in various parts of Haiti have spoken
to me very highly of their thriftiness and reliability when kindly treated.
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204 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Many of our own American marines have testified to me to the same efPect
tlie moment they changed their harsh and brutal methods, came to redlly
understand the natives, treat them humanely, and trust them they acted dif-
ferently and became reliable and devoted to their work and oflftcers.
Senator King. Well I went out into tlie island and I saw little shacks and
perhaps a quarter of an acre — ^well I will not say cultivated, but with wild
fruit growing, and a woman gathering it and putting It in baskets and carrying
it 20, 30, or 40 miles on her head to the town, and selling for a very inconsider-
able sum, and her husband or man she is living with would take the small
earnings, or part of them, and engage in cockfights and spend most of his
time in idleness and indolence.
Mr. Evans. There has been a great deal of cockfighting, and even petty
gambling with other undesirable things in Haiti in the past as stated, but I
blame the Protestant and Evangelical churches of America, and the United
States Government for this, and hold them responsible for withholding from
these Negroes all the Chrlsthin, e<lucational, and civilizing means we have
ourselves enjoye<l for over 100 years, and which have made us the Nation and
people we are to-day.
The Chairman. The Committee will recess until 2.80, when we may sit for
a little while, and let Mr. Evans conclude. *
(Mr. Angell thereupon offered for the record the following conventions and
agreements between the United States, and the Republic of Haiti) :
Convention Between the United States and the Republic of Haiti.
preamble.
The United States and the Republic of Haiti, desiring to conflnn and
strengthen the amity existing between them by the most cordial cooperation
in measures for their common advantage, and the Republic of Haiti desiring
to remedy the present condition of its revenues and finances, to maintain the
tranquility of the Republic, to carry out plans for the economic development
and prosperity of the Republic and its people, and the United States being in
full sympathy with all of these aims and objects and desiring to contribute in
all proper ways to their accomplishment;
The United States and the Republic of Haiti have resolved to conclude a
convention with these objects In vew, and have appointed for that purpose
plenipotentiaries :
The President of the Republic of Haiti. Mr. Louis Bomo, secretary of state
of foreign affairs and public instruction ;
The Presdent of the United States^ Mr. Robert Beale Davis, jr., charge
d'affaires of the United States of America ;
Who, having exhibited to each other their respective powers, which are seen
to be full In good and true- form, have agreed as follows :
Abticle I.
The Government of the United States will, by its good offices, air the Haitian
Government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural, mineral,
and conmiercial resources, and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on
a firm and solid basis.
Abticle II.
The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the President
of the United States, a general receiver, and such aids and employees as may
be necessary, who shall collect, receive, and apply all customs duties on im-
I>orts and exports accruing at the several customhouses and port** of entry
of the Republic of Haiti.
The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the President of
the United States, financial adviser, who shall be an officer attached to the
ministry of finance, to give effect to whose proposals and labors the minister
will lend efficient aid. The financial adviser shall devise an adequate system
of public accounting, aid in increasing the revenues and adjusting them to the
expenses, inquire into the validity of the debts of the Republic, enlighten both
Governments with reference to all eventual debts, recommend improved meth-
ods of collecting and applying the revenues, and make such other recommeoda-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 205
tions to the minister of finance as may be deemed necessary for the welfare
and prosperity of Haiti.
Abticlb III.
The Government of the Republic of Haiti will provide by law or appropriate
decrees for the payment of all customs duties to the general receiver, and will
extend to the receivership and to the financial adviser all needed aid and full
protection in the execution of the powers conferred and duties imposed herein ;
and the United States on its part will extend like aid and protection.
Article IV.
Upou the appointment of the financial adviser, the Grovemment of the Re-
public of Haiti, in cooperation with the financial adviser, shall collate, classify,
arrange, and make full statement of all the debts of the Republic, the amounts.
character, maturity and condition thereof, and the interest accruing, and the
sinking-fund requisite to their final discharge.
Article V.
All sums collected and received by the general receiver shall be applied, first,
to the payment of the salaries and allowances of the general receiver, his as-
sistants, and employees, and expenses of the receivership, including the salary
and expenses of the financial adviser, which salaries will be determined by
previous agreement ; second, to the interest and sinking fund of the public debt
of the Republic of Haiti; and. third, to the maintenance of the constabulary
referred to in Article X, and tlien the remainder to the Haitian Qovemment
for the purposes of current expenses.
In making these applications the general receiver will proceed to pay salaries
and allowances monthly and expenses as they arise, and on the first of each
calendar month will set aside in a separate fund the quantum of the collection
and receipts of the previous month.
Article VI.
The expenses of the rec-eivership, including salaries and allowance of the gen-
eral receiver, his assistants, and employees, and the salary and expenses of the
financial adviser, shall not excee<l five per centum of the collection and receipts
from customs duties, unless by agreement by the two Governments.
Article VII.
The general receiver shall make monthly reports of all collections, receipts,
and disbursements to the appropriate officers of the Republic of Haiti and to
• the Department of State of the United States, which reports shall be open to
inspection and verification at all times by the appropriate authorities of each of
the said Governments.
Article VIII.
The Republic of Haiti shall not Increase its public debt except by previous
agreement with the President of the United States, and shall not contract any
debt or assume any financial obligation unless the ordinary revenues of the
Republic available for that purpose, after defrajring the expenses of the Gov-
ernment, shall be adequate to pay the interest and provide a sinking fund for
the final discharge of such debt.
Article IX.
The Republic of Haiti will not. without a previous agreement with the Presi-
dent of the United States, modify the customs duties in a manner to reduce the
revenues therefrom; and in order that the revenues of the Republic may be
adequate to meet the public debt and the expenses of the Government, to pre-
serve tranquillity and to promote material prosperity, the Republic of Haiti
will cooperate with the Financial Adviser in his recommendations for im-
provement in the methods of collecting and disbursing the revenues and for
new sonrces of needed income.
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206 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Abticls X.
The Haitian Government obligates itself, for the preservation of domestic
peace, the security of individual rights, and the full observance of the provi-
sions of this treaty, to create without delay an efficient constabulary, urban and
rural, composed of native Haitians. This constabulary shall be organized and
officered by Americans appointed by the President of Haiti, upon nomination by
the President of the United States. The Haitian Government shall clothe theae
officers with the proper and necessary authority and uphold them in the per-
formance of their functions. These officers will be replaced by Haitians as they,
by examination conducted under direction of a board to be selected by the
senior American officer of this constabulary, in the presence of a representative
of the Haitian Government, are found to be qualified to assume such duties.
The constabulary herein provided for, shall, under the direction of the Haitian
Government, have supervision and control of arms and ammunition, military
supplies and traffic therein, throughout the country. The high contracting par-
ties agree tliat the stipulations in this article are necessary to prevent factional
strife and disturbances.
Abticle XI.
The Government of Haiti agrees not to surrender any of the territory of tlie
Republic of Haiti by sale, lease or otherwise, or jurisdiction over such territory,
to any foreign Government or power, nor to enter into any treaty or contract
with any foreign power or powers that will impair or tend to impair the inde-
pendence of Haiti.
Article XII.
The Haitian Government agrees to execute with the United States a protocol
for the settlement, by arbitration or otherwise, of all pending pecuniary claims
of foreign corporations, companies, citizens, or subjects against Haiti.
Article XIII.
The Republic of Haiti, being desirous to further the development of its
natural resources, agrees to undertake and execute such measures as, in the
opinion of the high contracting parties, may be necessary for the sanitation
and public improvement of the Republic, under the supervision and direction
of an engineer or engineers, to be appointed by the President of Haiti upon
nomination of the President of the United States, and authorized for that pur-
pose by the Government of Haiti.
Article XIV.
The high contracting parties shall have authority to take such steps as may
be necessary to insure the complete attainment of any of the objects compre-
hended in this treaty ; and, should the necessity occur, the United States will
lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian Independence and the
maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property,
and individual liberty.
Article XV.
The present treaty shall be approved and ratified by the high contracting
parties in conformity with their respective laws, and the ratification thereof
shall be exchanged in the city of Washington as soon as may be possible.
Article XVI.
The present treaty shall remain in full force and virtue for the term of ten
years, to be counted from the day of exchange of ratifications, and furtlier
for another term of ten years if, for specific reasons presented by either of
the high contracting parties, the purpose of this treaty has not been fully
accomplished.
In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present
convention in duplicate, in the English and French languages, and have here-
unto affixed their seals.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 207
Done at Port-au-Priace (Haiti) the sixteentli day of September, in tlie year
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifteen.
Robert Beale Davis, Jr.,
Charge d' Affaires of the United States.
Louis Bobno,
Secretaire d'Etat des Relations Exterieures
et de VInstruction Publique.
Agreement Regarding Telegraphs and Teijcphones.
The undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments,
have this day agreed :
I. That the operation, management, and maintenance of the telegraphs and
telephones in the Republic of Haiti shall be under the control and direction
of the engineer or engineers to be appointed by the President of Haiti upon
nomination by the President of the Unite<I States and authorized for that pur-
pose by the Grovemment of Haiti in accordance with Article XIII of the treaty
of September 16, 1915.
II. That in order that officers of the gendarmerie shall be better able to
fulfill their duties under the treaty, the unrestricted service of the telegraphs
and telephones is hereby assured to them, and in order to provide for the
prompt transmission of messages of the gendarmerie the officers thereof will
afford all necessary protection to the lines.
In witness whereof the undersigned have hereunto signed their names and
affixed their seals in duplicate.
Done at Washington, D. C, this twenty-fourth day of August, nineteen hun-
dred and sixteen.
Robert Lansing.
Solon Menos.
(Whereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken unt:i 2.80 o'clock p. m.)
after recess.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
recess, Senator Oddie presiding.
Senator Oddie. To begin with, Mr. Evans, I would like to ask you what
was done by the American occupation to foster education and self-government?
Mr. E>'AN8, I have seen nothing done to foster education but rather to dis-
courage it. Some of the schools have been actually closed up. The appro-
priations given to all the Protestant schools (some of a very high grade and
commended by the Haiti Government before the American occupation came)
have been stopped by our American occupation, and consequently some had to
etose up altogether.
It was reported while I was at St. Marc that the American marines were
80 hostile to the Haitians, so afraid to see any improvement and signs of men-
tal and moral development in4:he natives tending to qualify them for anything
like self-government, that they also closed some of the Government day schools,
and attempted to abolish the Haitian College and medical school at Port au
Prince, which they would have done but for the strong protest of President
Dartlguenave at the time.
When arrested without any warrant and marched under a heavy armed guard
through the streets of St. Marc to the gendarmerie of Haiti headquarters, the
heinous charge against me, spluttered out amid vile oaths of a wild, intoxicated
If not half-crazy American marine officer, Capt Brown, who alternately aimed
to lay hold of his revolver to shoot me In the presence of the Negro armed
police under him, was that I sought by my preaching and efforts to establish
In Haiti, among these damned niggers a normal and industrial school so as to
Clhristianlze and mentally and morally develop these low damned niggers, whom
I labored for and loved.
I had precisely the same exi>erience, with close<l fists, wild gestures, oaths,
threats of being shot, command never to preach In his section and through
north Haiti by the intoxicated American marine, Lieut. .Hang, who raved like
a maniac in front of me, and before native Christians at the St. Michel head-
quarters of the Haiti gendarmerie, and an officer whom Gen. Williams had re-
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208 INQUIRY INTO OCC^UPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
instated iDto official position under himself, and MaJ. Welles, after being
severely disciplined for drunkenness and misconduct by Col. Russell.
President Dartiguenave thus bitterly complains against the American occu-
pation to the correspondents of the New York Tribune and Chicago Tribune, who
visited Haiti last November, and so that they might publish the fact in the
United States:
"The strangest phase of the situation, from the Haiti Government's view-
point, is not only have the American officials done noth^g for the intellectual
improvement and economic development of people and prosperity of the country,
but they actually opposed the little the Haiti Government tries to do in this
direction. They resist every project we make to deal with the education of
our people, etc."
I wish, with consent of committee, to put in the record just here a copy of
certain correspondence between myself and Dr. Maclean, the chief of the
bureau de Tlngenieur charge du service dUiygiene of the United States Govern-
ment, in which I referreil to a conference on the question of education, and
had invited him. Col. Russell, etc., with President Dartiguenave to meet witli
me at the bureau of public instruction, at Port au Prince, which appeared to
have profoundly offended him, and shows the exact attitude unfortunately
taken by the American occupation in this fundamental development and re-
generation of Haiti ; also shows why the failure of the United States Govern-
ment, through the present American occupation (and type of leading American
marine officials there, out of all sympathy with the terms of the treaty), to
fulfill Its noble mission in the Black Republic, and Its 2,500,000 Negro people,
and objected to my Christian and educational " activities," and, with the aid
of Washington officials, tried to have the little board to recall me, and failing
this got them to stop my small salary. The two letters follow, with Dr.
Maclean's reply :
St. Mabc, Haiti, West (ndies, July 20, 1918.
Dr. MacLean,
Chief of Hygiene Department of American Oecupation, Haiti.
Dear Dr. MacLean : Mrs. Evans and myself take quite an Interest In our
little St. Marc Hospital, as we do in our local prison, and often go the rounds
of the poor and sick patients in the one and visit and conduct services in the
other.
We can not but notice the transformation that has already taken place and
the striking contrast between things now and a few years ago at our prisons.
This is still more so, If possible, at our hospitals, due, of course, to the efficiency
of the expert chief of our o<'Cuimtlon'8 hygiene department.
During my recent visit as general superintendent of the Haiti field to Jacinel
and the south, with all of which I was most intimately acquainted years ago,
and on visiting both prison and beautifully situated new hospital there with onr
captain and local doctor of occupation I noticed the change and contrast wore
most marked.
These refiunns alone' in the interest of health and humanity, altogether apart
from other drastic changes, not to mention what we further contemplate (now
that Haiti at last has declared ** war *'), prove what a godsend our Government,
through the " occupation,** has already been to this little Black Republic.
May 1 ask whether you contemplate changing the name of all the hospitals,
hitherto terine<l hospices (almshouses, but more of pest houses in the past),
into the more modern city and general hospital, and so as to make them equally
accvssilile and agreeable to both Protestant and Catholic alike, especially seeing,
of course, that they are now entirely maintained by Our (Government occupation,
aided by gifts of the local g(»neral public.
If you are not already planning this. I would resi>ectfully suggest that a
sei)Mrate apartment somewhere n<Nir the hospital (for the present) be arranged
for the mentally aflected, now left roaming about the towns, sleeping out at
nights, and in company — both men and women — together under porches, etc.
These unfortunates rtnd wrecks of poor Negro humanity, whether men or w^onien.
shouhl be c-arcd for, and under such restrictions as not to be permitted to
propagate their kind.
Have you at present, either connected with our hospitals or directly with the
Goverim'ient at Port au Prim'c. some system of outdoor relief for the aged and
genuinely but respectable poor, and so as to give 1^ to 2 gourdes a wc»ek to such
when perfectly satisfied with the worthiness of the case?
I am planning before going to the States at end of present month or very
early next, to visit my missionary boards with a view to cooperative and
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OT HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 209
much larger mission worlc, to have a brief conference there at Port au Prince
with Haiti minister, superintendent of public instruction, etc.. in reference to
tile proposed national and normal industrial college for Haiti, and founded
OD brood Christian basis (interdenominational), exactly like Hampton and
Tuskegee, for instance, with us in nie States.
I have already suggested to Mr. Burgeois. United States Govemmwit super-
intendent of our Haiti public instruction, that we should invite Col. Russell,
Oen. Williams — ^if not president — and members of the national council, when I
shall give in Tough outline as to what has been already attempted in this direc-
tion when I bore a petition seven years ago to Washington, signed by nearly
8,000 of the leading Haitians; and the first name Inscribed on this unique
document praying for such a noble Institution and urgent necessity, as they
termed It, was my old friend — broad minded. If not somewhat cultured and
afterwards the late President Cincinnatus I^econt^.
"While calling on leading educationalists, as well as at our Government's
Latin American department, at Washington last October, before my return to
Haiti, I was given to understand that if this petition is now presented to our
Government and has the hearty and cordial support of our United States official
representatives here at the present time — as, for Instance, my first petition of
nearly 3,000 had the enthusiastic support of Dr. Furniss and Dr. Livingstone,
United States minister and consul In Haiti during 1911 — this project would go
right through, and that either jointly or separately, but backed by our United
States Government our great Christian philanthropists, educationalists, and
friends of the Negro in America will finance it.
I shall therefore be very glad to have you with us. If possible, as soon as Mr.
Bnrgeois Is ready to arrange this.
Very sincerely, yours, and for Christ and Haiti.
L. Ton Rx'ans.
Repxtblique D'Haiti,
BmKAU De L*Ingenieitr Charge Du Service D'Hygiene.
Port au Prince, July 25, 19J8.
lUn. L. Tox E\'ANS,
St. Marc, Haiti.
Sn: Referring to your letter of July 20, I regret that from my observations
of your activities during the past few months I do not feel It advisable to
confer with you on any matter whatsoever.
Ver>- truly, yours,
N. M. Lean,
Sanitary Engineer of Haiti.
(Urgent needs. From the missions of the North American Baptist Convention for Septem-
ber, 1017: " lieearding Haiti (Central America)^ after carefal investigation by Drs.
Barnes and Brink (field secretary and superlntt'Ddent of education of the A. B. IT. M. S.).
the conclusion is If Haiti is to be entered at present (by way of cooperation with
Lott Carey Foreign Board) the best thing for the Home Mission Society to do Is
to establisb a school for the special training of native ministers and other Christian
leaders, and to foster in connection with it a model church. The project calls for
$75,000 outlay and 110.000 a year up4ceep.]
St. Mabc, Haiti, West Indies, July 27, 1918.
Dr. McLean,
Service D*Hygien€, Port au Prince.
Dear Sib: Yours of the 25th ultimo to hand, and reference to alleged but
undefined " activities *' of mine, I presume as ChriJ?tian minister and mis-
sionary in this Republic, preventing you from conference, as suggested In my
letter of the 20th ultimo, which, of course, I regret.
In spite of my deep and profound respect and genuine admiration for Dr.
McT.ean ami the noble profession he has the honor to represent, as well as for
tbe " opinion and judgment " of such, and holding high office under our own
Government In Haiti, It has not yet occurred to me, however, as a Christian
minister and missionary, with over 30 years* experience and more than 25 of
these in very close touch with Haiti, its leaders of all shades of religious and
political creeds, that I should In Haiti, more than in the States, really consult
the medical or the military profession as such as to nature, limitations, or ex-
tent of my own " activities '* In Haiti for God, country, and humanity.
While stating this, I am willing, yes, anxious, and feel it my duty as far
•a possible, and even use my personal Influence with our Christian workers
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210 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
(white and native) at nil times to honor and heartily support, both military
and medical, as well as all other departmental, anthorlties in the f<hfnl
discharge of governmental functions, and carrying out in spirit and letter of
the ** splendid treaty " entered into by our President and United States Govern-
ment with the Government and people (Neg^pes) of Haiti.
This ** treaty," as I regretfully and respectfully informed Col. Russell (for
whom I have very great respect), was grossly infringed in the matter of the
" so-called voting on the new constitution," but, as stated to our colonel and
as Christian minister as well as a true American, I assured him that I would
take no step whatever in Haiti as regards this matter, but defer my action
until I reached the States, and even there bring the whole affair, first of all,
to the President's personal notice.
I stand, of course, unalterably by this ** treaty " and am sure our President
does, and that our (iovernnient will strictly abide by that "sacred document"
as constantly emphasized by President WilHon, and which principles alone jnsti-
fled us ih entering the ** war " and in continuing in it until the " sanctity of
treaty " such as that between Germany and Bel^um, or the States and Haiti
is recognizecl by every civilized government, and the liberties and rights of
small as well as big nations are equally safeguarded, and furthennore that
every thhig of the nature of ** secret plotting, political scheming/* etc., shall
be utterly abolishnl and a new diplomacy, oi)en and frank and aboveboard, is
adopte<l by nations.
The only sense and spirit therefore of the " treaty " between the States ami
Haiti as well as between other nations nmst l)e understood, must be inter-
preted and carried out as to the liberties and rights of the Negro pec^^le of
Haiti as well as the liberties and rights of other nations — safeguarded in the
light and along the line given and laid down in the last and final address made
by President Woo<irow Wilson on July Fourth (last month) at the tomb of
Washington, and neither military, medical, or diplomatic representative of the
President and (voverument in Haiti or elsewhere have any oflicial right to give
a diflPerent interi>retation.
As a good American it may do no harm to mention the points of our Presi-
dent's latest address here, ami for fear Dr. McLean has had no time to read
this memorable speech, they are as follow*s :
" These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fight-
ing and which must be conceded them before there can be peace :
**(a) The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately
and secretly • • • disturb the peace, etc.
"(6) The settlement of every question, whether territor>% sovereignty of eco-
nomic arrangement of politicnl relationship upon the basis of free acceptance of
that settlement by the people imnie<liately concerned (after due explanation and
without intimidation, etc.) and not upon the basis of the material interest or
advantage of any other nation or [leople (nor group of speculators, etc.).
"(c) The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each
other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common laws of
(rivillzed society, etc., to the end that all promises and covenants may be ai-
credly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries
wrought with impunity. et<*.
"(rf) These great objects can be put into a single sentence: What we seek
is the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by
the organized opinion," etc.
As the missionary and Christian minister Is supposed to practice what he
himself preaches, surely a doctor should not at all object to take his own medi-
cine more than our own President Wilson.
Inasnuich as I have the honor of representing hi Haiti something like a little
over 3,000,000 colored American Baptists, and practically the 5,000,000 white
Baptists of the States, who morally back the above, and expected to soon finan-
cially cooperate in onr Haiti mission work, these matters will be naturally dis-
cussed by them, and action taken to bring the matter direct to the President
himself f<n- adjustment, etc.. and not to any ofliclnl either at the White House
or of the (Tovernment.
As being yourself therefore, an official representative of our United States
Government and its rhief of the Haiti hygiene service, and though we may
differ greatly as to the interpretation of the said " treaty " as it affects Haiti
or, indeed, as to the "nature and extent of the activities of a Christian min-
ister and a Baptist missionary representing as I do the colored Baptists of
the States, etc., in .Haiti, and that you may not see your way to be present at a
conference to supiwrt, as stated, a national and normal college fon Haiti on
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 211
Cbristian but interdenouii national basis exactly Uk^ Hampton and Tuske^ee,
with ns in the States for instance " — for the real uplift of Haiti and its sons and
daughters, and by way of training; their younj? Negro manhood and Ncigro
womanhood for future religious, educational, industrial, commercial as well as
judicial and civic leadership — in their own black republic, I can hardly believe
that for these reasons you would decline to give me the information sought
in that letter addressed you the 20th ultimo, re hospitals and our Haiti poor,
und to the following effect:
"(1) If you are not already planning it, I respectfully suggest to you that
a separate apartment (possibly for the present) somewhere near the hospital
be arranged for the mentally affected, now left roaming about our towns,
sleeping out at nights, at times in company with men under porches, etc., and
so that these unfortunates and wrecks of poor Negro humanity, whether
men or women, should be so restricted as not to be able to propagate their
kind.*'
Please furnish me with information on this point, or if it does not come
directly under your own department kindly let me know where to write.
"(2) Have you at present, either connected with the hospital or directly with
the Government itself at Port au Prince, any real system of out-door relief
for the aged and genuine but resiiectable poor, and so ns to give one or one and
a half to two gourdes per week to such, and when perfectly satisfied of the
need and worthinese of the recipient? "
Again may I ask you. as chief of our Haiti hospitals, for copy of the provision
made (if any) for these aged and really poor, or should they come under
some other department. Please let me know where I may write.
(3) Furthermore, we have a woman and her child, of about 9, from Isle
Oonave, here since Saturday. She is a member of our mission there and came
to be medically examined at our hospital at St. Marc. I gave her a note,
but she returned without being examined, saying the local doctor wished to
see me.
I went with her to .see Dr. Audin yesterday, and he explained that being
from Isle of Gonave she would belong to communal Port au Prince. The
doctor thought a permit from the magistrate here would be sufficient so
to arrange for reimbursing St. Marc and that she might be received, and so
that the doctor may examine her this morning.
However, she was up but returned again, saying Dr. Audin could not
act. Inasmuch as the native sister is not only suffering but also much dis-
couraged, and now that she is here it would be somewhat cruel for to send
her back in the boat in the same condition about Saturday or Sunday to Isle
Gonave, and then after several days of further waiting and suspense take
another small boat and spend probably a day and night in that sailing for
Port au Prince.
Under these circumstances will you kindly send word to Dr. Audin advising
him to proceed with examination, and if he thinks it necessary to have her
for a week or so at the hospital, and that you will see there about the com-
munal reimbursement.
In this case we shall be glad to look after the young child and feed her, etc.
As there is so much ignorance, and indeed prejudice re hospice, and which
will take time to remove, please send me any rules you may have in French
or English dealing with admission of sick and aged.
It was this I had in mind when suggesting in my letter of 20th ultimo the
change of names from hospices to that of city or general hospitals, as with
ns In the States, and so as to remove the fears re Christian and Catholic
creeds, etc.
I-«t me again assure you, sir. that knowing, as the board and myself do, the
great and ^gantic task our President anrl United States Government have under-
taken in Haiti, which has boon so long crinjinnlly iiegle<»t(Ml, find whose over
2,000,000 Negro people have been for yenrs exploited by the stronger race, white,
.'md financial filibusters and unscrupulous, If not mean and murderous, politi-
cians for personal power and selfish gretMl, and the many an<l often serious diffi-
<*ulties whk'h indeed confront our "Americnn occupation '* in carrying out its
work of not only political, economical, educational, industrial, and snnitary
reformation but actual regeneration, it is the sincere wish of the hoard, as well
n.*i myself, not merely to work in |>erfe<'t harmony but by every possible and
legitimate means to loyally support our Government ami our "occupation" in
the discharge of their onerous duties to Haiti, the l^nite<l States, and to civili-
zation and humanity, and if we can make it all the easier for them.
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212 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
There n I ways has been and, there will always continue, the closest relation be-
twei'u the spiritual, religious, and moral with the political, educational, and in-
dustrial, not to say social, life of the people in Haiti as in the States or any
other country, and neither our Haitian Government and "American occupation,''
though acting separately and apart — and should be officially and financially per-
fectly free from each ether for benefit and real efficiency of both — can possibly
ignore the Christian church and ministers and missionaries an<l their specific
work, more than the latter, indeed, can the former, without misunderstandings,
frictions, and serious weakening and injury on both sides.
Though we thus labor in two dlflferent departments — in fact, different realms
even — there is absolutely no reason why we should not be actuated in the honest,
faithful service rendered to God, country, and humanity by the same high Chris-
tian motives and inspired by the same ennobling and soul-lifting ideals.
I still remain, yours, very sincerely, for Christ and Haiti,
L. Ton Evans.
Dr. ]McT-.i'an never replied, and the poor, sickly native woman was obliged to
wait several days for an open boat, then discouraged, and almost brokaihearted
and in great pain to return to her small island home on He Gonave, and prob-
ably was never able to proceed again by boat to Port au Prince. Dr. Audin, a
clever native doctor, dared not, without special permit from Dr. McLean, either
take this sick woman to the hospice, maintained by occupation with Roman
Catholic sisters in charge, and where there was plenty of room ; neither to per-
sonally examine her, as he privately told me. at the risk of his job, if not his
life. V This is the arbitrary way those poor, suffering Negroes are dealt with.—
L. T. E.
In contrast with the attitude shown by the American occupation who are
fundamentally opposed to the treaty Qt the United States Government and our
real mission In Haiti, namely, as put by the chairman — to foster education and
self-government — I shall place a few letters which passed between me and the
natives themselves in reference* to intellectual improvement, moral, and civic, as
well as religious development, with a view to Haitian self-government, which
Dr. Maclean and so many of the leading American marine officers fear and
dread or, in the words of the Haitian President, discourage and determined by
every means to resist:
Haiti National Council, Port au Pbince, HAm.
December SI, i018.
M. L. Ton Evans,
General Superintendent Baptist Mission, 8t, Marc,
Dear Sir: I am favored witli your letter of the 21st Instant and thank you
very much for the information you give me about your endeavoring to get Haiti
rid of all her superstitions by true Christian bftsis and efficient civilized means.
I should really feel greatly honored to meet with M, Dr. James H. Dillard, of
the Uockefeller Foundation of Learning in the United States, on his visiting
in Haiti, and to personally present him to the Haitian leaders and our President,
who are only too glad and ready to help him in all his inquiries about this kind-
hearte<l people.
As I intend to go to Cape Haiti through St. Marc next month, I will not fall
to call on you.
Believe me to remain, yours, sincerely, and for Christ and Haiti.
Dr. Laboche.
(This letter reached St. Marc when I was pining for breath of air on the hard
floor of the narrow, dark cell of the old St. Marc slave prison amid yells and
groans of jioor native prisoners cruelly beaten and brutally pounded, and myself
expecting every monient at tlie command of the American marine captain of
gendarmes to be dragged before a *' firing squad " like the British Edith Cavell.
Hence did not see Laroche nor his letter until on in the following New Year.)
My own communication sent my old friend a few days before was penned
thus :
Baptist Study, St. Marc, Haiti,
December 2/, 1918.
Hon. Dr. Laboche,
Ex-Sen<itor of the Haiti Republic and
Member of Kational Covneih Port au Prince.
Dear Doctor : Seeing the very deep and profound interest you and my friends,
* late President Leconte, Hon. Leger, Hon. Johnny Laroche, with other leading
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 213
Haitians, irrespective of politics and creed, showed in signing that i)etition
eight years ago and addressed to Messrs. Rockefeller and Carnegie, etc., in
States, friends of education and believers in the development of the race, and
the promise of land by the Government for such a noble project as the normal
and industrial school, you will be sure to rejoice in reading inclosed memoran-
dum to President Wilson and tind on bottom of page 4 that the petition was
presented to trustees of Carnegie International Peace Endowment.
Matters are maturing very fast, and either next month or February Dr.
James H. Dillard (whose name you will see with that of Maj. Moton, in the
memorandum), representative of the Itockefeller Foundation General Educati<m
Board, New York, will visit Haiti.
I am planning a special conference with our American, us well as, of course,
our Haiti leaders here, and Haiti President.
I am still of opinion but more convinced than ever that this institutipn-ts vital
in the social, moral, industrial, as well a« intellectual, regeneration o^HaiHTnin —
its people.
Yours, for Christ and Haiti,
L. Ton Evans.
(From the scores of other letters to, and from Legation De La Republlque
D'HaitI, Washington, D. C. ; Dr. Francois Delacour, Port au Prince ; Dr. Booker
T. Washington, Dr. T. Jesse Jones (Slater Foundation) Government Bureau
at Washington ; Dr. James H. Dillard, James Brown Scott, Esq., Secretary of
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington; and from ex-Senator
Elihu Root, president of same, all along the same line, and showing efforts and
appreciation re native education, and Christianization will be inserted for
record and perusal of this committee at close of present testimony.)
Senator King. Is that [closing of schools] because of a lack of revenue.
Mr. Evans. That is their excuse. They can not get any money from Wash-
ington, they blame it entirely to the United States Government, yet strange to
say they have the money, about |100,000 or more a year — probably $150,000 — to
pay salaries of £)uropean dignital-ies of the Roman Catholic Church, college
(for white priests in France), annually for this illegal, anti-constitutional, and
anti-treaty confiscation as well as misappropriation of Haitian funds.
Sentor King. Are these supported by the State?
Mr. Evans. Absolutely either by the customs, or the United Staies Government
loans, supposed to be given for the improvement and development of Haiti, and
not for the fostering and boosting of any sect in Haiti, and thus directly plac-
ing that sect (Roman Catholic religion, with its archbishop, bishops, priests,
etc.) In position of financial, political, and religious authority, and power over all
the other protesant and evangelical Christian bodies, and their educational col-
leges and schools (for the benefit of Haitians) as seen in present withholding
of all appropriations from protestant schools, and closing of same, while Uouian
Catholic are receiving theirs and thus keeping them open thereby.
Article XVII of the Haiti constitution plainly and emphatically says :
"All forms of worship are equally free. Every one has the right to profess
his religion and freely perform his worship, provided he does not disturb the
public order."
Yet the Roman Catholic Church is tinanoially and officially tied to the State,
and protestants as those on Gros Morne, the last Sunday of June, 1918, are
arrested on the way to Baptist mission church, roped and driven like slaves
by gendarmes of the American occupation, whose infringement, and brutal viola-
tion of article 17 of the constitution, is upheld by Lieut. Kulp (Leogane) and
Gen. Alexander Williams, chief of Haiti gendarmerie, and with the official
cognizance of Brig. Gen. Catlin, official head of the United States (ioveriiment.
Senator King. Under the jurisdiction of the State?
Mr. Evans. Exactly; under the direct jurisdiction of the State, as every-
thing in Haiti is completely so, and every dollar handled by our American
official receiver.
Senator King. What I mean is this, that in some places the Catholics main-
tain their own parochial schools, which are supported by the priests of the
church and by the church itself.
Mr. Evans. This Is not so in Haiti for the last 60 years, unfortunately for
the Haiti Ck>vemment funds and Haiti Government's stability and efficiency.
If the Roman Catholic schools and the Roman Catholic church in Haiti, like
Digitized by VjOOQIC
214 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
the Protestant and Evanfrelical churches in the black Republic and throughout
the United States, maintained their own schools and paid the salaries of their
archbishop, bishops, and priests there would be no objection and no injustice.
Our strong objection and protest is to the financial and official alliance with,
and therefore inevitable official recognition by the Haiti and United . States
Qovernnients, and arising from which is the greatest injustice done to the
other churches, that are independent of State, and claim equality of treatment,
which has shown by the withholding of school appropriations from Protestants
while allowing for Catholic schools and maintenance of Roman Catholic church,
and whose expensive regime is unfair and unjust and in contravention to both
constitution and our American treaty with Haiti.
Dr. Burgeois, the United States Government superintendent of public in-
struction in Haiti, very kindly furnished me with an official list of Protestant
colleges and schools from which appropriations were withheld, which he said
then was a preparatory step to their introduction of a scheme of public instruc-
tion, popular and compulsory, and free for the whole Republic.
This was more than three years ago and must have been resisted by the
American occupation, and one of the things referred to by Dartiguenave, the
President, in his complaints last year to the New York correspondents.
Senator Oddie. I would like to ask you if there was an act of censorship of
mail and telegraph during your stay there from 1917 to 1919?
Mr. Evans. Yes.
Senator Oduie. Was there an active censorship?
Mr. Evans. I should say so ; very active ; extremely so, as, for Instance, on my
letters to and from the States, and which were admitted by a marine captain,
were opened, if not confiscated, in some cases, and we really thought that cer-
tain checks by way of my small salary from the missionary board, unduly-
delayed through the European war, were actually stolen.
Senator Oddie. Was that controlled by the United States Marines?
Mr. Evans. The American occupation, through the United States Govemmeut
marine — who did not appear to be accountable to anybody — were in complete
control and dominated everything.
Senator Oddie. Did the Haitian (Jovernnient have anytliing to do with that?
Mr. Evans. No; nothing wliatsoever. Dartiguenave is merely looked upon by
the Haitian people as a figurehead, just as he is by the American marines, and
he knows himself — completely stripped of every authority and the object of
Haitian pity.
Haiti members of the so-called Haitian G<ivernnient then, who In every case
and department, such as post office, telegraph, etc., have an American marine
officer over them, and who explicitly obey their American marine masters, and
are compelled to ignore their own Haitian President, in spite of treaty which
refers to coor>eration of the Haiti Government, etc.
The Haiti Government is powerless and does. not exist as such. The Uniteil
States Postmaster General assures me, also the State and Latin America Depart-
ments and Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, of the Xavy Department, that on this
side there is absolutely no censorship on letters that go to and come from Haiti,
and still it goes on.
I have even sent letters with copies of Postmaster (Jeneral and Assistant
Secretary of Navy down to Haiti and asked the recipients to show same to the
post-office authorities nt Port an Prince, St. Marc, Cape, and .Tacmel. Such,
however, is their fear and dread of American marines that they would not dare
to do even this. Their confidence in our o<-cupatioii is completely gone, and they
feel they must slavishly submit or face something worse.
Senator KiNct. Was it during th(» war that they had the censorship?
Mr. Evans. Yes; I believe around November or December, 1917, It commenced.
The American marine officer came on hoard the same ship as we did from Now
York, November of 1917, to take charge of the censorship at Panama, and I
believe he informe<l me that this was to cover Haiti as well.
Dealing further with the question of eilucation, with your |)ermission, I would
like to place copies of additional correspondence. sho>ving some further efforts
to provide for Haiti and develop these people, kept under so long.
Senator Oddie. Yes; if there is no ohjccti<>n. that will be all right, ^Ir. Evan.'«.
You can hund those to the st<nogr?iidier afterwards.
(The corres'pondence referred to i-^ here printed In full, and covering soiuo
years, as follows :)
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIBY INTO OCJCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 215
First Baptist Chubch,
Lamiordy Pa., ISeptember /, 1915.
Seuator Elihu Root,
President of Carnegie Endowment for IntematUmal Peace.
(Petition of over 2,500,090 officials, political leaders, citizens, etc., of the
Black Republic, earnestly praying for a national normal and industrial college
to be established on Christian basis in the new' protectorate.)
Deab Senator: Knowing as I do of your personal and profound interest in
securing among all nations the blessed boon of peace long before you became the
honored official head of the Carnegie endowment, etc., I therefore at this mo-
mentous crisis in the history of poor Haiti, torn for years by cruel and barbaric
revolutions and internecine wars, and now that the long-looked and earnestly
prayed for auspicious day has dawned and an American protectorate (for that
Is what is meant) actually established in Haiti, and so as to assist the present
American occupation of our l'nlte<l States Government in gaining the real
confidence and Implicit faith of the rank and file of the Haitians throughout
the whole Republic (and at the very outset) as to the purity of our motives
and benevolent intentions as an American Government in taking such a step, and
which is essential to real and permanent peace, I respectfully ask you just now
to receive a petition Intrusted to me and containing close on to 3,000 names of
the most distinguished leaders, irrespective of politics and religious creeds,
praying for the establishment in their Republic of a long- felt need, that of a
national normal and industrial college, and on Christian basis, like our Hampton
and Tuskegee.
I have had the honor of personally initiating this idea after, however, consult-
ing and interrogating a large number of the ablest, best, and most Influential
Haitians, and after years of study and close observation as to Haiti's real
needs.
For man^' weeks and even months of hard traveling on horseback during
revolntionary periods throughout the interior, as well as towns and cities along
the coast to carefully explain this idea at the extreme peril to life and limb,
as I presented (with assistance of a few most courageous Haitians) the matter
tnd with petition in hand approached President Simon in the midst of the
great excitment of a bloody revolution and surrounded with some 8,000 or
10,000 of his Government troops at Cape Haiti, and generals and others
trembling at what might happen at any moment as he sought to crush the
rebellion caused directly by German money and German propaganda against
the United States, etc.
1 visited him subsequently at his palace, senate chambers, superior and all
other courts, and civic councils of Republic, schools, plantations, and rice fields,
tnd everywhere found the heartiest welcome and enthusiasm, as the object was
elaborately and patiently explained In French and patois.
In showing how it would work to divert the thought and energies of the
youths of the Republic away from politics and revolutions and militarism into
the practical, profitable, and peaceful pursuits of life in Haiti, such as thrift,
«iltivation of the soil, etc., show to them the real dignity of labor, the tears
would freely fiow down their swarthy faces and hope for them and their
conntry's future could be seen brightening and glistening in their countenances.
In addition to these thousands of names I have official letters of nearly every
dyic council throughout Haiti, where the petition was presented ami discussed
with profoundest interest; indeed breaking out into shouts of joy as they
resolved to officially support it, ordering their commlssaire or mayor to draw
«P a letter, attach his own name, and officially seal it and send me.
May I therefore be permitted to present this petition personally so as to be
able to answer questions or explain any matter connected with this request
and prayer, practically of a whole little nation, sick and tired of revolutions
•nd bloody internal wars, but with no power to resist against the white and
profiteering politicians and filibusters whose interest has been to keep Haiti
in one great turmoil all the years, etc.
Should your peace endowment come to Haiti's help at this epochal stage
In the Republic's history and grant this industrial school which will be backed
bj the Haiti Government, which has promised some 200 acres of land for such
school purpose, it will most effectively in cooperation with the United States
Government's occupation work and activities mean the real regeneration of
622e»— 21— pt2 S ^
Digitized by VjOOQIC
216 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Haiti In a few years, tlie efltablishment of peace, without which there can be
no progress, etc.
In hehalf of Christ and Haiti.
Respectfully and sincerely, yours, •
L. Ton Evans.
Caknegte Endowment fob International Peace,
Washington, D, C, November 7, W15.
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
First Baptist Church, iMns^ford, Pa.
Deab Sib: I am in receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo^ with reference
to your petition for assistance from the endowment in the establishment of
a national normal and Industrial college in Haiti.
In reply, I regret to inform you that it will not be possible to comply with
your request for a personal hearing before the executive commitee upon your
petition. My own time is so taken up during the next few weeks that I shall
be unable to grant you a personal interview. If you care to call, however, one
of the assistant secretaries of the endowment will be glad to see you and
what you may have to say will be presented in proper form to the executive
committee when it considers your petition.
In accordance with your request, I am returning the original of Mr. Root's
letter to you of September 27.
I am, very truly, yours,
James Bbown Scott. Secretary.
Haiti Baptist Mission,
Jacmel, D'Haiti.
West Indies, Fehmary 2, 1912.
Dkab Db. Bookeb T. Washington : In view of your important conference
this year at Tuskegee, and the deep and profound Interest you have shown In
your people, as evinced in the noble an<l extensive and successful efforts, in
spite of ignorance, prejudice, and opposition in the past, to educate industrially,
morally, yea, and religiously members of the race, thus giving an object lesson
to the whole world of what the African can and will do if only helped and
encouraged along the right lines, is it not really possible for your institute,
either alone or in conjunction with Hampton, to arrange to send a commiRsioner,
each with the indorsement of your trustees, and so as to visit Haiti, present a
joint official report, and furnish reliable data that will enable you to proceed
to the establishment for the Black Republic a similar Institute to that of
Tuskegee and Hampton, and if you think proper, a kind of extension branch?
I have in my possession a petition, signed by over 2,500 of the leading
Haitians, from my friend His Excellency Cinnclnnattus LecontO (president).
Hon. Jonny Laroch^ (minister of public works), Hon. Leg&r (minister of foreign
affairs), etc., and including senators, deputies, judges, generals, etc., of nil
political parties, and religious creeds, earnestly praying for this and pledging
ever>' encouragement from the Government, even to the granting of land for this
purpose.
Though the said petition is directed through me to Messrs. the Hon. J. !►.
Rockefeller and An<lrew Carnegie, and other true friends of the Negro race,
it contains a reference to Tuskegee and mentions yoiir own name, which, by the
way, is most highly honore<l here, not only by the leading Haitians without
exception, but to my gn»at astonishment by small cultivators and even laborers
throughout the 28 cities, towns, and villages it was my privilege to visit along
the coast and in the far interior of Haiti during last year, and the most ex-
citing time perhaps we have had.
America has no idea, neither, in fact, over 90 per cent of our own Haitian
people themselves, as to the magnitude of the present change, yea, the real
transformation which has recently taken place by the incoming of the new
Government, and that in a most unexpected way. It represents the real in-
telligence and energy of the Republic. There is to be found in palace and
cabinet to-day not only a high tyi^e of civilization, but in fact an atmosphere
of refinement, which if now wisely directed and strongly backed up by the
sympathetic but real support of our own United States (Government, and with
the blessing of Go<l, must soon effect a most beneficient change also throughout
this long neglected country, with its nearly 3,000,000 priest-ridden, poverty-
stricken, yet most kind and Interesting people. OOQlC
INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 217
It is really the first civic gaverament Haiti ha^ ever had. The nwtt few
jears are the most momentous in the history of this country of Toussaint
L'Overture. Yes ; the psychological moment has at last come, and which some
of us have looked forward to and earnestly prayed for the last 10, 15, and 20
Will you not, therefore, now act in this matter and come to our help and
tlje rescue of Haiti, which means, in fact, the real uplift of the whole Negro
race? For the character and capacity of the African is, after all, to he mainly
Judged not by the 'members of the race in the States, much less by those on
the Dark Continent, but by what the black man is in his own Republic ot
Haiti.
You may (a) accept this petition from me and personally present It to Mr.
Rockefeller or Mr. Carnegie, or both, or (5) you may arrange for a special
interview and accompany and introduce me and personally support my plea in
behalf of this small, brave, but much mlsunderstooil nation, or (c) even as
suKgested tirst of all — appointing commissioners. •
I have credentials from Dr. Robert S. MacArthur, president of the Bapti^st
World's Alliance; Dr. Ferris, minister of our United States Government at
Port au Prince; Dr. Livingstone, Unite<l States consul at Cape Haiti, etc. In
(iise you can arrange an interview, then I would suggest also with us that we
ask the principal of Hampton, Dr. C. E. Morris, Arkansas, and Dr. B. D.
Gray, corresponding secretary of Southern Baptist Home Mission Board. The
latter is planning to visit us so as to take up the whole island as their mission
field.
I ought to state that already I have been in correspondence with Mr. Starr
Murphy and Dr. Buttrick, of the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Government
Educational Bureau at Washington, D. C. Also I have written to Dr. Pritchett
and have had a long and intere.sting interview with the esteemed secretary of the
Tamegie Foundation, etc.. New York. While all deeply sympathized with poor
Haiti's neetl and special claims upon America's help now that our interrelation
was becoming much closer every year, yet not one of these foundations as at pres-
ent constituted enabled them to consider objects outside of the States, however
worthy these might really be, and more especially anything in the nature of
an industrial school. We must have in Haiti, first of all, an efficient normal and
industrial college, though no doubt if Haiti will now advance as we hope and
rfncerely believe before very long, no doubt, the Republic would require also
a faily equipped university for the efllcient training in the higher branches
of the sciences, etc., on the same basis as we have in the States.
Please send me seven catalogues of your school, as parents are constantly
inquiring about your school. Do you teach French?
For Christ and Haiti.
Yours, very fraternally,
L. Ton Evans.
The Tuskeoee Normal and Industrial Instititte,
Tiiskegee Institute, Alabama, May 24, 1909,
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
Edward 9viUe, Pa.
Dear Sir: This is to ackiiowle<lge receipt of your letter in regard to the young
girFs admission to this institution. The inclosed circular gives information
as to the terms upon which students are accepted here.
If the young girl to whom you refer can meet the requirements in full for ad-
mission to the day school, we shall be glad to admit her to that department.
Students admitted to the day school are required to be fully 14 years of age,
able-bodied, strong, healthy, well grown for their age, and able to at least pass
the entrance examination for the B preparatory class.
The charge for board is $8.50 i>er month, but students are given an opi)or-
tunity to work out a portion of this amount. The entrance fee to be paid in
cash is $8. This fee is to be paid once each year at the time of entering.
Should the young girl decide to enter here in August, it will be all right for
her to do so. Please have her bring letters of recommendation as to Iier nmral
character from well-knou*n i)ersons in your conmmnity.
Plejjse advice if we may expect iier to enter.
Yours, truly,
Booker T. Washington,
Digi,rzedby©»6§'!e
218 IKQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
(Referring to one of the Haiti girls tlie missionary brought to the United
States, who, with boys longing for education and anxious to come to America
and learn English, he also placed in American Christian schools to be trained
for service In Haiti.)
Amcbican Baptist Publication Societt,
Philadelphia, March H, mu
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
First Baptist Church, Briabin, Pa,
Dear Bsotheb Evans : Answering your Inquiry concerning Haiti, it has been
my understanding that the home mission delegation to the West Indies are to
include Haiti In their Itinerary. I think I am right In this because in the
earlier preparations I was invited to be a member of this delegation, and was
told at the time that one of the main objects of the trip was to investigate
especially conditions In Haiti, with a view to seeing whether or not northern
Baptists ought to undertake work there, if funds for the same could be provided.
I have not heard of any change In the original plan.
Very sincerely, yours,
Gilbert N. Brink.
General Secretary.
BwTHYN, Wyoming, Pa.,
October 5. 19BL
Dr. HovEY,
Superinteiulent of Educatiofi, American Baptist Home Mission,
New York.
Dear Dr. Hovey : This is intended, through you, the education superintendent,
as an introduction for Secretary Detweiller, of the Home Missions I^tin Amer-
ica department, to Revs. Elie Mark, Nosirel Lherisson, Lucius Hypolite. Dr.
Hector Paultre, who, with all the other brethren and churches of Haiti, will
heartily rejoice and feel greatly heartened at your coming to them at this
time and, after our years of hopeful waiting and earnest praying, to make the
official surv ey of the Haiti field, and witli the purpose of .establishing a Bible
and industrial missionary school and with the view of laying a strong and
broad foundation for the successful development of the Baptist mission through-
out Haiti, and probably the whole island, providing Brother Deitweiller's re-
port is favorable and our mission society thinks fit
I can certainly bespeak for the Baptist mission's Latin America secretary a
most cordial and real Haitian welcome, not only from our Baptist brethren
and own churches, but also from my old friends, the Revs. TurnbuU, pastor
and principal of College Bird, Port au Prince ; De Feu, superintendent of the
London Wesleyan Mission, Cajie Haiti; and churches and pastors of other
denominations, as well as from leaders of the Haiti Government and people.
Am heartily delighted with dear Brother DetwelUer's impending visit and
both Mrs. Evans and myself shall pray for the success of his mission and his
safe return with a report of the inspiring type — of that of Caleb and Joshua,
of the tribe of Judnh — urging our hcmie mission committee " To go up at once
and possess it"
With a bon voyage and God bless you, the brethren and churches of Haiti,
and our aflfectioiiate regards to late Judge Orius Paultre's family, whole church
at St. Marc, and ml.«?sl(ms on Isle Gonave.
Fraternally and for Christ and Haiti.
L. Ton Evans.
Please make inquiries of Dr. Hector ns to tlie safety of our packed hooks
and things left at St. Marc.
The American Baptist Home Mission Society.
New York, October f. 1921.
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
Wyoming, Pa.
Dear Brother : Your letter of October 3, with Inclosures. concerning Haiti
have been received. I am passing them at once to Dr. Hovey, .superintendent
of Baptist religious education, with the suggestion that he return them to you
after they have served his purpose.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
iKQUntY MTTO OCCUPATIOIJ OP HAITI AND SAlffTO DOMINGO. 219
I trust that you and yours are well these days and that great spiritual
blessings will come to Haiti. With all best wishes.
Cordially, yours, .
C. I^. White, Exefnitive Secretary.
Kingston, Pa., ApHl 17, uni),
Mr. 8. G. INMAN.
ExecwHve Secretary of Latin American Committee on Cooperation,
Dear Bbotheb Inman : In reply to Mr. Oolton's letter to me In Haiti, notify-
ing me that your had been officially appointed to visit the island, and more
especially after our personal interview on the occasion he visited Wilkes-
Barre, allow me not only to express my great pleasure that the Latin America
committee has at last shown its tleep Interest In the black republic but ask
when you really propose to run down?
I thought of running in before you go, now that I have returned, with at
the present moment uncertainty of our being able to go back, solemnly as I
have pledged to Protestant Christians, Baptists, etc., as well as Haiti leaders
irrespective of politics and religious creeds, never, If possible, after so many
years of labor In behalf of religious, educational, and social, and industrial
regeneration ; and moral development of the republic and Its 2,000,000 Negroes,
to desert them at the present moment, and very important epoch in Haiti's
history.
I have already spoken, to and written leading Christian brethren there as
to your coming, and fully expected to have the pleasure of seeing you before
I left and accompany you around ; however, if possible, would like to see you
personally before you go, even should I not be able to see my way to come
down with you at this time.
Am going to Washington early next week, and may arrange to come from
there about Friday, or early following week to New York, so, if this will do,
please write me care of Dr. Jesse Jones, United States Education Bureau,
District of Columbia.
With sincere and fraternal regards, heartily yours.
L. Ton Evans.
Deckmbkh 21, 3918.
Dr. and Hon. Livingston,
United States Consul, Cape Haitien.
My Dear Dr. Livinoston : I have never forgotten the real and valnnble assist-
ance Dr. Furniss, Port au Prince; late President Laronte; Dr. Holly; and, of
course, our pastor, Condillac Jean Jacques rendere<l nie in regard to that won-
derful petition praying for the industrial college like Hampton and Tuskegee
for Haiti, and signed by nearly 3,000 leading Haitians, irrespective of religious
creeds and the so-called politics of certain classes.
You will be glad, yea. you and Dr. Holly and Pastor Condillac indee<l de-
lighted, to learn that after over eight years of incessant toll and amid moun-
tains of difficulties it looks now as if that unanimous and earnest prayer of
little and poor and almost crushed Haiti is about to be ans>vered.
This coining month, or not later than February, my friend Dr. James H.
Dillard, the direct representative of the great Uockefeller Foundation, general
e<lucation board, 61 Broadway, will visit Haiti, where I hope to have a con-
ference at Port au Prince both with our United Stjites as wUl as our Haitian
leaders, and shall try and see he goes to the Cape as well as the South.
I have just returned last Sunday on the Panama, and this Thursday morning
paid ray respects to Gen. CatUn, our new chief of American occupation, who is
not only a gallant officer but, I believe, a Christian statesman, that will prove
a credit to the old flag. Did you know that I was an intimate friend of the
Right Hon. D. Lloyd-George, whom our President has gone to meet and greet in
France and London? Ex-President Roosevelt is also interested in this in-
dustrial college and my efforts Just now.
With sincere regards to you, Holly, Jacques, and friends there, for Christ.
Haiti, and humanity.
L. Ton Evans.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
220 INQUIRY INT© OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
ADOPTION OF MISSIONARY FOR HAITI.
Whereas the Women's Home biuI Forelpn MiHsiou (^^oiivention of North Caro-
lina, assembled at White Hock Baptist Church, Durlfam, last year, expressed
an earnest desire in their report to employ a missionary of their own on the
foreign field; and
Whereas our newly appointed field secretary and superintendent of Baptist
missions in Haiti, the Hev. L. Ton Kvans, has lirou^ht before our conven-
tion this year at Goldsboro the appalling need as well as the bright pros-
pects of our new Haiti mission field generally, and especially the need and
prospects among our own sisters of the black Republic ; and
Whereas Mrs. L. Ton Evans has been already in the employ of the Womeu's
Anverican Baptist Home Mission Society, shown a profound interest in, and
done efiicient and valuable worlc for our own young women at the National
Missionary Training School, at Washington, D. C, where Miss Alice Alexis
and Miss Christine Frances, brought from Haiti by Dr. Evans, witii others
from Africa, etc., were trained ; and also
Whereas our white sisters of the Welsh and Wyoming Associations of the
northeast Pennsylvania have manifested their deep and practical interest iu
the evangelization of Haiti, as well as their jiersoual interest iu Mrs. L. Ton
Evans and her life and work while in their midst : Be it. therefore, unani-
mously
Resolved by the Women^ft Home and Foreiffn Mission Convention of North
Carolina and avxiliaru of the Lott Carey Baptist Convention, in session (U
Goldsboro, N. C, October 3-7, 1917, That we set apart the sum of $300 a .vear
for the employment of Mrs. Evans, and that we further appeal to our whlU»
sisters of the above Welsh and Wyoming Baptist Associations to donate a
similar amount of $300 annimlly. making a total of $600, all of which shall be
paid by us tlirouph the Women's American Baptist Home Mission for our sister,
Mrs. L. Ton Evans, with a view of her becoming the founder and principal of
a Bible and industrial missionary training school for the young women of
Haiti and leader in missionary and eilucational efforts genenilly for the uplift
of our long-neglected womanhood of the black Republic.
Mrs. p. G. Shepherd,
Pre-sident.
Mrs. B. H. Brandon,
Secretary.
At the official women'.s l><)ard meeting above it was passe<l tliat Mrs. P. G.
Sliei)henl, president (»f tlie Xortli Carolina W^anen's Home and Foreign Mis-
sions, be delegated to attend in behalf of this convention and as a menrt)er of
the l-iott (^arey Foreign Board the missionary *' send off " which the sisters of
the Welsli and Wyoming Associations may plan for Mrs. L. Ton Evans before
leaving this country with her husband for Haiti.
Legation de la Repubuque IVHaiti,
WasMngton, D. C. April 29, 1919,
Pastor L. Ton Evans, Kingston, Pa,
My Dear Pastor Ton Evans : I was very glad to receive your letter of yester-
day, in which you inform me of your present and continued effort not only to
secure for Haiti the establishment of an industrial school, such as Tuskegee.
on real ('hristian basis, but your special plea just now with the southern
Baptist brethren of the United States, to undertake the evangelizing of my own
dear people.
I profoundly appreciate your self-sacrificing work and the deep interest you
have shown in my country the last 2.1 years : that I have the privilege of
knowing you, and sincerely thank you for the splendid encouragement and
support you have rendered Haitian missionnries and brought some over to
educate in the.«5e States,
Your deep inten^st and untiring activities in the religious, moral and social
development of (mr Republic have won the entire sympathy and implicit con-
fidence of the Haitian peojjle.
With the personal knowledge you have of my country and dear people, and
should the Southern Baptist Board enter the Haiti field and thus support your
efforts. I am snre that with the blessing of Ood you must succeed in this great
enterprise of saving Haiti.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 221
I sincerely hope, and earnestly pray therefor, that you will find in the
United States Christian brethren and educational and philanthropic friends
who, with the cooperation of our own best and ablest people in Haiti, will
firmly stand by and support your splendid and noble work of developing my
own backward country at the present moment
My best wishes will always accompany you.
I am, my dear pastor,
Yours, very truly,
T. Ch. Mobavia.
HAITI FOR CHRIST.
"In order to make good the words of the Prophet Esalah • ♦ • the peo-
ple who were dwelling in darkness have seen a brilliant light, and on those who
were dwelling in the region of the shadows of death, on them light has dawned."
(Math, iv., 14-16.)
" We wait for light, but behold obscurity ; for brightness, but walk in dark-
ness." (Isaiah lix, 9-10.)
History in brief. — Hispaeniola, or little Spain, as it was termed in the fif-
teenth century, is an island next in size to Cuba. It has two Republics, known
to-day as Haiti and Santo Domingo, and where the French and Spanish patois
are spoken, respectively. The total population is estimated a little over
2,000,000. i. e.. some 250,000 more than the whole principality, of Wales, includ-
ing Monmouthshire.
Haiti was discovere<l by Columbus December, 1492, during his first voyage
west, hence is known before America. The aborigines (Indians) were de-
stroyed by French and Spanish pirates and exploiters who followed from
Europe. To repeople the Island and enrich the white settlers recourse was
taken to the traffic in human fiesli in vogue among the British and other
c'ivilize<l nations. For this punM>se many thousands of Negroes — men, women,
and children — ^were stolen, dragged from their homes in Africa, chained to-
gi'ther as beasts of burden, and curried over high seas, in small, stifling sailing
vessels. Such as escaped being beaten to death and cast overboard as food for
fish— a sweet and welccmie relief, no doubt — and those who survive<l the brutal
treatment meted to them, were conveyed to Haiti and other islands as slaves.
The cruel and barbarous conduct of the slave owners, after a long i)eriod of
untold suffering, brought upon them at hist its own punishment, for the Negroes,
failing to endure the insults, injury, and injustice any longer, engaged in n
fierce and bloody war, under the lea^lership of Toussaint L'ouverture, thus
avenging the wrongs of the past and ridding themselves forever of slavery.
To achieve this, however, 80,000 blacks and whites were killed by the sword
and yellow fever. Among the slain were 20,000 soldiers, the flower of the
French Army, sent by Napoleon to aid the slave owners, defend and perpetuate
slavery, and even at a time he himself was fighting for greater liberty to the
white man of Europe!
The brave and God-given leader and noble emancipator of his race, wiio could
neither be beaten nor bribeil by the offer of a kingdom and a crown, was sub-
sequently and treacherously allured on board a French man-of-war and taken
to France, where he died in a felon's cell.
"Sleep calmly in thy dungeon tomb
Beneath Besnncon's alien sky.
Dark Haitien ! for the time shall come
Even now is nigh —
When everywhere thy name shall be
Redeemed from color's infamy ;
And men shall learn to s[)eak of thee
As one of earth's great spirits born."
AppaUing condition of the people. — ^The Tarib Indians, and first inhabitants
of these iglands, were polygjimists and idolaters. The Negroes brought with them
from Africa, as one would naturally exi)ect, all the superstition, fetichisni, and
vice characteristic of the Dark Continent. Had the newly freed Hnitiens only
been permitted on the proclamation of freedom to retain their George Wash-
ington, in the person of Toussnint I/ouverture — as Americans, for instance,
were on the declaration of their lndepen<lence about 20 years prior to this, and
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222 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
so as to mold the policy of the new Republic and direct tbe government he had
been Instrumental in founding — Haiti undoubtedly to-day would have been a
model Republic, worthy of America or England, instead of a poor, saperstittoas,
degraded, and devil-worshipping country; it is unpitied and sometimes ^ven
sneered at by those with centuries of civilization to their back. In 1860 the
Government ignorantly and mistakenly signed a concordat with the Vatican,
recognizing Romanism as 'the island religion. By so doing they signed their
own death warrant, for the brand of Romanism in this island, as very properly
described by the Rev. J. G. Greenhough, M. A. — an expresident of the Baptist
Union of Great Britain — simply means " the most superstitious and degraded
form, well nigh as dense as the darkness of heathenism." This, therefore, with
vaudooism — devil worship — the real religion of 95 per cent of the islandera,
has enslaved them mentally and morally, checked the national aspiration, and
literally crushed the spirit of the race, and this, forsooth, after securing for
themselves political freedom 50 years earlier at such a tremendous sacrifice.
Though Haiti — called the Queen Island — is richest as regards soil and min-
erals in the Caribbean Sea, the people themselves — materially and socially—
are in a most wretched and deplorable state. Destitution is seen everywhere.
In connection with the vaudoo worship, to which they are summoned by the
sound of tom-tom from hill and vale, bush and grove, the devil devotees work
themselves into a frenzy, very much like devil possession. During these cere-
monies, which are most immoral and revolting, fowls are killed, and even at
times the blood and lives of innocent children offered, to slake the thirst and
pacify the anger of the demon god, whom they in their ignorance have been
taught for centuries to fear and dread. That such should be the case at the
dawn of the twentieth century is almost incredible, particularly so in a large
island like Haiti, and situated as it is between Jamaica and Porto Rico, which
belong to England and America, the wealthiest and most humane, not to say
Christian, countries of the world!
Baptist beginnings.— Ear\y in the last century Haiti became a safe rendezvous
to members of the race suffering from surrounding islands. As George Leisle
and Moses Baker — two American Negroes — were the first Baptist missionaries
in Jamaica 12 years previous to the English Baptist Missionary Society being
formed, so colore<l brethren from the States — ^probably runaway slaves like
Onesimus of old, referred to by Paul — were also the Protestant pioneers of
Haiti 25 years later. The Rev. Monroe and Rev. Hill — flatter an African Metho-
dist Episcopal, afterwards baptized — are the first regular preachers — colored—
of whom we have any certainty. This was prior to the year 1835. The first
white brother to come from America was the Rev. W. Mead Jones, of Welsh
descent, and a Baptist, who is supposed to have labored here under the Anti-
Slavery Society of those days. Owing to his changed views he was recalled
about 1846, when another by the name of Judd took his place. The latter again
left Port au Prince in a short time for Samana, San Domingo, where it is said
he soon died. The first missioner, however, to work among the Haitians proper
was the Rev. E. J. Frances, who came to the island from Lucea, Jamaica ; the
others confined their services chiefly to tbe English-speaking colored people
who came to the island. It was through the special pleading of the immortal
William Kuibb that Frances was sent by the English Baptist Society to labor
in Haiti. This brother, with one Flanders, Miss Harris, and Miss Clark, landed
in Jacmel Christmas, 1845. Though the missionnrles at once settled down,
rapidly acquired the language, and gave special promise of excellent work to
be done — the leader unfortunately was struck down in a few months — for be-
fore the end of July, following year, Frances succumbed to the dread malaria
fever. On account of the frequent revolutions, constant change of governments,
with the consequent hardships, destruction of property and life, etc., all this
entailed, missionary efforts became very protracted, and with tlie exception of
Rev. W. H. Webley — who labored alone for years — brethren continually retired
after short intervals, which told disastrously against the mission. Seeing
Jamaica's proximity to Haiti, the very flourishing financial condition of the
Baptist churches there at one time, as evidenced not only by their having be-
come self-supporting but also the pleasing fact that they raised £3,000 a year
for the purpose of evangelization in their own islands as well as for work
outside, the committee in London thought it advisable to transfer tills field to
the above missionary board, though for years after they continued their in-
terest and made certain contributions. Jamaica — for several years— has been
obliged to give up this, as well as other important fields in which they were
engaged simply for the lack of funds. Through the failure of the sugar in-
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 228
dostry, as well as the blind and blundering policy persisted in by succeeding
British Governments in allowing and assist^g thousands of East Indians —
coolies— to the British colonies of the west in the shape of indentured lubor —
by tbo way, a species of slavery — ^the island suffers great financial depression.
The latter is not only driving away from Jamaica and their island liome in
search of the means of livelihood a very large number of the more thrifty, but
lowers the morals of the people, discourages the natives, and impoverishes, if
not indeed paralyzes, the churches in their laudable efforts to unlift the Negro.
Sadi injustice and hardship as these Negroes suffer would not be tolerated in
&igland or America.
Bright outlook. — During the last few years, and practically since the termi-
nation of the war between America and Spain, great changes have taken place.
Haiti, in addition to its close proximity to Porto Rico, Is also now on the great
highway to Panama. The fact of the United States warshiijs plowing Haitian
waters, and policing the island as it were, is a guaranty there shall be no
filibustering from without, neither any serious rising from within, allowed
again as in the past, and which have proved so destructive. This will give
stability to the Republics and enable the Governments to encourage industry
and commerce. A new railroad (first in Haiti) Is just now being constructed,
IK^ting to great developments in the future. There is to-day a better under-
standing between Haiti and America than perhaps ever before, with a growing
SQ^cion, if not dislike to Romanism, among the more intelligent and thought-
ful people, and which recent events in France is almost certain to emphasize.
The outlook, therefore, has never been brighter and more promising than at
present
Proposed plans, — As soon as the native missionaries on the field can be pro-
Tided for, and one or two well-qualified workers (if possible) added to them,
who shall devote the whole of their time and energy to work the mission cen-
ters, the few poor scattered Christians are gathere<l together again and organ-
lied for regular public worship, etc., we will immediately start a normal and
Industrial school. A people like the Haitians, free, owning their own soil,
bom in a country whose climatic conditions are enervating, and where nature
herself is so rich and bountiful, if not indeed extravagant, yet degraded by
slavery and sunk in depravity, are not likely to be permanently benefited, unless
giten a full- orbed gospel, dealing with the whole of the man.
The black man of Haiti must therefore be gradually led to see the dignity
of labor and believe in his own capacity and skill. While the direct aim of the
mission Is the regeneration of the heart, that of the normal and Industrial
school will be to train the hand and head of the Negro. The latter we expect
to be associated with Tuskegee, Ala., United States of America, of which Dr.
Booker T. Washington is president. In 1902 this great American educator
writes: "We have students at our institute I could heartily recommend to you
as soon as you are ready, not only as efficient for the work intended but pos-
sessing In an eminent degree, also, the missionary spirit." The proposed school
will be interdenominational, open to suitable young Negroes (male and female)
all over the island, and supportetl by friends of the Negro both in America and
Bngland, and apart from the funds of the mission board.
Why the urgent need for help? — (a) Because the national convention foreign
mission board now, undertaking to evangelize Haiti, though the largest
(2,200,000) organized body of Negro Christians In the world. Is certainly also
the poorest as regards money. When freed by Lincoln's proclamation January
1, 1863, the Negroes of America numbered 4,500,000; to-day they are nearly
10,000,<)00, who live mainly in the black belt, and one-fourth of which belong
to our national convention. Though only 44 years since emerged from slavery,
with its degrading effects, when thrown penniless upon the world, and in spite
of discouragements, such as poverty, prejudice, and oppression, their progress
during this period has been phenomenal. With the Christlike sympathy, and
the generous help of the American Baptist Home Mission Society and their
own personal- sacrifice and self-denial, they have built schools, colleges, and
maintain over 12,000 pastors half of whom were born in slavery, when it was
a crime to be able to read the Bible I They also operate missions in West,
Sooth, and East Central Africa, British West Indies, and South America, which
tax their scanty funds to the utmost limit. Yet, for reasons given already,
they have decided to add Haiti as a special department to their work.
ib) Because that by giving the Gospel to Haiti, and establishing the insti-
tote (so as to help them to help themselves), we are furthering the highest
type of civilization, teaching America and the world that the African, under
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224 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
favorable conditioiis, is quite caimble of self-governmeut, thus securing tliat
respect and justice due to the race.
(c) Because the present is most opportune, as already pointed out in refer-
ence to future developments, etc. If the mission is well founded, and strenu-
ous efforts put forth the next four or five years, the field will be practically
occupied by one important section of the Evangelical Christian Church, which
means greater efficiency, a great saving in energy and money, with other ad-
vantages enjoyed on n mission field, where there is no denominational and
sectarian overlapping.
(d) Because money contributed to and labor bestowed oh evangelization and
education of the Negro is an excellent investment and bound to pay, securing,
as they do, the highest results for man and God.
Dr. H. L. Morehouse, the respected secretary of American Baptist Home
Missions Society and a shrewd student of missions, recently wrote to the
Standard :
" Our expenditure of $4,000,000 as n society among the colored in the States
during these 40 years has been one of the best investments in the world. Many,
indeed, are yet degraded; but are not many white even in the old centers of
Anglo-Saxon civilization V The Hebrews got out of Egypt in one day, but it
took more than 40 years to get Eg>'pt out of them. Who expects the Negro
to overtake the Caucasian with a start of a thousand ye«irs? But they are
coming on. Out of the depths up from slavery to noble Christian manhood
and womanhood many have risen. In 26 years of service for the society I have
seen poor, coarse Negro boys and girls develop into cultured, able, influential
characters, consecrated to the service of Christ."
DeI»AKTMKNT of the lNT]!»tIOB,
Bureau or Education,
Washmgton, July 31y 1917.
Dr. L. Ton Evans.
23 We8t Bcrtvh Street, Lansford, Pa.
Dkar Dr. Evans: I was very glad to receive your letter of July 3 and to
know that you are still working for Haiti. I hoi)e that your ambitions and
desires will be realized in this respect. As you Jsnow, I am much Interested
In the problems of that island. Thus far, however, I have not succeeded in
convincing the trustees of the Phelps-Stokes fund that the conditions of the gift
l>ermlt them to appropriate money for Haiti. In view of this I fear that the
fund will not now he able to give you the assistance which you desire. There
may be other sources of revenue that we can influence. When your plans are
made I shall be glad to know of them. I have heard of the good work of Mrs.
Evans tli rough Miss Burroughs. I know that Mrs. Evans is fully equipptnl
to work in Haiti.
I fear that I shall not be in the city during the lirst week in Septeml>er.
I shall be here on the 30th and Hist of August and will be glad to see yon
the last week of that month. On the days mentione<l above the bureau is to
hold an important conference on Negro education. This Is a small deliberative*
meeting, to which few i)eople are invited. Should you be in the city w^e would
be pleased to have you there. You will be glad to know that our report is
done. I shall order a copy sent to you if it has not already reached you.
With regard to passports to Haiti. I am quite certain that you would bave
comparatively little difliculty in obtaining the permission of the State Depart-
ment to leave the country.
With very kind regards, I am.
Very sincerely, yours,
Thomas Jesse Jones, Spedalifit.
St. JdARc, West Indies,
March 5, 1919,
Dear Friend Dei.acoi'r: Am sending a note to say that I am hoping to visit
Port au Prince soon on my way again to the States, and shall be greatly ob]i|:ed
if you can manage as one of the patriotic sons of Haiti, who by every moral,
coiiKtltutional, educational, and even ('hristian means seek to gradually rai$^
Haiti and |)eople to a liigher standard of thinking and living, and so some day to
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INQUIBY INTO OCXJUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMIN(;0. 226
rulfill the destiny God has intended for your race in Haiti, as of course He lias
int^ided for us as a white nation in the States, as well as all other nationalities
iu fact ; I shall therefore be indeed glad for you to see Pouget, Sincereg, Meyer,
and two or three other real patriots with high and pure motlTes like yourself,
80 as to meet me.
I liad the privilege when at Washington the last fall to have a special Haitian
committee (to watch the interest of the natives here) formed in connection with
tli« national race congress executive.
Of course, there is much connected with our colored brethren in the States at
tlie present stage, and often inspired by ignorance, prejudice, etc., which you and
tlKMse mentioned and others in Haiti would be as stoutly opposed to as myself,
and felt sad and wrong to encourage here, and absolutely detrimental to all
tliat is best in the development of the Negro people.
There are great leaders, however, such as late Dr. Booker T. Washington ( my
friend), present Maj. Moton (whose name you see in memorandum), that the
leaders in Haiti must become acquainted with, if real, stead>', mental, moral,
and material progress is to be made here, that must prove a permanent success.
There must, if possible, be no gerry building upon superstitions, ignorance,
prejudice, etc., and education nmst not be conllnd to the head, but be of a real
practical nature, etc.
As I have promised our chief of occupation (Gen. Catlln) not to give any
ci>pies away again of memorandum (at present), please keep the one you had
previously to yourself. If more convenient, we can meet at your place or at
Bolos. My l>oat may be sure to leave about end of next week. Believe me to re-
main your sincere friend, and for Christ, Haiti, and humanity.
St. Marc, Haiti, West Indies,
February 10, 1919.
Thomas A. Vilmenay, Esq.,
Directcur de LHnformatcur Haiticn, Port au Prinve.
My Dear Friend Vilmenay : Inasmuch that during my personal interview
with our Gen. (Ratlin, chief of our American occujiation, both the marine and
tbe gendarmerie in Haiti, I pledged my word of honor on the next day, Thurs-
day morning, after seeing you on the way from the dei>ot, and as there might
be a misunderstanding in some quarters, if not some advantage taken by
certain natives, who may be bitterly opijosed to our American Government's
procedure through our occupation, owing to statements made at Wusliiugton
and vouched for by myself and now officially being investigated here, I promised
not to distribute another copy of this " memorandum." and containing serious
cliarge I and others are prepared to prove before the commission sought and
fully expected to be appointe<l by our own responsible United States Govern-
ment in its own interest, and that, of cnmrse, of Haiti and its people; I have
now to specially reijuest you not to use the copy I gave you on the day pre-
vious (We<lnesday) and eitiier at the stati<m or on ray way to my hotel, when
I accidentally met you.
Am sure you will comply with my perscmal request, and that you, as well
as those friends of mine, including Dr. Laroche, Dr. Francois Delacour,
minister of instruction. Dr. Holly, Revs. Turnbull, Mark, De Feu, Liieris.son,
nFacques, and American Consul Livingston, American Vice Consul Vital, etc.,
so deeply interested in the swial, educational, industrial, and shall I also
add the spiritual regeneration of long neglected and politically and financially
expoited Haiti, and your over 2.(KK),000 suffering and oppressed people, and
in the providence of God and through our own Government and other American
religious, educational, and philanthropic agencies, essential to the uplift of
every nation (be it black or white), are as anxious as myself not to place abso-
lutely the least obstacle in the way of out "American occupation," but in every
way possible add to their influence and authority, and, if possible, moral
power and efficiency to carry out the intention of the American Government
in Haiti through present instruments and as set forth in the excellent treaty
(convention) between the two countries.
I hardly believe, however, there would be any objection from the genial
new chief of our occupation if you referred to the proposed industrial col-
lege, which must take a prominent place and prove a most important, if not
indispensable, factor in any future scheme of developing the black republic.
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226 INQUrBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
as set forth, indeed, in my "memorandum," and recommemiations to our
President, and tlirough him our United States Government, who, the moment
It is directly brought before him, and whether or not actually supported by
officialism and certain grades of politicians, will positively go through.
The fact of the names of Maj. Moton, president of Tuskegee, Dr. Thomas Jesse
Jones, and Dr. James H. Dlllard, of the Jeanes, and the Rockefeller Fouoda-
tion, of general education boards, of the United States, mentioned and sug-
gested as members of that commission, is a guaranty in itself, of course, to
any person who really knows President Wilson, ex-President Taft, late lamented
ex-President Theo<lore Roosevelt, and our Government, and great American
Christian leaders, that all this will — us soon as matters can be arranged prop-
erly— is already an accomplished fact.
I state this so as to encourage you to "patience, real faith, in American
Government, perseverance in all that is good and uplifting, and hope in the
meantime, as well as support for t4ie present instrumentalities as pioneers, of
court, and essential under present conditions, and for which undoubtedly every
intelligent and thoroughly patriotic Haitian must thank God. imf>erfect as they
are, but which will in the natural development of things and time goes on
be gradually changed and so adapte<l as to produce the changes mentioiiefl and
ontline<l in thie "memorandum."
Probably you and others who widely read and take such deep interest in
the struggles and grand victory just achieved in Eiirope for liberty and right,
and In which our own American Government has so distinguished itself, and
our soldiers, both white and colored, have, shoulder to shoulder, so valiantly
fought under that courageous and indomitable Christian, Gen. Pershing, who,
like President Wilson, Lloyd-George, ScH'retary of our Navy Daniels, etc., is
an enemy of liquor and alcohol, and to-day. because of his high and noble char-
acter is loved iill over the States, and would by acclamation be made our next
Prescient if he but consented, know also that Maj. Moton and Or. Jease Jones,
my personal friend, have been to France and. with our President, looking after
the interest of our colored American soldiers there, and even some of our
Halt an young men in American colleges who volunt«H>red to the front, such as
the son of Dr. Ghousse, our Baptist deacon, and local native preacher at
Jacmel, i*tc.
You may call attention in your paper to this an«l the fact that Dr. Dillard.
white, but real friend of race, both in States and here, pledged me again
and again, and the day I left him at the Rockefeller headquarters of the
general eclucation board, in Broadway, New York, to visit Haiti, either January
or tb s very month, so as to Investigate conditions, looking to the establishment
<»f what was called in 1911 by Cincinnatus Lwont^, LegSr, and even the then
President Simon (when I took that petition aroimd Haiti), "the noble project"
of an industrial college, foundtMl on Christian basis, like Hampton and Tuskegee
here among us in Haiti.
Your paper will certainly serve a most useful puri)ose in informing, therefore,
and thus preparing gradually our leaders in Haiti for this and showing how
indispensable, with all that our own American Government can do through
oecupation. ete., that the Haitians themselves must not only be converted and
eiiucated but bei'omt* actual tillers of their own ric^h soil and learn to look at
honest labor not as a species of slavery and something forced and degrading,
but elevating and. indeed, divine — essential, too, in their development — ^if exer
yoi] are to become free, independent, and a progressive people in the true sense
of these terms.
If you saw acccmnt of my lecture along these lines at the cape two weeks
ago. yon may coi)y same in I/informatenr, and I shall send some news occa-
sionally from our Government educational and labor department bureaus
which arp sent me here to St. Marc.
With (Christian regards, l>est wishes for new year, believe me to remain
Yours, and for Christ and Haiti,
li. Ton Evans.
AxN TjaGENT APPEAL IN HEHALF OF HAITI, WEST INDIES.
" So then faith cometh by hearing and hearing the word of God " — ^and how
shall they hear without a preacher? (Romans x, 14, 17.)
" But I can see though dimly through the mystery, His hand above."
Haiti, the black republic, as it is called, has on the whole island some 2,000,000
inhabitants, all of whom are Africans. Although a brave people as proved by
7le
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 227
the manner In which their forefathers fought and won their freedom from
slavery more Uian 100 years ago, under that iiohle Neprro chfeftnin, Tousnalnt
L.ouverture, yet to-day they are in the most pitiable condition materially, politi-
cally, and morally.
Since 1860 the recogniz^ed island religion is. the lowest tyi>e of Romanism,
tliough the people generally, if not entirely, are blind devotees of Voodooism,
^w^ho, in addition to immoral orgies^ frenzical dances, and other disgusting and
revolting practices connected with devil worship, at times sacrifice human life.
even the blood of innocent babes, to slake the thirst of their demon god, whoui
tbey have been taught for centuries, both in Africa and Haiti, by the papa lois
(witch doctor) to fear and dread.
At the dawn of this twentieth century, and though in close proximity to Ameri-
can shores — for Haiti lies between Cuba and Porto Kico. on the present direct
route to our Panama Canal, and within a few hurs' run of Jamaica — it is almost
incredible that tiiere should be at this moment an island five tiuu^s the size of
the latter and with over three times its iK>pulation in such a benighted and de-
plorable state and without any organized efforts whatever by our great mis-
sionary societies to evangelize its heathen.
The National Negro Baptist Convention, liowever, before whom the writer was
invited to plead the cause of poor Haiti at Birmingham, Ala., September, 1902
(where nearly 4,C00 dusky delegates attended from distances varying 500,
1,000, 1,500, and even 2,0(X) miles away), have now faithfully undertaken to
enter this region in 1904, providing some of the I-i4)rd's stewards are willing to
aid them .financially, as their funds are altogether inadetjuate for the m'ssion
board's work in other foreign fields now oi)erated.
Therefore, should a fund of $200,000 be placed to the credit of the foreign
board, the interest on the same would init at least eight brethen innuediately on
tlie island. The appointment also of an energetic agent to visit the churches
bere, a.s well as superintend the field, could in a few years through the careful
and diligent development of native resourws, augmented by outside subscrip-
tions, double the above annual income. This amount under the su|)ervision of
the national foreign board would be entirely (lev<jte<l to the direct evangeliza-
tion of Haiti along Bible lines.
The object of thus presenting these fncts is to enlist sympathy and prayer,
as well as raise the above amount required, to enable the national conventi(m
to commence oi^erations without further delay among the neglected poverty-
stricken, priest-ridden, and devil-worshlplng peo])le of this otherwise queen
island of tlie Caribbean Sea, that at last it may be said of them as the divinely
illuminated seer said of the land of Zebulnn ami Nephthalim, viz: "The people
which sat in darkne^s saw great light, and to them wh ch sat In the region and
shadow of death light is sprung up." (Matthew iv, 16.)
" Heaven's gate is close*! to him who comes alone :
Save thou a soul and it shall save thine own."
For Christ and Haiti,
Yours, sincerely,
L. Ton Kvans.
First Baptist Church,
EdtrardHdale, Pa.
Foreign Mission of National Baptist Convention,
Louisville, Ky., September 2, li)OS.
r>EAR Brother Ton Evans : As I see now our brethren would be exceedingly
glad to have you, If possible, to take up work for Haiti. At our annual mec»ting
in Philadelphia the matter comes before the. full board, and I am sure that
they will api>rove of it. The following is part of the board's report for the
year. I have l)een handicapped this year with poor help, which has hampere<l
me in much I hope<} to do.
Pray for us, and visit the convention If you can. Thanks for the pledge.
Yours, in His Name,
L. O. JORDON,
Correspondino Secret am.
Taken from the annual report of Brother L. G. Jordan, D. D., to National
Baptist Convention, September 18, 1903, and representing 2,100,000 Baptists :
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228 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
" Haiti, almost a next door neighbor, needs our immediate attention, but the
want of money hinders us from spending missionaries tliere.
•• We recommend, should we find friends of the blaster, who will aid. in
commence worii there in 1904.
" We highly conmiend the earnest efforts of Rev. L. Ton Evans, of Kdwnrds-
dale, Pa. (late of Wales and ex-missloner from Haiti), in behalf of that needy
field, and pray thftt he might find a way to go there again as a missionary and-
labor among the people who lay so heavily upon his heart, and otherwise assist
us as a board to take up the work there without unnecessary delay.*'
The appalling and urgent need of Haiti is also personally and strongly
indorse<l by Revs. S, MacArthur, D. D., Calvary Baptist Church, New York';
George E. Henderson, M. A.; Phillip Williams (ex-president ami secretary, re-
spectively, of Jnmaica Baptist TTnlon, West Indies) : Dr. Booker T. Washington,
the great Negro educator; and F. B. Meyer, B, A. (London) ; I*rof. T. Witton
Da vies, B. A., Ph. D., Baptist and University Colleges, North Wales; together
with John Cory, Esq., J. P., D. L. ; ex- Alderman R. Cory, J. P.; and Daniel
Thomas, Ksq., Christian philanthroi)ists in South Wales, who have already
proniise<l conditional and generous sxipport to this much nee«led missionary
enterprise.
Dr. Booker T. Washington has kindly oflfere<l to train at his excellent Nornml
and Industrial Institute, Tuskegee, Ala., some of the most promising Haitian
youths; and Rev. Dr. Bullinger. secretary of the Trinitarian Bible Society
(London), will donate uncorrui>ted and pure translations of Scriptures, both In
French and Spanish, which will be a valuable help to the ndssion.
Rev. Russell H. Conwell. D. D.. president of Temple College. Philndelphin.
who, through his private secretary, September 10, 1903, wrote:
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
Edwardsville, Pa.
l>KAii Sib: Russell H. Conwell received your letter of 14tli iu-stant, and wishes
me to say that he has confidence in you, and would like to be of some use to
such a missionary work as that you propose to do in Haiti. While he desires
to help the cause, yet regrets he has no time nor thought to give to such an
enterprise now, as lie is so crowded with <luties which he couhl not omit.
[By the Londoa (£>n^laii(]) committee of the Baptist Missionary Society, showing exten-
sive efforts in 1906 and 1907 of the pioneetr missionary In behalf of Haiti's rolifirlouB
and educational uplift]
RKCmiNlTION OF THK NKW HAITIAN ^IlSSTON.
To the Baptist churches and friends of the Xegrf):
We, whose names are attached hereunto, rejoice to state that the cfomniittee
of our Bai»tist Missionary Society meeting in I^ondon January 16. 1907 (pre-
sided over by the late Charles Williams, Accringt(m), and after due considera-
tion of the petition and punM>se of the foreign board of the American Negro
Baptists, the great imi)ortance of Haiti as a field, the wretched condition of
its sui)erstitious and devil-worshiping inhabitants, unanimously decidetl to
recognize the much-needed mission and exi)ress its hearty smypathy with, as
well as extend its moral support, to the praiseworthy efforts now made to
evangelize the benighted r»eople of this island. (Both brethren, Charles Wil-
liams and the late .1. .lenkyn Brown, congratulated us on the support given to
Haiti. These two veterans very deeply sympathized with our mission.)
In addition to the special claims of the field itself set before the committee
by the general secretary and suiierintendent of the work in Haiti, supported
by the strong plea of members of the society in Wales, the committee in London
also takes cognizance of the sympathy and interest of the churches of the prin-
cipality (Welsh and English) in this mission of their colored brethren, and
which sympathy and interest ftmnd expression in resolutions forwarded by
churches and associations to the Rev. C E. Wilson, B. A., se<*retary of the
B. M. S.. as well as Rev. W. Morris, I). D.. F. R. G. S., chairman of the new
missionary council for Wales.
Our society rejoices that the foreign board of the National Baptist Conven-
tion of America has undertaken to operate a mission in this sadly neglected
island, and further exi>resses its i^leasure that our Negro brethren In the
ITnited States have been so fortunate as to secure such an eaniest. energetic.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 229
and self-sacriflcintf brother as Rev. L. Ton Evans, late of Wales and Edwards-
dale, Pa.. U. S. A., to represent them in this important Christian enterprise.
As some churches have already been informed, the English Baptist Mis-
sionary Society has authorized its secretaries in London to receive collections
and subscriptions from churches and others in Wales and elsewhere (given
specially for Haiti) and forward the same to them.
Thus every sum contributed, whether by collection or subscription, will be
acknowledge and shall appear in the Welsh and English annual reports of the
Baptist Missionary Society, as those now glveh to the Zenana work.
We sincerely hope, therefore, that all the churches and friends of the once-
enslaved race and desplse<l Negroes of America anxious to give the pure gospel
and carry on a mission along strictly evangelical and scriptual lines among
the millions who worship the demon god in the Black Republic will appreciate
and take advantage of this arrangement made and send their collections and
Bubscriptions to the Mission Hou.se In I^ndon, marked ** for Haiti/*
We strongly believe and very heartily Indorse also the proposal to establish a
normal and Industrial institute on the Island concurrent with, though separate
from, the mission Itself, and so as to train the head and hand of the Negro
with a view to the cultivation of the rich soil and development of his country.
as well as to produce enlightened native Christians and furnish capable school-
teachers and efficient helpers for the missionaries from among the dark-skinned
race.
We further think that the fact of the Negro Baptist foreign mission board of
America (through our brother and fellow countryman, the Rev. L. Ton E^rans)
granting us control over the money raised for the ndsslon Is not only In har-
mony with our democratic policy as Baptists, can not but give great and gen-
eral satisfaction to all, and should. Indeed, prove a strong Incentive to churches
and friends to help and support the new undertaking In Haiti, West Indies.
May this new missionary effort be especially blessed of the Lord. '
Expect great things from God.
Attempt great things for God.
W. Morris, Treorchy (Chairman of the Missionary Council of
Wales) ; H. Cernyw Williams, Corwen; Charles Davles, Cardiff;
J. A. Morris, Aberystwyth; J. W. Maurice, Dlnas Cross (Presi-
dent of Baptist Union of Wales)', Members of the Committee of
the Baptist Missionary Society.
Signed also by the. following secretaries of associations which have already
adopted resolutions supporting the mission :
Mpmbers.
W. Rhys Jones, East Glam. Association 27,896
W. G. Davies, Glam. and Carni. (Eng.) Association 20,463
W. Trevor Jones, Cann. and Card. A.«?.soclation 19,835
I>.C. Davies, West Glam. Association 19,442
T. E. Gravell, Pern. Association 12.378
Edwin Jones, D., Fl., and Melrion Association 9,152
n. Hopkins, Anglesea Association 2,861
Total membership 112,027
If the above membership was divided, young men and women appointed in
each church to cfdlect 1 x)enny per month (an average of 1 shilling per year),
more than £5,000 annually could be realized for Haiti and that without Inter-
/erlng at all with local efforts for the church and worthy objects at present
supported. This sum would enable us as a Baptist denomination to take over
at once the whole island of Haiti.
We request every church to inform the secretary of its association of the
amount collected for Haiti, so that It may appear In the annual report of the
association.
"The earth Is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof.''
Among the 120 churches of Wales which have been visited up to date, and
that have promised to collect in aid of our mission, are the following:
Noddfa (Treorchy) ; Zlon (Llanelly) ; Bethesda and Hill Park (H. West) ;
Pembroke and Bethany (Pembroke Dock) ; Bethania (Cardigan) : Nebo
(Yrtrad) ; St Dogmells, Whitland, Bethel, and Hel)ron (Holyhead) ; Jerusalem
(Llwynypla); Calvarla (Aberdare) : Amlwch, Bangor, Zlon. and Tabernacle
(Oefnmawr) ; Hebron (Ton, Ystrad) ; Tabernacle (Pontypridd) ; Hebron, etc.
(DowlaR) ; Bethel, Morlah. etc. (Llanelly) ; Carnarvon, Pembrey, Bethania
(Cwmbach) : Blaenffos, Llwynhendy, Aberdare (Eng.) ; Nebo (Ebbw Vale) ; etc.
230 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Received already either in 8ub$cripiions or promises to- he .given annuaUy m
support of the mission.
Mr. Richard Cory, J. P
Libanus, Treherbert (Dr. Har-
Hes)
Trecynon, Aberdare (Rev. W.
.,Cynog Williams)
Bethlehem, PwU (Rev. Richard
Owen )
A friend of Christ and the Ne-
gro .
Mr. Sydney Rees
Mrs. D. Rees
Mr. W .Warren Kinsey (for fam-
ily of 5)
Mr. and Mrs. Jenkins
Aid. W. H. David
Mrs. C. EMraunds
Mrs. D. Franclp
Mr. Thomas Evans
Mr. Williams (Ton Ystrad)
Mrs. Lewis (Hengoed)
April 20. 1907.
£. 8.
50 0
20 0
20 0
10 0
10
5
5
5
3
2
2
2
2
2
1 10
Dr. Ivor Da vies 1 1
Dr. Lewis Lewis , 1 0
Mr. Richards (P^tre) 1 0
Mr. W. C. Short 1 0
Mr. Thos. Williams 1 0
Mr. B. Rees, J. P 1 0
Mi-s. Cynog Williams 1 0
Rev. Cynog Williams 1 0
Rev. W. Rhys Jones 1 0
Rev. B. W. Davies (Ton) 1 0
Rev. J. R. Evans 1 0
Rev. W. Trevor Jones 1 0
Rev. Rowe Williams 1 0
Rev. Taliesyn Williams 1 0
Rev. W. R. Lewis 1 0
Rev. O. D. Campbell, M. A 1 0
Rev. J. J. Richards 1 0
Rev. Morgan Jones, B. A 1 0
Prof. T. Witton Davies, B. A.,
Ph.D--_^ 1 0
L. T. B.
Senator Kino. Mr. Evans, during the war there were a number of Germans
in Haiti, were there not, and at the outbreak of the war?
Mr. EvA^Ys. Quite a number.
Senator King. And some were interned during the war?
Mr. Evans. Quite so.
Senator King. And some deported from the Island?
Mr. Evans. Yes; I suggested that all this should have boen done, just at
the time we as a Oovemraent entered the war, being that we had this treaty
with Haiti, and responsible for protecting Haiti, and feeding these people.
Senator Kino. If there was a censorship during the war, it grew out of the
occupation of the Island ?
Mr. Evans. Yes; but the Germans were allowed full sway for a long time,
and the Haiti people and ourselves suffered in consequence.
Senator King. By the Germans?
Mr. Evans. No doubt.
Senator Kino. And Europeans belonging to the Central Powers?
Mr. Evans. Yes, sir; there was a strong feeling here among not only (xer-
mans, but the priests and whole European Catholics, practically with the On-
tral Powers and against the Allies and United States.
Senator King. It was a real military necessity?
Mr. Evans. Yes; essentially so, but it was not explained as it should have
been to the Haitians, and it should have resulted in a greater benefit than it
really was by way of distribution of food, etc., after we declared war.
I complained at Washington for lack of suitable publicity literature ex-
plaining the whole situation, and how it affected Haiti, and work of our occu-
pation, but nothing really was done ; it was of course all Europe.
Senator King. The Germans did have control of the wharves and the harbors
and banks?
Mr. EvANB. Yes ; they were the leading merchants and exporters of coffee,
logwood, cotton, etc., and had a regular system through their native agents of
getting around, and they had studied the Haitian characteristics, and spoke
the French and patois, having been there so many years, had greet influence
over the island, and with all other Europeans in Haiti, including the priests.
They abused Haitian confidence, of course, in political propaganda to exploit
the customs.
Senator King. And they therefore had the business activities practically
of the whole island?
Mr. Evans. Yes; and I fear that our occupation and United States have
fftiled to really understand this, if not most of oiu* American Marine ofilcere
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I2^QUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 231
had been entirely off their guard, and even ignored it by their close associations
with them in drinking, and other social relations.
Somtor Kino. And Haiti was used as a sort of base for the dissemination
of German propaganda in the Caribbean Sea, and in the South American Re-
publics and Central American Republics?
Mr. Evans. Undoubtedly during the beginning of the war, and for many
years before in anti-British and anti- American propagandas.
Senator Kino. So it was necessary that there should be some sort of censor-
ship after we were in control, and during the war?
Mr. Evans. Yes; it was justified, but I am a great believer in publicity
propaganda, setting forth the situation, and explaining to these people, who
had Just come under our control, and we were pledged to protect and assist,
and to forearm them against misrepresentations and falsehood spread by
interested politicians.
Senator Kino. Was there any oppression used in the authority exercised by
the officials in
Mr. Evans. With regard to the Germans ; no, not to my knowledge.
Senator Kino. With regard to the censorship?
Mr. Evans. With the exception of what I referred to my own letters in Haiti
and here since my return, my impression is that they were too lax, before Haiti
declared war and for some time after, as in allowing Germans too much free-
dom, knowing the unfortunate bitter feelings tliat the United States had entered
the war on the side of the Allies, and I fear that several of the American ma-
rines were not so favorable either, thinking we had really gone in for Great
Britain's sake more than anything else.
Senator King. Do you make any complaint, then, because of the censorship?
Mr. Evans. None whatsoever in war time and when there are enemies around ;
but American marines ought to have a little Judgment to differentiate a loyal
and true-hearted American, for instance, from a German, an Austrian, or a
Turk, say.
Senator King. But now, do you make any complaint of the fact of there being
a censorship, or is your complaint merely they were too lax?
Mr. Evans. I thought my position was quite clear. During the war and the
situation obtained in Haiti, with so many Germans, I believe it tended to be
somewhat lax, but to-<lay to use the censorship on Haitians and American loyal
citizens to prevent conditions in Haiti reaching the responsible United States
Government, and people whose honor and national character are at stake, Is
absolutely wrong and most unjustifiable. They do this, as I understand, without
any authority whatever to-day from our Government, and an inquiry should be
made why it is not stopped in Haiti?
Senator King. Do you mean to say if I should write a letter to any person in
Haiti it should be censored?
Mr. Evans. No ; I do not believe they would be quite so daring with a Senator
of the United States after what has hapi)ened. They discriminate against indi-
viduals. It is most difficult somehow to convey a correct Idea of conditions in
Haiti and the conduct of the occupation, at least very many of the marines and
the docile, slavish fear of Haitians under present regime there.
Senator Hitchcock (then chairman of Foreign Relations) three years ago
in this room could not believe my statements re the occupation, closing up
Senate and Chambers, then this *' rape of the constitution," and refused to ap-
proach the President to appoint such as this committee to make inquiry ; so the
scandal came out through their own Navy officer which the United States Secre-
tary of the Navy felt bound to send to Haiti, on account of officials withholding
or falsifying reports, etc. •
When Senator Hitchcock expressed surprise that there was no other witness
or evidence but that of my own, I replied that others were in the pay of the
occupation in some way or other and dared not come or speak.
He would not allow Government i>rotectlon to Haitian witnesses and have
half a dozen, including Haiti President, to come here before the Foreign Rela-
tions Senate Committee. In fact he did not wish to know. It is a sad condition
to crush a little nation and totally forfeit its confidence.
Senator King. When I was there, more than a year ago, I found no evidence
of a censorship, but the people were communicating as they pleased ; at least
their mails were received regularly, and there was not the slightest effort, so far
as I would see, to intercept, censor, or scrutinize communications.
62260— 21— PT 2 9
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282 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SAKTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Evans. This might be so, as possibly some change has taken place; for
Instance, all my periodicals are returned from Haiti the last two years and
more, but not a single letter has come through. The real reason why, I suppose,
will have to wait and the mystery will some day be cleared up.
Senator Kino. I have received letters from Haiti, and I have not seen tbe
slightest evidence of any censorship?
Mr. Evans. As stated, this might be so, and things somewhat improved since
the scandal was made known and so many investigations as to the conduct of
these marines referred to and the flashlight thrown on them at last.
Senator King. You are speaking in reference to conditions when you were
there?
Mr. Evans. No; I had in mind chiefly since my return and long since the
war is ended.
Senator King. Do you charge that letters written by you to people in Haiti
have not been delivered or have been opened prior to delivery?
Mr. Evans. Yes; I am of opinion that they have not been delivered; possibly
they have also been opened ; several of these were to missionaries and one to
a I'nited States consul, whom I recently heard has been fired by the occupa-
tion or may be through Maj. Wells, who has escaped from Haiti, or by his friend
Gen. Williams, once chief of Haiti gendarmerie.
Senator King. The Haitians are the postmasters there, are they not?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; and with wholw I was always on the best of terms, as well
as all other leading ofllcials of the Haiti Government. They have in every
department, however, an American marine officer over them, and they fear that
anything should be done which he is not heartily in accord with ; and at times,
though he may not know it. in their overcautiousness (at times) fail to do their
plain duty. This might be so in my case, as they all know my own attitude
toward education and the reverse attitude of the occupation.
Mr. Angell. There is a special agreement covering that to have the general
direction in the hands of our United States nominee.
Mr. Evans. For instance, just to give you some idea of the nervous condi-
tions of the people, through outburst of abuse of authority, if not kaiserism, a
local editor had a paragraph merely stating that a high officer of the occupa-
tion had been relieved or recalled. He had his paper immediately confiscatwl
and he himself put in prison.
Senator Oddie. That fact is in the record?
Mr. Evans. This is to scare and terrorize these poor people, who are already
scared and terrified enough. An able Haitian and a strong intellectual native
while I was at Port au Prince was .schetiuled as chief consul for Kingston,
Jamaica, but something he had .said or done was construed to be unfavorable
to the Roman Catholic regime in Haiti, and his nomination was at once
canceled.
Senator King. It seems that the local priests, apparently, were the cause of
his undoing?
Mr. Evans. Exactly. The Roman Catholic Church in Haiti and its white
European priests — I have never seen a colored or native priest there — as Prot-
estants have native preachers, are the cause of undoing everything In Haiti
looking forward to the mental, moral, and industrial development of Haitians
and equip them for self-government of a progressive and prosperous nature.
They have to be intellectual slaves. The devious ways the Roman Catholic
influence and power works in Haiti is not easily discovered, but they have a
perfect machinery, which works smoothly but effectively, from the nuns and
priests up to bishop, archbishop, if not the late Cardinal Gibbons and the
W^hite House, through late private secretary, who are, It is said in Haiti, respon-
sible for most of changes in occupation's efficient officers.
Senator King. You mean by that, as I understand you, that able Americans
who had gone there for service were recalled because of opposition lodged by
the priests against them to the American officials or Haitian officials in Haiti?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; or charges sent from here — made by priests or bishops or
special Pope's delegate, w^ho has been some years at Port au Prince — to Wash-
ington, and that through Tumulty the State or Navy Department word would
arrive he must clear out, however efficient as American marine officer he might
be, simply at the caprice and dictation of the Roman Catholic apostoliqoe—
so-called church. Lack of whole-hearted sympathy with the Catholic regime
in Haiti and an unwillingness to subordinate the interest of Haitians, the
occupation, and that of the United States Government by an able, efficient.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 233
experimced, and true and patriotic American would suffice to remove that
marine officer.
Senator Kino. Your real criticism there is that the Catholic Church in
Haiti interferes with the duties of persons who were sent to Haiti from the
United States?
Mr. Evans. Precisely so ; deflects and demoralizes the personnel of the Ameri-
can occupation of the United States Government, some of whose ablest, bravest,
best military equipped and most experienced and efficient in the country, as
well as in the Navy Department service, to-day are Protestants.
Qnite an erroneous idea has been spread abroad, which, without any investi-
gation, was taken for granted as correct by the late administration and largely
accounts for their subordinating really the interest of the occupation's mission
in Haiti to the Roman Catholic regime — it is that all Haitians are Roman
Catholics.
Rear Admiral H. S. Knapp, in his official report to Secretary Daniels from
Port au Prince October 11, 1920, under " Haiti — Reports and inquiries regarding
conditions and the conduct of marines** (Appendix C, p. 223), and In section
8. and under Article XVII of the Constitution, where it says "all forms of
worship are equally free," etc., at last, and very properly, courageously, and
completely explodes this myth, as follows :
"There is a considerable number of priests (including the bishop at the
Cape and archbishop at Port au Prince) in the aggregate, and practically all
French (white) scattered all through the country, and there are several
sisterhoods of the Roman Catholic Church represented in Haiti engaged in its
worle
" It is doubtful, however, if the real unmixed doctrines of the Roman Catholic
Church are held by any but a very negligible minority; with most of the
population the practice of the Roman Catholic faith is more or less mixed ;
with that of the religions brought from the jungles of Africa Voodooism is
prevalent, and the farther one goes from the coast into the interior the more
openly is Voodooism practiced. Consecrated wafers of the Roman Catholic
Church are mixed with the blood of sacrifices by Voodoo priests at the Voodoo
rites."
According to this something like $1,000,000 of American money has been
misappropriated to financially sustain during the last six years a church of a
very negligible minority and a semibarbarous institution (more or less mixed
with Voodooism).
Senator Kixf4. And that the work of the occupation responded to the desires
of the local priests or to the Roman Catholic Church in Haiti?
Mr Evans. I would use a stronger word than respond; it actually deviated
the occupation and American marine officers from their mission in the Black
Republic, and even subordinated the interests of the United States Gov-
ernment— which was to carry out their treaty — to the Roman Catholic Church
and her sectarian interest. I know it is a delicate matter, but it has to be
plainly and courageously faced; and this imholy alliance and American cor-
porations, no more than German propagandas, must be permitted to inter-
fere with, much less to defeat — as they have so far done — our purpose in Haiti.
The honesty and honor of the United States Government and the American
PH^le are at stake not only before Latin Ajnerican Republics but before the
whole civilized world, and so our influence and integrity in negotiating treaties
through or independent of the League of Nationa
Senator Kino. Does not that indicate that the desire seemed to be to have
oflidalB there whose administration would be in harmony with the wishes of
the great majority of the people?
Mr. Evans. The motive of avoiding unnecessary friction, and especially
inflicting injury on any religious body is most commendable, and applies, accord-
ing to the Constitution, to the Protestant and Evangelical churches equally as
to the Roman Catholic Church. As Admiral Knapp states in his report, the
Bonuin Catholic Church in Haiti has no right to claim the majority of the popu-
lation. It is the church, as he says, a negligible minority, but owing to its
financial and official alliance with Haiti and the United States Governments It
to raore in evidence.
Senator Kino. The great majority of the people are Catholics, are they not?
Mr. Evans. According to the report given Secretary Daniels of the United
States Navy 12 months ago they are not, and this has been my position right
along. The Roman Catholic Church in Haiti is a bastard production of voodoo-
Digitized by VjOOQIC
234 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
ism, witchcraft, and other African heathenish cults, with a gloss of Roman
Catholicism — ^just as described by the American marine officer.
And again, these white priests of Europe who smoke and drink their wines,
etc., have little in common with Haitians and do not understand nor sympathize
with a republican form of government and equal rights for all Christian
churches.
On my first arrival in Jacmel, southern Haiti, in 1893, I was attacked by a
European white priest for holding a gospel service in the open air, and received
a warrant — both my assistant, Nosirel Lherison, and myself — to appear the
following Wednesday morning at the chief court, presided over by a real and
fine Haitian, a nominal Catholic.
The Judge said, ** The priest has failed to turn up ; and if he did, he can do
nothing to interfere with you. Continue to preach," he said; "this is a Re-
public, and the constitution gives equal rights to all churches," and he offered
the Haitian soldiers to protect me in the street or elsewhere and made arrange-
ments that I sliould visit the old prison every Sunday and any other time, etc.
Senator King. Your criticism Is that the priests, then, did not always repre-
sent the will of the majority of the people?
Mr. Evans. Yes; they are actually opposed to the intellectual if not moral,
industrial, and especially the Christian- development of Haitians, and would
not be surprised that they are not back of this occupation's resistance to educa-
tion in general of Haitian children and young people.
Senator King. And that the priests of the Catholic Church have interfered
with the legitimate and proper plans of the occupation?
Mr. Evans. Exactly so, only instead of saying priests (with whom as indi-
viduals I have no quarrel and they have as much right to preach and teach, if
they believe the Roman Catholic dogmas, as Protestants and Evangelicals), I
will put it the Roman Catholic Apostolique Church, so called, and their leaders
in the interest of this Roman Catholic Church have interfered with the legiti-
mate and proi)er plans of the occupation.
American marine officers themselves have again told me how they are de-
tailed off to wait on bishop and assist archbishop with their Government ma-
chines, and many, with the great majority of the thinking Haitians all over
the Republic, would hall the breaking of this alliance.
And this done expressly for the spiritual good of both Protestant as well as
the Catholic Church and an honest and efficient Haiti and United States Gov-
ernments' (latter through occupation) administration in the black republic.
Church and State have their distinct missions, and they can best carry out
these distinct missions by being entirely separate, and not the one entering the
others* realm and infringing upon the rights of one another, such as the Ameri-
can marine paying and acting the Catholic priest and the Catholic priest assum-
ing the function of an American marine officer. You thoroughly understand
what I mean.
Senator King. I exactly comprehend your meaning.
Mr. Evans. With your consent, I insert here for record an official letter of the
Haiti Government, which means as stated the occupation and really the United
States Government, and how It seeks to calm the fears of the distinguished dele-
gate of the Pope recognized in Haiti by both the Haitian Government and the
American marine officers not as a mere religious head but a prince representing
In Haiti an independent and foreign sovereign, but expenses and salary In Haiti
paid by Admiral Caperton (and afterwanls by the American occupation) as to
the continuance of financing the great Roman Catholic regime in Haiti, which
intelligent Haitians in Increasing numbers oppose, stating the concordat has
long expired. My copy is in French and taken from the L'essor for July 6,
1918, and Is as follows:
LA RELIGION CATHOLIQUE EN HAITI.
Nos lectures liront avec i>Ia!sir la lettere cl-dessus qui est un soulagement a
la foi catholique du pays:
Republique d'Haiti,
Port an Prime, le 31 Mai, 1918.
Skcretaire des Relations Exterieitrs.
MoNREiGNEi'R : .Fal eu I'honneur de recevoir la lettre du 20 de ce mols par
laquelle, etant donne que la religion catholique est celle de la majorite dii
peuple Haltlen et qu'elle a toujours eu en consequence une place privilige dans
le pays.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 235
Votre excellence me demande de lui permettre de rassurer le Saint-Siege en
precisant que TArt. 17 de la nouvelle Constitution ne porte aucune atteinte a
la satuation acqu.'se a TEglise catholique apostolique et roniaine.
Je me suis empresse de soumettre cette important question au Conseil des
Secretaires d'Etat qui c'est la consideree avec Tinterest legitime qui s'y attache.
Et c*est ainsl que je suis inflniment lieureux de pouvoir respondre a votre
excellence que TArt. 22 de la Constitution est identique a TArt. 22 de la Con-
stitution de 1880 et que tons les privileges accordes a TEgllse catholique par le
concordat demeurent maintenus. Couformement al'Art. 127 du project de Con-
stitution public au Moniteur du 8 Mai courrant qui prevot que les Traites en
vigeur constituent la Loi du Tays.
E. DupxjY.
A Son Exc. MoNSEiGNEUR Cherubini,
Internonce Apostolique Port au Prince.
Having at my request sent me an official list of all the schools belonging to
Protestants, whose names and total amount of appropriations hitherto given
by tile old Haitian Government — but now stopped by the American occupa-
tion— I further requested an official list from the Government's minister of
religion of the Protestant churches that received Government financial help to
pay their missionaries, and the amount given each. These names and amounts
were given as herein shown, and following is my letter of thanks, with a kind
request for a full and comi)lete list of total or itemized grants, and actual cost
to pay salaries and maintain the Roman Catholique Apostolique W^gime in Haiti.
To this request no answer came, and this broad-minded Catliolic, but real
American, superintendent of public instruction, who had prepared a scheme for
public instruction In the black Republic over two years ago and anxious to
launch it, has recently been fired by either the Catholic Church direct or by
the American occupation at the bidding of that church.
The letter and lists follow :
St. Marc, Haiti, West Indies, July 20, 1918.
Hon. Mr. Burgeois, • ^
Superintetident de Vlnfttructiwi Pnhlique,
Port au Prince.
GOVERNMENT Rl-BVKNTlON.
My I>ear St'pt. Burgeois: Many thanks for the official statement as to the
Protestant subventions given monthly by the Haiti Government; and also the
official list of subventions again given to the Roman Catholic schw^ls in your
communication safely received this week.
May I ask again through you, the minister of cult, to be kind enough to give
me an official list of the monthly or yearly salaries given the archbishop, bishops,
vicar generals, priests, etc., and all other minor officers of the Roman Catholic
Church in Haiti, with the extra subventions monthly or yearly given out of the
Republic's funds to maintain these Roman Catholic chapels, archbishop's palace,
and the presbyteries of said Roman Catholic priests?
Also include. If possible, in this list what is given to all freres and soeurs
teaching in Haiti at their Roman Catholic schools, as well as those engaged in
the various Government hospices through this Republic, and otlier useful infor-
mation you may add to this and coming under above heading.
It is very much better that I sliouhl have a correct and. If possible, a com-
plete list both of the Protestant and Roman Catholic subventions than one
should be left merely to guess on such important matters, and this can only be
got officially from you.
Is it pos.sible to find through you and the minister of cult whether the actual
and original concordat was meant for 50 years, and when did it really start?
I shall be exceedingly grateful for this relial)le and officijil information, to what
you have so kindly furnished me with already, and for which I heartily thank
you.
Should there be a boat leaving for New York from Port au Prince at end of
this month or beginning of August, we are hoping to leave for States, so i)er-
haps you could call, jointly with our Haiti minister of public instruction, and at
a short time the conference sxiggested.
If agreeable to you, I would very much like to have also present, say, Col.
Rossell, Dr. Maclean, Gen. Williams, with the President and ex-President Legi-
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236 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
time, if not the members of the national council itself, with our American min-
ister; and if you thought fit, and seeing their deep interest in Haiti, the British
consul general and the French minister, though if better, in your Judgment, these
can furnish their indorsements by way of a separate letter.
At this informal gathering I shall briefly give an outline of this ** noble
project," as they termed it through Haiti seven years ago, and what steps have
already been taken in the matter. I shall allude to the petition bearing nearly
3,000 names of all leading Haitians, irrespective of religious creeds and party
politics. I had the privilege of presenting at the Carnegie Bureau of Interna-
tional Peace, in Washington, and which had inscribed upon it as the first the
name of my old friend — distinguished, able, cultured, and progressive (after-
wards)— the late President I^econte, who was also the real friend of our own
American Government.
I believe that I mentioned to you, and as showing the widespread desire and
enthusiasm at the time referred to, official letters in my possession from the
civic councils, St. Marc, Gonaives, Port de Paix, Grande Riviere, Trou. Fort
Liherte, Dondon, St. Michael, Enery, Cape Haiti, etc., sincerely thanking me
personally for getting this up and carrying through the Republic, wishing the
success of my mission in their behalf in the States, and sincerely praying that
the great Christian and e<lucatlonist philanthropists of the States, such as
Rockefeller and Carnegie, for instance, to provide this blessetl boon and grant
this urgent necessity, a national normal and industrial school for the uplift of
Haiti and its sons and daughters and by way of training their young Negro
manhood and Negro womanhood for future religious, educational. Industrial,
commercial, as well as judicial and civic leadership in their own Black Republic.
Republic.
Our representatives at the La tin- American department of our Government
and other educationists at Washington last October, and just before my return
to Haiti thought that if this petition was now presented, and through our
Government it would most likely go right through, as it would be in harmony
with the spirit, and, indeed, letter, of our generous treaty ; thus enable it to be
carried out with greater effect by our United States Government, and through
its occupation and the Haitian administration, though the financial end might
be furnished by our generous American philanthropists, backed by our own
Government.
While we shall be glad, of course, of suggestions at this proposed conference.
It will be wise not to enter Into matters of detail until the proposed national
and normal industrial school has been sanctioned and Indorsed at Washington.
I am sincerely hoping, however, that this normal and indu.strial school will be
made fit into tiie new scheme of public instruction for the long-neglected chil-
dren of Haiti you intend soon to launch ; that in time it will provide practical
and efficient teachers for same, as well as professors in agriculture for the
Unite<l States (Jovernment to develop .scientific cultivation of our rich soil
through small Negro farmers and native cultivators, and therefore for this
reason will suggest when the time comes that trustees and managing council be
leading American citizens in the States (representing white and colored), who
will work in close conjunction with, or, if not, through, our American occupa-
tion and as an essential part of Haiti's public-school instruction system.
I wrote our Pastor Lherisson at Jacmel concerning that Government land so
urgently needed for a high-class school for boys.
With sincere regards to you and your colleague, and for Christ and Haiti,
L. Ton Evans.
RfePUBLIQUE D'HaITI,
Bureau du Superintkndant de l' Instruction Publique,
Port all Prince, IS juillet, 1918.
Monsieur L. Ton Evans,
t^aint Marc.
MoNSTETTR 1.E 1>ASTEUR : Vous trouvcrcz sous ce convert la liste gt^n^rale des
subventions que le Drn>artenient de rinstruction Publique paye mensuelleraent
Recevez, Monsieur le Pasteur, I'assurance de ma parfalte consideration.
M. Laurent.
Lc Superintendant de VInstruction Publique.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 237
Subvention,
Ooardea.
L Ecoles des Sciences appliques »1.200 or 150
2. Ecole de commerce 100
3. Madame Vve Paret 257
4. Mme. Torchon 200
5. Orphelina de la Madeleine 100
1
1. 857 or 150
Circonscription du Cap Haitien :
1. Ecole presbyt^rale de Milot 70
2. Ecole presbyt^rale de Quartier Morin 70
3. Ecole presbyt^rale Plaine dn Nord 70
4. Ecole presbyWrale Acul du Nord 100
560
Circonscription Grande Riv. du Nord :
1. Ecole presbyt^rale de Ranquitte 50
2. Ecole presbyt^rale de Dondon 100
150
Circonscription de Limbe Pla'sance:
1. Ecole presbyt^rale de Llmb^ 150
2. Ecole presbyt^rale de Plaisance 100
250
Circonscription de Trou, ecole presbyt^rale du Trou 50
Circonscription de Valliere, ecole presbyt^rale de Valli6r§ 50
Circonscription de Hinche, ecole presbyt^rale de Hinche 100
Circonscription de Dessalines, ecole presbyt^rale de la Petite
Riviere 50
3. 067 or 150
Republic D*HAm,
Bureau du Superintendant de l'Instruction Pubtjque,
Port au Prince, 5 juUlet, 1918,
Ijc Superintendant de l'Instruction Publique.
M. le Rev. Pasteur L. Ton Evans,
Superintendant de la Mission Baptiste, en Haiti.
Cher M. EJvans: Selon votre demand, je vous transmets sous ce couvert, la
liste des Subventions accordees par le Gouvemement aux divere Cultes, etabis
dans le Pays.
Cordialement,
L. J. Buroeois,
Supt. de VTnstruction Publique,
lAMte des Subventions accordees par le Gouvernement aux divers cultes Protest-
ants {Protestant reliffions) etablis dans le pays.
Savoir:
• Eglise Orthodoxe Catholique G. Apostolique d*Haiti 192.50
(This is Episcopalians.)
Baptistes de la Republique 187.50
Eglise Baptiste du Dondon 50.00
Eglise Baptiste du Cap 40.00
(This includes every Baptist church in Haiti, and rent of room
where Baptists of Cape worship since church burnt down. —
Paster Jaques.)
Wesleyannes, de la Republique 120.00
Wesleyannes, Independeante 50. 00
Wesleyan Methodists of England and the Port au Prince
CJhurch, which has broken away and become independent.)
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238 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Savoir — Continued.
St Paul 100. 00
(Native Episcopal, whose pastor is clerk at American consu-
late.)
Societe Biblique et des Llvres, Religleuse d'Haiti 150.00
(This is native Bible and religious books society of Haiti.)
^ Cert i fie Sincere,
H. Gamboub,
Le Comptahle des Cultes.
Port au Prince, le 2 juUlet, 1918,
Note. — Not being able to ascertain from the native pastors and others the
exact sum each received from the Government, which has been a curse on the
whole to Baptist churches and natives, not to say vitally opposed to N. T.
and Baptist teaching, I made an appeal to the Government direct for official
information and courteously received above response.
I also applied for official Information as to the total subventions paid by our
American occupation to archbishops, bishops, priests, nun.s, freres. seurs, and
the total monthly or annually, to maintain the whole Catholic Church and the
Haiti College in Prance for training of white Catholic priests, etc. This, of
course, was never furnished me.
While the estimate is that from $100,000 to $125,000 a year from the bankrupt
Haiti Republic actually paid the latter (U. C.) something like $4,000 to $5,000
a year was paid to Protestant churches and to aid Protestant schools. Latter
schools have been cut off for years from list of subventions, and ^veral thus
closed by the American occupation.
(L. Ton Evans.)
Senator Oddie. Now. I want to ask you this: In your opinion, will the evi-
dence that is asked by this committee be offered freely by the Haitians In
Haiti; and if not, why?
Mr. Evans. No. This committee will In the present temperament of Hai-
tians, I may say terror-stricken and almost hysteric mental condition, without
^ confidence of any kind in the American people, through the fundamental mis-
understanding of them by and the cruel conduct of the American occupation,
I very sincerely believe will find itself much like the Navy court did, and, as
beforehand predicted to Maj. Dyer, it would be by myself at our interview here
in Washington. He thought he knew better.
The occupation is still there, and with the priests, their paid agents, and
gendarmes they will know every native that attempts to give testimony, who
they will probably intimidate, though this Is not needed ; they fear and dread,
and are almost horrified at the thought of being pounced upon by way of re-
prisal the moment the Senate conmilttee has left the island, and will have no
court to apiieal to nor a single soul to protect them, hence they will be mum.
If account of present proceedings of the committee could have been pub-
lished In English and French at present in Haitian papers, this would be some
kind of preparation and something to calm their minds and win their con-
fidence, otherwise I fear that you will be sadly disappointed unless the Presi-
dent comes and talks to the conunlttee as he talked, for instance, to those
New York correspondents. This might encourage others, i>ossibly.
It is a stid condition, and I feel almost heartbroken for them, for when I
arrived there in 1917, and before the rape of constitution, and the actual resur-
rection, enforcement, with barbaric roping connected and developed with tlie
corvee, they seemed so happy and free.
I seriously advise the committee right away to request our President to
send a proclamation to be published in French and English in the Monitor and
all the papers and in all the public places in every town and village In Haiti,
inviting the citizens and others who have reliable evidence to testify before
the present Senate committee or commission now making an exhaustive inquiry
into conduct of United States forces in Haiti, assuring them of ample protec-
tion of the United States Government and the severe punishment to any mem-
bers of occupation, priest, or members of conx»rations, etc., who would attempt
to Intimidate by threats, reprisals, or any other method.
State the places the commission of the United States Government will meet,
approximate date of sittings. As a proof of the real and genuine desire on
the part of our Government to calm all fears and create implicit confidence
of the people, so as to secure their cooperation, our President should, more-
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 239
over, command that all political suspects and prisoners against whom no crime
has been proved by proper process of law be liberated the day of the arrival
of the commission at Port au Prince.
This proclamation, with protection, is essential, and the liberation of all such
prisoners as mentioned would have an immense moral and most favorable
effect * •
In a sense they must be treated as children and somewhat humored.
Senator King. When a number of Senators were there over a year ago some
of us went around quite freely among the people — at least I did. I was iii
Port au Prince and in the region outside.
Mr. Evans. Was that'ln March or April of 1919?
Senator King. No ; in 1920. Just a year ago, or a little more, and the people
talked freely to me, and I am sure they did to other Senators likewise —
lawyers, judges, professional men, and the people on the streets women that
were coming in carrying produce on their heads.
I talked, perhaps, with 200 in the island during the two or three days that
I was there. I found no one that hesitated to speak, no one that seemed to
feel the slightest strictures in explaining their views, and many of them ex-
pressed a qualified sat sf action with the conditions.
The principal objection seemed to be that there was a divided authority.
They could not tell which of the three chief officials was the one having au-
thority, and that led to confusloif, but, generally speaking, there was very
little criticism made by those with whom I spoke about the conditions there
prevailing.
I talked with perhaps 100, and those with whom I talked were poor people,
men and women on the streets. Some were working as stevedores and some
coming down from the hills. They talked perfectly free about the revolution,
the cacos, as you call them, and there was some criticism, I remember, about
the gendarmes, not very great; but the point I am trying to make is that no
one seemed to be under the slighest feeling of terror at all.
At least I did not perceive this anywhere among the classes of people, on
the street or out in the hills. Nowhere was there the slightest evidence of
their being repressed or existing under a state of terror. I do not know what
the conditions were when you were there.
Mr. Evans. Were these Inquiries going on about the time you were there;
that is, during the administration of Secretary Daniels?
Senator King. No.
Mr. Evans. That would be near that time.
Senator Kino. That was in April and May, 1920.
Mr. Evans. There was something going on by way of Investigations — either
by Gens. Lejune or Barnett ; some of these were around there?
Senator King. No ; that was after>vards.
Mr. Evans. Well, these investigations produced some moral effect, as some
of our American marine officers like Maj. Wells, for instance, cleared out,
and may be others. I was in communication at this time with Secretary Daniels,
and he informed me of Lejune and others he sent down to bring him the latest.
He it was (just before this) who sent Barnett to Port au Prince, and things
were beginning to change somewhat as they saw the red light
Gen, Williams is another who left, is he not?
Senator King. I do not know.
Mr. Evans. I believe he left months before your visit. I came up by a
Panama boat in April of 1919. Several Senators and Congressman came up
from Panama and came out at Port au Prince and witnessed a riot between the
marines and gendarmes — if not siiw one or two killed. I met one of the Senators
here tlds morning — Ashurst.
There has been great strain through jealousy between these two bodies which
led to confusion and lack of discipline.
Is it possible that this committee will immediately consider and act soon on
the proclamation, etc.?
Senator Oddie. They will consider that. We will take that up.
Mr. Evans. I wish to impress the importance of such a step on the com-
mittee so that you may not be handicapped in Haiti.
Senator Oddie. As soon as it is before them again, they will consider it.
I want to ask you what factors, in your opinion, contributed to the renewed
activities in 1919 of the cacos?
Mr. Evans. In 1919 and at the end of 1918 when I was there I saw a great
deal of the corvee work and its effect. On landing in Decemb^of 1918 at
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240 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Port au Prince, as seen in this record, I called on Brig. Gen. Catlin, who gave
a strict command that the corvee must be stopped, I understand, but it was
Btill in existence at St. Marc and other places in the Artibonite and around
Port au Prince, and south as well as all through the northern section. .
After receiving official assurance from State Department at Washington that
the corvee curse and other cruel and sad conditions were being investigated
and seriously considered by all the departments interested at Washington. I
made it my business not only to go and pay my respects to Brig. Gen. Catlin,
the new chief of American occupation, as soon as I arrived at Port au Prince,
but inquired from him personally whether he had heard from Mr. Lansing,
and was there anything being actually done?
I gave him, in addition to the typewritten copy of it received from either
State or Navy Department, the printed memorandum, and went over together
carefully re corvee, and the insidious influences at work interfering with and
deflecting it was alleged the occupation and its purpose in Haiti. This was in
December, 1916. If he gave orders in October to stop the corvee, then his
orders were not carried out, and to my knowledge, and after bringing it to his
direct attention, he permitted Gen. Williams, chief of gendarmerie, to prevent
Lieut. Kulp from Investigating the brutal and barbarous conduct of his gen-
darmes on Gros Mome.
Gen. Barnett, in October, 1919, writing Col. Russell, who succeeded Gen.
Oatlin, after expressing himself as shocked at conditions of brutality and pro-
miscuous murder by gendarmes and marines, added :
" I can not too strongly urge you the necessity of going personally and thor-
oughly into these matters and see to it that nothing is allowed to remain of
the corvee system ; let It be known throughout Haiti ; it will not be tolerated
hereafter."
There should be no need of this urge and imperative command from either
Barnett or Knapp or Lejeune if these chiefs did their duty, and from this lt*s
evident that the corvee existed other than in the north, and no honest effort
was made to actually stop it or ameliorate the brutal sufferings of the poor
natives under it.
Cacoism was mainly the product of the corvee, and the sufferings of the
uatives became more acute, and the marines and gendarmes conduct more
brutal and barbarous and murderous in their defiance of law, and with the
sad negle<'t and criminal laxity of American occupation, and gendarmerie chiefs,
cacoism Increased threefold and tenfold, and the serious attack made on Port
au Prince, though, it was not a revolution, nor even a rebellion, but a kind of re-
prisal, and the natural protest against the inhumanity, if not Insanity, of
American marines and their methods.
From a document sent me from Haiti, the headquarters of this supposed
cacoism, and by a Christian missionary whose valuable services, appreciated
by Gen. Cole, was scouted by the notorious MaJ. Wells, which I am placing at
your service in the record, I quote here a paragraph or so to dispel the mislead-
ing statements about these peoi)le:
" Some say that this revival and powerful renewal of cacoism is a German
intrigue against the United States. There may be a semblance of truth in it
but the real fact (and no one knows better than yourself) that this new native
uprising is directly due to the terribly bad administration.
" If different methods were adopted, more wisdom and humanity less colored,
prejudice and hatred by some of the American marines toward the Haitians,
and a conciliatory spirit shown, they would so gain these Negroes' confidence
and loyalty and love that all the money of Berlin' and guns manufactured in
Germany, if furnished them, would never turn these natives against our Ameri-
can marines and the United States Government."
This French citizen, and missionary for over 28 years in this section, is
one of my witnesses to testify before this committee if I can get to Haiti, and the
President's proclamation is made as requested.
Senator Kino. Were you there when the cacos came into Port au Prince and
attacked the sugar factory and others?
Mr. P]vANs. Do you remember that date?
Senator Kino. No; I do not.
Mr. Ano1':ll. There was an earlier one, in October, 1919,
Mr. Evans. That was after 1 left.
Senator King. I am referring to the one in 1920, when they came in perhaps
a thousand strong, and created a great state of terror, and they were repulsed
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMlNGr». 241
by the Marines and the gendarmes, and several score of the cacos killed. You
were not there then?
Mr. Evans, Xo ; but I have seen the account. It was the accumulation of the
bad feeling created through these oppressions and cruelties of Marine and
gendarmes of the occupation, I trow not. If what a white American and
contractor working on this sugar plant told me boastingly at the Port an Prince
general post office, of his brutality toward those who worked under him, and
killed one or two, and through the occupation the whole thing was squashed,
though deploring these uprisings and attacks, I am not surprised therefore at
them. It is cause and effect
Senator Kino. I am familiar with the history there, given by both classes,
and your knowledge would be perhaps no greater than mine, unless you read
more about it.
Mr. Evans. My knowledge of Haiti and the Haitian people is not the result
merely of reading, but years of my life in living and carefully observing them
before our occupation came, and since.
The petty jealousies existing between Marines and the gendarmes and their
Marine officers, the dual control as you put it, and confusion and military
demoralization in consequence, and the cruel way Haitians are handled account
largely for these. I have heard Marines repeatedly say things are so quiet,
unless they have a scrap among thems*elves, or gendarmes or so-called cacos,
they would resign and go back to the States, or ask to be transferred to France,
where there was something doing.
Senator King, I was told by a number of Haitians, some of them holding
good positions, that the revolution in 1920, if that was the date, was very
serious, and was the culmination not of the evils of which you speak, but
resulted from the activity of a number of revolutionary leaders who hud been
in the bush for years, and had been disturbing factors, and participated In
rebellions long before the occupation, and that they took part in the assassina-
tion or revolution which resulted in assassination of one or more Presidents,
driving from power of one or more Presidents ; and that their avowed purpose
was to assasinate all whiter, particularly Americans, and to put the government
back in control of these revolutionary Negroes. That was told me by Haitians,
Mr. Evans. I would not be at all surprised if this were true, and that even
Germans would take advantage of the bitter resentment of Haitians at the
way they have been treated, and the strong reversion of feelinjr product^l
against the occupation and Americans, as I have repeatedly said. It wiis fre-
quently reported when I was in Haiti that Oormany was winning In the war, and
that it was merely a matter of a short time before they came to Haiti and
cleared out all of the American marines. Those with the Central Powers (and
officials of the Roman (^atholic Church were) and Pope with Germany and
Austria spread these stories, and I saw little or nothing to convince them
otherwise.
Senator Kino. Is it not a fact that there had been revolutionary movements
for 100 years, which would result in the frequent deposition from authority of
the Presidents, or the Chief Executives of the island, and that there were in-
cipient revolutions in all parts of the island cofng on at all times?
Mr. Evans. As I mentioned this morning, this was partly due to the dissatis-
faction of educated Haitians with island conditions, readiness to he therefore
used or helped by white man's influence and money to try and better the state
of affairs. In the Stntes and in Britain, where people are educated and en-
lightened, bad conditions are as a rule blamed on the Government, and a change
is sought only with us is done by elections. Haitian agitators, however, are
all lun fortunately termed revolutionists, and in a sense every reformer, of
course, is.
Senator Kino. There have been nearly 100 Presidents there, have there not?
Mr. Evans. I forget exactly how many, but this is somewhat exaggerated, I
think.
Senator Kino. In a limited number of years?
Mr. Evans. Yes; this is true.
Senator Kino. And they would be driven from power by revolution ?
Mr. Evans. Yes; being without money, and failing to secure the friendly aid
of the United States, they would be too weak to resist the powerful influence
of white filibusters and German money?
Senator King. And a nnmber have been kille<l?
Mr, Evans. President Simon was driven from office and President Laconte
killed, because we as an United States Government failed though requested to
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242 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
eonie to their assistance, and their Government's aid against these insidious and
iwwerful invisible nsoncies working against every attempt at reforms, aari
progress in the blaclc Kepublic.
During last 100 yenrs we liave had many elections, and some able and well-
meaning Presidents have been hurled out of the executive office and many
changes brouglit about.
Senator King. I am speaking about conditions In Haiti. Is It not a fact that
tliere are revolutions for 100 years almost constantly, if not in all the island,
in parts of the island, and incipient revolts and movements which sought tbe
overthrow of one political party which had triumphed, in the interests of an-
other i)olitical party?
Mr. Evans. Yes; perfectly true, but more or less and chiefly owing to the
Influences I have alrendy mentioned and repeated. There are thoughtful,
smart, and energetic people among the Haitians. Political parties even hert
all the year round are preparing and agitating whether their parties are in
power or not.
Senator King. Is it not a fact that when Americans came there there were in-
cipient revolutions in many parts of the island, and that they were continued?
Mr. Evans. Yes; that is a fact, but my impression is that these revolutions
were contincMl to the north, and Port au Prince, or south. There Is a rivalry
between north and south of the l{ei)ublic of Haiti, just as there is here in
America, between the northern and southern States, not always beneficial.
Haiti has liad before now a President at Port au Prince for the south, and
the north had Christoph as their king, for instance.
Senator King. So that even when, as you said this morning, as I understood
you, the Americans came, and were welcomed by a large number down there
Mr. Evans. Y'es; this is quite so, and if they had continued their peaceful
purpose of pacifying, instead of arousing the feeling, causing bitterness, and
hatred through the corvee, change of constitution, etc., they would have been
still welcomed by practically every Haitian.
Senator King. Yes ; by the majority ; there were a large number that were .
opposing
Mr. Evans. Quite a number who misunderstood our intentions, and the man-
ner we landed our marines; yes.
Senator King. The occupation ; or would have opposed the control by any
respectable majority of the Haitian people themselves?
• Mr. Evans. There is a difference in being controlled by a foreign nation and
by a majority party of your own. As emphasized this morning which these
questions indicate that j'ou have forgotten some of my replies, these minorities
you refer to, as well as Haitians in general have for years been poisoned
against America and Americans and told by German and other European propo-
gandas to beware of us; that all we wanted was a foothold, to take away
their rich island and reduce them to the position of forced laborers and actual
slaves; and when we entered some were honestly doubting our intentions, but
to-day the majority have been convince<l that the Germans were about right.
Senator King. What I am trying to develop, if it be a fact, is. has there been
in that country for many years an element that should not be satisfied with any
kind of government, even the best government, that their own people could give
them?
Mr. Evans. I hardly like to say that, and if it is true as you mean it, We
have the same situation in the States and other countries. Human nature
whether white or black, is very much alike in these things. Haitians have a
deal of energy and much time also on their hands, and there has been unfor-
tunately not much under any government in Haiti that can satisfy reformers
and intellectual and Christian progressive people among this black little
nation.
Senator King. Have there been revolutions there?
Mr. Evans. Certainly there have.
Senator King. And a great many men deposed from executive authority?
Mr. Evans. They term almost everything in Haiti a revolution, if It means
political activity.
Senator King. Answer the question. Have there not been a large number of
executives deposed?
Mr, Evans. Yes.
Senator King. And some killed?
Mr. Evans. And some few killed.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 243
Senator Kino. You would not call the government which they have
Mr. Evans. A few I think, and two or so, the last 10 or 12 years.
Senator King. In the past 50 years?
Mr. Evans. Yes; there have been otliers killed I believe during the last 50
years.
Senator King. You would not call the government which they had in Haiti
for the 50 years preceding the American occupation a stable government, would
you?
Mr. Evans. Certainly not, and I have been trying to point out the reasons
why. Because of this I have l>een for 20 years urging upon our Government at
Washington to assume a friendly mandate* and act the big brother toward these
Haitians so as to assist them in laying down a firm foundation for a perma-
nent government, and intellectually and industrially help to train and develop
them so as to enable them to understand the secret of a stable, peaceful, and
progressive government in Haiti, but which the occupation has failed to do,
though an essential part of their mission in the liepublic, according to the treaty.
Senator King. There have been fewer revolutions, and there has been less
banditry and outlawry since the American occupation than before, have there
not?
Mr. Evans. There have been no revolutions, but I have heard more about
banditry and outlawry in Haiti since our American oecupation, as well as
cacoism, than I ever heard of before during nearly 25 years, but of course the
stealing and banditry connected with tliose i)eriodlcal revolutions referred to.
If the natives of Haiti had their arms, and the Haiti Government her army,
there would have been a revolution to-day, I fear, that woukl have made it
imi)ossible to close their senate and chambers and change their constitution.
Senator Kino. What were the revolutions l>efore this that resulted in the
murder of President Sam ?
Mr. Evans. Those were the periodical revolutionists, which have simply the
overturning of the government in view. If the President, however, uses very
ruthless means to put down the revolutionists, and in desperation instead of quit-
ting and yielding the government re.sorts to wholesale exetutions, as I under-
stand Sam did, then a certain element goes rav nj; mad and swear vengeance,
etc., which happens in backward countries and among illiterate and quick-
tempered people.
Senator King. These cacos were revolutionists, were they not?
Mr. Evans. No. not in the sense it is used in Haiti ; they would be called ban-
dits, and those in North Haiti, and referred by you as attacking I>ort au Prince,
would be these augmented in very large numbers by those driven into des|>eration
by the corvee cruelties and brutalities and probably had escaped from the
gendarmes while working on roads, etc.
Senator King. What would you call those who have deposed the multitude
of executives who have been dei)Osed ?
Mr. Evans. The north is proverbially known as the starting place of revolu-
titons ; some believe those at the Cape and in the northern secti(m are stronger
men intellectually, but certainly they are apparently more active and energetic.
I believe, however, that an important reason is that it is more accessible to
the Dominican Republic and can be easily reached, should something happen,
within a few hours' ride on horseback. It has been easier to land ammunition
here and more Inaccessible for the Government to get up from Port au Prince.
There would as a rule be certain cacos that would join and follow the revolu-
tionary forces on their forward march on Port au Prince, and as these rebels
had to be fed they would be useful in doing some looting very likel^y^. They
would be the general inhabitants, with Haiti politicians at the head, and in-
variably financed by whites.
Senator King. I want to know what the fact is as to the revolutionary con-
ditions in the island before the American occupation, for the 50 or 75 years pre-
ceding the Americans going there?
Mr. Evans. There have been many revolutions during the nearly 30 years I
have known Haiti, and some of the oldest people have told me about the real
horrors of revolutions back 50, 60, and 80 years ago. Unfortunately, there
have always been white men on the lookout to foment and exploit small, weak
nations, unless these are merged in or cared for, protected, and otherwise re-
ceive the benefit of the leadership of a stronger, wealthier, and more develoi)ed.
The revolution which lead up to our landing in Haiti would probably be more
<»r les? typical, with its bloodshedding and devastating consequences, as those in
years gone by.
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244 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Kino. Well, 50 or 75 years ago there could be no German infloeoces?
Mr. Evans. This has been true for the last 25 years, and other nations, sucli
as England and France, have had their filibusters and political pirates as well.
Senator King. Without attempting to determine the cause, there have been
frequent revolutions there?
Mr. Evans. Yes; very many.
Senator Kino. And public peace and order constantly disturbed?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; most seriously ; and formerly there would be a small colony
of Haitian exiles at Kingston, Jamaica, who were Induced l)y whites, and with
money and ammunition and small ships, to go back, land at night, and start a
political upheaval. There was another class who really sought to go in for a bet
ter government, but unaided, too weak. So I have often looked upon these as the
birth pangs of this small nation, which seeks not only an Independent existence
but even a larger life of greater and larger usefulness, but too weak without
si>eclal assistance and protection.
Senator King. I am not attempting to excuse, palliate, or condemn. I am
trying to find out what the fact is. I do not want the Impression to go out from
your testimony-, unless you so want it, that whatever trouble has occurred in
the island in the shape of revolution or disorder has occurred since the Ameri-
cans went there.
The fact is, as I understand, that there have been trouble and revolutions
for many years.
Mr. Evans. Yes ; this fact is well known in America and through all Europe,
Senator King. Inherent — I was about to say indigenous — to the island and
the people?
Mr. Evans. Yes; under present and past peculiar conditions, and all the beat
intellectual people have been long sick and tired of it, as shown by the
enthusiasm in reference to a normal and industrial school and the efforts of
President Simon re concessions of railroads and banana plantations, etc.
Senator King. And the Germans before and after the outbreak of the war
fomented strife?
Mr. Evans. Quite so.
Senator King. And used the island as a base lor German propaganda?
Mr. Evans. Yes; they were for many years entrenched through bushiess,
banks, etc., in and throughout Haiti.
Senator Oddie. I just want to ask you what the cacos had to do with the
adoption of the new constitution?
Mr. Evans. The cacos?
Senator Oddie. Yes; do you think they had any influence or anything to do
with it?
Mr. Evans. There was not much talk about the cacos previous to June of 1918.
and. for instance, when I travele<l through the north in April I found little or no
evidence of their existence, which I attribute to the wise and humane methods
of Maj. Cole, who sought, counsel with our French missionary and used him
as an intermediary more than once, but which when suggested to Maj. Wells
in January of 1919, when they hod so increased in number and power, he
tabooed with a sneer arid took as an offense, saying he could handle them with-
out aid of a missionary or Gen. Catlin and his marines.
The arousing of the Haitians and creation of bitterness and hatred towanl
the occupation an^ Americans confirmed, I should think, whatever cacos there
were in the north at tills time ; that the destruction of their Negro constitution,
so as to give away landfall over Haiti to the white foreigners, confirmed them
in their previous belief/ that Americans were taking away their country from
them, and therefore they were justified in their strong opiK>sition. It must also
have added large nu^ibers to them, as well as create other bands of cacos
around the outskirts of Port an Prince.
Senator Oddie. What have the cacos had to do with this corvee systjem?
Mr. Evans. Well, while the cacos have had a!>solutely notiiing to do with the
corvee system, but stoutly oppose it and denounce the occupation and Ameri-
cans, the corvee system has much to do with cacoism. The forced and slavish
labor on the roads, and catching, roping, brutal treatment, and killing of those
who tried to escape, not merely doublecl, trebled, and multiplied many folds the
number and strength of the cacos by way of recruits, but it was, in my opinon.
the clenching nail and proof positive at last not simply that Americans took all
their lands but had come there to bring them all back to slaverj* vriih all its
horrors.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 245
Senator Oddie. Now, I want to ask you another question with regard to the
character of the gendarmes who were chosen by the marines?
Mr. Evans. The gendarmes are chosen by the marine officers, I understand.
Where the marine officer is strict, firm, yet sympathetic, as a rule he has a
higher type of a gendarme, with better behavior, and quite humane because of
the better type of American marine officer. Where, however, the marine officer
is a (irunlcard, immoral, prejudiced against the colored, and curses and brataL
his gendarmes chosen are inferior and copy their white American captain or
Ueatenant, and probably goes beyond him, especially when he finds that this
pleases bis superior white officer.
Many of our American marine officers have confessed to me that when they
came first to Haiti, inexperienced, somewhat prejudiced, ignorant of the lan-
guage (obliged to use any liind of interpreter), they often misunderstood them,
wrongly abused these men.
With better knowledge of the language and the Haiti Negro's characteristic
things changed, with excellent results.
If care was taken, and chief of occupation see that not only their marine
officers of the gendarmes were of the highest American type, atid should hold
him stricrl^' rosponsible for the character and accountable for the conduct of
his gendarmes, all this scandal — and providing the corvee was merely used in
its true sense, and workmen were paid 25 or 30 American cents a day — this
scandal would never have occurred.
Saiator King. The trouble is that when you are asked to explain one matter
you also explain another at)out our occupation.
May I ask you a question right here? I was told by Haitians and by Ameri-
cans and other foreign residents there that whereas Haitians are kindhearted,
there was a callousness with regard to brutal treatment that would seem to be
quite inconsistent with their other sympathetic characteristics ; that they were
quite brutal in their treatment of each other and did not seem to appreciate that
fact; and that they are brutal to their animals, brutal in their treatment of
chickens, their domestic animals, and seemed to have no sensitiveness when the
question of personal suffering of animals was involved. What is the fact about
that, very briefly?
Mr. Evans. This is true in many cases, and arising from the lack of training
and moral development, and being deprived of the civilizing and Christianizing
influences we have, and criminally neglected by us as Americans and Christians
to give these Haitiana They are not responsible for this. The Negro fiery
nature and intensity of feeling would have much to do also with this.
I hardly like to think what Americans and America would be like if Christian
and civilizing influences of church, schools, and in the homes were withdrawn.
This what you wish to imply, in my judgment, shows what care should be taken
in choosing the natives by competent marine officers, and after the spec'al train-
ing they should have for these important positions of authority they are
placed in.
Senator Kino. I agree with you, but I am now trying to get the characteris-
tics of the people.
Mr. Evans. There is a great deal of truth about that, but, as stated, if a
certain type of men are given any position of authority without explaining the
meaning and responsibility of such, they will abuse their trust and soon lapse.
Sometimes white persons do this. They are, on the other hand, not only kind,
generous, sympathetic, but scrupulously honest, generally speaking, and would
put us often in so-called Christian lands to shame. Seeing how these folks are
misrepresented if not vilified, the following from the New York Times fOr
October 15, 1920, is interesting, and may modify somewhat certain views as to
Haitian Cacos and bandits:
AMERICANS IN HAITI.
To the New York Times,
Sa: About eight years ago I was in Haiti on a riding trip in the interior of
the island. I recall how the French priests, who were our hosts, all testified
to the honesty and peacefulness of the people, and I recall In particular the
words of one of the priests, who said that you could drive a donkey laden with
gold from one end of the Island to the other In perfect safety.
It would be interesting to learn why so many bandits have developed in Haiti
since the American occupation. Is it possible that the term bandit has become
confused with the term nationalist?
EiLSiE Clews Parsons,
Harrison, N, Y.
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246 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator King. This was given me as an explanation for the alleged brutel
treatment of other Haitians by some of the gendarmes. They said they did
not regard it as brutal treatment to strilje some one; they did not think that
was anything serious at all.
Mr. Evans. The day before I called on our American marine officer at Petite
Riviere, who stated (and by the way lived in the Roman Catholic presbj-tery
with the European priest) that the day before his gendarme had shot a pris-
oner. The prisoner had merely attempted to strike the gendarme because of
his brutal handling of him.
This shows the poor native who receives the blow is not insensitive to the
brutal treatment he gets. Prisoners and corvee workers all over Haiti have tlms
been shot on showing resentment to the iTuel way they are dealt with, whose
number during the last tive years would run up into thousands and more than
double Oen. Bamett's figures.
Senator King. To illustrate what I mean, I remember see'ng a number of
animals being brought in. those little burros heavily laden with wood, and one
of them, as it was ai>proaching Port an Prince, fell from exhaustion because of
the burden !t carried
Mr. Evans. Yes; I have seen many of them.
Senator King. There were several in the caravan, and as I remember, a man
and a woman came up, and instead of lifting the load they beat the iK>or animal
and the inten)reter, and they were very much annoyed and continucnl the beat-
ing of the iK)or animal ; and the interpreter insisted that they remove the load
and permit the animal to rise, and very reluctantly they did it, and he exiilainetl
that the Haitians were very brutal to animals and, indeed, to each other. Tliey
seemed to be insensible to suffering and to the infliction of pain, either upon
each other or upon animals.
Mr. Evans. Well, their moral sensibility has not been developed. Some of
these finer senses take a long time to develop. What you saw I have seen also,
but they were somewhat rare cases, I am glad to say. It is the other side of
their nature I have most frequently witnessed. These donkeys, and especially
mules, are somewhat tricky and often go down quietly, load, mother, and child,
in a stream or river, and but with little weight. I have had this experience
myself, in both water and imid.
Roads in Haiti have been wretched and Impassable, and it is cruel to have ,
to drive donkeys heavily loaded over them. The whole country, as well as
people, are in a very backward condition in spite of some very excellent traits
mentioned. It is a field with splendid opportunity for Christian statesmen, as
well as teachers and missionaries.
Senator Oddie. Were you in St. Marc's prison In 1918?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; I spent the closing days of year 1918 and the opening days
of 1910 in the slave cell of St Marc's old prison, strictly confined, and no per-
son, not even members or officers of church, daring to come and see me.
Senator Oddie. Did you see any acts of cruelty and ill treatment in there?
Mr. Evans. Yes; while night after night, as well as during the day, and actu-
ally gasping for a breath of air, and expecting every moment at the comnrand
of the white, intoxicated, and raging, cursing American marine to be dragged out
like others before a "firing squad," I could hear the yelling and groaning of
native prisoners, as well as their being cruelly beaten and pounded by gendarmes.
Many a time these yells and groans would suddenly cease, an<l then a scuffle,
whispering, and the sound like if they were carrying out a dead body or bodies.
Through the small cross-barred window of my dark cell I could see 100 or
more lined up about 6 in the morning to have coffee, at t'mes without a morsel
to eat, and without the least provocation struck a terrible blow with almost
anything the gendarme might have in his hand, until the prisoner was stunne<l.
I have seen them fall like logs in the prison yard from pure exhaustion, starved,
and the lack of nourishment.
After the coffee and under armed guard of gendarmes I have seen them
marched for corvee work on roads several miles from the town of St. Marc.
Between 2 and 3 I have seen them brought back to prison, roughly searclunl,
and whatever they had taken from tiiem ; whether these had any pay' for corvee
work I don't exactly know, though I think not.
Often they would have to wait two and three hours without a bite. A few
occasions there were no food at all, the American captain having gone away
with the keys or drinking.
I saw again and passed by under armed giiard of the gendarmes dead body,
if not bodies, in the farthest yard perfectly nude and covered with vermin, and
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 247
where men and women prisoners and corvee workers stood and sat around. I saw
women prisoners have their heads held under spigots by gendarmes and other-
wise tortuVetl. And the day I was talien out under gendarme guard, after being
tried by Negro high court, and said American marine officer immediately com-
manded to liberate me, my imprisonment condenmed as illegal and court decreed
substantial indemnity, etc., for torture and agony suffered, a man just brought
in and laid on his stomach attended to by the native assistant local doctor
and another^ This Haitian had his back t)eaten into a kind of jelly and in-
sensible, and, on asking how it happened, was told that this American, Capt.
Brown, in another of his drunken rages had i)ounded this man.
While staying at St. Marc, at the home of the family of the late Judge Orius
Paultre, heard on cre<lible testimony that two or three prisoners had been taken
out by night driven at the command of the American captain a mile or so from
town, forced to make their own graves, and shot into them. This, with my own
imprisonment, marched several times under guard through streets, almost drove
natives into hysterics.
My last Sunday at St. Marc in the end of March or beginning of April of
1919, and coming from church servic^e, saw great excitement and persons run-
ning to hide in their shacks, closing doors and shutters — ^as in revolutionary
days — and trembling in fear, and was told that the gendarmes had just killed
two natives. I returned toward our church and saw a dead body almost nude
carried on a sack by four others, and .swayed from one side to tlie other, liinbs
hanging over, the most gruesome sight I ever w^itnessed, with an armetl gen-
darme riding along l)y their side.
This metiiod was adoptetl, I felt, to drive the already terror-stricken natives
perfectly and purposely crazy.
Senator Oddie. Is that cai)tain a marine?
Mr. Evans. Yes; all captains and lieutenants over gendarmes are American
marine officers.
Senator Oddie. A captain of our marines?
Mr. Evans. Yes; he was Capt. Pizgerahl Brown in full and complete charge
of the St. Marc gendarmes; the one conspiring with Gen. Williams, Port au
'Prince; Maj. Wells, captain, and lieutenant Hang (St. Michel) had me ar-
rested and impri.s(med, etc.
Senator Oddie. Do you know of any other cases where the marine officers
actually committed any cruelty?
Mr, Evans. Yes; this Cajit. Brown's own lieutenant boasted in the train be-
tween St. Marc and Port au Prince around February or March of 1919, to me and
other white folks and some natives, that he had just come back from hunting
Cacos in the north, and had bagged several, and that as soon as he returned
from Port au Prince — I believe he said — he was going back to bag some more.
He talked of killing Cacos as if shooting game and without any apparent com-
punction of conscience.
When left together I seriously talked to him of a humane method of dealing
with these supixjsed Cacos, which he admitttnl to be the right, and he believed to
be the more efficient, way. He admitted that he was sick and disgusted with the
way things were in Haiti and was quitting to go back to the farm in the Middle
States, and would be done forever with this kind of life.
This lieutenant sat in court during tlie hearing of my case before the Negro
high court, and that same evening he quietly came to the door of my cell.
"Cheer up, that captain is an ' insane fool," or words to that effect; '*you will
he free," he siiid.
At rai>e Haiti in January of 1918 one of our members, in deep mourning, with
her aged mother, informed me of her two brothers dragged out from the Cape
prison at night, after cruel torture, and somewhere had to dig their own graves
and shot at the command of American marine officers — Maj. Wells or his subor-
dinate. Their father was for years a deacon and local preacher with us at the
Caiie.
Ak showing absolute ignoring of and defiance to Haiti court by the American
marine officers, this captain (Brown) on being ordered by court to set me imme-
diately at liberty and give me adequate protection to life and mis.si(m work with
threats of violence and militarj- force, coini)elletl me to go at midnight — that
same evening I came out from my cell — to gr> alone in an open boat to sea on the
way to Gonaives and north to face another court there, under the notorious Maj.
Wells, for another trial, when tin* St. Marc high court declare<l emphatically
there w^as absolutely no case, and so-called mandates of Judge Obas issued at
62260— 21— PT 2 ^10 r^^^^T^
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248 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
the instigation of MaJ. Wells and other American marine officers — sent to St.
Marc were not valid (illegal).
Senator Oddie. Alone?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; only the Nejrro Judge advocate employed by St. Marc Haitians
to defend me, without my knowing, at the high court came with me for company
during the sea voyage, and intending to come all the way to the Cape.
Senator Oddie. How many miles?
Mr. Evans. Over 100 miles, probably, altogether, through the interior; and
after a sleepless voyage we both landed the following afternoon at (Jonaives.
To my astonishment, if not amazement, as soon as Gonaives was reached the
judge refused to come a step farther and accompany me through the interior
and by land.
The wild and weird stories we heard here about how American marine officers
and their gendarmes were cutting out the tongues of natives, taking their eyes
from their sockets, cutting their throats, etc., this educated and intelligent judge
not only got excited but became hysterical, and with tears he and other leading
Christian natives of Gonaives begged of me not to venture; that I would 1h* u
dead man: He therefore went back to St. Marc, leaving me alone to face tho
north and what now seeme<l positive death in the most ])arbaric and butchery
method, according to what these natives honestly believed.
On reaching St. Michael on Sunday morning our native members failed to recog-
nize me with a prison-grown beard. When I explaine<l they wept. I was invitinl
to the gendarmerie headquartws here, when denounce<l by the apparently intoxi-
catetl American marine officer (Lieut. Hange) whom 18 months before Col.
Russell had disciplined for drunkenness and other imworthy conduct, but whom
Gen. Williams and Maj. Wells had reinstated.
With the wildest gestures, clinched fists, and terrible oaths this foreign-
born American officer denounced me, walking and raving like a maniac, now
with fists up to my face, then turning around to grasp his revolver to shoot me,
cursed God and religion and all missionaries, and warned me at the peril of
Imprisonment, if not death, to preach in the north, and all this in spite of the
official letter of Mr. Lansing and the note I bore from Capt. Gibbon, our
American marine officer and chief of the St. Michel lieutenant, stationed at
Gonaives, a gentleman and a young, educated and efficient American officer.
When at last, amid all the threats, I reached the cape and got my witnesses
who would testify to the drunkenness of the lieutenant, whom Col. Russell
in the interest of military morale and marine efficiency in Haiti had dis-
ciplined, I found that on learning of the action of St. Marc high (Negro) court,
and that I had reached the cape with my witneases, the conspiracy of these
American marine officers alleged of drunkenness and other conduct sub-
versive to the occupation and United States mission and work in Haiti sud-
denly collapsed.
Maj. Wells was indignant that I refused to allow them to withdraw, and in-
sisted upon the Negro court therefore to receive my testimony, which it did,
and signed by myself under oath and witnes.«?ed by Rev. De Feu (white) and
superintendent of the London Wesleyan Missionary Society (British subject),
and also Rev. p:iie Marc, Baptist Missionary (white) and French subject.
This judge admitted there was no case, and that he was forced to this
action by American marine officers, as the judge of St. Marc petty court was
compelled to condemn me at the Instance of Capt. Brown.
Senator Oddie. Did any of the United States marines at any time tell you of
the killings of natives?
Mr. Evans. The lieutenant of St. Marc and the lieutenant of Petite Riviere
already referred to. It was, however, common knowledge and spoken gen-
erally among the natives as well as the whites throughout the whole Republic.
Capt. Kenny, stationed at St. Marc for some time, and at one time had a
terrible reputation for brutality and the killing of natives, appeared to rne
at St. Marc to have reformed and greatly changed for the better. He pleaded
his Inexperience, his lack of really knowing the true Haitian character as
reasons and excuses, but admitted his error, and now praised the natives as
reliable and honorable if properly handled and truste<l. Before he had, like
many more, to depend upon interpreters, and all these were aliens from out-
side of Haiti, with a great deal of jealousy toward Haitians.
Though a Roman Catholic in the States, he showed great appreciation of
our mission work at St. Marc and voluntarily gave me the following official
permit, permitting Mrs. Evans and myself to regularlv conduct sendees at the
prison, with some 170 or 200 present and the greatest decorum.
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The {gendarme officers also showed a growing and intelligent interest and
asked many questions as to the Bible and teaching. This was only a few
months before Brown was made captain and succeeded Kenny as chief American
marine officer in charge of St. Marc company and my own arrest, etc.
CRia>ENTIALS BOBNE FROM WASHINGTON AND TAKEN FBOM L. TON EVANS BY CAPT.
BBOWN.
Department of State,
Washington, October 8, 1917,
The honorable Philalandeb G. Knox,
United States Senate.
Sib: I have received your letter of October 3, 1917, requesting a letter of
introduction for Rev. L. Ton Evans, of Lansford, Pa., to the diplomatic and
consular officers of the United States of America in Haiti.
I shall have pleasure In complying with your request after Rev. Mr. Evans
has obtained a passport, for which purpose I inclose blank forms of application
and a copy of the passport rules. In transmitting his application for a pass-
port to the department, Rev. Mr. Evans should refer to this letter. I have the
honor to be, sir,
Your obedient servant,
RoBEBT Lansing.
Departmknt of State,
Washington, Octohcr 22, 1011.
To the diplomatic and consular officers of the United States of Am^^ica in Haiti,
Gentlemen : At the Instance of Hon. Philander C. Knox, a Senator of the
United States from the State of Pennsylvania, I take pleasure In introducing: to
you Rev, I^wis Ton Evans, of Lansford, Pa., who Is about to proceed to Haiti
as general superintendent of the Baptist missions.
I cordially bespeak for Rev. Mr. Evans such courtesies and assistance which
you may be able to render, consistently with your official duties.
I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant,
RoBEBT Lansing.
COPY OF FEW BEFERENCES QUOTED.
1. Right Hon. David Lloyd-George, British prime minister, written at the
British House of Commons on my leaving Wales for the United States March,
1902, and an ex-presldent of the Baptist Union of Wales :
My Dear Ton Evans : I only wish I could comply with request to be at your
farewell reception, but am trying to keep down my meetings, to reserve all my
time and strength for the House of Commons. Here where the real battle will
be for the next six months. (This was against Tory (i(>vernnient's sectarian
c<!ucation bill, which was utterly defeated as far as Wales Is concerned under
his masterly leadership and daring championship.)
With kind regards to youi*self and friend Williams.
Yours, sincerely,
D. Lloyd-George.
P. S. — If any letter from me would be of use In the United States or Canada
shall indeed be only too glad to give it you.
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
Barry, South WaJes,
2. Dr. Robert S. MacArthur, president of World's Baptist Alliance and late of
Calvary. New York :
This is to say that Rev. L. Tern Evans, of the Haiti Baptist Mission, is well
known to me. He Is a man of wide exiierience and varied ability and noble
character. He is doing unique work In the black Reimblic, and no other man
lias ever reachefl the men there with whom he Is In heli)ful touch. He deserves
the unstinted supjwrt of all lovers of humanity and disciples of the Christian
religion.
Truly, yours, R. S. MacArthur.
3. Dr. Prestrldge, editor of Baptist World (Ky.) and American secretary of
Baptist World Alliance, writing from Louisville, Ky., in 1909, urging this field
on southern Baptists : ^g,^^, .^ GoOglc
250 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
This morning our I»uisville pastors* conference heard with deep interest (a1
Theolojjical Seminary) Kev. L. Ton Evans, field secretary of Haiti mission, and
unanimously passed resolution urplng southern Baptists to take up work iu
this close island. Brother Ton Evans is now at dinner with me, and I am
touched by his thrilling stories regarding his work. Though a Welshman from
Wales, he is a true American, full of life and on fire for the Christian faith.
He will write to you.
Yours,
J. N. PRESTBn)CE.
4. Dr. Cynonfardd Edwards, pastor of largest Welsh and Congregational
Church in Unltecl States, and internationally known and most highly esteemed
on both sides of Atlantic:
I have known Uev. L. Ton Evans for more than 18 years while in Haiti, aud
as i)astor of First Baptist Church of Edwardsvllle, and some years my nearest
neighbor. He is a born missionary, and wherever he may be, whether in pagan
land or in Christian country he will find work to do for his Master. He has
been a most faithful servant of the Lonl in this whole eouuuunityt and leaves
behind hhn evidences of an active and conse<»rated life. He Is the keenest,
bravest, and most consecrated Christian adviK'ate of temperance reform I have
ever seen in this State. He has had a very wide experience and has proved him-
self eqiml to every emergency.
Sincerely, yours,
T. C. EIdwards.
3. From Dr. F. B. Meyer, sei-retary of National Feileration of Free Churches'
Council. Christ Clmrch, Westndnster, and ex-president of Baptist Union of
Great Britain and Ireland:
I^NDON, January 19, 1921.
Dear Mr, Evans : I have read your letter and reviewed the accompanying
private doc'uments with profound interest and sympathy in all that you have
suflfertHl. 1 am glad to see that the new (iovernment is likely to appoint a
special conuiilssion to go thoroughly into the whole matter, and with such a
President as Afr. Harding you can almost certainly reckon on a fair hearing.
No one is more suited than yourself to conduct the case for the natives of
Haiti.
Cordially, yours,
F. B. Meyer.
4. Hon. T. Ch. Moravia, legation de la Uepublique d'Haltl at Washington,
D. C, under date April 28. 1919, wrote :
I an) very glad of your letter and to find you still continue your laudable
efforts to secure for Haiti an educational institution and industrial school like
Tuskegee on (^hristlnn basis and your present endeavor to have the great
Baptist denomination here to undertake the evangelization of my people.
We profoundly appreciate your interest in and sacrifice for our c<mntry the
last 2.^) years that I have been personally privilege*! to know you, and the
splendid encouragement and support y<m have rendere<l Haitian mls.sionarles
and the way you have brought some of our young people and placed here in
American schools to be taught.
These years of deep Interest and untiring activities for the religious, moral,
and industrial development of our Uepublic have won for you, dear pastor, the
entire sympathy, implicit confidence, and hearty good will of all our Haitian
people.
With such intimate knowledge as you have of my country and our people's
confidence and good will, should American Baptists enter the Haiti field and
supfM)rt your efforts you must succeed with God's help In saving Haiti. My best
wishes will ever accompany you.
I am. dear pastor.
Yours, very truly,
T. Ch. Mobavi.\.
5. Dr. Reynold Morgan, major In Ignited States Army, who distinguished
himself in France with Canadians, then under Gen. Pershing and h'.s own flag,
once as.sociated in ('hristian and temi>erance work Iu Pennsylvania and done
some clerical work for Haiti mission :
How can I express to you my admiration for the determined stand which
you have taken in the defense of the poor defenseless Negroes of Haiti? The
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 251
spirit of sacrifice which yon have manifested In working out this great problem
conmiands the deepest re8i)ect of all trne Americans.
The fruits of your great efforts will become manifestetl throughout the
Black Republic, and future generations will give you the credit and praise which
apparently is lacking now while this work of yours is in progress.
Do^rop in and see me at any time you are this way and can spare a few
minutes, for I always treasure you in my memory as a great pioneer who has
had to cut his way through the great wilderness alone and as one who has
hart to blaze the trail where 'er^ long multitudes will follow.
With best wishes, as ever,
Your friend and pupil,
David Reynou)8 Morgan, M. D.,
Major of United States Army Reserves.
Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, D. C, August 2. 1919,
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
226 Chestnut Avenue, Kingston, Pa.
My Dear Sib: I have your letter of July 13. The matters complainetl of
will be looked into so far as this department is able to do so.
Very truly, yours,
A. Mitchell I'almer.
The. matters complained of were "illegal arrest, and imprlscmment with
mental and physical torture in a small, dark, narrow slave cell of a Christian
missionary, and a white American citizen, hejirlng an official credential from
Secretary of State Robert Lansing (at request of Senator Philander Knox»
the ex-Secretary of State, from Pennsylvania), with rt»quesr to know the
moral and legal responsibility of the United States Government for the
criminal actions of the marine officers and the American occupation, who were
tllrect parties to the same? No word was ever received from Mr. Mitchell
Palmer. L. T. E.
St. Marc, Haiti, West Indies, January 22, /.9/.9.
Senator Phitjinder Knox,
United States Senate, Washington, /). C.
Dear Senator: You will bo surprist'd, perhaps astonished, to learn that
through a Capt. B. (marine officer), of our American occuprttion, and in sp te
of being and American citizen, ordained minister of the (Sospel and general
superintendent "of the colored Baptists of the States, morally supported by
about 5,000.000 white Baptists of America, and though bearing an official letter
of Secretary Lansing (given at your own request), I was recently and without
any warning or warrant arrested in my own study; marched under armed
native (Negro) gendarme heavy guard thnaigh the public streets, searched,
stripped of all articles, then cast into a small, dark priscm cell, where I was
closely confined for 13 days and 12 nights, etc., causing tmtold physical suffer-
ing, through hard bare floor, lack of food, and the mental strain and terrible
suspense night and day through fear of being at any moment pounced upon
and beaten to death, or dragged before a *' tiring squad " as done in many of
the cases at St. Marc, and elsewhere in Haiti, by command of Ameriean
marine officers.
After first three days, and again marched through public streets of the c'.ty,
exposed to a strong tropical sun (my shade having been roughly torn froin
me by the excited black corporal) and as a criminal, robber, or murderer I
was brought to the two tribunals, questioned, thence marched back under
same armed Negro guard (gendarmes) to my small, almost lightless. airless,
death cell, with Negro prisoners and criminals all around, yelling and groan-
ing through flogging often the whole night long and often during the day. A
Negro armed guard was stationed before my barred door.
But for the smuggling into the cell, by the Negro guard of a native straw
mat, and other Catholic and Protestants of casava and other native food at
times, and at risk of their own lives, my lot would have bet*n intolerable, with
the result I would have like others (I saw) weakened, faintetl, and dropped
dead in my close confinement struggling for a breath of air, etcT^^^^I^
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252 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The following week I was again marched through the public street** under
armed guard, this time to the chief tribunal of Justice, while tlie natives iu
the street fled in fear into their houses and shanties; trembled and wept to
Bee ttielr American missionary friend weak and wan with haggard appearance,
fyad by this, a prison-grown beard passing, followed by the American occupa-
tion's armed guard, where the white Unite<l States marine captain had l)e€n
commanded by the high negro court to bring the prisoner for trial at an
" extraordinary session."
No sooner seated than a Negro member of the church, and moved by the
white pale face and apiiarent frail body of her pastor, and her missionary fol-
lowed hliii through the streets with tearful eyt^ and at the risk of life into the
tribunal, with hot coffee, milk, and sugar so as to refresh and strengthen him,
which met with the strong approval of most present, and so affecteil the
Judge that he smiled with a notl for the missionary to help himself.
Another expression of the natives* sympathy with prisoner and reversion
of feeling and hatred against tlie occupation's tyranny was, that without my
knowledge, they had engaged a Negro judge advocate to help and plead for
me, but whom dared not visit my strictly watched and closely confiiieii cell,
as nearly all are terror stricken, as set forth in the memorandum presented
Mr. Lansing and our President last Octol)er; and copies of which I supplied
Chairman Hitchcock with for members of Foreign Relations Committee of
the United States Senate last Noveml)er and l>efore I left Washington.
It was shown, of course, that there was no case ; that it was mere persecution,
possibly enough of a conspiracy of white American marine ofBcers in Haiti given
to drink, encouraged and partly inspired in the States; may be, at the back
of all a determined and malicious attempt to drive me from the island or
crush nnd murder me, thus bringing all my missionary. Christian, educational,
an<l temperance work to an abrupt end. The exposure of such purpose and adop-
tion of such methods curb and crush my missionary efforts for the spiritual,
moral, and industrial development of Haiti and Haitians at this court produced a
most favorable effect with exactly the contrary feeling against the poor, armed
Negro corporal and white United States superior marine officer, who at first
wore a pompous Hpi)ejirance, but somewhat dejected at the abrupt adjournment
of the court proceedings.
In my address I first asked the court for an offlcial copy of the court pro-
ceedings and verdict for my United States Government, which request was
immediately granted, then went on to describe the exact nature of my activi-
ties in behalf of Haiti and Haitian people during the last 25 years. The eloquent
plea of the judge advocate which followed, ** praising my self-sacrificing efforts in
and for the Black Republic and the Haitians, stating that Haiti constitution gave
equal liberty to Protestants as to Catholics, which priests from Europe, and
some marine officers from the United States, seem to be either ignorant of, or
to ignore, and that President Wilson was a Protestant and a temperance re-
former like the missionary, and supported war prohibition measures with present
government; hence it could not be a crime in Haiti to-day, even under an
American occur)ation, to be either a Protestant or a temperance reformer, for
which a Haitian, much more an American citizen and a Christian missionary,
should be arrested in his own private study without a warrajit, denounced,
and cursed, after being publicly paraded through the streets of St. Marc under
heavy arniKl guanl, then at the bidding of an American marine officer of the
United States (rc^vernment cast into a dark, narrow cell, so strictly confined
that not one of his members dared see him, robbed of all liberty, food, and air.
and light, with his own life in jeopardy every moment of the 13 days and 12
nights he remained there pning cm the bare floor."
Tills caused almost a sensation, and the court abruptly adjourned until the
next morning, which they did (I understand) and declared the whole procedure
of the American occupati<m*s captain illegal, demanded immediate freedom of
missionary with ample reparation.
Though this was Wednesday morning, it was not until Thursday evening,
and under armetl Negro gendarme, that I was again paraded once more through
the streets to the bureau of the American occupation, and there told (first time)
by the marine captain that I was free and given back the articles, photos, and
papei-s, including Mr. Adee's official acknowledgment of my memorandum by
Pres dent Wilson, and our United States Oovernment*s assurance that the sad
conditions, tlien directly brought to their attention " were actually at that moment
being seriously considered," etc.— taken from me, on being searched, Saturday
afternoon, r)e<'eniber 28, 1918— just before I was thrust ^o my slave cell
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 253
anrl death dungeon, and the strong iron bar banged heavily behind me at the
stern command of my own United States Government's white marine captain!
On seeing the judge advocate that evening I was informed of the judgment
of the high court in my favor against the United States marine officer and all
those who acted or wmspired with him, declaring arrest and imprisonment
illegal and unwarrantable, that I am entitled to substantial indemnity calling
for irame<liate, release, and commanding the Haiti Government to give me per-
sonally, as well as mission work engaged in, ample protection.
That very night, however, and in spite of my pleading for one night's rest, and
in utter defiance of the high court's decree. 1 was driven umler threat of mili-
tary force by this same American marine officer in a small open boat to the wide
('aribl)ean Sea, en route for Gonaives and north to face another court (where
<»tlier parties to the official marine ctmspiracy operate<l), and on a supposed
"mandate" the high court of St. Marc had emphatically declared the day be-
fore to be invalid, and so forth.
En route through the interior of the north to the cape, another white Ameri-
can marine officer (recently disciplined by Col. John H. Uussell for drunkenness,
etc., but reinstated as lieutenant in another town and over an important sec-
lion), with whom I found the St. Marc captain and others in collusion, dared
me to preach, cursed missionaries, denounced Christianity, and in his rage, and
apparently lntoxicate<l, and before a number of our Christian natives, and irre-
si»ectlve of my showing him Mr. Lansing's letter and a note from his su|ierior
marine captain (which letter and note he ccmld not read), again and again
raved like a madman and attempting to reach his revolver to shoot me, so under
these serious and sad conditions inflaming the minds of the poor natives, and
causing them to hate the United States and everything American, obstacles
may be possibly placed in my way to return to Pennsylvania and Kingston,
where my dear family live.
Hence. I shall profoundly appreciate your own personal service as our Senator
frcmi my home State, as well as an ex-Attorney General of the United States
Oovenmient, with or without the cooperation of Senator Lo<lge and others in
securing immediately, not only my own safe return unmolested, but also Gov-
ernment authorization, and protecrtion to bring three or four leading and re-
sponsible Haitians with me, whose presence may l>e essential to me in the States
and at Washington.
Though incredible and almost unthinkable, I still maintain (though the late
ex-President Roosevelt, the great friend of Haiti and much lamented throughout
the Black Republic, strongly believes to the contrary, with others throughout
the United States) that somehow the real and vital facts concerning conditions
in Haiti, and brutal and murderous treatment of natives, etc.. are studiously,
persistently, and criminally withheld by somebody, or Fomeboclies, from Se^rp.
tar>' Daniels, Secretary Lansing, and our President, who repeatedly denounce
secret, ancient, and defunct diplomacy.
As demanded in my memorandum presented to the President, nothing but the
appointment of a special commission — by Mr. Wilson on his immediate return
from Europe and through the Influence of the Senate — will convince Haiti of
the sincerity, veracity, and honor of the United States, and restore absolute con-
fidence in our Government and American people's humane, benevolent, and even
indee<l Christian purpose according to our treaty.
Am sincerely trusting this will reach you safely through our " censor " and
that you can act at once, and if possible by cable.
Fraternally and loyally to Government, country, and flag, and still for Christ,
Haiti, and humanity.
L. Ton Evans.
Mrs. Ton Evans's mental distress and souls agony In the States can at this
time be best judged from the following quotations from certain letters which
managed to elude the censor and reach his friends, etc. :
"Had I known that my dear husband was in prison I could have done some-
thing to demand his release. Oh, that awful thought! Yes; awful that he,
one of the truest and most self-sacrificing friends of Haiti, who has given his
all for the black Republic and its suffering people, should be so cruelly and
brutally^ treated. Really I feel I can never again say the word Haiti without
a sharp pain, like a dagger piercing through my heart.
"Do tell me. what led to his imprisonment? How is he now, and where at
this moment? What became of the impending second trial In the north? He
has not received one letter from me since he has left, and I have written him
Digitized by VjOOQIC
254 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
every week since he left the SUites. Shameful conduct! What are the vil-
lains trying to do to my dear husband and the faithful and tender father of
my two darling little boys (Adoniram Judson and William Carey in the photo-
graph taken from him in prison)?
"Won't you tell him (if you dare visit and talk to him, and if he is alive)
that I have written him regularly? He must know I can never, no never,
forget him. Had I know*n about his case, I fear nothing wouUl have kept me
from coming right on. Oh, what I could have spareil him, had I known im-
mediately— of agony and anguish to him, for I would have gone to the very
limit of the law of our United States to obtain his instant release.
" I shall myself go at once to Washington unless a word Is received imme-
diately. Am sure our President and responsible officials in the Government
do not know the barbarity and treachery carried on in Haiti! What can we
expect, however, from the low and degradetl character of many of our white
American officers, gendarmes, and corrupt type of representatives of our own
country there. Tell dear madam and sisters and all the dear ones there that I
beg them to join in prayer for my dear one's life and liberty. Oh, it is dread-
ful to bear all this ! God alone can lift this terrible burden from my heart, ami.
Indeed, from your ow^n hearts as well.
" I feel I can never tell my two boys about this horrible and dreadful treat-
ment of their dear papa In Haiti, and at the hands of white marine officers
of my own American Government and under our own Stars antl Stripes down
in the black Republic!
" If you can possibly see my dear husband, tell him not to worry about us
here in Pennsylvania, but let him know that it will certainly be the very hai>-
piest moment of our lives when he is safe back with us here again. I can not
think for a moment the Lord would have him to suffer this cruelty. No; I am
claiming still his promise —
" The angel of the I^rd encampeth around about them that fear Him and
dellvereth them." (Psalms 34, 8.)
I^t us, therefore, pray, pray, pray, for the I^>rd can as miraculously deliver
His children to-day from i)rison as he did Paul.
Again, writing two days later, in answer to a note which had been smuggletl
so as to reach her home at Kingston, Pa., and thus elude the strict censorship,
Mrs. Evans says:
•*-I)KAR Husband: It seems years, indee<l, have passed in the hist three months.
So much has happene<l and events have crowded that I can not imagine where
I am and what I really am. When your letter of January 9 cjime I could no
longer withhold my grief from Martha, my sister, for it setnneil that my heart
would really break. Oh, how dreadful to think. Dear Papa, that you were made
to suffer such humiliation and barbarity at the very hands of your own so-
called American countrymen. Then to think you were alone, strictly conflne^l,
and receiving no mail from me, and I have written every week since you left us.
"The gract* of (iod alone kept you from desperation and death. Sometimes I
really wish we had been there with you in Haiti at the time, and to again fear
that the two little lads and myself could never have stootl it. I feel sure It
would have killeil us all. But when I think we were so comf()rtid»le here in
the States at that time, and you. Dear Papa, at the St. Marc, little dark dun-
geon, being pliysically and mentally tortured and all but starved — the tears
even now f<»rce themselves into a convulsive cry."
Tlie missi<aiary's snuiggled note in English and Welsh of January 9, 1919,
which by a circuitous route at last safely reached Kingston, Pa., was scribbled
hastily and tremblingly about mi<Inight of the day the high Negro court com-
manded his immediate release, and the Haiti (Jovernment's protection of his
life and mission work, but which the white captain of the l'nite<l States
marines, still and immediately In defiance of the high Negro court, and under
threat of military force, conip»'lled to take — at nddnight — ^a small open boat and
thrust out to the Caribbean open sea, en route for Gcmuives. and through the
far interior to fa<-e another court in the north, and on so-called charges de-
clared by St. Marc court as illegal, etc.
Judge Advocate Stucco. engage<l without the ndssionnry's knowieilge by the
natives to defend him at the St. Marc high court, accompanie<l the missionary
on that lonely voyage, but on r^»nchi!^g (xonaives the afternoim of next day and
hearing the wild and weird stories of the natives after landing — as to the
'* Indiscriminate killing " and pulling out of eyes, of tongues, and cutting of
throats of Haitians by white marine American officers and their gendarmes
throughout that section of the interior and north — this educate<l. intelligent,
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 265
and one of Haiti*s leading attorneys, absolutely convinced of the truth of what
he heard, became not only excited but at the thought of being butchereil and
murdered by American marine officers and the gendarmerie at their bidding,
became actually frenzietl, refused to come a step further, and ere he deserted
me to my own murderous fate to return to the little boat and back to his wife
and family at St. Marc, this Judge advocate and others with tearful eyes im-
plored me also to return with him and not attempt the journey through the
interior to the north.
IN RE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT OF REV. L. TON EVANS, GENERAL SVPERINTENDENT
OF BAPTIST MISSION, ST. MARC, HAITI.
Rev. L. Ton Evans was illegally arreste<l without warrant in his own private
study at St. Marc. Haiti, on Saturday afternoon, December 28, 1918, Jmraded
under Negro arnKHi police through tlie public streets of the town, and confined
in a small and narrow priscm <'ell for 13 days and 12 nights, not only .so as to
rob him of all i)ersonal liberty and public rights as an ordainetl mihister and
nii.'ssionary in Haiti as well as an American citizen, but further with malicious
intent to do him physical harm, repudiate, crush, if not murder, ag repeatedly
told him, and threatenwl by (me Capt. Brown, and a demand for heavy
damages.
1. The arrest was made on Saturday, December 28, 1018, at his private
study in the home of Mme. Orius Paultre and family (widow of Judge Oiius
Paultre), at St. Marc, Haiti, and while he was engage^l at the time in the dis-
charge of his duties as missionary and pastor, preparing on the tyiiewriter
si)ecial envelopes for his church and mission stations.
2. The reque.<«t of the missionary on thus being suddenly arrested by the
pendarnie (armied native police) to show his authority by way of warrant or
mandate and stating the cause or causes of such strange procedure on the
part of Capt. Fitzgerald Brown, the white American officer, was not only
I»eremiytorialy denie<l but afterwanis construed by above captain as c<mstltuting
a case of open rebellicm against public authority on the part of the Baptist
missionary in question.
3. That while on the way and under arrest and proceeding to the head-
quarters of C^apt. Brown. American officer in Haiti, another i*e<iuest of the
missionary — uixm whom it now dawiunl he might be taken to prison — namely,
to allow him to give the key of the private study, which had been loike<l — and
so as to get the enveloiK»s for clistributicm on Sunday to the othcers of the
church, whose door we passed, and so as to return it to Mme. Orius. was also
furiously denied and further construefl ])y ('apt. Brown as a criminal attempt
to escape from the hands of public authority. The same gendarme, who
apiH*are<l very excitcnl and as if under tlie influence of Taffla, had amid the
protests of the other native soldiers or police violently taken the umbrella
or .«ibade from the missionary, and thus exjjosed hhn to the Inirning tropical sun.
4. Having arrive<l at the headquarters of this white American captain under
Jirnie<l native police, these two charges were excitedlv read to him by above
white officer, who seemed under the influence of liquor, then the missUmary
was cursed and damned on acc«»unt of his devotion to Haiti ainl his efforts to
spiritually, educationally, morally, and industrously develop its 2,0(KMM10 Negrcies.
Capt. Brown vowed he would degrade him l()W(»r than the lowest " nigger " ;
that as a minister and missionary he. captain, wotdd have him repudiated
and utterly crushed, and pointing rei»eatedly to his revolver excite<lly added,
"You ou^ht to be shot." The UKssionary was dumbfounded, for this officer had
a few months before acted toward him entirely tlie reverse.
5. After the mi.ssionary was sent under same armed guard to prison, where he
was .searched and every tiling taken from him, such as otlicial letters from the
Cniteil States State I.)ei)artment re ofticial investigation coiiducte<l by the
United States (Joverniiient into alleged misconduct cruelties, and other crlnief
on part of certain oflicers and gendarmes in Haiti. A photograph of the
missionary's wife and two little boys, as well as that of Pn^sident Wilson — in
States — all of which were on the missionarj' when arrest^nl, were taken from
him, ami he was cast into prison.
6^ Immediately after this search was through the missicuiary was cast int<) a
small, narrow cell, almost lightless and airless, the small door hanged and Iron
bar drawn with tremendous force as if to say, there he is safe and shall never
be able to preach and help these i>eople any more. An armed Negro was kept
256 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
marching day and night hefore the door. Thus for 13 days and 12 nights the
missionary laid on the bare floor of cement surrounded by some 160 Negro
prisoners with their yells and groans day and night when set upon on least
provocation and lialf killed an(J sometimes actually murdered by certain groups
of Negro oflicers. and in fear every moment the light flashed upon his glassless
window he heard the tramp of the feet of the armed gendarme, or the sudden
drawing back of the iron bar of his prison cell door, that they had come to take
him before the "flring squad," like the British nurse, P^dith Cavell, for Instance,
was taken by the Germans.
7. On Tuesday the missionary was led through the public streets, under Negro
guard, to court of justice (Negro) and then to the court of public prosecutor,
both of which being under the influence and dominion of American occupa-
tion, and dreade<l white officers of the gendarme in Haiti. He was condemned
under the two aforesaid charges preferred against him by the white captain, and
in spite of his own evidence to the contrary. ' The missionary was afterwards
taken back to his cell, where he would have starved but for the bread and
fruit brought to him stealthily by the Negro prison officers (and brought by
Negro Catholics and Protestants) when the American white captain was not
to be seen about.
8. On the following Tuesday, January 7, 1919, pale, haggard looking, and with
a prison-grown beard, Missionary L. Ton Evans was again paraded through the
streets to the high court (Negro), where he was to be tried at a si>ecMal and
extraordinary session, the case having created not only such a deep interest,
but caused a profound sensation. This court went carefully into the two pre-
ferred charges of rebellion and attempt to escajx*, which, after all, were only
an occasion or pretense for this captain and other white American officers in
Haiti, who were in some cases Catholics and rum drinkers and brutal, con-
spiring maliciously to destroy the Christian influence and great religious and
moral usefulness of the Baptist missionary, and to absolutely crush him in
spite of the Haiti constitution granting the same equal freedom and protection
to Protestants as to Catholics ; and that a very strict prohibition had been pro-
claimed throughout the Haiti Republic, printed in all the papers in both French
and English and posted at every liotel and liquor store, signed by Col. Russell,
in supreme command of all American forces in Haiti (both marines and gen-
darmerie), and as direct representative of the United States Navy, Secretary
Daniels, prohibiting under very heavy penalty (though not at present enforced
much) the sale of liquor to any officer or gendarme in uniform, etc.
9. After a very careful examination of witnesses and a thorough investiga-
tion into all charges, and the so-culled mandate from the court in the north,
and alleged defamation of a white officer seen drunk on duty, the conspiracy of
certain officers on this account, and owing to the fact that Col. Russell felt
compelled as the officer in supreme command to exercise rigid discipline, and
in violation to the spirit and letter of the prohibition order of other superior
oflilcers in the interest of American occupation, efficiency, and necessary to
secure respect and influence from United States Government In Haiti, the high
court in question made therefore the following declaration in their judgment:
(a) There was absolutely no case. All charges hail failed against missionary.
(b) That the arrest without mandate was both illegal and unwarranted.
(c) That the missionary must be at once liberated and given the full protec-
tion of the Republic In life and labor there; and
{(I) Further, he was entitled on demand to the most substantial damages.
The missionary has been suffering ever since his wnfinement, lying on floor,
and mental agony he has gone through with when exi)osed to bodily harm every
day and night, and taken before a flring squad by a Negro gendarme at com-
mand of white American Government officer in Haiti.
BwTHYN, Wyoming, Pa., October 16, 1920,
Dear Senator Harding : Accept sincere thanks for self and nearly 3,(X)0,000
helpless Negroes of Haiti (who, sad to say, have l)een worst exploited and even
brutally butchered under our "American occupation,'* especially the last three
or more years, than ever In time of German filibusters, etc.) for your correct
description, only far too mild.
For over two years I have placed information with President and Secretary
of State and Senator Hitchcock, but officials have either withheld facts or
President, Secretary of State, etc., have proved blind, adamant, if Jiot idiotic,
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 257
and States and Nation (ilsgrace<i, exactly as stated in yesterday's Ledger
editorial.
I am now suing United States Government, under our President Wilson, for
indemnity for false imprisonment, etc., decreed against United States and
their officials in Haiti by the high Negro court of St. Marc (Haiti), who felt
it a disjB^race and scandal upon the Haiti Negro Republic that a white American
citizen and Christian missionary should be pining in a French old slave cell,
etc., and demanded the white officials of United States of America to at once
bring him out for a legal trial, etc.
I wrote Secretary Daniels in March and again last week, and unless imme-
diate settlement is made and commission appointed, then am coming to Marion,
and will publish letters, with full, complete account of the ** Infamous rape,"
etc., you referred to, which, if true that it emanated from Hon. Frank Roose-
velt, it has blighted his prosi)ect8 for any responsible office under our American
Nation, least of all the Vice Presidency.
Am leaving for Washington, I>. ('., tliis afternoon. Your letter may find me .
at New Howard Hotel. Sixth and Pennsylvania Avenue.
Please not make this known until I see what Secretary Daniels does on this
thoir last opiwrtunity. Mine is the case of the American Edith ('a veil, the
British nurse* rescue<l from the jaws of death under Ood by the Negro high
court of Haiti, etc.
Sincerely, yours.
1 was advised by late, illustrious friend, ex-President Theodore Roosevelt
(November, 1918), to come to you and Republican Party immediately I failed
with President Wilson, etc., in adjusting Haiti's wrongs.
BwTHYN, Wyoming, Pa., November ,9, J 920,
Hon. Warren G. Harding.
Presulent-Eleci of the Vnited States.
Dear President-elect: Heartiest congratulations, with the millions more
loyal Americans for the unheard of victory in the annals of this great Republic.
May God specially succor, physically and spiritually sustain and signally bless
yon during your term of office, as Thief Executive of this mighty Nation.
Now. that the present administration after years of incompetency and
criminal neglect and heartless betrayal of Ha:ti as well as the honor of this
Nation — through your own clarion call — has awakened to the seriousness of the
liresent situation in the Black Reimblic, and have api)ointe<l a Navy court,
can not you from Texas again demand that I should be asked to accomi)any
this court, with my attorney, not merely so as to prove the cases I definitely
charged the administration's oflieers to have committe<l, and tliose mentioned
in inclosed copy of letter to Judge Advocate Dyer, October 30 — but also to
assist — in my capacity of missionary sui)erintendent, etc., among them for
something like 28 years — to ass'st the natives, to place their grievances, produce
evidence, etc.. through the judge advocate to the court.
The natives are entitled to this assistance and protection, otherwise I fear
through their exploitation, their brutal treatment, rape of the!r constitution,
murder of thousands by United States marines, and their gendarme officers,
etc., resulting in suspicion, fear, and hatrt»d they will not feel free to come
forward while the administration's side will be cared for.
If this can not possibly be done, then rather than the Haitians, should be
led to think that this Navy court, and present limited and of necessity one-
sided inquiry, is genuine, not to say either satisfactory to the United States
Government and American people, I resi>ectfully urge, that you —
1. Make an immediate statement to this effect, that a congressional commis-
sion is at once contemplated, and a thorough and complete investigation will
be made.
2. That notification of this shall be sent to, and at once be published in Eng-
lish and French in the Monitor and other Haiti papers.
3. That an opiK)rtunity to every Haitian, from the Pres'dent down, to the
I)oorest Protestants and Catholics alike, and of all .shades of i)olitics to testify
and that the United States Government will [jrovide an able attorney, assisted
by myself, so as to enable them to gather reliable evidence all over the Rei)Ubllc,
and place same in proper order before the congressional commlssitm. i
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258 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
4. That every witness shall he protected, and ne<»es8ary expense which may
be incurre<l on account of distance to where the comnifssion will sit will be
given and paid by the United States.
5. Also, every Haifan confined in the prisons of the Republic on mere sus-
picion shall, on the coming of the said commission, be allowed his and her
freedom. Am sure this will be profoundly appreciated at the present moment,
and as coming from the United States I>resident elect, in fact, it will thrill
them with a new confidence and hope for themselves and the future of their
Negro Uepublic and actually look upon the recent election here as providential
and, indeed, 3^ourself as the savior raised of G(k1 at this time to deliver them
and country.
Am seiKling the Inclosed copy of letters to Major Dyer and Secretary Daniels
to Senator Lodge, and am sure he (latter) would fall in with something along
the lines I am here suggesting. It will be a master stroke as far as poor Haiti
is concerned.
Your letter to us as ministers re the enforcement of the constitution and the
benefits of temperance to our American homes, etc., was most timely, and
thoroughly satisfied the most ardent temperance and Christian reformers,
male and female, throughout the commonwealth, hence most heartily welcomed
by all of us as your supi)orters and admirers.
It is significant that the President of the greatest and most civilized and
Christian Hepubli<* in the world, as well as the prime minister of the greatest,
most democratic, and ))rogressive Christian empire, should be both strong and
loyal Christians and Baptists at this time in history, and so as to lead in'tlie
reconstruction not (»nly of America and Britain but of the world, and under
God the speedy healing of humanity's wounds.
Should you go to I'anama from Texas, I sincerely trust you can arrange to
call, either in going down or on return voyage. In Haiti. Am sure ytou would
receive, in spite of all, a royal welcome from these misunderstood and misrepre-
sented but kind-hearted people. In such case, if not there with the navy court,
I would certainly like to join the party and act as guide, etc.
With best wishes, and hoping you can even bring influence to bear on present
administration so as to secure through the present court most imi>ortant evi-
dence, and by my presence with an attorney prevent tampering for party and
political purposes with some of the lending Haitians.
Fraternally and most heartily, yours, for Christ, Haiti, and humanity.
Missionary on Island Protested to Wilson and Lansing in 191 S — pROMisf>^—
No Action.
AMERICAN marines AND OFFICIALS TREAT NATIVES LIKE DOGS — PHEACHF-B PLT IN
j^^If^ — JUS APPEAL TO AT'TIIORITIES TO BND CRl'ELTY MEETS WITH DRASTIC
REPRISAL.
[Special dispatch to the New York Herald.]
New York Heraij) BrREAi*.
Mashinffton, I). C, October 2-f.
For almost two years the Wi'son administration deliberately has suppressed
full and accurate information of deplorable condithms brought about in the
Uepublic of Haiti by the American occupation.
The evidence shows clearly that the slaughter of 3.250 natives by the Marine
Corp^ in the last two years, which was admitted officially only after Senator
Harding laid bare tlie Haitian scandal, is due chiefly to the strong anti-Ameri-
can feeling engendered in tlie island reimblic by tlie methods of the Ameri<?an
occui»ation. which has ilestroyed any vestige of independcMice there.
These rond tions are described l)y an eye witness who is now in Washington
ready an<l eager to give his testimony, already long in possession of the State
and Navy Departments, to the navnl court of inquiry named by Secretary of thr
Navy Ihuiiels aftc'r the attention of the court was brought to the situation in
tlie little Black Ucpul»lic by Senator Harding.
This man s th(* Uev. Dr. L. Ton Evans, a Welshnmn by birth, with letters
of recommendation from David Lloyd-George and from prominent Americans,
indud'ng the late Theodore Uoos**veIt. He is a naturalized American who for
25 years had been engaged in Baptist missionary work in Hijiti.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 259
FIRST REPORT MADE IN 1018.
The New York Herald corre8i)ondeut has in his possession documents which
prove that Dr. Evans first brought this deplorable state of aflfairs in Haiti to
the atteutiou of the State Department in the fall of 1918, more than three years
after the American marines were lauded there. Other documents show he re-
peatedly has called the atteutiou of the Navy Department and other branches
of the (lovernment to conditions there. Absolutely nothing? has been done, so
far as can be learueil. to better these ccmditicms, and a spe<*iflc request made
by Dr. Evans for an unbiased noumiUtary and nonpolitical conmiission to
inquire into the Haitian wrongs under American occupation was: ignored after
repeated informal " promises *' to do something about it.
Statements from Secretary Daniels and others represent -ng the administra-
tion that they acted as soon as any irregularities in Haiti or any comi)laint9
were brought to their attention are disproveil. Dr. Evans came to this cimntry
from Haiti in 1918 to bring to the attention of President Wilson and the (iov-
crument authorities at Washington this state of affairs in the island Kepublic.
He couhl nt>t believe these comlitions would be i)ermitted to continue if once
they were told to the resj^nsible Government officials in Washington.
LETTER FROM STATE DEPARTMENT.
The following is a letter showing that he laid the facts before the State De-
Iiurtuiont at that time:
Washington, \ovcmbor 2, 1918.
Dr. h. Ton Evans.
226 Chestnut Street, Kingston, Pa.
Sir: The department has received your memorandumi ui>on conditions in Haiti
presente<l on October 21. address(»<l to the President of the UnikHl States, and
wishes to inform you that it is re<M»iving the serious consideration of this de-
l)artment as well as of the various other branches of the (Jovernment nuicerned.
The department will be pleased to communicate with you at a later date after
the careful study of the matter contalne<l in your nKMUoramlum is terminated.
1 am, ST, your obedient servant, for the Secretary of State,
Alvet a. Adee,
Second Assistant Secretary,
Kvery thing indicates that the " careful study " given to the matters mentioned
in Dr. Evans's memorandum consisted of pushing it into some already overfull
I>ig<?onhole or old letter file and forgetting all about it, if, indeed, it was not
thrown into a State Department waste basket which is cleaned out by the
janitor every evening.
This memorandum mentioned by Assistant Secretary Adee's letter of No-
veinl)er 2, 1918, was handed in i)erson by Dr. Evans to an official of the State
Department, a Mr. Stabler, then in charge of the Latin-American sectlcm of the
State Department and esiiecially detailed to handle Haitian affairs, llie facts
were at the same time lai<l before Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska, then chair-
man of the Semite CoinnUttee on Foreign Relations.
Siuc-e that time Dr. Evans has en<ieavored rei)eatedly, but without suc-
cess, to get this (tovernment to recognize the situation in Haiti. He has several
times notifleii Secretary Daniels, his last letter l)e:ng dateil as late as October
5.1920,
Dr. Evans insists that a mere naval board of inquiry never will be able to get
the facts before the American people. He said to-day that the American mili-
tary representatives — the marines and the so-called gendarmes — otllcerod in
maliy instances by renegate white men from the States, have so overawed the
natives that they can not be made to tell the truth ; that they are afraid of their
lives of uttering a word in criticism of their white suiieriors or of any of the
black native policemen in the imy of the white ofl^cers.
As evidence of this state of affairs he told about his own arrest on trumped-
up charges as the result of a conspiracy formulated by a white captain of gen-
darmes, against whom he had made a personal protest in the private oftice of
Col. Russell, who was in supreme connnand of the nwirines. because of the bad
example this captain was setting the natives in a certain village by his mode of
Jiving. W'hen the case was brought before the high court it was at once dis-
missed for want of even a scintilla of evidence, and the officer who made the
arrest and kept Dr. Evans in a vile native Jail for thirteen days with the
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260 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Negroes, was informed abruptly there was no authority in the first place for
the arrest of Dr. Evans. Nevertheless on his release he again was comijelled
by the same officer under threat of rearrest to go in an open boat at night a
long distance to another point on the island to face again the same charges
which again turned out to be groundless in every particular.
It is the first belief of the native population, as the result of the Anierican
occupation since July 28, 1915, that the L'nited States is trying to reestablish
the system of slavery which their forefathers knew. Dr. Evans believes it is
high time the American i)eople were fully informed of what is being done by
their Government in Haiti in order that this helpless little Black Republic have
the sort of civilizing and humanizing it deserv^es.
Dr. Evans says the amazing number of indiscriminate killings of natives to
which the Marine Con^s oflicials have ccmfessed and which is the snibject of
the present investigation is but a small part of the case.
More important than anything else, in his opinion, is the terrible blow being
given to American prestige not only in Haiti but elsewhere in the Latin-
American countries, to which stories of the American military methods are
getting abroad, despite every effort cm the part of the military overlords to keep
everything unfavorable to their r6gime from reaching unfriendly channels.
DOCX'MENTS REVEAL SCANDAL.
The New York Herald is able to present herewith extracts of the documents
in the possession of various departments laying bare the whole Haitian affair
and which will be brought to the attention of the Daniels inquiry board and elu-
cidated by Dr. Evans himself. Dr. Evans is waiting in Washington for this pur-
pose and is willing and anxious to appear before this committee or any other
that may be named and to go with the committee to Haiti. He expe<'ts to have
counsel to assisit him in presenting the cuse in an orderly manner.
Dr. Evans, in a memorandum submitted to the State Department, after con-
sultation with Senator Hitchcock and which bears the date of October 21, 1918,
makes it clear there is no animus behind his charges.
At the beginning of this memorandum Dr. Evans assures the President and
State Deimrtment of tlie " genuine gratitn<le shared by every loyal and iiatriotic
Haitian native, both e<lucated and uneducate<l alike, because Admiral ("aperton
landed his American marines at Port an Prince, thus rescuing them from the
iron grasj) and selfish greed of Germans', who for years have financially and
murderously exploited them by aid of Berlin money and ammunition."
SVMMAKY OF THE CHARGES.
Here briefly is a summary- of the charges quoted verbatim from Dr. Evans's
memorandun^ of October 21, 1918, as submitted to the State Department. In
order to make his statement more impressive these charges were embodied in
an affidavit sworn to by Dr. Evans before a notary in Washington, a copy of
wtiich is in the possession of the New York Herald correspondent:
" 1. The forcing of a new constitution upon the people under militarj- pressure
of armed gendarmes (native police) of the American occupation on the 12th da.v
of June last, so as to put in a clause in favor of the white man and foreigner,
and acconiiplish ng this by methods which have been declared in the Unite<l
States and all civilized countries to be both illegal and fraudulent. The intelli-
gent Haitians connected with the Government of American occupation, wlio, in
fear and trembling, were compelletl to vote or be dismissed or imprisoned if
they refused, very aptly described these humiliating processes as * thrusting a
dagger at the very heart of our own Negro Republic'
"2. The closing on two separate occasions of the senate and chamber of
deputies at Port an Prince; the turning out by military forces under the Ameri-
can occupat cm of the Haitian i)eo,ple's only representative bodies and the lock-
ing of the doors again them, just as the late Czar did with the Russian people's
Duma, and while these officials were oiXMily friendly to the United States and
favorable to our Annerican occupation, merely, it :s said, because they protested
and oi^posed as illegal and unconstitutronal a change of what they felt to he
the vital clause of their constitution— namely, the clause w^hich withholds the
ownership of lan<l from the white foreigner and the speculator. Haitian judges
who declared this to be illegal are said to have been either driven out of office
or imi>risoned or both, in spite of the fact that under the old Haitian constitu-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 261
tion foreigners, white or colored, could hold real estate in Haiti bv becomine
citizens of Haiti.
*• 3. The taking through force and with much brutality by ignorant, immoral,
and drunken gendarmes in the employment of the American occupation of inno-
cent men and women, even native preachers and members of their churches,
frum their s mple small habitations or from their work and cruelly roping them
tightly together and marching them as African slave gangs to prison. The writer
and others were eyewitnesses on a Sunday morning in June last to the treat-
ment of the wounds of prisoners who had undergone this experience by the occu-
imtion doctor — wound*? which had gone unhealed for many weeks and months.
The white American doctors said these cases were very frequent.
'• 4. The arresting of natives in large numbers in their homes and on the small
farms and making them work on new roads under armed gendarmes for merely
a gourde (20 American cents) a week, witliout furnishing them with food."
ALL PBOTESTS ARE IGNOBED.
Failing to move the State Department, Dr. Evans finally turned his attention
to the Navy Department and to Secretary Daniels, the official in control of the
Tnitefl States marines who have been acting jointly with the State Department
in the American occupation. He wrote to Mr. Daniels on March 27. 1920. calling
attention to the fact that he liad apprised the State Department in the fall of
191 H of what was going on in Haiti without anything being done about it. He
said more than seventeen months !)efore he had suggested to Mr. Adee the
appointment of an unbiase<l commission to inquire into the situation and was
informed by letter that the department was " seriously considering the grave
conditions set forth " in his memorandum. In the same letter he told Secretary
Daniels that Mr. Adee had promised to let him know the result of his investi-
gation, but had never done so.
The New York Herald correspondent quotes the following extracts from this
remarkable letter from Dr. Evans to Mr. Daniels on March 27 last:
"Over 17 months have elap?e<l since the receipt of the above assumnce from
Mr. Adee, with not a word from our UnittMl States Government.
•• In the meantime, however, conditions have been allowe<l to grow rapidly
Worse among these suffering, oppressed, enraged, and terror-stricken people,
na evidence<l even by the riots between the marines and gendarmes, not to say the
more fre<iuent and daring raids by the so-calleil bandits, or cacos, who are
daily growing in strength and numbers and who are at the same time gaining
the real symi)athy of more and more of the mmierate, intelligent, educated, and
better class of Haitians, who have lost respect for our American occupation.
" U'ith our influence, therefore, on the wane and our prestige and iK>wer all
but gone and <mr motives and integrity as a democratic, civilized, not to say
Christian, Nation suspecte<l and imimgned, it is no wonder that a staff coi^
re.<pondent of the New York World, who visited Haiti a little over a m<mth
ago, should state:
'• * It should he remembere<l that there are many educated and substantial citi-
zens of Port au Prince who are no more cacos than Henry Cabot Lodge is a
feather duster, who none the less <lesire a complete change of administration
and the ending of the present occui)ation.' "
Since the letter of March 27 Dr. Evans has had other convsiwndencv with
Secretary Daniels on the subjwt of Haiti, and up to the last few days he
apparently continued to have faith that a proper inquiry would be made and
the conditions improved. He sent Mr. Daniels, under date of October 5, 1920,
au exhaustive r6sum6 of the whole matter.
lejeune's inquiry bklittlkd.
In his letter Dr. Evans said :
"After a careful reading of the quotation from the official statement or
report of Gen. John A. lejeune's hurrie<l visit to Haiti, after my letter to you
of March, I find they fail even to touch the vital i)oints. I candidly state that
if I had not been anxious from the commencement, three years ago, to keep
entirely out of party politics in missionary and Haitian matters, and if I had
not, in spite of the strong criticism and the severe condenniation of the Presi-
dent an<l the Secretary of the Navy, still finnly believed that you both sincerely
wished to right all the past and present wrongs of this administration in poor
Haiti, I would certainly, after i-eading this morning's statement, have imme-
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262 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
diately given a startling reply to the Associated Press and at once directe^l
my steps to Marion and the headquarters of the Republican Party, disap-
l)ointe<ily convinced that further efforts on the part of Haiti and myself were
. utterly futile and a mere waste of time."
The New York Herald corresiwndent has before him a complete copy of tlw
detaileil and painstaking statement of Haitian conditions brought up to dale
and mailed to Secretary Daniels on October 5. 1920, by I>r. Evans. It con-
tains upward of 6,000 words. It will be undoubtedly placed in evidence before
Mr. Daniels's naval lK>ard, and if any attempt is made to suppress it there it
will be brought to light before a ccmgresslonal investigation committee.
In the meantime the New York Herald presents herewith some of the more
startling passages from it:
" Is it not sad, indeed, to have to state tbat after nearly five years of Ameri-
can occupation in Haiti and under our Democratic administration iMJople of
the little l)lack Republic sincerely and firmly believe that the real mission of
the United States (Jovernment and the American people there is to reestablish
slavery in their midst once more: to abrogate and annul the work of Tousst\int
roverture (who is their Washington representative) just exactly as in the
nineteenth century Napoleon tried to be the tyrant of France and in recent
years the German Kaiser attempted to be the ruler of the world? '*
Dr. Evans then described how he hastened to write to President Wilson and
to his personal friend, ex-President Roosevelt, fnmi Haiti in June. 1918. ex-
plaining the terrible blow to American prestige in Haiti and thnmghout Latin
America that was resulting from the actions of the American, marines. It
was as the result of this letter that ex-Presldent Roos<?velt stateil in Wash-
ington in October of the same year In his criticism of Wilson's 14 points that
" the Negro Republic of Haiti is nonexistent under the Democratic adminis-
tration in spite of their treaty."
Dr. Evans hen* tells an almost unbelievable story, which he is prepared to
substantiate in every iwrticular, of how he was arrested on a trumped-up
charge by a drunken white captain of gendarmes employ e<i under direction
of the Marine Corps, parade<l through the streets, and openly insulte<l by this
white officer. So far as he is able to learn, although he was refused a state-
ment of the charges against him, the basis of the whole conspiracy was a
determination to punLsh him for pleading in his capacity as white missionary
for the natives and against certain methods and the immoral and drunkeji
behavior of Americans coiniecte<l with the occupation.
He was confined in a filthy native jail and forced to bathe naked with native
male and female prisoners by orders of this white captain. He said the Negro
judges and other officials whom he knew personally were eager to help him.
but were prevent e<l under threats of death. He was accu.sed by this white
officer with resisting arrest when he asked for a copy of the charges or an
official summons or any other official authority for the action.
CHARGED WITH ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE.
When he asked permission to give to a native the key to a building which he
used in his missionary work a charge of attempting to escai)e was placed
against him by the same white offic<»r. He was finally releasetl by a Negro
court an<l immediately taken by force by the same white capUiin to Cni)e
Haitien, in the extreme north, by night in a small boat in the open Caribbean
Sea for another trial.
Dr. Evans said he was releasetl on the statement of the court that there wen*
no charges against him.
The so-calle<l A'oting by the people of Haiti on the constitution prepared in
advance for them ami rammed down their throats by the Wilson administra-
tion is ridiculed by Dr. Evans. He thus descril>es it to Secretary Daniels:
*' The procession of voters ( !) resembled funerals in their silence, solemnity,
and mournful character as these people passed along like sheep into courts of
justice (?), which were turned that day all through the country into Haitian
slaughterhouses. Each whs especially guarded by the gendarmerie. For the
sake of giving a little color to the affair and thus i)erfectlng the farce a native
conimissaire, or dunnny oflicer, sat in the chair by the side of the white officer.
" When entering the court a small white paper stamped with the wonls
* Pollee administration ' an<l bearing date, June 11, 1918. and also the French
word *oui' (yes) was placed in the trembling hand of the native, who then
was motionetl — no word being siM)ken or question being asked — to the box in
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INQUIRY INTO 0(X^UPAT10N OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 263
front of the white American officer in supreme charge, with a native dummy ah-
«bt4int jit his Hide. A |)UDdIe of pink impers bearing the French word * nou ' (wo)
curiously- and significantly remalneii tied together on the table. Thus terrorlssetl
and helpless to resist, tlie^ people wirrowfully and slavishly submitted, a^*
most of them were brought in from small villages giuirded and closely watchetl."
Fresh RE\ErATioNs on Haiti Promised.
0. 0. p. WILL FOHE8TALL MOVE.S TO DELAY EXPOSURES UNTIL AFTER ELECTION —
REBELUON AOOEAVATED — AMERICAN-MADE CONSTITUTION FORCED DOWN THROATS
AT-POTNT OP BAYONET.
(Hpecial dispatch to the New York Herald.]
New York Herald Bureau,
Washinffton, D. C, October 25,
Desperate efforts of high ofiiciuls of the Wilson administration to smother
every move to expose true conditions in Haiti under the American occupation
tOKhiy seem doomed to failure. Even their Immediate efforts to postpone until
after election day the storm which is sure to follow an unbiased investigation
are likely to come to naught.
The naval board of inquiry headed by Hear Admiral Mayo, which was ap-
pointed hurriedly by Secretary Daniels, after Senator Harding first directed the
attention of the country to results of the American occupation of Haiti, is
showing a surprising want of alacrity in proceeding with the investigation —
which may or may not be particularly significant, in view of the fact that
election day is only a week off.
But Republican leaders have evidence in their possession which widens the
scope of the inquiry far beyond the narrow limits to which. Secretary Daniels
may de.^ire to hold It. The special province of the Naval Board, by the
teniw of the Daniels order creating it, is an investigation of the killing by the
United States marines of 3.250 natives during the last two years, already ad-
mitted by the high oflicials of the Marine Corps. Terrible as this is in itself,
it appears to be only an incident in the forthcoming exposure of the manner
in which the Wilson administration has destroyed the independence of this
nation while professing to be its best friend and the protector of small and
oppressed nations everywhere.
The Republican national connnittee to-day employed a lawyer who will assist
the Rev Dr. L. Ton Evans, who was showni in the New York Herald*8 dis-
patches yesterday to have trie<i for nearly two years to induce the Government
to make an Inquiry by an unbiased nonmilitary board of these deplorable
conditions now brought to light. It is the purpose of Dr. Evans and the
Republican committee to prevent any further suppression of the facts by
Seeretarj- Daniels or any other board which the present administration may
create in its efforts to meet the charges of Senator Harding.
RECORD SHOWS RtT,E OF FORCE.
It became evident to-day that the acts of the Wils(m administration in Haiti,
which have turned the original cordiality of the natives toward the Americans
Into hatred or fear, are in a large measure, if not wholly, responsible for a
condition of affairs which may permit the Navy Department after five years
of ineffectual " pacification " to offer some semblance of justification for the
killing of the natives in such large numbers.
In other words, it now comes to light that the •* indiscriminate killing " of
natives, now admitted by high oflicials of the Wilson administration, was merely
hicidental to and the inevitable result of the following acts of the American
forces in Haiti during the occupation :
t The forcing down the throats of the unwilling natives of a constitution
prepared in advance in this country by the Wilson administration and taken
to the island Republic.
2. The almost unbelievable methods adopted by the marine officers in charge
there to make it appear that the natives had by their own ballots indorsed this
American-prepared constitution, whU*h the natives did not want, because it
62209— 21— PT 2 11
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264 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
specifically killed the clause in their own constitution against foreign speco-
lators purchasing lands from the ignorant natives.
8. The actual voting on the new constitution with American officers sitting
at each ballot box with the bundles on the table in front of them, one bundle
containing ballots marked "Yes" and the other containing ballots marked
" No.** The officials handed only ballots marked ** Yes *' to the ignorant natives,
the bundles marked " No *' remaining unopened on the table.
4. The cruel and inhuman treatment of natives in prisons presided over by
white officers.
5. The imprisonment of Dr. L. Ton Evans, a white American missionary,
who had preached to the natives for 25 years, by white officers, on tnimped-up
charges. Dr. Evans had merely sought to protest in an orderly fashion against
the action of other white American officers in command of gendarmes, becanse
these officers were setting a bad example to the natives, by openly drunken and
immoral habits, in various towns and villages throughout the island.
6. The actual expulsion by the American marines of the Senate and House
of Deputies because they objected to the ** rape " of their Government and con
stitution by the Wilson administration, which professed to represent the most
civilized country on the globe, headed by the author of the doctrine of "self-
determination,** and the locking of the doors of the House of Parliament on two
occasions by American officers when the native senators and representatives
sought to return and exercise their constitutional functions.
CONSTITUTION WRITTEN IN UNITED STATES.
In the article published in the New York Herald this momfng a comparatively
brief portion of the suppressed evidence which Dr. Evans in the last two years
has laid before the State and Navy Departments was printed.
It now seems that the so-called constitution that the Wilson adrain'stration
foisted on the terrorized natives in a manner by which they sought to make it
appear that the Haitians wanted it — when the native efforts at that time,
as well as now, showed that they did not want it — was actually written in
Washington, probably by Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of
the Navy and now vice-presidential candidate for the Democratic Party.
Critics of these inhuman and un-American methods of the Wilson adminis-
tration in Haiti are prepared to produce eyewitnesses to this destruction of
Haitian Independence. They have not the slightest hesitation In issuing through
the New York Herald a challenge to Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was second
in authority of the Navy D^artment at the time these political crimes were
committed, to deny that this constitution was prepared in Washington and
that there was every Intention on the part of the Navy Department that the
natives of Haiti must be "induced** to adopt it. In fact, there Is evidence
In the possession of the Republican national committee to show that Mr.
Roosevelt has openly boasted that he wrote it hlmsell
The Haitian Killings,
senatob m*cobkick says thebe will be a beal investigation.
To the New Yobk Hebald :
I have just seen in your Issue of Monday the Washington dispatch upon Haiti
It will not meet the needs of justice or satisfy the American people to have no
other inquiry than that now being conducted by a board of officers awJolnted
by the Secretary of the Navy and subject to his orders and to those of the
President, who, with the Secretary, of course, Is ultimately responsible for
whatever may have been done in Haiti.
A committee of Congress must review all the charges made and all the evi-
dence to be submitted to the board of inquiry, as It must hear any forthw
charges and any new evidence which may be adduced after it shall be possible
to provide for the appointment of the congressional committee.
Medttx McCk)BHICK.
Cleveland, Ohio, October 26.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 265
(Issued from advance copy to President-elect. Warren G. Harding, national Reoublican
poMicity committee, Cnairman Henry Cabot Lodge, of Senate Foreign Relations, as
well as Members of the United States Congress.]
The Pbobino of the Haiti Scandal and an Earnest Plea fob a Nonpaktisan
iNVESnOATION BY THE NEWT^Y APPOINTED NaVY COITIT OP THE PRESENT ADMIN-
ISTRATION.
The Rev. L. Ton Evans is of the opinion that the official number given out
by G«i. Barnett as shot by American marines and their gendarmes in the open
does not cover more than about one-half actually killed by the American occupa-
tion through unjustifiable violence, brutality, and murder under the corvee
slave labor (as applied by American occupation) and taken out from their prison
cells and shot In the dead silence of the night tit Port au Prince, St. Marc, Cape
Haitien, and all over the Itepublic, as natives, if given a chance and with proper
United States Government protection, are only too eager to testify.
Central Union Mission,
Washington, D, C, October 30, J9Z0.
Maj. Jesse Dyer, U. S. M. C,
Judge Advocate Court of Inquiry
Investigating Ameiican Occupation in Haiti,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Dkar Sir: I am astonished and con^med to learn from an article in tlie
Washington Post of yesterday, the 29th Instant, of a statement attributed to
you— that you contemplated calling me as a witness before the court of Inquiry,
but that I had no personal knowledge of the incidents referred to, but had agreed
to furnish a list of persons In Haiti who had supplied me with Information, and
that you had said these persons would be examined.
The statement that I have no personal knowledge of unjustifiable acts of
oppression or of violence perpetrated against citizens of Haiti or unjustifiable
damage or destruction to their proi>erty by marines is, of course, wholly untrue.
I assume you readily recall that In the several interviews I have hitherto had
with you I explicitly stated I was prei)ared to testify from personal knowledge
to a number of unjustifiable acts of oppression, violence, and assaults to citizens
of Haiti, as well as damage and destruction to their proi)erty by gendarmes
under the direct command of United States marines during the Amerlean occupa-
tion.
1 explained that Inasmuch as a number of necessary native witnesses, both
white and colored, to corroborate my testimony were known in some Instances
to me by their Christian names and others only In the localities in which they
lived, tliat my testimony should be taken In Haiti, where these crimes and atroci-
ties occurred.
In order that there may be no i)osslble ground of misunderstanding now, I
oflfer, if called as a witness to testify in Haiti, to establish from my own personal
Imowledge the following specific acts :
1. That In Jacmel during the last week of June and the first week of July,
1918, while in my capacity of a Baptist missionary and superintendent Inspect-
iug missions and schools in that section, I saw a number 'of natives whose arms
had been injured and the flesh reduced to Jelly as the result of having been roped
together and marched as slaves to prisons and for work on the outlying roads,
I saw these natives being attended by a white doctor of the occupation forces,
name unknown, but who I can Identify if still in the service, who stated to me
that he was constantly called upon to render treatment of this kind to these
poor, abused natives, and that their condition was an outrage and a shame,
2. That I found during my stay at Jacmel that one-half (or so) of the male
members of our Baptist Church were absent from holy communion and in hiding
throughout the mountain districts in fear and terror of the cruelties of the
geadarmes, who arrested and Imprisoned natives, subjecting them to the grossest
cruelty. I am prepared to produce as witnesses before the court the pastor of
the church in that district and two or more of the officers of that church.
3. At Gros Morne, District of Leogane. on the last Sunday of June, 1918,
while on my way to hold service at the Baptist mission In company with the
local native pastor, I saw men and women stopped by gendarmes and turned
back from attending their place of divine worship. At this time I further saw
two bands of some 8 or 10 natives roi)ed tightly together and marched like slave
gangs, among whom I recognized nfembers of our mission and our native
preachers. ^^ I
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266 INQl'IRY INTO OCC UPATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
I Inquired fr<»m the airiMirHl in charge wliat crime these men Iiad committel,
and lie answered n<ithiiijr. hut that lie was determined to rope them together and
take them away. I later appeaUnl to the white lieutenant of the United States
marines, over the Kt*n<lurmes for that section, and demanded that an inquiry
he made, the natives he jit <mce released, and the hlack corporal dismisned. The
lieutenant promisetl to make the inve.stipition, hut never did so. I wiU prodoee
if given an opportunity, the i»ast<»r of this m ssion, with several officers of the
church, to cornilMirate this .statement.
4. DuriuK niy imprisonment at St. Marc prison, in the Artibouite section, be-
tween DeceinlHfr 28. 191H. and January 9, 1919, 1 saw the ffrosaeBt brutality OTd
cruelty pra(*tice<l ui>on native prisoners and women.
I saw them repeattnily set upon and beaten in the jail yard and cells l^
jrendarmes, whose cai)tain an<l lieutenant were meml)ers of the Marine (Jorps. I
have seen a numl>er of them l)eaten into insensibility, felled like logs to tlie
hard tioor; others lylnj? dead in the jail yard, occupied by prisoners, and where
the bodies remalne<l two ami three «lays, nake<l an«l covered witb tiles and creep-
inp vermin. I freipiently heainl in my own cell, niplit after nijrht, the cries and
groans of native prisoners who were <*onstantly beaten and atrociously abused.
5. During my imprisonment 1 also saw each morning probably KK), more or
less, ill treateil and compelled, under arme<! gendarmes, to march to their work
several ndles away. <»ften withotit fo<Ml other than a little c<iffee. there to labor
imder supposed c<»rvee system.
These men would be returne<l in the afternoon, searche<1 and rougbly treated,
and made to wait hours in some <*ases l>efore the ttrst bite of fiMKl be furnished
tliem. I have seen on many m'casions as the result of this a number of these
prisoners fall to the ground from sheer weakness and exhaustion. If giveii
the opiK»rtunity, I will produce a number of native prisoners (If still alive) to
corroborate these statements.
G. On .Taimary 9, "1919, the day I was discharged from prison and while wait-
ing to be relea.sed, at stern conmiand of negro high court, I saw a native carried
Into the cell in a condition of Insensibility, and whose back had been beaten
Into a jelly. He was attende<l by a native assistant doctor of the American <KCii-
pation, who stated that this man had been beaten by the white captain during
<me of his dnniken rages. If given an opportunity, I will produce this native
doctor (if not shot) and several nat've witnesses who saw the man in tlie ctaidl-
tl<m describwl.
7. That if afTordtnl an opportunity. I will te.stify also to indignities and brutal
treatment accordeil me during my imprisonment — and by this captain of the
United States marines. I would have starved to death but for the fragments of
fcKKl smuggled Into my cell by prisoners and natives on the outside.
8. While I was at St. Marc, about March, 1919, an old native was either ninr-
dered or burned to death, with hut de8tro,ved, in Mnie. Orius's habitation.
Three natives allegeil to be impliCatwl In the crime were arresteil and impris-
oned. Several nights later these three men were taken ojat of prison in the
night, being fli*st compellwl to dig their graves, then were shot by the gemlarmes
in the pivsence of their white cai>tain, and their dead bodies fell into the holes
they themselves had made. I did not witness the murders myself, as they took
place in the dead of night, and ever>'body in a state of fear and tremble, hut I
was staying at the home of Mme. Orlus and children and saw the excitement
and horror prmhice<l among the family and In town, and heanl details and saw
the graves.
9. On or about the secorid Sunda.v of .\pril. 1919, an<l while on my way home
from church at noiai. I heard commotion and cries In St. Marc streets that the
gendarmes (of the United States marines) had shot two men. Immediately
returning toward the church, I saw }i dead man, naked, carried along througli
the public streets on a sack by four natives, with an armed gendanue riding
by their side. The bo<ly was rolling from side to side, and was the most grue-
some sight I ever witnessed. The purpose of thus carrying this uncoveretl
dead body was to further terrify the people, who were already hiding in fear
and dread of their lives.
10. That at St. Raphael, about April, 1918, while as superintendent on a visit
among <mr Baptist churches of North Haiti. I found the white lieutenant of
gendarmes In charge of American occupation at that point, a United States
marine in a shocking, drunken condition, and was told numy stories by the
Christian natives and others throughout the village of his intemperate and
scandalous conduct. I am prepared to give name of the lieutenant, and if
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 267
?:iven an opportunity will produce witnesses, l)oth wlilte and native, to cor-
roborate my stateni^ita
11. In January of 1919. at Cape Haitieu (in extreme north of Republic) I per-
}«onaIIy witnessed a number of marines in l)road daylif^ht engaged in open orgies
with low colored women in the streets. I saw them enter huts for immoral
purposes, T^ter, after services held in the churches of the ca|)e, several of the
tuembers of the Marine Corps have confes8e<l again and again c<m(*erniug the
terrible amount of drinking going on, and awful temptations by way of Immor-
ality they as American hoys had to contend witJi in Haiti.
12. That during the American occupation I have witnessed at Port au Prince
and otlier points in the Republic drunkenness and dissipHtion on the part of our
Tnited Stiites Marines. If given an opportunity I will corroborate this state-
ment with witnesses, both white and colored.
In tliis connection I suggest that the court summon Dr. Sanmel Innian. exe<*u-
tive secretary of the mi8sionar>' cooperative committee of Latin America, at
New York. Or. Inman visited Haiti last year In behalf of both his own com-
mittee ns well as the Union Home Missions' Council of North America (New
York), at my own invitation, and for the express punH>8^ of a ca^reful survey
with a view of the establishment of religious and educational work' in the black
republic. He has therefore personal knowledge of the very low moral standard
of many of our marines, and as stated In more detail in his able and informing
article on the present situation in Haiti in this month's number of the Journal
of International Relations, published In New York.
I am returning to-night to my home at Wyoming, Pa., where a telegram or
letter will reach me, and shall hold myself in readiness tjo respond to your sum-
mons to appear in Haiti and testify before the court to the foregoing facts.
I assume, of course, that due arrangements for my transportation to Haiti
and return will be arranged by you, and that upon arrival there full authority
and protection will be given me so as to locate and produce the witnesses to cor-
roborate my testimony.
Awaiting your further advices.
Yours, very truly,
L. Ton Evans.
Wyoming, Pa., November 2, J920.
Hon. .To8i'a»Hrs Daniels,
Se<retary of the Nary, M'ashington, D. C.
DiJiR SECKETTAaY Damkls I An investigation into Haiti affjiirs such as you
♦lesire, so that the i)eople of the United States may know as well as yourself as
Secretary of the Navy the whole truth concerning the Haitian activities of the
Marine Corp.s— that is. everything, the good and ha<l bnmght out, the resiHiusi- .
blllty rtxetl, and the whole thing cleaned up once for all — Is utterly impossible
Uy the present Navy court you liave Just ai)polnte<l, though headed by such an
able and experienced officer as Admiral Mayo, unless a careful, searching, as
well as Judicial Inquiry Is nmde by the said c<»nrt into the following fuiula-
meiital and direct caiuses of the present situation in Haiti, resulting in un
JuKtflable acts of oppression, violence, assaults, and killing of Haitian citizens:
1. The closing of senate and chambers (parliament) of the i>eople under the
aniieil forces of the American marine oc<*upatlon.
2. The change, or what Is known as the rap*', of the Haiti constitution by the
.\nierlcnn occupation, and methods ami force used by the United States Marines
to compel the natives tjo adopt the new constitution, which gives away their
land to foreigners and American corporations.
3. Adoption and working of tiie so-calle<l <*orvee slave labor by Anieriran
marines, and through their gendannes, whereby, in spite of treaty, citizens of
Haiti were <leprlved of their rights. robl)ed of their I berties, oppressed, as-
.vaulted and murdered, with the inevitable result that the Negroes of Haiti gen-
erally were Inflameil, fierce anger engendere<l. and bitter hatred against the oc-
cupation of the United States Government, finding expression, now that their
parliament and constitution are gone, in oi)en fighting and defiant rel>ellion
against what tliey firmly believe to be the determined an<l treacherous effort of
liie American people, through the I'nltecl States iwcupation in Haiti, to bring
them all back tjo slavery, with all Its horrors.
4. As other material and direct factors in the absolute failure after five
years of the American Government, through its marine m-cupatlon. ti> pacify
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268 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Haiti, establish peaoe and pood will, not to say secure the natives* ronfidenoe
and cooperation, anticipated by the treaty between America and Haiti in the
economical, industrial, and social development of the black republic and its
people, the present Navy court should have the right and authority to malce a
thorough and searching investigation into the nature and extent of the alliance
l>etween marine officers of the United States, at Washington as well as in Haiti,
with American corporations which followed the "occupation " to the blacl? re-
public, and the European special delegate of the Pope (a foreign potentate)
sent to Haiti during the present American occupation, with the European arch-
bishop, bishops, priests, freres, and nuns, etc., of the Roman Catholic Church in
Haiti and all of whom are paid their salaries like officers and members of the
American marines and the native gendarmes from the ITnite<l States (Govern-
ment, money, loans, etc.. to the littJe bankrupt black republic, and directly
through the hands of the United States financial adviser.
5. In such thorough and searching investigation the Navy court should have
the right and autJiority to determine what influence and power such alliance
with corporations and close relation of the Catholic Church with the Haiti so-
called government and the. American occupation of the United States Govern-
ment., as now exists in the Republic of Haiti, has been responsible for the ap-
pointments of American marine officers to and removals from Haiti under the
present occupation; for the demorallzntion of the Ignited States marines from
their usual high standard of military discipline and moral efficiency' : and for
the deflection also of the adminlKtratlon at Washington, or officers of the Navy
Department, as well as the American occupation on the i.slnnd. from the high
purpose of the United States Government's special mission in Haiti, according
to the terms of the sacred treaty, t^o apparently serve financial Interests and
sectarian c^ds.
In requ(»st!ng that you should reemphasize the Importnnce of making the
present investigation thorough and searching, and to authorize the Navy conrt
to include the foregoing fundamental causes of the present sad situation of
Haiti alTnirs, I hereby quote from the statement and the earnest plea of my
personal friend, Dr. Francois Delancour (Port an Prince) In Current History
for the month of r>ecember. 1919,:
"All Intelligent Haitians know that American stiitesmen and lenders of
opinion are not aware of what Is happening In Haiti. The American Nation is
too great and too goiMl to tolerate such infractions of i)olitical morality. Haiti,
which In July, 1918, entered the confraternity of the allied nations by declaring
war on Germany, is with the approval of the American officials (occupation)
in a stiite of anarchy, anarchy of legislation, anarchy of administration, with
no parliament (senate and chamber) to discuss the living Interests of the
people, with no freedom of thought, of speech, of action. Deprived of ju«tico
and legality, also undermined by disorganization of labor and by pauperism,
that the Haitians are driven out to Cuba to look for work in large numbers,
or remain to starve."
The inclosed letter to Judge Advocate Dyer, of the Navy court you have jnst
appointed to Invesrlgntje a frail's In Haiti, will show that as the person who two
years ago prepare<l by way of a memorandum and sworn affidavit and in*»de
definite charges against the American occupation, etc. I have offere<l if called
as a witness to personaly testify in Haiti, and so as to estJibllsh from my own
personal knowleilge such si)eclfic acts as related therein through him to the
court.
As I have had no reply from Ma.l. Dyer. I hasten to repeat my offer to you
as Secretary of the I'^nlted States Nav>% responsible for the creation of this
Iward and, of course, to the Government and American people for affairs in .
Haiti, namely, to hold myself in readiness to respond to your summons and
the above Navy court to appear In Haiti and testify to the facts as stated in
the letter to Maj. Dyer, judge advocate of said Navy court.
As assumed in that letter, you will see to arrangements for my transjwrta-
tlon, authority, and protection given both to myself and witne.sses In Haiti, and
any necessary expense the witnesses may have to Incur for attending the court
in various sections of the Republic, so as to corroborate my testimony.
Very sincerely, yours,
L. Ton E>ans.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 269
Thb Sbcbetaby of the Navt,
Washington, November 4, 1920.
My Dear Mb. Evans: I have your recent letter concerning Haiti. I thank
you very much for it, and the same has been given to the court investigating
Haiti matters.
Sincerely, yours,
JosEPHUs Daniels.
DocTEUR Hector Paultre,
8t, Marc, Haiti, 25 novembre, 1918.
Mr. L. Ton Evans, Kingston, Pa.
MoN Bow Pasteur: Votre lettre du 25 octobre m'est bien parvenue.
Le frere Hippolyte n*a pu venipartage le Ix>upe du Lciycier avec nous scion
Tentente qu'il a cu avec vous. II m' a ^rit le 5 septembre pour m'annoncer qu
il eta it couffrant.
Nous avons depuis le mois pass^ une ^ole primaire de jeunes filles avec le
personnel suivants. Direct rice: Mme. Hector Poultre; professeurs: Mme.
Hector Paultre, C^cile Paultre et Mathilde Gresseare ; survelUante : Mme. David
Guillot. Nous avons main tenant 30 ^t^ves mais nous esp^rons en avoir beau-
coup plus a Taveni. Nous faisons tous nos efforts pour ouvri sans trop tarde
une 4cole primaire de govcons.
Pour la muison que vous habitiez, j'oi eu de norabreuses diflicultes avec Mr.
Murat Monfils qui a m^me cu recours au Yeige de Paix. Aussi J*ai ^6 oblige
de prenotre la liberty de la reniettre le 20 septembre en transportant vos effets-
Chez ma mere et ecux de Mr. Cambell chez moi. I-.e garde done A vos ordret
votre bon de $45. Des votre arrive eci je voies cherchcrai une maison.
I.,es freres de da Gonave vout bien y'ai Ctet une seconde fois & la Grande
Laline ou J'ai eu Tavantage de faire une i)etite prMiction.
Cons ici vous reraercient de vos bonnes salutntions et implorent pour vous
et les votres les secours du Cr^s Haut.
Votre brebis fldC'Ia.
Hector Paultre.
St. Raphael, June 8, 1911.
Rev. L. Ton Evans,
Field Secretary of Haiti Baptist Mission.
Dear Brother Ton Evans : I am profoundly glad that you have brought to
the attention of the pastor, deacons, and church of St. Raphael last Sunday the
matter of the entire consecration to Christian work of our Sister Christine
Jean Francais, and that under God, in addition to what you have already done
for us, can see your way to take her with you to the United States and to place
her in tlie same mission college as Alice Pierre, our Haitian daughter, whom
you took just three years ago from our nndst, and to study so as to serve the
same Master. As I have employed Christine some years as my assistant pro-
fessor in our small Government school for girls here, and, as you know, I can
bear testimony to her deep interest and faithfulness in her work and her espe-
cial quail ficafions as a teacher, even when she was staunch, if not bigoted,
Romanist. However, now since her conversation to the Protestant faith and
her public baptism by you in Banaha River in October of 1910 her active service
in our church and Sunday school, as well as the part she takes in our open-
air gospel work, her deep sincerity, quiet, steady, consistent, and loyal Christian
life, in spite of i)ersistent persecution of the priest and even or her own mother.
I can further add to the above testimony that in my opinion Christine is spe-
cially called of God to work in Haiti, and with the training such as you pro-
pose to give her at the national Negro Baptist college for girls in the United
States she will prove herself, if life and health are given her, a most efficient
and devoted Christian when among her own people and sex in this morally and
spiritually neglected and destitute country.
May God richly bless you, my beloved, for your splendid efforts in behalf of
my countrymen.
Your sister in Christ,
Eliza Menard.
(Wife of Pastor M. Menard, directress of Government school for children at
St. Rapliael; age 80 years.)
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270 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Haiti Baptist Mission — Appat.li.^g Xekd of 3,()0ll.0()0 Pekishing Souls fob the
CffOSPKL.
a missionary PIONKKK and his KFFOKTS COMMKNDEI) to CHRISTIANS OF BRITAIN*
AND AMERICA BY ONE OF JAilAICA's BEST-KNOWN PASTOR EVANGELISTS AND
SCHOLARS — YEARS OF MISSIONARY ZBAI. AND DEVOTION UNDIMMED AND UNDI-
MINISHED ENCOURAGED TO PROCEED " ISAIAH-LIKE ALONE TO A WORK GOD HAS
CAIXED HIM."
"Go ye into all the world and i)reach tlie K«wp^l.'* etc. — (-hrlst.
Letter from Rev. George K. Henderson, M. A., graduate at Madison Univer-
sity, New York, that years ago conferred the degree of doctor of divinity on him.
Rev. G. E. Henderson is pastor of churclies with a membership of 1.80(1, has
been a member of tlie Jamaica Baptist missionary executive for 34 years, and
was president of the Jamaica Baptist Union and cliairiuan of missionary Iwmrd
when Rev. L. Ton Evans was under that society as Its chief missionary in Haiti
18 years ago and previous to his resignation through his late wife's sickne.«f>.
Mr. Henderson, wlio is cousidere<i a profound Bible student, prominent teacher
of the higher spiritual life, and leader in the island's missionary activities, is
well known in the United Stiites among the following Baptist leaders, many of
whom also are his old college mates: President W. H. I*. Faunce < Brown's,
R. I.), President (i. E. Horr (Newton, Mass.), Dr. Henry L. Morehouse (A. B.
H. M. S.), Dr. Robert S. MacArthur. Dr. Edward Judson, Dr. Bitting, Dr. W.
Newton Clark (Rochester), Dr. Leigh ton Williams, Dr. J. A. Francles (Boston).
Dr. Thomas S. Barbour (A. B. F. M. S.), Dr. Charles Watson, Dr. Seymour
(Philadelphia), Dr. W. M. Lawrence. Dr. John S. Love. Hon. Mornay Williams
(New Y^ork), and others.
The < -hapel.
Browns Town, P. ()., Jamnu^a, ^yest Indien, August J 2, 1910.
Rev. L. Ton Evans.
My Dear Bro. Ton Evans: Having a keen interest in your ilesire to establish
the gospel in the neighboring island of Haiti, and with the keen knowledge of
your plans, your efforts, and discouragements in this great enterprise, and also
with an intimate pei*sonal actiuaintance with yourself for many years, I have
thought that a letter from me may be of some use in helping you to overcome
the difficulties that are likely to opix)se you in the mission to which I believe
(jod has called y«m for the extensicm of his Kingdom in a land hitherto almost
neglecteil.
In saying this I know of the efforts put forth by the Wesleyan frien<ls for
nmny years, and also by the Baptists of England, and after of Jamaica, ns I
have taken my part in all that our society has done in Haiti. ♦ ♦ ♦
My heart goes out toward you, as I found that zeal an<l devotion which
burned in your heart 18 years ago, when you were the missionary of the Jamaica
Baptists to Haiti, is still undemarred and undiminished, luit has con.stanrly
manifested itself through the Intervening yejirs (though nuu^h occupied with
your own churches in South Wale.s, and after in Edwardsville, Pa.) in efforts to
awaken others, both individuals and societies, to take up the evangelization <»f
Haiti.
lie who fed the fires through all these years will. I believe, still keep thein
alive until your efforts meet that success which we all desire, and Haiti at last.
like her sister islands of Jamaica, Porto Rico, and Cuba, is not only o|>eiKMl to
the gospel, but dotted over with churches from which God's message of siilva-
tion to all mankind is proclaimed to " every creature."
I could wish that your efforts to awaken some of the great societies of our
Bai)tist denomination in Great Britain or the United SUites of America hart
been more successful, and tiust that this will ultimately be brought about.
I say this as it is only natural that left to work alone as a sort of free lance
(missionary at large) you are likely to be misunderstood and misinterprete<l
even by (certain) brethren. * ♦ ♦
On this account I trust before long you will succeed in securing the ccxiperu-
tion of some responsible Baptist society to shoulder the (whole) work and carry
it cm to the success that awaits those wiio are ready to respond to our IionVs
" Whom shall I send, etc? " This I know is your earnest desire also, and until
it is brought about I can only encourage you to go on Isaiah-like alone in the
work to which God has called you, and He will lead.
Some misunderstandings have already arisen and some criticisms made, and 1
have had the advantage of hearing these (and refuting them) from the Bev.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 271
C. E. Wilson, etc., • ♦ • who have inisunderstoofl some of your actions.
The publication of your accounts (1) that has recently been made, which is
signed by auditors, will satisfy some and remove their stronj^est objection, and
I am hoping a letter from myself to Mr. Wilson (Ix>ndoa) will satisfactorily
explain some other points he entirely misunderstood, (2) and trust will tend to
remove the unfavorable inipi-ession he had formwl as to y«iur generalship.
I am grateful that your visit to Jamaica (1908 and 1909) has tended to revive
the efforts of our Jamaica Mi.ssi<mary Society in Haiti, our first foreign field,
and resulted (on this account) already in our taking over the support of Brother
l/Herisson (3), of Jacmel, etc. ♦ ♦ ♦
Iw^t me as.sure you of my own deep interest in your work and my desire to
c-ooperate with j-ou to the extent of my ability, and allow me also to -way that
with an intimate knowledge of almost every step you have taken in tliis great
work, I commend you to &<* confldenc-e of ('hristian l)rethren who may not yet
know you as well as I do.
(iod has directed you .«50 far. and He will guide you still. I am not unknown
to a good many of our brethren in the States, having lieen graduated from
Madison University, now Colgate, in 1875, and if this letter can be of any ser^•i(•e
to you, please use it in whatever way you wish, and believe me always, «
Your brother and comrade In the gospel,
Gfx). E. Henukrson.
"My hand is still shaky, but I hope you will be able t<r decipher what I have
written."— O. E. H.
Bro. Henderson, who was resting in the country after a very severe illness
when he wrote above, has since givatly improved.
In another letter from the Rev. George Henderson he says :
" I am so glad to see that your spirit is equal to the changed attitude of the
B. M. S. (England). Mr. Wilson broached the matter when he and Mr. Penny
stayed with us, so I was not surprised when I saw the decision in the Herald,
etc. I don't think there is any ultimate loss in dissolving an arrangement that
could only be temporary and that was likely to bring friction as hmg as it
Iaste<l.
"There Is no doubt that (Jod, who oi)ened up India by (^arey and China by
Hudson Taylor, when the societies threw them over, is also equal to open Haiti
as well by whomsoever He finds ready to be His instrument. ' It is nothing to
Him to work by many or by few,' and when He works by few and by feeble
instruments the glory is all the more conspicuously His."
(1) Three reports in all have been issued, viz, 1,000 in 1908. 1,500 in 1909, and
8,000 (2,000 English, 6,000 Welsh) In 1910, which were sent at the time to all
contributing churches and friends in Wales, America, and Jamaica, at u cost of
over £50 ($250) out of our scanty funds, not to mention the labor entailed on
the flew secretary in addition to his work ns organizer, deputation, and mis-
sionary.
(2) So deeply did Mr. Henderson feel the injustice and injury Inflicted uixm
the mi.ssion and missioner among contributing churches in Wales, Jamaica, as
well as friends of Haiti, that he wrote a strong letter not only to Rev. C. E.
Wilson himself, but to T. S. Penny. Esq., chairman of West Indian English
Baptist missionary committee, and Rev. Leonard Tucker, M. A., of the B. M.
Society, now one of the tutors at Calabar Baptist C^ollege, in Janmica, complain-
rng of his conduct toward a brother engaged in tlie same kind of mission work,
only as yet without wealthy religious organization at his back.
(3) For 14 years Rev. L. Ton Evans has urged the Jamaica Baptist Mission-
ary Society to support tliis brother, ordained by him in 1894. but through the
extreme poverty of the churches, etc., they have not been able to do this until
now and through the personal visits referred to. and tlie influence of Rev. (teorge
E. Henderson.
There are already two consecrated and certilicated teachers from E.lwards-
ville (Pa.) First Welsh Bapti><t Church studying at tlie Women's Missionary-
Training C-ollege, Cliicago, preparing for Haiti, and two more, Miss Bailey and
Miss Alice Henderson (latter from Browns Town, Jamaica, We.^t Indies), who
have recently graduate<l and taken their B. A. degree in the States, seeking to
enter the same Chicago Baptist missionary school, witli the intention of labor-
ing in the Black Republic. This is in addition to Mi.ss Alice Pierre Alexis, the
native young sister taken by the field secretary to the United States, etc., and
who is now studying for missionary work In her own island, at the National
Missionary Training School for Girls, Lincoln Heights, Washington, D. 0.,
undep the able principalship of Miss Nannie Burroughs.
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272 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
New Haitian Railroad — Ratification by Senate and President.
News has Just been received in Kingston, Jamaica, and New York that the
important contract between McDonald & Co., and the Haitian Government re-
cently passed by the chamber of deputies has now been adopted by the senate
and signed by President Simon. This carries with it a Government guaranty
of an interest in the banana trade and other fruit interest and the central sugar
factories. It will be proceeded with as soon as possible, and opens up large
areas of undeveloped, rich land and create new industries. It Is said that a
large and bitter fight has been waged for this valuable concession sought by
French, and especially German, firms, opposed to American and Protestant influ-
ence. The sura and substance of this is that the present is the most important
epoch in the history of Haiti, and hencre a special call to the rr«it liaptist body
to strongly establish themselves in the social, moral, and spiritual interest of
these long-neglected people.
L. Ton Evans.
September 15, 1910.
An Island Sadly Neglkctkd of Great and Unique Baptist Opportunity.
BRIGHT prospects OF A WELL-SUSTAINED AND ORGANIZED CHRISTIAN ENTERPBLSB—
PERSONAL TESTIMONY AND HEARTY RECOMMENDATION OF MISSIONARIES AND THE
MISSION BY A POPULAR AND EMINENT COLORED MINISTER WHO HAS VISITED THE
BLACK REPUBLIC ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.
"And how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard?" — Paul.
" Your visits and touching appeals have awakened renewed interest in
Jamaica. But what is one missionary among millions? "
I^etter from Rev. Hon. and Rev. W. M. Webb, a member of the Jamaii*a
Legislature, founder and managing director of Westwood College for Girls in
the island, pastor of churches with a membership of nearly 1,001), ex-President
of Jamaica Baptist Union, member of missionary board for 45 years, twice
special deputation of the denomination to the island of Haiti, and oldest native
(colored) Baptist minister in Jamaica, West Indies:
Woodlands, Stewart Town Post Office,
Jamaica, September 6, 1910.
Rev. L. Ton Evans.
Db.\r Brother Evans: Having visited the island on separate occasions, and
twice as a deputation from the Jamaica Baptist Missionary Society, to inquire
into the spiritual condition of tlie people and report on difficulties, needs, and
status of the mission worlc there (many years ago) you will know how deeply
intereste<l I am in Haiti and the social, moral, and religious welfare of the
inhabitants. I deeply deplore that the efforts of the B. M. S. of London, and
subsequently those of the Jamaica Baptist Missionary Society — were spasmodic,
inefficient, and short lived — and that such a large island, with over 3,000,000
people who are trying to find out the true system of Government and have
hitherto failed for lack of the evangel among them, should be so entirely left
until now in the cruel bondage of Romanism, witchcraft, etc.
I am, dear brother, greatly interested, therefore, to learn of your self-sacri-
ficing efforts to give these people the pure gosi)el. and from my own personal
knowledge of such natives (Christians) as Dutreville Lamour, Hector, Hypolite,
Jaques, Osiris, and Sisters St. Aude, Lamour, Louise Holder, and others I met
there I am sure that any well-sustained efforts put forth In the evangelization
of this island and its interesting per)ple and under God's blessing must bring
abundant success.
As one of the oldest members of the Jamaica Baptist missionary committee
I remember well how deep was the regret felt by us when, through your late
dear wife's illness, we were conii)elled to accept your resignation of your post,
which you had so loyally and enthusiastically filled some 18 years ago as
missi(mary of our society.
During the intervening years, however (though actively engage<l in pastoral
work in Wales and America), I am thankful to learn you have had Haiti in
your heart and kei)t In personal touch with the natives and given many proofs
of your deep sympathy with the evangelization of that dark land.
Your visits also and touching personal appeals have awakened renewed
interest amons us in Jamaica, and only at our last annual union meetings our
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 273
missionary society lias resumed in a small way (after j^iving up entirely for a
number of years and through sheer poverty, etc.) its work in Haiti by the
engagement of our (native) Brother I/Herisson, etc. We recognize this as
the direct result of your lalmrs and answer from Go<l to your faith and prayer.
But, then» what is one brother (receiving a salary and devoting the whole of
his time and energy), among the perishing priest-ridden and superstitious
millions of that island? WUht everyone who loves the kingdom of God and
prays the Master's first petition, "Thy kingdom come," desires to see for
Haiti is a well-organized Christian mission founded upon a strong, sympathetic,
and lasting basis.
This requires an organizer with funds behind him to employ best methods
and best qualified native and sympathetic foreign agents (white missionaries)
for this purpose until the people now waiting and longing get a chance to hear
the gospel.
From my own personal knowle<lge of the Haitian (character) I am satisfied
that as soon as they have received the gosiiel ♦ ♦ ♦ they will not only
prove a stable, happy, and prosperous people, but will largely and rapidly
become self-supporting and assist in giving the (same) gospel to other parts
of the heathen world.
To this end I therefore much regret that your request made to the Baptist
Missionary Society (England) for a grant of £300 ($1,500) a year for five
years (until a constituency had been created or the cooperation of a strong
Baptist society secured) and to be made good from the collections of Welsh
churches (already passeil resolutions to do this) interested in the Black
Republic through your visits and advocacy of the special and imperative nee<ls
of the Island was not resjwnded to.
To secure this amount and much more which is urgently needed I must
heartily commend you and your efforts to all who know the grace of God In
their own salvation and Protestant churches able and willing to help, by
contributions, sympathy, and prayer.
My own personal contact with y<m on several occasalons, your residence with
ine for short p(*rlods at my home, your pulpit ndnlstratlons that I and my
people have greatly enjoyeil. as well as your deep sympathetic spirit with the
Negro race and large -hopes for their future material, social, and spiritual
progress, have convinced me long ago of the high motive and good faith of
your endeavor In the evangelization of the Black RepidUic.
I am sure, dear brother, that knowing Him and His i)ower, in Whom you
believe, as I know you do, no misunderstanding of yxnir aim by some and
opposition to your efforts by others will discourage you In what you conceive
under the Inspiration of the Holy Spirit to be a direct call from God.
You will no doubt find in our northern and southern Baptist brethren in the
States large-hearted and most generous sympathetic helpers, who will not fail
you in your times of need, but will sustain you by their organized gifts, counsel,
and prayers in your high and noble aim to give poor Haiti the gospel.
As a Christian brother and missi(mary worker I highly esteem you and only
really wish I were a younger man, so as to be able to show in a more practical
way my real sympathy, eta.
May our gracious Master raise up for you 'generous helpers among Christian
leaders in Great Britain and America.
I am, ver>' dear Brother Evans.
Yours in Christ,
W. M. Webb.
Note. — Words in parentheses are not a part of original letters, but Inserted
for elucidation of meaning.
INDORSED BY NEW YORK MINISTERS.
Report submitted and accepted by New York Baptist Ministers' Conference
Monday. June 27, 1910. (See Examiner.) Revs. S. J. Arthur, Harvey Wood,
Gorrell Quick, G. A. House, and E. T. Stanford, special Haiti committee, formed
Immediately after the delivery of a missionary address by the lield secretary,
in which he described the spiritual destitution of Haiti, proximity to America,
and its strategic importance.
" Your committee appointed to consider and report on the matter of Baptist
mission work on the island of Haiti beg leave to report that liaving listened to
the story of the work presented by Rev. L. Ton Evans, aii<l confirmed unto us
by printed reports from the field, and the personal testimony of Rev. G. A.
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274 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
House, who has speut 25 years on the adjacent Island of Jamaica (and who
is intimately acquainted witli Mr. Ton Evans and his work), and the work
having already received the hearty hulorsenient of tlie northeast Welsh, AbUig-
ton, and Huntingdon Asmwlntions of Pennsylvania, and the western Penu-
sylvania Welsh and the Turnbull Associations of Ohio, as well as the Wyoming^
and Louisville Ministers' Conferences. We, the New York Baptist Ministers'
Conference, respectfully and earnestly petition the officers and executive com-
mittee of the Home Mission Society to resi)ond to this call of semibarbarous
but awakening Haiti, to the end that these two and a half millions at our very
doors may enter on the heritage of a New Testament Christian life and the
privileges of an enlightened civilization."
Contributions should be sent toward missionaries' salaries, new clmijels,
schools, or bells to Councillor W. P. Thomas (chairman of East Glamorganshire
Welsh Baptist Association). Gorphwysfa, Treorkey, South Wales (Britain).
Haiti mission, treasurer in Wales; or Rev. J. E. Daires, M. A. (clerk of North-
east Baptist Association of Pennsylvania), Nanticoke, Pa., United States «f
America, treasurer in America. French. Spanish, and English tests and tracts
and periodicals to be sent direct to L. Ton Evans, field secretary, JacmeL
Haiti. W. I. All moneys, if forwarde<l to the latter, must be in registered letters
I Rev. L.Ton Evans's Interview In Wilkes- Barre, Pa., Evening News, Aug. 21, 1911 (revised).!
A Remarkable Career of a Baptist Missionary — Tells of Struggles in Haiti—
Fiercely Attacked by Devil Worshippers — A Whole City and Himselj
Saved from Burning and Butchery by American Gunboat — Black Republic
Making Great Efforts to B attire With Social and Financial Probijsms—
Proposed Industrial College.
Rev. L. Ton Evans, field secretary of the Haiti mission, is home from tho^
Southern and Northern Baptist Conventions, and the World's Baptist Alliance
in Philadelphia, at which he spoke as the official representative of Haiti.
Rev. L. Ton Evans left the Welsh Baptist Church of Ed wards ville exactly five
years ago to preach the gospel to 3,000,000 spiritually dark and socially de<iti-
tute Negroes of Haiti.
Like George Whitfield, the eighteenth century evangelist, he was born in a
saloon in Wales, and on account of family relations and other pecuniary ad-
vantages might have easily been to-day. had he chosen, one of the wealthiest
liquor merchants and brewers in that principality.
His parents having quit the hotel, their youngest son became a strict abstainer,
and after his conversion, college training, and entrance upon the Christian min-
istry he eschewed all, gave up entire proi)erty so as to devote himself wholly
to his sacred calling and consecrate all his energy to the work of soul saving.
W^hlle in the large seaiwrt town of Barry, as a phmeer In Christian and social
work, and where he was the means of forming five Baptist churches, l^lr. Evans-
was one of the best known temperance reformers in the whole of Wales. He has
been the recipient in this capacity of many tokens of esteem and respect from
leading men, irrespective of religious denominations and political parties,,
although he himself is a strong Baptist and a staunch radical or liberal, or what
we here would term prohibitionist-democrat. He is a freetrader. The very
active part he playetl while pastor of First Baptist Church of Edwardsvllle as
temi)erance reformer will not be soon forgotten when, in one year, he and his
friends closed up about one-half of the saloons and reduced the tax revenue
from that source alone some .$4,CKX>. The dastardly dynamite outrage against the
Ongregational Church Is well known to have actually been alme<l against the
Rev. L. Ton Evans's church and people.
Like the reformers of his type he has been l>itterly attacked, and seriously
threatened many times, but all of which simply act as a tonic to him and only
strengthen him in what he conceives to be his duty to God and man.
interviewed at home.
After locating the missionary at his West Side American home and haviup
gone into certain preliminaries, he expressed hie willingness to a News reporter
to answer question relative to himself and his special work and prospects In the
black Republic.
" How long have you been in the island and what is the nature of the work you
are engaged In, Mr. Evans? "
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 275
'* I first left my churches In Barry. Wales, to jro to Haiti in connection with
Jfluiaica Baptist Churches, 18 years ago. Owln^ to rei)eatcd sickness of my
wife, I Avas obliped to leave and return in two years' time, but before I left I
had an able and conseerateil native brother, Nosirel L. Herlsson. ordained and
pUiced In charge of the church and southern portion of the island, and whom
God has signally blessed, though imtil two years ago he had not been in receipt
of anything like a salary. In 1906. without a society really at my back. I left
here and have traveled some 60,000 miles over sea and land, and spoken at many
handreds of churches, associations, conventions, etc., in Wales, Jamaica, West
Indies and here in the States in behalf of Haiti. I have during the same period
traveled five times through the Haiti Republic, and part of the Dominican,
spending days, weeks, and months at various cities, towns, and villages of the
coast and interior. As field secretary, or general missionary, my special work,
after endeavoring to secure some financial aid to college trained natives and
other brethren on the Island, has l>een to visit churches and stations systemati-
cally, preach, baptize, marry, ordain native brethren of 8i)eclal ability and
reliable Christian character, and so as to arrange for regular preaching in our
poor churches and out-of-the-way places in the interior. In addition to this, 1
have been able to render financial help for new church buildings, rent, and
repair others, secured financial aid altogether for five missionaries, etc. When
I state that there are very long dfstances between these churches and stations :
no railroad facilities, nor even roads, and that one must go for days and often
weeks on ponies or mules through deep mud, thick bush, fioodeil rivers, and on
small sailing boats around the coast, sleeping during the nights on the hard
wooden decks, it will give you some Idea of the difficulties and hardships of a
Baptist field secretary in Haiti, and also enable you to^ understand how the
poor members and natives appreciated and enjoyed my going and living among
them. Perhaps no other man, white or black, has traveled so much and experl-
encwi what T have among all classes, and Is In a position to really understaml
Haiti from the Inside. I have been openly and personally attackeil by the priest
of the devil worshippers, on top of Oros Morne. l>etween .Tacme! and Port au
Prince, and the whole city of Jacmel in November of 190S. when al>out to be
bombarded, and people cruelly butchered by swldlers and officers of late Alexis
Norri, to spite them for not preventing ex-President Simon entering Port an
Prince, was saved, under God, by the American gimboat EafjJe that salle<l with
the Haitian man-of-war Into the harbor.
"We have now three financially supported brethren on the field, and through
visiting the churches of the Baptists of the Island of .Jamaica, I have succeede<l
also In getting them to financially support two more, making a total of five. Wc
hare in Haiti 14 Baptist Churches and 17 stations. 5 financially support e<l
trained missionaries, 25 native preachers, 600 members, baptized last yesir 100,
over 100 recelveil for baptism, and 1,200 converts In our churches and stations
at present and under instruction. Also a number of day schools in cities, towns.
wmI very poor country districts, but the latter for some years and to our great
sorrow have been closed for want of funds."
DEFINES PLAN.
"What plan had you In mind when starting out, and how far have you
realized this?" was next asked.
"Knowing the Inability of Jamaica Baptists, and difficulty with the Baptists
of Wales, and the poverty of our Negro Baptists in the States, who have helloed
me so far and enabled us with the Baptist Churches of this valley (Wyoming
Valley, of the Welsh Pennsylvania Baptist Association), to do what has been
<ione, yet I felt that to do effective work in Haiti and develop the mission, one
of onr great and strong American Baptist missionary societies must take over
the work and carry it on as they do their work elsewhere, with schools and
«>llege8, where the best young men and women could be trained for work In
their own Island.
"Haiti, which has a population of 3,000,000, that Is. 2,000 000 more people than
•Taraaloa. and 1,000.000 more than even Cuba, Is only 1.000 miles from New York
Citj', and 300 miles off* the coast of Florida. In addition to our proximity to
Haiti, and growing American Interests in the Caribbean Sea. the Baptists of
this country are at present operating missions In Porto Rico. Cuba, and Canal
^ne right around the island. Again, Haiti Is a Republic, and so can be better
nmlerstood by our American Baptists than by the more conservative. If not
pessimistic Baptists of England and .Jamaica. Our American missionary
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276 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. ,
methods have the great advantage also of being more aggressive and scriptural
both on the foreign as well as the home field.
" It may not be known the debt which the United States owes to Haiti, and the
obligation this country is under to the black Republic. It was the downfall of
Haiti and defeat of Napoleon and France by Toussiiint L'Ouverture and his
black forces in their securing freedom from slavery and independence from
France at the end of the eighteenth century that compelled Napoleon to sell the
1,200,000 square miles France had in North America to our Thomas JefFersoo
in 1803 for 2 cents an acre. Apart from the Louisiana Purchase, we in the
States to-day would not have had any Pacific slope, Alaska, Philippines^ Porto
Rico, nor Panama Canal to boast of. Hence, in the providence of God and as
authentic history attests, Haiti has materially helped to make the United States
the leading world power it is. Yes, I am perfectly satisfied, and in taking
everything into consideration I really feel delighted at the bright prospects aud
real success so far achieved. I came up from Haiti through Cuba, where I saw
the splendid work of our Northern and Southern Baptists, and so as to attend
the convention held at Jacksonville, Fla., this May. After hearing the story
of Haiti's needs, the convention immediately called the attention of their home
board to this field, with authority to act. The board have planned for Dr. Gray,
their corresponding secretary, to come down at once to visit the island in
accordance with the convention's desire.
" Exactly a month after, namely, in June, our Northern Baptists at Philadel-
phia also decided to make an appropriation of from $5,000 to $10,000 annually out
of their budget and through their Home Mission Board, and so as to extend
their work to include Haiti."
SOCIAL PB0BLEM8.
" What, in your opinion, are some of the reasons which account for the rest-
lessness in Haiti and the constant revolutions on this island? "
** Perhaps there is not a people in the whole world misunderstood and misrep-
resented as a whole more so than the people of this black Republic. From my
long experience and intimate knowledge I can safely say that there is not a
more kind-hearted and generous natured people anywhere than the Negroes of
Haiti. The immediate cause of discontent which crystallizes into iwlitical
upheavals, undoubtedly is the widespread poverty arising through want of
money, and industries in the country. Men and women in sheer want can l)e
easily worked upon by certain political factions, and so-called leaders, most of
whom themselves again are In penury ; and are used by certain whites or Euro-
peans who have an eye to business, and make great profits to themselves through
these revolutions and financial embarrassments of the Government. There is also
a system of corruption and spoliation carried on often by those around the Presi-
dent, and people in official positions, ^specially at the administration of customs
and finances. Hence the treasury becomes depleted, soldiers, officers, and many
others are not paid, often robbed in other ways. The people become discontented,
and even bitter, and at times driven to desperation.
GOSPEL THE REAL NEED.
" The chief want of Haiti is the Gospel, the religion of the Bible, and Chris-
tianity of Jesus and the New Testament.
" When dissatisfied with political and social conditions (and no thinking man,
much less educated, and Christian man should be satisfied with conditions in
Haiti) unfortunately Instead of having recourse to the ballot and the polling
booth, they begin to plan and plot a revolution and appeal to the gun and sword
rather than to justice, reason, and common sense. The Gospel is the greatest
civilizing factor of any age, and this alone in its wide and far-reaching range
can satisfactorily solve the Haitian problem. When the teaching of the Word
of God, and principles of Christianity find a lodgement by faith in the human
heart they change conduct as well as cJiaracter. There is a new vision, new
hope, in fact, an altogether new life, finding expression not only in mental
thrills and spiritual throbs, but in fresh and actual daily activities. The burden
and drudge becomes something worth while ; and one's whole life through this
new motive power is lifted entirely from its old ruts. The whole man is brought
into harmony, morally, Intellectually, physically, and socially with the heavenly
will and divine purpose of God in Christ. New conception of duty, new rela-
tion to wife and family, and community follow as the day follows the night.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 277
Hence, they become honest, sober, and thrifty. They want, however, to be
helped, encouraged, and taught so as to make the best of these new powers and
energies.
SCHOOLS THE BASIS.
" We endeavor by way of Sunday and day schools for the young and middle
aged, and even those advanced in years, as well as in other ways to accomplish
this. One of the objects of my being now in this country is to interest our lead-
ing educationists and Christian philanthropists in the States to establish a
normal and industrial college on a large scale ; and so that the most promising
young men and women, many of whom will go out again as teachers to lead
their own people by example on lands, in homes, etc., and create respect for
honest labor and gradually build an indu.strial system of sound and practical
education that will make them self-supporting and independent, thus materially
Iielplng in the formation of a complete Christian character."
CARE FOB SHALL NATIONS.
" Don't you really believe that Haiti should be annexed to the Un!ted SKates
and that this is the only political solution of the problem? "
"Certainly not. Small nat'ons, in my opinion, have a place in the plan and
purpose of God; and very often, if not always, like Israel and Wales for in-
stance, have an important destiny to fulfill. The United States has never yet
(lone her duty by Haiti. Had she heli)ed Haiti as she has helped Cuba, and
even recently heli)ed the i:)ominican Republic, I am certain America would
have had better results. The great powers concede that the interests of the
United States are paramount to the combined interests of all other nations
in the Caribbean Sea ; and that according to the Monroe doctrine and the
doctrine of God and humanity, that the strong should help the weak — the United
States Government should befriend Haiti, not only by restoring order, or con-
fiscating the Island against their will and by force, but by establishing perma-
nent peace and thorough confidence. By a little effort on her part to explain
to the Haitian Government the true situation, and the purity and nobility of
America's motive, not only Haiti would raise no objection, but really welcome
such friendly help and protection, and encouragement to open up industries, etc.
PROMINKNT MEN ENLIST.
" I have nearly 3.000 signatures of senators, deputies, judges of supreme and
every other court, generals, mag'strates, merchants, inspectors, cultivators,
etc. When I inform you that only 20 per cent of our people can read, and but
10 per cent write, you will see that the petition comprises actually the whole
nation as far as it can be got at. When the objects of this school were ex-
plained many hundred of times by myself in French and patois (the speaking
language of 90 per cent of the natives) as well by many of my helpers in-
terested, namely to train young men and women in skilled labor, useful in-
dustry; pointing out that It would effect eventually great political, social, moral,
and religions changes that would be far-reaching In its effect upon the island ;
and revolutions and bloodshed, send three out of every four of our starving,
barefoot soldiers back to their homes and habitations (small farms) In the
countr>% and Inspire confidence in one another, etc!, they became deeply in-
terested and even enthusiastic at the very idea of such an institution for the
training of their sons and daughters in Haiti with such benign Influence. In
addition to the signatures named and support mentioned, I have received
official letters afterwards from mayors and councils of the leading cities and
towns, thanking me officially for my deep interest and real love for their
country and people, and expressing tlieir sincere hope that the earnest prayer
of the petitioners will be responded to and answered by educationists and
Christian philanthropists of this country and true friends of the Negro. Though
I admit the responsibility of this most important and further great under-
taking in behalf of Haiti, I naturally feel a little proud of being the first white
man entrusted with such a mission ; and especially that this whole black
nation, so diversified in character, so opposite In their religious creeds, so
different in temperament and opposed in politics, should consider me worthy
of their implicit confidence and a true and genuine friend of Haiti and its
people."
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278 INQVIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
'* May I finally ask you the effects of the last disturbances iu the island, «r
will the change of President and cabinet and overthrow of late government
by the revolutionists since you left Haiti, in any way hiterfere with your work,
or change your plans?"
" I think not. In fact, I expect the present new government to prove of
greater help. It may not be known that though Roman Ism is the State religion.
ac<*ording to Haiti constitution, there is liberty for all, and none moVe than
for the Baptists. It is true, however, that certain Roman Catholic priests have
from time to time cause<l warrants to be serveil on me and my native brethren,
for preaching on ground claimed by the Catholic Church to have been conse-
crated by them; and that they have seriously threatened us for publicly baptiz-
ing in rivers and .sea those who once were prominent in the Roman faith. But
it is only fair and Just to state that never has the Hialtliui (Negro) himself
been the instigator in these cases. Moreover, in every c*ase we faced the court
or officials asserting our legal as well as moral rights as Baptists, and liumble
representatives of Christ, tlie autlu)rities and Government, strange to say.
have always stood by and supported the radical Baptist missionary.
" The leaders in Haiti areat least beginning to understand that Baptists stand
for the liberty of the individual to think and to act in all matters of conscience
and religion. Tlie right to read the Bible and interpret it by the help of the
Holy Spirit and without the interference of State, priest, or person. His ex-
cellency, Leconte. and Senator Dr. Laroch, the new minister of public instruc-
tion, were the first to sign the petition and are ardent supporters of the college.
Friends of Gen. Flrmln are not a bit less In their desire and with Gen. Flrmln
himself, whom I know as a learned man, and an author of ability and depute,
but was tibsent from the island when the petition was gotten up. wlU, with all
his influence, supi)ort everything in the way of e<lucation and religion for the
real enmncipatlon of his country and people from Ignorance, supersition, etc.
WILL DRAW HAITI TO UNITED STATES.
" In addition to the advantage of this Industrial institution as mentioned
above, such an excellent college as th's established among them In the language
of the petitioners and which iietition is written in French — will place this
small, but heroi(r little nation under a lasting obligation to the generous bene-
factors, and more than all else draw Haiti closer than ever before in its history
to the I'nlteil States and serve as a means of uniting the two Republics together
in real sympathy and genuine good will.**
Rev. Condillac Jean .Tacqus, C'ai^e Haiti, a graduate from Newton Theological
Seminary, Massachusetts, and also attending the Baptist world's alliance, was
also seen and questioned :
" Do you know much about Mr. Ton Evans and his work in Haiti? *'
" Most decidedly. We look at him there at HaltFs best friend, and he enjoys
the esteem. Christian affection and ccmfidence of all classes, and we look at his
coming among us as God's direct answer to our i)rayers. No white man lias
traveleii more extensively and become personally acquainte<1 with our social, in-
tellectual, and spiritual needs than Mr. Evans himself. Hence he can speak
with real authority based on personal knowledge. The moment we heard of
his project of a normal and Industrial college to teach my countrymen the value
and dignity of honest labor, we (myself and a number of other leading men)
at once fell in love with the idea, and at great risk during the political troubles
associated ourselves with him and rendered what support we could. I may add
that Rev. L. Ton Evans, whom we often call, on account of his I'eal love for
Haiti, and esteem for him " Negr^ blanc" (the white black man), has the
support of all the leaders of the Haiti Republic. The success which he has
attained through his undaunted courage and inceH.sant efforts which astonish
us all in Haiti, has been most marveliou.K. As stated In the petition I am sure
the President and Government and .senate and chamber will only be too glad to
give the necessary land required, as well as do everything else they can te
encourage this grand project."
APPRECIATE THE MISSIONER's WORK.
" You then agree with Rev. Ton Evans, that the i>eople would really ap-
preciate such an institution, and that as he maintains. It will go a long way
to establ sh peaw and cnmcord in your island, and unite the two Republics in
sympathy?"
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INQUIRY INTO OC C?UPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 279
"I am certain that a larpe number of our best young men and women are
yearning for knowledge, and prepared to make great sacrifices so as to equip
themeelves for useful vocations in life, and I do not see how such a college as
this would not be as successful as Hampton and Tuskegee, with which Mr.
Evans is already acquainted. Such a training would enable my people to
devetop themselves as well as our rich soil, and give them a taste for something
other than politics. It would bring contentment to the whole island and help
in the development of industries, as well as make in my opinion all the educa-
tional and religious work more effective and permanent I may also add that
such a generous act on the part of educationists and Christian philanthropists
at your great country would never be forgotten by my people. The college
itself, with Its training of young men and women, year after year would be a
standing reminder among us of your generosity and good will toward us, and
actually cement Haiti to the United States as nothing else could; remove all
BQSpiclon that sometimes exists among nations, and especially a small nation
like mine toward a large and powerful one. On account of these blessings
therefore we are all earnestly praying that God may give success to Bro. L. Ton
Evans, and that friends of the Negro with you here will do what they can
to assist him in this noble effort to free little Haiti and its people from igno-
rance and superstition by giving an Jnstitution that will give them a sound and
practical education that shall enable them to take their stand among other
civilized, yea Christian, nations of the western world eventually."
PBESENT STATISTICS OF HAITI BAPTIST MISSION (1911).
Churches in Haiti 14
Church buildings 8
Church houses for missionaries 2
Mission stations 17
Mission chapes 5
Church buildings now being built ^ 2
Mission chapels being built 4
Missionaries at present paid 4
Missionaries, graduates of Baptist College, unpaid 2
Native preachers and assistant missionaries unpaid 25
Total membership 600
Baptized since last report 100
Accepted candidates for baptism 105
Professed converts at churches and stations l . 1,200
In addition to the above there are the following day schools lan^ishing for
help, and most of country schools among the very poor have had to be given up
for lack of funds :
L Jacmel (two higher boys* and girls') grades, conducted by missionary and
teachers. Connected with Jacmel, six country schools.
2. Port au Prince (capital), one day school conducted by missionary. Has
flBancial support from the Government.
3. St. Raphael, one girls* school conducted by aged wife of missionary and
Christian, recently converted from Romanism. Received financial support from
the (Jovemment.
4. Dondon, one girls* school conducted by member of Baptist Church. (Jiven
Government financial help.
5. Trou, one mixed school conducted by member of Baptist Church. Given
(Jovemment financial help.
6. Cape Haitian, one young men's school conducted by Baptist missionary-
here. Can be developed into a preparatory school to train native preachers.
At present receives Govemmenrt financial help.
Headquartrbs Ninth Company, G. D. *H.,
DUtHct of St. Marc, June 25, WIH.
From: District commander, St. Marc.
To: Prison sergeant, St. Marc Prison.
Subject: Services on Sunday afternoons.
The bearer, the Rev. Dr. Evans, has permission to enter the prison at St.
Marc every Sunday afternoon for the purpose of holding a service for the
benefit of the prisoners. Services will be held in the mess hall and order will
6226^—21— PT 2 1 2
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280 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
be maintained at all times. Prison cell doors will be opened, and all prisoners
who wish will be allowed to attend services.
Charles E. Kenny,
Captain Ninth Company, O. D. *H.
Mr. Evans. May I put in letters from and to Senator Knox, Lansing, and
others pertaining to matters here dealt with, etc.
Senator Oddie. Yes.
(The letters referred to will be printed in appendix.)
Mr. Evans. I would be decidedly opposed to any idea of withdrawing fron«
Haiti, but urge through this committee the establishment of a civil occupation,
with sufficient high-grade American marines for administration purposes.
That a scheme of popular instruction should be launched as soon as prac-
ticable with compulsory free education, and both in the English as well as the
French language, being that Haiti is so closely allied to the United States, and
so as to do away with need of InteiiJreters.
The lands should be preserved for the people and developed under a super-
vision of the United States, but with hearty and active cooperation of the
Haitian Government, functioning through its Senate and Chambers, and witli
its constitution restored.
Senator Oddie. And you feel sure that in your opinion there are a number of
marines down there who would make very worthy men, and it would be well
to retain?
Mr. Evans. Yes ; I believe there are some excellent officers there, but many
have degenerated through drink and other forms of vice, so prevalent, unfor-
tunately, in such a backward country as Haiti is. These marine officers, how-
ever, should have a high-class gendarmerie and less expensive administration
through the employment of more qualified Haitians all through the civil occupa-
tion, and fewer but stronger white American officials who are free from
prejudice against the colored, and must have faith in the future of the race
under proper and favorable conditions.
Senator Oddie. But the conditions have been trying on many of these marines,
have they not?
Mr. Evans. Quite so. They have been neglected both by the United States
Government and by the Christian churches of America and the Y. M. C. A. Pro-
hibition should be extended so as to include the manufacturing as well as sale
of all intoxicants, and to the civilian white and colored, as well as marines and
gendarmes. Drink and immorality have been the serious undoing of many of
our young men who have come to me at Cape and also at Port au Prince with
their complaints.
If Col. Russell and Gen. Cole and others had a free hand in Haiti from corpo-
lations and the Roman Catholic influences there would have been a much bet-
ter record to-day. Without separatation of Protestant and Catholic Churches
from the Government there can be no spirituality and power in the one, nor
honesty and efficiency in the other. This is absolutely necessary.
If the civil occupation is established and the Haitian Government completely
restored only such minor changes and modifications made to harmonize with
new conditions, and the treaty is going to be carried out in its educational and
Industrial phases, the confidence of Hatians will again be restored and Haiti will,
under the sympathetic and efficient leadership of capable American statesman-
ship, yet take her place before many years among the Republics of the West,
prove a credit to our own Government, and cemented In the closest bonds of
amity and good will with her fostering as well as protecting neighbor and true
sister Republic of the United States.
Senator Oddie. Well, I think that covers everything. We will take a recess
until Tuesday at 10.30 o'clock a. m.
OVhereupon the committee adjourned until Tuesday, October 11, 1921, at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
Agreement Regardixg the Gendaumkrie.
The undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments,
have this day agreed :
1. That the constabulary contemplated by Article X of the treaty between
the United States of America and the Republic of Haiti, signed at Port au
Prince on September 16, 1915, shall be known as the Haitian Gendarmerie;
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DTQUntY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 281
tiiat its strength and amounts to be expended for pay, rations, and expensed
of operation, etc.* shall be as set forth in the following table :
Per annam.
1 commandant, $250 per month $3, 000
1 assistant commandant, $200 per month 2, 400
4 directors, $200 per month 9, 600
9 inspectors, $150 per month 16, 200
1 quartermaster, paymaster, director, $200 per month 2, 400
2 assistant quartermaster paymasters. Inspectors, $150 per
month 3,600
1 sHrgeon director, $200 per month 2, 400
2 surgeons, injectors, $150 per month 3, 600
IS captahis, $150 per month.^ 32,400
21 first lieutenants, $100 per month 25, 200
3 first lieutenants (hospital corps), $100 per month 3, 600
39 second lieutenants, $60 per month 28, 080
8 second lieutenants (machine gun), $50 per month 4,800
6 second lieutenants (hospital corps), $60 per month 4, 320
19 first sergeants, $25 per month 5, 700
112 sergeants, $20 per month 26, 880
2(J2 corporals. $15 per month 47,160
40 field musicians, $10 per month 4, 800
2.100 privates, $10 per month 252,000
Pay, personal $478, 140
Rations, 2,533 enlisted men, at 10 cents per diem 92, 455
Clerical force:
1 secretary, $100 per month 1, 2(K)
1 clerk to commandant, $45 per month 540
1 clerk to assistant commandant, $45 per month 540
2 clerks, $50 per month 1, 200
11 clerks, $45 per month 5, 940
9, 420
Forage and remounts 40,000
Uniforms 66,000
Ammunition and target practice 15,000
Hospital, meclicine, etc., per month 10,000
Transportation, maps, office supplies, intelligence service,
etc., per month . 35,000
Miscellaneous rent and repair of barracks, tools, kitchen
utensils, lights, etc., per month 20,000
186, 000
Total land forces - 766, 015
Coast Guard, annuaf (»ost of maintenance :
2 inspectors, $1,800 •_ : 3,600
4 first lieutenants, $1,200 4,800
4 engineers, $276 1,104
4 quartermasters, $216 864
30 seamen, $156 4,680
15,048
Fuel 20, 000
Total 35,048
II, A coast guard service shall be established, operated, and maintained as
a constituent part of the gendarmerie, under the direction and control of the
oommandant of the gendarmerie, and in addition to the annual expenses here-
tofore set forth, the sum of P75,(X)0 shall be allotted for the purchase of the
"Necessary coast guard vessels for this service. These ves.sels may be used for
the transportation of troops. Government employees, and the supplies of all
departments at the discretion of the commandant of the gendarmerie, subject
to the direction of the President of Haiti.
III. All American officers of the gendarmerie shall be appointed by the Presi-
dent of Haiti upon nomination by the President of the United States, and will
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282 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
be replaced by Hditlnns when they have shown by examination, as provlde<l In
Article X of the treaty, that they are tit for command.
IV. The gendarmerie shall be considered the sole military and police fort^
of the Republic of Haiti, clothed with full power to preserve domestic peace,
the security of inflividual rlj^hts, and the full observance of the provisions of
the treaty. It shall have sui>ervi8ion and cpntrol of arms and ammunitions,
military supplies, and traffic therein throujrhout the Republic. It shall be sub-
ject only to the direction of the President of Haiti ; all other officials desiring
the services of the gendarmerie, shall be required to submit request through
the nearest official of that organization.
The private guanl referred to in article 175 of the constitution of Haiti shall
be composed of 100 men of the gendarmerie, chosen by the President of Haiti,
which men shall wear distinctive insignia while employed on that service.
V. All matters of recruiting, api)ointment, instructicm or training, promotion,
examlnationfl discipline, operation, movement of troops, clothing, rations, arms
and equipment, quarters and administration, shall be under the jurisdiction of
the commandant of the gendarmerie.
VI. The gendarmerie shall be organize<l and officered as provided for in Article X
of the treaty. The clerical force of the gen«larmerle shall l>e Haitian citizens.
VII. Rules and regulations for the administration and discipline of the gen-
darmerie shall be issueil by the commandant, after being approved by the Presi-
dent of Haiti. Infraction of these rides and regulations by members of the
gendarmerie may be punished by arrest, imprisonment, suspension from duty with-
out pay, forfeiture of i>ay, or dismissal under regulations pronmlgate<l by the
commandant of the gendarmerie and approved by the President of Haiti.
VIII. Other offenses committed by gendarmes will be investigated by the
gendarmerie officers as directed by the commandant of the gendarmerie. If the
behavior of a gendarme is unjustified, he may, at the discretion of the com-
mandant of the gendarmerie, be discharged from the gendarmerie, and, after
his guilt is established, be punished in the same manner as other Haitian dtl-
isens; or, if not discharge<l, he will be punished as provided for in Articles VII
and IX of this agreement. Officers and enlisted men of the United States Navy
and Marine Corps serving with the gendarmerie will continue to be .subject to
the laws of United States for the government of the Navy.
IX. A tribunal, consisting of five officers of the gendarmerie, is authorized for
the trial of gendarmes charged with conspiracy against the Government of
Haiti. This tribunal will be ordered by the commandant of the gendarmerie,
and in case of conviction is authorized to inflict the punishment of death or
such other punishment ns the tribunal may adjudge and deem proper, in accord-
ance with the laws of Haiti. All sentences of this tribunal, after being reviewed
and approved by the commandant of the gendarmerie, must be conflrmetl by the
President of Haiti before l)eing (»arried into execution.
X. Persons violating the laws governing traffic in arms, ammunition, and mili-
tary stores shall be punished by a fine not exceeding P. 1,000 United States cur-
rency, or imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both.
XI. The Haitian gendarmerie shall be under the control of the President of
Haiti, and all orders from him pertaining to the gendarmerie shall be delivered
to the commandant through the minister of the interior. All other civil officials
desiring protection or the services of the gendarmerie will make application to
the senior officer of the gendarmerie in the locality.
XII. The sum of P. 801,063, United States currency, shall be ai)propriated an-
nufflly for pay and allowances, equipment, uniforms, transportation, administra-
tion, and other current expenses of the Haitian gendarmerie. Allotments for
the various needs of the gendarmerie shall be made from this sum by the com-
mandant, but the total of such allotments in any month shall not exceed one-
twelfth of the total annual appropriation : Provided, howevei\ That the surplus
from one month may be allottetl In sub.««equent months.
XIII. Reports of expenditures shall be made by the commandant as directed
by the President of Haiti.
XIV. The laws necessary to make efTe<'tlve the above provisions shall be sub-
mitted to the legislative body of Haiti.
In witness whereof the undersigned have hereunto signed their names and
affixed their seals in duplicate.
Done at Washington. D. ('.. this 24th day of August, 1916.
Solon Menos.
Robert Lansing.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 288
ACCOBD RKGARDINO SALARIES OF ENGINEKBS ATTACHED TO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS.
Tbe undersigned, duly authorized tliereto by tlieir respective Goveruuients,
have this day agreed that the engineer or engineers to be charged with tbe
rapervlsion and direction of the sanitation and public improvement of the
Rpnblic of Haiti and to be nonmated and appointed as stipulated in article
13 of tbe treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of
Haiti, signed at Port au Prince on September 16, 1915, shall each receive annual
compensation not to exceed seventy-live hundre<l (P. 7,r)0()) dollars Uniteil
States currency.
It is also agreed, pending further arrangement between the high contracting
parties, that should such official or officials as may l>e nominated by the Presi-
dent of the Ignited States, pursuant to article 13 of the convention herein-
before referred to be selected from the senice of the United States and receive
compensation as such from the Government of the United States, the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Haiti shall be obligated to remunerate such officer or
officers each in a sum not to exceed one-half of the above-mentioned total an-
nual emolument of seventy -five hundred (P. 7,500) dollars.
It is further agreed that should such officer or officers be appointed other than
from the service of the United States the total annual emolument of each such
officer shall be defrayed by the Government of Haiti in the following propor-
tions:
A sum not to exceed P. 4,500 United States currency per annum for salary.
A sum not to exceed P. 3,000 United States currency per annum for personal
expenses.
Id witness whereof the undersigned have hereunto signed their names and
affixed their seals.
Done in Washington, in duplicate, this 27th day of June, 1916.
Robert Lansing.
ACCORD RRGARDING FINANCIAL ADVISER, RECEIVER GENERAL, AND ASSISTANT RECEIVBI
The undersigned, duly authorized thereto by tlieir respective Governments,
have this day agreed that the following officials, to be nominated and appointed
as stipulated in article 11 of the treaty between the Republic of Haiti and the
United States of America, signed at Port au Prince on September 16, 1915,
shall, pursuant to the provisions of article 5 of said treaty receive annually
compensation as follows:
Ftnancial adviser: $6,000 United States currency i)er annum for salary and
$4,000 United States currency per annum for personal expenses.
General receiver of customs: $5,500 United States currency per annum for
salary and $3,500 United States currency per annum for personal expenses.
Deputy general receiver of customs : $4,800 United States currency per annum
for salary and $1,200 United States currency per annum for personal expenses.
It is also agree<l that pending further arrangement between the high con-
tracting parties the President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the
President of the Ignited States and at salaries fixed or the recommendation of
the latter, such additional aids and employees as may be necessary to assist
the ^neral receiver of customs properly to collect, receive, and apply all cus-
toms duties of imports and exports accruing at the several customhouses and
ports of entry of the Republic of Haiti : Provided, That the total salaries and
expenses of all the officials and employees herein mentioned shall not exceed
5 per cent of the collections and receipts from the customs duties, unless by
subsequent agreement between the two Governments.
In witness whereof the undersigned have hereunto signed their names and
affixed their seals.
Done at Washington, in duplicate, this 27th day of June, 1916.
Robert Lansing.
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LNQUIRY LNTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select CoMMiTTEifi on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washinffton, D, C,
The committee met at 10^ o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment, Senator
Medill McCormick (chairman) presiding.
Present : Senators McCormick, Oddie. and King,
Also present: Mr. Ernest Angell and Mr. Horace G. Knowles In their repre-
sentative capacities as hereinbefore Indicated ; and MaJ. Edwin N. McOlellan,
United States Marine Corps, representing the Navy Department.
STATEMENT OP BEAB ADHIBAL WILLIAM B. CAPEBTON, XTNITED
STATES NAVT, BETIBED, 714 MONTAUX AVENUE, NEW LONDON,
CONN.
The Chairman. Admiral, will you give your full name and rank?
Admiral Cafebton. Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, United States Navy,
retired.
The Chairman. In your own way, Admiral, will you tell the committee of
your being ordered to land and the circumstances which attended not only your
landing, but the receipt of the orders to land, in Haiti?
Admiral Caperton. I landed several times. I do not know to which particular
time you refer.
The Chairman. I would start with the first and end with the last.
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir. I did not know what you wanted. I do not
suppose it is necessary to repeat verbally my ordel*s?
The Chairman. If you will refer to them and give them to the stenographer
for the record, if they are brief, that will be sufficient.
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir. One is not very brief.
(The matter referred to is here printed in full, as follows :)
January 5, 1915.
To : Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet, U. S. S. Wash-
inffton, flagship, via Commander in Chief United States Atlantic Fleet;.
Subject: Movement orders — Washington, \
1. On January 10, or as soon thereafter as practicable, proceed with the
Washinffton to San Domingo City, S. D., stopping at such ports en route as may
be necessary for coal and men.
2. Upon arrival at San Domingo City, S. D., communicate with the diplomatic
representative of the United States and acquaint yourself with the political con-
ditions in San Domingo.
3. After such length of stay at San Domingo City as you may deem necessary
for the purpose indicated, proceed to Port au Prince, Haiti, where you will also
communicate with the American minister and acquaint yourself with the politi-
cal conditions in Haiti. After such length of stay at Port au Prince as you may
consider advisable, proceed to Habana, Cuba, via Guantanamo, for coal and
stores* at discretion.
4. Upon arrival at Habana. communicate with the American minister and
acquaint yourself with the political conditions existing In Cuba.
5. After such length of stay at Habana as you may consider necessary for
the purpose, proceed with the Washington to Vera Cruz, via Tampico and
285
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286 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Tuxpam. acquainting yourself In each locality with the political conditions In
Mexico.
6. The department desires that you conduct a militar>' inspection of KOch
units of your command as the Waahimgton may fall In with .from time to time
and as opportunity offers.
7. The department will be pleased to receive any suggestions or recomniendfi-
tlons you may consider it necessary to make in connection with the political git-
nation in West Indian and Mexican waters.
JOSEPHUS DaNIEIA
Also the following by radio on January 19, 1915 :
Rush. Ten p. m. Tuesday. Department directs you proceed Cape Haitleii,
Haiti, without delay to report conditions. Under what orders did you sail
to-day for Guacanayabo, Gulf of Cuba.
Fletcher,
The Chaibman. Let me ask when did you land first and where?
Admiral Capebton. I landed first at Cape Haitlen.
The Chairman. And when? Was it in July, 1916?
Admiral Capebton. I was just thinking whether I landed before or not It
was in July ; yes, sir. I do not think I landed before. I mean I did not land
my forces before.
The Chairman. The report of the department reads that the American con-
sul at Cape Haitlen
Admiral Capebton. That is what I was trying to find.
The Chaibman (continuing). Requested that a warship be sent there In
compliance with this request, the U. S. S. Washinfftan arrived at Cape Haitlen
on January 23, 1915.
Admiral Capebton. Tes, sir ; I arrived at Cape Haitlen at 9.S0 a. ra., January
23, 1915.
The Chaibman. Had you had any communication with the department before
that time relative to the landing or the prospect of landing?
Admiral Capebton. My original orders directed me to proceed to the West
Indies and become acquainted with the political conditions in Santo Dooiingo,
Haiti, Cuba, and Mexico. I proceeded with the U. S. S. Washingtm from
Portsmouth, N. H., on January 10, 1915.
The Chaibman. When did you reach Haitian waters?
Admiral Capebton. On January 19, 1915. I received a radiogram from the
conmnander in chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet directing me to proceed
to Cape Haitlen without delay and report conditions.
The Chaibman. Where were you when you received the radiogram?
Admiral Capebton. At sea.
The Chaibman. En route to where?
Admiral Capebton. Well, I was en route first to Santo Domingo. My original
orders, I may explain
The Chairman. Admiral, you need not go into the orders particularly, but
Just give us a running story. You received a radiogram?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
The Chaibman. While you were on board the Washingtonf
Admiral Capebton. I was on board the U. S. S. WashinffUm.
The Chaibman. You proceeded to Cape Haltien. did you?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
The Chaibman. What transpired after your arrival at Cape Hatien?
Admiral Capebtoi^ On the 20th of January, 1915. I received by radio code
a message from the Department of State, for delivery to the American consul
at Cape Haitlen, Haiti, which was delivered on arrival there. I have the In-
closure here, Inclosure C, If you wish It. •
The Chaibman. Is that the code or a translation of it?
Admiral Capebton. I do not know whether I have It translated or not I
think, perhaps, that would be the code, sir.
The Chaibman. What Is Inclosure C?
Admiral Capebton. By reference to my report before me, I see it is the State
Department's code. I did not translate it
The Oh ARM AN. Then, it Is Immaterial if you have not got the translation.
What transpired when you reached Cape Hatien and met the consul?
Admiral Capebton. At 10 a. m., January 23, 1915, the Washington anchored oflf
Ploolet Point. Cape Hatien, Haiti. I immediately sent a staff officer to com-
Tiunlcate with the American consul. As the weather was very rough, I did
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAin AND SANTO DOMINGO. 287
not Ins'st on the consoFs coming off to the ship, but I received a report of the
conditions from the staff officer sent ashore. The consul sent off to me a copy
of a letter he had written to the American minister, Port au Prince, Haiti, out-
iUiing the situation on the 20th of January, 1915.
The Chaibman. Have you got the letter?
Admiral Capebton. I have, sir. Shall I read it?
The Chaibman. If it is not very long you may read it at this time.
Admiral Capebton. It is two pages.
The GHAIBMA17. Well, read it
(Admiral Cai)erton thereupon read the letter referred to, as follows : )
Cape HAiriEN, Haiti, January 20, 1915.
Hon, Arthub Bailly-Blanchabd,
AmmHcan Minister, Port au Prince.
Sib: I have the honor. to report that on last Friday, the 15th instant, Gen.
Yilbrun GulUaume Sam, the delegate of the departments of the north and north-
west, convoked a reunion of the civil and military officials and many of the
notabilities of Cape Haitien, and exposed to them the situation, stating, as I
ha?e been informed, that the town was threatened by a revolutionary army
which it was impossible for him to resist because the Qovemment had failed to
place in his hands the means of resistance; that the only arms and ammunition
that he had at his disposal were those sent here to the minister of the interior
and which he had seized ; that in view of this condition of affairs he felt it to
be his duty to convoke the influential citizens of the town in order that the
necessary measures might be taken to safeguard the general interests. At
the Y&ry outset he reminded his hearers that it was generally known, and
should be borne in mind, that he was a candidate for the Presidency.
After some deliberation a proces-verbal was drawn up giving the delegate
full powers to act for the general good, and this document was signed by all
present, including several senators and deputies and intimate personal friends
of the President. The proces-verbal, with the names of the signers, was pub-
lished the foUowiag day in the Cable, the local journal, a marked copy of which
is herewith inclosed.
On Saturday morning Gen. Metallus, with about 1,000 men and a few pieces
of cannon, entered the town, lined up the whole force In front of the cathedral,
and, after a short visit to the temple of worship, made a tourney of the town.
These troops, as well as those already present, have up to the present tinit
observed the most perfect discipline, and I have not heard of a single act of
disorder. The town remains in an entirely normal condition, no flags have
heeo displayed, and business pursues its regular course. This is entirely excep-
tional as a revolutionary Incident.
Yesterday morning (the 19th instant) Gen. Metallus fired a salute of 17 guns,
and his army proclaimeil Gen. Vilt^nm Gutllaume Sam as chef du pouvoir
executif.
The Cable of yesterday (the 19th) published an ordre du jour by Gen. Vll-
bmn Gnillaume (this is the name by which he is geenrally known), dated the
16th, stating that measures had been taken to preserve order and asking the
poblic to be reassured. A marked copy of this paper is also inclosed.
It seems now that the whole of the Departments of the North, Northwest, and
Artlbonite are in arms and that Gen. Gnillaume has been very generally accepted
as the candidate for the presidency.
Oens. Peralte and Fradelhomme (?), of the Zamor party, and formerly the
brother-in-law of the ex-president, have written him letters accepting his can-
didacy and offering their support. A delegation was sent on Sunday last to
^en. Tieux, who is occupying Fort LIberte, and Gen. Bertan Codio, who is
holding Ouanaminthe, and it is expected that both will accept, as they have
already been in correspondence with Gen. Vilbrun. The delegation is expected
to return to-day.
Two days ago a telephone message came here from Gonalves stating that it
had been reported that a Haitian warship would be sent there with troops to
hold that place. The delegate there. Gen. Misael Codio, has also offered his
services to Gen. Vilbrun.
Your telegram bearing date of the 13th instant was delivered to me yester-
day (the 19th). I immediately went to the delegate and made a complaint. He
admitted that he had recently given orders not to accept any telegrams without
his authorization, but promises to give orders that all my telegrams be accepted.
I ram* to mv office and made up a long telegram to you in code;^ When I
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288 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOBONGO.
sent it to the office the operator refused to accept it. The young man who took
it went to the office of the delegate and made a complaint. The delegate sent
his son with him to the telegraph office with the necessary orders. The operator
replied that there was no communication and returned the telegram to me this
morning. I have no means of verifying the facts, and, as I am writing yon the
contents of the telegram, I do not deem it necessary to inclose a copy.
Mr. Marsh asked me to beg you to deliver the inclosed note to Mr. Berlin.
As the agents of the French steamer refuse to accept private correspondence,
and the post office is not sending any mail to Port au Prince, I am taking the
liberty of inclosing to your address one important business letter of my own,
and three left by Mr. Marshand and Mr. Edwards, which I would thank you
very much to deliver.
I am, sir, your obedient servant,
L. W. Livingston,
American Consul
The Chaibman. Admiral, will you tell us, without any unnecessiary references
to the record there, how you came into contact with the consul, and what led
to your landing, whether it was events, or the suggestion of the consul, or
a decision on your own part?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir. Well, as I recall it now — this was six years
ago— as I recall it now, without looking at my notes here, I am of the opinion
that I did not land any force at that time, on my first visit to Cape Haitien.
The Chaibman. You left without landing any force at that time?
Admiral Oapebton. Yes. I went myself — if you would like a little story of
it — I went myself to call upon the consul, and we discussed the condition of
affairs.
Senator King. Mr. Chairman, has Admiral Caperton already testified at any
hearing?
The Chaibman. No.
Senator Kino. Or has he submitted a full statement of what he did and said?
The Chaibman. The only statement we have is the department's general
statement, with which you are familiar, of the history of the occupation of the
two Republics.
Senator King. Yes.
The Chaibman. You left without landing. When did you return?
Senator King. May I Inquire, is there any controversy as to the department's
statement? Does not that embody all that Admiral Caperton would testify to,
or any other witness?
The Chaibman. Well, I would not have called the Admiral if I had not
thought he might throw some light upon the circumstances under which he
landed and upon the orders which led to his landing.
Admiral Capeston. I have all those orders, sir.
The Chaibman. Now, tell us, Admiral, when was it that you returned to
land? Was it in conjunction with the arrival of the French ship Descartes,
in June?
Admiral Capebton. That was several months afterwards. In the meantime
I had gone to Port au Prince, and I followed Mr. GlUaume Sam around the
coast, in order to impress upon him the importance of carrying on a — I am
trying to think of the word for the kind of warfare.
The Chaibman. Moderate warfare or civilized warfare?
Admiral Capebton. Civilized warfare. That is the word I was trying to
think of.
The Chaibman. You mean he was not carrying on the electoral campaign for
the presidency, but a military campaign?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir; but you will understand that their methods are
quite different from those of civilized people.
The Chaibman. That is interesting.
Admiral Capebton. I had been infomie*! by the consul that it was the general
habit, if any man disobeyed, or did anything to displease hlni — I do not know
to what extent — he would order him shot.
The Chaibman. You mean to displease the commanding officer?
Admiral Capebton. Yes; Gen. Vilbrun Oillaume Sam.
The Chaibman, WIk) is the consul, L'vingston?
Admiral Capebton. Yes; Mr. Livingston.
The Chairman. Is he a white man or n crolored man?
Admiral Caperton. A colored man. r^^^^l^
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 289
The Chairman. So Livingston himself, who is a colored man. told you that
It was habitual that If a man offended the commanding general he was shot?
Admiral Cafebton. Yes, sir; words to that effect, and he suggested that I
call on Gen. Gillaume Sam unofficially, because he did not wish to recognize
him <^9cially as the " chief of the executive power," and after discussing the
matter I called.
The Chaibman. Was there another president in Port au Prince at this time?
Admiral Cafebton. Yes, sir. This was a revolution. He was fomrtng a
re?olation where they usually form them, in Ouanaminthe.
The Chaibman. They started in Ouanaminthe as a rule?
Admiral Cafebton. In Ouanaminthe. The cacos live in the vicinity, and the
chief of the revolutionists, who afterwards proclaims himself " chief of the
executive power," proceeds to Ouanaminthe, gathers In the chiefs of the cacos,
and they bring In their men, and in a short time he has formed a revolutionary
army.
The Chaibman. You followed him then, as chief of the executive power,
around the coast?
Admiral Cafebton. Yes, sir.
The Chaibman. Where did you head In again, at St. Marc or some place like
that?
Admiral Cafebton. Gonalves Is the first place I think I touched. Understand,
sir, there is a regular procedure In this warfare.
The Chaibman. T^ey take one place after another?
Admiral Cafebton. Yes, sir; and they take them consecutively along the
coast
Senator King. Did you make it clear that this Gen. Sam was a revolutionary
general, or was In charge of the army of the recognized de facto and de Jure
goremment?
Admiral Cafebton. I do not think I have yet, sir.
Senator King. Well, what was he?
Admiral Cafebton. Shall I just read a few lines on that, that will explain the
whoie thing? It seems that Portly after Davilmar Theodore, the then presi-
dent, became president at Port au Prince, Gillaume Sam, In view of his strength
In northern Haiti, demanded to be, and had been ai>i>ointed by Theodore, as a
ddegate of the department of the north and northeast, and had taken up his
headquarters in Cape Haitlen. About the middle of January a revolutionary
force of about 1,000 men appeared before Cape Haitlen. This is the force I
spoke of a moment ago. And as it eventually turned out, he pretended that
he could not defend the city ; In fact, he had nothing to defend the city with,
and he immediately appealed to them to make him the chief of the executive
power. In other words, he aiH)olnted himself there, the chief of the executive
power, after arranging with the generals in the north and northeast for this
pwpose.
Senator King. Then he betrayed the President?
Admiral Cafebton. Yes, sir.
Senator Kino. And the Government, and organized a revolutionary party
and designated himself as the head of it? ^
Admiral Cafebton. Yes, sir.
Senator King. And he was well on in his revolutionary movement around
the Island?
Admiral Cafebton. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Electioneering by force, and attempting In a revolutionary
way to make himself president of the Government?
Admiral Cafebton. Yes, sir; and carrying out the usual routine of taking
the march that was taken by all revolutionary forces. Strange to say, they
are all exactly alike.
Senator Kino. Was the president able to do anything to preserve order and
P^ce and to maintain the dignity of his office and the Government against this
revolutionary movement?
Admiral Cafebton. He was not, to a satisfactory extent.
Senator King. Where was he during the movement?
Admiral Cafebton. He was in Port au Prince, the capital.
Senator Kino. But no attempt had been made up to this time to oust hlro;
that Is, physically oust him from the capital?
Admiral Cafebton. No, sir. They, the Government, carried on the usual proc-
«« of getting ready and waiting for him to come around. The President of the
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290 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Uepubllc eventually sent troops around to meet him at these different places,
and as he advanced he took these places, because the forces that the Goverih
ment had were not sufficient to hold these cities.
The Chaibman. Now, let us get, If we can. Admiral, as promptly as may be,
to the events which le<l to your first landing. Gen. Vllbrun Gillaume Sam was
on his military electoral campaign and moving toward the capital?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir.
The (Chairman. He took the capital, did he, or not?
Admiral Caperton. He took these various cities all the way arouod the coast
frtmi (*^pe Haltlen to Port au Prince, via Gonalves, St. Marc, etc.
The ('II AIRMAN. I understand that.
A<lmlrnl (Japerton. And finally, when a revolutionary general or commander
reaches a place called St. Marc, about 60 miles from the city, if he wins and
cakes that city, the capital falls Immefllately, and the President then makes
arrangements to get out
The Chairman. To go to St Thomas?
Admiral ('aperton. To go anywhere he can, unless he Is murdered In the
capital.
The Chairman. Who took St Marc? #
Admiral Caperton. Vllbrun Gillaume Sam.
The Chairman. Then what?
Senator Kino. Was there a real battle there?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir; there was no real battle. The forces simply
withdrew after a slight battle, when (illlaume Sam arrived, and when he got in
everybody was his friend. They turned and went to him.
The Chairman. There are analogies between Haitian and American elections
after all. However, after he took St Marc, then what?
Admiral Caperton. After he took St Marc GlUaume Sam moved down
toward Port au I*rince. Everything was in great excitement, and abont that
time, at 9.30 a. m., on Wednesday, January 27, 1915, the U. S. S. WashingUm
arrived at Port au Prince.
The Chairman. You arrived at Port au Prince, and what did you find there?
fou did not land at Port au Prince at that time?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir. I am trj'lng now to follow up this revolution.
The Chairman. Had Gillaume Sam come Into Port au Prince when yon got
there?
Adlmral Caperton. Not at that time. He arrived much later. I shifted my
headquarters from Cape Haltlen, as things quieted there, as his army moved
out in the circle of march, and as I saw that my presence was demanded in the
capital, I went there with my flagship, leaving the other ships under my com-
mand to look out for the different cities where I knew there would be
The ('hairman. What were these ships, gunl>oats?
Admiral Caperton. Yes ; gunboats.
The Chairman. You left them back in the various ports?
Admiral Caperton. I left them In the various ports and gave them orders to
meet the general outside of the city and make him again promise me that be
would not loot or burn down the cities or fire In the cities, because I considered
that not humane. The cities were all undefended, and they were poor peoi^e,
generally speaking, and unarmed.
The Chairman. These were campaign pledges that you were exacting of him?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir. He gave me the first one In Cape Haitien. bat
I was not satisfied with It. I met him at each one, and so he finally laughtogly
said to me. " I do not see how you know where I am going. EJvery time I go to
enter a cltj I find your representative outside with some question, asking me to
behave myself." He promised to do so, and upon the whole he did very well,
considering everything. He kept his word very well In that respect.
Senator King. Were your movements appn.ved by the Government?
Admiral Caperton. Every movement, sir; every single movement.
Senator King. And you were not interfering with the functions of the Gov-
ernment that was in control of the island?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir.
Senator King. I do not speak of the revolutionary movement.
Admiral Caperton. No, sir; I understand.
Senator King. And all that you were trjing to do was to exact pledges from
the revolutionary commander that he would not sack, bum, rape, destroy, and
loot in the towns and cities which he conquered?
.\dnilral Caperton. Yes, sir. That Is what they usually ^^^oOCjIp
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 291
S4'i]ator KiNCi. Admiral, right at this i)oint. did you familiarize yourself
sufficiently with the anteeeilent history of the Island to justify the statement
which you just made, that they usually do those things in a revolutionary war?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir.
Senator King. They did not have civilized warfare there in those form«'r
revolutionary movements?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir; to my knowledge there has never been one.
and I have followed up the history of many and bave heard of many an<l
talked about many.
Senator Kino. It was savage warfare?
Admiral Caperton. Savage warfare; that is, uncivilized warfare.
Senator Oddie. Do y<m know whether in any previous revolutions there were
battles fought at St. Marc, before taking the capital, in which men were injuretl
orkUIed?
Admiral Caperton. Oh, yes, sir; later on, when the ufext general came around.
I will give that in detail. I was ashore then, having landed my forces to
** protect proi)erty and preserve order."
The Chairman. This excursion was taken later by another?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir.
In order to clear up several questions asked 'me in regard to fighting at
various places before they were taken by the revolutionists, also concerning the
action taken by the Haitian Government In regard to the ** service of the treas-
ur>;* and also my sudden sailing for Port au Prince on the 26th of January,
1915. I would like to add the following remarks: I had decided to remain in
Cape Haitien for a time after the departure of Guillaume Sam in order to
observe conditions at that time; but the commanding officer of the Wheeling,
Commander Moody, reported that the Theodore government had declared a
blockade of the ports of northern Haiti, but was unable to enforce the blockade,
as its naval vessels had no coal ; that the American schooner Alice Pendleton,
of New York, was in the harbor alongside th^ wharf with 600 tons of coal
contracted for by the Haitian (Government. It was knoMTi that the Government's
financial condition was still in a low state and that they had been unable to
obtain money for the purchase of this coaL Moody further stated that the
Haitian Government had made attempts to obtain money from the Haitian
National Bank, and upon the refusal of the management of this bank to deliver
the money it was rumored that the Government had made threats to seize the
money by force. The Wheeling further reported that our minister had received
requests from both French and German Legations for an American man-of-war
to visit Gonaives for the protection of foreign interests. The Wheeling also
requested instructions relative to landing an armed force to protect the bank
property. In view of this threatening attitude on the part of the Haitian Gov-
ernment, I feared for the safety not only of the bank property but for American
lives and property in general at Port au Prince, and especially for the schooner
Alice Pendleton. In view of these conditions, and also in view of the appeal
of the American minister to protect American and foreign interests at St
Marc and Gonaives, I decided to concentrate what forces I had available and
proceed to Port au Prince. In reply to the Wheeling, 1 informed Commander
Moody to consult with the American minister, use discretion relative to pro-
tection of bank property, and also to protect the schooner Alice Pendleton. I
notified the Secretary of the Navy and commander in chief of the Atlantic
Fleet of these facts immediately.
I arrived with my flagship on the morning of the 27th of January, 1915, at
Port au Prince, visited the minister with my staff, and found that although
the rumored threats of the Government to seize funds in the bank bad not been
carried out, the bank situation was far from easy. Previous to my arrival I
learned that the Haitian ofiScials had again visited the bank and demanded gold,
claiming this money belonged to the Haitian Government as part of " retrait *'
fond. Williams, acting director of the bank, refused, and reported to the lega-
tion that it was rumored same authorities would return and again renew their
demand, in which case he vould again refuse, and was afraid the authorities
would attempt to take the money by force.
In view of the financial condition of the Theodore Government their urgent
and vital need of funds, the lack of coal for the gunboats, the exposed posi-
tion of the Alice PendUton, the approach of the revolutionists, and the gen-
eral insecure conditions at Port au Prince, I decided to keep in constant touch
with the American minister and watch events. In view of the distance of the
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292 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Washington from the legation, I mounted a field radio set at the American
Legation for purposes of communication. *u-^ «.«,.««„ f^ hum
Because of the report that the Government forces were threatemng to burn
St. Marc if they were forced to retire from that place, our minister and the
French and German ministers were somewhat worried and requested that I
send a ship to that port. a«««.*«..,r
On January 28, 1915, I received the f«)llowiiig message from the Secretary
of State, via the Navy Department, in reply to ray request of January ^ for
immediate instructions relative to the protection of bank property at Port au
''•State to the Government of Haiti that the Government of the United
States of America can not consent to the removal of funds that belong to banlc
and getting which funds it is not possible for the bank to comply with con-
tractual obligations it has assumed. You will issue to that Government a
warning that any attempt that might be made to remove the funds of tlie
bank will compel you to take into consideration means to prevent such vio-
lation of foreign stockholders' rights."
Shortly after this I received the following message from the Secretary of
the Navy : • , , m «
" If deemed necessary In cooperation with minister land marines and sailors.
I also received from the commanding officer of the Wheeling on this date
the following message describing conditions at St. Marc, Haiti :
" Government force 300. Revolutionists greatly outnumbered are said to be
fighting 4 miles from town back of hills. Consular corps in body called aboard.
Is stated it is feared Government forces will be defeated again and fall back
Into town and then fear they will burn town to-night unless I can prevent.
Govewiment expects reinforcements about 2 p. m., Thursday. Ministers war
and interior now in town and I will have Interview this afternoon. Town
itself quiet now but practically deserted by population except few foreigners
on account of fear. More later.
Moody."
On January 29, 1915, the Theodore Government published the following
proclamation changing the depository for customs and tax receipts from the
National Bank of the- Republic of Haiti to such business houses or banks as it
may designate, etc. :
[Translation.!
PROCLAMATION — JOSEPH DAVIT.MAB THEODORE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC.
(See art. 97 of the constitution.]
See that the seals have been fixed to the National Bank of the Republic of
Haiti, on a value of 95140 dollars (P or 05140) that by reason of the two laws
of the 18th and 23d of December, permitting the running use of certain avail-
able values for the State.
Considering that it is of moment before the illegal opposition of the banX
that these definite values should be at the disposition of the Goveniment, and
considering that the extreme rarity and scarceness of gold renders difficult the
payment of taxes in gold, paralyzes the innwrtat on and exportat on and
creates a situation very prejudicial to the public treasurer, that it is necessary
to provide against this case with major force of wh'ch the gravity is evident
With reference to the second new paragraph of the first article of the law
of the 23d of December, 1914, aiming at the resumption of the service of the
treasury under the direction of the secretary of state of finance and of com-
merce and the advice of the councils of the secretary of state.
Article 1. After the publicat on of the present proclamation all of the cui^
toms duties of exportation and the additional 45 per cent tax of gold American
on imports will be deposited to the credit of the State at Port au Prince,
Jacmel, Cayes, Jermie, Aquin, Miragoane, Petit-Goave, and St. Marc, at such
business houses and at such banks which will be desgnatetl by the secretary of
state of finance, this and the amount of 95,140 dollars will belong to the State
actually u;ider the seals at the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti and of
the value fixed by the two laws of the 18th and 23d of December, 1914, that
portion of the mortgages dei)oslted designated to the home debt will be de-
ducted from the moneys received and held at the disposition of the bank. After
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the whole collection by the State of the value of the moneys before defined the
bank w 11 make reimbursement to the interested accounts by means of the
moneys actually under seal and as fixed by the laws of the 18th and 24th of
December, 1914.
Art. II. The exportatlons and the surtax of 45 per cent will be deposited one
half in American gold, one half in treasury bonds, or in the notes of the new
issue of 18,000,000 at the rate of 5 piasters for $1.
Abt. III. The present proclamation will be published and executed un<Jer
the direction of the secretary of state, of finance, and of commerce. Given
at the nat'onal palace at Port au Prince, January 27, 1915, and the one hundred
and twelfth year of the independence.
Davilmar Theodore.
By the President:
D. Dalinois,
The Secretary of State of Finance <md of Commerce.
In the meantime I had been in consultation with the American minister
relative to the situation at Port au Prince. On Saturday forenoon, January
30, I was informed by h'm that the final answer of the Theodore Government
to his representations directed made l>y the State Department in its telegram
of January 26, had not l)een received; that he expected such reply in a few
days. In the meantime about 1,000 Government troops had collected at Poit
au Prnce, some arriving from the south.
On February 3 the American minister informed me that he was assured by
the Theodore Government that no attempt would be made to forcibly remove
the funds from the banlc. and that in all dealings in connection with these funds
legal proceedings would be followed exclusively.
On the afternoon of February 5 I received a radiogram from the commanding
officer of the Wheeling, who, as stated previously, had gone to Gronaives. that
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, with about 1,000 men, had entered Gonaives with-
out resistance at 9 a. m. that day and had been received with a 21-gun salute
by the shore battery. The commanding officer of the M^heeling urged on Guil-
laume Sam to take necessary measures to avoid injury to life and property at
St Marc and Gonaives.
Since the end of that phase of the bank situation at Port au Prince relative
to the forceful removal of funds Port au Prince had been quiet. In so far as
disorders were concerned ; there was a suppressed air of uneasiness among all
classes, however. Prominent men were preparing to take refuge in the lega-
tions, and many fantastic rumors of the doings of the revolutionists and Gov-
ernment forces and the Government officials there in the town were constant.
I was in constant touch with the minister relative to the situation.
About February 9 Gen. Monplaisir came to Port au Prince, and there was also
In Port au Prince at this time Gen. Defly, at one time general of the Arron-
dissement Both of these men were undesirable characters. Defly had an
unenviable record while general of the Arrondissement, and Monpalisir, while
strong, was high handed and arbitrary in his methods. Both were consequently
disliked and feared by the best Haitians. There was coming to my notice con-
stantly indications of plots by Defly and Monpalisir for getting control of the
Government I thought it possible from information that I had gathered in
Port au Prince that Monplaisir or Defly might attempt to force intervention
by the United States by creating such insufferable conditions in Port au Prince
that I would be forced to land for the protection of foreign life and property.
These men evidently, from what I could learn, thought that if they were in
power at the time I landed and that if the United States should decide to inter-
vene at this place that in view of their high official positions at the time we
landed they would probably be kept in office by the United States and would
then be assured of steady pay and support. Further, in connection with the
ibove, a combination of 10 senators had attempted to approach me with the
further proposition to prevent Guillaume from entering Port au Prince so that
they might have a free election for President, their ideas being that the United
States support them in a government to be. It is needless to say that I ignored
all such advances and that I refrained from showing by any word or action
any disposition to favor any man or party in Haiti.
Guillaume was a strong man, but feared by the better class of Haitians on
account of his harsh methods and crooked tendencies. He had already served
one year of a life sentence imposed for falsifying government financial state-
ments and causing a large overissue of bonds the proceeds of which he had
iippropriated to his own use.
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294 INQUIRY INTO (K^CUPATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
In view of the conditions in Haiti whicli I believed were unusually dis-
turbed because of the excessive number of plots and counter plots among the
Haitians, the excessive continuation of revolutionary movements and disorder
throughout the country, the rapidly approaching fall of the Theodore govern-
ment and the consequent chaotic conditions that would occur in Port Au Prince,
the approach of Vilbrun Guillaume with about fifteen hundred men, among
whom were many cacps, the lawless men of the north who were very much
feared; in view of the rep^tsentations made by tlie United States with refer-
ence to the customs and other matters; in view of the possible violation of
Haitian neutrality by belligerent ships of European powers; in view, further,
of tlie unsettled condition of the bank question which, although assurances had
been received that no forcible attempt would be made to remove funds, was
yet far from settled owing to the brea Icing of the contract by the Theodore
government ; the changing of the depository for customs receipts, and the action
taken by the directors of the bank in connection therewith ; in view of the dis-
turbed conditions in Santo Domingo; and especially in view of my lapk of
knowledge of the policy of the United States Government, which, without warn-
ing, might demand of me to take prompt action in that vicinity; I requested
that an expeditionary regiment of marines be sent to this naval station, Quanta*
namo Bay, Cuba, together with the necessary means of transportation to Haiti,
and that both the Marines and the transiwrt \>e subject to my immediate call.
On February 18, the commanding officer of the Des Moines reported that St.
Marc was in the hands of the revolutionists ; that about eight of them had taken
the town during the night; that casualties were few; and that a number of
the Government forces were drowned w^hile trying to get off to the Nord Alexis :
and that Monplaisir, the Theodore minister of the interior, was reported dead.
It was afterwards found out that Monplaisir had been stabbed in the back
presumably by one of his own men in the boat getting off to the Nord Alexis.
In the midst of the foregoing events on February 8 the commander of the
Wheeling r^)orted that ex-MInister Bobo was on board the Piwiflqne going to
Monti Cristi and Ouanaminthe to organize and lead a new revolution.
During this time Port au Prince was becoming more disturbed, but up to
this date, February 18, 1915, there had been no outbreaks. On that day sev-
eral changes were made by Davilmar Theodore in his cabinet,- among which
was the resignation of Mr. Norno. minister of foreign affairs.
At 7 p. m., Saturday, February 20, the commanding officer of the /)e«
Moines reported that the Dutch steamer Prins Frederick Hendrik had arrived
at St. Marc from Cape Haitien with 70,000 srourdes for Guillaume, and had
little; that all was quiet at Cape Haitien and Ouanaminthe; and that the
Pacifique had recently been at Puerto Plata.
As I believed that Guillaume had the situation well in hand at St. Marc,
and would preserve order, and as he now had received considerable money and
had paid his troops, and as, therefore, the pressure on the customs money at
St. Marc was relieved, and as the situation was rapidly approaching a climax
at Port au Prince, I decided to concentrate all my forces at Port au Prince,
and accordingly ordered the Des Moines to that place.
The arrival of the Dutch steamer Prins Frederii^k Hendrik had been expected
for a day or so prior to arrival, and it was believed that President Davilmar
Theodore would take passage on her, this being in accordance with the time-
honored custom of procedure in the abdication of Haitian Presidents who were
exiled.
After the departure of President Davilmar Theodore on the Prins Frederick
Hendrik, and after the occupation of Port au Prince by the Guillaume forces
on February 23, a beneficent effect was noticeable. Business was resumed.
Stores, which had been closed for several days, were reopened; the market
reopened and the country people began brining produce into the city; the
water was turned on In the city again ; and excellent order was preserved. It
was reported to me by men who have witnessed these revolutionary move-
ments for many years that this change of government In Port au Prince at this
time had been occasioned by the least disturbance of any time for many years.
On February 26 I received a radiogram from the commander in chief, quoting
one from the department, directing that the Taconia or some other suitable
vessel proceed to Santiago de Cuba, meet Gov. Fort and Mr. C. C. Smith, repre-
sentatives of the State Department, and then convey them from Santiago deCuba
to Port au Prince, Haiti, and stating further that these gentlemen expected to
arrive at Santiago de Cuba on the evening of March 8.
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On Thursday, March 4, tlie Haitian Congress, in a joint session of senators
and deputies, elected Vilbrun Guillaume Sam President of Haiti.
At 11 a. m., Friday, March 5, the Tacoma arrived from Santiago de Cuba
with Gov. Fort and Mr. C. C. Smith, commissioners to Haiti from the State
Department.
The situation at Port au Prince and throughout the Haitian Republic had
DOW become tranquil. A constitutional government was established on shore
which was maintaining order and gaining the confidence of the people. The
negotiations pending between the United States Government and the Govern-
ment of Haiti were in the hands of the American minister and a special com-
mission from the State Department There seemed, therefbre, to be no need
at present for as large a naval force in the vicinity of Port au Prince as I had
theretofore kept. However, I decided to leave one vessel at Port au Prince to
watch the political conditions and report thereon and to furnish sudi aid to the
State Department commission as it desired.
I left Haiti with the Washington on March 8. Throughout my operations
in the island of Haiti I had endeavored to ascertain and follow the Govern-
m«it'8 policy with reference to that island, and in view of its great economic
and commercial importance to the United States* its vital strategic importance
to the Navy in future operations in this our most threatened area, and the
complications that might arise with foreign powers growing out of its chaotic
conditions I had devoted myself to especial care in all operations in that
Tidnity.
The Chaikm^an. Well now, proceed. Admiral, to the events which led to your
landing in July, if I remember rightly, at Cape Haitien.
Admiral Caperton. Then, as I understand, you do not care to hear any fur-
ther details?
The Chaibman. Well, not in detail. Sam took the capital and made himself
president?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir.
Senator Kino. If the chairman would not object, I would be very glad to
learn how he took it and what became of the president, very briefly.
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir. I have all that written down here, if I can just
find it.
On the 22d of February, Washington's birthday, I remember — I would like to
explain the reason why it takes me so much time to do this
Senator King. Do not do that.
Admiral Caperton. I want to do it, in justice to myself. Every move I
made and every move that was made by the forces of the Government and the
revolutionary forces I reported daily, and sometimes twice a day, to the de-
partment here in Washington, so that I have all this down chronologically. It
l8 a little hard to refresh my memory, as I have about 20 of these volumes.
On the 22(J I arrived. I have gotten down to when Guillaume Sam arrived.
He came in, I think, about the 23d of February. I have not looked at these
tilings for a long time, and I have not refreshed my memory because I have not
bad time. I wish to make it plain that there was fighting at these different
places outside of the city generally, during Guillaume Sam*s march from Cape
Haitien to the capital.
Senator King. Did he always vanquish the forces of the Government?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir; generally he was successful. He had more
troops and he had money and he managed to get ammunition.
Senator King. Where did he get his money and his ammunition?
Admiral Caperton. It was said that his uncle, a previous president, gave him
150.000 to make himself president. This I have heard dfscussed in Port au
Prince, and I believe it is a fact He d!d not have all of this at that time,
but as I recall, in one instance — I think it was St. Marc or Gonalves — he man-
tged to borrow money from some of his friends who were bankers.
The Chairman. Foreigm or native bankers?
Admiral Caperton. Well, they are very much mixed up, sir; it is hard for
me to tell exactly. I know of some native people who loaned him money.
Senator King. Were there any German bankers who loaned him money or
from whom he obtained money?
Admiral Caperton. I think there were in St. Marc. I had quite an experi-
ence with them, which is all detailed here in my report. It would take some
little time to find it
e22e^-21--PT 2 13
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296 INQUIBlf INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Kino. He did not conceal the fact that he was trying to overthrow
the Government, did he?
Admiral Oapketon. No, sir. This was a regularly organised revolution, If it
can be termed such. The moment he acclaimed himself " chief of the executive
power " he became the chief revolutionist in the island and the next president-
to-be if he were successful with his revolution.
Senator Kmo. Tliat was a violation of their constitution— his movement?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Well, he got to Port au Prince?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
The Chaibman. £>o you want to say anything about his actions in the cap^ire
of the city?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir; I would like to make a few remarks in regard
to that. During Sunday, February 21, 1915, the three parties of revolutionists
under Hilaire, Zamor, and Guillaume Sam, continued closing in on the city of
Port au Prince. These people had joined with Guillaume Sam, one coming from
the east and the other from the south, so that he had, finally, three armies or
bodies of troops advancing on Port au Prince. At this time General Zamor,
who was spoken of as the head of one of the parties of revolutionists, was in
the French consulate or French Legation, having taken refuge when the previ-
ous president went into office, and he had l)een there for four or five or six
months, not able to get out, during which time he was fed and clothed by the
French minister's family, with whom I talked much about this subject at a
later date.
At 11.30 o'clock Sunday evening, the minister of war, Vagues, sent an oflfcer
to the Wheeling, in Port au Prince, and through him applied for an asylum fbr
Vagues on board that vessel the following night, stating he intended to go
aboard a Dutch steamer, the Prins Frederick Hendrik, the next morning. It
seemed that it was arranged to delay this entry into the city of Port au Prlna
until this steamer arrived, and it was presumably understood that the Presi-
dent was to leave on this steamer, which it turned out was a fact.
The Chaibman.* You mean that just as these revolutions are fuhctionlzing in
their progress so also it is customary to allow the outgoing President to leave
the country before the arrival and the inauguration of the new one?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir ; sometimes he is allowed to do so, unless he Is
unfortunate, like President Guillaume Sam, who was assassinated iu the
capital.
The Chaibman. Yes; I understand.
Senator King. There have been others who have been killed, have there not?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
Senator Kino. If they did not get out, they were killed?
Admiral CJapebton. Yes, sir. They usually took asylum promptly in the
French legation, which was divided from the palace by a large wall. In which
there was a door with a key about that long [indicating], and if the lock bad
not rusted between the time the previous President had run through he
would make his escape all right, but on this occasion, with Guillaume Sam.
they could not unlock the door, and he had trouble getting over the wall, but
he finally got over ; they assisted him over the wall. That I will come to later.
The matter of asylum — I do not suppose you want to know how that was
dealt with?
The Chairman. Did you receive the general?
Admiral Capebton. No, sir; we informed him that there were other vessels
in the harbor, two of his own men-of-war, and he could go to them, besides
this Dutch steamer was expected the next morning at daylight, and they usu-
ally arrived on time, and in this instance she did arrive on time, and he then
went aboard from his hiding place that night. I did not consider It a case of
suflSclent danger to grant him an asylum. I knew he had other places to go,
as stated to him above.
The Chaibman. Let me interrupt. Admiral, to ask during all this time you
were reporting, as you have said, to the department?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
The Chaibman. Did you receive from the department messages approving
your course?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir. They are all In the record here.
Senator King. I would like to ask, If I may, what did you understand you
were there for?
Admiral Capebton. For the protection of foreigners and foreign property.
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.Senator Kino. Do you think that your presence and the presence of the
American fleet did protect lives and property?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir ; undoubtedly so.
Senator King. If you had not been there, do you think that not only Ameri-
can lives but the lives of other foreigners would have been taken?
Admiral Caperton. I fear so.
Senator Kino. Had former revolutions resulted in the massacre of foreigners
as well as natives?
Admiral Caperton. Generally speaking, no. I think they had not been in
the habit of killing foreigners. I think that is a matter of history. But they
did interfere with the property and the business of the cities, and no one knew
wliat they would do at the time. I will show you later, when I really landed,
and will tell you the circumstances and things that did take place in the city
at that time.
Senator King. Did you have sufficient contact with the people, the Haitians
who were loyal to the Government, and the foreigners. Including Americans,
to introduce into your mind the belief and the conviction that your presence
there was necessary?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
Senator Kino. For the protection of the lives and property of foreigners?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir; and especially property, because they always
looted. When a man joins a revolutionary army, it goes without saying that
he has the right to steal, loot, or do whatever he likes to the natives, which
they generally do. They fed themselves all the way along, and lived on the
country.
Senator King. Did you talk with Americans there?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Did they state to you that their lives were in danger, and
their property?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir; they insisted upon my landing, and when I
reached the point of landing I will tell you why I landed. I had a conver-
fiation with the French minister, with the charge d'affaires of the English Gov-
ernment, and also our own, who was then really the secretary of our legation.
Senator Kino. Were you in contact with the President of tbe Government from
time to time?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir; I was, in a manner, but we had not recognized
the then President. I had not met him, but my officers talked with some of
his cabinet from time to time, but we had not recognize*! him, so that I had not
••ailed ui)on him officially ; I had not called upon any of them officially.
Senator King. Hut he was de facto as well as de jure President?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir ; he was de facto President.
Senator King. But any movements of your war vessel around the Island there
were with his ai>i)roval, or were they not ; what is the fact, from what you could
It«m?
Admiral Caperton. From what I could learn ; yes, sir. He knew I was trying
to make the revolution be as civilized in warfare as near as possible.
Senator Kino. To protect life and property and to prevent massacre?
Admiral Caperton: Protecting property and protecting lives; and the Presi-
dent knew I was going out to beseech the then revolutionary chief not to do his
ft«htinR in the cities.
The Chairman. Let me interrupt there with a specific question that will go
back to your colloquy with the Admiral.
What si)eclfic instances, of your own knowledge, were there, either in *the
Vilbnin Gillaume Sam revolution, or others, of injury to the property of for-
eijpiera, or loss of life by foreigners at the hands of the revolutionists? Can
you tell of any case where a foreigner was killed by the revolutionary or Gov-
ernment forces or where property was <lestroyed?
Admiral' Caperton. I do not believe I can, sir. You must understand that
foreigners were not allowed to own property by the constitution.
The (Chairman. They are not allowed to own real property?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir.
The Ghaibman. Do you know of any case where any of them were ever
killed?
Admiral CAPteiTO*. I do not know that I can recall now, sir.
The Chairman. That Is all on that point, Admiral.
Admiral Capebton. On the morning of the 22d of February I sent an officer
ashore to the American legation to ascertain the news. From tWs officer I
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298 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
received the report that there had been considerable firing throughout the town
during the night.
I might say tliat during tills time they shut off the water from the city—the
revolutionists did — so that the citizens were crying out for water in the city, and
the F"rench minister made a protest to the officer in control relative to the water
and had received assurance that the water would be turned on again as soon as
tiie revolutionists took control.
Furthermore, 1 was informed that Gen. Praedel and Gen. Polynice were hi
charge of the city and were making arrangements to turn same over to Vilbnin
Gillaume, and that Davilmar Theodore had been informed by the revolutionary
factions that he would be given until noon to make his departure. That was
on the morning of the 22d of February.
I may say that Gen. I*olynice and (Jen. Praedel and four or five others were
in the habit of taking charge when the President was about to leave. They
assumed authority to handle the police and the soldiers as best they could in
the city, constituting themselves a committee of safety.
The (Chairman. That was their usual function there?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir. On many occasions before, and while I was there
with two Presidents, they both had the same i)08ition.
The Chairman. Di<i tliey hold oflice in the intervals between the assumption
of this authority?
Admiral Caperton. No. sir ; Gen. Praedel, I think, did, but Gen. Polynice was a
business man — I do not know his business, because none or few of them have
any business. I do not think he was a lawyer, even. Many are professional
uten, but they are not business men.
The Chairman. Well, his business was to take charge in the intervals?
Admiral (^aperton. At that time he always took charge. They always went
to him ; they looked to h'm to take charge.
The Chairman. Did he snve enough during that short time to live in the
interval?
Admiral Caperton. I suppose so. He had a very nice home there and was a
very nice man. They always went to him and expected him to bob up, and when
he came up things quieted down more or less in the city when the took charge. He
was the man I went to later when I had to go in myself, as I will explahi when
I reach that part of my testimony.
At 11.45 a. m. on this same day, January 22, Port Alexander and the battery
on the water front fired a salute, and Davilmar Theodore, accompanied by «
guard, went aboard the Prins Frederik Hendrik, unoccasioned by disturbance
of any kind. With him went only two or three of his cabinet.
The Chairman. Accompanied by whom?
Admiral Caperton. Accompanied by the ex-Minister of War Vagues. 1 saw
them with my glasses. They made quite an imposing march down the street and
wharf with their long frock coats and silk hats. He was then going aboard the
Prins Frederik Hendrik leaving the country. He was accompanied by ex-
Minister of War Vagues, as I said before, Locean Baptlste, Mr. Geradin Theo-
dore, and two sons. 1 know it to be a fact that the old man, Mr. Davilmar
Theodore, had hardly a sufficient amount of money to buy his ticket out of the
country, as he appealed for money to help him to go where he wished to go. and
as It turned out he only went to Santo Domingo.
The Chairman. Now, will you not move on to the events which led to the
occupation ? I think that is what we want
Admiral Caperton. You wish to know how the President came in — how Mr.
Gillhume Sam got in? The then President, as I have said before, Mr. Davlhnar
Theodore, left the country in the Dutch steamer.
The Chairman. In a plug hat, on a Dutch ship?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir; leaving the city without any government what-
ever, and the only people with any authority whatever were those two officers,
Gen. Praedel and Gen. Polynice, who appointed themselves a committee of
safety, as they usually called themselves.
The city became more quiet as soon as Theodore left, Gens. Praedel and Poly-
nice being in charge, working until the arrival of Vllbrun GlUaume Sam.
Senator King. Where were the revolutionary forces then; how near the city?
Were they in the city then, some of them?
Admiral Caperton. Not yet. About 800 revolutionists arrived in the dty me
following day.
Senator King. You said they had been firing.
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Adminil Capebton. Well, on the outskirts, a mile or so out, but there was some
firing in the city. Everybody fires there on an occasion of this kind.
The moment the President left, according to custom the (Jovernnient forces
occupying the city usually turned Dver and joined forces with the new man com-
ing in, because they wanted to be paid, and they would be paid under this pro-
cedure. Tlie Government had «ome forces at this time up in the northeastern
part of the island around near Ouanaminthe, where they went after Gillaume
Sara priKeefled around on this tour of his.
On the afternoon of the 23d of February about 800 troops of Vilbrun Gil-
launieV forces entered the city from the north. A committee of administration
t<»ok charge, pending the arrival of Vilbrun Gillaume, and publicly assured peace
and order.
On the morning of the 2oth of Februar>', Vilbrun Gillaume entered Port au
Prince with about 2,000 men on foot and 400 mounted. His entry was occasioned
with no disturbance of any kind. It was now estimated that about 5,000 troops
were in I*ort au Prince. These men, or troops, had very few clothes. They were
ruggetl. hungry, dirty, irresjionsible, with no education, and simply did what
they pleased in the city to a certain extent
Senator King. The cacos constituted a large part of the troops, did they?
Admiral (\\perton. Yes, sir; they are all cacos; all the revolutionary fellows
are cacos.- They live in the northern hills, and they have chiefs, as I said, and
they all come in to be paid by the new (lovemment. I might say that in the
course of a few days — not being on shore at this time I do not know how many days
it was — but in a few days they paid them off a few gourds, 5 or 10 each. Eight
gounls at that time were equivalent to our dollar. They pay these troops off,
who generally turn in their rifles, and sometimes they pay them a gourd or two
for a rifle, and then they proceed back to their hills again, waiting for the next
presidential move.
The President was unable to get a quorum of the Congress, so that he was not
electe<l President until several days afterwards.
The (^HAiRMAN. Was that a formality usual under the crcumstances?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir. I might say there is always a kind of "per-
manent committee." Tliis committee can meet and call the congress.
The Chairman. In special session?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Ami it Is usual for a man, when he has come to the end of
his military exmrsion to the capital, to be confirmed in the position of power by
the c<mgress?
Adndral Capebton. Yes, sir. So this committee met and sent out a call for a
meeting of ccmgress, but they were not able to get the delegates together — they
were scattered around — so that Guillaume was not inaugurateil until the 7th,
I thnk.
The Chairman. Never mind the date.
Admiral Capebton. The situation at Port au Prince and throughout the
Haitian Reipublic had now become tranquil. A constitutional govenmient was
established on shore, which was maintaining order and gaining the confidence
of the other people. I merely mention this- to explain my next move. I there-
fore considered the opimrtunity available for me to withdraw what vessels I
could spare in this vicin'ty and order them to Guantanamo for target practice,
which, in view of the lack of opportunity for such work during the year pre-
vious, was greatly nee<led by all vessels of the cruiser squadron.
I left on the 8th of March, two days after the President was inaugurated,
and sa iefl for Guantanamo. Upon arrival at Guantanamo the commander in
chief of the Atlantic fleet informed me that conditions were not very settle<l at
Vera Cruz and said he would have to order me to that station, so that that
afternoon I sailed for Vera Crua with two or three vessels.
On July 1. 1915, in accordance with ortlers of the Navy Department, stating
that French marines had landed at Cape Hatien, Haiti, and that I was to
proceetl there with the Wnshintrton to thank the French commander and take
the necessary steps to ** protect property and preserve onler." I arrived with
the Washington at Cape Haitien at 9.30 a. m. on Thursday. July 1, 1915, coming
from Vera Cruz, Mexico. In order to bettor estimate the situation at Cape
Haitien and get in tmich with the general situation in the Haitian Uepublic, I
assumed authority of the department to send the Eagle to Port au Prince for
news. Upon arrival at Cape Haitien I found the French cruiser Descartef*
anchored near the town and exchanged salutes with that vessel. At 10.30 a. m.
the commanding officer of the Descartes, Capt. H. Lafrogne, paitl an official
gitized by Google
300 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
call on me. The commanding officer of the Descartes stated that he had arriYcd
at Cape Haitieu, coming from Jamaica via Port an Prince, on the early morning
of June 19. at the direction of the French minister at Port an Prince; that at
that time a revolutionao' force under Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, minister of interior in
former President Davilmar Theodore's cabinet, was in charge of the town;
that at noon on that day the revolutionary troops under Bobo evacuated the
town and the Government troops entered ; and that on that day, for the pro-
tection of foreign interests, the DescartipH had landed a force of 50 men, sta-
tioning them/ at tlie French consulate, the French monastery, and the bank,
Commander Lafrogne further stated that he Icept these men on shore until
June 24, guarding foreign interests and otherwise aiding foreigners. He stated
that he had sent some flour ashore for the use of the French citizens.
The Frencli commander furtlier stated that when he arrived in Haitian waters
the French minister at Port au Prince had received an official protest from tlie
Haitian Government against the Descartes remaining in Haitian waters on
account of the violation of neutrality. He further stated that the German
minister in Port au Prince Imd protested to the same and to the Haitian
Government.
Senator Kino. All your inquiries supported the statements made to you by
the French commander?
Admiral Caperton. Yes. sir.
Senator Oddie. Were there any foreigners or Americans hurt or liilled at
Cape Haitien at this time?
Admiral Caperton. I thinlc not, sir. The French commander stated that he
placed himself at my disposal and orders.
The Chairman. Excuse me. May I ask about what time you are speakinjf
now?
Admiral Caperton. July, when I was about to land.
The Chairman. Your ship is lying off
Admiral Caperton. I had left Vera Cruz under orders, and I had arrived in
Haitien waters.
The Chairman. Where?
Admiral Caperton. Cape Haitien, and there I met the Descartes,
The French commander stated that he placed himself at my disposal and
orders while at Cape Haitien for the protection of foreign interests He asked
me if my instructions interfered with his remaining at Cape Haitien. I told
him that tliey did not. He stated that he would probably have to leave shortly
for coal.
The Chairman. Did he tell you that property had been injured when lie
landed ?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir; but another revolution had started, and the
Government troops had left, or vice versa, I do not know which, aM one had
come in and the other gone out, and when they do that they always sack every-
thing, you know, and shoot up the town, and the people were fighting, so they
asked for French aid, and he landed.
Senator King. There were foreigners residing there?
Admiral Caperton. Yes.
Senator King. Americans as well as French and Germans?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir; Americans, French, and Germans.
Senator King. Many nationalities?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir; many nationalities.
Senator King. The French had done nothing other than protect the property
of foreigners?
Admiral Caperton. That is all, sir, and sent some provisions ashore because
the people were starving generally.
The Chairman. You landed then?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir — not just yet, sir. I do not suppose you would
care to know how the revolutionary forces came in. You understand that Dr.
Bobo was the minister of Interior under Davilmar Theodore, the President, who
had just left Haiti. He became dissatisfied, I might say, in the meantime, and
resigned from the cabinet and went north to become President himself.
Senator King. He started another revolution?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir ; he did. This was in about two months' time.
Senator King. And he had gathered a considerable force, had he, of these
vagabonds and cacos?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir. We will get to that. Even on the 2t\ of Jnl.v.
with a revolutionary force of 500 men under Gen. Bobo, he had arrived at
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 301
Cape HaiUen and had on that day assumed control of the town. The town was
tfterwards blockaded by the Government gunboats Nord Alexis and Paoiftque
and approached from the south by a Government force. There was some pil-
laging when the Gk)vemment troops entered, but most of these offenders were
promptly punished.
During the time that Bobo occupied Oapt Haitien there was some shooting
in the vicinity, some bullets falling in the town, and a few shots from the gun-
txwts fired at Fort Picolet, at the head of the cape; otherwise order had been
maintained.
All the cables from Cape Haitien, namely, one to Puerto Plata, one to New
Yorlt, and one to Mole St Nicholas, were open and in working order.
At this time the town of Cape Haitien was In charge of the Government
forces under Gen. Blot, assisted by the commandant of the fort. Gen. Parisien.
Oen. Blot was special delegate in the north in charge of the military operations
against the revolutionists — that is, against Gen. Bobo.
The commanding officer of the Descartes informed me that he had as refu-
gees on board the chief of staff and one or two other members of the staff of
Bobo, who fled to his ship when Bobo left the city upon the return of the
Government forces.
I do not like to take up the time of the committee, but what I next wish to
8how is what relations I had with this man. Gen. Blot, and also with Gen. Bobo.
Senator Kino. Can you not state it without referring to your memorandum?
Admiral Capebton. Not very well, sir; I can not get the names. I think I
can give it to you.
The city of Cape Haitien is so situated that it is very easily protected from
the outskirts of the city. That is to say, a vessel in the harbor Is able to pro-
tect a small neck of land over which troops have to pass In order to enter.
The Chaibman. The city is on a sort of peninsula?
Admiral Caperton. A i)enin8ula; yes, sir. After several days of discussion
with Gen. Blot and also with our consul there and the prominent people of
the city I decided that I would not allow any fighting within the city walls.
The Chaibican. Was this conformable with any general or specific instruc-
tions from the Navy Department?
Admiral Capebton. This was not, sir. I had orders to protect the lives and
property of Americans and other foreign citizens, and knowing how th«e
pec^e act when one force comes into the city
lie Chaibman. Tou had orders to preserve peace or to protect
Admiral Capebton. No, sir; I had orders to protect lives and property of
the foreign citizens. I had orders to protect the city and property.
The Chaibman. Is there some one general order which laid down your^wlicy,
a general order of the department to you?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir. You mean upon occasions like that?
Senator Kino. Did you have any special order here?
The Chaibman. The admiral has testified he did not have a special order in
the case of Cape Haitien.
Admiral Capebton. Yes ; I read my orders here, sir. I will Just repeat them.
I was to proceed there with the Washinffton, thank the French commander,
and take the necessary steps to protect property and preserve order. This is
the order :
"French marines landed Cape Haitien. Proceed there with U. S. S. WQsh-
in0(m, thank French commander, take necessary steps protect property and
preserve order. Dispose of vessels on Mexican coast to best advantage. U. S. S.
Marietta en route to Vera Cruz.
(Signed) Daniels.'*
As I said, after discussing this matter with our consul and the French con-
'^l, with Gen. Blot himself, and other prominent men In the city, I considered
it my duty. In order to carry out my orders, to allow no fighting in the streets,
hecanse the city was entirely unprotected. Therefore I drew up an order,
which I presented to Gen. Blot, and also managed to send my chief of staff,
with an escort, out into the jungles to find Gen. Boho, and I presented each one
of them with this order. I sent my chief of staff on shore to have a conversa-
tion with Gen. Blot, the commanding officer of the Government forces in Cape
Haitien. The chief of staff stated as follows :
"I am charged by my admiral to express to you his compliments and his
good wishes for the peace and prosperity of Haiti. The admiral desires to
state frankly the purpose of his visit here. The statement is made with kind
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802 INQUIRY INIX) OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
feeling and without any desire to appear as a threat, but it is made so that you
may know exactly what to expect of him. The admiral is here to protect the
lives of foreigners. This he will do if necessary, but he sincerely hopes and
believes that there will not be occasion for him to do anything. The admiral
knows that there are armed revolutionists near Cape Haitlen, and there is a
possibility of a conflict between these revolutionists and the Government forces.
** The a(lnilral believes that the lives and property of foreigners residing in
Gape Haitien will be threatened and insecure should there be fighting in the
city itself or near the city. Therefore the admiral states that there must be no
fighting in the city or near it. or he will have to take means to protect the lives
of foreigners. He therefore suggests that all fighting must take place at a rea-
sonable distance from the city, and that under no circumstances shall foreigners
be endangered in life or property."
In reply to this the commander stated as follows :
" I thank you for your kindly sentiments. Express to the admiral my com-
pliments and my appreciation for his message."
Senator Kuvo. That was the representative of the Government?
Admiral Capebton. Gen. Blot, the representative of the Government.
Afterwards I wished to confirm this, so I wrote the following letters to Gen.
Probus Blot, commanding the Haitian (^vernment troops at Cape Haitien,
Haiti.
The Chairman. Put them in the record as they are. You do not have to
read them.
(The letters referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)
Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. Washington, Flagship,
. Off Cape Haitien, Haiti, July 2, 1913,
Gen. Probus Bixrr,
Commending Haitian Oovemtncnt at Cape Haitien, Haiti,
Sir: In confirmation of the conversation you had with Capt. E. L. Beach, my
chief of stuff, this morning; I have the honor to state that the United States
naval forces are present at Cape Haitien for the purpose of protecting the
lives and property of American and other foreign citizens.
In view of the number of lives and quantity of foreign property in Cape
Haitien, It is impossible for fighting to occur in that town without seriously en-
dangering these lives and property. In vew of the situation of Cape Haitien,
the whole attack and defense of that town can take place well clear of
it; and victory to one faction or the other there decided. I must, therefore,
insist that no fighting whatever take place in the town of Cape Haitien and
that the contending factions fight their battles well clear of the town where
bullets will not fall therein.
In furtherance of these ends, and to aid the local authorities in preserv-
ing order and guarding property, If It should become neceasary, I am prepared
to land United States forces at Cape Haitien.
I have no Intention of questioning the sovereignty of the Haitien nation or
of maintaining any but a neutral attitude toward the contending factions?.
I trust that, by confining your military operations to the country, well clear
of Cape Haitien and by continuing to maintain order in the town, you will
make it unnecessary for me to take action.
A letter similar to this has been sent to Gen. Rosalvo Bobo, commanding the
revolutionary forces in the vicinity of Cape Haitien. I am,
Respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Commanding Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
and United States Forces in the vicinity of Cape Haitien.
Substantially the same letter was sent to Gen. Rosalvo Bobo. commanding
the revolutionary forces In the vicinity of Cape Haitien.
Senator Kino. Gen. Blot approve<l of your course, did he?
Admiral (L'aperton. He approved of my course.
Senator Kino. And the foreigners approved of it as well, and the Americans?
Admiral Caperton. They were satisfied, I think, but I stated further to these
gentlemen that If they would fight out on the plains outside of the city I would
recogni/x' the man who won, and I would see that he afterwards took possession
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INQUntY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 803
of the city, but he would so so in an orderly manner. In other words, I did not
wish to appear as wanting to stop this revolution, or as taking any sides one way
or the other.
The Chairman. You were just establishing rules lilce those of the Marquis
of Queensbury?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Did you learn from the American consul, the French consul,
and others that there was danger to the lives and property of foreigners, except
for the landing of French marines, or the maintenance, at least temporarily,
of an American war vessel in the harbor?
Admiral Capebton, Yes, sir. I do not thinlc I can hardly describe the dif-
ference of conditions in the city by merely having a few foreign troops there
to take charge. When they came in, these fellows, especially the revolutionists —
in fact, they are all perhaps more or less revolutionists — the Government had
some few forces — tliey did as they pleased, ransacked everything, took what
they pleased, shot up the town, and were entirely unruly.
Senator King. Looting and violence?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir ; no order whatever.
Senator King. And were the lives and property of foreigners jeopardized by
those revolutionary movements?
Admiral Capebton. I should think so, sir. They are certainly a very dis-
turbing element.
Senator King. You sent an order to Gen. Bobo?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir ; the revolutionary general.
Senator King. I know who he is. Did he respond to your suggestion tliat if
there was any fighting that it be removed from the town?
Admiral Capebton. I think he did, sir. I have his reply here.
Senator Kino. Did he make any objection to your suggestion to him?
Admiral Capebton. No, sir.
(Whereupon, at 12.15 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2.30 o*clock p. m.)
afteb becess.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
recess.
The Chaibman. Now, Admiral, let me recapitulate. At the moment that
you communicated your views to Blot and Bobo, the French marines had re-
embarked?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
The Chaibman. But yours had not been landed?
Admiral Capebton. No, sir.
The Chaibman. You did not land forces Immediately upon the reembarkatlon
of the French ; there was an interval between ?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir; an interval there of several days.
The Chaibman. Had your forces been landed nt the time that you dispatched
this communique to Bobo and Blot? Were you In occupation of the city or
the posts in the city at that time, do you remember?
Admiral Capebton. No, sir : my men had not landed. I landed them first on
the 3d of July. I think this happened on the 1st of July, the 1st or 2d.
The Chaibman. I want to be sure whether I have got the date of the com-
munique to Blot and Bobo. Under what date did you write them?
Admiral Capebton. The letter was written on the 2d of July, about their not
fighting.
The Chaibman. In the city?
Admiral Capebton. Asking them not to fight In the city ; yes, sir.
The Chaibman. And you landed on the 3d?
Admiral Capebton. I lande<l my troops on the 3d, and I give my reasf)us here
for the landing.
The Chaibman. (io on and give them.
Admiral Capebton. This was on July 3. In order to facilitate the communi-
cation between tlie American consulate and the V. S. S. WaHhington, I estab-
lished a field radio station at the railroad station on American property— we
have a railroad there
The Chaibman. I understand.
Admiral Capebton. And landnl a party of 1 oflicer and 11 marines, and 1
operator to guard and operate the radio set. I informed Gew. Blot of my Inten-
tion to land these men, and he made no objection.
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804 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
On July 3, 1915, I inforiue<t tbe cxiiUDiandlng officer of the Descartes aod Geu.
Blot of my intention, and on July 5, the ship in full dress, fired a salute of 21
guns in honor of Independence Day, and in order to close this incident up, I migbt
say that on the day I tired the salute I was very much suri>rised to see that the
Guillaunie Sam Government had two ships in the harbor and they fired a salute
with us, being also In full dress.
The Chairman. What date was this — the 4th of July?
Admiral Capebton. On the 5th it was done ; the 4th was Sunday. That showed
that the feeling l>etween the (Jovernment at that time and ourselves was
The (^HAiBMAN. Very goo<l?
Admiral Capf3Ton. Very good ; yes, sir.
Bobo*8 minister was also seen. He state<l that the revolutionists did not want
to fight in or near Cape Haitien, and that they were very anxious to avoid injury
to foreigners. The minister of war further stateil that unless the Government
forces came out to fight, the revolutionists would move up to Cape Haitien on
Wednesday and attacic the Government forces.
On July 8 Gen. Blot informeil me that lie had receiveil orders from Gen.
Guillaume Sam in Port au Prince to extend to us all courtesies. I expressed
my appreciation of this jnessage through an officer and myself.
As an engagement between the Government and the revolutionary forces had
not taken place, and as the revolutionary forces were still witliin 3 miles of Cape
Haitien, and as occasional shots were dCcurring in the vicinity, indicating pos-
sible further fights in the near future, and in view of my announced intention
to prevent fighting within the town of Cape Haitien, I decided to take precan-
tionary measures to prevent a sudden rush of both factions Into the town and
their consequent fighting therein before I could land to prevent same. The
Washington could not He closer than 3 miles of the to^\*n, and trade winds made
boating difficult. I learned from residents of the town that on two occasions
outside forces had, enteral the town without warning, and fighting resulted
therein, and my experience of the past winter also indicated that a similar case
occurred at St. Marc.
This is to show why I wished to establish that radio set. so that I could com-
municate 3 miles distant from Cape Haitien, and, in fact, the city was partly
hidden by tbe cape from where I had to anchor.
On July 9th, in accordance with my intention to land an outpost detachment
of Marines at Cape Haitien, I directed an officer of my general staff to see Gen.
Blot and explain my intentions, and to obtain his assent if possible. This
officer visited Gen. Blot, in company with the American consul, and under my
directions stated to him my wish to land this force of Marines, to guard tbe
railroad property and American and foreign interests, and that I would be
pleased to have his assent to this landing.
In answer to that Gen. Blot withheld consent for tlie present, giving as
his reason that in view of the revolutionists' propaganda that foreign powers
were aiding the government, any lauding of a force there would be interpreted by
the revolutionists as a movement to aid the government, and that he could not
see any reason for the landing at that time.
From this date up to July 27 I remained at anchor off Cape Haitien, watching
closely the actions of the revolutionary forces and the government forces out-
side and near Cape Haitien.
On the morning of July 27th I received Information from the manager of the
French cable station at Cape Haitien that the Arrondlssement and the palace
at Port au Prince had on this morning been attacked by a revolutionary faction,
and that fighting was going on at Port au Prince. I Immediately sent a flag
officer ashore to investigate that report. They visited the cable station and
received a confirmation of this report. It was also learned that Guillaume
Sam and the government had been overthrown, and that the revolutionary
faction now controlled the city, and that the government officials, including
Guillaume, had taken refuge in the French and Dominican legations, and that
the leader of the revolution was not yet known.
These rei)orts were confirmed by cable which was received while thew
officers were at the cable station, and also from private messages to the
business houses and Individuals at Cape Haitien.
I immediately sent a cable to the American legation at Port au Prince,
directing the American charge d'affaires to report the situation to me.
In reply to my message I received the following:
"Guillaume In French legation. Revolutionists in entire control of dty.
Outgoing government shot 70 political prisoners in their jeeUs, including ex-
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INQXHRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMLINGO. 305
Preflldent Zamor, on account of which trouble la feared. Large number of
soldiers killed and wounded in fighting this morning. Not known at present
in whose favor is movement City quiet, but under circumstances your pres-
ence and American ship deslrefl.
" Davis, Charge d^ Affaires,
Senator Oddie. What date was that?
Admiral GAPfarroN. That was on July 27th. This was in reply to the message
I sent:
"French legation threatened. Forcible entry attempted for the punx)se of
taking out president. English Charge and French Minister have cabled for
ships. Situation very grave, and presence of warship as soon as ix)ssible
necessary.
" Davis."
As soon as I could withdraw the landing force from Cape Haitien, I im-
mediately sailed for Port au Prince, leaving only the U. S. S. Eagle to take
care of the situation at Cape Haitien.
The Chaibmait. The Eagle had no force ashore, then?
Admiral Caperton, No, sir; I withdrew all my forces.
On July 27, 1915, while the U. S. S. ^Vaghington was en route from Cape
Haitien to Port au Prince, I sent the following message to the Secretary of the
Navy:
** Cable dispatch from Port au Prince reports a revolutionary faction attacked
the Arrondlssement and palace at Port nu Prince Tuesday morning, and has
overthrown Gulllauuje government. Revolutionary faction now controls city.
Government ofliclals, Including Gulllaume, have taken refuge In French and
Dominican legations. Leader of revolutlcn not yet known.
" American legation at Port au Prince reports outgoing government shot 70
political prisoners, Including ex-President Zamor, and a large number of soldiers
killed and wounded in fight. Latest cablegram from American legation just
received as follows : * French legation threatened and forcible entry attempted
for purpose taking out President. Englit h charge and French minister have
cabled for ships. Situation very grave.'
" Cape Haitien at present quiet but growing uneasy. Gen. Blot received
message from Port au Prince, stating revolutionists had control of city, and
asked him to Join them. This message feigned l)y Delva, Polynlce, Dellnol.s,
Robin, Etlerine, and Delencourt, and Zamor.
" Have withdrawn detachment from shore, and am pi-oceedlng with Washing-
ton to Port au Prince. Am leaving Eagle to tend situation Cape Haitien. Have
requested marine company, naval .station, Gu mtanamo Bay, stand by to embark
on Jason for expeditionary service in Haiti ; unless otherwise directed will use
this company to reenforce Washington's battalion If situation requires."
Upon arriving at Port au Prince at 11..50 a. ni. on July 28, 1915, I immediately
assumeci control of the situation, and confirmed the report which I had previ-
ously received, and Informed the Secretary of the Navy as follows
The Chafrman. Admiral, wliat are you reading from?
Admiral Caperton. This is a copy of my dispatches here.
The Chairman. Is that your dispatch that you are reacling now?
Admiral Caperton. I am going to read it now.
The Chairman. Where you say " Hear Admiral Caperton," did you write
a dispatch In the third person?
Admiral Caperton. These are the quoted parts there.
The Chairman. What Is that volume?
Admiral Caperton. This is a report that Maj. McClellan has gotten up from
my reports. You see, it Is a copy.
The Chairman. I>o you not think you would do better just to tell us the
story in your own langauge?
Admiral Caperton. Ye»<; I can tell you a good many things, but I think jier-
haps It is due me. I could tell you what I did, but perhaps I would not be
able to give you my authority for acting.
The Chatbman. Well, I want you to follow the course which seems good to
yoii, but we are interested, as you understand, primarily to tenow the cir-
cumstances under which you landed marines, and the authority uiion which
you acted.
Admiral Caperton. I am endeavoring to give yju that.
The Chairman. All right, sir.
Admiral Caperton. This Is my m(»ssage.
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306 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
" Dominican legation violated Tuesday : Gen. Oscar, chief of ArrondisseixHait^
forcibly removed and killed. At about 10.30 tlds morning French lega-
tion invaded by mob of about 60 Haitians, better class; President (iuil-
laume forcil)ly removed from upstairs room and killed at legation gate,
and body cut in pieces and paraded alxmt town "
Tlie Chairman. Tlie.st* were the Haitians of the better class, then, who in-
vaded the legation and cut Sam to pieces?
Admiral Capertox. Yes, sir. If you will allow me, in a moment I will tell
just a short story i)f that. It will take me a few minutes. The cablegram con-
tinues :
" No government or authority in city. Many rival lea<lers in town. Am laml-
ing force in city for purpose preventing further rioting and for protection
foreign lives and in'operty, and to preserve order. Have directe<i naval station
Guantanamo, Cuba, to send ccmiiiany marines Port au Prince. Ac(H>unt large
area city, will require regiment of marines from United States nt once for
policing and patrolling. Suggest V S. S. Montana, V. S. S. \orth Carolina,
or U. S. S. Tcnncftsee as transport.
** Caperton.*'
When I arrived with tlie Washhiffton at about 10.30 on the morning of the
28th, the circumstances which 1 have Just related in these varl<ms messages
were reported to me from the city, and while I was listening to these re^wrts
I had my glasses in my hand, and as I looked ashore I saw much confusion
there. I was about a mile off, and I saw much confusion, people in the streets,
and apparently there was a procession, as if they were dragging something
through the city, and I afterwards found out from officers when I sent them
ashore that this was the body of President Guillaume Sam, which had been
mutilated — the arms cut oiT, the head cut off and stuck on poles, and the torso
draw^n with ropes through the city.
To go back a little, I learned from what I considered good authority that
President Guillaume Sam had received many notices In regard to the revolution
which might break out right under his nose, and it is said in Port au Prince
that he gave the order to Gen. Oscar to execute all prisoners at the first sound
or first shot in the palace grounds. He was to murder or kill all the prisoners,
wlrch he proceeded to do.
The Chairman. Chiefly political prisoners?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir; I understood and know% in fact, that many of
these prisoners were the best people of the city.
The Chairman. That is what I mean ; they were seized as political hostages.
Adndral Caperton. They were seized, but thej' were not political prisoners.
A good nmny of them were business people, and were seized, as I have often
lieard dLscussed there, on rei)orts, without being substantiated at all.
The Chairman. It is generally believed that these prisoners were seized as
hostages and killed by Sam's order. *
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir: but I would like to state that they were the best
people of the city, and a great many of them had never interfered or had any-
thing to do with politics.
This report became current at once throughout the city, and people who ha«l
friends and relatives there rushed to the prison and found the center of the
court filled with bodies lying dead. There were 5 out of about 170 w^ho were
still alive. They saved their lives, as I found out afterwards, by getting behind
the prison doors, the little cell doors. They just shot and stabbecl and cut and
mutilated as they went along from one cell to another. There were three or four
or five in each cell. Those* who ^vere saved had enough sense, w^hen the attack-
ing party came back, to fall over as if dead. One man was under this whole
crowd of one hundred and sixty otld men, and came near smothering before
they got him out. Finally they pulled him out, and he had not been hurt at all.
During this melee, or this attack on the palace by, it is said, 50 or 60 men
under Delva — I do not know that it is necessary to give the names: I have not
that list just now, but I know the five or six men who stirred up this affair, and
headed by these men they ran to the palace, broke open the palace, and began
to shoot and kill one another, and do all sorts of outrageous things.
In the meantime the President attempted to leave the palace. He attempted
to leave by this large door which is in the w^all which separates the French Le-
gation from the palace. He could not unlock the door, and I believe was rai8e<l
and pushed over the wall, but, anyway, he reached the legation in some way, but
in doing so he w^as shot in the leg, so that when he arrived In the legation he
was wounded. This was about 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning jnf the 27th.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 307
Sometime that afternoon the soldiers, who I think at that time had all turned
perhaps and joined the new chief of executive power, attempted to gain entrance
to the legation ; and some of them, I believe, did get in, and Gen. Zamor setmed
to be the leader. This was told tome by one of the young ladles in the legation.
As he rushed to go upstairs, where the President had hidden himself in a locker
or bathroom, it was, really, she put out her hands to stop him, and plead with
him, with her hands on his shoulder, and reminded him that for the past four
or five months, while he was In exile in the legation, she, herself, had fed him
with her own hands, and appealed to him in such a manner that he broke
down and sat down on the steps and wept. Then he arose and passed out, and as
he went out he said to her, " I will take all of this mob, or this crowd of soldiers,
out now. This legation will not be entered again by any soldiers. I will be
responsible for that." He left and took the soldiers out, and as far as we know
carried out what he promised. That was on the afternoon of the 27th.
Then the next morning, while all the good people of the city were taking
their dead to the cemetery to bury them, and were in the act of doing this.
somebody passed tJie word that the Washington was coming ; that they saw her
smoke; and that tlie admiral would be there in a few minutes and would stop
all of that ; and that everybody must rush to the French Legation and get the
President So that was the ero*vd that went the second time and really got in
and got the President. They found him upstairs in the bathroom, pulled him
out dragged him down, dragged him through the back of the house, along a
cobblestone walk or driveway about 50 or 100 yards to the gate, and there
attempted to throw him over the gate. The gate being iron, with spikes on top,
his body in some way or some manner caught on the top. They succeeded in
palling him over anyway, and when he reached the outside of the legation they
fired six or eight shots into him, and found that he was not dead ; and, as I
have been told, the next Uiing they did was to cut his throat, cut his head off,
put a rope around his body, and started ofC Then the cry was to stop. Then
they proceeded to amputate his arms and his legs and his head and stuck them
CD poles and paraded his body around through the streets. And that was the
procession that I saw.
Immediately upon my arrival I sent two officers of my staff to call at the
American Legation and ascertain the news. There these officers were met by
Mr. Davis, the charge d'affaires; and after hearing his statement, Mr. Davis
aad the two officers went into the French legation, where they found the French
minister and the British charge d'affaires.
The Chaibmapj. Which legation were they in then?
Admiral Capebton. In the French Legation. The two officers, the American
charge d'affaires, the French minister, and the British charge d'affaires returned
to the Washington and held consultation with me.
There was no government or authority In the city, but a so-called " committee
of safety," which, it was stated, was formed by Gen. Polynlce and three other
generals. They made no attempt to preserve order, nor did they inform me or
any foreign legation of their assumption of authority. Polynlce himself per-
petrated the violence on the Dominican consulate. As three of his sons had
been murdered by Gen. Oscar, he went himself to the Dominican Legation,
entered It, found (Jen. Oscar, and dragged him out to the street and shot him
full of holes.
Senator Oddie. May I ask you here. Admiral, if any Americans were injured or
killed dnring this time?
Admiral Cap>:bton. I think not, sir. There were not very many Americans In
Port au Prince.
After a consultation with the American charge d'affaires, the French minister,
and the British charge d'affaires, I decided to land American forces for the
purpose of preventing further rioting and for the protection of the lives and
property of foreigners and to preserve order.
In the meantime, at 3 o'clock p. m., on July 28, the Acting Secretary of the
Navy sent the following message to me in Port au Prince :
" State Department desires that American forces be landed at Port au Prince
and that American and foreign interests be protected ; that representatives of
England and France be informed of this intention— informed that their inter-
ests win be protected and that they be requeste<l not to land. In acting on this
request be guided by your knowledge of present conditions in Port au Prince
and act at discretion. Department has ordered Jason, with marines at Guan-
tanamo Bay, to proct^ed immediately to Port au Prince. If more forces are
absolutely necessary, wire Immediately."
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808 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITIJIND SANTO DOMINGO.
On my way clown from Cape Hatien, as usual, I made all preparations for
landing our landing force. Under orders of the Navy Department, and in
cooperation with the State Department, I landed a provisional regimait of two
battalions, under command of Capt George Van Orden, United States Marine
Corps, at Port au Prince on the afternoon of July 28, 1915, and occupied that
city.
This operation is described in the following radiogram sent by me to the
Secretary of the Navy on July 28, 1915 :
''Landing at Port au Prince decided on after consulting with AmerlcaD
charge d'affaires, French minister, and British charg<§ d'affaires. Informed
Gen. Polynlce and three others, who seemed to be leaders ashore, of my Inten-
tion to land and protect lives and property and preserve order. They assented
to this landing, but said they could not guarantee peaceful entry, but would do
all they could to explain our Intentions to the populace and prevent disturb-
ance and would cooperate with us. Descartes (French warship) expected to-
night. No foreign men-of-war In harbor excepting Wctshington at preset
Considered Immediate landing necessary. landing made at Blzoton with two
companies of marines and three companies of seamen at 5.4o p. m. U. S. S.
Eagle reports conditions Cape Haitien quiet. Eagle has landed 20 men Cape
Haltlen to protect French consulate for fear of attack on refugees there. Land-
ing made at request of French consul.
" Capebton."
I think that letter explains this.
The Chaihman. It does. It is all very clear and satisfactory.
Admiral Caperton. In order to acquaint, the charg§ d'afftilres of my Inten-
tions, after deciding to land I wrote the following letter :
'* I have the honor to state that It appears that rioting and disorder In Port
au Prince have gotten beyond control and the situation to have become such
ias to endanger the lives and property of Americans and other foreigners who
are left without protection. As a result of our conference a naval force will
land and afford such protection .\ Tp facilitate this you are respectfully re-
quested to notify all Americans and all foreign diplomats, representatives,
consuls, and others who desire protection to keep within doors, to hoist the
flag of their nationality, and refrain from all actions which could possibly be
interi>reted as a hostile demonstration against the naval force.
" Caperton.**
I think it but fair and Just that I make some mention of the Intense feeling
and desire with which the French minister especially and the British charge
d*affaires Insisted upon my landing immediately. The French minister has a
family consisting of a wife and two daughters, and he said, " They are there
at the legation with no one to protect them. Now, you see what Is going on
In the city." And he begged that I land as quickly as possible, as did also the
British charge d'affaires.
At 11.20 on the 29th of July I sent the following message to the Secretar>'
of the Navy and Commander in Chief:
'* Landing force established in city. Slight ^resistance during early part of
night as advance was being made. This resistance easily overcome. No
casualties our forces. As there is no government or authority In town, am
required assume military control in city. Am proceeding disarm bodies
Haitian soldiers and civilians to-day. Can not see how this can develop Into
any other than absolute military control of city. Regiment of marines abso-
lutely necessary, and should be sent at once. Two Haitian gunboats at Cape
Haitien and most of army in that vicinity. Earnestly recommend U. S. S.
Nashville be ordered take charge situation Cape Haltlen and that U. S. S.
Castine be made available as soon as possible.
" Caperton."
From the reports which I receiveil on shore, the majority of the Haitianj?
welcomed the landing of the American forces and were overjoyed at the pros-
I)ect of relief from revolution and government by terror. The politicans and
soldiers naturally were opposed to any action which would prevent them from
securing to themselves the results of the overthrow of the government
On the morning of the 29th I immediately sent the chief of staff, Capt E. L.
Beach, ashore to confer with the commander of the landing forces and promi-
nent citizens with reference to disarming the Haitian soldiers and civilians
In the town. The chief of staff and the commander of the landing forces met
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INQUIRY INTO OCCTTPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 309
G«n8. Polynlce, Delva, CharleR Zanior, Noel, Nau. Samson Monpoint, and Robin,
who had organized themselveR as a revolutionary committee. I might add that
at the time when the city was taken Gen. Robin was in command of the forces.
After considerable parleying It was agreed that they would undertake to dis-
arm all the soldiers and civilians and place the arms in the palace under guard
of police, subject to my inspection as to the completeness of the disarming.
I. of course, assumed the right, and exercised it, of placing a guard over these
arms. The conference with the committee of safety was of some length. I
explained to them my intentions relative to the preservation of law and order
and the necessity of assuming military control of the city. They assented to
this control and agreed to cooperate. This committee agreed to meet my repre-
$aentatives dally to insure cooperation. I make these remarks so as to show
and emphasize their promises at the time.
The Chaibman. This committee included these same gentlemen who acted
during all of these interregnums?
Admiral Capebton. Some of them ; the principal ones, Mr. Delva and Poly-
nice. Mr. Praedel was not in this party at the time.
The d^artment sent the following message on July 30, 1915, to me concerning
the military occupation of Port au Prince :
"The department appreciates the excellent manner In which disturbance at
Port au Prince has been handled and directs that you retain military control of
city until further orders. Acknowledge.
" Daniels."
At 7.40 p. m. on the 30th I sent the following message :
"In accordance State Department instructions, American charge d'affaires
informed French minister of my Instructions relative requesting he not land
French troops. This was done previous my consultation with French minister
on subject. French minister naturally feels great humiliation for his country
and flag over Insult of violation of his legation. While he feels amply pro-
tected, and expressed gratitude to me and to United States Government through
ine for furnishing him guard, yet he says not landing French guard at his lega-
tion might indicate to Haitians that he was deserted by his Government and
prestige of France thereby suffer. French minister will probably Insist on
landing legation guard. Suggest advisability of arrangements being made
between State Department and French Embassy, Washington, D. C'., relative
this matter. French cruiser Descartes arrived Port au Prince 2 p. m. Friday.
" Caperton.**
I would like to add here that the first thing that was done when the landing
party reached the vicinity of the legations was to send guards Immediately to
these legations for protection before our troops blvouacke<l for the night.
On the 31st I sent the following message to the Secretary of the Navy:
"Port au Prince quiet during day, but still unsettled. French minister In-
formed me he had received dispatches from Paris, France, Government stating
that French Embassy, Washington, had been directed inform United States
Government that France considered landing legation guard at Port au Prince
necessity for national honor. French minister repeated his conviction that we
were ably protecting life and property and assured me his guard would be
confined to legation and that arms of French guard would not be carried by
them outside of legation. He further stated that ln» wishes It understood he
does not Intend Interfering In any way my actions in town. Press dispatches
received to-day from Unite<l States indicate State Department evidently thinks
de facto government exists l*ort au Prince. No de facto government ex-
ists Port au Prince. All government functions at present undertaken car-
ried on by committee citizens acting practically under my direction. Cham-
ber deputies asked permission elect president, but deferred in compliance
my request. Time for ele<*tic)n President not propitious for maintaining
law and order. U. S. S. Eagle reports heavy firing outside Cape Haltien;
reports Bobo will attempt enter Cape Haltien. Blot in full control there at
present. Blot has taken Gonaives, Haiti. Army in north menace peace and
order, both Port au Prince and C>ape Haltien. May have to occupy Cape Haltien.
Hepartment may expect request for another regiment of marines.
" Capkrton.**
The Chadiman. Had the first regiment arrived by this time in Port au
Prince?
Admiral Capeston. No, sir; it had not arrived. I think It was about this
time that a company came.
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310 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
I deeire to state, in order to make the record clear, that the Zamor killed was
the ex-President Zamor, Charles Zamor*s brother. Charles Zamor was the goi-
eral who was In the French legation.
I have been asked the question as to whether or not I have ever heard of
the killing of a foreigner by Haitians. The records of the Navy Department
disclose that our vessels of war have been there at practically every disturb-
ance since at least 1857. I have not gone back beyond that. This, in my opinion,
caused the Haitians to hesitate before killing any Americans. In other words,
no one can tell how many foreign lives would have been lost and foreign prop-
erty destroyed if United States warships had not been continually present to
prevent violence. I think the committee would be surprised to see how many
vessels it has been necessary to send down to Cape Haitien since 1857, every
year, just to stop these things.
The Chairman. If the department has a record of that sort, it would be
interesting to have if presented to the committee at your convenience. Admiral
Admiral Capeston. Yes, sir.
( Whereupon the committee adjourned until Wednesday, October 12, 1921, at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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INQUIRY IKTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
WEDNESDAY, OGTOBEB 12, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
WasMngton, D, C.
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment, Senator
HediU McCormick (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators McCk)rmick, Oddie, and Knox.
Also present : Mr. Ernest Angell, Mr. Horace G. Knowles, and Maj. Edwin N.
McClellan, United States Marine Corps, in their respective representative ca-
pacities as hereinbefore indicated.
STATEMENT OF BEAB ADMTKATi WILLIAM B. CAFEBTON, UNITED
STATES NAVY, BETIBED — ^Besumed.
The Chaibman. Will you take up your testimony. Admiral, at the point at
which it was concluded yesterday when you were about to speak of the landing
at Cape Haitien, I think.
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir. At this time, about July 31, 1915, the Army in
the north and the leaders, Blot and Bobo, were menaces to peace and order,
both at Port au Prince and Cape Haitien. Cape Haitien was uneasy, and it was
reported to me reliably in Port au Prince that trouble was feared at that place.
The Froich minister was anxious that steps be taken to guard French interests
in Cape Haitien. For these reasons it seemed that it might be necessary for
me to occupy Cape Haitien, in which event the department might expect a
request for another regiment of marines.
On August 1, 1915, 1 sent the following message to the Secretary of the Navy :
''Sending, on Jason, commission to Cape Hatien composed of following:
Uent Coffey, ex-President L^getime, Archbishop Bronan, Gen. Polynice, ex-Min-
ister Charles Zamor, Col. Chevalier. My instructions to commission are to
require armies in north disarm and disband, soldiers to return to their homes,
leaders Blot and Bobo to return Port au Prince with commission and Join con-
ference promoting order in Haiti. This commission is formed by my order and
acting under my order.
" Caperton."
Upon the airival of this commission, they were able to communicate with
Gens. Blot, Bobo, and Bourand, the latter in command of the Government
forces near Ouanaminthe, and the others prominent officials and citizens of
Gape Haitien.
During this time the following message was sent to me from the commanding
officer of the NashviUe:
"Blot left on Paoifique, some other gentlemen on Nord Alexia, also some
tioops. Have landed and taken charge. Will prevent entering of armed per-
aons until some leader can take charge. Blot troops from country entered town
6 a. m., Wednesday ; some firing. Have now gone back country. At present
all quiet in town : expect Bobo will try to come in.
( Signed ) " Olmstead.''
The Chaibman. May I interrupt a moment there?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. To what order of the department would you refer as laying
down the policy under which that landing took place at Cape Haitien — your
general order in which the State Department wished you to keep order?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir.
62269— 21— PT 2 14
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312 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
About this time, on August 4, the U. S. S. Connecticut arrived in Port an
Prince, but after discharging her marines and stores, owing to the disturbed
conditions in the north at Cape Haitien, she was sent to that point. 4^er
using my best efforts through the Joint American-Haitian Committee, as it was
termed, and after inducing as many of the leaders of the ex-Government and
revolutionary forces to come to Port au Prince, the Jason was ordered to
return on the 5th, at which time I received the following message from Lieat.
Coffey, the chairman of this committee :
"Am returning Port au Prince on Jason with commission, Bobo and 26
generals, Bourand, La Roche, and 17 nuna Bobo troops will remain in prH>ent
position as per your desire. Disarmament can not be accomplished except \>j
aid of troops, either our troops go to, them or their troops come to us. You m&j
e3cpect demonstraticm when Bobo arrives ; parades, and cheering occurred at
Cape Haitien this morning. Nothing serious. Commission, Bobo, Bourand, and
I^ Roche will probably wish to pay respects. Do you wish to see them? All
generals have arms. Will let none land until question disarming them settled.
"Coffey.*'
I think a few words of explanation are due in regard to having those nuns od
board. In compliance with the earnest request of the church authorities at Port
au Prince, through the charge d'affoires, and in view of the unsettled conditioos
at Cape Haltlen, I authorized the passage of about 17 sisters of St Joseph from
Cape Haltlen to Port de Prince. They represented to me that they were^unetfl^
and disturbed In their minds, and that they would like to go temporarily for the
time being to Port au Prince.
On Augrust 5 the following message was sent to the Secretary of the Navy :
" To-day Haitian Congress published notice It would elect President Sunday,
but has postponed at my request because time Is Inopportime. Am Informed
congress would elect Menos. Haitian minister at Washington, If here. In
absence of Menos am Informed |T>iysidp^t of se^flt^i PftrtUDieiMi*©r"^l ^
elected. From many other sources^ fiear Dartlgeuenave Is man of personal
honor and of patriotism. Has never been connected with any revolution, is of
good ability, and anxious for Haltrs regeneration, realizes Haiti must agree Co
any terms laid down by United States, professes to believe any terms demanded
will be for Haiti's benefit, says he will use all his influence with Haitian Con-
gress to have such terms agreed ui)on by Haiti. If elected must be sustained
by American protection. Same condition applies to whoever else Is elected.
Bobo only other prominent candidate. Bobo said to be man of Intellectuality,
honor, and patriotism. Friends maintain would work solely for Haiti's good.
Bobo could be elected only through fear of Cacos, and If elected revolution
against him would undoubtedly start unless prevented by United States.
" Great relief expressed by all classes except Cacos at presence of American
troops. Americans afford hope of relief from Government by terror. Uni-
versally believed that if Americans depart, Govemnaent will lapse Into comply
anarchy. My opinion Is that United States must expect to remain In Haiti
until native Government is self-sustaining and people educated to respect laws
and abide by them. Should president be elected now there would be complete
machinery for all Government functions. With American protection and In-
fluenced by United States, progress toward good government could be soon
commenced. Haitian people anxious to have president elected, because at
present no central Government in Haiti except as directed by me. Also people
uneasy, fearing United States may not permit continuance of Haitian inde-
pendence.
" Caperton."
The Chairman. That telegram, as far as I have followed the record, Is the
first forecast of the policy later pursued In Haiti, that with the election of
Dartiguenave and the continuance of the American occupation foundations
might be laid for the progressive development of civil order and dvll iiu^'
tutions?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir; those were my views, obtained by discussing
the situation and conditions with all promiment men In Haiti.
The Chairman. The Initiation of that policy, then, was in Haiti and not In
Washington?
Admiral Capbrton. That I could not say.
The Chairman. Well, now, had the Secretary, by verbal messages or other-
wise, Intimated to you that that was the policy he had In mind prior to the
sending of that dispatch? r^^^/^I^
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 313
Admiral Cafebton. The following message was sent on August 2, 1915, to the
Secretary of the Navy:'
"Large number Haitian revolutions, largely due existing professional sol-
diers called Cacos, organized in bands under lawless, irresponsible chiefs,
who fight on side offering greatest Inducement and but nominally recognize the
Gorerxunent Cacos are feared by all Haitians and practically control politics.
About 1,500 Cacos now in Port au Prince, ostensibly disarmed, but retain
organization and believed to have arms and ammunition hidden. They have
demanded election Bobo President, and Congress, terrorized by mere demand,
is on point complying, but restrained by my request Present condition no
other man can be elected account fear of Cacos. Believe can control Congress.
Can prevent any Cacos outbrealc in Port au Prince after arrival regiment of
marines U. S. S. Connecticut. Stable government not possible in Haiti until
Cacos are disbanded and power brolcen.
** Such action now imperative at Port au Prince if United States desires to
negotiate treaty for financial control of Haiti. To accomplish this must have
regiment of marines in addition to that on Connecticut. Majority populace well
disposed and submissive, and will welcome disbanding Cacos and stopping
revolutions. Should agreement with Haiti be desired, recommend Capt B€»ch,
U. S. N., be appointed single commissioner for United States, with full instruct
tions and authority. He has conducted my negotiations on shore, and I brieve
has confidence generally of Haitiana As future relations between United
States and Haiti depend largely on course of action talcen at this time,
earnestly request to be fully informed of policy of United States.
"' Cafebton."
Senator Oddie. I would like to ask you a question there, Admiral. What was '
meant by this clause, " Such action now imperative at Port au Prince if United
States desires to negotiate treaty for financial control of Haiti "?
Adndral Cafebton. I do not know why I mentioned or specified " financial
control." I have in my mind now, and I am sure I had then, tiiat if we wished to
form a treaty with Haiti for all purposes, and a treaty like we finally did
succeed in getting ratified, the expression " financial' control " would be one
part of the treaty.
Senator Oddie. Are you referring to the policy adopted with Santo Domingo
in comm^iting on this wording, " the financial control of Haiti "?
Admiral Cafebton. Somewhere in my dispatches here I did mention some-
thing about a treaty similar to the one which we had in Santo Domingo. I
can not Just put my hand on the message now to the department, but I am
quite sure that I can find it somewhere in the record.
Senator Oddie. Now, another thing. Admiral. In the last part of your tele-
gram you said, "As future relations between United States and Haiti depend
largely on course of action taken at this time, earnestly request to be fully in-
formed of iJolicy of the United States." Had you been informed of any policy
from the Navy Department prior to this time?
Admiral Cafebton. No definite policy.
Senator Oddie. Did you receive instructions regarding the future policy In
answer to this telegram?
Admiral Cafebton. I did, sir.
Senator Oddik. I will ask you to go on and give it.
Admiral Caperton. On August 7 the following message was recvived from the
department :
" Conciliate Haitians to fullest extent consistent with maintaining order and
firm control of situation, and issue following proclamation: 'Am directed to
assure the Haitian people United States of America has no object in view except
to insure, establish, and help to maintain Haitian independence and the estab-
lishing of a stable and firm government by tlie Haitian people. Every assistance
will be given to the Haitian people in their attempt to secure these ends. It is
the intention to retain United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be
necessary for this puriwse.* Acknowledge.
'* Benson, Acting:'
Senator Oddie. Is there anything else that occurs to you that would show the
policy of the Navy Department prior to tliis?
Admiral Caperton. There is a jn*eat deal afterwards. At the present time I
am unable to say whether there was anything definite before or not.
Senator Oddik. Let me ask you in regard to that telegram of August 5. You
said, in referring to tbls man you recommend as the best for President : " He
314 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMIXGO.
realizes that GLaiti must agree to any terms demanded by the United States,
and he professes to believe that any demands laid down by us will be for Haiti's
benefit."
Admiral Capebton. He must have received this from various conversations
that my representatives had with him, perhaps, or he read it in the papers. I
do not remember whether such were published or not, but it was, as I under-
stood, the general impression.
The Chairman. Now, Admiral, as tlie basis of that general impression, as the
basis for the conversations which your representatives had with him, who sug-
gested that the United States Government was going to propose terms? Where
originated the idea that under a new President new contractual relations were
to be established between the Haitian Government and the American Govern-
ment which would require the approbation of the new President?
Admiral Capebton. I think the answer to that question would be found some-
where in my notes. I can not Just put my hand on it now.
The Chaibman. This is the most important phase of this part of the testi-
mony. Are you qnable to recall, olfhand, whether the State Department or
the Navy Department, directly or indirectly, suggested to the naval commanders
or the diplomatic agents in Haiti that any terms to which Dartiguenave would
accede would be proposed to him by our Government?
Admiral Capebton. These were my opinions at the time. Just how they were
formed at the present I am unable to answer.
The Chaibman. Let me put it another way then. Is there in the record, or
have you any recollection, of a statement of policy which indicates that it was
the purpose of the department that American troops should land and restore
order, as already indicated by your testimony, and then withdraw, or that It
was at the same time the policy of the department that having landed for tlie
restoration of order, then steps should be taken by treaty to assure the con-
tinuance of order?
Admiral Capebton. My first orders were as outlined in my testimony here,
to land for the purpose of preserving law and order and the protection of prop-
erty, etc.
The Chaibman. Your allusion to these other matters was based on conver-
sation current, originating in the negotiations between the State Department
and the Haitian Government which had taken place prior to your coming to
Haiti?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
On August 6, finding the presence of a large number of Cacos in Port au
Prince extremely undesirable, I directed that they be ordered to dhqperse and
return to their homes. All Cacos found in the streets after 11 a. m. were
placed under arrest. There was some excitement in the city as the first arrests
were made, but when the populace realized that the disbursing of the Cacos
was for the good of the people of Port au Prince they appeared to welcome this
movement. A detachment of marines, which was taking a number of Cacos to
the detention camp, was fired upon from a crowd on the sidewalk near the
customhouse.
This Is to show the disorder, etc., and what I had to cont^id with there in
keeping peace.
The Chaibman. I wish we might know what constituted a Caco. Do Cacos
come from one part of the island, or are they like the medieval condeterri of
professional soldiers who travel in each invading candidate's train? I gather
they are turbulent fellows, but I would like to know.
Admiral CapEbton. I am under the impression that I had in my testimony
described where they lived and something about them.
The Chairman. Up in the Grand Basin, you said.
Admiral Capebton. I have something further here in the way of a description,
if I can find it. In the absence of a better description, I would like to express
myself as follows: This northern section of Haiti, or more the northeastern
section of Haiti, is the home of the Cacos, and to understand the modus ope^
andi of a political campaign in Haiti it Is essential that one have a clear Idea
of who and what the Cacos are. The numerous revolutions, in combination
with the tribal instinct of their African forbears, have resulted in the forma-
tion of numerous bands of men, each band under its own chief, who are called
Cacos. They know no law save that of brute force, and obey the commands
of their chief only because he has the physical power to enforce them. The
minor chiefs usually follow the direction of a head chief, but the organization
is very loosely knit, and it is not uncommon for bands who* have fought each
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 315
other in one revolution to be on the same side in tlie next As a general rule,
tbe Cacos are on the side of the " outs/' and the men who help a President to
power often are instrumental in driving him out a few months later.
With regard to the question of the policy of the d^mrtment, I would like to
add the following: The activities of the revolutionary committee which had
been established at Port au Prince for the purpose of assisting me in maintain-
ing order were of such a nature that It was necessary to direct them to resign
and to assist all the good forces in Haiti to restore peace and order.
The Secretary of State advised the American Minister in Haiti concerning
the procedure which he should adopt toward me for the purpose of assisting
tbe Haitian National Assembly to elect a president of the republic on August
10, 1915, as follows:
"In view of the fact that the Navy last night informed Admiral Caperton
that he might allow election for the president whenever the Haitians wish,
and of the impression which exists here that election may take place Thursday
next, it is desired that you confer with the Admiral to the end that in some
way to be determined between you the following things be made perfectly
dear:
"First: Let CJongress understand that the Government of the United States
intends to uphold it but that it can not recognize action which does not establish
in charge of Haitian affairs, those whose abilities and dispositions give assur-
ances of putting an end to factional disorder.
"Second: In order that no misunderstanding can possibly occur after elec-
tion it should be made perfectly clear to candidates, as soon as possible, and
in advance of their election, that the United States expects to be entrusted
with the practical control of the customs and such financial control over the
affairs of the Republic of Haiti as the United States may deem necessary for
efficient administration.
"The Government of the United States considers it its duty to support a
Constitutional Government It seems to assist in the establishment of such a
government and to support it as long as necessity may require. It has no design
upon the political or territorial integrity of Haiti. On the contrary what has
been done, as well as what will be done, is conceived in an effort to aid the
people of Haiti in establishing a stable government and maintaining domestic
peace throughout the Republic.
" Lansing."
On August 10, 1915. I received the following message from the Secretary of
the Navy:
"Allow election of president to take place whenever Haitians wish. The
United States prefers election of Dartiguenave. Has no other motive than that
establishment of firm and lasting government by Haitian people and to assist
them now and at all times in future to maintain their political independence
and territorial integrity. United States will insist that the Haitian Govern-
ment will grant no territorial concessions to any foreign governments. The
Oovemment of the United States will take up the quesion of the cession of
Mole St Nicholas later along with the other questions to be submitted to the
reorganized Government with regard to its relation to the United States.
Aeljnowledge.
(Signed.) Benson, Acting.*'
The night of the 10th of August and the day of the 11th of August passed
quietly at Port au Prince; but there was considerable uneasiness and some
snail demonstttitions due to the* approaching election and the desi)erate atti-
tude of the Bobo and Zamor factions. Seventeen disorderly Cacos were ar-
rested.
Referring to the dismissal of the revolutionary committee, the following
letter was addressed to them by my order :
Auousf 11, 1915.
The revolutionary committee, Port au Prince, Haiti:
Gentlemen: I am directed by Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton, commander in
chief of United States forces in Haiti, to direct the revolutionary committee to
resign and tq assist all the good forces in Haiti to restore peace and order.
E. L. Beach,
Captain, United States Navy, Chief of Staff,
By direction of the Commander, United States Forces in Haitian Waters.
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316 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
On August 11, 1915, the following message was sent to the Secretary -of the
Navy :
"In conjunction with American cliargd d'affairs, Informed senators and depu-
ties assembled and presidential candidates of Intention and polcy United States
Government as set fortli by Secretary of State In cable luessage of Aaugst 10,
midnight. Senators and deputies cordial. Election will be held to-morrow.
To-day passed quietly, Port au Prince, but considerable uueasiness aud small
demonstrations, due approaching election and desperate attitude IU>bo and
Zanior factions. Revolutionary conmiittee issue<l order dissolving Congress
to-day. and attempted seal doors chamber deputies ; anticipated their action by
sending force to chamber of deputies, and Informed conmiittee their action
without authority. For this reason and account hostile and disturbing infiti-
ence of Bobo and Zamor factions, have dissolved revolutionary committee and
Informed them they have no further authority Port au Printre, and would be
considered public enemies of United States if they attempte<l to give any far-
ther orders or further menaced United States policy*. Have taken extra pre-
caution against disorder during election; have placed Castine and Eagle at
wharf and landed men from them to reen force landing forc*e. Have assumetl
control State telegraph office. Petite Goave quiet. Connecticut to-day held con-
ference with ex-Bobo forces relative surrendering arms at Cape Haitlen.
" Capebton.*'
On October 8 I arranged to have a meeting between the prominent candidates
for election as President for the purpose of ascertaining, if I could, their riews
and their feelings toward the United States. I think it but fair to say that
I do not believe — and I received no such reports from the various representa-
tives that I had on shore from time to time — that Dartlguenave knew that the
United States wantetl him to be president. I gathered this from what my officers
told me. and I- do not know that he actually knew that we wanted him to be
president.
According to arrangements, on Sunday, the 8th, I arranged a meeting at the
American legation, at which were present Senator Dartlguenave and Deputy
Cham, Dr. Bobo, John A. Laroche, and my two staff officers — my chief of stafE,
Capt E. L. Beach, and IJeut. E. G. Oberlin. Dartlguenave and Bobo were
address€Hl as follows:
"Gentlemen, It seems likely that one of you will be elected President of Haiti.
Haiti is in great trouble ; she has suffered much. The United States has come
to Haiti as a good friend, interested only in Haiti's welfare, in her happiness,
in her prosperity. The United States has determined that revolution and dis-
order and anarchy must cease in Haiti ; that unselfish and devoted patriotism
must characterize hereafter the acts of the Haitian Government Senator I>ar-
tlguenave and Dr. Bobo, realizing this momentous crisis in Haitian history, with
the eyes of Haiti and of the United States upon you, do you promise that if
elected President of Haiti you will, in your official acts, be guided solely by
earnest devotion to Haitrs honor and welfare?"
Senator Oddie. I^t me interrupt a minute. Who was asking this question?
Admiral Capebton. My representative, Capt E. L. Beach, my chief of staflf,
acting under my orders.
"I will so promise," replied Dartlguenave. "I have no other ambition tlian
to be of service to my country.'*
"I promise," exclaimed Dr. Bobo, rather theatrically. **I would be happy to
lay down my life for my beloved country."
"Senator Dartlguenave, in case Dr. Bobo should be elected will you promise
that you w\\\ exert every influence in your power to assist him for Haiti*s good ;
that you will Join with him heartily and helpfully and loyally?"
"If Dr. Bobo is elected president I will give him the most loyal, earnest
support In every effort he may make for Haiti's welfare," replied Dartlguenave,
with simple dignity.
"Dr. Bobo, if Senator Dartlguenave is elected president, will you help him
loyally and earnestly In his efforts to benefit Haiti? **
" No ; I will not ! " shouted Bobo. " If Senator Dartlguenave is elected presi-
dent I will not help him. I wiU go away and leave Haiti to her fate. I alone
am fit to be president of Haiti ; I alone understood Haiti's aspirations, no one
is fit to be president but me; there is no patriotism in Haiti to he compared
with mine'; the Haitians love no one as they love me."
While I am upon this subject I might mention another meeting that I had,
trying to ascertain the feelings and purposes, aud what these gentlemen would
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INQUntY INTO QjOCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 317
do it they were elected president, because I did not know. I felt, as the talk
srew about Senator Dartigruenave, that I desired to know something about
him. This, I might add, was previous to the other meeting. I sent two of
my staff officers, one of them being Lieut. E. 6. Ol>erlln, and the other my chicrf
of sta£^, Capt E. L. Beach, to converse with Senator Dartiguenave. They met
by appointment in the pleasant home of Dr. Furniss, formerly American
minister to Haiti, and at the time a resident of Port au Prince. Present at
this interview were Senator Dartiguenave, Deputy Cham, Dr. Furniss, and my
two staff officers. My particular purpose was to gain a personal Icnowledge
of Senator Dartiguenave and of his views and attitude toward Haiti and the
United States. My idea was that the man most suitable for the Haitian
presidency was one in whom the Haitians had confidence, one whose a,nimatlug
purpose would be Haiti's welfare, to which purpose he would give unselfish
devotion; and, also, one who combined such qualifications with confidence in
the United States, who was friendly disposed toward the United States, who
wanted her help, and who would listen sympathetically to the intentions of the
United States. There was never any bargaining of any kind whatever with
Darti^Tuenave, as far as I know. No pressure of any kind was brought to bear
upon any Haitian elector in Dartiguenave's interest. The Haitians them-
selves, without any outside influence or pressure or bargaining, made him, later,
their president
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Thursday, October 17, 1021, at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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IKQUIRY LNTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MONDAY, OGTOBEB 17, 1981.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment. Senator
Medill McCormick (chairman) presiding.
Present : Senators McCormick and Oddle.
Also present: Mr. Ernest Angell and Mr. Horace G. Knowles, in their repre-
sentative capacities as hereinbefore indicated, and Maj. Edwin N. McClellan,
United States Marine Corps, representing the Navy Department.
The Chairman. Maj. McClellan, in order that the committee may have in its
possession the record available to the admiral and prepared by the depart-
ment, will you place in the hands of the committee before the day is over a
copy of your record?
Maj. McClellan. I will present that to you right now; I have anticipated
your request.
(Maj. McClellan thereupon presented to the committee the record referred to.)
STATEMENT OF BEAU ADMIRAL WIIXIAJC B. CAPEBTON, tlNITED
STATES NAVY, BETIBEB — Continued.
The Chaibman. Admiral, you may proceed.
Admiral Capeeton. Mr. Chairman, as there has been much criticism in re-
gard to this election, I think it necessary that I explain, in a few words, the
things that really happened at that time.
The law-abiding citizens were very anxious that the Haitian Congress meet
for the purpose of electing a president. These requests were always coupled
with the request that it should take place so there should be no intimidation of
the senators and deputies who were to vote at that time. At this time the most
urgent demands were being made in favor of Dr. Bobo*s candidacy for the
presidency. They insisted that a " free election " be held, which practically
meant that it be held with caco guns leveled at the head of every Haitian
congressman as he cast his ballot.
The Chaibman. What do you mean when you say that a " free election "
should be held?
Admiral Capebton. The Bobo people were impressing me with the idea that
they wanted a " free election," and I was explaining what a " free election "
had heretofore been, under the revolutionary regime.
The Chaibman. You mean you inserted the words •* free election " in the
quotation marks?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir. The most extravagant offers were being made
by Dr. Bobo personally and by his friends, the idea being that the United
States in its dealings with Haiti was actuated only by selfish, interested mo-
tlves, and it was thought that the United States wanted the cession of St.
Nicholas Mole. So the Bobo crowd offered this and anything else I wanted.
The Chaibman. If you feel that you can, will you not tell us presently who
made these offers in behalf of the Bobo faction and through whom they were
made?
Admiral Capebton. These offers just referred to were made to my chief of
staff, Capt. E. L. Beach, sometinjes in the presence of one of my staflf officers
who were accompanying him. It was his almost sole duty at this time to look
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320 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
out for this election business on shore. I might add that the so-called revolu-
tionary committee of safety, self-appointed, were in favor of Dr. Bobo.
In the meantime good citizens, whose only animating purpose was to save
Haiti from as much misfortune as it was possible, who had no selfish aims,
kept me informed of the schemes which seethed through Port au Prince.
It was seen by me that if the Bobo crowd were permitted to control the
election, it would be a sign that the cacos were still capable of directing Haiti's
destinies by rifles, and that fear and not free choice would determine each ballot
Some time before this the Haitians began to talk of Senator Sudre Darti-
guenave, a man long in public life. At the time he was president of the senate.
He had kept out of political quarrels, belonged to no faction, and he was
universally esteemed.
Many willing candidates had presented themselves to me, with statements of
their claims ; their great friendship for the United States, what they would do
for the United States if elected President of Haiti, etc. But not one of these,
though listened to, received encouragement
As I have stated before, it was announced that the election would take place'
on August 12. At this time I gave orders to Col. E. K. Cole, United States
Marine Corps, who was then commanding the marines on shore, having arrived
on the Connecticut on August 4, to take such steps as were necessary to prevent
disorder of any kind on shore. Any Haitian who came within a block of the
Chamber of Deputies on August 12 was to be turned back unless he had a pass
signed by a senator o^deputy or Col. Cole or myself. This effectually excluded
the cacos. At the election that occurred on August 12 the galleries of the
Chamber of Deputies were thronged by Haitians invited by the senators and
deputies and a few marines and marine officers.
Matters seemed to take on a very serious turn about now, so that the committee
of safety — that is, the revolutionary committee — rushed to the ex-minister,
J. M. Leger, and tried to induce him to be a candidate. He declined to have
his name considered. There are a few remarks I would like to put in right here.
It is a little long, but I would like to have them go in the record at this point
Mr. Leger was one of the most distinguished Haitians living, a gentleman
educated in Paris, a famous traveler, author, and diplomat ; former minister at
Paris and at Washington ; a gentleman at home in any society ; a man of keen,
alert, vivid, and remarkable intuition; in every way a cultured, high-minded
gentleman. Of him Lord Pauncefote. at one time British ambassador at Wa^-
ington, once said : " Mr. Leger is the ablest, most accomplished diplomat I have
known In all my experience."
All Haiti was proud of Mr. I^eger, easily In popular esteem Haiti's first
citizen, and the United States undoubtedly would have been satisfied with his
election for the Haitian presidency. But he peremptorily refused to have Ws
name considered. I sent my chief of staff to discuss the matter with him.
He replied, "Tell the admiral I will do everything in my power for Haiti;
but I must watch and see what the United States will demand of Haiti, and
be in a position to defend Haiti's interests In case the demands should he
unreasonable. At this time I could not possibly accept the presidency. I am
for Haiti, not for the United States."
The Haitian minister at Washington, Mr. Enos, was cabled to and asked to
accept the presidency. He peremptorily declined. Then efforts were made to
Induce ex-President Legitime, a venerable, universally beloved Haitian, an ex-
Presldent of the Republic, to stand for the presidency. He refused to accept
Any one of these three men would have had the respect and confidence of all
good Haitians, and would have receive<l many votes, perhaps a majority of
those cast.
So now at the last moment the Bobo adherents determined to prevent the
election, which clearly meant Dr. Bobo*s defeat. So they determined that early on
August 12 there should burst fourth .such a scene of disorder, riot, andbloosshed
In Port au Prince that all thoughts of election would be driven from our minds.
But law-abiding Haitians learned of this and informed me on the morning of
August 11, the day before the election. That afternoon, as I previously stated,
I went on shore and inforjped the committee of safety that they were no longer
to exercise any authority whatever in the city. In dismissing the committee of
safety, which I related in my previous testimony, I failed to state the following,
which I addressed to the committee of safety :
*' Further, you are informed that your conspiracy to plunge Port au Prince
into riot and bloodshed to-morrow morning is known and will not proceed."
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INQTTIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 321
Previous to their being dismissed, tliey had made no pretense of denial or Inno-
oence. They were full of consternation for fear they might not he able to stop
their Intended riot — that is, all except Charles Delva. He simply laughed in,
perhaps, an ordinary way, and exclaimed, *' You have won."
Nothing happened on August 12 to interfere with the election. The Haitian
senators, 39 of thehi, and 102 deputies met in the Chamber of Deputies. There
were but few formalities. The galleries were packed with Haitians, who had
been disarmed at the door, and a few marines were present. My representative,
Capt E. L. Beach, chief of staff, was present on the floor and mixed in with
the senators and deputies. All senators and deputies were armed at their own
urgent request.
But one ballot was taken. Each congressman when his name was called, un-
iatimidated by the cacos, freely announced the name of the man he voted for.
It was soon evident that- the majority for Senator Dartiguenave would be over-
whelming. Then the vote was announced as 94 for Dartiguenave, 16 for Bobo,
and a scattering for Cauvin, Thegun, and others.
Then came exulting cheers, triumph, and order, and hope, for Haiti had won.
But Senator Sudri Dartiguenave did not cheer. He sat in his chair overcome
with emotion; tears gushed from bis eyes. It was some moments before he
regained his self-control. He then took the oath as Haiti's President, swearing
to maintain the constitution and laws of Haiti and to administer his high ofllce
with justice, without partiality, and solely in the interest of Haitians.
After this, with deep feeling, he made a noble speech, touching on the dis-
orders that had such a painful effect on Haitian reputation, Haitian prosperity,
and Haitian life. Among other things he said, was : ** I have been elected be-
cause I belong to no faction, to no political group ; I am free from all obliga-
tions of a faction nature. I beg earnestly for the support of every Haitian in
the efforts I shall make for Haiti^s welfare. If I receive this support^ Haiti will
make a start for the good pf things we all long for. If I do not receive it, I
will accomplish nothing, and the uncertainties, disorder, and sadness of Haitian
live that now environ us will be continued."
Coming down from the elevated place from which he spoke, he went directly
to where my chief of staff, Capt. E. L. Beach, was sitting, and taking him by
the hand, made an impromptu speech, in words as follows: Admiral Caperton
came to us at a moment when Haiti was in complete despair. But two days
previously hundreds of Haitians had been murdered in their cells in the jail,
Haitians against whom no crime was charged except lack of friendship for the
Haitian President The day Admiral Caperton arrived a mob, frenzied with
ftrief, killed President Vilbrun Guillaume. The Government was overturned;
chaos ran riot. It seemed that everything good in Haiti had burst into nothing-
ness, and black, hopeless despair laid heavy on our hearts, and at this moment
Admiral Caperton came in and landed troops, only for our protection and the
protection of foreigners.
He assured us that he came to help Haiti ; that he came as a sympathetic
friend, and he asked for the cooperation of all Haitians. His troops came not
at cimquerers, trampling on our hearts, our bodies, our properties, but only
as frienda His kindness, his consideration, his goodness, so apparent in his
every act, started hope in our hearts. We love our Haiti and our independence,
bat we accept the help so generously given us by the United States, representeil
by Admiral Caperton. It is with the understanding and knowledge of all
Haiti that as President I am to have the support and help of the United States.
Otherwise I could not accept office. But also, with the clear understanding
that the only promise and obligation that I am under to anybody is expressed
in the oath I took to defend the constitution and the laws of Haiti, and to
gov^n and be governed by them.
The inaugural procession then occurred, passed through the streets of Port
au prince, and in one of the carriages, the leading carriage, was the Presi-
dent Dartiguenave, and Capt E. L. Beach, my chief of staff. They were
escorted by marines, followed by many carriages. Haitian soldiers, resplendent
hi brilliant uniforms, 100 in number, were the immediate guard and escort of
the President, the President's idea of this being that it would show to everyone
that Haiti and the United States were together from the beginning of his ad-
ministration. Then the President and Capt. Beach went to Deputy Cham's
home, where the inaugural reception was held. Here the senators, deputies,
foreign oflicials, foreign residents, and Haitians came to pay their respects to
Haiti's new President and all gave the most cordial greeting to the American
oflkrer with the President. There was in that reception joy and hope.
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322 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Oddie. Admiral, let me ask you this question : Was that speech taken
down in shorthand?
Admiral Capebton. Not in shorthand; no, sir. The speech was not taken
down in shorthand, but Capt Beach has a wonderful memory. He is a verj
good writer, and immediately after he left there and could get to himself he sat
down and wrote this out, and, as you noticed, I did not quote the speech, bnt I
said " in words as follows/' I am satisfied that the President said about those
words, knowing Capt. Beach's memory and his knowledge of the subjects dis-
cussed. He sat down and wrote out the whole speech. That same sort of
coincident had happened before with me at various conferences.
The election occurred on the 12th. In the meantime. President Dartiguwiave
was most anxiously awaiting to hear the national salute, which would an-
nounce his inauguration, and which had been arranged for. Haitian gunners
were to fire the guns, loaded and prepared by American sailor men. But no
salute came. The President grew anxious. So Lieut. Oberlin was dispatched
to the fort, Fort Nationale, where the guns were located. After a while
the salute began. There was a painful interval between each shot, but finally
the twenty-first gun was fired. This of Itself might not seem to have been im-
portant, but it is mentioned here because of the great importance attached to
it by President Dartiguenave. He could not feel that he was President until
he had received the national salute, which had been customary upon similar
occasions.
I would like here to recapitulate a little bit and make some remarks in
regard to what happened a few days before the election, which took place on
the 12th.
On August 7th Port au Prince remained quiet during the day. I liad In-
formation that a number of bandits had been pillaging plantations to the
north of the city, in the vicinity of Croix des Bouquet. A marine detachment
was dispatched and succeeded in capturing the bandit chief and 11 others,
who were engaged in pillaging.
On this day I directed that ex-Minister Bourand, who was one of the late
cabinet, and Mr. Laroche, another one, be landed from the Jason, and escorted
under guard, to Minister Bouraiurs residence, as I dUl not know how he would
be received, and as he had been in immediate conmiand of the Groverunient's
troops in the northwest. Mr. Bourand was minister of interior under Guil-
laume's government. I therefore placed a guard about his residence and
directed that he and Mr. Durand be especially guarded during their stay hi
Port au Prince.
On August 8th, the next day, the Haitian Government's gimboat Nord Alexi*
arrived at Port au Prince with 766 soldiers disarmed at Cape Haitlen. These
soldiers lived In the vicinity of Port au Prince and In south Haiti. Seven
hundred and thirty-six of these soldiers were landed and sent to their htimes.
The remaining 30 were either sick or wounded, and were sent to the Haitian
hospital on shore.
The Chaibman. By whom had they been disarmed?
Admiral Capebton. They had been disarmed — these were Government
troops — either voluntarily or by my troops in the north for the purpose of
bringing them down to their homes. They had nothing to eat, and they were
in a destitute condition. So I sent this Haitian gunboat, the Nord Atexi*,
up there for them and brought them down. Through the connnlttee on shore—
this was on the 8th — I paid each soldier 10 gourdes and informed him that
he was no longer a soldier, must not appear in uniform, and must return to
his home and keep orderly.
"Referring to the destitute condition of these men, they arrived about 7
a. m., shortly after which I learned that they had nothing to eat on board
to speak of during the past 24 or 36 hours. The crew of the U. S. S. Waah-
ington heard of this, whereupon they volunteered to send over their breakfast,
which was about to be served, to these destitute soldiers, which was done.
These soldiers were paid as I have said before, about 10 gourdes each as thev
passed over the gangway. The Nord AlexU was at this time alongside the
wharf in the navy yard and it was necessary for the soldiers to pass through
ttie navy yard and in doing so to pass by two or three of our marine sentries.
To show the custom of graft which prevailed even ^mong the soldiers, each
one of these destitute soldiers as he passed a marine sentry, tried to hand
to the marine his money which he Just received, saying In so manv wonis.
Take out your share and give me the balance.' "
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO BOMINGO. 323
On the 9th I had removed from the Haitian gunboat Nord Alexis all the arms
and ammunition on board that vessel and turned them over to the commander
of the landing force for safe-keeping, not knowing what the Nord Alexia might
do under the then prevailing conditions in the city and harbor.
To explain the condition of Haitian finances at this time, I may say that last
January the treasury service, by an arbitrary act. was taken from the National
Bank of Haiti, the national treasury — this was done by the Guillaume Sam
government — and given to private banking firms, the principal one of which is
SImmond Freres. The Simmond Freres Is under no control which will safe-
guard public interests. They merely make collections of the revenues and
receive a certain percentage as their fee and turn the rest over to whomsoever
may exercise sufficient force or persuasion in the name of a government or
revolution to obtain It.
The result is that considerable money is being thus forced from Simmond
Freres by the so-called revolutionary committees in various towns, and );his
money is being used to actively support revolutionary' activity. I might add
that in all these towns they have also a self-constituted " committee of safety."
On account of military necessity, therefore, I this day, on the 9th, informed
the committee in Port au Prince, Simmond Freres, and the National Bank of
Haiti that the treasury service would be resumed by the National Bank of
Haiti. This bank is under legal and exacting contract for the handling of the
treasury service for the Haitian Government.
Referring to my previous remarks about the treasury service being restored
10 the National Bank of Haiti, I sent the following message to the Secretary ot
the Navy. This is a message to the department to inform them with regard to
the case. The cablegram was as follows :
"Account military necessity, restored treasury service to National Bank of
Haiti. Last Januarj' treasury service taken from this bank; given to Sim-
mond Freres. Money forced from Simmond Freres by so-called revolutionary
committees various places, constituting menace against order and prolonging
disturbances. Cablegram sent to-day Washington, D. C, by revolutionary com-
mittee recommending provisional government caused solely by definite knowl-
edge Bobo will not be elected by Congress. No doubt absolute legality status
of Congress. Forming provisional government would be government by uncon-
atitutlonal means and in effect another revolution in Bobo's favor; would con-
tinue unrest and unsettled conditions for long time and make uncertain and
delay desired treaty with Haiti. Recommend no consideration be given recom-
mendations for provisional government. Haiti needs freedom from political
mirest, and most of all settled government. While many prominent Haitians
at first favored provisional government, sentiment In this respect has generally
changed, and now practically all Haitians except adherents of Bobo demand
Immediate election of President.
" Yesterday met Dartiguenave and Bobo together In conference. Asked Dar-
tiguenave would he. If Bobo elected, accept Congress choice and give assistance
to Government; answer, yes. Asked Bobo same question If Dartiguenave
elected. BobOvreplled would not accept Dartiguenave nor assist his Government
** Capebton."
The Chaibman. This Is still a recapitulation of the events before the election?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir. That cablegram was sent on the 10th.
Cape Haitien remained quiet during the day of August 8, but information
was received that the ex-Bobo troops had looted in the vicinity of Grande
Riviere. I only mention this to show the disturbances In the north at this time.
On the 9th the following message was sent to the commanding officer of the
U. S. S. Casiine:
" Have assumed military control Port au Prince and Cape Haitien ; am dls-
afmlng and disbanding all* Haitian troops I can get hold of. Reports here
Indicate an ex-Government force of about 200 men under Gen. Auguste ap-
proaching St. Marc; prevent their attacking town and endeavor persuade them
to deposit arms in your keeping and disband. Am not yet ready to perma-
nently occupy St. Marc ; cooperate with de facto civil authorities. Acknowledge
15100.
" Capebton."
Under date of the 10th of August the following message was received from
the commanding officer of the Connecticut:
"Referring your 12508, proclamation will be published broadcast in French
to-morrow and copies issued at outpost to people leaving town. Have received
gitized by Google
324 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
no word yet from revolutionary generals. No troops have presented tbemadves
to surrender arms.
'* Have opened customhouse for business and made good progress In est&b- .
lishing local government.
** The revolutionary troops interfiere with the free ingress of market people.
There has be^i no disturbance to-day.
•* Duwcix."
This tells about the first disturbance made by the revolutionary forces, tlie
cacos, in preventing food from coming into the cities.
The Chairman. What date is this?
Admiral Capebton. The 10th of August
The Chaibman. What was the date on which they elected Dartiguenave?
Admiral Capebton. That was on the 12th, sir.
On August 10 Port au Prince was becoming more uneasy as the election
approached. The Bobo faction, since the cacos had been driven from tbe
town and it had thus lost its power to Intimidate Congress, was growiog
desperate. Threats of assassination had been made against Dartiguenave and
other senators, and Charles Zamor and his faction were doing little toward
aiding to quiet matters.
On August 10 the following message was sent from the commander of the
cruiser squadron to the commanding officer of the Connecticut:
''National Bank of Haiti has resumed treasury service. This bank has
issued 'Instructions to its representatives Cape Haitien to pay each soldier dis-
armed and dismissed there 10 gourde and each chief 10 gourde. €let in toacb
r^resentatives bank Cape Haitien and make necessary arrangements for pay-
ing these troops. Supervise payment troops yourself. Information given to
troops in country that they will be paid if they will disarm and disband in
Cape Haitien, may aid you in persuading them to come to Cape Haitien. This
applies to any troops who will lay down arms at Cape Haitien and disband
either government or any other kind.
" Capebtow ."
I think I might add here in regard to paying these soldiers for their services
If they would disband, I had many conferences with the generals of both
factions in the north in regard to this matter and arrangements had been
made looking to this disarmament.
The following message was sent from the commander of the cruiser squadron
to the Secretary of the Navy on date of August 10:
"Port au Prince quiet during night Cape Haitien quiet; ex-Bobo troops
causing some disturbance vicinity Grande Riviere; none of these troops have
arrived Cape Haitien to surrender arms as yet. Ex-government forces about
200 under Gen. Auguste attacked St. Marc Saturday, but r^ulsed by forces
under committee of safety; Auguste and four followers killed. St Marc
quiet now; am encouraging local authorities preserve order. U. S. S. Eagle
arrived Mole St. Nicholas 7.30 p. m. Monday for news.
" Capebton."
The Chaibman. I think that is sufficient of the preliminary matter. You
may now proceed to the conditions which followed the election of the President
Admiral Capebton. After the 12th?
The Chaibman. Yes. But before you do that let me ask you this questioD,
Admiral. Did Capt Beach speak French?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir; very weil.
(Thereupon, at 12.10 o*clock p. m., the committee adjourned subject to tbe
call of the chairman.)
Digitized by VjOOQIC
IiNQUIRY IKTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBEB 19, 1921.
United States Senate,
Set£ct Committee or Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, I). C.
The committee at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment. Senator
Medill McCk)rmick (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators McOormick, Oddie, and King.
Also present : Mr. Ernest Angell and Mr. Horace Q. Knowles in their repre-
sentatiye capacities as hereinbefore indicated, and MaJ. Edwin N. McOlellan,
United States Marine Corps, representing the Navy D^>artment.
STATEMENT OF BEAR ADMIBAL WILLIAM B. CAPEBTON, UNITED
STATES NAVY, BETIBED, 714 MONTAXJX AVE., NEW LONDON,
CONN. — ^Resumed.
The Chaibman. Admiral Caperton, before you proceed, let me call your atten-
tion to page 255 of the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy, paragraph
52, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920. Thisi is paragraph 52 of Gen. Bar-
netf 8 report, which purports to quote from cables sent by you to the depart-
ment I refer more especially to the assertion attributed to you that " In the
presence of congressmen, Dariguenave, president of the senate, stated that
congressmen are agreed that Haiti must and will accede gladly to any terms
proposed by the United States, ' including right of Intervention when necessary,
customhouse control, and cession outright without restriction of St. Nicolas
Mole.* " I read so much of it in order that you may refer directly to the dis-
patch to which he alludes, and if you have it, you might read it directly into the
record. You may answer that later.
Admiral Capebton. On August 7 I sent the following message to the Secretary
of the Navy, parts of which are quoted in the chairman's question :
" Before landing Port au Prince to-day Bobo formally resigned position chief
executive power and dismissed his cabinet ministers. Has telegraphed all his
generals in north to deposit arms with American forces Cape Haitien. Prom-
ises use every effort for good order. Bourand has given similar promises and
sent similar instructions to his troops in north.
"I have curtailed power revolutionary committee; it did not keep faith.
This results in not having services committee. Civil officials late Government
glad accept and execute my orders.
"All classes Haitiens 'clamoring for immediate election President I^egal
congress with civil functionaries and all necessary organization except Presi-
dent and cabinet for regular Government now exists. Only two serious candi-
dates—Bobo and Dartiguenave ; latter will probably be elected. Have had
daily conferences with president of senate and chamber deputies, with senators,
deputies, ex-cabinet ministers, and many leading Haitiens. President of Senate
Dartiguenave, in presence of congressmen, states congressmen are agreed that
Haiti must and will gladly accede to any terms proposed by United States.
They now say will *cede St. Nicholas Mole outright without restriction, grant
costonidiouse control, right to intervene when necessary, and any other terms.
They beg only as far as possible avoid humiliation. They insist no Govern-
325
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326 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
ment can stand except by United States protection ; state without this protec-
tion there would be nothing but anarchy in Haiti. Most Haitiens now fear
American forces may l>e withdrawn.
" Extremely desirable reestablish Government immediately. Unless other-
wise directed I will permit congress elect President next Thursday.
" Capektos."
The Chairman. Now, you may turn to the period after the election.
Admiral Caperton. As an indication of how matters were shaping themselves
at this time, on August 13 Gen. Poly nice informed me of his intention to help
the present Government maintain order. Charles Zamor informed me that he
would use all his influence for peace.
On the same date Bobo was living in the British legation. He seemed to be
overwhelmed in his disappointment. His nerve, pluck, and self-assurance had
gone. He stated that he no longer had a country, and that he was going to
France. ,
Also, on August 13 considerable destitution exists among the lower classes in
Port au Prince. On the morning of August 13 a woman and child were found
dead in the open market place in the vicinity of Rue de St. Honore and Rue de
Centre, their deaths having been due, without question, to starvation. A very
Intelligent woman, claiming to be a school-teacher, appeared this morning and
showed what purported to be an acknowledgment of Indebtedness to her for pay
as school-teacher for the month of January. She claims that neither she nor
family have had anything to eat for two days.
The Chairman. I do not think we can go Into this detail.
Admiral Caperton. I do not Intend to give you all of it. Other cases similar
to this have been brought to my attention, and some cases where families have
been without food for 24 to 48 hours. The starting of public works and estab-
lishment of peace will, without doubt, furnish employment to many men who
are now without food, but this will not, In all probability, reach the women and
children who have no men to support them.
I requested that this matter be brought to the attention of the Red Cross
Society, with the request that they send representatives and undertake relief
work at Port au Prince.
The Chairman. Did they do that ultimately?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir. I might say they from time to time sent me
$1,000 at one time and $2,000 at another time.
The Chairman. Did they send you any nurses or physicians?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir. I had doctors from the ships whom I detailed.
The Chairman. Did any of the missionary societies of the United States
undertake to do anything?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir-; not outside of the Red Cross. I was compelled
to employ some missionaries there to take charge of the work.
The Chairman. But no American Christian organization did anything to aid
you in the relief of the suffering or the destitution of the people?
Admiral Caperton. No, sir. I formed all sorts of committees or societies.
The Chairman. During the first few weeks after Dartiguenave's election,
what was the condition of the country in reference to order?
Admiral Caperton. The country to the north was very much upset From
day to day I reported these facts In messages, copies of which I have here,
about the Cacos collecting in various ports and sections of the north.
The Chairman. If you care to, you may Incorporate the messages in the
record, but do no take the time to read them now.
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir; I would like to do that.
The Chairman. There were bands gathering in the north?
Admiral Caperton. Yes. sir. I would like to Incorporate in the record the
following messages :
Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. ** Washington," Flagship,
August ij, 1915,
From : Commanding Officer Connecticut.
To : Commander Cruiser Squadron. •
Daguesseau Montreull arrived this morning. He communicated with revolu-
tionary committee at St Marc and Gonaives and sent telegram to revolntlonary
committee here to the effect that Bobo was very strong politically. Strongly
Digitized by VjOOQIC
mQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 327
80^)eet that he will urge Bobo troops to maintain present stand and not sur-
render arms. Think Bobo's absence from north Haiti strengthens new govem-
menL The committee of public safety appointed by Bobo declared Itself to be
strong last night after the news of the election. No troops have presented them-
selTes yet to surrender arms. There has been no disturbance to-day.
DUBEIX.
August 14, 1915.
From : Ck)mmander Cruiser Squadron.
To: Commanding Officer Connecticut,
No revolutionary activity any kind will be tolerated In Haiti and especially
within the limits of my command. It is duty all cit zens support present gov-
ernment. If Daguesseau Montreul or any other Haitian attempts revolutionary
activity any kind arrest them at once. Bobo I believe is entirely eliminated
politics in Haiti for the present. He is in Brit'sh legation now in pitiable con-
dition ; am inclined to believe he is insane.
Caperton.
Admiral Caperton. Then, at about 4 p. m. on August 14 I received the depart-
ment's
The Chairman (interposing). This was two days after -the election of Presi-
dent ; the President was elected on the 12th ?
Admiral Caperton. Yes, sir. I received the department's sigcode radiogram
No. 02014, relative to the treaty between the United States and Haiti. The
translation of the message was completed by 9 a. m. on the 15th of August,
when it was sent ashore to Mr. Davis, the American charge d'affaires, by
special messenger. Mr. Davis received this message at 9.45 a. m. on the 15th
of August :
" U. S. S. Washington, U August, 1915.
"No. 2 du Check 561 via cable 3.10 p. m.
" Prom : Wa^ington, D. C.
**To: Government U. S. S.. Washington, Guantanamo.
" Sigcode flag for American Legation, Port au Prince.
" For more than a year the Haitian Government has been familiar with the
terms of the treaty contained in department's instructions of July 1, 1914, with
which they have already expressed their agreement regarding the principal part.
Recently, however, assurances have been received that the Haitian authorities
are willing "
The Chairman. Does it read " willing " or " unwilling " ?
Admiral Caperton. It reads ** are willing " ; " are willing now to go farther
than before, including the cession to the Ignited States of Mole St. Nicholas.
In view of that friendly attitude of the Haitian Government, as shown by
these proposals, you will please prepare forthwith a draft of treaty as outline<l
in this cablegram. Without delay submit it informally to the President elect
and advise him that the department believes that as a guaranty of sincerity
and interest of the Haitians in orderly and i>eaceful development of their
country that the Haitian Congress will be pleased to pass forthwith a reso-
lution authorizing the President elect to conclude, without modification, the
treaty submitted by you. When officially notifie<l that such a resolution has
been passed by Congress extend to the President elect the formal recognition
of this Government and simultaneously conclude with the newly elected
President of Haiti, to the end that it may be forthwith submitted for ratitlca-
tion by the present Haitian Congress before its adjournment, a treaty in strict
accordance with the draft referred to, with the following alterations and
additions :
** alterations.
**Omit from article 1 the words ' if he shall deem it necessary and expedient,
or if the Haitian Government shall request.' so that that portion of article
1, referring to the appointment of financial adviser, shall read as follows : * ami
the President of the United States shall designate a financial adviser to the
Republic of Haiti, who shall devise an adequate system of public accounting,
etc.* Make corresponding changes throughout the treaty, particularly in articles
4 and 8. Omit last two words ' of account ' at end of article 1.
62260~21--pt 2 15
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328 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
** In article 2 after the word * receivership ' add * and to the financial ad-
visor,* change * its ' before * execute ' to * the.'
" In article 3 substitute * financial advisor ' for * general receiver " in both
instances.
" First paragraph, article 4, will read * all suras collected and received by the
general receiver shall be applied, first, to the payment of the salaries and
allowances of the general receiver, his assistants and employees and expenses of
the receiver shall include the salaries and expenses of the financinl advisor;
second, to the interest and sinlving fund of the public debt of the llepublic of
Haiti ; and, third, to the maintenance of the constabulary referred to in article
9, and then the remainder to tlie Haitien Government for the purpose of current
expense*."
"Second paragraph of article 4 will end with the words 'previous month.'
"Additional after article 8 insert articles as follows :
"Abt. 9. The Haitian Government obligates itself, for the preservation of
domestic peace, the security of individual ri^ts and the full ob8er>'ance of the
provisions of this treaty, to create without delay an efficient constabular>-
composed of native Haitians. This constabulary shall be organized and officered
by Americans designated by the President of the United States, which officers
the Haitian (Government shall api>oint and shall clothe with the proper an<l
necessary authority and uphold in the performance of their functions. The
constabulary herein provided for shall, under the direction of the Haitien
Government, have supervision and control of arms and ammunition. mllltar>*
supplies, and traffic therein, throughout the country. The stipulations in this
article are necessary to prevent factional strife and disturbances.
** *Art. 10. The Government of Haiti agrees not to surrender any of the
territory of the Republic of Haiti by sale. U^se, or otherwise, or Jurisdiction
over such territory, to any foreign Government or power except to the Fnited
States, nor to enter into any treaty or contract with any other foreign power
or lowers that will impair or tend to impair the independence of Haiti.
" *Akt. 11. The Haitian Government agrees to execute with the Uniteil States
a protocol for the settlement, by arbitration or otherwise, of all pending pecu-
niary claims of foreign cori>o rations, companies, citizens, or subjects against
Haiti.
" *Art. 12. The Republic of Haiti being desirous to further the development of
its natural resources agrees to undertake and execute such measures as in the
opinion of the Government of the United States may be necessary for sanita-
tion and public improvements of the Republic, under the supervision and direc-
tion of an engineer or engineers, to be designated by the President of the Unite*!
States and appolnteil and authorized for that purpose by the Government of
Haiti.
" *Art. 13. That the United States shall have authority to prevent auy and
all Interference with the attainment of any of the objects comprehende<l in this
convention as well as the right to intervene for the preservation of Haitian
independence and the maintenance of a Government adequate for the protection
of life, property, and individual liberty.
" 'Art. 34. The present treaty shall be approved and ratlfieil by the high
contracting parties in conformity with their respective laws, and the i-atifica-
tion thereof shall be exchanged In the city of Washington as soon as may be
possible.
"*Art. 15. The present treaty shall remain In fuU force and virtue for the
term of 10 years, to be counted from the day of exchange of ratifications,
and further for another term of 10 years at the request of either party.'
" In faith whereof the resiiect've plenipotentiaries have signed the present
convention in duplicate and have hereunto affixed their seals."
Dr. Bobo left Port an Prince on August 15 on the French steamer Ahdel
Kadei\ which is bound for Jeremie. south Haiti, and ports in San Dominj^o.
Bobo states he Is going to San Domingo.
Referrng to conditions In the north again. Information was received on
August ir> that ex-Bobo forces under (Jen. ]Morency were marching toward
Gonaives. About this time I decided it was time to n^ke some distribution of
my sh'j>s and forces In the north of Haiti. I therefore Issued campaign order
No. 8, as follows :
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 329
J. No. 7645-15.
Cbuiseb Sq^adbon,
United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. •* Washington," Flagship,
Port au Prince, Haiti, August 15, 1915—l.SO p. m.
Campaign order Xo. 8.
Forces:
{a) Northern detachment, Capt. E. H. Durell ; Connecticut, Nashville, First
Resiment marines, less Second Battalion and band; (b) main body, Washitiff'
ton, Castine, Eagle, First Brigade marines, less one battalion.
1. No further news.
2. This force Will maintain military control of Port au Prince and Cape
Hatien pending negotiations United States and Haiti.
3. (a) Northern detachment, maintain military control Cape Hatien; (6)
main body will maintain military control Port au Prince. Troops on shore
maintain military control Port au Prince and sufficient outing territory to
insure foo<l 8upi)ly for city. Occupy St. Marc, Leogane, and PetionviUe.
Washington remain Port au Prince and support main body of troops.
Castine patrol coast St. Marc to Gonaives, both inclusive. Support troops SL
Marc and vicinity.
Eagle patrol coast I..eogane to Miragoane, both inclusive. Support troops
Leogane and vicinity.
Protect life and property and preserve order.
4. Base is at Guantanamo Bay. Osceola will carry mail, stores, and provi-
sions between various detachments and base. Jason and Solace remain Port au
Prince for the present
5. Squadron commander on Washington, Make 8 a. m. and 8 p. m.. daily
reports and at such other times as may be necessary to keep squadron com-
mander fully and frequently informed of situation. Use seventy-fifth meridian
mean time.
W. B. Capebton,
Rear Admiral, Commander Cruiser Squadron,
Commanding United States Forces in Haitian Waiera.
Copies to: Operations, commander in chief, Washington, Connecticut, Tenr
nessee, Castine, Nashville, Eagle, commandant Guantanamo.
Extracts to Solace, Jason; commander First Brigade; commander First
lU^ment
I also issued letters of instruction as follows:
U. No. 7637-15.
Cbuiseb Squadbon,
United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. ** Washington," Flagship,
Port au Prince, Haiti, August 15, 1915,
From: Coiuniander cruiser squadron, commanding United States forces in
Haitian waters.
To: Chief of Staff.
Subject: Orders.
1. Orders No. 7198-15 of August 3, 1915, issued by commander cruiser squad-
ron are hereby revoked.
2. I will directly, in conjunction with the American charge d'affaires, carry
on the negotiations and have charge of the important relations with the Haitian
officials. These duties will be carried on by nie, either personally or through
members of my staff.
W. B. Capebton.
V. No. 7^3-15.
CRriSEK SgUAORON,
United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. ** Washington," Fi.agship,
Port au Prince, Haiti, August 15, 1015.
From: Conunander cimiser squadron, I'nited States Atlantic Fleet, connnanding
United States forces in Haitian waters.
To: Capt. E. H. Durell, United States Navy.
Subject : Letter of instructions.
1 The commander cruiser squadron has assumed military control of the
dUes of Port au Prince and Cape Haitien. A naUonal government lg^|^
830 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
been formed at Port au Prince with Dartlguenave as President, and this Gov-
ernment is now or^n)zing and assuming control of civil affairs throughout
Haiti. Important negotiations are going on between the United States and
Haiti, of which you will be kept informed.
2. It is my intention to support the present Haitian Government and to
carry on negotiations with it, while maintaining military control of the cities
of Port au Prince and Cape Haltien.
3. You will maintain military control of the city of Cape Haltien, and will
protect life and property and preserve order.
4. The deployment of forces in Haitian waters will be as given in campaign
order No. 8.
5. I will directly, in conjunction with the American charge d'affaires, carry
on the negotiations and have charge of the important relations with the Haitian
officials at Port au Prince. These duties will be carried on by me, either per-
sonally or through members of my staff.
W. B. Capertow.
W. No. 7644-15.
Cruiser Squadron,
Unfied States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. " Washington," Flagship.
Port au Prince, Haiti, August IJ, 1915,
From : Commander cruiser squadron. United States Atlantic Fleet, commanding
United States forces in Haitian waters.
To : Col. Littleton W. T. Waller, United States Marine Corps.
Subject: Letter of Instructions.
1. The commander cruiser squadron has assumed military control of the
cities of Port au Prince and Cape Haltien. A national government has Just
been formed at Port au Prince with Dartlguenave as President and this Gov-
ernment is now organizing and assuming control of civil affairs throughout
Haiti. Important negotiations are going on between the United States and
Haiti, of which you will be kept informed.
2. It is' my Intention to supix)rt the present Haitian Government and to carry
on negotiations with it, while maintaining military control of the cities of Port
au Prince and Cape Haitien.
3. You will maintain military control of the city of Port au Prince and of such
outlying territory as may be necessary to insure food supply for the city, and
will protect life and property and preserve order.
4. The employment of the forces in Haitian waters will be as given In cam-
paign order No. 8. You personally will have direct charge of the trooiis at Port
au Prince and vicinity. Col. Eli E. Cole will have charge of the troops at Cape
Haltien.
5. I will directly. In conjunction with the American charge d'affaires, carry on
the negotiations and have charge of the Important relations with the Haitian
officials. These duties will be carried on by me. either personally or through
members of my staff.
W. B. Caperton.
X. No. 76G7-15.
Cruiser Squadron,
United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. ** Washington," Flagship.
port au Prince, Haiti, August 15, 1915,
The American CuARGft d'affaires,
American Legation, Port au Prince, Haiti.
Sir: I have the honor to state that Col. Littleton W. T. Waller, United Sttites
Marine Con>s, has this day relieved Col. Eli K. Cole, United States Marine Cori^s,
of the militiiry duties at Port au Prince.
Col. Waller will be in charge of maintaining the United States military control
of the city of Port au Prince and of such outlying territory as may be necesssiry
to insure food supply for the city, and will protect life and property and preserve
order.
Col. Cole will be in charge of maintaining military control of Cape Haitien
and of the protection of life and property and the preservation of ortier at that
place.
I will directly, either personally or through members of my staff, and in con-
4unction with you, attend to such civil matters on shore and /such lmfM>rtant
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 831
relations with the Haitian officials as may from time to time be undertaken by
the Un'ted States forces.
Yon are requested to communicate these facts to all foreign diplomatic and
consuUir representatives. I am, sir,
Ilespectfully,
W. B. Oapebton,
Rear Admiral^ United Staten Nary, Commanding Cruiser Hquadron.
Y. Xo. 766^15. Port au Prince, Haiti,
August 15, 1915.
The Commanding Officer French Cruiser " Descartes/*
PoH au PfSnce, Haiti,
Sik: I have the honor to state that Col. Littleton W. T. Waller, United States
Marine Corps, has this day relieved Col. Kll K. Cole, United States Marine
Corps, of the military duties at Port au Prince. •
Col. Waller will be in charge of maintaining military control of the city of
Port au Prince and of sufficient outlying territory as may be necessary to in-
sure food supply for the city, and of the protection of life and property and
preservation of order.
Col. Cole will be in charge of maintaining military control of Cape Hatlen
and of the protection of life and property and the preservation of order at that
place. I am, sir.
Respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, United States Nary,
Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
Commanding United States Forces in Haitian Waters.
To show that I was making endeavor to qtliet the revolutionary forces in the
north, I went to Mr. Leger in Port au Prince and he Informed me that Mr.
Adeinar Auguste and Bishop Kerzusan In Cape Haitlen are prominent men who
have great Influence with tlie Cacos. I immediately got in communication with
these men in the north.
On August 16 I received Information, which was fairly reliable, that the Cacos
forces were concentrating at Le Borgne, on the north coas-t of Haiti, west of
rai>e Hatlen, and at Fort Sonde, just east of St. Marc, on the Artebonlte River ;
that the Cacos were becoming restless, as they had not received pay for some
time; and that the leaders appeared to fear that they will lose control over their
men.
The Cacos question will be the most difficult one for the United StJites to
.solve In Haiti ; as these men have long been used to the wandering life of a
bandit and to a life without work. The Cacos question is a most serious one,
and will probably not be successfully handled until a reliable constabulary is
established and money comes into the country to provide work for tliese men.
I would like to Insert the following report In the record. This is a report
made by one of our officers who was entirely engaged In keeping track of the
Cacos situation : %.
" IIeadqt'artkrs Second Ri-xjiment,
** United States Marine Corps,
"Porf au Prince, Haiti, August 16, 1921.
" From : Capt. George Van Orden, Marine Corps.
•* To : Chief of staff. First Brigade.
" Subject: Report concerning location and condition of revolutionary forces.
** 1. The * Caco * forces have been reported as concentrating at Le Borgne, on
the north coast west of Cai)e Haitlen, and at Point Sonde, just east of St. Marc,
on the Artlbonlte River. The report of their concentration at Point Sonde was
practically confirmed from another reliable source, and as It agrees with reports
of activities in the vicinity of St. Marc it can be taken as trtie. I was also
informed by an agent of the organization that the chiefs were having some con-
siderable difficulty in maintaining discipline because of the delay In paying their
men and sending them home, which they were told was the intention of the
Government. He told me that the conditions were getting rapidly more threat-
ening and requested me to urge that steps be token toward paying off these
men, in order that he and the other chiefs, who had given me their personal
assurances that their men would make no trouble during negotiations, could
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382 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
continue their contract with me. The above information was not given in a
threatening manner, and it was plain to be seen that the a^ent was considerably
worrie<I over the prosiiect of his men getting out of hand. He stated that it had
been very difficult to convince the lesser chiefs and the men that the Goveni-
ment would play fair with them, and that it was only l>ecause they knew that
the Americans were handling this question that they consider it at all. I was
also informed that if the man name<l Filogene were appointed a member of any
commission that had to do with their organizations, it would (rertainly cause ii
serious- outbreak, as Filogene is considered by them a traitor and an all-around
scoundrel."
That report is signed by Capt. George Van Orden, United States Marine
Corps.
On the 17th of August the American charge d'affaires. Davis, deliveretl to
President Dartiguenave the draft of the proposed treaty and a memorandmn
relative to Congress passing a resolution directing the President to conclude the
treaty. ,
It now became necessary for me to occupy one or two of the cities adjoining
Port au Prince, as a further security for that city, and to pn)tect an important
area furnishing food for Port au Prince. It must be remembered that these
revolutionary troops, the Cacos, were prohibiting the entrance of foodstuffs and,
in fact, all traffic for the cities, so it became a question of supplying food to the
people within the cities.
On the 16th of August the American consular agent at Port de Paix informed
the commanding officer of the Connecticut that Port de Paix was entirely and
openly hostile to the Government of I'resident Dartiguenave, which has not
been recognized at that place yet. and that the population was ready to Join the
Cacos. This is a city to the eastward of Cape Haitien, on the north coast of
Haiti.
Touching upon the point of alleviating the star\'ing poor at Port au Prince, I
would like to say that the follo\ring committee was named to carry on that
work.
Senator Oddie. Who appointed that committee. Admiral?
Admiral Capb»ton. I did, sir. That committee consiste<i of Archbishop
Pichon. llev. TunibuU, United States Vice Consul Battist, Senators Harrison
and Villard, Madame Vue F.ils Aime, president, and Madame N. Solages, treas-
urer of St. Vincent de Paul's Hospital, under direction of Lieut. Oberlin. They
were engaged in alleviating the suflTering of the starving poor at Port au Prince
with funds provided by the American Red Cross Society.
I would like to mention a few of the things this society was doing. They
formed milk .stations where they a.ssured the poor that they would get fresh
milk. At first we sold it for a small amount and afterwards gave it to the
patient.*^ We also formed a station with the aid of some French nuns who
were there, where the poor women could leave their children in arms while
they went out to procure work in the city. Then we had another station where
they treate<l all sorts of diseases as the people would report Our doctors
and also some of the Haitian doctors were very active in this work.
It was on the 18th of August that the Haitian Government published a decree
of amnesty to all political factions. ^
The ('HAiRMAN. What date was that?
Admiral Capebton. That was August 18. In this ccmnection I would like
also to refer to the foUowing letter. ad<ln*ssed to the American consul at Port
au Prince. Haiti, in whch I said : " I have the honor to request that you take
the nHcessar>' measures to dinn't the consular representatives at Port de Paix,
Aux Cayes, .Tacniol. and Jeremie to publish the following proclamation to the
people of their districts :
"'I am d'rected by the United States Government to assure the Haitian
people that the I'nite<l States has no object in view except to Insure, establish,
and help to maintain Haitian independence and the establishing of a stable and
firm government by the Haitian people.
" * Every assistance will ])e given to the Haitian people In their attempt to
secure these ends. It Is the Intention to retain United States forces in Haiti
only .so long as will be necessary for this purjiose.* "
It has been shown here that I had agreed, through the President of Haiti, to
pay these troops from the north certain sums if they would turn over their rifles
and ammuu'tion, and, Incidentally, they were paid a certain amount for doing
this, provided they would lay down their arms and return home.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 333
In order to give further publicity to my offer to pay the soldiers upon coming
wltliin the United States lines, depositing their arms, and returning to their
homes, 15 gourdes apiece, and to each chief 100 gourdes, I directed the com-
maading officer of the Castlne to publish the department's proclamation and
this information at Gonaives. Tlie other commanding officers throughout Haiti
were ordered to publish the same
The Chairman. Throughout Haiti or at the several Haitian ports?
Admiral Caperton. At the ports occupied by the American troops.
There were many promises — papers signed — to the end that these leaders in
the north would carry out this plan of disarming the Cacos. We received hun-
dreds and thousands of arms, but the project failed, as will eventually be snown.
The Chaibman. This sum was paid from the Haitian treasury, I presume?
Admiral Capebton. Yes; I said with the understanding and permission of
the Presiflent
It was about this time — on August 18 — that I informed our Government of
my intention to extend to the President elect of Haiti formal recognition of
the United States Government, as directed in the department's radiogram
02014 : " Unless otherwise directed, I will fire a national salute of 21 guns with
the Haitian flag at the main if I ascertain that this salute can be returned by
the Haitian authorities."
The Chairman. Do you mean if they had powder enough?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir.
In that connection, I would like to put the following in the record^:
"August 18. 1915.
"Prom: Commander cruiser squadron.
" To : Secretary of the Navy, via wire.
** If American charge d'affaires extends to President elect of Haiti the formal
ivcognit'on of United States Government, as directed in department's radio-
gram 02014. unless otherwise directed, I will fire national salute of 21 guns
with Haitian flag at the main If this salute can be returned by the Haitian
authorities. 23318.
** Capebton."
On the 19th of August I received a radiogram from the Navy Department
stating that the State Department desired that I assume charge of the custom- '
bonses at JacraeL Les Cayes, Jerem'e, Miragoane, Petite Goave, Port au Prince,
St Marc. Gonaives, Part de Paix, and Cape Haltlen. It further directed that
the funds collected be used for the organization and maintenance of an efficient
constabulary for conducting such temporary public works as will afford im-
mellate relief through employment for the starv'ng populace and discharge*!
soldiers, and finaUy for supporting the Dartlguenave government. I was
further directed to confer with the Amercan charge d'affaires for the purpose
of having President Dartlguenave solicit the above action; but whether the
Presdent so requested or not, I was directed to carr>' out the State Depart-
ment's desires. The Navy Department further directed that the American
officials placed in charge of the customhouses " be furnished with the necessary
customs guards.'*" I ^ra to direct these American officials to collect all the
Import and export duties, to immediately deposit them w'th the respective
local branches <tf the National Bank of Haiti in separate accounts opened in
my name, and to draw against these accounts for the purpose mentioned above,
the surplus to be held for the time being by the United States Government in
trust for the people of Haiti.
In that connection, I would like to put the following into the record :
"August 19, 1915.
" From : Secretary of the Navy.
"To: Commander cruiser squadron.
"State Department desires you assume charge of following customhouses:
Jacmel, Aux Cayes, Jeremie, Miragoane. Petit Goave, Port au Pr nee, St. Marc,
Gonaives, Port de Paix, Cape Haltlen. Funds collected to be used for organiza-
tion and maintenance efficient constabulary, for conducting such temporary
paUic works as will afford Immed'ate relief througjii employment for starving
populace and discharged soldiers, and finally for supporting Dartlguenave gov-
ernment Conger with charge d'affaires for purpose of having President
Dartlguenave solicit above action. Whether Presdent so requests or not, pro-
ceed to carry out State Department's desire; supply American officials place 1
334 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
in charge with necessary customs guards. Direct officials coUect all import
an:l export duties to be immediately deposted by them with respective local
branches of National Bank of Haiti in separate account opened vour name.
Draw against this account for purposes mentioned above, surplus* to be held
for t'me being by United States Government in trust for people of HtitL
Acknowledge. 20019.
" Danieia"
The Chairman. I want to ask you a question which may be answered some
time later, as to the effect of the use of the funds so seized upon the pavment
of the interest on the foreign debt— that is, the effect of the sequestradon of
these funds on the payment of the interest on the foreign debt
Admiral Capekton. In view of the more or less delicate situation existing
with reference to American control of customhouses, which has been violently
opposed by the Haitien people for a number of years and even at the present
time ; and as there is a treaty under negotiation now in Port au Prince covering
this customs control matter, I considered it extremely undesirable to aggravate
the situation by announcing that we were going to forcibly seize the custom-
houses immediately. This we are not in a position to do at the present time on
account of the lack of my forces, and I therefore believe that the military inten-
tion of seizing the customhouses be for the present not communicated to the
Haitiens. We should, however, immediately assemble the necessary forces. In
this way no time will be lost, the treaty will be signed with less opposition, and
the matter of military occupation of the customhouses can probably be ar-
ranged without unduly increasing the hostile attitude.
The Chaibman. Let me ask. Admiral, what was the object in seizing the cus-
tomhouses at the ports of entry?
Admiral Capebton. The funds that were being collected were being used at
different ports by revolutionary forces in some instances. There was no control.
The Chaibman. Had it been the practice in Haiti for a revolutionary chief
at the beginning of his movement to seize a customhouse as the financial basis
of his movement?
Admiral Capebton. Yes, sir. When he became President; of course, he
always became President.
The Chaibman. The seizure of a customhouse was the first step in the accom-
plishment of a successful revolution? When they began a revolution in the
north they seized the customhouse, did they, at Cape Haitien?
Admiral Capebton. I do not know. They seized — in many instances they
did, but not always, I think. When they could, they did. In these marches
around from Cape Hatien to Port au Prince during the revolution I had occa-
sion frequently to intervene in the matter and save them from taking money
from the Haitian Republic, and also on one or two occasions, I think, from some
private bank.
On the 18th of August, referring to the matter of customhouses, I informed
the department that the United States had not actually accomplished a military
intervention in the affairs of another nation ; that hostility exists now in Haiti
and has existed for a number of years against such action ; that hostile con-
tacts have only been avoided by prompt and rapid military^ action which has
given the United States control before resistance has had 'time to organise;
that we now hold the capital of the country and two other Important seaports;
that the total force at my disposal now is one armored crui^r, two gunboats,
one converted yacht, and 1,500 marines ; and that this force is now employed at
the maximum extension consistent with maintaining control of the occupied
territory and prompt concentration for defense. The department now desires
that the customhouses in seven other cities be occupied. These customhouses
can not be taken charge of unless the cities in which they are located are occu-
pied with sufficient military force to protect our customs officers and preserve
order. A further extension of my present force Is Imperative to avoid.
No troops should be without the support and communication facilities of a
naval vessel for the present at least. To occupy these seven additional ports
means practically military occupation of the seacoast of Haiti, which is extensive.
No attempt must be made to accomplish this until there are available sufficient
forces and suflficient oflicers and an organization completed for assuming control
of the customs service. This will require not less than one more regiment of ma-
rines of not less than eight compan'es, the Artillery battalion of marines, and
three more gunboats or light cruisers. For the reasons given before, I informed
the department that I considered it imperative that these contemplated operations
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMING<». 335
be kept a secret for the present and undertaken only when force is ayailable
and customs service organized and ready. This secrecy is extremely important
now, pending the treaty negotiations. While we ai-e powerful enough without
doubt to accomplish anything we desire by force, yet a due respect for the
sensibilities of tlie Hu tluns and a friendly attitude in our operations at this
time will do a great deal toward accomplishing what we wish now, and will lay
the foundation for good relations hftween the two Governments in the future.
We are not at war with Halt', and hostile operations, except where they can not
be avoided, should be replaced by pt»aceful methods, consistent with accomplish-
ing our objects.
I reconimende<I that not less than one regiment of marines of not less than
eight conn>anles, the battalion of Artillery, and three gunboats be immediately
ordered to Ha tl and placed at my dL^posal, and Paymaster Charles Conard and
10 other pay ofllctTs not below the grade of lieutenant be sent Immediately to
organize and administer the customs service. Paymaster Conard is especially
fitted for this duty (m ac*count of his previous experience at Vera Cruz, Mexico.
While at a later date, after be'ng sufficiently organized, our forces may be
withdrawn, yet at the present moment the United States should take no chances
of injury to its dignity and prestige.
The message I sent to the Swretary of the Navy in regard to this matter reads
as follows :
ArcrsT 19, 1915.
From: Commander Cruiser Squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy and Commander in Chief, via wire.
United States has now actually accomplished a military intervention in
affairs of another nation. Hostility exists now in Haiti and has existed for
number of years against such action. Serious hostile contacts have only been
avoided by prompt and rapid ralltary action which has given United States
control before resistance has had time to organize. We now hold capital of
country and two other important seaiwrts. Total force at my disposal now,
one armored cruiser, two gunboats, one converted yacht, and 1,500 marines.
This force now deployed at maximum extension consistent with maintaining
control of occupied territory and prompt concentration for defense. Deimrt-
ment now desires that customhouses In seven other cities be occupied. Custom-
houses can not be taken charge of unless cities in which they are located are
occupied with sufficient military force to prote<'t our customs officers and pre-
sence order. Further extension of present force imperative to avoid. No forces
should be without support and communication facilities of naval vessels for
the present at least. To occupy these seven additional ports means practically
military occupation of seacoast of Haiti, which Is extensive. No attempt must
be made to accomplish this until there are available sufficient force and sufficient
officers and organization complete<l for assuming customs service.
This will require not less than one more regiment of marines of not less
than eight companies, the artillery battalion of marines, and three more gun-
boats or light cruisers. Consider it imperative that these contemplated opera-
tions be kept for the present secret and undertaken only w^hen force is avail-
able and custom service organized and ready. This setTCcy extremely impor-
tant now pending treaty negotiations. Recommend not less than one regiment
of marines of not less than eight companies, the artillery battalion of marines,
and three gunboats be Immediately ordered Haiti and placed my disposal, and
Paymaster Charles Conard and 10 pay officers not below rank lieutenant be
sent Immediately to organize and administer customs service. Paymaster
Conard especially fitted, due previous experience, Vera Cruz, Mexico. While at
later date, after constabulary is organized, our forces may be withdrawn, yet
at present moment United States should take no chance of Injury to Its dignity
and prestige.
Caperton.
Senator Oddik. I would like to ask why that secrecy was suggested.
Admiral Caperton.' It was my suggestion. The country was In a state of
uproar at that time, and of course it has always been known that they violently
opposed any taking over of their customhouses, and I thought it was not the
opportune time to do this; and also the fact that, as I had asked for 10 pay-
masters in addition to Paymaster Conard, It was necessary to get up an organi-
zation before taking charge of these customs.
On the 20th of August there were approximately 17 shots fired in the vicinity
A}t the railroad station in the northern part of Port au Prince. One sentry
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336 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
was fired upon by a native ; the sentry returned the fire with one shot, but the
man escaped. I merely mention this to show the great unrest in the dty at
that time. On the 20th I reported that there had been no disturbances at Cape
Haitien. The country people are still held up outside the town by the Cacos,
which prevented food from coming in. On the 20th of August the American
charge d'affaires was continuing the treaty negotiations. All our eilorts were
directed toward a speedy conclusion of this work.
Conditions became so unsettled at St. Marc, which is about 50 miles to the
westward of Port au Prince, that I found it necessary to issue the following
order to the commanding officer of the Castvne:
" Seize and administer customhouse at St. Marc. Collect all import and ex-
port duties. Open account in local branch of National Banlc of Haiti In my
name and deposit customs receipts therein. Acknowledge.
" Caperton."
The Chaibman. When was the President elected?
Admiral Caperton. On August 12. On August 21 treaty negotiations are not
progressing satisfactorily. President Dartiguenave still continues his favorable
attitude toward the treaty, but there is a change in the attitude of certain
members of the cabinet and of the Congress apparent. An unfavorable senti-
ment has appeared in Congress in the form of inflammatory speeches against
the customs control and American occupation in general. This change of atti-
tude has been made in spite of repeated and solemn assurances given me before
the formation of the present Government. Both the Congress and the members
of the Government are cowed and intimidated by fear of sentiment throughout
the country against the American customs control, propagated constantly during
the last few years by the faction leaders.
Senator Oddie. Let me ask you, who gave you these assurances?
Admiral Capebton. They were given to my representative by the President
and some of the members of his cabinet. We got this information from them
vtluntarily.
On the 21st of August, in accordance with the Navy Department's instructions,
I directed the commanding officer of the Connecticut at Cape Haitien to open
an account for customs receipts in the local branch of the National Bank of
Haiti and otherwise carry out the department's instructions relative to the
administration of customs. I have temporarily placed this account in Com-
mander Olmstead's name until I can organize an office in Port au Prince to
take care of this business for the coast as a whole in my name. In that con-
nection I would like to put into the record the following communication:
August 21, 1915.
From : Commander Cruiser Squadron.
To : Commanding officer Connecticut.
In accordance orders Navy Department you will keep control customhouse
at Cape Haitien, with an American officer as collector of customs. Collect all
import and export duties. Open account in local branch National Bank of
Haiti in name of Commander Olmstead, military governor, and deposit total
customs receipts therein daily from now on. Draw against this account for
the following purposes : First, for conducting such temporary public works as
will afford immediate relief through employment for starving populace and
discharged soldiers, and second, for supporting local military government Snr
plus will be held by American military governor in trust for Haitian people.
Acknowledge.
Capebton.
The Chaibman. This was on the 21st of August. When was the seizure of
the customhouses completed?
Admiral Caperton. I think Port au Prince was the last one I took. I do not
remember the date.
The Chaibman. I am trying to get a picture of that. You were on the
station how long?
Admiral Caperton. For about 18 months.
The Chairman. You have now covered 2 or 3 months of the 18 months?
Admiral Capbrton. Yes, sir. Maiiy things happened in that interval with
regard to outbreaks. The customhouse at Port au Prince was taken over on
September 2.
The Chairman. Between the 20th of August and the 2d of September, when
the customhouse at Port au Prince was seized, what events of importance took
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 337
Admiral Capebton. I could not answer that offhand without following my
notes consecutively, as I am doing now. This happened six or seven years ago,
aince which time I have been busy at other things, and it is hard to answer
questions without referring to my official notes made at that time.
On August 23 treaty negotiations are still unsatisfactory. The fear of the
Government and the Congress of the faction leaders and the Cacos apparently
grows more each day. This Government, of course, by its very nature, in
which it consists of men not associated with factions and not supported by
Cacos, is weak, unless suppiirted by the United States. Politics hi Haiti has
been entirely in the hands of the faction leaders for the last 30 or 40 years,
and anyone not a member of a faction and not a participant In these factional
disturbances is not politically strong. This present Government is not getting
the support of the various parts of the country, nor has it been able to estab-
lish local government in other cities to any extent.
The American charge d'affaires received at noon on the 23d of August a note
delivered personally by the minister of foreign relations, who stated that should
the United States insist on any other action than that which the Haitian Govern-
ment expressed itself willing to perform in the note, the President and cabinet
would be forced to resign. In this note the Haitian Government says, after
expressing its great desire to enter into an arrangement with the United States,
that it holds itself at the disposition of the United States Government to com-
mence pour parlers, and, further, as it is anxious to avoid all difficulties which
would be of a nature to alter the good relations which exist between Haiti and
the United States, that it would be disi)osed, since the United States insisted
upon it, to suggest to the Congress the passage of a resolution expressing the
desire to see the President of Haiti conclude a convention with the United
States for best reciprocal interests of the two countries. There is apparently
no doubt but what the question of customs control is practically the great and
only question in obtaining a treaty with these people, and that these pour
pailers will without doubt be directed on the part of the Haitian Government
toward the avoidance of customs control, or a great modification of it.
I still made reports from day to day saying that the town of Port du Paix is
strong for Bobo ; that the Cacos are reported at Le Borgne and are on their way
to Port du Paix, and that the town is without a government.
(Thereupon the committee took a recess until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)
AFTER BECESS.
The committee reassembled, pursuant to the taking of'recess, at 2.30 o'clock
p. m.
The Chaibman. You may proceed. Admiral.
Admiral Capebton. On the 24th of August private interviews by the Ameri-
can charg4 d'affaires with the President and members of the cabinet indicated
a more conciliatory attitude toward the treaty. The President himself is ap-
parently anxious to have the treaty matter settled and states that, with few
mhior changes not affecting the general principles, the treaty would be
acceptable.
On the 25th of August the American charge d'affaires, in an unofficial and
private talk with the President, received from him what seemed to be a most
sincere expression of his desire to conclude the treaty as soon as possible.
The President stated that he believed the treaty could be signed, provided the
United States would agree to the change of a few details which in no way
affect the basic principles involved. The American charge d'affaires told him
that while he was not authorized to sign any treaty other than the one sub-
mitted, he would not object to forwarding to Washington these desired changes,
diould they he of a detail nature and not affecting the basic principles.
Unreliable and irresponsible political enemies of the Haitian Government are
attanpting to stir up animosities against the Government and the American
intervention. There are, both in the Congress and in the country, among the
Cacos, irresponsible agitators, mostly the faction leaders, who are attempting
to undermine the present Government and on every pretext to influence opinion
against it. It is believed that the chances for successfully negotiating the
treaty will be increased if we for the moment cease seizing the customhouses
and conduct no further military operations except those necessary for preserv-
ing peace and order and for other important military reasons.
Senator Oddie. Was that your cablegram?
Admiral Capebton. Those are my notes. ^ j
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338 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
I sent the following message to the Secretary of the Navy on the 25th of
August :
•* From : (Commander cruiser squadron, August 25, 1915.
" To : Secretary of the Navy via wire and Commander in Chief.
" Referring American charge d'affaires radiogram of August 25, 6 p. m. : For
better supporting treaty negotiations, unless otherwise directed, will for the
present cease seizing customhouses and will for the present conduct no further
military operations except those necessary for preserving peace and order or
for other important military reasons. In event resignation present Haitian
Government I recommend that military government be established Port au
Prince, Haiti, with American officer as military governor. Present is most
critical time in relations with Haiti, and our decision now will, to a great ex-
,tent, determine future course. If military government is established, we would
be bound not to abandon Haitian situation until affairs of country are set at
right and pre<lominant Interests of United States of America secured. Neces-
sity for action on my part will come if Government resigns, and I should at
that time Icnow wishes of United States of American Government. 23425.
•* Capkrton."
The Chairman. At this point. Admiral, I will put into the record the follow-
ing from the department's record :
" Under date of September 20, 1914, the Secretary of State informeil the Sec-
retary of the Navy that the conditions in Haiti had improved to an extent that
would admit of the withdrawal battleships New Jersey and Georgia, now in
Haitian waters, but felt that a gunboat should be retained there. In reply
thereto, on October 2, 1914, the Secretary of the Navy Informed the Secretary
of State that the gunboat Taeoma would be held at Cape Haitlen, awaiting
orders. Immediately following this, however, the situation in Haiti grew
steadily worse, and under date of October 28, 1914, letters were addressed by
the Secretary of State to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy as
follows:
" * Dear Mr. PREsroENT : In view of our conversation this noon relative to
Haiti it seemed to me of first importance that the naval force in Haitian
waters should be at once increased, not only for the purpose of protecting
foreign interests but also as evidence of the eaniest intention of this Govern-
ment to settle the unsatisfactory state of affairs which exists. We have one
vessel now at Cape Haitlen and two others are needed on the south coast, one
at Port au Prince and the other at Gonalves.
" * In the absence of Secretary Daniels and Assistant Secretary Roo.sevelt, I
look up the matter with Admiral Flske, who thinks one vessel can be spared
from Dominican waters, and with him I agree. As to the other vessel neces-
8ar>% the Admiral suggests that one of the warships now at Vera Cruz might
be ordered to Haiti. In view of the urgent need of increasing our force on
the south coast at this time when a renewal of negotiations seems probable, will
you please advise me whether or not I can say to Admiral Fiske that j'ou
approve of sending a battleship from Vera Cruz to Port au Prince? ' "
" * The Secretary of the Navy.
" * Sir : I have the honor to inform you that the poltlcal situation In the Re-
public of Haiti is such as to render necessary the presence of additional United
States naval ships in Haitian waters. It is therefore requested, in order to
carry out the policies of this Government, that two ships be sent to Haiti of
sufficient size so that their landing complements will be able to take charge of
and preserve order in the cities of Port au Prince and Gonalves, should occa-
sion therefor arise. It is hoped that these two ships may arrive in Haiti as
soon as practicable.'
" To the above letter the Secretary of the Navy replied on October 29, 1914,
as follows:
** * Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October
28 stating that the diplomatic situation in the Republic of Haiti is such as to
render necessary the presence of additional United States naval ships in Haitian
waters. It is noted that the Department of State requests, in order to carry
out the policies of this Government, that two ships be sent to Haiti of sufficient
size so that their landing complements will be able to take charge of and pre-
serve order in the cities of Port au Prince and Gonalves should occasion therefor
arise.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 339
"*I have the honor to Inform you that the U. S. S. Hancock now at Monte
Cristi has been ordered to proceed immediately to Port au Prince and that
tlie battleship Kansas has been ordered to proceed immediately from Vera Cruz
to Port au Prince. The Hancock has on board a regiment of marines, which
force should be adequate to preserve order in the cities of Port au Prince and
Gonaives should necessity require it to be landed/
"The foregoing letters were followed by further requests from the State De-
partment as follows, on October 30, 1914 :
" * Sib : I have the honor to request that the attached telegraphic instruction
to the American minister at Port au Prince, Haiti, be sent through the radio
coDiinnnication of the U. S. S. Hancock, as this department understands that
ctble communication with Port au Prince is very uncertain.
•* * It is requested that instructions be sent to the senior officer of the United
States naval forces in Haitian waters to confer with the American minister at
Port au Prince and to accede to any requests he may make for the movement
of ships and landing of men.'
"The Secretary of the Navy replied to the above letter on October 30, 1914,
as follows :
" * Sib : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October
30, requesting that the telegraphic Instructions attached thereto be sent to the
American minister at Port au Prince, Haiti, through the radio communication
of the U. S. S. Hancock. It is also noted that the Department of State requests
that instruction be sent to the senior officer. United States naval forces in
Haitian waters, to confer with the American minister at Port au Prince and
to accede to any request he may make for the movement of ships and landing
of men.
*^ • I have the honor to inform you that the telegraphic instructions- to the
American minister at Port au Prince have been sent as requested. The com-
muiding officer of the Hancock has been directed to confer with the American
Banister at Port au Prince and to cooperate with him.* "
Admiral Capkrton. On August 25 I issued instructions relative to the admin-
istration of the customs and civil affairs. I appointed Paymaster Charles Mor-
Hs, United States Navy, as " administrator of customs " for the entire customs
service of Haiti assumed by the United States forces. In that connection, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to put in the record the following communications :
•*No. 818Ckl5.
" Cbuiseb Squadbon, United States Atlantic Fleet,
"U. S. S. Washington, Flagship,
« Port au Prince, Haiti, August 24, 1915.
"From: Commander cruiser squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet.
"To: Commanding United States forces in Haitien waters.
"Subject: Letter of instructions.
•Reference: (a) Campaign order No. 9.
"1. The following instructions will be followed for the purpose of admin-
istering customs and such other civil duties as may be assumed by the United
States forces in Haitien waters.
** CUSTOMS ADMINISTBATION.
"2. The squadron commander will administer the customs through an 'ad-
ministrator of customs,* who will be established at Port au Prince. The ' ad-
ministrator of customs ' will have general charge of the collection of customs
duties at all ports and the depositing of receipts, in accordance with instruc-
tions given by the squadron commander and in accordance with the Haitien
law not inconsistent with these instructions. For the purpose of insuring
nniformity of administration the * administrator of customs * is authorized to
issue dh*ectly to the local commander such detailed instructions as may be
necessary relative to the customs collection, depositing of receipts, keeping of
accounts, rendition of returns, and such other administrative matters as comes
within his province.
"3. Detachment commanders will appoint from their respective commands
for each port in which customs are to be collected a commissioned Navy pay
or Navy line officer as * collector of customs * and * captain of the port.*
"4. Detachment commanders will exercise general supervision over the ad-
ininistration of customs within the limits of their respective commands, being
guided by the instructions of the squadron commander acting through the
' •'talnUtrator of customs.' ^^ ,^^^^ ^^ GoOglc
340 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
" CIVIL ADMINISTRATION.
*" 5. Detachment connimnderg will have charge of such other civil affairs as
may be assumed within the limits of their respective commands and of the dis-
bursement of funds allotted to them by the squadron commander to meet obli-
gations incurred thereby.
*' 0. Disbursements will be made by detachment commanders only under the
following appropriations :
'' 'Appropriation constabulary ;' to be used for the organization and main-
tenance of an efficient constabulary. .(For use at Port au Prince only for the
present.)
" 'Appropriation public works ;' to be used for conducting such temporary
public works as will afford an immediate relief through employment for the
starving population and discharged soldiers.
" 'Appropriation military and civil government of the United States forces ;'
to be used for the maintenance of the customs and port services and such mili-
tary government as the United States may establish.
"7. Detachment commanders will submit to the squadron commander by
radio not later than the 25th of each month, confirmed by letter, estimates
covering the funds desired under each appropriation for each town for the com-
ing calendar month.
" 8. Funds will then be allotted by the squadron commander to each detach-
ment commander from the funds on deposit in the local branch of the National
Bank of Haiti in each town, and these funds so allotted will be placed to the
credit of the detachment commander in these local banks.
•* 9. Each detachment commander will render the following returns covering
funds allotted to them by the squadron commander as specified in para-
graph 8:
"(fi) At the end of each quarter, beginning September 30, 1915, an account
current with all substantiating vouchers.
"(6) At the end of each calendar month a statement of cash received and
expended.
" 10. The commanding officer of the Washington will assume the duties of a
'detachment commander.' indicated herein under 'civil administration' for
Port au Prince. He will in addition assume the duties of 'captain of the port'
at Port au Prince.
"W. B. Capebton."
" No. 8282-15.
" ('ruiskr SquADBo:?, United States Atlantic Fuzrr,
" U. S. S. Ship 'Washington, Flagship,
" Port au Prince, Haiti, August 23, 1915,
" From : Commander cruiser squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet, com-
manding United States forces in Haitian waters.
"T(»: Paymaster Charles Morris, United States Navy, U. S. S. Washington (via
commaiuling officer).
*' Subject : Appointment as ' administrator of customs * and * collector of cus-
t(mi8 ' nt Port au Prince.
"1. There is inclosed herewith Navy Department's radiogram No. 20018,
directing the seizure of certain customhouses and a letter of instructions rela-
tive to the administnition of the customs service. Customhouses at St. Marc
and Cape Haitlen have already been selze<i. The customhouse at St. Marc is
administered in exact accordance with department's radiogram No. 20018.
The customhouse at ('ape Haitien is administered in the same manner, except
that the account with the local branch of the National Bank of Haiti has
temporarily bwn placed in the name of Commander P. N. Olmstead. The
seizure and administration of the remaining customhouses will be undertaken
as soon as possible.
" 2. Vou are hereoy appointo<l * administrator of customs ' and 'collector of
customs ' at Port au Prince.
"3. You will t*stal)lish an office at Port au Prince and administer the cus-
toms service In accordance with department's radiogram No. 20018, the letter
of instructions No. 818<>-15, of August 24, 1915, and the Haitian law where this
law is not inconsistent with these Instructions.
" 4. This is in addition to your present duties.
"W. B. Capebton."
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INQXHBY INIO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 341
•* No. 8283-15.
•* Cruiser Squadron, ITnited States Atlantic Fleet,
•* U. S. S. Washington, Flagship,
" Port au Prince, Haiti, August 25, 1915,
" From : Commander cruiser squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet, command-
ing United States forces in Haitlen waters.
"To: Paymaster Charles Morris, United States Navy, U. S. S. Washinffton (via
commanding officer).
'• Subject : Appointment as * fiscal officer * for 'civil administration.'
"Reference: (a) Navy Department's radiogram 20018.
** Inclosure : 1.
" 1. There is Inclosed herewith a letter of instructions No. 8186-15 of August
24, 1915, relative to * civil administration,' assumed by the United States forces
in Haitian waters.
** 2. You are hereby appointed tlie * fiscal officer * for the squadron commander
in connection with the funds placed to his credit by the various collectors of
castoms.
** 3. Funds will only be disbursed under the following appropriation :
•* * Appropriation constabulary ' ; to be used for the organization and main-
t»*nance of an efficient constabulary.
"* Appropriation public works'; to be used for conducting such temporary
pablic works as will afford an immediate relief through employment for the
starving populace and discharged soldiers.
"* Appropriation military and civil government of the United States forces ;
to be used for the maintenance of the customs and port services and such mili-
tary governments as the United States may establish.
" 'Appropriation Haitian Government.' to be transferred to the Dartiguenave
government as may be determined by the squadron commander.
"Tlie funds remaining after such disbursements will be left in the admiral's
account and held by him In trust for the people of Haiti.
•4. You will keep the necessary accounts and tiles and the returns rendered
by the detachment commanders.
"5. You will each month after the receipt of the detachment commanders'
estimates prepare a synopsis of those estimates and a synopsis of the allotment
which you consider necessary for the different detachment commanders for
the coming month, and will submit same to the squadron commander for his
approval. Upon approval of these allotments you will make the necessary
arrangements through the National Bank of Haiti to place the funds so allotted
to the credit of detachment commanders.
••6. This Is In addition to your present duties.
•* W. B. Caperton."
" Cruiser Squadron, Ignited States Atlantic Fleet,
" IT. S. S. ' Washington,' Flagship,
** Port au Prince, Haiti, August 25, 1915.
'* Capt. E. H. DiTRELi., United States Nav>%
" U. 8. 8. * Connecticut* Cape Haiticn, Haiti.
**Dear Durell: I am inclosing herewith a draft of campaign order No. 9,
which I have not yet issued, but will in the immediate future as soon as the
necessary reconnoissances are completed at the southern ports. I am sending
this advance copy to you so that you may have a general outline of the deploy-
nittit of the forces In Haitian waters. It will be signed by me in a few days and
your regular copy sent to you then. So far as your detachment is concerned
you may consider it In effect now. I am inclosing herewith a letter of Instruc-
tions which will become effective immediately upon its receipt.
** Paymaster Charles Morris, United States Na^T. has been appointed * admin-
istrator of customs,' and will immediately proceetl with the administration of
customs for the entire coast of Haiti. You are, of course, tlie detachment
commander referred to in the letter of instructions, and will immediately
assume the administration duties directe<l therein for your two towns. We
may have to be a little patient for the first uiontli or so, until we begin to get
some funds to our credit. After that I think matters will run more smoothly.
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342 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
** Under direction of the Navy Department, the customs receipts are to be
placed to my credit in a single account in the National Bank of Haiti.
You will open an account in my name at this bank both at Cape Haitian and
Port de Paix. You will proceed to shift the money on hand at Cape Haitian
from Commander 01mstead*s account to my account, keeping out sufficient
funds as you may need to cover expenditures for one week in that town.
Please advise me when this has been done and how much you have placed to my
credit.
'* I suggest that you immediately send in for both jtowns estimates for the
month of September of the amounts of money desired, in accordance with
the letter of instructions. I wull then immediately make an allotment by
transferring funds to your credit at each place. I intend to have each town
self-supporting; that is, the customs receipts at each place must support tlie
work at that place. You will for the present use two appropriations: (a)
•Public works* and (6) 'military and civil government of United States
forces.' In these two I think you will have plenty of leeway to meet all
expenses of your administration and undertake such sanitary and cleaning-
up jobs as you wish.
" If you need funds for immediate uses at Port de Paix, take funds out of
Commander Olmstead's account at Cape Haitien before transferring to my name
and inform me of the amount so taken.
** It is very necessary that the method outlined in the letter of instructions and
in the circular letter of the administrator of customs to the col!e<*tors of customs
be followed in order to carrj' on the business uniformly throughout the Republic.
The scheme is roughly to <*ollect the customs, put then in my name, and then I
allot to you what I can out of these funds to pay for your two towns. After that
I leave it entirely to your business and as to how you spend your money. No
further action is necessary on my part. The only restriction is that money must
be .spent cmly under the two appropriations mentioned. I think these will leave
you plenty of leeway to give you anything you please.
"With reference to the Nashville controlling Port de Paix and Cape Haitien,
I consider it necessary to have the NashtHUe touch in at Port de Paix fre-
quently, at your discretion, in order to got news, investigate conditions, support
as necessary the landing force there and maintain communication with it. I
am not as yet ready to leave any detachments in isolated positions without their
being in reach of the pnmipt support of a naval vessel. This may Interfere
with Commander Olnistead's present duties as 'military governor' at Cape
Haitien. If It does you are authorized to relieve him from that duty and appoint
(X)l. Cole or anyone else you may have available in his place.
"A battery of Artillery will be landwl at Cape Haitien in the near future by
the TrnnvsMce. The force you will then have ashore at Cape Haitien, .supported
by tlie ConnerliciiVs bluejacket battalion, will give you practically the uunil>er
of troops that ('ol. (.'ole thought were necessary there. I would suggest that
this bluejacket battalion be kept aboard the Connecticut as a reserve, ready to
land at either Port de Pnix or Ca|H» Haitien.
" In this connection it is very desiral)le to have the bluejacket battalion-
officers, petty officers, and men — given thorough instruction in their military
duties on shore. The department available has no more troops available to In-
crease the force in Haiti at the present fme, and we must therefore be prepared
to use our seamen to reinforce our marines at any threatened point. In Port au
Prince I have directed (*ol. Waller to furnish instructi^m through one of the
marine officers to the liVif.vAni,r7/ow'>f seaman battalion. He is running a school
in the simple military duties for officers and petty officers under the charge of a
marine captain. I think this is of highest importance.
** With reference to the 2.()(K) ox-Oovernnieiit troops in the vicinity of Ouans-
minthe, I don't presume that the orders issued by the President that they boani
the Nord Alcrin and come to Port au Prince will be effective. I told hlni of teh
situation there with reference to their not being able to reach the seacoast, but he
holds that If his orders get through to these troops they would honrd the Nord
AlexiH all right: so 1 forwarded his radiograms and gave you your directions
relative to the Nord Aleris, as it will do no harm to try.
" I have been investigating Montreuil's activities and am endeavoring to get
a line on him which will give you something definite to work on. You, of course,
have orders to arrest him Immediately if he attempts to start any revolutionary
trouble.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATIOlSr OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 343
"Bobo is out of it, and neither be nor any of his so-called factions can be
rtcngnited by us. We are having onr own troubles in Port au Prince endeavor-
bi|r to get the treaty through. Things are not entirely satsfactory, and I may
be forced to establish a military government here. My general plan with refer-
CDOe to you is to give you entire freedom consistent with carrying out the gen-
eral ideas with which you are familiar.
" Very sincerely,
" W. B. Capebton."
During the day reports continued to be received indicating pillaging and dis-
order in the interior ; that Is, in the northern interior. At this time there were
ibout 1,000 of the old Government troops in the northeast of Haiti near
Ouanamine.
I took the matter up with the president of paying thef^ soldiers a few
sourdes each, giving them some clothes, and bringing them down to Port an
Prince and disbanding them there, as they lived in the southern part of Haiti.
To this the president consented, and I had them brought down.
On the 27th of August I had a conference with Mr. Charles Zamor and Gen.
Robin, relative to the Caco question. These gentlemen made the proposition
timt a joint commission, consisting of Gen. Zamor, Gen. Robin, and one other
Haitian, and three or four American officers, proceed into the interior and visit
all Caco chiefs and their towns. Upon the arrival at each chief knd their
men, sums of money would be paid to them in the form of checks, which would
be cashed in the National Bank of Haiti within the American lines, and could
only be cashed upon the surrender of arms and ammunition to the American
fwces; the amount of money to be paid to depend upon the particular influence
of the chief, the size of his detachment, and other local conditions to be de-
termined by the commission on the spot These gentlemen say that then the
Oicos would return to their homes and cease marauding. They proposed to
pay these chiefs, when they met them, and also the men. They would gather
around and receive their arms and disband them.
The proposition of paying each soldier 1.5 gourdes if he will surrender his
rifle and disband, and 100 gourdes to each chief, which is the standing proposi-
tion now. Is, I understand, quite liberal, and at this rate not more than 200,000
fpoordes, or at>out $35,000, gold, could possibly be spent It is therefore evident
tfiat this proposition of Zaraor's Is, to a great extent, an attempt to bleed
the Americans. His proposition was for a great deal more than this. I forget
just the figure now.
On the 27th of August the American charge d'affaires received from the
minister of foreign, affairs the written reply of the Haitian Government to the
latest treaty proposition. In this reply practically every stipulation of the
original treaty wur either omitted or so changed as to defeat its purpose.
This was done In spite of the repeated assurances that the Haitian Government
was in accord with the United States as to all principles involved, differing
only as to slight matters of detail.
The Chairman. Did Zamor propose that the Americans or the Haitians i»ay
this excessive sum ?
Admiral Capebton. The sums were, of course, to be paid out of the Haitian
treasury.
The Chairman. I only askeil that because you referred to his bleeding the
Americans.
Admiral Caperton. That is what I have here in my notes.
The Chairman. You meant to take advantage of American credulity?
Admiral Caperton. I think that was the Idea. This money was all paid out
by the consent and orders of the president at that time for these various arms
at these different places.
Gens. Blot and Davllmar Theodore arrived at Cape Haltlen on the 29th
of August, and I was of the opinion that the providing of work to the Cacos In
north Haiti will be a valuable aid in stopping the present disorders in the north,
and will probably do more toward this end than a commission such as Mr.
Zamor suggests. I understand from reliable sources that the National Railroad
of Haiti can, under its present contract with the Haitian Government, im-
mediately employ about 1,500 men on new construction between Bahon and
PigDon; about the same number between St. Marc and Petit Riviere, d*
e22e0— 21— PT 2 16
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344 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
L'Artlbonlte, and about 1,000 men between Gonaives and Grog Morne. I
believe that If the State Department will use its good offices to induce the
National Railroad of Haiti to begin this work and will offer its help, that the
work may be begun at once. Funds from the customs will not be available for
me to begin public works as directed by the department for some little while,
and an early employment of the men in the north is extremely desirable.
A message was sent to the Secretary of the Navy on August 29. as follows:
AuGUSX 29» 1915.
From: Commander Cruiser Squadron.
To : Secretary of the Navy.
Believe providing work will do great deal toward stropping present disorders
in north. Understand from reliable sources that national railroad of Haiti .
can immediately employ about 1,500 men on new construction between Bahon
and Pignon, about same number between St. Marc and Petit Riviere de L'Arit-
bonlte, and about 1,000 between (lonaives and Gros Morne, under present con-
tract with Haitian Government. Recommend State Department use good offices
to induce National Railroad of Haiti to begin this work at once. Funds from
customs will not be available for me to begin extensive public works as directed
in department's radiogram 20018 at once, and early employment men in north
extremely desirable. 16029.
Capebton.
On the 30th of August the American charge d'affaires had a consultation
which lasted several hours with President Dartiguenave and his cabinet. They
agreed only to sign the treaty in a modified form. They insist that eiistonis
control infringes on the bank concession, and this matter must be adjusted
before further discussion. They also stated that they are willing to give cus-
toms control, but even after this difficulty is removed would not be willing to
allow the Unitjed States the administration of customs. *
The Chairman. How did they make a distinction between customs control
and administration?
Admiral Capebton. I think they meant the collection of customs. The matter
of collecting customs depended entirely upon the collector of the customs. I have
been informed by high officers there that it was only necessary to appoint a
Haitian as an official collector of customs in one of these ports to give him
the opportunity of becoming a rich man. They seemed to be satisfied with the
manner in which we went about collecting the customs, reducing the large
number of employees In the office. And with the vast increase in the amount
of money turned over to the Government, because formerly each man, in addi-
tion to his pay. received a rake-off. which they admitted. When we went in. in
readjusting tJie pay for the fewer number of men we found It necessary to in-
crease their pay to include their rake-off, which was not too much, I thought
The Chairman. You mean the rake-off was reasonable?
Admiral Capebton. The president himself seemed sincerely desirous of reach-
ing an agreement, but he does not appear to be a man of sufficient force to
control the cabinet and the congress at this time.
On the 31st of August there were no encouraging developments in the treaty
situation. I have therefore decided that, unless otherwise directed, I will oc-
cupy and begin administering the customhouse at Port, an Prince at 10 a. ui.
on the 2d of S^eptember. I so informed the department of this decision.
In connection with this matter I would like to put in the record the following
communication :
August 31 1915.
From : Commander Cruiser Squadron.
To : Secretary of the Navy.
Unless otherwise directed will occupy and begin administering custnmhouse
at Port au Prince at 10 a. m., September 2.
CAPorroN.
On September 1 I appointed Paymaster Charles Conard " administrator of
customs " and " fiscal officer " for tJie civil administration, relieving Paymaster
Charles Morris of those duties. In that connection. Mr. Chairman, I would like
to put into the record the following communications :
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 345
ZZ.
No. 8639. Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. " Washington," Flagship,
Port au Prince, Haiti, September i, 1915.
From: Commander Cniiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet, command-
ing United States forces in Haitian waters.
To: Paymaster Charles Conard, United States Navy.
Subject : Appointment as " adminlstratjor of customs."
Reference: (a) Commiuider Cruiser Squadron's letter of instructions No.
818(^-15 of August 24, 1915.
L You are hereby appointeil "administrator of customs" and will immedi-
ately relieve Paymastjer Charles Morris, United States Navy, of the dnties of-
that office.
2. You will establish an office at I^rt au Prince and administer the customs
service in accordance with department's radiogram No. 20018, reference (a),
and the Haitian law where this law is not inconsistent with these instructions.
This shore duty beyond the seas is required by the public interests.
W. B. Caperton.
AAA Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fi>eet,
No. 8642-15 U. S. S. "Washington," Ft^gship,
Port au Prince, Haiti, September i, 1915.
From: Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet, command-
ing United States forces in Haitian waters.
To: Paymaster Charles Conrad, United States Navy.
Subject : Appointment as fiscal officer for " civil administration."
Reference: (a) Navy Department's radiogram No. 20018.
1. You are hereby appointed the " fiscal officer " for the squadron commander
in connection with the funds placed to his credit by the various " collectors of
customs," and will immediately relieve Paymaster Charles Morris. United States
Navy, of the duties of that office.
2. Fimds will only be disbursed under the following appropriations:
"Appropriation constabulary," to be used for the organization and mainte-
nance of an efficient constabulary.
"Appropriation public works," to be used for conducting such temporary
public works as will afford an immediate relief through employment for the
starving populace and discharged soldiers.
"Appropriation military and civil government of United States forces," to
be u.sed for the maintenance of the customs and port services and such military
government as the United States may establish.
"Appropriation Haitian Government," to be transferred to Dartlguenave
government ,as may be determined by the squadron commander."
The*funds remaining after such disbursements will be left In the admiral's
account and held by him In trust for the people of Haiti.
3. You will keep the necessary accounts and files and the returns rendered by
the detachment commanders.
4. You will each month after the receipt of the detachment commanders'
estimates prepare a synopsis of these estimates and a synopsis of the allot-
ments which you consider necessary for the different detachment commanders
for the coming month ; and you will submit same to the squadron commander
for his approval. Upon approval of these allotments, you will make the neces-
sary arrangements through the National Bank of Haiti to place the funds so
allotted to the credit of the detachment commanders.
5. This shore duty beyond the seas Is required by the public interests.
W. B. Caperton.
On September 1, I Informetl the American Charge d'Affaires that I proposed,
in accordance with Navy Department orders, to assume charge of the custom-
house at Port du Prince at 10 a. m. on the 2d of September, and requested him
to Inform the Haitian Government of this Intention and to request that they
take the necessary steps to Inform the Haitian Administrator of Customs. I
farther requested that the Haitian Government direct the Haitian Admlnlstra-
^^ of Customs to meet Paymaster Conard at the customhouse at 10 a m. on
the 2d of September so that an amicable arrangement could be made relative
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346 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AJ^D SANTO DOMINGO.
to the transfer. In connection with this, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pot
the following communication In the record:
EEE.
No. 8655-15. ^ ^
Gbuisis Sqitadeon, United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. " Washington," Flaoship;
Port au Prince, Haitiy September i, 1915.
The American Chabge£ d^Affahucb.
American Legation, Port au Prince, Haiti,
Sir: I have the honor to state that at 10 a. m., Thursday, September 2, 1915,
In accordance with orders of the Navy Department, I will assume charge of
the customhouse at Port au Prince, Haiti.
I request that you inform the Haitian Government of this Intention and
request that they take the necessary steps to Inform the Haitian Administra-
tor of Customs. ^ ^ . ,
I further request that you ask the Haitian Government to direct the Haitian
Administrator of Customs to meet Paymaster Charles Conard, United States
Navy, at the customhouse at 10 a. m., Thursday, so that an amicable arrange-
ment can be made in the premises.
I am, sir, respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral United States Navy, Commander Cruiser Squadron,
and Commanding United States Forces in Haitian Waters.
In view of the uneasy situation, the possibility of disturbance, the apparent
attitude of some of the members of the Cabinet toward the Government,
trouble or outbreak ut Port au Prince Is possible. In such a case it may be
necessary for me to declare martial law. That was on the 1st of Septenrt>er.
In reference to this I sent the following message to the Secretary of the
Navy, under date of September 1, 1915 :
MMM. September 1, 1915.
Prom : Commander Cruiser Squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy and Commander in Chief.
Conditions Port au Prince Haiti uneasy. Continued reports of minor officials
exercising unwarranted au<thority and committing other abuses which Govern-
ment api)ears unable to control ; newly appointed police in towns near Port au
Prince overbearing and cause general complaint. Cabinet minister warned me
to-day to be especially on guard against outbreak against Government to-day
and to-morrow and intimated present Govenunent would not be adverse to mar-
tial law. President states action taken by Haitian minister at Washington,
D. C. Menos, relative trealy negotiations was done without knowledge or con-
sent of President or counsel of cabinet; have reliable Information Minister For-
eign Affairs Sannon communicated with Menos relative this matter on his own
responsibility. Will occupy customhouse Port au Prince to-morrow. Any out-
break or trouble Port au Prince may necessitate martial law. 23401.
Caperton.
On September 2 I requested the American charge d'affaires to inform the
Haitian Government of the necessity of assuming charge of the port services
and the intentions of the Unted States Government relative to tlie adm'nistra-
t.'ou of customs, l also informed the commanding officer of the French cruiser
Cond^. of tlie action I had taken with reference to the customhouses. In that
connection I would like to put this communication In the record:
YYY.
No. 8781-15
Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. ** Washington," Flagship,
Port au Prince, Haiti, September 2, 1915.
The American Charon d'affaires,
American Legation, Port au Prince, Haiti.
Sir: I liave the honor to state that the following appointments have been
made by me to admnister the customs and the port service at Port au Prince:
Paymaster Charles Conrad, United States Navy, administrator of customs for
all custondiouses taken charge of in Haiti.
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rNQXJIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 347
Paymaster Herbert R. Stevens, United States Navy, collector of customs at
Port an Prince.
Lieut. Commander Willis McDowell, United States Navy, captain of the port
at Port an Prince.
I lequest that you inform the Haitian Government and all foreign diplomats
and consular representatives of these appointments.
I am, sir, respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral^ United States Navy,
Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet, Haitiy
and Commanding United States Forces* in Haitian tcaters.
Then the following letter was written under date of September 2 to the
American charge d'affaires at Port au Prince:
WV.
No. 875^15.
Cruises Squadron, United States Atlantic BYeet,
U. S. S. " Washington," Flagship,
Port au Prince^ Haiti, September 2, 1915.
The American Charge d'affaires.
Port au Prince, Haiti,
Sir: I have the honor to request that you inform the Haitian Government
that, in the name of the United States Government, I will administer the custom-
bouses of which I have assumed charge for the benefit of the Haitian people and
for the support of the present Haitian Government.
The funds collected will be used for the organization and maintenance of an
efficient constabulary, will be used for conducting such temporary public work
as will afford immediate relief, through employment, for the starving populace
and discharged soldiers, and for supporting the Haitian Government.
The surplus receipts will be held for the time being by the United States Gov-
ernment in trust for the people of Haiti.
I am, sir, respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
Commanding United States Forces in Haitian Waters.
On account of increasing uneasiness at Port au Prince, the apparent inability
of the present Government to control conditions with which it is confronted, the
propagation by newspapers and public men of inflammatory propaganda against
the Government and the American occupation, the disloyalty to the present
Government of some Government officials, the personal request of the President,
and In order to better support the present Government, I decided to proclaim
martial law in the city of Port au Prince on the 3d of September, 1915. Under
date of the 2d of September I sent the following message to the Secretary of
the Navy :
OOCC. September 2, 1915.
From: Commander Cruiser Squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy, and Commander in Chief.
On account of increasing uneasiness Port au Prince, present Government con-
fronted with conditions aiH)arently unable to control ; propaganda by newsi)ai)er8
and public men of inflammatory propaganda against Government and American
occupation ; disloyalty to present Government of some Government officials ; and
in order to better support the present Government I will to-morrow. September 3,
proclaim martial law in Port au Prince, Haiti. This action in accord with
American charge d'affaires. Proclamation follows by radio 22402.
Caperton.
I sent another message to the Secretary of the Navy under date of September
2. hi which I said :
" In addition reasons for martial law given in my 22402, I was also this morn-
ing requested by President Dartiguenave, in informal interview, to establish
martial law as soon as possible.'*
On the 3d day of September I Issueil the following proclamation :
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848 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOBflNGO.
0000. Cbuiseb Squadbon, United States Atlantic Fleet,
V. 8. 8. **Washififfton,'' Flagship.
PBOCLAHATION.
To the people of Part au Prince, Haiti:,
Information having been received from the most reliable sources that the
present Government of Haiti is confronted with conditions which they are
unable to control, although lo^lly attempting to discharge the duties of tlieir
respective offices ; and these facts having created a condition which requires the
adoption of different measures than those heretofore applied ; and in order to afford
the inhabitants of Port au Prince and other territory hereinafter described the
privileges of the Government, exercising all the functions necessary for the
establishment and maintenance of the fundamental rights of man, I hereby,
under my authority as commanding officer of the forces of the United Stated of
American in Haiti and Haitian waters, proclaim that martial law exists in the
city of Port au Prince and the immediate territory now occupied by the forces
under my command.
I further proclaim, in accordance with the law of nations and the usages,
customs, and functions of my own and other Governments, that I am invested
with the power and responsibility of Government in all its functions and
branches throughout the territory above described; and the proper adminis-
tration of such Government by martial law will be provided for in regulations
to be issued from time to time, as required, by the commanding officer of the
forces of the United States of America in Haiti and Haitian watera
The martial law herein proclaimed, and the things in that respect so ordered,
will not be deemed or taken to interfere wiUi the proceedings of the constitu-
tional Government and congress of Haiti, or with the administration or justice
in the courts of law existing therein ; which do not affect the military operations
or the authorities of the Government of the United States of America.
All the municipal and other civil employees are. therefore, requested to con-
tinue in their present vocations without change; and the military authorities
will not interfere in the functions of the civil administration and the courts
except in so far as relates to persons violating military orders or regulations, or
otherwise Interfering with the exercise of military authority. All peaceful
citizens can confidently pursue their usual occupations, feeling that they will
be protected in their personal rights and property, as well as in their proper
social relations.
The commanding officer of the United States Expeditionary Force, CoL Little-
ton W. T. Waller, United States Marine Corps, is empowered to issue the neces-
sary regulations and appoint the necessary officers to make this martial law
effective
Done at the city of Port au Prince, Haiti, this 3d day of September, A. D. 1915.
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Commanding the Forces of the United Steves of America
in Haiti and Haitian Waters.
Later I wrote the following letter to the charge d'affaires of the American
Legation at Port au Prince';
PPPP.
No. 8840-15.
Cbuiseb Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. "Washington," Flagship,
Port au Prince, Haiti, September 8, 1913,
The American Charo6 d'affaires,
American Legation, Port au Prince, Haiti,
Sir: I have the honor to request that all foreign diplomatic and consular
representatives be informed that martial law has been declared in Port au
Prince, and that copies of the proclamation be sent to them.
I am. sir, respectfully,
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet,
Commanding United States Forces in Haiti and Haitian Waters.
I also requested that a copy of that letter be sent to the commanding officer
»^ the French cruiser Condd, informing him of this fact C^ r\r\o]e
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 349
To farther refer to the conditions in the north, on September 4, the following
day, the commanding officer of the Conneciicut, Capt Durell, reported that
there was no information at Cape Haitien from the Cacos regarding the sur-
render of arms ; that they still besieged the town ; and that the prices of food-
stuffs were exorbitant and were causing hardship and suffering among the poor
citizens. The commanding officer of the Connecticut further reported that two
generals, representing the troops at Ouanaminthe, had arrived at Cape Haitien
to see him about rations and pay. The sum of 5,000 gourdes g1*anted last week
was Insufficient to ration these troops for one week, and he stated that 7,000
gourdes a week were necessary.
I fmraedlately asked the commanding officer of the Connecticut what outly-
ing towns it would be necessary to occupy to Insure the food supply for Cape
Haitien, an'l if any troops In addition to what he had would be necessary for
occupying these towns and conducting offensive operations in connection there-
with. The minister of the interior, Mayard, on this day stated that provision
had been made for rationing the troops at Ouanaminthe and Mont Organise for
one month.
The Caco situation is becoming critical. These Cacos will not come within
our lines and surrender their arms and d'sband on account of the leaders, who
are endeavoring to obtafh exorbitant bribes. The liberal offer of 15 gourdes
per soklier and 100 gourdes per chief, to pay for their rifles and give them
sufficient money to return to their homes, has not been accepted, after repeated
efforts made both through channels In the north and through the'r leaders In
Port au Prince. These Cacos are a source of annoyance In the north, and, If
they continue investing Cape Haitien It may force active measures against
them. I am of the opinion that furnish ng work on the railroad construction
In the vldnlty of Cape Haitien, as recommended In my radiogram No. 16029,
might Induce many of these men to desert their chiefs and go to work. Unless
some measures are taken in this connection, I will probably be forced to con-
tinue very soon offensive operations against these Cacos.
On this snme day, September 4, I received a cable message from the American
charge d*affalres at San Domingo City, stating that he had reliable Informa-
tion that deposits of muntlons of war were being made In Haiti along the
border at Mlrebalals, Fonds Parlslen, and Fonds Verettes. In connection with
this matter I desire to put into the record the following communication :
xxxx.
*• Prom : American Charge d* Affaires, San Domingo.
**To: Commander cruiser squadron.
Have relieble information that deposits of munitions of war being made In
Haiti at following places on border mountain near town of Bourg St. Louis or
Mirebelals, houses In towns of Fonds Parlslen and La Mission or Fonds
Verettes; the latter place can be reached via railroad and Lake el Fondo.
Johnson, American Charge,
Late that night I sent the following report to the Secretary of the Navy :
YYYY. September 4, 1915.
From : Commander cruiser squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy and Commander In Chief.
Caco situation. north Haiti becoming critical. These Cacos wU not come
within our lines* and surrender arms and disband on account leaders wlio
are endeavoring to obtain exorbitant bribes. Liberal offer of 15 gourdes per
soldier and 100 gourdes per chief to pay for their rifles and give tliem sufflclent
money to return to their homes not accepted after repeated efforts both through
diannels In north and through their leaders In Port au Prince. These Cacos
have agan begun Infesting Cape Haitien and are preventing market people and
foodstuffii entering town. Believe furnishing work on railroad construction
vicinity Cape Haitien as recommended In my radiogram 16029 might lndu»^
maily men desert ther chiefs and go to work. Unless prompt measures are
taken in this connection will be forced to consider very soon offensive opera-
tions against these Cacos. 11504.
Caperton.
ZZZZ Septembeb 4, 1915.
From: Commander cruiser squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy and commander In chief.
Bxpedition consisting of Marietta and sixth company of marines will leave
Port an Prince Sunday afternoon to occupy Jeramie and customhouse tfjat
o
350 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOBONGO,
place. Paymaster Manning H. Philbrick has been appointed collector customs
and captain of tbe port of Jeramie. No further news. 22204.
Gaferton.
On September 5, under my direction, the commander of the expeditionary
force sent for Mr. Charles Zamor and requested him to go immediately to Cape
Haitien and endeavor to persuade the Cacos to open the food supplies to that
place. Mr. Charles Zamor was informed of the Seriousness of this situation
and of the great* danger of serious consequences to the Cacos if they persisted
in such methods of annoyance. Mr. Charles Zamor agreed to go as I requested.
This expedition was finally arranged after much talk and discussion with
Mr. Charles Zamor for several days previous.
On this same day, September 5, I received the department's radiogram
No. 12005 that I should take no offensive action against the Haitians without
first consulting the Navy Department. I am now investigating the feasibility
of occupying the towns on the principal roads entering Cape Haitien to insure
the food supply for the city. I will not undertake any offensive operations
before referring the matter to the Navy Department. In this connection, I
would like to put in the record the following radiogram :
A September 5, 1915.
From: Secretary of the Navy.
To : Commander cruiser squadron.
11504. Take no offensive action against Haitiens without first consulting Navy
- Department unless absolutely necessary to prevent loss of llf^ or property.
More detailed instructions will be sent you to-morrow. Inform department
immediately of any conditions that would seem to make offensive action either
desirable or necessary. Acknowledge. 12Q05.
Daniels.
Further unrest was reported at Gonaives on account of the reported approach
of the Cacos. Information was continually coming in of Cacos movements in
various places in the north. I would like to give you for your information, in
connection with that matter, the following:
D Septembeb 5, 1915r
From : Commanding officer CasHne.
To: Commander cruiser squadron.
Oouaines and St. Marc quiet. Plaisance reported quiet Information that
Cacos are moving from St. Raphael to St. Michel. 08005.
Carteb.
R * September 5, 1915.
From: Commanding officer Ca9tine,
To: Commander Cruiser squadron.
Oflicer 5102 (Capt. Fay, Marine Corps) reports considerable unrest in
Conaives over reported approach of revolutionary forces under Chief Rowean
Inst reported near Ennery. U. S. S. CasHne will proceed to Conaives to-
morrow up(»n arrival of U. S. S. Osceolo. 19305.
Carter.
1 reported the situation to the Secretary of the Navy that evening by the
following message :
September 5, 1915.
From : Commander cruiser squadron.
To : Secretary of the Navy and commander in chief.
1200."). Charles Zamor, at my request, agreed to go immediately to Cape
Haitien and endc^avor persuade Cacos open food supply to that place. Am
Investigating feasibility occupying towns on principal roads entering Cape
Haitien to secure food supply for city. Will not undertake offensive operations
before referring to Navy Department. Some unrest Gonaives over reported
approach Cacos. 23205.
Caperton.
On the same day, September 5. I issued a campaign order. No. 9, covering the
deployment of the forces in Ha'ti an<l Haitian waters for occupying and main-
taining military control of the ports of entry and the collection of customs
thereat, pending negotiations between the United States and Haiti. That cam-
paign order which 1 have just refer nd to reads as follows:
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 351
Cbuiseb Squadbon, United States Atlantic Fleet,
U. S. S. ** Washington." Flagship,
Pwrt au Prince, Haiti, September 5, 1915 — 10 a. m.
Campaign order No. 9.
Forces;
(fl) First detachment,— K^apt. B. H. Durell, C<mn€cticut, Nashville. First
Regiment Infantry, less Second Battalion, one battery Field Artillery.
(6) Second detachment.— Commnnder J. F. Carter, Castine. Seventh and
Twenty-fourth Companies Infantry.
(c) Third detachment.— M&j. N. H. Hall. Sixth and Twelfth Companies
Infantry.
id) Fourth detachment. — Commander L. McNamee, Sacramento. Fourth and
Seventeenth Companies Infantry.
(c) Main body. — Washington, Marietta, Eagle. First Brigade Infantry, less
ooe battalion and six companies. One battalion Field Artillery, less one battery.
1. The Cacos will remain in arms in north Haiti. South Haiti is at present
quiet. Negotiations relative to the treaty with present Haitian Government are
continuing. This Government without funds and not at present strong; efforts
to strengthen and support it are continually under way.
2. This force will assume and maintain military control of the ports of entry
of Haiti and collect customs thereat pending negotiations between United States
and Haiti.
3. (a) First detachment maintain military control Port de Paix and military
government Cape Haitien. Nashville patrol Port de Paix and Cape Haitien.
Connecticut support these operations.
(b) Second detachment maintain military control St. Marc and Gonalves.
Castine patrol St. Marc and Gk)naives and support these operations.
(c) Third detachment occupy Jeremie. Maintain military control Petit
Goave and Miragoane.
(d) Fourth detachment occupy Les Cayes (Aux Cayes) and Jacmel. Sacra-
mento patrol Les Cayes and Jacmel and support these operations.
(e) Main body will maintain military control under martial law at Port au
Prince. Washington support these operations. Marietta patrol Petit Goave,
Miragoane, and Jeremie and support third detachment. Eagle continue repairs.
(*) Maintain military control and administer customs at all ports occupied.
Protect life and property and presei^ve order. Disarm all Haitian troops encoun-
tered.
4. Base is at Guantanamo. Osceola will make trips between base and various
detachments with stores, mail, and provisions. Jason and Solace remain
Port au Prince for the present
5. ^uadron commander on Washington. Make daily and such other reports
ns may be necessary to keep squadron "ommander fully and frequently infornie<l
of tlie situation. Use seventy-fifth meridian mean time.
W. B. Caperton,
Rear Admiral, Commander Cruiser Squadron,
Commanding United States Forces in Haiti and Haitian Waters.
The Castine arrived at Gonalves at 5 p. m. on September 6. The town of
Gonalves continues uneasy and there is much excitement among the natives. A
force of about 150 Cacos are a few miles from the town imder Chief Kamcau.
Cacos are endeavoring to stir up the inhabitants against the Americans. Many
people are leaving Gonaives In small craft. The Castine disembarked her land-
ing force of seamen to reenforce the marines on shore.
I would like to submit, in connection with the arrival of the Castine, the fol-
lowing report of the commanding officer of that vessel :
September 5, 1915.
Prr>m t Commanding officer Castine.
To: Commander cruiser squadron.
Castine arrived Gonaives 5 p. m. Monday ; immediately sent landing force to
assist marine detachment in patrolling town. One hundred fifty Cacos a few
miles from town under Chief Rameau. Cncos endeav(»ring to stir up inhabit-
ants against Americans. It is reported that Cacos sympathizers having come
into town In last few days. Inhabitants fear town will be burned by Cacos
sympathizers. Many people leaving Gronalves In small craft. Much excitement
prevails. Can disperse Cacos difficult Will maintain regulation patrol of town
to-ni^t and await dev^opments to-morrow. 19006.
Cabter.
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352 INQUIRY IISTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
On the 7th of September the American charge d'affaires had a confwence with
the President and his cabinet relative to the treaty. The minister of foreljm
affairs and public instruction, Mr. Pauleus Sanon, and the minister of agricul-
ture and public worlis, Mr. Antoine Sansaricq, refused to accept the financial
adviser stipulation. Upon this refusal the President requested and acc€»pted
their immediate resignation. The remainder of the cabinet agreed to accept
the treaty substantially as submitted. The President then aslced to be allowed
a short delay to enable him to fill the vacancies in the cabinet, which was agreed
to. The resignation of the minister of foreign affairs and public instroctlon
removes a dissenting and undesirable element.
It was reported on the same day that the Oacos were outside of Gonalves
under the command of Ilameau.
The commanding oflioer of the Castine, Commander James Carter, stated that
it was advisable to disperse the Cacos or drive them back without delay, in
view of the present force being insufficient for outposts and patrols unless the
Cacos were driven back.
On the same day I sent the following message to the commanding officer of
the Castine:
September 7, 1915.
From: Commander cruiser squadron.
To: Commanding officer Casinc.
09007. Do not take offensive unleas necessary to protect life and property
and hold town. Charles Zamor should arrive Gonaives to-day. He has prom-
ised to consult with Rameau and arrange difficulty. Believe you can arrange
conference with Cacos through Charles Zamor and obtain results In that way.
Have already told Zamor we can not tolerate these Cacos' annoyance and unless
they cease will l>e forced take strong measures. Acknowledge. 11507.
Caperton.
Later in the evening of September 7 I sent the following report to the Secre-
tary of the Navy:
Septembeb 7, 1915.
From: Commander cruiser squadron.
To : Secretary of the Navy and Commander in Chief.
Gonaives uneasy and much excitement among natives. About 200 Cacos dose
to town under Chief Rameau. Cacos endeavoring stir up inhabitants against
Americans. Castine has landed seamen to reinforce nrarines. Zamor on way
to Gonaives to endeavor induce Cacos to cease operations. Have directed Cas-
tine not take offensive unless necessary protect life and property and hold town.
11407.
Caperton.
September 7. 1915.
BYom : Commander cru'ser squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy and Commander in Chief.
Passed Assistant Paymaster Fred E. McMillen and Passed Assistant Pay-
master Henry R. Snyder appointed collectors of customs and. captain^ of the
port at Petit Goave and Mlragoane, respectively. These officers sent to those
ports on U. S. S. Osceola to-day. Pauleus Sanon, minister foreign affairs, and
Antoine Sansarlcq, minister agriculture, resigned to-day. 22407.
Caperton.
Septeicber 7, 1915.
BYom: Commander cruiser squadron.
To: Secretary of the Navy.
National Bank of Haiti at Port au Prince has contributed $500 to Red Cross
fund. 23107.
Caperton.
On September 9 Louis Borno and Paul Salomon were appointed ministers of
foreign affairs and public works, respectively, filling the vacancies in those
places.
The Chairman. Louis Borno was appo!nted minister of foreign affairs?
Admiral Caperton. Yes; Borno was appointed minister of foreign affa'rs. and
Salomon was appointed minister of public works. President Dartignenave
informed me that Lecontc, minister of war, had instructions to get in touch
with the Cacos at Cape Haitien and endeavor to reach an agreement with them
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 353
or ascertain their terms. Leconte is not to pay any money or' make an pecuniary
arrangements with them.
The Chairman. You have omitted a dispatch of September 8 to the com-
manding officer of the' Connecticut. The language of that message is : " Success-
ful negotiation of treaty is predominant part present mission. After encounter-
ing many difficulties treaty situation at present looks more favorable than
usual. This has been eftected by exercising military pressure at propitious
moments in negotiations. Yesterday two members of cabinet who have blocked
negotiations heretofore resigned. President himself believed to be anxious to
conclude treaty. At present am holding up offensive operations and allowing
President time to complete cabinet and try again. Am therefore not yet ready
• to begin offensive operations at Cape Haitlen, but will hold them in abeyance
as additional pressure."
The plain implication is that under the direction of the department the naval
forces of the United States in Haiti were using the military pressure to com-
pel the acceptance of the treaty.
• Admiral Caperton. I have that message in my record.
The Chairman. I think you ought to describe the character of the military
pressure brought to bear to secure the ratification of the treaty.
Admiral Caperton. Well, the only pressure I can think of or consider was
the fact of bringing pressure to bear, in order, if possible, to quiet the Cacos
and keep them from intimidating the members of congress and the senate who
were in favor of the treaty as has been previously stated in my testimony. The
pressure, I should say, was more moral than military. As I have frequently
referred to taking over these customhouses at times, I ceased taking them
over because It seemed to militate against us in getting the treaty ratified at
that time. Perhaps I would have taken the customhouses at some distant
points thinking it necessary at that time, owing to the disturbed conditions,
but that would naturally have had a moral effect on the congress. There was no
actual military movement made against the congress.
The Chairman. I am only seeking the interpretation of your own cable.
Admiral Caperton. If there was any pressure brought to bear at all, it was
only on the enemies of the government, which I was there to support
( Whereupon^ at 4.10 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until Thursday,
October 20, 1921, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
THimSDAY, OGTOBEB 20, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment, Senator
Tftsker L. Ckldie presiding.
Present : Mr. Ernest Angell, Mr. Horace G. Knowles, and Maj. Edwin N. Mc-
Cellan, United States Marine Corps, in their respective representative capacities
as hereinbefore Indicated.
STATEMBNT OF BEAB ADMIBAIi WILLIAM B. GAPEBTON, XTNITED
STATES NAVY, BETIBEI>— Besumed.
Senator Oddie. Capt. Angell has requested the committee to grant him the
privilege of asking some questions of Admiral Caperton regarding his testimony,
and if there are no objections, his request will be granted, but this must not
be considered as a pred-edent
Mr. Angell. Admiral, at the time that you went down to Cape Haitien in
January, as I remember, 1915
Admiral Capebton. Yes.
Mr. Angell. On your assignment of duty In the West Indies to observe the
general political situation
Admiral Capebton. Those were my original orders.
Mr. Angell. The original orders to which you testified, I think the first day
last week, were you at that time familiar with the correspondence between tlie
office of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy, which was intro-
duced in the record by Chairman McCormick yesterday, that being specifically,
if you remember, the letters of Octoben 28, 1914, and the replies? You may have
to refer to your memorandum to know specifically the letters to which I refer,
appearing on pages 343 et seq. of the typewritten report of the hearing. My
question was essentially whether you were familiar with that correspondence.
Admiral Caperton. No; in glancing over them, it is all new to me.
Mr. Angell. And had you at that time had any conferences with the respon-
sible officials in Washington of the Navy or State Departments or any general
instructions from them along the line of those letters, namely the desirability,
as appearing to the State Department, of putting additional naval forces In
Haitian waters in conjunction with the proposed negotiation of a treaty?
Admiral Capebton. No ; I knew nothing about it I did know that the Georgia
and the New Jersey, I believe, were down there, because we were always getting
news of them from the papers, and in this way I knew something about It, but
I never saw any official correspondence.
Mr. Angell. You had no knowledge, then, of any purpose behind the presence
of additional vessels in Haitian waters?
Admiral Caperton. No; I had not.
Mr. Angell. During that fall and winter?
Admiral Caperton. I had not.
Mr. Angell. Admiral, did you have any knowledge, or have you since ac-
quired any knowledge, of the afEairs of the Machias at Port au Prince on
December 17, 1914, when the $500,000 were taken from the bank and brought
up to New York?
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356 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Admiral Oaperton. I do not think I have enough definite Information to dis-
cuss the matter at all. I merely heard that this amount of money was talceo
from Port au Prince, and as I recall, the Machias was the vessel I perliaps
have discussed it a little bit, but I really know nothing about the particulars
at all.
Mr. Angell. Did you ever have an opportunity to discuss it with the then
commanding officer of the Machias f
Admiral Capebton. No; I had not; I do not yet know who he was. I do
not recall.
Mr. Angbll. You never discussed it, then, with anyone who had a direct
and immediate connecton with that afCair?
Admiral Capebton. No.
Mr. Angell. With reference to your presence at Cape Haitien In June and
July, 1915, at the time you established a field radio station, and later landed
marines^ as you said, to protect the railroad property, am I correct hi remem-
bering that your testimony on the first or second day was that the French
marines had already been reembarked on board when you arrived there?
Admiral Capebton. As far as I remember, they had been wihdrawn.
Mr. Angell. And was the French vessel in the harbor when you got there?
Admiral Capebton. It was inside, in the inner harbor. You could never
take a big vessel In there until after I surveyed that harbor.
Mr. Angell. You arrived there about July 1, as I remember?
Admiral Capebton. The second time.
Mr. Angell. The second time, yes.
Admiral Capebton. From Vera Cruz.
Mr. Angell. Did you have any conference at that time, personally or through
your staft officers, with the commander of the French vessel there, regarding the
presence of the French marines or French forces at Cape Haitien?
Admiral Capebton. Oh, yes ; I have stated in my testimony here that he paid
me an official visit, of course, the moment I arrived, and told me the situation
which I have outlined in my testimony. I returned the call, I think, the next
day, as far as I remember now. I know I did, if the weather was good, and we
discussed it further afterwards.
Mr. Angell. Was the discussion about the advisability of the presence of
the French on shore?
Admiral Capebton. Yes; the captain, as I have stated here, said he had
landed at the request of his own consul or consular agent, as I recall it now;
and, as I have outlined it in my testimony, the commanding officer told me that
he had been sent there by the French minister at Port au Prince on account
of the French consular agent at that point being fearful of the safety of French
interests.
Mr. Anghxl. Did you have any instructions from the Navy Department on the
point of whether or not it was deemed advisable and proper for the Frendi to
land in Haiti?
Admiral Capebton. I had no direct information as to that point I can not
recall my test mony exactly now, but my orders were to proceed there, and — •
Senator Oddie. I think it would be a good idea for the admiral to have time
to prepare his answers, because he has to refresh his memory.
Admiral Capebton. I had orders for each move, which I have already given
in my testimony, but I had so many things to do that I can not recall.
Mr. Angell. The purpose of my question was to find out if there was any
general or, on tliis occasion, any 8i>ecial policy of the Navy or the State Depart-
ment, as indicatetl to you, regarding the presence of foreign forces in Haiti
In connection with my question, let me call your attention to the message of
July 28, 1915, from the Acting Secretary of the Navy to yourself, which appears
as imragraph 9 of Gen. Bamett's report attached to the report of the Secretary
of the Navy for 1920, reading as follows:
•' State Department desires that American forces be landed at Port au Prince
and that American and foreign interests be protected ; that representatives of
England and France be informed of this intention ; informed that their interests
will be protected, and that they be requested not to land.'*
That was, of course, later in the month, regarding the landing at Port au
Prince.
Admiral Capebton. Yes; later in July.
Mr. Angell. Now, earlier in the mouth, when you were at Cape Haitien, were
there any such instructions, general or special, as far as you remember?
Admiral Capebton. I will have to refer to my notes. C^ooalp
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 367
Senator Oddie. That can be answered and put in the record. Admiral, tliat
answer can be held in abeyance until you have time to prepare it. We will save
time in that way.
After looking over my notes I And I received no additional orders or instruc-
tions, general or special, except the following, which is my ori^nal orders,
received on June 22, 1915, at Vera Cruz :
"Flag French Marines landed Cape Haitien. Proceed there with USS
Washington thank French Commander take necessary steps to protect property
and preserve order. Dispose of vessels on Mexican coast to best advantage.
USS Mavhiatt USS Marietta enroute Vera Cruz acknowledge 14022 Daniela"
Mr. Angell. Then, following the same line, Admiral, and Jumping a month*
if I may, down to Port au Prince, as I remember your testimony and the official
reports, the Frencli vessel Deavartes arrived in Port au Prince three or four
days after you got there, on the 1st or 2d of August A very short time, a day •
or two after, did the French land marines or naval forces in Port au Prince, at
that time on shore as a legation guard, or otherwise, do you remwnber?
Admiral Capebton. I would rather refer to my notes. I have stated this in
the notes definitely and I do not Just recall.
Mr. Angell. You do not remember whether or not they landed at all?
Admiral Caperton. Oh, yes; I think they landed a guard, and after a certain
time relieve^l my guard, and I sent an ofllcer to be present when they relieved
the guard. After referring to my diary I ilnd the F'rench guard landed August
2, relieving the American guard at the French legation.
Mr. Ansell. I lind again in Gen. Barnett's report, paragraph 34, the follow-
ing:
" Rear Admiral Caperton, on August 2, 1915, informed the Navy Department
that the Descartes landed legation guard at 7 a. m."
Do you remember, roughly, how long tlieir legation guard remained on shore?
Was it a few days, or a few weeks, or months?
Admiral Caperton. They remained there for quite a while. I can tell you
by referring to my notes the exact date they were withdrawn, and the date
they landed.
Mr. Angela. I do not think the exact date is material. Was it weeks or
months?
Admiral Caperton. I think it was weeks?
Mr. Anoell. Several weeks?
Admiral Caperton. Yes; and possibly months, I think*
Mr. Angell. I believe it was Mr. Farnham, the National City Bank's vice
president, who testifiwl earlier here suljstantially to the fact that the French
forces, such as they were, remained in Port au Prince on shore some six months.
Is he mistaken in that recollection, do you think?
Admiral Caperton. I could not answer that without referring to my notes»
and by doing that I could give you the exact dates.
Mr. Angell. Have you any idea or recollection how large a force that was
that the French landed and maintained? In other words, was it a dozen men,
or one hundred men?
Admiral Caperton. Well, it was a legation guard. Without referring to my
notes, I would say there were about 25, perhaps, or 50, maybe more.
Mr. Angell. That is sufficient.
Admiral Caperton. I have the exact numbers in my notes or official reports.
Mr. Angeix. During the period of your command in Haiti, that f!s from
June, 1915, until November, 1916, did any other European nations have forces
on shore in Haiti?
Admiraal Caperton. I am quite sure there were no others; in fact, I do not
think there were any foreign men-of-war that visited the port during this time.
Mr. Angell. Only the French?
Admiral Caperton. Yes; they depended entirely on the Americans, because
the French minister, or the French captain, officially informed me that he would
not interfere in any particular with the American occupation, and that he
i^ould keep his guard inside the legation, and that they would not be «een out-
side of the legation with arms.
Mr. Angeij.. And that, I suppose, was followed, as you remember?
Admiral Caperton. As far as I know, that was followed, leaving the entire
protection of the other legations and the rest of the city to the Americans.
Mr. Angell. And, so far as you know, was the purpose of the French in
having a legation guard at Port au Prince for the protection of the legation
based upon the Incident of its violation about the time of the murder «f the
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358 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SAliTTO IX)MINGO.
Admiral Capeiton. Well, I can not go Into their motlTes, as to how much
they proposed to protect when they went ashore, but they landed as a legation
guard for the protection of the legation.
I find here that, referring to incident in question, I made a report to the
Secretary of the Navy something as follows, on the Slst of July :
" French minister informed me he had received dispatches from Paris, French
Government, stating that French Embassy, Washington, had been directed in-
form United States Government that France considered landing legation guard
at Port au Prince necessity for national honor. French minister repeated his
conviction that we were ably protecting life and property and assured his guard
would be confined to legation and that arms of French guard would not be car-
ried by them outside of legation. He further stated that he wishes it under-
stood he does not intend interfering in any way my actions In town.**
Mr. Angell. That is the answer. I had not seen that before.
Admiral Oaperton. That is already in my evidence, I think ; I am quite sure
I quoted it.
Mr. Angeix. Do you think. Admiral, that there was on the part of the French
in Haiti, or the British official representatives, any fear of the Germans using
the island as a base for operations against them in the war which was then
almost a year old. or using the island as a base for propaganda?
Admiral Caperton. Well, I can hardly answer that. On one occasion, while
I was in Mexico — off Vera Cruz, Mexico — we heard something about the Kark-
ruhe, I think it was, one of those German ships having entered the St Nicholas
Mole at one time, which I investigated but never could find out the exact truth
about it, or whether she was really there or not. Some vessel went in, but we
never could find out what nationality she was.
Mr. Angell. Well, during your 15 or 18 months in Haitian waters did you,
in the course of conversations with individuals or by reports which may have
come to you, learn anything which would have given you grounds to suspect
that the French or British had any such fears regarding the use of the island
of Haiti by the Germans?
Admiral Caperton. Well, the commanding officer of the French ship that was
there always kept very close guard and watch in port ; that is to say, he carried
out his orders and regulations In regard to protecting himself from danger out-
side, as we did not know — at least, he said he did not know — what time the
Germans might appear> but I had no discussion with him at all because I was
busy.
This will repeat my evidence given before, but I find that on the 27th of July
the department Informed me as follows :
"23327. State Department desires that American forces be landed Port au
Prince and that American and foreign Interests be protected; that representa-
tives England, France, be informed this intention; informed that their inter-
ests will be protected and that they be requested not land.**
As I have stated before, after my arrival an hour or two afterwards, the
French minister, the British charge d'affaires, accompanied by our chargft
d'affaires, Mr. Davis, came off to the ship with some of my staff whom I had
sent on shore to find out the latest information and condition of affairs, and
both the French and the British representatives requested me and pleaded with
me earnestly to land forces and to do It as quickly as possible, as they had no
idea as to what might or what might not happen on shore. This was on July 28.
Mr. Angell. At Port au Prince?
Admiral Capebton. At Port au Prince, immediately after my arrival in my
flagship, the Washington,
Mr. Angell. Now, to come to one or two points in connection with the mur-
der of President Sam and the events of the landing, did you hear of any for-
eigners, including Americans, who were at that time molested or actually threat-
ened by the disturbing element in Port au Prince?
Admiral Caperton. When I landed I took possession of the city between the
hours of 5 and 10 at night, when everything was settled. I had given orders for
the commanding officer, as he passed the various foreign legations, to ask them
if they needed any guard, and, as I recall It now, many or all of them asked
for the guard. I even gave a small guard to the German minister who, upon
being asked whether he wished them, replied that he would like to have them,
and they remained there, as I recall it now, for several days.
Mr. Angell. When your forces landed did you hear of any actual instances
prior to the landing when foreigners had been molested or harme<l?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 359
Admiral Capebton. No; things were in such a chaotic condition that I did
not ask whether any of them had been hurt or murdered, and I did not know
whether they had been or not.
Mr. Angell. Did you receive any rei)orts, voluntarily given you, of foreigner^
having been hurt or molested?
Admiral Caperton. No ; I do not think I did.
Mr. Angell. You or your representatives, of course, conferred with the
French minister and the British charge d'affaires and others, as you have
said?
Admiral Caperton. Every day.
Mr. Angell. Did the French diplomatic officials at Port au Prince report to
you that any person had been molested in their legation except the Haitian
president who was taken out?
Admiral Capebton. Not as far as I remember now, there was no one else
hurt.
Mr. Angell. So, as far as you can now remember, you received no reports at
that time of any foreigners having been actually molested or harmed during the
riot and d sturbances Immediately preceding your landing?
Admiral Caperton. No ; I do not recall any.
Mr. Angell. And do you remember receiving any reports of the harming
or molesting of foreigners, Including Americans, at any time Immediately fol-
lowing, or in connection wltli your landing, other than the casualties to the
military forces?
Admiral Caperton. No ; under my order8,^they could not very well have been
molested, because I gave orders strictly to protect everything In the dty and
keep absolute peace and quiet.
Mr. Angell. Were there any specific attempts to molest or harm civilian
foreigners?
Admiral Caperton. Well, we had several attacks on the city at night. I do
not know who these fellows wanted to sl)oot up. Apparently, they wanted to
shoot up the town, but they never told me whether they were after the British
or after the French.
Mr. Angell. There were no specific attacks on Individual foreigners?
Admiral Caperton. The view that I took df It was that with a mob, with
no leader except the various chiefs around the city, I considered that anybody
and everybody was In more or less danger, because these fellows were drunk
and ungovemed and did pretty much as they pleased about the city ; they were
a lawless mob.
Mr. Angell. When you landed had this so-called revolutionary committee,
or the committee of safety, actually been formed?
Admiral Caperton. When my chief of staff landed, as I recall my testimony
here and my records, at that time he found a committee on shore of three or
four men. Polynice was one, and I think Delvar was another. There were
three or four at that time. Later there was a committee of six or seven. ^
Mr. Angell. Whose names you gave?
Admiral Caperton. Whose names I think I gave here.
Mr. Angell. Yes; you gave those names.
Admiral Caperton. But these fellows, except Mr. Polynice, were all Cacos
and Caco chiefs. Mr. Robin was a man, as I afterwards found out, in command
of the revolutionary forces, or the Cacos, In the city. He Is one of the big
Caco generals.
Mr. Angell. This committee which you found, or your chief of staff found
on landing, was the so-.called revolutionary conmiittee, and that was the com-
mittee which Capt
Admiral Caperton. That Is the committee that they usually formed every
time these affairs took place.
Mr. Angell. And this was the committee which a little later Capt. Beach,
acting under your direction, dismissed or
Admiral Caperton. It may not have been this first committee, because they,
as I said before, later either joined In or formed a committee ; but It was a
** committee of safety," and I think all the members who were In this first
committee, three or four, were also in this final " committee of safety." As I
recall It, he only found three or four, and so reported to me ; that there was,
1 think now, Mr. Polynice, Mr. Delvar, and I do not know whether he said
Robin was there at that first meeting or not ; but he said he met several of the
62269-21— PT 2 17
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860 INQUERY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
committee of safety, and it was this committee that he asked for permission to
land, seeing that the
Mr. Anoell. That is Aujnist 3?
Admiral OapertoN. No; the 28th.
Mr. Angell. I was just inquiring ahout what this committee was.
Admiral Capebton. I would lilje to add that they were about all there were
that had any appearance
Mr. Angell. Of authority or government?
Admiral Capebton. Had any appearance of order or authority, and this same
committee agreed to my landing, but said they would not be responsible for
my reception.
Mr. Angell. I find in your message of August 3, which is contained in para-
graph 36a of the Barnott report — I do not know the page of the record there-
in the middle of the second paragraph, you say :
" Revolutionary committee at first acted practically under my direct'on, but
now frequently give orders w.thout my knowledge and act more independently."
I also find a similar message earlier, on July 31, which is paragraph 25 of the
Barnett report, the last sentence of which reads :
"All Government funct on.s are at present carried on by a committee of citi-
zens practically under my direction."
The phrase " practically under my direction " appearing in each of tliose two
messages, just what did that mean? How were they acting under your direc-
tion, sir?
Adm ral Caperton. They promts^ that they would not issue any orders or do
anything contrary to my orders, you might say, or my ideas and wishes in the
matter. In other words, they promised to cooperate with me in everything I did.
Mr. Angell. So that you had, pursuant to instruct ons from Washington,
assumed both military and to a certain extent political control of affairs hi
Port au Prince?
Admiral Caperton. I did, because there was no political head, and these were
the only people who apparently were' trying to keep peace.
,Mr. Angell. Was there a Congress in session at the time you landed?
Admiral Capebton. Oh, no.
Mr. Angell. Congress was not- in session?
Admiral Caperton. Not in session ; no, because a few days afterwards
Mr. Angell (interposing). When did the Congress meet, do you remember;
how soon 'after the murder of Sam and your landing?
Adm. ral Caperton. I think I have the exact date here, but I think it was
several days, about the 5th, 6th, or 7th, because the permanent committee which
has the authority and power to call Congress together under such conditons*
were unable to get a quorum, so that Mr. Guillaume Sam had to wait several
days in the city before he was elected President, and it is usually done within a
few hours if they can get a quorum of the Congress together.
Mr. Angell. Well, in th s Navy Department file there is a mes.<wge from
' Admiral Caperton to the Secretary of the Navy on July 31, the end of which
message reads : ** Chamber Deputies asked i)ermi8sion elect President, but de-
ferred in compliance my request.*' That would seem to indicate that the Cham-
ber of Deputies were in session at that time or had convened.
Admiral Caperton. Well, as I recall it now, they were trying to meet because
they wanted to elect the new President, and, as far as I could find out, the
reason why they did not meet, which I have stated in here, was be<»use they
could not get a quorum. I knew that that was no time to have a meeting, on
the 31st, because things were so unsettled, and I dare say that if they had been
able to have gotten a quorum — I do not know, but it appears to me now— that I
would have requested them to wait a day or two, so that things could have quieted
down a little bit and so that I would have a better grasp of the situation and
be able to protect foreign interests in case they had an outbreak in carryhiK
on the elections, as I have been told it was their custom to do when a President
was elected, with Cacos all armed all over the city, the galleries full of Cacos
with their pistols, and as each representative was called upon to vote he would
cast his eyes around and see everybody had a pistol aimed at him. This was
what was told to me there by the people throughout the city. I do not mean
to say that this was perhaps actually the case, but I was told that was the wa.v
elections were actually carried on.
Mr. Angell. Of whom did the chamber of deputies ask permission to elect
a President? Your message reads, "Chamber deputies asked permh^sion elec-t
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 361
Preaident, but deferred in compliance my request" Did they ask you or your
representatives on shore for permission to elect a President?
Admiral Capebton. I suiH)ose they must have.
Mr. ANQELL. The message would so indicate.
Admiral Caperton. I would infer that.
Blr. Angell. You do not remember the incident specifically ?
Admiral Capebton. I do not recall now, but I kept In touch with all thes*»
affairs on shore, trying to get order and to assist them.
Mr. Angell. The purpose of my question, Admiral, was merely to establish,
so far as we could, the approximate date at which you had actually assumed
the general direction not merely of the military affairs in the city, but of the
march of political events which culminated in the election of the President.
Admiral Capebton. At tlie time referred to there was nothing, no govern-
ment, nothing at all except these three or four self-constituted " committee of
safety." There was no government, no President.
Mr. Angell. You do not remember, then, Admiral, when the Congress con-
vened, do you?
Admlial Capebton. I have It here.
Mr. Angell. It must have been prior to August 5, because In the long cable
of August 3 the following appears In the beginning of what apparently Is the
third paragraph : "Although Congress Is In session, it has elective power only,
there being no President. Upon the electlcm of President Congress acquires
legislative power and revolutionary committee loses all authority." So that
is a £9)ecific statement of fact, which was undoubtedly an accurate statement
of the constitutional situation. Tliat Is August 3. Then, Admiral, so far as
joo remember, and as Indicated by this message of August 3, Congress was in
seashm at that time?
Admiral Capebton-. On the 20th of July I have this note :
"Considerable uneasiness, however, exlt^ throughout city. Both houses
of d^egates met to-day. An effort Is being made to elect a President. The
session was stormy and although a government may be established In form,
there are not at present In sight sufficiently strong candidates to alleviate
uneasy conditions among the populace and to Insure prevention from further
outbreak. The leading candidates here at present api)ear to be Bobo and
Cauvin."
That was on the 29th of July.
I would like to say here that in my previous answer in regard to there not
being a quorum of the Congress, I was then referring to the previous President,
GolUaume Sam, who entered the dty about the 22d or 23d of February, and
wag not elected, as I recall It now, until a week afterwards anyway, for the
lack of a quorum of the congress.
Mr. Angell. Now, coming down, Admiral, to the 5th of August when you
reported to the Secretary of the Navy that the Haitian Congress had Issued
a bulletin that on the Sunday following they would elect a President, but at
your request they had postponed the election, how, If you remember, was that
request of yours communicated to Congress?
Admiral Capebton. I am quite sure through my chief of staff, and probably
through the charge d'affaires, perhaps. I am not sure whether he went
through the state department, but I Imagine he did.
Mr. Angell. What was the usual procedure In your diplomatic negotiations
on shore at this time ; that Is. did Capt. Beach go direct to the leaders of the
House, or did he move entirely through the charge d'affaires?
Admiral Capebton. I always cooperated very closely with the charg6 d'affaires.
That was my usual order and custom.
Mr. Angell. Well, what form did that cooperation take?
Admiral Capebton. Consultation. I do not remember a special case.
Mr. Angelu Do you remember whether Capt Beach went direct, for example,
to the leaders of the two Houses?
Adnili:al Capebton. You mean on this occasion?
Mr. Angelu On this or similar occasions.
Admiral Capebton. That I can not recall now, but Capt. Beach will be able
to tell you exactly his procedure on shore.
Mr. Angell. Coming now to the 9th of August, when the Acting Secretary of
the Navy, I believe. Admiral Benson, sent the message to you, you remember,
** Whenever the Haitians wish, you may permit the election of a President to
take place. The election of Dartlguenave Is preferred by the United States."
Admiral Capebton. Yes. r^^^^l^
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362 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angeix. Did you communicate to the leaders of the two Houses this
statement, or the substance of it, to the effect that the election of Dartiguenave
was preferred by the United States.
Admiral Capebton. I did not
Mr. Anoell. That was simply information for your guidance?
Admiral Caperton. That was information for me and my officers, my staff;
it was for me really.
Mr. Angell. It was not communicated to the leaders in Congress?
Admiral Capebton. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Angell. Not to your knowledge?
Admiral Capebton. No; I do not think it was.
Mr. Angell. Either formally or informally?
Admiral Capebton. I th.nk not. Of course, we had met these various can-
didates and had discussions with them, and talks, and found out what they
would do and what they would not do ; but, as I stated before here, as far as
1 know, Mr. Dartiguenave may have thought that he was the favorite candidate
in the eyes of the United States, but he was never so informed by me or by
my orders. I made up my mind about him from the answers which he gave
me in various conferences which ray chief of staff and other officers had iiad
with him on shore.
Mr. Angell. What steps,- if any, were taken, Admiral, so far as you now
remember, to throw the weight of the United States influence in Port au Prince,
either the influence of the military forces under your command or the Influ-
ence of the charge d'affaires, to the supi)ort of Dartiguenave as a candidate
for the presidency?
Admiral (Uperton. I think it was Mr. Dartiguenave himself. He was then
president of the senate, and he had many frienda He had been president for
some time — I do not know for how long, but for quite a little while for Haiti—
and, as I have stated here, he was a man of a gcKKl deal of t)ersonal influence,
and I think he swung these fellows himself. There was certainly no pressure
brought to bear on them.
Mr. Angelt^ Well, was the election of Dartiguenave, then, in a substantial
sense, a free election of the candidate fwpularly ilesired by the elective body?
Admiral ('aperton. I think It was, perhaps, the only fair and free election
that Haiti has ever had, as far as I know, not having read up all the elections;
but it was free from all sorts of intimidation, free of Cacos, with their guna,
and each man got up and spoke and voted without any fear of anyone shoot-
ing him or going to shoot him afterwards, as far as I was able to protect him.
My chief of staff, as I said here before, and several of the Marine officers-made
reports to me .of the election afterwards, and they were present there and saw
what was going on.
Mr. Angktx. Oapt. Beach was present on the floor at the election, was be
not?
Admiral (Uperton. He was present on the floor ; and perhaps yon were here
the ilay I recited the si)ee<*hes they made and the little Incidents that happened.
The President, when electetl. cjune down from the speaker's stand and shook
hands with Capt. Beach, and It was absolutely an orderly election. Not even
one gun was fired, as far as reported to me; and on previous occasions there
was nothing but shooting over the whole town.
Mr. Angell. And such American influence as there was — ^mllitai-y and dlplo-
nmtic — in Port au Prince was not thrown in favor of or against any of the
<'andldates?
Admiral Caperton. As far as I know, no sir. We had only been there a few
days, and we would have been pretty good diplomats to have gained the
influence that was required to elect a President.
Mr. Angell. Of course, several times, at your request, though, they post-
poned the election, so you had acquired that much influence?
Admiral Caperton. Yes; I had many friends in Haiti at that time. I was
met and told on the streets time and time again that it was their salvation,
and that they appreciated everything of the kind. They saw what we were
doing, and it was the first time they had ever been able to walk down tlie
streets without being in fear of being shot at.
Mr. Angetx. I do not want to appear to insinuate that you went so far in
your diplomacy as to have the electors approached in order to secure the Sec-
tion of the candidate we wanted, but you evidently were a good enough diplo-
nmt to secure the postponement of the election several times?
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 363
Admiral Oaperton. That was always accomplished, as far as I know, In an
orderly, diplomatic way, by requests, and by representing to them that the time
was not opportune, as tlie city was still in a state of great unrest, and as soon
as I determined or thought that things were quiet enough for them to really
liave an election, and I had made all preparations to preserve order and had my
forces stationed throughout the dty the election was held. My forces did noth-
ing except in behalf of peace, to protect everj'body. All sorts of people went
Into the senate chamber when the election took place, as I have said before,
at the request of either senators or deputies, as their friends. They were dis-
armed at the door and allowed to go in. The representatives all wore their
arms by special permission.
Mr. Angell. You said something, Admiral, in testifying on Monday last,
October 17, which I frankly did not get thoroughly at the time, and I want to
ask you about it. It undoubtedly is in the record there, but there was some
mention made by you, if I remember correctly, of getting one senator to come
at the time of this election. There was somebody who was absent, away at
some other town? ^
Admiral Capebton. No; I never mentioned that, but there was a senator
that was brought down from Cape Haitien, I think.
Mr. Angell. Was that for the election of the President or fbr the ratification
of the treaty?
Adm ral Caperton. Oh, I think that was it.
Mr. Angell. There was an incident of bringing down a senator from Cape
Haifen for the ratification of the treaty along in October or November.
Admiral Caperton. Yes; but not for the President.
Mr. Angell. Not for the President?
Admiral Capebton. You see, at that time I did not know any of the people on
shore except the few that I had met in the few days before the election took
place.
Mr. Angell.. In further connect 'on with the election of the President, you
remember yesterday morning, Admiral, there was a question which was put
to you by Senator McCorraick regarding Dartiguenave*s statement that Haiti
must and will accetle gladly to any and all terms proposed by the United
States, including the cession outright of .Mole St. Nicholas, and he asked you,
as I remember it, to put in there the message verbatim, as it was, because in
the reports so far there was merely a paraphrase of it. MaJ. McClellon found
that message.
Admiral Caperton. He found it afterwanls, and I quote<l it and put it in
afterwards.
Mr. Angell. It Is not in the record, not in this stenograplpc copy 1 have.
Admiral C^aperton. It is coming, I snppose ; it has not been copitnl yet.
Mr. Angell. It ought to be inserte<l on page 301 of the tyi)ewrltten (^>py.
Referring to your message, can you tell us why Partlgueiiave, ostensibly n
patriot and Jealously interf^sted In guarding the welfare of Hati. should have
voluntarily, as appears to be tlie case, made an offer in advance of his election
to the presidency, to cede Mole St. Nicholas to the Ignited Stntes?
Admiral Caperton. No; I do not know what was in his nrnd to cause him to
make that remark.
Mr. Angell. The message to which I refer was sent by you on August 7, the
message containing this statement; that Is, some 9 or 10 days after you luid
landed?
Admiral C'aperton. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Had there bet^ii any discussion with hint, so far as you know,
or can now recollect, by your representatives, Capt. Beach or others, or by the
Amer can diplomatic representatives In Port an Prince, regardintr the (juestion
of Mole St. Nicholas?
Admiral Caperton. Not by my orders. Capt. Beach, as my representative,
was-on shore, and one or two oth(»rs, trying to arrange for the election. I knew
about Mole St. Nicholas or St. Nicholas Mole, but I knew nothing alM»ut or gavo
no orders to go and tell Mr. Dartiguenave that we wanted that or would want
it In case anybofly was electe<l. I do not know what these officers said to Mr.
Dartiguenave. We had several formal and informal nie<*t»ngs w'th Mr. Darti-
tnienave, as we did with all the other candidates that we hejird proposed. As
Koon as we heard of one we would try to find out what kind of a fellow he was
and whether he could be trusted or depended upon; whether he was a goml
citixen. and whenever we inquired about Mr. Dartiguenave we always heard
that he was a good man. He had been distributing the spoils, you might say.
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364 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
I believe that was the way it was done in Haiti. The President of the Senate
dealt out the money — I do not know where they got it — or the funds or spoils,
as they say, and I have heard it said by many, and by prominent men, that
although Dartiguenave had been doing this according to the custom, they did
not believe Mr. Dartiguenave had ever accepted a cent in that way or through
that channel, and so, of course, I had a high regard for Senator Dartiguenave
at that t.me. But as to why he made this remark and whether there was any
pressure, you might say, brought on him to make this remark, I am unable to
say. There was nothing, to my knowledge.
During this time, it is but fair to say, that I did not know everything that
the State Department was doing through the charge d' affaires. We were
working very closely together, but I did not know that I ever told him every-
thing that I did and I do not believe that he told me everything he did.
Mr. Anoell. There was no treaty or draft of a treaty, of course, submitted
to anyone at this time, prior to the election, was there?
Admiral Cafebton. No. I had never seen one.
Mr. Angell. The first draft of a treaty submitted to the Haitians after your
arrivaf, so far as you know, was that draft wh!ch the State Department ordered
Davis, by telegraphic message sent through you, to submit on August .14?
Admiral Oapebton. I have already so stated in my evidence here or else I
am going to do it.
MaJ. McGlellan. You did on the 14th, and the whole thing is included in
there.
Mr. Angell. That is included in the testimony of yesterday.
Admiral Caperton. It was ; so it was.
Mr. Angell. And the suggestions and corrections for the draft are in the
testimony of yesterday.
Admiral Gapebton. That is in my testimony of yesterday.
(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock ni., a recess was taken until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)
AFTEB BBCESS.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
recess. Senator Oddie presiding.
Mr. Angell. Referring, Admiral, to the message of August 14 from Wash-
ington, directed through j'ou to the legation at Port au Prince, wh ch com-
mences, as appears on page 306 of the typewritten report of the hearing, " For
more than a year the Haitian Government has been familiar with the terms
of the treaty contained in department's instructions of July 1, 1914," I would
ask you whether you were or are now famil ar with the terms of that treaty,
as contained in the department's instructions of July, 1914?
Admiral Caperton. No ; I am not familiar with it.
Mr. Angell. You do not know whether or not the terms of that proposed
treaty, or tlie department's instructions, as referred to in this message, made
any reference to Mole St. Nicholas's cession?
Admiral Gaperton. No : I do not. That was a year before I went there.
Mr. Angell. In you testimony of this week. Admiral, you referred to your
statement on August 9, I believe, to the revolutionary committee that the treas-
ury's services would be restored to the national bank and would be taken from
the banking firm of Sinnnond Freres. 1 wanted to ask you in connection with
that, Admiral, whether the service was restored by you to the National Bank of
Haiti?
Admiral Caperton. Yes.
Mr. Anoelt.. What steps did you take or have taken to restore this service to
the National Bank of Haiti? In other words, how did you accomplish the
transfer of the treasury's service from Sinnnond Freres to the National Bank of
Halt ? What I wanted to bring out, Admiral, is the general means by which you
effected this transfer from one bank to the other.
Admiral Caperton. I do not recall at this time. I had a paymaster who was
looking out for the financial arrangements on shore.
Mr. Angell. The financial arranj^enients with regard to the Haitian national
fund?
Admiral Caperton. Yes ; but without finding my notes here, offhand I do not
remember the modus operandi, but, as I recall it, it was done through the chief
of staff and the paymaster.
Senator Oddie. I would like to ask a question here. Admiral. Who coutrolle«l
the bank of Simmoud Freres?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 365
Admiral Caperton. It was reported to me that anybody got money, as I have
stated in my testimony liere, who had the power to go and demand it
Senator Oddie. Biit I mean who controlled the bank itself? What interests
controlled the bank itself?
Admiral Caperton. Well, I do not know. It was a private bank, Slmmond
Freres, and there were two or three brothers of them, I think.
Senator Oddie. Do you kqow whether it had any connection with any country
other than our own and Haiti?
Admiral Caperton, I do not recall that now, sir. It was more of a banking
house than a regular bank, as I understand it.
This was what I put in previously in my testimony :
•* Last January the treasury service by an arbitrary act was taken from the
National Bank of Haiti, the national treasury, by a proclamation of President
Theodora and given to private banking firms, the principal one of which is
Simmond Freres. Sinmiond Freres is under no control that will safeguard
public interests. They merely make collections of the revenues received, take
a certain percentage as their fee, and turn the rest over to whosoever may
exercise sufficient force or persuasion in the name of the government or revo-
lution to obtain it. The result is that considerable money is being thus forced
from Slmmond Freres by the so>calle<l revolutionary committee in various
towns, and this money is being use<l to actively support the revolutionary can-
didate. On account of nrilltary necessity, therefore, I this day informed the
committee in Port au Prince, Simmond Freres, and the National Bank of Haiti
that the treasury service could be resumed by the National Bank of Haiti.
This bank is under legal and exact contract for the handling of the treasury's
service for the country."
Mr. Angeu* Now, Admiral, are we to understand from this testimony that
such fimds as there were of the Haitian Government on deposit at Simmond
Freres were seized or directly controlled by you and your officers between the
time of your original landing and the election of the new President?
Admiral Caperton. We seized no money at all, and as far as I remember I
do not think there was any fund that was transferred. I do not know
whether there were any funds in the bank or not. I simply ordered ihe
National Bank of Haiti to resume the service for the Government, witli tlie
idea of making deposits in future there and not making them with Simmond
Freres.
Mr. Ancell. Was there nuy order, for example, given to Simmond Freres
not to pay out any funds which may have l)een on dejwsit there nominally
in the name of the Haitian Government except upon your orders or subject to
your conrtersign?
Admiral Caperton. No: there ware no orders of that kind given at all. I
<lid not have anything to do with the money that Simmond Freres had. I just
heard and it was reported to nie that everybody with autljority who came
along had access to it, or words to that effect.
Mr. Angeix. If they were collecting it and paying it out and the different
people were getting it, there must have been some funds which were nominally
national funds on deposit somewhere?
Admiral Caperton. Yes : it was deposited there, I imagine.
Mr. Angell. Witli Simmond Freres?
Admiral Caperton. Witli Simmond Freres, yes; but I did not transfer any
funds from there at all. I just issued an order that day that in the future
the service would be resimied at the other bank, and then if there was any
collection anywhere it would be deposited in the other bank. Of course, at that
time I forget whether I had taken over any of the ports of entry or not.
Mr. Anoell. I am speaking now of the point of activities up to the taking
over of any of the customhouses?
Admiral Caperton. Yes. Understand. I had ray officers detailed to look
out for certain things on shore. I did not attend to these duties personally;
I simply did it by orders, so that it Is not quite fresh or clear in my mind as
to how we did it or what the procedure was. I do know that I took no fund-?
that were deposited to the credit of the Government.
Mr. Angell. Then, as far as you remember. Admiral, there was no seizure
or control of any of the funds of the Haitian Government whatsoever, while
you were there, prior to the seizure and control of the funds coming in from
customs collections?
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866 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Admiral Caperton. Nothing prior to the time when I received orders to
deposit whatever was collected (after I had seized or taken possession of the
ports of entry in my name) in this National Bank of Haiti Und its branches.
Mr. Anoell. What you refer to as the funds collected at the ports of entr>-
is the funds you collected through the customs?
Admiral Capebton. Yes; through the customhouses.
Mr. Angell. So that the sole control exercised by you over the financial
matters and funds began with the customs seizure?
Admiral Caperton. Began with the taking over of the customs. As I remem-
ber, this was done simply to let the National Bank of Haiti (which had a
regular contract, by law. or a regular agreement, to look out for the funds
of Haiti) receive these funds again and not let them go to an oCitslde bank,
to which they had been transferred, as I said before, by some arbitrary act,
not legal at all.
Mr. Angell. Did you receive any prders, Admiral, from Washington to make
this shift of service from Slmmond Freres to the National Bank of Haiti?
Admiral Caperton. I must have received such orders or I certainly would
not have done so.
Here on the 19th of August I find the following cablegram, which says that
I was directed to take charge of certain customhouses, and then how I was
to spend the money, and all that sort of thing, and to collect the Import and
export duties, to be immediately deposited by me with the resident legal
branches of the National Bank of Haiti, in a separate account opened in my
name.
• I have either testified to this before or else have it in my notes to do It
when I come to It. I had probably received orders before that time. I handled
no money in the hands of Slmmond Freres. I simply wanted to divert the
manner in which the duties or customs were being deposited at tliat time back
to the National Bank of Haiti, which had a lawful contract to handle these
duties.
Mr. Angell. So far as you remember, were the funds c*ollected after the
issuance of your orders to the National Bank of Haiti and to the Simmond
Freres deposited according to your Instructions?
Admiral Caperton. Do you mean here on the 8th or 9th?
Mr. Angell. Yes, sir. In other words, was the service resumed with the
National Bank of Haiti?
Admiral Caperton. Without refreshing my memory, I am unable to answer
this ; I do not recall.
Mr. Angell. At that same time, namely, August 9, you will remember that the
Acting Secretary of the Navy sent you a message, to which we have referred
here a number of times, regarding the election of the President and saying that
Dartlguenave was favored, and that message went on to say, as Is already in
the record, " You will assure the Haitians that the United States has no other
motive than the^establishlng of a firm and lasting government by the Haitian
people, and wishes to assist them now and at all times In the future to maintain
both their iwlitlcal Independence and territorial integrity unimpaired." That
message was, as I read it, an order to you to assure the Haitians of these
puri)oses of the United States?
Admiral Caperton. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember, sir, what steps you took to carry out that
order to assure the Haitians of these avowed i)urix)ses?
Admiral Capebton. I think I issued several proclamations there. What was
that date?
Mr. Angell. August 9, sir.
Admiral Capebton. Just taking them as I find them here, here Is one niessa;;^
from t!ie conimandincr officer of the Conneviicut: *' Referring to your 12,608,
prochimation will be published broadcast in French to-mori;ow and copies issued
at outposts to people leaving town.
" Have received no word yet from revolutloiuiry generals.'*
That shows the proclamation was there.
Mr. Angell. What Is the date of that? That is the 8th, is it not?
Admiral Caperton. No; that is the 10th, really the 9th, you know. It was
sent to jue on the 9th. Everywhere tliat I had any ships or any men in control
I issued this proclamation throughout the country, and, as in this Instance here,
It was posted on the outside or near the entrances of the city, so that the
people leaving the city could st»e it.
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IKQUDBtY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 367
Mr. Angkll. Noiv, Admiral, referring to your testimony yesterday, on August
15 you sent a message to your chief of staff, appearing on page 313 of the
typewritten report of the hearings, in which you say in paragraph 2 : .
"I wiU directly, in conjunction with the American charge d*afEaires, carry
on the negotiations and have charge of the important relations with tlie Haitian
officials."
And the substance of that is repeated in several other communications of the
same date as this, as appears in the following pages of the record, to Capt.
Dtirrell, to Col. Waller, to the charge d'affaires, etc.
Admiral Capkbton. What is the date of that?
Mr. Angkll. August 15, immediately following the election, and at the time
when the treaty negotiat ons were just be ng put under way. Can you tell us,
sir, in a general way, what the respective parts were, played by yourself or
yo«r representatives in the negotiation of this treaty, which culminated In its
signature in September, and the part played by the charge d'affaires?
Admiral Capkrton. Well, I do not know ever>'thing the charge d'affaires did,
but in running my work I cooperated with him and Capt Beach. I had Capt.
Beach visit the different Senators around through the town, and talked with
them about the treaty, and discussed it with them to get their views, all of them.
I think finally I had a talk w.th every one of them — that is, through Capt.
heeich — and we worked together in trying to persuade them or to represent
to them what the treaty was. The charge d'affaires, of course, conducted it.
you know; but I assisted him, and I went so far as to tell Capt. Beach to go
and see these different Senators and talk to them about it. If I had spoken
French I would have, perhaps, seen some of the Senators and deputies myself.
Mr. Angell. From the record It does not appear, you see, what respective
part was played by your side in Haiti, and what part was played by the
accredited diplomatic representatives.
Admiral Caperton. I had orders to cooperate with the charge d'affaires and
aid him all I could in every way, which I did.
Mr. Angkll. If I understand you rightly, then, the charg6 d'affaires really
controlled and was the general directing head of the American side of the
negotiations?
Admiral Caperton. Certainly. He made the reports and conducted the
affairs, and I assisted him in every way I could. There is one thing I do not
th nk is necessary to bring out ; that is, where the radiogram was sent to me to
be delivered to him, giving him his power to sign the treaty, etc. He had no
way to receive It, the cable being out of order, so I received it by radio and
delivered it to him. •
Mr.* Angell. You testified. Admiral, yesterday, and it has already appeared
in the record before, that on the 17th of August, Mr. I>avis, the American
charge d'affaires at Port au Prince, delivered to President Dartiguenave a draft
of a treaty, as outlined in a message which passed through you on August 14.
Adm.ral Caperton. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether or not the draft of that treaty, as pre-
sented by Mr. Davis to the President, contained any reference to Mole St.
Nicholas?
Admiral Caperton. Without looking at it I do not remember. It was a long
message or treaty, and I read it at the time, hut now I can not recall it. It
Is down in the treaty, and you have a copy of it. You can read it yourself
and see.
Mr. Angell. That is what I wanted to find out, whetlier the original draft,
as delivered by Mr. Davis to President Dartiguenave on August 17 contained
any reference to Mole St. Nicholas.
Admiral Caperton. Without looking at it, I could not tell.
Mr. Angell. You testified yesterday, Admiral, that on August 17, 191,"), five
days after the election of Dartiguenave, and three days after the receipt by
you of the message for the charge d'affaires concerning tlie treaty, that Mr.
I>avl8, the charge d'affaires, delivered to President Dartiguenave the draft of a
proposed treaty. Do you remember whether that draft contained any reference
to Mole St Nicholas?
Admiral Caperton. If he delivered the one that I rec(»ived by radio, if that
is the one he delivered, which I presume it is, the treaty itself, a copy of which
vi^?^® here, would show of itself whether there is anything about Mole St.
Nicholas in it. That is all in the record, and has all been submitted. I do not
»e why you can not go to that and get it.
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368 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOIUNGO.
Mr. ANGEI.L. Pardon me. Perhaps I misunderstand, but what Is in the record
of yesterday is the message of the 14th, which outlined a treaty, and that
message of August 14 directed Mr. Davis to prepare a draft of a treaty on
the following basis.
Adm.ral Caperton. That was the message of August 14.
Mr. Angeix. Now, on August 17, as you testified yesterday, he had by that
time evidently made a draft of a treaty and presented to Dartigueuave that
draft of a treaty, a complete treaty in other words.
Admiral Capebton. That is not in the record of yesterday. In my answer
I was referring to the message that I received from the Navy Department —
that is, from the State Department, I tliink it was, through the Navy Depart-
ment and through me to Mr. Davis.
Mr. Angell. Now, what I am referring to is the actual draft, as delivered
three days later by Mr. Davis to President Dartlguenave.
Admiral Caperton. That I am unable at th s time to answer, because I do
not recall. No doubt I read the treaty before he presented it, but I do not recall
now whether St. Nicholas Mole was mentioned or not.
Mr. Angell. Coming now, sir, to the message of August 19 which dii*ectetl
you, on the authority of tlje State Department to seize the 10 mam custom-
houses, you testified yesterday, on page 326 of the tyiiewritteu record of the
hearings that you were directed to confer with the ^Vinerican charge d'aftaires
for the purpose of having President Dartlguemive solicit the above action,
namely, the seizure of these customhouses, *• but whether the President so re-
quested or not, I was directed to carry out the State Department's des.res."
Do you remember whether you did confer with the American charge d'affaires
for the purpose of having President Dartiguenave solic.t the seizure of the
customhouses?
Admiral Caperton. Oh, yes ; I conferred with him through my chief of staff.
Before taking over any customlwuses, I always conferred with the President,
and informed him of what I was going to do, and requested his permission or
agreement to the matter, and as far as I remember now, ne never gave his
consent In each case where a customhouse was taken over, the order issued
to do it was referred to the charge d'affaires, to have him go to the President
first, and in many instances I asked h.m if he would not aid me in taking it
over by having his customhouse ofl^cials pre^ient to aid me when taking it over.
Mr. Angell. When you say "he,'* you mean the Pres.deut?
Admiral Caperton. Yes ; the President.
]Mr. Angell, But, so far as you know, he never consented aflirinatively to
tile st'izure of any customhouse^^? *
Adm.ral Capbhiton. Not that I recall now, but I did have some of his ciflstoms
officials at different customhouses, several of them, who aideii us in taking
charge. If he did not assent, he naturally objecte<l. 1 do not know what lie
said at the time, except that it was generally understood that he did not ap-
prove of it.
Mr. Anokll. Do you remember whether or not he made any siiecific protest?
Admiral Caperton. No; I can not recall that now, in the absence of my
representatives who personally conferred with him.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember the protest which was published in the
Moniteur on September 4, 1915, spetfifically rejiarding the seizure of the custtuu-
houses at Port au Prince, vvliich was dated Septeini>er 2? I want to offer thU?
in the re<'ord, and I will read you the material i>ortioiis of it. Admiral, anU
ask if it refreshes yonr recollect on on the general attitude of the Government :
*' Haitians I At the very moment when the (Government, engaged in negot.'a-
tions to settle the (question of the preseiue of American military forces on
Haitian territoiy, was looking forward to a prompt solution in accordance witli
law and justice. It finds itself faced with the simple seizure of possession of tlie
customs administration of the capital.
*' Previously the customhcmses of several other cit'es of the Republic have
been occupied in like fashion, and whenever the news of such occupation
reached the national palace or the department (»f finances it was followed by
an energetic protest, demanding that the d plomatlc I'epresentative of tlie
Amer can (Government residing at Port an Prince restore the customhouses Rnil
put an end to acts so contrary to the relations at present existing between tlw?
(fovernment of Haiti and the Cfovernment of the United States of North
America."
And it goes on to ccuument on this situation, and is signal by President
Dartiguenave. ^ ,
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 369
Admiraf Capebton. So far as I recall now, I had no paper written to me con-
taining any objection, nor do I remember the words of objection that were
given at various times to my representatives but I know there was more or
less of a protest, whether from the President himself, or whether from the
press, I am unable to say.
(The balance of the protest above quoted is as follows : )
** Haitians ! In bringing these facts officially to the attention of the country,
I owe it to myself to declare further, in the most formal fashion to you and to
the entire civilized world, that the order to carry out these acts so destruc-
tive of the interests, rights, and sovereignty of the Haitian people is not due
to anything which can be cited against the patriotism, devotion, spirit of
sacrifice, and loyalty of those to whom the destinies of the country have been
intrusted. You are the judges of that.
"Nor will I conceal the fact .that my astonishment is greater because tiie
negotiations, which had been undertaken in the hope of an agreement upon
the basis of propositions presented by the American Ctovemment itself, after
baying passed through the ordinary phases of diplomatic discussion with
frankness and courtesy on both sides, have now been relieved of the only
obstacles which had hitherto appeared to stand In their way.
"Haitians! In this agonizing situation, more than tragic for every truly
Haitian soul, the Government, which intends to preserve full national sover-
eignty, will be able to maintain the necessary resolution only if all are united
in exercising their intelligence and energy with it in the present task of saving
the nation.
" SUDBE DaBTIOXHCNAVE.
"Given at the National Palace, September 2, 1915, in the one hundred and
twelfth year of our independence."
Mr. Angell. With further reference, Admiral, to this question of the customs,
and the use of funds, and the seizure, and the like, you testified yesterday with
respect to the funds that were being collected at the customhouses as follows —
and I am quoting now from page 329 of the typewritten record of the hearings :
"Admiral Caperton. The funds that were being collected were being used at
different ports by revolutionary forces, in some instances. There was no
control."
Oin you remember — appreciating the difficulty of remembering things that
happened back six years — can you now remember any specific instances where
the customs funds were being used by the revolutionary forces or bands of
Cacos?
Admiral Caperton. No ; I do not know that I can recall any specific instances
at the present I might be able to refresh my memory by looking over my
notes, but I do not recall any now.
Mr. Angell. Is It a fact — and I am asking this for mere information — tliat,
as I have been told, and as I undei^tand it to be, many of the customs services
from particular ports were specifically pledged to meet tlie foreign debt or
foreign loan service or services?
Admiral Caperton. Yes; I think tliat is the case. I do not know about the
various ports.
Mr. Angeix. I have no particular port or ports in mind,. but merely the fact
that some of the
Admiral Caperton. The money that was collected from customs on indi-
vidual things was frequently allotted for certain purposes or for certain debts
to be paid. On a certain amount of coffee sometimes they had one or two
different allotmenta A certain percentage of it was to pay for one thing, and
a certain percentage for another thing.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember, Admiral, whether there were any pledges of
customs receipts from a specific port for the service of a specific foreign loan?
Admiral Caperton. No ; I do not know of that detail.
Mr. Angell. At the time the customs services were seized by you, pursuant to
the State Department's request, as contained in the Navy Department's tele-
CTam of August 19, were you informed officially by the Navy Department or
the American diplomatic representatives in Port au Prince, that the customs
aerviees were in some instances, and on some types of exjwrts and imports,
specifically pledged to certain foreign loans?
Admiral Caperton. Yes; as I recall it now, the National Bank of Haiti
looked out for it, and had been looking out for it all along except when the
services were taken from the bank as referred to previously. Thot^was their
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370 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
daty. That was a part of their obligation, to devote so much of tke customs
money to this, and so much to that
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether the seizure of the customs, as carried oat
by you, contemplated the honoring of these pledges?
Admiral Capebton. I do not know about that I only know what was done
with the money after I collected it ; it was paid out in accordance with in-
structions from the Navy Department
Mr. Angell. You have no idea whether the Navy Department or the State
Department accepted these customs receipts to be used to carry out the
pledges previously made by the Haitian government?
Admiral Oapkrton. No ; I do not. I made several recommendations, or many
recommendations, to pay out this money that was collected, and I remember
that several hundred thousand dollars were paid out for the interest on the
internal bonds. I was particularly interested in that because it was explained
to me on shore, what the internal bonds were. I was there such a short time,
less than a year, after the time I took over the customs; however, we col-
lected a good deal, and, as I remember, when I left there I left a million and
a half or $2,000,000, something like that, in the Haitian National Bank, and I
paid out $600,000 or $700,000 for interest on the internal bonds,
I might say that all these details were looked after and handled carefully
by my officers whom I detailed for that ^>eciflc purpose. For instance, the
administrator of customs, Capt Connard, looked out for all of this. He made
a study of it and was constantly in consultation and worked with the National
Bank of Haiti, and he would come and report to me the results of what he was
doing, so that I would know what was going on. He is thoroughly conversant
with every step that was taken with regard to the finances of the country after
his arrival and after his appointment under me.
Mr. Anoell. During the period of your assignment to duty in Halt'an
waters, which was up until November, 1916, as I remember
Admiral Capebton. No ; until July 18, 1916.
Mr. Angell. July 18, 1916, there was no payment made, was there, of
interest on the foreign debt?
Admiral CAPiaiTON. No ; I think you will find in the records here somewhere
frequent mention of this subject, but, as I recall it now, we paid no interest
on the external or foreign debts.
Mr. Angell. There was no direction from Washington to you to pay such
interest on the foreign debt?
Admiral Capebton. Not that I recall now.
Mr. Angell. In connection. Admiral, with the negotiation of the treaty or
financial matters such as the customs control, did Mr. Farnham appear a.«
interested in any way in these questions, or did he assist in any of the councils';
Admiral Capebton. I never saw Mr. Farnham. I heard a lot of talk about
him, promiscuous talk. I appealed, I presume it was to him, or to the Na-
tional City Bank, or some one in New York, to try to start up work on this
railroad to keep the people from starving, which was outlined in my testi-
mony, or will be before I finish, but as far as having any intercourse witb
him at all, I had none whatever. .
Mr. Angell. Do you remember or not whether he was in Haiti during the
summep of 1915?
Admiral Capebton. I do not recall now ; I do not believe he was. He may
have been, but I never met him. Of course, there was a great deal of talk-
about him. The people on shore did not seem to like him; a great many did
not, especially the people who were against the occupation. In that way they
would frequently bring up his name, but I paid no attention to it, because I
had my own orders and business to attend to.
Mr. Angell. Coming back again now to the customs, sir, it is a fact is it
not, that the customs service was the chief source of revenue of the Govern-
ment?
Admiral Capebton. Oh yes ; as far as I know, it was the only source.
Mr. Angell. There was none or i)ractically no internal-tax revenue?
Admiral Capebton. No; they said they collected them, but when I went to
look for them after I took charge, I could not find any.
Mr. Angell. Referring still to the customs seizure, you testified yesterday,
on page 330 of the typewritten record of the hearings, that on August 18.
as it appears here — I think it should be August 19--you sent a message to
the Secretary of the Navy, stating that the United States had now actually
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INQUIBY INTO OCXJUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 371
accomplished a military intervention in the affairs of another nation. Re-
ferring, sir, to that message, you testified yesterday, and it appears in the
message, that you said, "This secrecy extremely important now, pending
treaty negotiations,*' the secrecy referring to the proposed seizure of the
customhouses. Do you remember whether secrecy was maintained at that
time? Were you permitted to carry out your own idea of maintaining secrecy?
Admiral Caperton. Yes; to a certain extent I was. It came through me,
and unless it was intercepted it was kept more or less secret i)y me. To tlie
best of my power the secrecy was maintained.
The secrecy referred to in this message refers to the secr(*cy covering the
arrival of a regiment of marines. I think it refers generally to all my activities
there. I had recommended the bringing down of a lot of marines, additional
marines, and I think now, l(K>k;ng at it, as I recall it, I meant that my general
activities would be kept secret, because I was not ready ta do much then. If
you will notice, these places were taken over one at a time for a while, because
1 had not the force to do otherwise. When I took one I had to have a sufficient
force there to protect myself, to'prote<'t the act, and look out for the custom-
house and see that that was properly protected.
Mr. Anqell. The taking over of an individual customhouse was not a matter
of secrecy in itself, was it?
Admiral Caperton. Oh, no.
Mr. Anqell. That was done entirely openly?
Admiral Capeeton. After the act commenced, and, as I have stated before,
I always informed the Government of the fact and asked them if they would
not assist me In turning over the archives.
Mr. Angell. So that as soon as you seized an individual customhouse that
fact became known generally and broadcast at once?
Admiral Caperton. Oh, yes; as fast as news traveled at that time in Haiti.
Mr. Angell. Because I notice that in your testimony yesterday, on page 336
of the typewritten record of the hearing, you quote a message or note of yours
of August 21, which was the date, I believe, that the first of the customhouses
was taken over, that at St. Marc saying, *' an unfavorable sentiment has ap-
peared in Congress in the form of inflammatory speeches against the customs
control and American occupation in general." That is on August 21, the date
of the first taking over of any of the customhouses.
Admiral Caperton. Then the 21st was the date on which the first one was
taken over without looking at my notes?
Mr. Angell. Referring to this statement in there with regard to the unfavor-
able sentttnent appearing In speeches against the customs control, that would
indicate, would it not. that this whole question of customs control was being
agitated, and had been agitated, in and out of Congress, even before the customs
were actually seized? In other words, was there any general discussion inside
of Congress or outside on the question of the customs control or seizure of the
customs prior to the first actual seizure by you on or about the 20th or 2Lst
of August?
Admiral Caperton. Not that I recall now.
Mr. Angell. So that the storm J)roke regarding the seizure of the customs
only after the first of the seizures?
Admiral Caperton. It would appear that way.
Mr. Angell. On August 23 you reported. Admiral, to the Navy Department,
I believe, as appears on page 338 of the typewritten record of the' hearings, in a
message which begins, "Treaty negotiations are still unsatisfactory," and that
phrase or words are substantially the same or indicating the same idea, appears
in parlous other messages of this general period. Can you tell us what you
meant by such expression or expressions as "treaty negotiations are un-
satisfactory T'
Admiral Caperton. Yes. Of course, I kept track every day of the discussions
and what was going on in Congress. I knew exactly nearly everything that took
place in there, and I was able to tell when they were opposing it violently, or
whether they were coming around, so to speak. In other words, if the speeches
and the proce<lure in congress were satisfactory, they were satisfactory; if
they were unsatisfactory, they were unsatisfactory, favorable to the treaty or
unfavorable.
Mr. Angell, Whetlier they were fa^ orable or unfavorable to the acceptance of
the treaty is what Lam trying to ascertain.
Admiral Caperton. One day we would have a senator with us. and then the
next day he would be against us. ^ ,
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372 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angell. What was the main ground of such opposition as. there was?
Was it the opposition to the customs control?
Admiral Capebton. Oh, the customs control, no doubt, had something to do
with it, but I think the whole American occupation. These people who were
bitterly opposed to it were against the occupartlon, and many of them were — I
do not know what you would call them, Cacos, i)erhaps; they were certainly
very sympathetic with the Cacos.
Mr. Angell. The opposition in general was to the principle of the American
occupation of Haiti?
Admii*al Caperton. Well, the custouis, I suppos(\ also had something to do
with the opposition.
Mr. Angell. Including the customs?
Admiral Caperton. Yes; otherwise there would have been, as far as I can
see, no opposition to it at all.
Mr. Angell. And those who opposed the acceptance of the streaty and tlie
American occupation in general were the Cacos?
Admiral Caperton. Well, there were some men who opposed it; I would not
like to say they were all Cacos, but they were sympathetic with the Cacos at
that time. I think what I intend to infer is, that many of them, deputit*s.
senators, were really Cacos.
Mr. Angell. You read into the record yesterday, Admiral — and they appear
on page 347 and following of the typewritten record of the hearings — your In-
structions regarding the customs administration.
Admiral Caperton. What is the date?
Mr. Angell. The particular letter which I have in mind being date<l the 24th
of August, your letter of iiistructions to the United States forces in Haitian
waters, where, under the heading of "Civil administration," 'it says:
" Detachment commanders will have charge of such other civil affairs as may
be assumeil Within the limits of their resi)e<'tive commands.'*
Can you tell us what those other civil affairs were Intended to be, and what
charge was actually a.ssumeil by detachment commanders over other civil
affairs beyond the customs?
Admiral Caperton. I have in my previous testimony shown that in taking
over the affairs of Haiti I sjiid that the civil affairs would still be maintained
and run by the Government, and that we would only take charge of such civil
affairs as interfered with my military operations. That, I am sure, is already
in tlie record, and was possibly in the proclamation, as I remember, or the
order to my representatives on shore when they took over a place, namely,
that the civil authorities would not l>e interfered with except where they Inter-
fere<l or clashed with my military oi)erations.
Mr. Angell. The military operations, of course, were regarded as para-
mount in case of any conflict?
Admiral Caperton. Those were my operations; yes. When I did interfere,
as I recall it, I usually informed the Government, or informed the locality,
that It was necessary to do that. That was my intention to always do that,
and I think I did.
Mr. Angell. Gn August 31, as you testified yesterday on page 363 of the type-
written record of the hearings, you sent ir message to the Secretary of the
Navy, saying: ** Gn the 31st of August there were no encouraging developments
in the treaty situation. I have, therefore, decided that, unless otherwise di-
rected, I will occupy and begin administering the customs house at Port au
Prince at 10 a. m. on the 2(1 of September." Was your detenuinatlon to occupy
the customhous** at I*ort au Prince made with a view to forcing or assisting by
that act in the general aim of bringing about an acceptance of the proposed
treaty?
Admiral Capkrton. No ; I think, as I statwl there, whatever the words were
there, that the developments were not encouraging for the treaty. I had been
waiting and waiting to take over this customhouse, because I had my orders
some time before to do so, and as the paymaster had only arrlve<l a short time
before that, I de<nded to take it over the next \lay and not to wait any longer.
I think if the conditions under which the treaty was being considered had
been taken into consideration I would not have taken over this customhouse If
I had wanted to Improve the treaty negotiations, because every time I took
over a station there was a howl, and I lost a great many senators and repre-
sentatives. Gn a round-up they went against me. They said they would vote
now the other way on the treaty.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 373
Mr. Anoell. Admiral, there has already been placed in the record Maj. Mc-
01ellaD*8 memorandum which was submitted back here in August, containing a
general outline and, of course, a great many specific details. In that memo-
randum now appearing on page 67 of the printed record appears your proclama-
tion of martial law of September 3, in which in the second paragraph I note
you say that ** I am invested with the power and responsibility of government
in all its functions and branches throughout the territory above described, and
the proper administration of such government by martial law will be provided
for -n regulations to be issued," etc. That proclamation and the language of
it would hardly seem to be reconcilable, would it, with the previous proclama-
tion of political independence as ordered from Washington through you?
Admiral Caperton. I do not quite get that.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember, sir, the message which has been referred to a
number of times to-day of August 9, in which you were directefl by the Secre-
tary of the Navy to assure the Haitians that the Tnted States wished to assist
them now and at all times in the future to maintain both their political inde-
pendence and territorial integrity unimpaired? I was asking you, in a question
which was somewhat argumentative, possibly, whetlier the jmrposes of that
order of August 9 could be reconciled with the fact of the issuance of the
proclamation of martial law and the language of the proclamation?
Admiral Caperton. I think that is answered in the next paragraph, which is
a modification, which reads as follows :
•* The martial law herein proclaimed and the things in that respect so ordered
will not be deemed or taken to interfere with the proceedings of the constitu-
tional Government and Congress of Haiti or with the administration of justice
in the courts of law existing therein which do not aflfect the military operatiou.s
or the authorities of the Government of the United States of America."
Mr. Angell. In other words, the military operations or the authorities of the
United States were to be regarded as supreme?
Admiral Caperton. No ; I will not say that at all.
Mr. Angell. It says that martial law would not interfere with the proceiMl-
UiR8 of the constitutional Government or Congress or the courts that did not
affect the military operations of tlie United States.
Admiral Caperton. That is the theory, I think, of martial law. On page 68
of the printed hearings appears a legal opinion rendered by the judge advocate
l!eneral of the Navy with reference to the status of the marines in Half, which
reads as follows :
" The military forces of the United States have not displaced the civil gov-
ernment of Haiti and established a military government of the T'n ted ^bites in
that country, but are engaged, pursuant to law, in lending suflicient aid to the
Republic of Haiti," etc.
That is here. You can read it on that page.
Mr. Angell. The opinion is based, as I read it, sir. u|K)n the treaty and uixm
the status of the United States forces in Haiti subsequent to the treaty of Sei>-
tember 16, 1915, whereas your proclamation of martial law was made and
martial law went into effect 13 days before the treaty was signed, so that the
opinion of the judge advocate general is hardly in point, it seems to me. That is
more a statement for the record than a question to you, sir, because that is u
felrly technical question of constitutional and International law. I s mply
asked you whether in your opinion there was a fcmflict betwet»n the avowed
porposeg to maintain the political independence and territorial integrity unim-
paired of the Haitian people and the acts which were taken by you in accord-
ance with your instructions received from Washington.
Admiral Capebton. Well, if you will recall my testimony, it was by the
rwioest of the President of Haiti that I declared martial law. I announcetl I
would do It, and I had the approval of the department.
Mr. Angell. Am I to understand from your answer that you believe there
was no conflict between the announced purpose to take no steps to impair the
political independence of Haiti and the steps which were actually taken?
Admiral Cafebton. Well, I found it necessary to declare martliil law n order
to exlit there or get along. No one seemed to pay any attention to the laws.
The new^Mipera were defaming us and me individually, and everything was
romUng riot, so in order to handle matters and keep peace at all I really did
H, yon might say, to^support the constitutional government of Haiti.
Mr. Argkli* I am not asking you i>ersonalIy to defend it, and I am not
crlticithig or' attacking It, but I am just trying to get the official view. If I
^'>n,of the accordance of these acts with our avowed puriwses.
I
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374 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Admiral Caperton. I informed the department l)efore that I would do this
unless matters got better, and I had their approval, and I let the people know
that I would not interfere with their civil government in any way, provided
they did not affect the military operations or the autiiorities of the Government
of the United States.
Mr. Angell. In other words, in accordance with the discretion which was
vested in you, or with the instructions, you regarded the step of proclaiming
martial law as an act necessary and proper to assist in the maintenance of the
])Olitical independence of Haiti?
Admiral Caperton. And to preserve law and peace ; yes ; and I was so eompli-
menteil by and had the approval of many of the best people in the cty. Of
course, a great many acts arising from this they disapproved, but the good
things I did for them they all agreed to. They came to me and said it was
the best thing. They could not live there without martial law. and I do not
believe tliey could exist there without it at the present time.
Mr. Anqeli^ You have referred in your testimony. Admiral, and It appears also
in the record in the memorandum prepared by MaJ. McC^lellan, that martial
law, as proclaimed by you on September 3, 1915, in Port au Prince, was requested
of the American forces by President Dart'guenave. Can you tell us when,
where, to whom, and under what circimistances that request was made?
Admiral Caperton. I can not at the present time. It came to me officially.
I would say very likely it came through my chief of staff. He reported it to me.
Just how I received the message now I can not recall, but It was official and
came from him, and I reported it to the Secretary of the Navy, and it Is all a
matter of record, and I think It Is already entered In my testlmon.v. Military
Intervention was required because there was no existing or prospective Ha tlan
autliorlty, either civil or military, to cope with the existing state of anarchy. As
the only iioss ble means of establishing order and bringing peace and protection
to the mass of the people, martial law was declared. This mart al law was,
in fact, the martial law of the Republic of Haiti put Into effect at the request
. of the President of that Republic and for the preservatlton of the lives and
property of law-abiding Haitians as well as to avoid the necessity of the various
units of the military' forces adopting their own means for self-protection and
for the preservation of order in their immediate vic'n'ty.
(A supplemental statement filed by Rear Admiral William B. Caperton is here
printed In full, us follows:)
STATEMENT OF BEAB ADMIRAL WIIXIAM B. CAPEBTOK.
(In accord/ince with the previous understanding betiK'een the chairman and
Admiral Caperton the following was Introduced In written form on November
10, 1921, by Mr. Howe, coun.^el for the committee, on behalf of Admiral Caper-
ton, as a continuation of his former testimony:)
On September 9 I receive<l the following report from Mr. McLean, the Ameri-
can deputy receiver In the Dominican frontier customs service, via the Can-
necticut: "Town quiet. Minister I^conte will send out a committee to-morrow
to interview Cacos. Following message received this afternoon. Was sent to\
me by Beall, Unltefl States deputy receiver of customs, by boat leaving Monte
Crlste at 8 p. m. September 7 : * Haitian revolutionists are attacking the town
of Ouanaminthe. They desire the loyal troops to unite with them to go to the
cape and attack the Americans. When the troops at Ouanaminthe refused they
began a siege and then the attack. The revolutionists are being aided from
this side. The Dominican authorities have taken a stand against the loyal
troops, but allow the rebels privileges here. In short, the Haitian revolution-
ists being maintained and sustained by the Dominican Government this side.
Prisoners taken by both sides are put to death in most frightful manner.
Troops at Ouanaminthe are willing to turn in arms to Americans and disoand
If they can find a way to do so. The revolutionists of Bobo and Theodore gov-
ernment preventing them going to the cape for that purpose.' (Signed)
McLean, deputy receiver frontier customs service. 19308. DurelL"
On this same date I^ouis Borno and Paul Salomon were appointed mlQlsters
of foreign affairs and public works, respectively, filling vacancies In those
places.
On September 10 I received the following me.ssage from Commander James
F. Carter, commanding officer of the Castine: "Between 300 and 400 Cacos
reported to be at Poteau ; majority armed with rifles. Reports from Gros
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAIH AND SANTO DOMINGO. 375
Morne that Cacos left there for Gonaives. Small bands scattered on roada
leading to Gonalves. It is reported that Cacos Intend to make demonstration at
Gonaives. Since visit of Zamor revolutionists pretend that opposition is to
the Government and not against the United States. Previously their threats
were against Americans. I have no faith in good offices of Zamor. Consider
it advisable to suppress any attempt of demonstration here. No coffee coming
iu now. 20110. Charter."
On September 12 the Caco general, Morancy, appealed to Zamor for fnnds to
aid his sicli and wounded, on which I directed the commanding officer of the
Connecticut to inform Mr. Zamor and the Cacos that we have now established
a hospital in Cape Haitien and would be glad to render medical assistance to
rheir sick and wounded. It was on th^s date that I decided to send Col. Waller
on a trip of inspection and reconnaissance to St. Marc, Gonaives, and Cape
Haitien. I decided to await his report before taking any action in these Caco
annoyances.
It was on the 13th of September that the Amer*can consul at Santiago de
Cuba rei>orte«l Dr. Bobo in that place; that he was keeping watch on him
and would keep me advised as to his movements.
Late on the 13tli I made the following report to the Secretary of the Navy :
" Cacos continue fnterfere food supply at Gonaives. Connecticut reports Leconte
has offered Cacos vicin ty. Cape Haiten, 50,000 gourdes for disarmament.
Leconte informed that Cacos would disarm for 60,000 gourdes. Government
accepted this offer, which inclu<1e<l surrender all arms. General amnesty, and
chief proceed Port au Pr nee. This apparently only appl'ed to Cacos in vicinity
Cape Haitien. Government's message to I..econte advised him come to quick
terms. * because United States forces may take offensive act on.' American
consul Santiago de Cuba reports Bobo at Santiago de Cuba. 22313. Caperton."
On Septeml)er 14 a conference was held between the minsters of foreign
affairs and finance and the American charge d'affaires and Paymaster Charles
C'onard, my representative, concerning which I sent the following report to
the Secretary of the Navy: "In conversat on held between ministers foreign
affairs and finance on one hand and American charge d'affaires and Paymaster
Charles Conard, my representative, on the other hand it was agreed that treaty,
now being translated into French, would be signed and ratified and modus Vi-
vendi entered into. In order to assure prompt ratification Ha t an Government
desires mmediate assurances in such shape as to be effective for use in Cham-
ber of Deputies to the effect that the United States will exercise its good offices
to obtain a temporary loan of $1,500,000 for the Haitian Government to cover
expenses; first, for approximately three months, pending settlement of details
of receivership, and, second, back salaries and unpaid expenses. Of ths sum,
$500,000 is estiniate<l as necessiiry for covering first head and $1,000,000 for
second. In connection with amount last mentioned, the Haitian Government
will agree to refrain from em tting paper to value of 5,000,000 gourdes, now
authorized, of which 500,000 gourdes are said to be now in transit. In view of
the fact that the collection of practically all the revenues Is at present in my
hands, as the receipt from these revenues after deduct on made by me In ac-
cordance Navy Department's radiogram 2(K)18, August, will for some fme yet
not be sufficient to meet current expenses of the Ha tlan Government, especially
as funds should remain in national bank to move coffee crops and as the Haitian.
Government has at present insufficient revenues avalable to meet these ex-
penses, I recommend that the assurances be given as above requested. Opinion
was expresse<l by United States representative to effect that bonded indebted-
ness will be consolidated into one loan, including temporary loan /eferred to
above and back unpaid interest on public debt. Confirmation of this is re-
quested. 23414. Caperton."
About 8 p. m., September 16. the treaty as signed by the plenipoteutaries of
the United States and Haiti, Mr. R. B. Davis, American charg6 d'affaires,
and Mr. I^^uis Borno, secretary of fore'gn relations of Haiti, was forwarde<i to
the United States. It was understood that the ukkIus vivendl would be held In
abeyance pending a resolution relative thereto to be passed by the Congress.
On September 17 I was informed by the American charge d'affaires that the
present Haitian Government had been recognized by the Uiiite<l States. I ac-
cfjrdingly at 9 a. m. fired a natiimal salute of 21 guns to the Haitian flag at
the main. This salute was imme<llately returne<l from the guns by the Haitian
6226»— 21— PT 2 1 H
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876 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
shore battery. After this salute, In company with my staff, I called officially
on the Haitian President, which I at once reported to the Secretary of the
Navy. On this day the treaty was presented to the Chamber of Deputies and
was referred to the committee of 11 deputies. This committee consisted of
five mnlattoes and six blacks, five from North Haiti, two from the Artibonite
region, and four from South Haiti.
On September 17 I called the attention of the department to the fact that
since the establishment of martial law conditions at Port au Prince relative
to disturbances have become greatly improved, so that the city is now entirely
quiet and well regulated.
It was reported on the 17th that interference with the food supply at Go-
naives by the Cacos continues. The Cacos levied illegal tax on coffee outside
the town and had cut off the town water supply.
On September 18 the President of Haiti and his cabinet called officially on
board the WMhington during the forenoon. Full honors according to the Navj-
regulations were given. The Haitian congress was formally dissolved on the
17th of September on account of its being the end of the session ; on this day
the President convoked an extraordinary session of both bodies to meet Sep-
tember 20. I was informed that on the reconvening of congress on the 20th
the Senate would appoint a committee and the deputies would reappoint the
committee mentioned above to consider the treaty and make recommendations
to their respective bodies. It was understood that after this report the request
for a modus Vivendi would be passed. I was informed that the President felt
confident that there would be no opposition to the ratification of the treaty,
but desired a full discussion to take place in order that acceptance might l)e
made nearly unanimous.
The r^)ort formerly received that the Dominican authorities at Dajabon
were aiding tiie Haitian Cacos to lay seige to the loyal troops at Ouanaminthe
and openly aiding the Oacos was confirmed on September 18 by the American
receiver of customs at Santo Domingo dty.
On September 18 I was informed by Col. Waller of the conditions at Go-
naives. He reported that with my approval he would take MaJ. Butler and
adjutant to Oonaives on the Osceola on the following day; that the situation
would be cleared by direction from the chiefs outside Cape Haitien ; that the
water and food supplies were most Important for Gonaives; that our prestige
was involved and that if necessary he would stop at Gonaives in person ; that
he believed pressure necessary on the small bands; that no offensive move-
ment was involved, and that protection of movements at a point like Gonaives
was necessary. I immediately approved this contemplated action of Col.
Waller's.
Commander Carter, the comnumding officer of the Castine, reported that on
the morning of the 18th he sent a working party, accompanied by a guard, to
repair the water main broken by Cacos at the reservoir near Pierrehead; that
the Cacos fired on our men when landing, but were quickly dispersed to the
mountains when we returned fire with machine guns ; that the water pipe was
then repaired; that on the afternoon of September 18 the Cacos advanced a
force against our outpost at Gonaives, but retreated to the bushes upon tht'
approach of a patrol. It is reported that the Cacos received reinforcements
and it is e8timate<l that their force now amounts to 000 men. The CasUne'»
landing force is still on shore. Interference with the food supply conthiues
and Is a great hardship on the poor people.
The commanding officer of the Castitie earlier in the day reported that a
patrol of ^men and 1 offlc<*r encounteretl 75 armed Cacos outside of Gonaive**
at 9 a. m., Septenilun* 18; that the Cacos attempteil to surround the patrol,
who then fired a few shots; and that the Cacos returned the fire and theji
withdrew to the bushes. There were no casualties at this time.
I dec»ided to await a report from Col. Waller, who was en route to Gonaives,
before taking any active measures at that place which could not be taken by
him on the spot under his instructions.
On September 19 the Caco chiefs failed to appear for a conference with Col.
Waller, which had previously been requested by them, but instead the com-
manding officer of the Connecticut, Capt. Durell. stated that they would senil
a letter stating their views. On this day the water main at Gonaives, which
had been repaire<l by our forces the day before, was again broken by th«»
Cacos.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 377
On this (late I found It nw-essary. owing to conditions, to forward the fol-
lowing letter to the American charge d'affaires:
The American OiiAiui^ d*Affaibes,
Afnerican Legation, Port au Prince, Haiti,
Sir : I have tlie honor to state that reports from varioas towns which Ameri-
can forces have occupied show a dilatory- attitude on the part of some Haitian
officials in cooperating with the American authorities, amounting in some places
to negative opposition.
I request that you bring this matter to the attention of the Haitian Govern-
luent and state that it is necessary that instructions be issued immediately to
i\\\ concerned to cooperate with and meet the wishes of the American authori-
ties in the various official matters under consideration without delay.
Unless this is done it may be necessary for me to take action in order to
carry on necessary business and to safeguard the interests of the Haitian people
in these various localities.
I am, sir, respectfully,
W. B. Capebton,
Read Admiral, United States Navy,
Commanding United States Forces in Haiti and Haittan Waters,
The Secretary of the Navy on September 18 informed me that the State De-
imrtment stated that informat'on received from the British vice consul at
Sanchez, Santo Domingo, indicated need of protection for lives and property at
that place and Macoris, Santo Domingo, and requested me to send a vessel to
investigate and report conditions there. I accordingly directed the Marietta to
proceed to Sanchez to carry out these duties.
A sitort t me previous to September 18 I received a report from the American
consul at Cape Hatien, stating that Bobo had sent a cablegram from Santiago do
Cuba to a friend of his in Cape Hatien urging the Cacos to hold out.
On September 20 I rece'ved the following reply from the American charge
d*affaires to my letter of the 19th, relative to the dilatory tactics of the Haitian
officials in the various towns :
Legation of the Uni-kd States of America,
September 20, 1915.
My Dear Admiral: I am inclosing a copy of the treaty. As you will notice,
it is the Frencli-Engl'sh text, but I suppose this will serve as well for your pur-
l)06es as the English-French.
With reference to your letter received this morniiig with regard to lack of
cooperation by certain Government officials in the different i)orts, I have brought
its contents to the attention of the minster of foreign relations, and he assures
me that he will see that the action requested be at once had.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
II. B. Davis,
Charge d' Affairs ad in
Upon the return of Col. Waller from his reconnaissance and inspection trip
to the north and after having received h*s report I made the following report
to the Secretary of the Navy, describing the situation on September *J1 :
•* Col. Waller returnwl Monday from reconnaissance and inspections trip lo
north Ha ti. He visited and consulte<l with Caco chiefs in north, explained in-
tent ons of United States in regard to Haiti. Cacos found to he intereste<l in
United States intentions, but 0|)i)osed Dartiguenave government. They were
told It was necessary to oi)en railroad from ('ape Haitien to Grand Riviere to
.secure foo<l .supply for Cape Haitien, but were opposed to departure of train.
On September 18, with three sciuads marines, two machine guns, and wreck ii;;
material, Col. Waller oprnied railroad to Grand Riviere without difficulty. Cacos
much excited but offered no resistance, and finally accepted situation apparently
In gO(xl humor. At one iK)lnt train was dera led by (-acos, where two rails luul
been removed where track was hidden in grass, Cacos were little threatenin;::
at this point, but four marines tak ng i)osition to guard men working on traciv
Cacos ran, although under imme<liate command of Morenci and Petion. Country
people along road and at Grand Riviere greatly pleased our action. Condition
Cacos miserable and not to be considere<l any value as troops ; they now live by
robbing inhabitants and market people. Same class Cacos exist vicinity Gon-
aires, but are much bolder, due to excitement createil by their proximity. Have
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3t8 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
directed commanding officer Connecticut keep railroad to Bahon open and secure
free access market people and coffee to Cape Hait:en. 13421, CapertoiL"
Col. Waller brought a report from the north that it Is possible the CacoB
would accept the Government's proposition relative to disarmament, if they conld
be assured that the money Involved would be handled and paid to them by the
Americans. I accordingly sent Col. Waller to see the Government, in company
with the American charge d'affaires, and come to a definite understanding relt-
tive to this matter. As a result of this conference the Grovemment agreed to
guarantee payment of .50,000 gourdes to every 1,000 Chcos soldiers who would pro-
ceed to Cape Hnitien or Gonalves and surrender 1,000 serviceable rifles and am-
munition to the American officers at those places within a period of ei^it days,
beginning the day this notification reached the Cacos chiefs. The Government
agreed to deposit to my credit the sum of 100,000 gourdes, and more if necessary,
for th's purpose.
I informed the commanding officers of the Connecticut and Ca-stine that this
money would be deposited to the credit of the collectors of customs at Cape
Haitien and Gonalves ; that the disbursement would be controlled by them and
made personally by American officers appointed by them ; that no payment would
be made unless the Caco chiefs agree in writing that hereafter they and their
men will not oppose the present Government or interfere in any manner what-
soever with commercial, agriculturnl, or any other industries, and agree to re-
turn to their homes and take up peaceful occupations, I directed the command-
ing officers of the Connecticut and Castine to inform the Caco chiefs that the
proclamation of generni amnesty made by the President would be insisted upon
by the United States forces. I then definitely withdrew all pecuniary propod-
tlons made by nie relative to the surrender of arms and disbanding.
Preparations were miide September 20 to open the railroad from Gonaives to
Poteau. When the Cacos learned of these preparations they endeavored to de-
stroy the railroad track, and a detachment of marines sent out to induce the
Cacos to desist were fired upon. The fire was returned, the Cacos retreating Into
the bushes, though sniping from the bushes continued at Intervals. The Caco
chief was warned on the morning of September 21 not to interfere ^ith the
food and water supply. I immediately afterw^ards gave orders that the railroad
be kept open to Ennery and Jhat such steps as necessary be taken to secure food
and water supply for the town and a free entry for coffee, and that no further
tampering with these necessities be permitted.
I was informed about this time that the steamer Fauna, due to arrive Port
au Prince on September 24, had on board unsigned bank notes for the Haitian
Government to the amount of 500,000 gourdes. In view of our recognition of the
Dartiguenave Government I, on September 21, requested Instructions as to the
disposal to be made of these bank notes upon their arrival.
On the 21st Maj. Butler, with a detachment pent out to keep open the railroad,
held a parley with Gen. Rameau, who agreed to withdraw his force from the
neighborhood of Gonaives and promised not to interfere with the food and
water supply or injure the railroad or telegraph lines.
In connection with the expected arrival of the Fauna with unsigned hank
notes for the Haitian Government and in reply to my request for instructions
in the premises, I received the following from the Secretary of the Navy:
" 15221. State Department has sent full Instructions to charge directing him
consult with you. Hold gourdes for present and be guided by State Depart-
ment wish as expressed in instructions to charg6. Acknow^ledge. 17022.
Daniels."
On September 23 I learned that the Cacos at Cape Haitien were disagreeing
among themselves and holding out for a much greater sum of money than they
had been promised by the Haitian Government through Charles Leconte.
On the same date I learne<l that Rameau was informed that he and his chiefs
would be held personally responsible for any further interference with the
water and food supplies or the interruption of railroad and telegraphic com-
munication or the collection of taxes on coffee or other products. Rameau
promlsetl to prevent further interference and to keep his men beyond Poteau.
The Haitian Senate met on this day in closed session and appointed the fol-
lowing committee to study the treaty: MM. Fouchard Martineau, EMward
Pouget, Morpeau, Edmond Roumain, St. Lafontant, Beauharnals, J. Francois,
and Dr. Jaenty.
On September 24, 1915, I informed the commanding officer of the Connecticut
that I desired trains to be sent frequently on the Grande Riviere, allowing de-
tachments to remain at Grande Riviere over night occasionally, and that de-
oogle
INQUIRY INTO (KXTPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 379
uichiuenta should visit Llmonade, Quartier, Morin, Huut de Cap, Plain du Nord,
and otlier arceHsihle towns. These sc*outiug operations were m no way in the
iMture <»f oflfensive operations, bnt were necessary to insure tlie free entry of
fiKKl aud otljer supplies into the town of (Jape Haitien, an«l, in addition, to give
our forces a l)etter liuowledge of the surrounding country. On this day the
steamship Fauna arrived at Port au Prince in the afternoon, having on )>oard 10
cases of hanlv notes consigned to the Haitian Government. In accordance with
instructions from the Navy Department, I directed tliat these hank notes be
held iu the customhouse pending disposition in accordance with instructions
from the State I>epartment to the American charge d^afTalres.
In view of the disquieting rumors received from Port-de-Paix, I directed the
cumniunder of the military forces at that place, on September 25, to report how
far ucouting oiierations had lieen conducted, and directed him to warn the Caco
chiefs tliat interference with the food and natives must cease, authorizing him
totnke neces.sary action, but warned him to not lire unless tire<l upon.
Ou Septemlier :i6 the Caco chief, Morenci, and Petlon gave Charles Zamor and
Kirbert St. N<iel power of attorney to go to Port au Prince to see President
Dartlguenave to negotiate c<mditions of disarmament, giving them full power to
arrange conditions ami pledge<l themselves to abide thereby. The commanding
oflk-er of the Connecticut informe<l Morenci and Petlon that he would send out
liatrols, hut with no offensive or hostile intent. On the next morning the coni-
mundhig officer of the Cfmnecticut and the American consul each received wani-
ings and deftant letters not to attemitt to patrol the Plain du Nonl. The com-
manding otti<'er of the Conneiticut replied that he would cHintinue to jmtrol but
without hostile intent.
At 6 a. m. the 26th of Sei)tember two }>atrols, about 40 men each, were sent
ont from (^aiie Ilaitien, the first to go to the town of Plain du Nord via Haut
Uu Cap; the second to Haut du Cap via Petit Anse. The |)atrols had orders to
push through to take no oflfensive action, but to defend themselves if attacke<l.
The second patrol was ambushed and attacked between Petit Anse and Carr<'-
fwr «le Trous. They forded the Haut du ('ap River aud returne<l to Cai)e
Haitien almut 12.30 p. m. with 4 wounded, all horses having been killed. The
rommandiug officer of the Connecticut stated that tlie work of this patrol was
excellent. The first patrol met • opposition at the Cac<i outi)ost, but went on
toward Haut du Cap. About 8.30 a. m. tiring became general near Haut du
Cap, supt)orts consisting of Col. Cole and marines were sent to reinforce the
patrols, and the remainder of the Connecticut's landing force was put ashore.
I informed the commanding officer of the Connecticut that the oi)erations at
Cape Haitien were approved and that the Eagle would sail that night from
Port ao Prince with Col. Waller and staflf for Cape Haitien.
The patrolling in the vicinity of Cain? Haitien was not considered In the light
of offensive operations, but was necessary to insure the free entry of food sup-
plies to the town of Cave Haitien. In view of the attacks made upon our forces.
I considered that no let up in patrolling could be i)ermitted until the Cacos
voluntarily agreed to disarm or until they were driven fn)m the Plain du Nord.
At 9 p. ni. September 25 information was received that the Cacos near Des-
salines were stealing and pillaging residents. Capt. Underwood, in temporary
command of the Twenty-fourth Company, at St. Marc, was directe<l to proceed
to Petit Rlvl»re de TArtlbonite with 50 men, all mountetl, on the morning of
September 2(5, to protect residents against Cacos and bamlits. At 3 p. m. Sep-
tember 26 Capt. Underwo<Ml re|)orted having arrived at Petit Riviere and en-
KHJ5W1 the Cacos, estimated at 150. Sergt. John Piatt, of the Twenty-fourth
("ompany of marines, was killed ; no wounded. The number of Caco casualties
is reiwrted as being three killed and nine wounded. This force ociaipie<l a goo<l
lK)8ition in Petit Riviere for the night, the Cacos retreating to the hills toward
Dessalines.
Together with Col. Waller and our respective staflTs, on September 25 I at-
tended the Te Deum mass, celel) rated in honor of the election of President
Dartiguenave, and afterwards attended a reception at the iJalace. This was
also attended by the American charge (raflfaires, the Cuban charge d'affaires,
and the I>omlnican consul general.
In connection with the disposition of the unsigned bank notes, amounting to
500.000 gourdes, previously mentloneil, I sent the following to the Secretary of
the Navy on September 26 :
"The Haitian Government l>eing desirous that the 500,000 gourdes now in
nwtomhouse ex steamer Fauna W issue<l, the following plan has been devlseil
by Paymaster Conrad : National Bank of Haiti to sign notes, thus issuing the
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380 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
first installment of its own circulation in accordance with its contract The
required reserve to be set aside from funds in hand. The notes so signed to be
turned over to the Haitian Government immediately after ratification of the
convention. Rate of exchange of bank circulation being 5 to 1. The delivery
of these notes will constitute the loan of $100,000 by bank mentioned in State
Department dispatches to charge d'affaires. Bank approved this plan and is
cabling New York to-morrow for necessary authorization. Bank in conference
with Conrad regarding further steps for retirement of Government paper and
.lickel currency, to be undertaken promptly if above plan is carried into effect
It is believed that the issue of notes under the conditions stated will satisfy the
Haitian Government, since it is to the loss of prestige resulting from their sup-
pression that they really object. Will also indicate desire of bank to assist In
settling difficulty and to carry out contract. This matter has not been dis-
cussed with Haitian Government, and if plan is approved it is requested that
charge d'affaires be authorized by State Deimrtment to negotiate in conjunction
with Conrad, as my representative, on that basis. This message was prepared
without knowledge of charge d'affaires* disT)atch to State Department 235^
•* Capebtos."
The Eagle arrlve<l at Cape Hnitien at 9 p. m. the 27th of September with
Col. Waller and his staff.
On September 29 I received the following report from Col. Waller and Capt
Durell, commanding officer of the Connecticut, concerning the agreement entered
into, and signed between them and the Caco chiefs at Quartier Morin: "In
accordance with agreement by Haitian president and cabinet, made in personal
interview with me, agreement approved by you, I have to-day in conference
with the Cacos chief, concluded following agreement : Cacos of Haiti will disarm
immediately. All arms to be deposited at Quartier Morin as soon as possible.
Cacos chiefs submit to the Government of Haiti, as represented by Dartigeunave,
the president. Cacos delegates will visit Port au Prince, consult with president
No money transaction involved now. We stand ready to affirm former agree-
ment made by I^icconte of 50,000 gourdes. Nothing asked. Cacos withdraw
to-day all outposts and guards as evidence of good faith and country is free to
traffic. Agree that after this all armed bodies of Cacos shall be treated as
bandits. This agreement effective after to-morrow. We agree to sustain the
general amnesty proclamation. No arrests for political offenses committed
since institution of Dartiguenave government. All armed (^position after
date of this agreement to be treated as act of bandit. Cacos chiefs ask that
the appropriation heretofore made for the army be diverted to public works.
Agreed we urge that upon Government. Cacos ask representation in constabu-
larly police and civil government. We will see to the first two propositions and
urge upon Government the wisdom of the latter, especially in locality. I have
asked that the many wounded Cacos be sent in for treatment in hospital here,
we to pay for treatment This is voluntary and outside of any agreement In
conference. Day after to-morrow I shall visit r- and chief at Quartier
Morin. diaries Zamor has been Invaluable in all dealings with chiefs and has
lived up to his promise to us. Request that money to be sent at once for pay-
ment quanamlnthe troops. 17029. Waller Durell."
On the 29th I addressed a comnnmlcatlon to the American consul at Santiago
requesting any further information he might have regarding Dr. Rosalvo Bobo,
and in reply was informed on September 30 that Bobo was still at that place
and under close surveillance.
In view of the fact that the Haitian Government did not wish to enter into
any johit agreement with the bank regarding the Issue of the 500,000 gourdes,
the plan proi)osed in my radiogram 23525 can n(»t be accepte<l. I therefore on
September 29 addressed the following message to the Secretary of the Navy:
"As the Haitian Government does not wish to enter into any joint agreement
with bank regarding Issue of 500,000 gourdes, no such plan can be accepted.
At the same time the Government claims to be seriously embarrassed, having
counted definitely (m using the bills now withheld by me. Need for Immediate
funds seems to be real. If the State Department does not intend to release
hills without condition, nor provide loan prior to ratification of treaty, am I
authorized to furnish Haitian (government such funds as can be spared from
customs receipts? 22229. Caperton."
On October 1, I received a radiogram from the Secretary of the Navy regard-
ing the organization of the Haitian constabulary, which reads as follows: "It
is intended to proceed with organizing of Haitian constabulary. As soon as
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 381
practicable report to department by radio number of men considered necessary
to form both urban police and rural constabulay ; also number, makes, and con-
dition of arms in Haiti available for use of constabulary. Submit any sugges-
tions that you can regarding mounts, houses, feed, and clothing, this forc«,
and any additional suggestions as to comparative cost of this force and that
formerly spent by Haitian Government on army and police force. It is proposed
that this force officered from Marine Corps, including sergeants. 10001.
Daniels."
To show the unreliability and duplicity of tlie Haitian Caco the following
incident is reported. Gen. Christian Fish called upon me aboard the flagship
on October 2 and showed a letter dated September 27, which was signed by
Morencl and Petion, giving Fish full power to settle any question in regard
to the Caco situation. I informed him that Col. Waller was conducting negotia-
tions in regard to the Caco situation, but inquired upon what conditions the
Cacos would agree to disband and remain peaceful. He stated that the only
condition acceptable to the Cacos would be the removal of President Darti-
goenave, and that without the removal of Dartlguenave from the presidency,
there could be no peace in Haiti. I informed Gen. Fish that Dartlguenave had
been elected after a free election; that revolution against the Daxtiguenave
government would not be tolerated ; and that in case of further disturbance, the
Cacos chiefs would be held personally responsible ; that it was not the desire or
hitentiou of the United States to shed the blood of the common people of
Haiti, but that no revolutionary movements could be tolerated. Gen. Fish in-
formed me that negotiations in the north w*ere being carried on only to gain
time until the result of his negotiations in Port au Prince could be reported
there. I did not tell Gen. Fish of the agreement between Col. Waller and the
Cacos chiefs, signed on October 1. I informed Col. Waller of this Interview.
In reply to my message to Col. Waller concerning Gen. Fish I received the
following: "Your (17002) request provost marshal arrest Christian Fish im-
mediately. He has no power with anyone. Hold Fish incommunicado. Waller.
0M03. Olmsted."
This request was complied with.
The fact that Christian Fish presented to me credentials from the cacos
leaders, Morenci.and Petion, which, from the information received from Col.
Waller, were not bona fide ; the threats made by him of continued disturbances
against the Dartlguenave government and bis reported affilations with men hos-
tile to that government and the American occupation convinced me that Fish
was a dangerous character to have at large at this time. I therefore directed
that he be confined incommunicado until the reutm of Col. Waller. In order-
ing this confinement I directed that Fish be allowed all the comforts the cir-
comstances would permit
President Dartlguenave on October 3 requested an interview with the
American charge d'affaires and my representative, Lieut. E. G. Oberlin. He
hiformed them that his government was practically without funds, and that
with no funds to meet the current expenses the government could not continue
and he would be forced to resign. In view of this I sent the following radiogram
approving the recommendations contained in the dispatch of the American
charge d'affaires of this date, which I also quote : " Charge consulted with me
before sending his telegram of to-day, and in view of all the facts as they
appear here I approve request and consider Haitian Government should have
immediate financial assistance. Will report more fully to-morrow and submit
estimates of receipts and expenditures. 21303. Caperton."
" October 3, 5 p. m. This morning at 10, and before receipt of yours October
2, 5 p. m., I had an interview with the President personally at his request. He
stated that he had asked for this interview in order to ascertain what steps
he could take under existing conditions ; that the Haitian Government following
its plan to pay back salaries and thereby strengthen its position before the
people and relieve suffering now finds Itself entirely without funds, and in-
quired as to the disposition of the United States Government to assist them in
this financial crisis. I told him that I expected instructions as to the matter
and would advise him on receipt thereof.
"After receiving yours October 2, 5 p. m., I told the President that, as before
stated, funds ^ould be immediately available upon ratification of the treaty.
The President seemed utterly discouraged and pointed out once more that the
delay was not due to any lack of effort by himself or his cabinet ; that with-
holding of funds only gave another weapon to the opposition, and that if the
United States Government persists in withholding all funds ratification becomes
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382 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOlflNGO.
so difficult that he and his cabinet will resign rather than attempt the fl^ht in
the senate under this handicap.
** I fear that I have failed in my previous reports to make perfectly under-
alood the existing situation, which is as follows : The vote on ratification by the
deputies wJl talce place probably to-morrow, the committe having unanimously
recommended ratification. Under the mode of procedure, after ratification by
congressmen, the treaty goes before the senate, and there it is referred to t
senate committee, who, after considering, subm.t a report, which is then printed
and distributed, and three days allowed for consideration before discussion on
the floor of the senate begins. Therefore ratification can not be expected before
the latter part of next week.
*,* The Pres dent and cabinet are using every iiossible effort to secure ratifi-
cation and seem confident of securing the same if not embarrassed financially.
The Halt en Government realizes that such ratification is absolutely necessarj-
for the welfare of Haiti. Opiwsit on in the senate is strong, due to the fact
that many senators are unscrupulous politicians or fanatics and wish either
to embarrass the Un ted States by non ratification or to overthrow the present
admin stration, hoping to secure possible personal gain thereby. Pressure l»
also being brought to bear by outside Interests which desire a continuance
of past cond tions for reasons of financial gain and which yr\A be glad to see
the present adm nlstration which is already reorganized and supported by the
United States forced to resign.
" It is most important that the present administration rema n in power as It
is not l>e1ieved that one more favorable to the United States could be obtained,
and in view of all facts as they appear here that a military government would
probably have to be established should this Government fall.
** Inasmuch as .t s necessary to secure a treaty ratified before any definite
financ al plan can be formulated or pt^nnanent peace and prosperity assured In
Haiti it would seem advisable to support and maintain the present adm nistni-
tion, which will fall unless the slight financial assistance which they have
requested Is Inmieiliately available, and further, the progress made during tiie
last two months will be lost. Although funds collect etl from customs Imve
been expended for the first three purposes named in the department's nstruc
tions as to the use of money collected, not; one cent has been turned over to the
Haitlen Government for living expenses, which expenses have been met by use
of gourdes then on hand and now exi>ended. In view of the importance and
the extreme urgency of the case It is recommended that Adm ral Caperton be
in.structe<l to turn over nee<led sums out of customs receipts not necessarj' for
the customs serv ce, constabulary, and public works. Request earliest possible
decision and reply. Pavls "
In a rei>ort made to the Secretary of the Navy on October 4, after out
lining total customs ret-e pts in Haiti to September 30, ami quoting expendi-
tures for various pubic works, etc., I reiterated my concurrence In the recom-
mendation of the American charge d'affaires, that I be allowed to turn over
to the Dartlguenave government such fimds from the customs receipts on hand
and unobligated as I might cons der necessary for its support, in view of
the financial cr'sis of the Dartlguenave government, the loss of prestige of
United States should that government fall, and the inevitable detrimental
effect up<m the treaty the failure of that government would have had.
On October 4 the American consul at Sant ago de Cuba reportetl that Dr.
Uosalvo Bobo hud left that place for Guantunamo.
On October 5 Cai)e Haitlen and vicinity was rern^rted as qu'et, but th**
report stated that certain minor Cacos chiefs were still collecting taxes on
food products entering Cai)e Ha'tien and that unarmed outposts were man-
tuine(l outside that town by M«>renci. The detachment commander at Cape
Haitlen and warne<l Moreiici that these outposts must be removeil, and that if
not removed a patrol would be sent out to arrest the men In charge of. the
outposts.
I reported to the dei)artment that the chamber of deputies met on October*?
to consider the adoption of the treaty and voted to ratify it without change,
the vote being 15 in favor and 6 against ratification.
On October 7 I informed Col. Waller that the matter of bringing the com-
mission of Cacos chiefs to Port au Prince at that time was left to his d'acre-
tion. I further Informed him that Gen. Christian Fish was st*ll under arre^
and incommunicado. On this day the commandant of the naval station at
Guantanamo reported that Dr. Rosalvo Bobo arrived at Guantanamo on
October 4 and left the same day for Santiago de Cuba; the commandant in-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 383
formed the American consul at Santiago de Cuba of this fact. The mayor
at Guantanamo had received instructions from the secretary of the Interior to
keep in touch with Bobo and to detail policemen to watch him while there.
On October 8 Zamor, Marpoint, Noel, Btiene, Mehu, and Bellelrie, left Cape
Haitlen at 2 p. m. for P<yt au Prince via Plaisance on horseback. Th.s com-
mission represented the Cacos in the negotiat.ons with the Haitlen Government.
Belleir.e was said to be a member of the chamber of deputies.
Col. Waller on October 8, with his staff, returned to Port au Prince from
Cape Haiten.
On this date the American consul at Santiago de Cuba reported that Dr.
Rosalvo Bobo left that place for Jamaica on the preceding night.
Upon the arrival of Col. Waller he reportetl north Haiti quiet; that move-
ments for relieving Government troops at Ouanamluthe were well under way ;
and that he had provided for feeding and transporting them to homes.
In view of the recent disturbances in the north ; of the fact that for a num-
her of years the center of unrest had been In the vic.nity from Cape Haitlen
to the Dominican border; and of the reports that arms were being received
from Santo Domingo; and that coffee and other products were being smuggled
across the border from Haiti to Santo Domingo, I decided to occupy Fort
Liberte and Ounanamlnthe. The Eleventh Company of Marines, wh.ch were
divided between Fort Liberte and Ouanaminthe, was (»rdere<l to Ounanaminthe,
and on October 8 I sent the Fifteenth^ Company of Marines from Port au
Prince to Fort Liberte on board the Nashville, The Nashville sailed for Cape
Ha.tien and Fort Liberte at 3 p. ra. that date.
In reference to my message to the department of October 3, in which I
recommended approval of the request of the American charge d'affaires of
the State Department of the same date that immediate financial assistance
be extended to the Haitlen Government, to which message the Secretary of the
Navy on October 5 made the following reply : " 23103. Cable has been sent
this date to t?harg6 with full instructions. You are authorized to furnish
Haitien Government weekly amount necessary to meet current expenses. Use
funds collected Haitien customs. Question payment back salary Will be settled
by department immediately after ratification of treaty. Report what weekly
expenditure will be necessary under these instructions. What is full amount
baclc salaries now unpaid? Acknowledge. 22004. Daniels.**
On October 9, in reply to these instructions given me by the Secretary of
the Navy, I sent the following radiogram to the department : ** Estimates sub-
mitted by Haitien Government for expenditures classed as absolutely neces-
sary approximate $150,000 per month. This does not include salaries of Presi-
dent and cabinet and other expenditures of like character. These figures have
been gone over in detail but are difficult to check accurately. It is recom-
mended that a weekly allowance of $25,000 be made. Tliis is all that customs
receipts can assure for the present, in view of expenditures contemplated for
constabulary, public works, etc. 18309. Caperton."
With reference to the 100,000 gourdes deposited to my cre<lit by the Haitian
Go?emment and forwarded by me to the collector of customs at Cape Haitien
and Gonaives for disbursement by American officers to the Cacos for turning
in arms, etc., according to the agreement made with them, this money having
been forwarded to the collectors of customs at Cape Haitien and Gonaives
on September 21, I on October 5 addressecl a letter to the National Bank of
Haiti, as follows:
October 5, 1915.
N'ation.\l Bank of Haiti,
J*ort au Prince^ Haiti.
Oenti^men : You are requested to retransfer to the Haitian Government
the sum of one hundred thousand (100,000) gourdes, recently deposited by
them to my account under the heading "Arms and ammunition."
Very truly, yours,
W. B. Capekton,
Rear Admiral, United States Navp.
None of this money had been expended for the purpose intended, as the
project had failed.
With reference to the loyal Government troops who had been left at Ouana-
minthe, as there had been no means available for them to return to their homes
I took the following steps to relieve them, their situation having been re-
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384 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
ported to me as most deplorable. On October 4 I ordered the Haitian gunboat
Nord Alexis to be coaled from the U. S. S. Hector and to proceed to Cape
Haitien with orders to report to the senior officer present at that place for
the purpose of transporting the loyal Government troops at Ouanaminthe
to Port au Prince. The Nord Alexis sailed at 9 a. m. October 4 and arrived
at Cape Haitien at 8 a. m. October 5 and reported a5 directed. On October 6
Ool. Wnller arrived at Fort Liberte with the loyal Haitian troops, numberjig
about 370, where they were to embark on tlie Nord Alexis, In reply to a
request for money for pay due these troops I had on October forwarded to
the collector of customs at Cape Haitien for payment to them five weeks'
pay, 10,000 gourdes, and for rationing them on the Nord Alexis 600 gourdes.
Before leaving Ouanaminthe for Fort Liberte it had been necessary to clothe
nearly all of them, as they were ragged and many of them naked. The }iori
Alexis with the loyal Haitian troops on board sailed from Fort Liberte on
October 9, touched at Cape Haitien, and arrived at Port au Prince on October 10,
where they were disembarked and ordered to proceed to tlieir homes in and
near Port au Prince.
During October 11 reports from the north showed that rifles and ammunition
were be ng turned in at various places in the north and that at other places
tlie Cacos were failing to live up to their agreement.
On October 11, in view of the official request of the Haitian Government
for information on the following subjects, (o) Are salaries of all customs
employees being paid by the United States forces, and if so, have these sal-
aries been increased over the salaries paid them by the Haitian Government
and to what extent; and (ft) the percentage cost of collecting customs duties
for the different ports, I directed the administrator of customs to furnish this
information in the following letter :
No. 11055-15.
October 11, 1915.
From : Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet, Comuiand-
ing United States Forces in Haiti and Haitian Waters.
To : Administrator of customs.
Subject : Customs administration.
1. The Haitian Government has officially requested information regarding
the following subjects :
(a) Are salaries of all customs employees being paid by the United States
forces, and if so, have these salaries been increased over the salaries paid by
the Haitian Government and to what extent.
(6) The percentage cost of collecting customs duties for the different port*.
2. You will please submit at the earliest practicable date a written report
embodying this information for Port au Prince. The reports for other ports
to be submitted as soon as you can obtain the necessary information.
3. In case the percentage cost can not be furnished at this time, submit a
report of the amounts expended for the collecting of customs at the various
ports since they have been under the charge of American officials, together
with the total amount collected at such ports.
W. B. Capebton.
On October 12 I received the following message from the Navy Department:
"Report immediately what in your opinion is cause of delay in ratifying
treaty. What steps should be taken to accomplish early ratification. Acknowl-
edge. 21011.
"Benson, Actii^'*
There is no doubt but that there was active opposition to the ratification
of this treaty, and, in addition to the delays caused by the legislative pro-
cedure, this opposition endeavored to prevent the treaty from being ratified
and employed various means to delay its being acted upon. I believed that
the Haitian Government was using its utmost endeavor to expedite the rati-
fication of the treaty, and considered that any open interference in its methods
would be productive of evil results. I informed the 'department of my opinion
on this subject at 3 a. m. October 12, as follows :
"10001* Cause of delay in ratifying treaty due to legislative procedure
and discussion in senate. Considerable opposition in senate due outside in-
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 385
fluences and selfish motives. Believe opposition can only employ dilatory
tactics to delay vote but can not block ratification, as opposition much weak-
ened by large majority vote of deputies. Haitian Government taking all steps
possible to hasten ratification and expects favorable senate vote first part of
next week. Believe for the present we should only support present Grovern-
ment awaiting senate action. Senate meets Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday.
08012.
"Capebton."
In compliance with the deimrtment's radiojrram No. 10001, regarding the
organization of the gendarmerie, on October 12. I submitted the following
recommendations in a message to the Secretary of the Navy :
"10001. Submit following recommendations regarding constabulary, gend-
armerie, for Haiti :
"1. (o) Gendarmerie to consist of 1,530 men, officered by 55 marine officers,
including sergeants. The gendarmerie will perform the duty of both urban
police and rural constabulary. (5) There are no arms in Haiti suitable for
this purpose, (c) Annual cost estimated, as follows: Pay including marine
officers and sergeants as officers, $351,200; clerical force, $9,780; uniforms,
$40,000; forage and remounts, $22,769; ammunition and target practice,
$12,000; administration expenses, $43,099; total, $478,848.
"2. The saving during tlie first year on pay rations, and other estimated
expenses of personnel will cover the necessary appropriations of barracks, and
also for the first equipment, as the recruiting up to the full strength will take
several months.
"3. This organization provides for two marine officers for each company and
Haitian officers to be assigned when they are properly instructed in their duties,
the number of marine officers to be gradually reduced as the Haitian officers
are substituted.
" 4. The cost of the gendarmerie, as proposed, will be about $40,000 less than
Hatian budget for 1914-15 for army and police.
"5. The pay recommended for the American officers and gendarmerie is as
follows: American officers to receive following additional monthly pay: Ck)m-
mandant $250; assistant commandant. $200; quartermaster and paymaster,
$200; assistant quartermaster and pymaster, $150; directors, $200; inspectors
$150; medical officers, $150; captain of company, $150; lieutenant of company,
$100. Haitian officers and men, monthly pay as follows: Captains, $90; lieu-
tenants. $60 ; first sergeants, $15 ; sergeants, $20 ; corporals, $15 ; privates, $10.
Enlisted men to receive ration of 10 cents per day. In addition to pay and
rations, each enlisted man will have certain clothing rllowances. 14412.
" Capkrton.**
On October 13 I received the department's authorization to establish a weekly
allowance of $1^,000 to the Haitian Government for the present, wliich reads
as follows :
"18300. You are authorized to establish weekly allowance of $25,000 for
tbe present as recommended. Acknowledge. 11013.
" Daniels.'*
On October 12 the delegation, composed of Charles Zamor and five others
irpresenting the Cacos, arrived at Port au Prince.
On October 14 I reported the situation to the Secretary of the Navy as
follows :
"MaJ. Butler with detachment 50 men returned to Fort Liberte, having
scouted to Coupe Michel to Le Trou to Port Llberte. Coupe Michel is high
hill near Le Trou and former Caco stronghold. Found no Cacos and Inet with
no opposition. Seized and destroyed 116 rifles at Terrier Rouge. Caco dele-
gation accompanied by Col. Waller was received by President Dartlguenave
and cabinet to-day. Meeting amicable but no definite negotiations entered into.
Committee appointed by Senate to report on treaty has expressed desire to
reopen treaty negotiations. Cabinet to-day declined to discuss treaty with
committee, and it is understood Government will endeavor to force committee
to report at early date even If report is unfavorable desiring to bring treatv
up before entire Senate where Government believes ratification will be voted.
22114.
** Capkbtox."
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386 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
On October 14 the administrator of customs submitted a reply to my lettc-r
No. 11055-15, of October 11, 1915, In which I directed him to report the differ-
ence between the salaries of customs employees under Unite<i States supervi-
slon and salaries formerly paid by the Haitian Government and the percent-
age of cost for collecting customs duties. I transmitted this Information to tlie
Haitian Government Informally. The administrator's letter follows:
OCTOBEB 13. 1915.
From: Administrator of Customs.
To: Commander Cruiser Squadron, United States Atlantic Fleet commandlu;:
ITnlted States Forces In Haiti and Haitian waters.
Subject: Customs Administration.
Reference: (a) Commander Cruiser Squadron's letter No. 11055-15, of October,
11, 1915.
1. The salaries of all employees in the Haitian customhouses conducted by
the United States are paid from custom revenues. While direct comparison
between salaries paid by the Haitian Government and salaries paid under
American administration Is difficult, the following relative to Port an Princo
will be of interest:
Number of eranloyees
Monthly pay (in gourdes)
(Gourdes calculated at 6.20.)
Avornge per employee (in gourdes).
Haitian.
86
10,425
121.22
United
States.
5o
7,m
141.81
2. It Is not believed that figures baseil on one month, during which the sy><-
tem was In course of development, will he f<mnd of much value. So far as tliey
go, however, it would ai)pear that while the total pay under American adminis-
tration is less, tlie average per employee Is higher, fewer men being employed.
It was found that many employees under the Haitian Government receive<l
merely nominal pay, their Income being lnci*eased by fees advanced to them by
merchants dealing with the custondiouse. These fees have all been abolished
and rates of pay In some cases have l)een. raised to allow a fair wage to the em-
ployees concerneil.
3. The i)ercentage of cost for collecting duties at Port au Prince fi>r the
month of Sei)tember was 5.1 |ier cent. This cost, however, included Items prop-
erly chargeable to capital accouiTt, covering repairs and Improvements to
I)roperty.
4. Reports on other i>orts will l)e made as soon as practicable.
OHAiti£S Conrad.
In connection with conditions in the uorth, on October 15 I received the fol-
lowing rei>ort from Col. Cole :
" Sullivan returned this morning ; reports resumption cultivation along route :
quiet generally ; priests I^ Trou and Limonade state that people are generally
reiurning to their homes; roads beyond Limonade generally in l>etter condition
than this side, though in wet seas(m in present condition will probably Ih»
Impassable for motor truclvs; believed that if (Jovernment will adopt general
repair and construction roads immediate Improvements In general con<litlon will
follow. Campbell returned from Quartler-Morin new route: reports i^esump-
tion cultivation and attitude inhabitants very friendly; have receivtMl some
reports from (Jnmde Hlvlere that some pillaging and enforced recruiting going
CHI in vicinity St. Suzanne ; am sending Campbell with 62 men automatic epe-
ckU train to-morrow morning to operate In section around and beyond Grande
Itiviere. Butler reports all (piiet but no rifles turned In Fort Llberte. 1401.'».
" COTJ5."
On October 15 the rep<«*t of the board ordered to submit a report on the or
ganlzation of a constabulary for Haiti was submitted to me.
On October IG rumors in Port au Prince were rife to the effect that the
Government would force action in the Senate on the treaty during the coming
week, regardless of the report of the committee. No definite Information on
this subject was obtainable.
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. • 387
On October 18 I received the department's radiogram stating that Capt. E. L.
Beach. Unlte<l States Navy, had l)€en ordered to command the U. S. S. Wash-
in ffton and would arrive at Ouantanamo, Cuba, October 22, 1915.
On ()ctol)er 19 the Haitian Senate convenetl and reelected Steven Archer as
president of the senate. No action In regard to the treaty was taken. The re-
election of Mr. Archer by vote of 21 to 17 was regarded as showing that the
treaty would be ratified, as Mr. Arclier was isnown to be In favor of tJie treaty.
I Informed the SecTetarj' of the Navy on October 19 that Col. Cole w»is unable
to communicate with the Caco chiefs at Fort CaiK)ls on account of heavy rains.
He left a letter to be forwarde<l to the hK-al chiefs informing the Oacos at Fort
(^pois that if they remained under arms they would t>e treated as bandits.
The regular local government in charge at that place was favorable to America.
Further, at the request of the Haitian Government and upon the advice of the
American charge d'affaires, I authorize<l the payment from custom funds of
current months' salaries to senators and deputies, amount allotted being $35,000.
The Connecticut on October 20 sent a boat exiietlitlon to Petit Port Fran-
cais on the west c<mst of Cai)e Haitien and arreste<l M cennor, the leader of a
sang of bandits that had Just i)reviously robbed and pillageil at Fort Francais,
and turned them over to ('ol. Cole for trial.
On October 21 I received the following message from the Secretary of the
Navy :
" Information from State l>epartment that Governor Monti Crist 1, S. D., has
informed Dominican Goveniment that arme<l Haitian discontents crossed fron-
tier near Dajabon and had encounter with frontier guard. Several Domlni-
<*ans killed. Dominican Government has ordered authorities capture and intern
all Haitians who cross frontier and for authorities to cooiiernte with military
forces of United States. Acknowledge. 13020.
" Dantei^."
On October 20 I sent the following mes-sage to the Secretary of the Navy and
C. in C. :
"Patrolling vicinity (^ape Haitian Ouanamlnthe, Fort Llberte, cont'nued.
\a8hrille arrlve<l Cain* Haitien from cruise to Mole St. Nicholas, Port de Palx,
Fond la Grange, having investigated conditions these ports. Situation un-
<'hanged elsewhere. 22220.
"Caperton."
On October 22 I sent the following message to the Secretary of the Navy
and C. in C:
"Detachment commandetl by Capt. Canipbell flred on at 1 n. ni. Friday, at
Bahon; fire returne<l ; known casualties, (»ne Caco chief killed; none of our
men hit. 22022.
** Caperton."
Also forwanled tlie following nH»ssage to the Secretary of the Navy and
O. In C. :
"Today charge d'affaires receivefl assurances frcan president of Senate
and minister of foreign affairs that Senate committee report will be sub-
mlttetl Tuesday. In case report is not recelve<l Tuesday Dartiguenave states
that steps will be taken to force action by c<mnnlttee. Press and public
criticizing Senate for delay. Inasniucli as I have re<'cived continual assurance
tliat majority In Senate favors treaty, have refralne<l from taking any steps
which might appear as using force to secure ratification, be'ieving it to best
interests of both c(»untries that tretity be ratifie<l after full discussion following
Haitian rules of pro<'edure. 22122.
" Caperton."
Col. Cole reiKirtcil on October 24 that patrolling in tlie vicinity of Rahon and
Cirand Riviere was being continued. A patrol from Pahon was flreil on tiie
precetUng afternoon while ivturning from that place, but there was no casual-
ties to our forces. He further stated that it was jiroixK^^Hl to garris<m Le Trou
and then to systematically clear the district in the vicinity of St. Suzanne
ttnd Bahon of bandits tlien operating in that section. This was reiiorted to the
Secretary of the Navy and C. in C.
On October 25 marine-? from the Connccticnt were sent at 2 p. m. to Ralmn
to reinforce garrison; the first company (if the Coniwctirut liluejackets left
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388 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
for Grand Riviere at 4.90 p. m. ; second company Connecticut bluejackets had
been landed at Cape Haitien.
Orders were issued on October 25 by the governor of Monti Cristi, Santo
Domingo, that all Haitians be returned immediately to Haiti.
On October 25 I was assured that the Senate committee would that week
submit a report favorable to the treaty, but with interpretations of certain
articles. I was informed that the Senate would vote for the ratification of
the treaty without change, regardless of the committee's report. The public
opinion in Port au Prince seemed to be very much in favor of ratiflcat.on
at an early date. The press was favorable to ratification, and within the last
few days posters had been put up in various parts of the City, censoring the
Senate for delaying the ratification.
Capt. E. L. Beach, Un.ted States Navy, arrived at Port au Prince at noon,
October 25, on the Osceola with orders from the Navy Department to command
the Washiiiffton.
On-Octol>er 26 Col. Cole returned from Grande Riviere. That afternoon
patrol between that point and Bahon were fired on several times to-day, but
always from hillsides considerable distance. Yesterday much of the firing wa.*4
from western s.de of railroad; to-day almost entirely from hill to east; prac-
tically all firing has been beyond kilometer 80, except night attack on Grande
Riviere. Conditions of unrest reported from time to time, but pei-sonally have
seen nothing to indicate it except in locaLtles reported on heretofore. There
is much clearing of ground going on, and yesterday the former minister of
war for Bobo sent h.s distillery apparatus to h.s place, al)out kilometer 12, to
resume operations, it having been in store in Cape Ha.tlen for some months
for security. Patrol to Mllot yesterday and to Quartler-Morin to-day reported
conditions normal.
On October 26 I sent the following message to the Secretary of the Navy
and G. in C. : "To-day President Dnrtiguenave aga.n personally assured me
that treaty will be ratified and stated that he had fully expected ratificat ou
tli.s week, but that in view of more favorable attitude of senate committee he
had cons.dered it wise to wa.t a little longer before forcing action. States
that under any c.rcumstanoes will secure ratification next week. Caperton."
On October 27 Col. Waller left Port au Prince at 7 a. m. on board the
Osceola for Cape Haitian.
Ah 1 had heard nothing from my radiogram No. 22019 relative to the relief
of the financial conditions in Haiti I, on October 27, informed the department
by radio that unless otherwise directed I proposed to allow customs funds in
excess of current needs to be use<l by the National Bank of Haiti for the
purchase of New York drafts, thus facilitating shipments of coffee. This
would result in transferring part of my credit to New York, subject to 15 days'
order. This step was necessary in order that funds might be available for
moving the coffet* crop, and unless this or equivalent steps were taken the
customs funds, which were kept apart In the bank, would soon accumulate to
the extent that it would seriously disturb economical conditions in the countrj*.
"22019. Unless otherwise directed I propose to allow cu.stoms funds in
excess of current needs to be used by national bank for the purchase of New
York drafts, thus facilitating sliipments of coffee. This would result in trans-
ferring part of my credit to New York subject to 15 days' order. Unless this
or equivalent steps be taken funds will be hoarded in bank seriously disturbing
economic conditions. Request acknowledgment. 23027. Caperton."
On October 19, in order to temiwrarily relieve the situation in regard to
foreign exchange, I suggested to the <lepartnient that New York representatives
of the National Bank of Ha.ti be allowed to dei)osit $26,000 in the subtreasury
and the pay officer of the WaHhUtffton- he authorized to deposit the saiiue
amount in the bank here, this money to be used by the bank to cash New York
drafts, which were then discounted at 2^ per cent. I requested permission to
render assistance later !)y allowing the customs funds, which were then bein^
segregated and held entirely subject to my orders, to l)e used for th's purpose.
I therefore sent the following message: "After consultation with Haitian
syndicate of exchange and later with nationnl bank find that foreign exchange
situation likely to become serious. New York drafts now discounted 2^ iier
cent. The reason for this is that the demands for foreign drafts usuallv
experienced this season of year does not exist owing to the probable nonpay-
ment of interest on foreign debt. Coffee exporters for the most part are com-
pelled this year to sell drafts on New York to realize on the crop and will
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 389
suffer considerable loss owing to the discount mentioned. Situation can be
temporarily relieved if New York representatives of the bank be allowed to
deposit $26,000 in subtreasury and the pay officer of the Washington be author-
ized by radio to deposit same amoimt in bank here, thus furnishing funds to
cash New York drafts. Sufficient funds aboard Washington to do this and meet
other demands. Can assistance be rendered later from customs funds, which
funds are now segregated and held entirely subject to my order. 22019.
Caperton."
On October 28, on account of the disturbances in certain sections in the north,
it liad become necessary to take action to clear the country of the marauding
bands that were pillaging and disturbing conditions in that vicinity. If these
bands had been allowed to continue their actions unchecked, the good accom-
plished by the pacification of the Cacos would not be lasting.
On October 28, in answer to the -department's radiogram requesting Informa-
tion as to the total amount of United States currency on board vessels at Port
an Prince available for deposit in the National City Bank to help out the
exchange situation, I replied that $26,000 could be spared.
Due to the falling health of the charge d'affaires, Mr. R. B. Davis, on October
28 I found it necessary to send tlie following message to the Secretary of the
Na\7 : " I feel it to be my duty to report that Charge d* Affaires Davis has been
in failing health for six months and Is now physically unfit for duty, due to
persistent pus Infection resulting in successive abscesses and marked lowering
of resistance which do not respond to most active treatment lioss of weight
more than 30 pounds. Ten days ago a rapidly spreading blood poison started up
right arm, requiring 24 hours of heroic treatment before it was checked. Medical
offices believe it to be imperative that he proceed north at once to enable him
regain resistance to dis«^se. Recommend he be ordered home by first steamer,
leaving about October 31. and that Surg. May be directed to accompany him, not
awaiting report of relief. 14528. Caperton."
On October 29 the Haitian Senate did not meet, as there was no quorum
present
In reply to my message of the 28th relative to Mr. Davis going north on account
of his health I received the following message: "14528 approved. Provided
CharF^ d'Affnires Davis cores north d rect, may report by telegram to Bureau
Navigation on arrival. 18229. Daniels."
Id view of the Information contained in the State Department's cable of
October 28, 7 p. m., to the legation, that the Navy Department would direct me
to des'^ate an officer to take charge of the legation upon the departure of the
chanr^ d'affaires, I designated Lieut. E. G. Oberlin for this duty, as stated in
the following letter :
Port au Prince, Haiti, October 29, 1915.
From : Commander cru*ser squadron, United Statas Atlantic Fleet, commanding
United States forces in Haiti and Haitian waters.
To: Lieut. E. G. Oberlin, United States Navy, U. S. S. Washington.
Via : Commanding officer.
Subject: Onlers.
Reference: (a) Navy Department's radiogram 18028.
Inclosure: One.
1. In accordance with reference (a), on the departure of Mr. R. B. Davis,
Ainer'can charge d'affaires ad interim, you will consider yourself temporarily
detached from duty as senior engineer officer of the Washington and assigned
to temporary duty in charge of the archives of the American legation. Port au
Prince, Haiti, pending the arrival of the official designated by the State Depart-
ment to assume charge of the legat'on.
2. Yoii will retain your duties as aid and squadron engineer officer.
W. B. Caperton.
Uent. Oberlin had been one of my representatives ashore during the preced-
ing few mouths. He spoke French fluently, and during the illness of the
charge d'affaires had assisted at the legation. He was closely in touch with
the situation and conversant with any duties that might be required of him.
Owing to the disturbed conditions on October 29 throughout the north, I
found it necessary to take action, informing the Secretary of the Navy as fol-
lows: "Although country vicinity Cape Haitien and Fort Liberte is quiet and
inhabitants resuming normal occupatons, conditions vicinity Bahon and St.
Snsanne are disturbed. Bands of Cacos raiding and pillaging small towns and
terrorizing country. Under agreement these Cacos are to be treated<«s bandjlts.
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390 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
and I have directed Col, Waller to take active measures to suppress them.
This plan should be kept secret, as action to be effective must be complete sur-
prise or bandits will escape to mountains and continue depredations. 18029.
('ajierton."
On October 30, 1915, I was informed by Col. Waller that all reports showed
that there was a ^therin;; of Cacos in the neighborhood of Capois. and that
there was much dscontent in the north due to the appointment to office by the
Dartiguenave government of men formerly affiliated with the Vilbrun Sam
government, and that unless the gathering in the vicinity of Capois was not
broken un that discontent would spread and serious disturbances probably
result. Col. Waller also submitted a general plan of operations to be taken
aga'nst the forces in the vicinity of Fort Capois. which was approved of by me
in the following message to him: "For Col. Waller. 21429. Plan approved.
Conduct operations at discretion. 13130. Caiierton.'*
Ilef erring to the sanitary board consisting of Passed Asst. Surg. H. A. May
and Passecl Asst. Surg. P. R. Garrison, aprjolnted by me to make a sanitary
survey of the city of Port au Pr*nce» although their report was but a prelimi-
nary report and did not go into details as was contemplated for a later report,
it was complete in itself and contained information which would be of much
value in planning In the ^'mprovement of sanitary conditions. This report was
forwarded by me on October 30 to the Secretary of the Navy.
On October 31 Col. Waller reporte^l from Cape Haitien that all plans for the
campaign against the bandits ^*n the Fort ('apois dstrct had been i>erfectefl
and thattrooi)s would be in position to-morrow evening, weather |>ermittinp.
He further state<i that the general feeling in the n(»rth was uuich imi>roved.
In vew of the report that Dr. Rosalvo Bobo was to return to Ha'ti. on Oottv
her 31 I requested the commandant. Naval Staton, (luantanamo Bay. Cuba,
to forward the following message to the American consul at Kingston. Jaraaldi.
requesting him to Investigate this rumor : " Informed Haitien Oen. BoIk) will
return to Haiti from Kingstcm. Please rei)ort If it is true and keep me advise<l
of Bobo's movements. C^ai^erton 20031."
I received the following message from the Navy Department on Octolier 31
concerning the financial situation : " Flag, State Dev»artment, informed National
Bank of Haiti can not purchase ('oflfee draft on Paris now <liscounted at 12
per cent because you have made no reni'ttance of custom receipts from dut.v
pledged to servce of foreign loans of 1825. 18J)C, and 1910. Sfa*e Department
desires to furnish bank with funds to purchase draft on Paris to gi^'e enu-
tidence to bondholders of fore'gn debt and to faclitate coffee export, thereby
increasing customs receipts. In this counect'on you are informed active organ'z-
ing constabulary will be commenced immediately modus vivendi is entere*! into,
plan under consideration contemplates annually approi>r'ation about $500000.
I'rovision should be made for appropriation to meet initial exi)enditure for or-
ganization. In view of the above is '*t possible to pay to bank any part of duty
now collf»cted by you pledged to service of foreign loans above mentioned with-
out .substantially affwt-ng expenditure constabulary, public works, etc.. or cur-
tail weekly advances to Hait'an (lovernmentV lf>030. Benson, Act'ng.''
In reply to tlrs radiogram from the department on November 1 I .sent the
following message to the Secretary of the Navy and C. in C. : •* 16030. Plan
re<*ommended in my 23027 is desgned to correct high exchange rate and facili-
t4ite movement of colTee. It is i)ossihle. advisable to pay bank part of duty
collected but impossible to guarantee suflicient funds in exct'ss of all neiMls U*
meet servce of foreign loans, if excess funds a»e transferred to New York by
j)urcha.«<e of drafts as I suggested they will be later available for such servicv.
Th's plan suits bank. Very few transa<'tioi)s in Paris exchange probable,
everything financed thnmgh New York. Consider this matter urgent. 20101.
Caper ton."
On November 1 I rei)orte<l the situat'(m to the Secretary of the Navy and
C in C. as follcn\^ : '* In pursuance plan of acti<m aga'nst bandits in C«pois
district forces being dis]M).«5ed mi north, all Conneciimt and one-half Nashviile
landing force ashore. No news Bahon and GraTide Uviere ttMlay. American
charge d'affaires and Surg. May sailed for New York via steamer Venezuela.
21001. Caperton."
On November 2 I received reports of skirmishes Ijetween our forces and Caco
bandits near I.e Trou and a report from Col. Waller stating that he liad
delayed operations against the band'ts in the Fort Cairn's district for one day.
In connection with the financial situation, on November 2 I received the
following message from the Navy Department: ** Flag. 20101^. Statie Depart-
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OP HAITI AITD SANTO DOMINGO. 391
njent is eudeavoring establish satisfactory arrangement to meet Haitian finan-
cial situation with New Yorlv representative national band. Will inform you
arrangement decided uinm earliest i>os8ible date. Acknowledge. 120002.
Danieh?.**
I sent the following messages to the Secretary of the Navy on November 2,
relative to the situation : ** Patrol yesterday encountered bandits pillaging
village near Grande Riviere. Bandits driven off with serious losses. No
injuries our forces. U. S. S. Patuxent sailed 8 a. m. Tuesday with Sixteenth
Company Marines for Cape Haitien. 11402. Caperton." ** Caco bandits at-
taclied Le Trou this morning. Six were killed by our forces. No other par-
ticulars. 22002. Cai>erton."
On November 3 the Patuxent arrived at (Jape Haitien and at 8.45 a. m. the
Sixteenth Company of Marines left <'ape Haitien in boats for Caracol, en route
to Le Trou. The concerted operations in the Capois district were again post-
poned for one day. ()n this date I received the department's radiogram, stat-
ing that Minister Bailly-Blnnchard had been ordered to resume duties as
minister in Haiti and that he would arrive at Guantanamo about November 9,
and directed me to send a vessel to transport him to Port au Prince.
Accompanied by Capt. E. L. Beach, on November 3 I called on the President
of Haiti. The reception by President Dartiguenave and Minister Bomo was
most cordial. I explained the department's desire to cultivate friendly rela-
tions between the Republic of Haiti and the United States by telling the
Haitian people of the benevolent intentions of the United States in Haiti and
of its intention to support the Dartiguenave government. I suggested that my
representative, Capt. E. L. Beach, United States Navy, and a representative of
the President should visit the interior and coast towns, in order to explain this
poliay to the Haitian people. This suggestion was enthusiastically received
and prompt and hearty cooperation promised.
During this InterAiew I made a statement to the President of Haiti, substan-
tially as follows :
"I have given <^apt. Edward L. Beach, who Is my senior cai)taln, orders to
do everything in his power to get the treaty ratified. Accordingly, he has re-
peatedly seen different members of the senate treaty committee, as well as
other prominent and infiuential Haitians, and has earnestly and forcefully
presented to these members my rea.sons why the senate committee should recon-
sider the report it has determined upon, and should recommend immediate ratifi-
cation by the senate of the treaty as It lias passed the House. Capt. Beach
will continue to work for this ratification.
"I will be glad to have you. President Dartiguenave, glv« me tlie names of
any Haitian senators whose attitude toward the treaty is doubtful for the pur-
pose of having Capt. Beach present my arguments to them. These arguments
are that I*re8ident Dartiguenave needs support and is entitled to the support
of all tT«e friends of Haiti ; tlie salvation of Haiti dejiends on the immediate
ratification of the treaty ; that the interests, prosperity, and honor of Haiti de-
p«nd on this ratlficatiou ; the present complete prostration of business, agricul-
ture, and commercial activities requires it ; the deplorable misery of so many
poor people ^iio are crying for food need it. The only objections are unim-
portant technical points and abstract i»r:nciples. These and other details can
be arranged later.
"The United States prefers no further modifications of the trc^ity. It desires
the immediate settlement of the Haitian question. Failure to ratify will delay
regeneration, and the tens of thousands who are crying for food will become
hungrier. It must be clearly understood that the outside world will not invest
money nor start business enterprises in Haiti until Haiti's relations with the
Vnited States are settled.
***Capt. Beach thoroughly understands these and other reasons of convincing
force which I would be glad to have impress on any senators now in oppasition,
or whose attitude the treaty is in doubt, particularly and nlvvays showing why
the absolute salvation of Haiti def)ends on Haitians supi)orting Dartiguenave.
All of the energies of Haiti are nee<led for Haiti's regeneration : there is now
no time or place for opposition to President Dartiguenave, nor for political
dissension.
" I desire that Capt. Beach should explain my views where they would help
I'residenl Dartiguenave to Qnvry out his measures, and would be glad if tiie
President w!ll Inform me unofficially in ways in which I can help to securt
ratification and also help create and maintain confidence In the present Haitian
e22e»~21— PT 2 ^19
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392 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Government; and therefore I would like the names of any senators that I
might i)088lbly influence.
•• I desire to inform President Dartiguenave that as soon as the treaty is rati-
fied I wish to institute systematic methods to inform the people of Haiti of the
benevolent, unselfish, and helpful purposes of my Government toward Haiti.
When conditions are «uch that I can be spared from Port an Prince I intend
to visit different ports of Haiti, either personally or by my representative, and
perhaps at times go into the interior. My purpose will be to meet Haitians of
all classes and to explain to them the friendly intentions of the United States.
With this friendship, if there is genuine cooperation on the part of Haitians.
Haiti will be a land free from violence, with President Dartiguenave guiding'
the destinies of his country. With the support of his people, justice and pros-
perity will mark the life in Haiti, the country's fertility and possibilities will
be developed, there will be plenty of work with good wages for the country's
peasantry, and employment for the abilities and intelligence of the upper
classes. It is easy to see that instead of misery and desolation, with misfor-
tune knocking at every door, Haiti will be a land of honor, peace, and content-
ment. Haitians will do this for themselves; the United States will stand by
as an elder brother to help and support. I shall give Capt. Beach special duties
in spreading this information amongst Haitians.
** I hope that President Dartiguenave will be interested in this matter an'i
that he will designate some olUcial to arrange plans and details with Capt.
Beach. I further hope that President Dartiguenave will cordially approve
of this plan and that he will see that in it there are possibilities fqr good to
Haiti, and that one of its chief features is to make everywhere apparent the
necessity of complete and cordial cooi)eration by all Haitians for the support
of President Dartiguenave and his measures.
" Capt. Beach understands thoroughly my policies and is imbued with the
spirit of what I wish to accomplish for Haiti and is in complete and cordijil
cooperation with me in working for the good benefit, honor, and prosperity of
Haiti, as well as for the good relatioiis between Haiti and the United States. '
The Haitian Senate mot on November 4, but the committee ordered to report
on the treaty did not submit its reports, giving as an excuse that the argu-
ments had not been prepared. It was expected that this report would be sub-
mitted the next day.
Fort Capois was captured on November 5 by a detachment under Capt. C.
Campbell, Unite<l States Marine Corps. There were no casujilties to the Ameri-
can forces. One more company was landed. from the Conncctk^ut on this date
and another company sent to Grande Riviere. The Connecticut reported hav-
ing ashore in various places 363 men and 15 ofllcers.
The senate committee on November 5 presented its report on the treaty in
substance, as follows :
Article 1 : This article was accepted as being conventional and a necessary
preamble to all treaties.
Article 2: This article is declared unconstitutional because only the Presi-
dent of the Republic can appoint. *
Articles 2, 3, 5 : Are contrary to the agreement now in force with the Bank
uf Haiti. The ap])ointment of a receiver general is a political subordination
of the President of Haiti to the President of the United States, who will be re-
sponsible for any malfeasance on the part of the receiver. In place of a
receiver a bank is i)ropo8ed.
Article 4 : To be cut out and an expert appointed to advise the minister of
finance.
Article 6: The substance of this article would better be included in such
conrract as it is proiwsed to make with a bank.
Article 10 : Better to have commission of American instructors, not to control
the gendarmerie.
Article 11 : Accepted.
Article 12: Changed in some unimportant particulars.
Article 13: Republic wishes the United States to loan funds for the carrying
on ot pul)lic works. American and Hait'an engineers to do th« work.
Article 14: Added the word "constitutional."
Articles 15, 16 : Accepted.
A new convention (treaty) was recommended.
The Haitian Government claimed to have a majority In the senate and re-
peated its determination to force ratification of treaty without modification
In spite of the adverse report of the conunittee.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 393
Col. Waller reported on November 6 that he would continue clearing the
section around Le Trou of bandits, and on the same date I received the follow- .
ing message from the Navy Department :
"Secretary of State received following telegram from minister, San Do*
mingo City, dated October 30: * Confidential minister of Haiti tells me he
nas received following report from Bomo: "With the Idea of overthrowing
the present Government in Haiti, which he accused of selling itself to the
Americans, and to bring himself into our power. Zamor is playing a double
game, pretending that he is in favor of the American policy iu Haiti and that
he is supporting It when In realjty he Is working for the power and to obtain
money at the same time. Zamor about 15 days ago sent agents from Port au
Prince, among them a deputy, to treat with Cacos for the above objects. The
Cacos are surrendering to the American forces at Cape Haltien and are un-
armed, bat their arms have been hidden in Dominican territory near the fron-
tier. It l)eing Impossible for him to overthrow the Government with the
American forces In the Island, he Is plotting to assassinate Dartlguenave. The
trouble makers in Haiti are acting in accordance with certain Dominicans of
either political Influence." The Dominican official referred to is Deslderio
Arias. (Signed) Russell.' Acknowledged. 11006. Roosevelt, acting."
On November 7, Col. Waller reported that operations wero pro^rre^siiiir well
aga nst the Caco bandits and that the bandts were scarce at present. He also
stated that in his opinion the north would be quiet, but that our troops would
be active for a few days more. He exi)ected to ntervlew several Caco generals
the next day.
On November 7 I directed the c<mimamler of the tifth naval district to occupy
the customhouse at Aquin in accordance with or-lers previously ssued. Ensign
P. J. Searles, United States Navy. U. S. S. Sannmento, was designated for
temporary duty as collector of customs an<l captain of the i)ort, Aquin.
Having been requested by the Haitian Government to furnish transportation
for Mr. Antoine Francois from Cape Hatlen to Port au Prince (Mr. Francois
was to be electe<l senator to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Senator
Paplllon), on November 8 I sent the following orders to the V. S. S. Connrrii-
out: "Expect senate will vote on treaty Thursday. Absolutely essential all
possible votes for ratification be secured. Haitian Government urgently re-
quests Antoine Francois. ('ai)e Halt en. who will be eU*cte<l to fill vacancy, be
sent Port au Prince. Dlre<*t Hector i)roceed November 9 to Port au Prince
with Antoine Francois as soon as he comes aboard. Acknowle<lge. 221 ."iOS.
(.'aperton."
In connection with the excellent work performe<l by the V. S. S. Eai/le. under
command of Lieut. Aubrey K. Shoup, United States Navy, In Halt an waters,
on November 8 I sent the following message to the Secretary of the Navy :
"Referring departure Eagle from Haitian waters, squadron commander wish(»s
take this occasion express to Navy Department his appnn'iation of efficient
Herv ces rendered by officers and crew that vessel while un<ler his command in
Haitian waters. He commends this personnel to department for its most
favorable consideration. 22008. Caperton."
With reference to the financial situation, I received the following ni€»ssage
from the department on November 9: "22019. Authority granted pay officer
Washinifton depos t $26,000 with Haitian Bank for use in cashing drafts. This
amount has been deposited to official crcHlit of Paymaster Morris subje<*t to
check; $12,500 currency shipped by Vvlran for deposit with bank. Acknowl-
edge. 16508. McGowan."
In connection with the treaty ratification I advised the department on No-
vember 9 that I strongly believe<l treaty wouhl be ratified Thurs lay, but that
IMjwerful nfluences In the senate were against ratification; that .sbould ratifica-
tion fail the constitution requires a year's delay before reconsideration of the
treaty, which would be by the same senate. There was a strong demand
throughout the country from all classes for immediate ratification and no
public sentiment anywhere against t Tens of thousands were starving and
the prostration of all industries demanded ratification. I also informe<l the
department that delay would probably cause further outbreaks because of pre-
vailing lack of work. The Dartlguenave government seemed earnest in work-
ing for the welfare of Hait'an people, and I had heard no protests against the
Government or treaty except from senators working against the treaty. In
view of these facts I requested instructions from the dennrfmefif
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394 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAin AND SANTO DOMINGO.
In reply to uiy message to the depnrtment in reference to ratification of the
treaty on November 10 I received the following reply from the SecretJiry of the
Navy :
" 23101). Arrange with President Dartlguenave that he call a cabinet
meeting before the session of senate which will pass npon ratification of treaty
and request that you be i>ermltted to appear before that meeting to make a
statement to President and to members of cabinet. On your own authority
state the following before these officers : * I have the honor to inform the
President of Haiti and the members of his cabinet that I am personally gratified
that public sentiment continues favorable to the treaty ; that there is a stron?
demand from all classes for immediate ratification and that treatj^ will be
ratified Thursday. I am sure that you gentlemen will understand my senti-
ment in this matter, and I am confident if the treaty fails of ratification that
my (lovernment has the intentiim to retain control in Haiti until the desire<l
end is accomplished, and that It will forthwith i»r(>ceed to the complete paci-
fication of Haiti so as to Insure Internal tranquillity necessary to such devel-
opment of the country and Its industry as will alford relief to the starving
popula<v now unemployed. Meanwhile the present Government will lie sup-
porteil in the effort to secure stable conditions and lasting peace in Haiti
whereas those offering opi>ositlon can only expect such treatment as their con-
duct merits. The United States Government Is particularly anxious for imnn^
dlate ratification by the present senate of this treaty, which was drawn «|>
with the full intention of employing as many Haitians as i>os8ible to aid iu
giving effect to Its provisions, so that suffering may be relleve<l at the earliest
possible date. Rumors of bribery to defeat the treaty are rife, but are not
believed. However, should they prove true, those who accept or give bribes
win be vigorously prosecuted.' It Is expecteil that you will l)e able to maiie
this sufficiently clear to remove all opposition and to secure Immediate ratifica-
tion. Acknowle<lge. 22010. Daniels."
On the morning of November 11, In accordance to the above instructions,
having asked for and obtained an audience, I appeared before the President
and his cabinet and made* the following statement:
" I have the honor to Inform the President of Haiti and the members of his
cabinet that I am personally gratified that public sentiment continues favor-
able to the treaty : that there Is a strong demand from all classes f(»r Immetliate
ratification and for the belief that treaty will be ratified to-day.
" I am sure that you gentlemen will understand my sentiment In this matter,
and I am confident If the treaty falls of ratification that my Government ha'*
the Intention to retain control In Haiti until the desired end is accompUshe<l.
ahd that it will forthwith proceed to tlie complete pacification of Haiti so u-?
to Insure internal tranquillity necessary to such development of the coantr>'
and its Industry as will afford relief to the starving populace now unem-
ployed. Meanwhile the present Government will be supported in the effort to
secure stable conditions and lasting peace in Haiti, whereas those offerin#{
opi)osltl(Mi can only exi)ect such treatment as their conduct merits.
"The United States Government is particularly anxious for immediate rati-
fication by the present senate of this treaty, which was drawn up with the full
Intuition of employing as many Haitians as possible to aid in giving effect to
its provisions, so that suffering may be relieved at the earliest possible <late.
" Rumors of bribery to defeat the treaty are rife, but are not believed. How-
ever, should they prove true, those who accept or give bribes will be vigorously
prosecuted."
Minister Ballly-Blanchard arrived at Port au Prince on November 10 at
10 a. m.
On November 10 the commander of the expeditionary force reported that
Forts S^on and Berthol had been captured on November 8 ; that the Cacos hfid
fired at the sight of our men ; and that all the people in the Caco country were
displaying white flags. He further reported that a band of 15 bandits were
trapped near Grande Riviere and that 2 were killed and 9 wounded. He also
reported Limonade quiet, and stated that he was satisfied that the movement
crushed was more than an aggregation of ordinary brigands. The commander
of the expeditionary force now expected to start operations to the west of the
railroad and toward Renqultte.
The senate met at 10 a. m., November 11, and remained in session until 5ii0
p. m., when It ratified the treaty by a vote of 26 for to 7 against. The debaties
were long, the opposition being led by Senator Pouget. Pouget, at the opening
of the session, stated that he approved of the treaty In principle, but that he
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 395
did not agree with the details. It was noticeable that there was a preat relief
and general rejoicing among the people upon the sucoessful outcome of the
treaty negotiations I promptly reported the ratification of the treaty on this
(late to the department.
Shortly after having reported the ratification of the treaty I received the
following message from the Secretary of the Navy, November 12 : ** 22111. De-
partment wishes to express its gratification at the ratification of the treaty and
to warmly commend the able manner in which you have handled this ini|)ortant
matter and the ability yon have shown in directing affairs in Haiti. Aclcnowl-
edga 11012. Daniels.*'
On November 12 I made the following report to the Secretary of the Navy :
** Commander expeditionary force returned Cape Haitien Nov^uber 11. having
completed operations against bandits to eastward of Cape Haitien — Bahon
Railroad. Operations to westward at railroad begin to-day anil expect to end
by night of November 14. First Lieut. Osterinann slightly wonn<led in nrni
while on patrol between Bahon and Grande Rivlt^re. Sernav. Flag W'lfommg.
00812. Caperton."
On November 13 I reported the following conditions to tlie Swretury of the
Navy:
•* ConditlouR more quiet and more people going to work on farms near Grande
Riviere, Bahon district. Secnav, Washington, ami Flag WifoniiHy. 22013.
Caperton.*'
On November 15 I sent the following dispfitch to tlie department : '* Mr.
Bailly-Blanchard received to-day formal audience by Pn»si(lt*iit and cabinet
and presented credentials as minister of the Unitwl States to Haiti."
On Noveml)er 15 I also sent to the Secretary of the Navy th»» following
proclamation of the President of Haiti, made in rpferen<v to tht* ratification
of the treaty : FF Nov. 15.
Liberty. Equality. Fraternity.
Republic of Haiti. Sudre Dartlguenave, President of the Uepublic.
ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE.
Felt4)w ('iTiZENs: At the meeting of November 11 the senate of tlie Repnhl c
has sancti<me<l the Haitien- American convention. This event, the most im-
portant in our national history. Is the foundation of Ho it en inde|)enden<»e, of the
solemn consecration of the new era of progress for the nation after the power-
ful dayse of 27th and 28th July, which days we can not think of without a
shudder of horror.
It you will consider the vote of the convention by its merits and patriotism
you will render with me legitimate homage to the honorable members of the
legislative corps who have shown once more their sense of duty in the face of a
situation exceptionally grave for this unhappy country. They have come
together in large numbers to open finally the road of material and through
evolution which has always been their object. ** Honor, therefore, to the
saviors of the country's glory of their act for which the magnanimity Is only
equaled by its heroism to have the right to the bene<llction of our posterity."
Fellow citizens, these pressing circumstances which have made known to
you the urgency of the convention with all the unhappy sacrifices which go
with it, of the ransom for the faults and errors of a century, it is not neces-
.sary that I remind you of this, nevertheless, for the safeguard of the future,
that you impress yourselves during these days were the chaos, the anarchy,
and the humiliation of the pt^ople resulting from our unscrupulous competi-
tions of bad and doubtful passions, which disputes with one another for a
power which was involved in the advance to bring about the sterility of the
country, of awaiting the hopeful moment of the final breaking up of the above
evil conditions.
Without entering Into a discussion of facts anterior to the condng of the
American.s. remember that in a moment of our supreme despair the ix)werful
and generous nation of North America saw our unhapplness, taking pity upon
us and came in the name of humanity and universal fraternity to offer us
the hand of friendship and of succor. Was It neces.sary to repulse, even under
a disguised form, as several people of the same tjpe as many of my predeces-
sors seem to think, this friendly aid.
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396 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Being persuaded of tlie loyalty of the Government of the United States and
convinced that its people who, l)y means of their work, have become great a^
to become our ideal, des re fully to ^uide us in the route whicli centuries of
civilization have made, we unliappy slaves of false mentality, brought by
jealous prejudices, have never tried to find this way for our own nationality.
I, therefore, have not a second of hesitation.
I wish here to thank cordially my official collaborators whosa experience,
wisdom, and imijerturl)able conviction, together with the ardent faith In their
devotion have been the strong aids to my firm resolution.
You have not been strangers to the struggle brought about by the severity
of opinion whereby people opposed to the convention struggled against the
Government to prevent Its acceptance. We have defended It foot by foot and
have guaranteed its various clauses In order to overcome the Imminent peril
which lack of reflection and blindness was liable to threaten our national
sovereignty. And who can affirm but that the formal refusal to accept the
c»)nvention would have been the destruction of our independence?
It Is, therefore, In regard to the acts of brutality which have been conthined
for 80 long a time, and also with the conscientious reflection that we hare in
your name signed the act of diplomacy which has but recently been sanctioned
by your own republic.
If you have seen the executive power marching resolutely to the solntlon
of these troublesome questions, It Is because that the power had the feeling
that your hearts bfat in unison with their own, although far away from them the
chimerical dreams dear to those i)eople who had no common sense or any
appreciation of events as they really were.
The people In the future will see that we have done the best thing and that
we have acted for love of country.
Fellow citizen.**, by your n*^w contract with true civilization there are the exi-
gencies of livlnjr absolutely free which ^^ ill appear before you and are destined to
make of you a prosperous, honest, and laborious nation. Therefore, it Is
not your satisfaction to anticipate the happy effect of the new state of thiniw
Implanted In our midst
To the populations of the department of the north and the northwest and
the Artlbonite, who have been the most intlu ted by our latest calamities', have
shown themselves above all courageous and confident, what a joy it will he
for them to return to a full existence made possible by the local appreciation
of the convention which has been so unjustly attacked.
All those who have been longing for such a long time for a definition of this
union are concerned so that this treaty alone can bring to them secarity,
prosperity, and happiness, and they recognize that already there is a better
futui*e assured them by means of work which incurs agriculture, industry,
and commerce. This is the end of your desires and has come after your long
dreams of peace after your sad deceptions, the sacrifices of life which we have
accepted in the hour of peril to our signification.
Therefore, fellow citizens, let us wish success to ourselves and glory for the
world of civilization. I repeat that the new era has begun, but the fruits of
our labors demand that you repudiate forever the past shame and nefiirious
past which has made a blot upon the Immortal names of our ancestors.
If the generations which have preceded you are judged by history for ac-
cumulated crimes you will be more than pardoned if you refuse to consecrate
to-day yourselves to the work of the nation's redemption.
Having thought well over this convention and with firm realization of the
future, join in crying:
Long live peace and union.
Long live work.
Long live regenerated Haiti.
Dartiguknavk.
On November 18 I sent the following report to the Secretary of the Navy,
describing the capture of Fort Riviere on November 17 : " Fort Riviere captureil
by forces under Maj. Butler. All avenues of escaiH* had been previously dosed
so that no Cacos escaped; 51 were killed, including Gen. Joseph, 3 division
chiefs, and all others captured. No casualties our forces. Attack made by
Thirteenth Company Marines, Capt. C. Campbell ; marine detachment, Cormecti-
cut, Capt. Barker ; Fifth Company Marines, Capt. W. W. Low ; seaman company
from Connecticut, Lieut. (Junior Ctriide) S. P. McCaughey, and autoinatic-?iui
detachment from Third Company. Assault made by Fifth Company. Hnnd-t*>-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 397
hand conflict in fort lasted 10 minutes. Forty-seven rifles, considerable ammuni-
tion, found. Port made of masonry and brick of most substantial construction.
Fort will Ije leveled to ground. The fact that this fort was taken without a
single casualty on our side speaks well for ability and judgment all officers con-
cerned. Marine patrols continue operations to southward. All other areas in
Caco country quiet. 12018. Caperton."
In answer to the department's radiogram 13050, a copy of which follows,
asking for comments and recommendations relative to the claims of the P. C. S.
Railroad, Power & Light Co. at Port au Prince, on the Haitian Government, I,
at 2.10 p. m., on this day, forwarded to the Navy Department information as to
our dealings with this company, and recommended that the loan to the Haitian
Government, of one and a half million dollars, which the State Department has
mentioned In its dispatches to the legation and of which the Haitian Govern-
ment has been informed, be lmme<liately made after the signing of the modus
Vivendi, in order that the Haitian Government may settle many pressing claims,
of which the railroad Is one. I further recommende<i that the $100,000, prom-
ised upon the ratification of the treaty in the State Department's cablegram of
September 15, 5 p. m., be cabled at once. In view of tlie promises made by the
State Department, which have not yet been carried out, the fact that the enemies
of the United States and of the treaty are taking advantage of this apparent
lack of support of the present Haitian Government to its detriment and intend to
carry such information to Washington to aid in the fight against the ratification
of the treaty in the United States Senate, I consider that American prestige Is
Involved in this mattter.
The following is the department's radiogram 13050 : " P. C. S. Railroad, Power
& Light Co. at Port au Prince prior to American intervention in Haiti had for-
mally notified Haitian Government that operations have to cease on October 1,
1915, on account of lack of funds if Government continued not to live up to Its
financial engagement toward them. Department now informed that as these
companies are still without funds they will be unable to continue further opera-
tions. President Staude states he has so far continued to operate under direc-
tion given by United States naval authorities. In view of above companies hav-
ing requested State Department to give them preference of speedy consideration
of their claim so that arrangements can be made to assure operation of railroad
and electric light company, comments and recommendations requeste<l. 13015.
Daniels."
T^ie following is my reply to the department's radiogram forwarded on Novem-
ber 18: "13015. Onnmenclng middle of August electric light company is being
imld by me $7.5(X> iwr month, contract price for light Port au Prince and Cape
Haitien. P. C. S. Railroad has been paid $5,000 and later $2,500 more in order
to maintain it in operation as a military necessity. Haitian Government owes
both companies several month arrears. President Staude states that if amount
now due railroad as balance of guaranty of Interest, about $17,000. is not paid
before Decem!)er 1 the road will be forced into i>ankrupt»y. Haitian Govern-
ment acknowledges this debt but is unable to i)ay. Owing to pecuUarity
of contract under which Government guarantees annual Interest at 6 per cent
on bonds of road to amount of $088 I liesitate to recommend further payments
by American authorities. Instead I reconmiend further that loan to Haitian
Government of $1,500,000 which State Department has mentioned in its dis-
patches to legation of which the Haitian (iovernment has btvn Informed be
made immediately available after signing modus vlvendl In order that the
Government may settle many pressing claims of which railroads Is one. The
$100,000 promised upon ratification In State Department Sei)teniher 15 5 p. m..
should be cabled at once. American prestige Involved in this matter. 14118.
Caperton."
In order to acquaint the department with conditions on November 10, I made
the following report to the Se<'retary of tbe Navy : ** OiK»rations against Cacos
bandits in north Haiti during last three weeks has resulted in dispersing Cacos.
capture many of their strongholds, destruction quantities arms and annnunl-
tion, and bringing [)eaceful conditions throughout Cacos country. This area
Ls Included within lines Cape Haitien, Dondon, San Rafheal, Pignon, Carice,
:Mont Organize, Onanaminthe, Mouth of Mas.«*acre River, and Cape Haitien.
This area is now ])atrolIeil throughout by our forces, is now peaceful, and
roimtry people are now busy with their crops. Our patrols are also at present
operating from Gonaives througli Ennery, St. Micliel, Marmalade, Plalsance, and
Potenu, from Port de Paix for distance of 8 miles to southward and from St.
Marc through Artlbonlte Valley. These areas are quiet. This J^st movement
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398 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
of Cacos appears to have been of revolutionary nature against present Oovem-
ment as well as brigandage. While petty brigauclage will continue from time
to time; yet it Is hoped no more such organized brigandage or revolutionary
activity win occur. Our casualties to date in this campaign one officer and
one man wounded. Secnav, Washington, and Flag, Wyoming. 14419. Caper-
ton."
On November 19 I received the following radiogram from the Secretary of
the Navy referring to tlie capture of Fort Uivlere : " 12018. Department ap-
preciates excellent work done and gallantry displayed. In view of heavy losses
to Haitians in recent engagement department desires our offensive be suspended
in order to prevent further loss of life. Acknowledge. 32018. Daniels."
In reply to this message on November 19, I sent the following dispatch to the
Secretary of the Navy: ** 22018. Department understands that patrolling in
north Haiti is now under way by American forces and that hostile contact with
the bandits may unavoidably ocx^ur from time to time, resulting in loss of life.
Operations being conducted are purely of defensive character for the preserva-
tion of law and order, suppression of revolutionary activity against present
Government and military Intimidation of people, and for protection of life and
property of the innocent farmers and tradesmen, who form by far majority of
population in these districts. The Cacos, against whom operations have been
undertaken, are bandits pure and simple, owing no allegiance to the Govern-
ment or any political faction, but organized under petty chiefs for sole purpose
of stirring up strife against Government and robbing, pillaging, and murdering
innoceilt people. The suppression of this brigandage and these activities is
absolutely essential to peace and security in Haiti. It will be remembered that
there is no Government authority in these areas at present, and that we have
disbanded the Haitian Army, heretofore the only means of protection to the
inhabitants. The operations now undertaken should continue until this brig-
andage is suppressed or the constabulary is ready to relieve our forces. Having
undertaken this intervention any diminution in the protection and support of-
fered the Government and people of Haiti by the United States will greatly
harm our prestige. Our action Is approved by Haitian Government. It is abso-
lutely necessary that our present movement continue to southward, to include
Hlnche at least, where arms and anmiunltion have been collected for delivery
to our forces in accordance with agreement of Quartier Morin, and if Hlnche is
not occupied it will therefore form base for further revolutions. It is possible
some slight opposition may be encountered at Hinche, although we are assured
there will be none. Unless otherwise directed will contiime this movemeni.
Secnav, Washington, and Flag, Wyoming. 30119. Caperton."
Referring to tlie financial condition, on November 19 I receiveil the following
from the Secretary of the Navy : "After setting aside sufficient of the revenue
coming into your hands for support of Dartiguenave government, for public
works, and for constabulary, you may, upon request of Haitian Government, ap-
ply remainder of revenue collected by you, for purpose of and In accordance with,
pledges thereof, which have been heretofore made or given by Haitian Govern-
ment. Acknowledge. 18018. Daniels."
In connection with this message from the department and also my message
14118 of November 18, I sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of the
Navy: "18018 and my 14118. Strongly recommend that distribution of reve-
nues in accordance with past pledges be not attempted, for following rea8on^ :
Current receipts much too small to satisfy arrears of creditors extending back
many months. Computation complicated owing to retention of sums for pur-
poses mentioned by you, and results obtained will be difficult to make clear.
Treaty provides different and better method of handling revenues, so that it is
unwise now to revert to old system. The immediate loan of sufficient funds t«>
discharge all obligations and subsequent organizations of debt as provided hy
treaty considered the only satisfactory method to follow. 18019. Caperton."
On November 20 information continued to be ret*eived from reliable sources
that active aid was being sent to the Cnvos from the Dominican Republic.
The latest reports statetl that Dominican police were aiding the Haitian
rebels; that the governor of Monti Cristi was entirely failing to take any
steps to prevent this; that there were nmny Haitians on the Dominican side
of the border; that there was considerable agitation going on to foment
revolution ; that the American chief of the Dominican frontier guard had made
numerous reports to the governor of Monti Cristi, who made promises but
did nothing in the matter; that notorious Haitian bandits were receivimr
protection, notably one Hara and Hose Rinito; and that officials in Dajabon
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 399
were doing all in tlieir power to prevent the American chief of the frontier
guard from cooperating with our troops on the Haitian side.
Ou NoYenrt)er 20 I received the following message from the Secretary of the
Navy relative to the recent military operations : ** 16119. Department strongly
impressed with number Haitians killed. D^artment feels that a severe
lesson has been taught Cacos and believed that a proper patrol can be main-
tained to preserve order and protect innocent persons without further offensive
operations. Should these measures prove inadequate, inform department before
takmg steps that would lead to loss of life on either side, except in case
of urgent necessity. Acknowledge. 14020. Daniels.*' I immediately trans-
mitted these instructions to Cols. Waller and Cole, who in turn issued the
necessary orders to all organizations to the effect that all operations must
cease except patrolling pending further instructions.
In r^ly to the following inquiry from the Secretary of the Navy : " 12018.
How many prisoners taken at Fort Riviera? 10019. Daniels." I replied as
follows on November 22. 1915: "10019. Later reports from north Haiti indi-
cate that when Port Riviere was rushed by Fifth Company Marines 29 Cacos
were killed in the n»ftl6e. Many jumped over the parapet and attempted to
escape. These were attacked by remaining companies and 22 were killed.
Not known how many escaped. My radiogram 12018 was in error relative
captures made at Fort Riviere; none were captured there; 42 prisoners were
captured that day, but elsewhere. 14322. Caperton."
At 2.10 p. m. November 22 I reported to the department the action taken
Pdative to department's instructions to suspend active operations against the
Cacos, as follows : " 14020. All operations except protective patrolling have
been suspended. Directions have been given that loss of life both sides be
avoided if possible. 14122. Caperton."
Id order to suppress smuggling along the coast, which had been brought to
my attention, on November 24 I issued special orders to naval vessels and
the expeditionary force to begin operations against smuggling at once, and to
take all smuggling cases to the nearest provost court for adjudication.
In view of the statement of President Staude that his railroad would be forced
into bankruptcy if the interest on the bonds, amounting to $48,000 was not paid,
on November 24 I sent the following recommendation to the Secretary of the
Navy : " 13015 and my 14118. In view <»f statement of President Staude that his
railroad wiU be forced into bankruptcy if interest on bonds, amounting to
$48,000, is not paid by December 1, it is recommended that stay of proceedings
be urged on National City Bank, chief bondholder, or money furnished to tide
over emergency. Haitian Government acknowledges indebtedness to various cor-
coratlons controlled by Staude considerably exceeding sum stated, but can not
pay at present. Bankruptcy proceedings which might be ascribed partly to
American occupation deemed inadvisable at this time irrespective of actual
merits of case. Status quo of this and all other concession holders should be
maintained pending settlement of differences by commission under terms of
treaty. Acknowledgment and information action taken requested. 22324.
Caperton."
On November 25 Dessource, minister of war, was dismissed from the cabinet.
The President states this was done on account of Dessource's grafting. This
was promptly reported to the Secretary of the Navy.
On this day President Dartiguenave called at the French legation and fonnally
apolized for the violation of that legation on July 28, 1915. The Haitian shore
battery fired a salute of 21 guns to the French flag. This salute was returned
gun for gun by the French cruiser Descartes, with the Haitian flag at the main.
Shortly afterwards the Descartes got under way and stood to sea. These facts
were reported to the Secretary of the Navy.
During Ae past few days the American minister and I had been in daily con-
ference with the Haitian Government relative to the modus vivendi.
At 6 p. m.. November 29, the modus vivendi embodying the exact terms of the
treaty was signed by Mr. Bailly-Blanchard and Mr. Louis Borno. plenipoten-
tiaries of the United States and Haiti, respectively. This now put the treaty
into full working effect, and I therefore immediately recommended the following
officers for nomination by the President of the United States in accordance with
the terms of the treaty to act in a pro tem capacity pending the arrival of the
regular appointments : Financial adviser, Capt. E. L. Beach. United States
Navy; general receiver. Paymaster Charles Conard, Unitted States Navy ; senior
American officer of constabulary, Col. L. W. T. Waller, Marine Corps ; engineer
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400 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
for public improvement, Lieut. E. G. Oberlin, United States Navy ; engineer for
sanitation, Passed Asst. Surg. P. E. Garrison, Unitted States Navy.
This would continue the work heretofore done by the same officers that had
been doing it, with the exception of Capt. Beach and Lieut. Oberlin. Tlie flnan-
<2ial duties had theretofore been done by Paymaster Conard and the public im-
provement duties had been done by the marines under Col. Waller. I was
informed these nominations would be acceptable to the Haitian Government.
I reported these facts and made these recommendations to the Secretary of the
Navy and the commander in chief at 6.30 p. m. November 29.
On November 2S I received the following message from the Secretary of the
Navy, which is self-explanatory:
" Loan of $1,500,000 can not be arranged until after arrival of commission
4ind settlement of difficulties with bank. Advance of $100,000 upon ratification
of treaty proposed to furnish funds for current expenses in the place of 500,000
gourdes held by you, but Haitian Government declined offer and stated they
desired that conditions of affairs with National Bank of Haiti remain in statui>
<luo. Weekly payments of 25,000 was authorized in lieu of this proposed ad-
vance and was intended to supersede it. If, however, Haitian authorities still
consider 100,000 due upon ratification of treaty, the amount may, in order to
maintain prestige, be paid from funds in your hands, provided advance from
this source Is agreeable to Haitian Government. Owing to strainal relations
understood to exist between National City Bank and Central Railroad of Haiti,
it is not desired to attempted to make arrangements for staying of proceedings
unless it is absolutely necessary. Central Railroad informs State Department
Haitian Government has requested you to pay $48,000 to railroad company.
Can you not do this under authority granted in 18018? It would seem that you
would be protected in such payment made at request and with consent of
Haitian Government. Desirability of phin suggested by you appreciated, but
delay in getting loan can not be avoided and prompt compromise action appears
necessary. To place entire responsibility on Haitian Government suggest fol-
lowing procedure: If it requests that payment be made to prepare receipt for
signature of proper officials acknowledge receipt from you of $48,000; also re-
ceipt from you for your signature acknowledging receipt from Haitian Gov-
ernment of $48,000, to be paid over to the Central Railroad of Haiti in accord-
ance with request of Haitian Government. If you will direct purchasing pay-
master New York to make payment to New York representative of railroad
upon notice from you that $48,000 of Haitian funds has been turnetl over to
Paymaster Morrl.s, to be taken up under general account of advances for official
use offsetting payment. Above sent after consultation State Department and
conforms in views expressed in its cable of November 23 to American minister.
Acknowledge. 14027.
" Victor Blue."
On November 20 the department again sent me a message concerning the
foregoing, as follows:
'* Very urgent department's 14027 should be settled by November 29. Please
■expedite action. Acknowledge. 11029.
" ltoosi':>T.LT, Acting '*
In reply to these messages on Novem!)er 29 I reported the following action
taken, my report reading as follows:
-• 14027 and 11029. One hundred thousand dollars were transferred to
Haitian Government to-day from funds in hand. Haitian Government has
requested $48,000 to pay Central Railroad and amount will b<» tnrne<l over to
Paymnster Morris to-morrow. Immediately thereafter purchasing paymaster
New York will be notifle<l that he may make payment to New York representa-
tive of railroad. Regarding loan of one and a half million dollars, Haitian
Government fully expects to receive this amount Immefllately, as State Depart-
ment dispatches have indicated that temporary loan would be arranged ininie
diately after slgniiiir of treaty r.nd modus vlvendi. Earnetly nvoninu'nd
that such temporary loan be made as soon as connnission sails and prior to
negotiations in Washington, to be at'terwarcls included in f^nal adjustment of
all outstanding obligations. 2:^120.
" Caperton."
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 401
On November 29 I sent the folUm-lnp cUspntch to tlie Secretary of the Nftvy :
"French Government has ofticlally nH*ojsnIze<l Dni-tij^iuMunT. British charge'*
d'affaires has instructions to recognize Dartifniennvo jrovernment. Sec. Xav.
Washlnjfton and fiag Wyotninfj, 231. "'»29.
" (\\PKirroN."
On Noveml»er 30. in accordance with my report to tin* Secretary of tlie Navy
of November 29, I sent the followinjr Instructions to tlie Navy pay office.
New York :
•*For Navy Pay Oftice. New Yorlv:
"By direction of the Navy Department, pay immediately tt) (Vntral llailroad
of Haiti. 2."> Broa<l Street, .$48,(MH). Same amount has l>eeii deposited with
Paymaster Morris under j^eneral account of advances. Aclcnf)\\i(Mlpe. 15030.
" (*APERTOX."
On I)eceml»er 1 1 sent tlie followinj; jlispjit^'h to the Sei-retary of the Navy:
' *' Conncctivut miiletl from Port an Prince t«» rejoin battleship sciuadron noon
Wednesday. Commander cruis<*r squadron tal<es this occasion tc» express his
appreciation of excellent service and support rendered by the ciimmandinK
officer, officers, and crew of Conti<'ctirnt to the crui«^er stpiadron and marines
<luring operations of last four months in Haiti. He regrets that tlie lack of
larf?e cruisers in the cruls*M- squadron forced the tenqK)rary withdrawal of a
battleship from her most im])ortant war trainintr dutie.: with the battleship
squadrons. 1 44^n .
" Caperton."
On December 2 I r(H*eive<l reiHjrts from the north to the effect that condi-
tions between San Uaphael and Dondon were excellent; that the priests had
report e<i the country absolutely quiet. There were many men at work clearing
the gi'ound and the district recently infested with outlaws. Patrols from
Grande Riviere to Limonale, Fort Liberte to Perches, and from Ouanaminthe to
southwest and to north report all quiet. There was considerable cleaning of
the land and resumption of work between Perches and Terrier Rouge.
On DecemlMT 6 the Haitian treaty comndssion to consult with the State De-
partment relative to the details and operations of the treaty was announced as
consisting of Solon Menos, Haitian ndnister at Washington, president; August
Magloire, administrator of finance. Port au Prince ; and Pierre Hudicourt, law-
yer and plenipotentiary' to second peace conference at The Hague, as members;
and Lecm Dejean, chief of bureau of ministry of foreign affairs, and Edgard
Laroche, attach^ of the ministry of finance, secretaries. I reported the sailing
of this commission to the Ignited States on December 6 to the Secretary of the
Navy as follows:
" Prairie sailed 7 p. m., Monday, from Port au Prince for Annapolis, Md.,
with following gentlemen of Haitian treaty comndssion: Pierre Hudicourt and
August Magloire members, and Edgar Larouche, secretary. Recommend repre-
sentative State Department, who speaks French, meet commission upon arrival
Annapolis, and that acconmiodations Annapolis and Washington and special
transportation Annapolis to Washington be arrange<l. Request Prairie be in-
formed arrangements made in advance arrival St»c. Nav., Washington, and flag
Myomino. 21106.
" CAPjaiTON.**
Again on December 6 in further connection with the Haitian treaty commis-
sion I sent the. following to the Secretary of the Navy : ^
*• Commission has now sailed for United States. Urgently recommend loan
of $1,500,000 be made immediately, as previously recommended in my 231229.
Haitian Government has inherited mouths of unpaid debt and has incurred
expenses in etlucating country to realize necessity of ratifying treaty. Salaries,
debts, and obligations amounting to $500,000 umst be paid before December 20.
Otherwise Government prestige will be lost amongst Haitians and serious condi-
tions will result. Expect part of cabinet will resign unless Government can
meet its obligations by this date. Settlement of existing problem will be de-
Isiyed and purpose of Unied States impeded under present conditions. Believe
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402 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
immediate favorable action on this recommendation vital and imperative.
22206.
" Capkrton."
In reply to my recommendation relative to a loan to the Haitian Government,
made on December 6, the Secretary of the Navy on December 8 sent me the fol-
lowing :
" 22206 and 231229. In view of article 1» section 9. paragraph 8. of the Con-
stitution, officers nominated in your 18329 can not be appointed by President
until special authority obtained from Congress, which may take some thne.
Treaty negotiations did not provide for arranging for loan until after arrivftl
of commission in Washington, D. C, and there are certain matters which should
he adjusted by commission. State Department averse to loan being made unless
assured it will be properly disbursed. Can you assure disbursement will be
made undor supervision naval officer pending appointment by President officer
provided in modus Vivendi? Loan negotiations will be expedited after arrival
commission subject to foregoing. For information. State Department, submit
by radio statement from occupation to November 30, showing total collected,
also amount collected from each general source, total payment to Haitian
Government payment for work done under your direction by general object,
and balance on hand acknowledged. 10008.
" Daniels."
Information as to the intontiouH of the Tnlted States CJoverniiiont with ref-
erence to executing the terms of tlie modus vivendi wns very desirable in
guiding me in the administration of Haitian aflfairs. and I therefore ou
December 10 sent the following message t«» the Swretary of the Navy :
** 1008. Information as to Ignited States (Jovernment intentions with refer-
ence to executing terms of modus vivendi very desirable in guiding nie in
administering Haitian alTars at this time. Is it intention to ask Ck)ngress to
pass necessary resolution authorizing naval and marine officers to accept
offices under Haitian Government or will civilian nominations be made. If
latter, when may these appointees be exix^fted to arrive Port an Prince?
15410.
" Oapertos."
In reply to the department's radiogram 10008 of Deceml>er 8 requesting infor-
mation relative to the question of expenditures and collections of customs
duties since the occupation I forwarde<l the following :
"10(K)S. Total collections to and of NovcMiiber, .$953 372. Include export**'
eoflfee. $3(>«,()98: miscellaneous exports, *144.227; Imports and miscellaneous
duties, ,$443,047. Expeinlitures, $179,519, tlivided as follows: Constabulary,
22,099; public works, $*)6.7(W; military and civil goveniment, $64*210; customs
service, $20,447. Transferred to Haitian Oovernment, $393,0(N), which Includes
$48,000 to Ontral Railroad ; balance. .$308,853, of which $325,972 was In account
of Admiral Caperton and .S54,asi in hands of disbursing officers. Figures
given closely approximate, as returns not all In for Novemlier. 23011.
" Capkrton."
On Dweniber 11. 1915, there was consitlerable unrest on the Dominican sid**
of the border In the vicinity of Monti Oristi and Dajabon. The American cu^
toins officials in the Dominican service stated that the Dominicans were hostile
to the Americans, particularly to the Americans occupying Haiti ; that tlip
Dominican officials used tt> visit Haiti, but that now they never cross the
border owing to the presence of the Americans; and that the people of Santo
Domingo were much agitated over the reported pressure being brought to l>ear
for making an addition to the present treaty between the United States an<l
Santo Domingo, especially as to the clause for the formation of a constabular)'.
The formation of a constabulary would affect the politicians and persons con-
nected with the rural police, who would lose their present graft. It seemed to
l>e fairly well establlshe<l that the Dominican authorities were Imrborhm
Haitian criminals and aiding Haitian bandits.
With reference to the question asked by the Navy Department in 10006, «<
to whether or not I could assure that disbursements of a loan made prior to
the completion of the work of the commission would be made under the super-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCXIPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 408
vision of a naval officer, pending the appointment by tlie President of the officer
provided in the modus Vivendi, I made the following report to the Secretary
of the Navy : " 10008. Can assure disbursement of $500,000 will be made u»der
supervision Capt E. L. Beach, United States Navy, under following written
agreement of the Haitian Government : * With regard to the disbursement of
the advance loan of $500,000 gold desired to be received by the Haitian €k)v-
emment l»y December 20, 1915, it is agreed that the advice of Capt. Beach
will be necessary for the expenditures to be made from the $500,000, and that
the concurrence of Capt. Beach will be required by the depository bank in
honoring drafts on this amount. This procedure applies to this advance only
and shall not be considered as an application to the terms of the treaty of
September 16, 1915. It is equally agreed that in order to facilitate the pay-
ments, Capt Beach will be at his office at the hours of service, and that he will
give no advice contrary to the payments regularly ordered by the law fixing
the budget (Signed) Louis Bomo.* Recommend this sum be deposited in Na-
tional Bank of Haiti. This bank already agrees in writing as follows : * With
regard to the $500,000 proposed ^to be deposited with this bank as a repository,
for the expenses of the Haitian 6ov»*nment, the bank agrees that on all with-
drawals on such particular deposit the prior signature of Capt. E. L. Beach,
United States Navy, will l)e required; provided, however, that instructions to
this same effect be passed to the bank by the depositor when the above said
deport shall be made. (Signeil) Reine.* Secretary of the Navy, Washington,
and flag Wpominff, 10412. Caperton."
On December 14 the situation in north Haiti was quiet. Many people were
at work and everyone apparently friendly.
In connection with the ten^porary appointment of financial adviser and other
officials without congressional action, the department on December 13' advised
me as follows: "On account of constitutional restriction impossible to appoint
financial adviser and other officials without congressional action. The de-
iXtrtment assumed that in the meantime officers are discharging these duties.
Report whether or not such is the case. Acknowledge. 21013. Daniels."
In r^ly to this I advised the department as follows: "21018. Status of
administration of affairs here the same as prior to signing of modus vlvendi.
It has not been considered practicable to proceed under the terms of the modus
Vivendi owing to the nonappointment of necessary officials. Instructions re-
questecl Secretary of the Navy, Washington, and flag Wyoming. 11414.
Capearton."
As the I'nitetl States, by the signing of tlie ukkIus viwfidl was now under
r*h1igaticm to a|>point the flificials provided by the twrtty to carry the same Into
effect, as I had ali^eady recommended officers f«»r these offices, and as there was
nothing further tJiat could i>e done by me or by the Haitian <iovernment, I con-
sidered it necessary to request further instructions in the matter.
In reply to my request for further Instructions in the matter the department
un December 14 advised nw as follows : ** 11414. Department has assumed that
pending rejmlar api)ointments of financial adviser, genenil receiver, engineer for
public works, and engineer for sanitat'on these duties were being performed
under your authorit>' by Capt. Beach. Paymaster <^«nrad. Lieut. Oberlin, and
Pa.ssed Asst. Surg. Garrison, respectively. Is mirh tJ»e case or iKit^ 18014.
Roosevelt, acting." /
In reply to the foregoing message I on De<»eml>er 15 advised the department
as follows : ** 18014. Officers mentioned are not i)erforraing duties mentioned
as defined by the treaty, nor are any other officers i»erforming these duties.
Capt, E. L. Beach, Paymaster Charles Conrad, Col. L. W. T. Waller, Marine
CoriJs, and Passe<l Asst. Surg. P. E. Garris<m ai*e performing duties some-
what similar to those provide<l in the treaty fw financial adviser, general re-
ceiver, engineer for public works, an<l engineer for sanitation, respectively,
under the status of subordinate officers aiding nie in maintaining military- con-
trol of the situation, under authority department's radiogram (20018), August,
and such other military instructions as have l)een issued. The terms of the
treaty as placed into effect by the modus vlvendi are not being carried out by
anyone. Haitian Oovernment has made repeated requests that United States
carry out their part of modus vivendi agreenoent and urge immediate appoint-
ments be officially made. Have explained constitutional restriction preventing
naval officers accepting appointments have stated that civilian appointments
could be made at once, and have offered to recommend such apimintments.
Haitian Government earnestly requests apiK>intments of naval officers and re-
quests that special efforts be made to expedite these appointments. Can not
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404 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
joint resolution be iuimediately obtained from Congress authorizing in generul
terms naval and marine oflicer^ to serve temporarily under Haitian Government.
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, and Flag WyonUng. 11315. Caperton."
(For tlie benefit of the committee it is stated that the department's radiogram
(20018), August, mentioned In the foregoing will l>e found in my testimony
covering the date Aug. 19, 1915.)
In explanation of the foregoing I desire to malce the following remarks: The
status of our administration in Haiti was at this time purely one of military
control. The terms of the treaty as placed into effect by the niodus vivendi
were not being carried out by anyone, nor could they be until appointments
were made which would give a legal status to the appointees. For the pro-
tection of the United States* interests and the officers concerneil, in order to
gain the benefits to accrue from the treaty and prevent misguided interference
on tlie part of the Haitian Government, no othcer should attempt to carry out
the duties defined in the treat>' until their legal status and their authority anil
responsibility could be definitely assured by proper appointments. Until that
time the present military control should contiijue.
The Haitian Government had made repeateil requests that the United States
carry out their part of the modus vivendl agreement and urged immediate
appointments be oflacially made. I had explained the constitutional restric-
tion preventing naval officers accepting appointments, had stated that civilian
appointments could be made at once, and had offered to recommend such ap-
pointments. The Haitian (Jtivernment earnestly requested appointments of
naval officers and requested that si>ecial efforts be made to ex|)edite these
appointments.
From a cablegram received by the American minister on December 20 it
appeared that the possibility of making the loan of $500,(XX) to the Haitian
Government was very slight. I theivfore made the following recommendations
to the department : '* Dispatch received by American minister to-day indicates
that possibility of making loan of ;f500.(KH) to Haitian Government is very
slight. It is now recommended that I be authorized to transfer to Haitian
Government funds in my possession to meet immediate pressing demands, such
funds to be disbursed under agreements similar to those contained in my 10412.
If this be done, it will be necessary to arrange payment of interest of debt and
similar obligations from funds to be later loaned to the Haitian Government.
Secretary Navy, Washington, and Flag Wyotning. 22220. i.^aperton."
(Note. — The message 10412. mentioned above, may be found quoted under my
testimony covering December 12, 1916.)
It having been decided to turn over to the Haitian authorities the control of
all activities now being undertaken by the American forces for which expendi-
tures were then being made under the heads " Military and Civil government "
and " Public works,*' with the exception of such activities as were necessary to
maintain military control under martial law for the purpose of preserving
peace and order, I, on December 20, issued the following instructions to carry
out this decision in a letter to the expeditionai> commander, which is quoted,
as follows :
" 1. It has been decided to turn over to the Haitian authorities the conti-ol
of all activities now undertaken by the American forces for which exiienditures
are made under the heads " Military and civil government " and " Public
works," with the exception of such activities as are necessary to maintain mili-
tary control under martial law for the purpose of preserving peace and order.
"2. To this end you are directed to proceed with the preliminary arrangt^
ments necessary.
"3. (a) You will designate officers at each of the places where we now have
control of these activities, who will make an inventory of the utilities, public
works, repairs, etc., in progress and who will confer with the representatives
appointed by the Haitian Government who are to receive control of these
activities.
(b) Furnish squadron commander with the names of the officers so deslg-
nntetl.
(v) The terms of the arrangements will be forwarded to the squadron com-
nmnder in each case, together with your recommendations, before tJils control
is actually surrendered.
id) For your information Mr. Price Is designated by the Haitian Govem-
nievit to receive the Hydraulic Service at Port au Prince. W. B. Caperton."
On December 21 a band of outlaws was reported to have been holding up
women near Malssade. A marine patrol was sent to investigate. Other
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INQUIBY INTO OCCXJPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 405
patrollinj? eontiuue<l In north Haiti. A marine patrol while Investigating rob-
bery by a Caco band in the vicinity of P^'ches had a slight skirmish with a
small Caco band. Five thousand rounds of ammunition were captured by
the marines near the Dominican border, having been buried there. The loca-
tion was ascertaineil through the secret service. Incriminating papers had
been eapture<l in north Haiti from a Caco chief, one Darius Davilmar, includ-
ing one from Bobo from Cuba written in September, in which he styled himself
as chief of the forces operating against the Americans. It was rumored that
lie was implicated in the recent Caco troubles.
In accordance with the decision to turn over to the Haitian authorities the
control of the public works, etc., I on December 22 transmitted to the Ameri-
can minister tlie names of the officers who w^ould consult with the Haitian offi-
«iuls at the various ports to make the necessary arrangements.
On December 22 I received the following radiogram from the department :
" Desirable have as many marines as possible sent north at earliest practicable
(late. Report conditions and make recommendation. 13021. Daniels."
In reply to the foregoing, on December 22 I advised the department as fol-
lows : *' 33021. In view of present unsettled relations between United States
and Haiti and necessity of maintaining present military control of situation
until appointments under modus vivendi are made, in view of public work car-
rietl on by marines under present status of military occupation, and in vlew
noncompletion of organization, training, and arming of constabulary and their
present inability to assume duties of maintaining peace and order una.ssisted,
I recommend that marine force now ashore in Haiti be not reduced at this time
beyond detachment of Twelfth Company, and that Col. Waller remain here
until situation clears up. Recommend that twelfth company of marines be
detacher 1 from duty Second Regiment and ordered proceed north on Waahing-
ton when that vessel leaves Haiti. This company has been on continuous cniis-
injr and tropical shore service for about one year without leave or recreation,
and is as much in need of leave and recreation as crew of Washington. Secre-
tary Navy, Washington and flag Wyoming, 16122. Caperton."
On r>ecember 24 Annulyse Andre was appointed secretary of war and navy
In the Haitian cabinet, and I so roimrted this fact to the Secretary of the Navy
on the sjime date.
With reference to the turning over to the Haitian Goverament of the activities
being carried out by me under " Public works " and " Military and civil govern-
ment," on December 27 I made the following recommendations to the depart-
ment, as quotetl in the radiogram : " (Jontrol of public works and civil expendi-
tures which have been assumed by nie is now to be turned over to the Haitian
Oovemment. As weekly payments of .$2o,000 now authorized was not estimated
to include expenses und(*r the activities to be transferretl, it is re<Y»mniended
that additional allowance be authorized. Expenditures made by me for public
works and civil government have averaged $12,700 per week, and similar ex-
penditures for which funds are to be transferred should be limited to this
amount. I>etaih»d estimates from Haitian Government will be rc>quired for
exi)enditure8 to be made for these punwses. Secretary Navy, Washington, and
flag Wyoming, Caperton. 14127."
On December 28 I received a letter from the President setting forth what he
considers a seriouG! situation due to the lack of funds, etc. I transmitted this
letter to the Secretary of the Navy, as follows :
"Have just received following letter from President Dartiguenave : ' Mon
Cher amirnl, II ne reste plus que quatre jours pour la fin de Tannee. Toutes nos
conversations, depuis plus de deux mois, vous ont suffisammeut reselgiie que,
mome aux pires epoques. les pires Gouvernements n'ont pas lalsse le peuple aux
prises avec la falm, quand Fannee se renouvelle. C'est le pays entier qui, par
lettres et telegrammes, me le rappelle. Hier, Je voussal ecrit et juaqu*a ce
moment, je suls a attendre votre reponse au sujet de Targent qu*il nous ressourees
sont retenues par Toccnpation. Jr dois a jouter que, dans la situation de crise aigue
que le Gouvemement traverse, par manque de nioyens de subvenlr aux obliga-
tions les plug imperieuses de FEtat, J'al de serieuses raisons de craindre que
le Conseil des Ministres ne se disloque, si la question d*argent pour la fin de
Tannee n'est pas reglee. Et je crains aussi qu'il ne me soit difficile, dans ce cas,
de reformer le cabinet. En attendant votre reponse, jr vous renouvelle, mon
Cher Amiral Texpression de mes meilleurs sentiments. Signed, Dartiguenave.*
19428. Caperton."
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406 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
TRANSLATION.
My Deab Admiral : Thwe are only four more days before the end of the year.
All our conversations for more than two months have sufficiently shown you
that even at the worst periods the worst Governments have not left the people
to struggle with hunger when the new year began. The entire country is
reminding me of this fact by letters and telegrams. Yesterday I wrote to yon
and am still awaiting your reply on the subject of money, as our resources are
retained by the occupation. I must add that in the acutely critical situatioD
through which the Government is passing, due to laclc of means of meeting tbe
most pressing obligations of the State, I have serious reasons to fear that the
council of ministers may be dissolved if the question of money is not settled
before the end of the year. And I also fear that it will be difficult for me in this
case to form a new cabinet. Awaiting your reply, my dear Admiral, I am,
Yours, very respectfully,
Dartiguenavi.
On I>eceml)er 30 I receive<l from the (lt*partnient tlie following radiogram
transmitting to me a messajro to the American legation from the Secretary
of State relative to the loan to the Ilait!un Government:
" ' Your December 18, 6 p. m., eliminating the appropriation for war, pubik
work, public debt, and senice of the armistice contained in the Haitian budget
for 1914-15, that budget, although contemplating a large deficit, made provlsiofl
for an average monthly exi>enditure of about $150,000 gold a month.
*' ' Inasmuch as the Haitian Government had to make no expenditure for war,
public work, public debt and service of the bank during the months of October,
November, and December, it should have needed on a basis of the 1914-15
budget the sum of $450,tKX). During these months tlie Haitian Government
has actually l)een In receipt of $385,000 advanced to it by officer No. 17. It
>4houkl therefore require but $65,000 to cover the deficit The department be-
lieves that the law of I><venil»er 2 contemplates the expenditure of nearly
$1,000,000 for these three months is unwise and is not prepared to consent to
tlie use of an advance of $500,000 upon any loan to be made for the purpose
contemplated in that law and will not under the terms of the treaty approve
also increasing the foreign debt of the Republic of Haiti for any such purpose.
Commission informs depni*tment that Minister Meuos has received tdegram
from President Dartiguenave instructing him to request d^mrtment to au-
thorize officer No. 17 to pay over all the funds in hand to be reimbursed by
loan of two million, ami states that situation of Grovernmeut is critical and
ministerial crisis imminent.
" ' Tlie departments opnion regarding such loan is stated above and it oob-
slders the funds held by officer 17 to be in the nature of a trust fund, as these
moneys do not belong to tbe Haitian Government but to the holders of dif-
ferent debts of the Government. In view, however, of allege argency, jw
will report immediately by cable the amount in your opinion absolutely neces-
sary to defray salaries of public employees for months of November tnd
December while, notwithstanding advance of $25,000 per week, the department
is surprised to learn have not been paid. Lansing.' 19029. Dani^s."
In answer thereto I forwarded for the American minister to the Navy De-
partment for transmission to the Secretary of State, the following:
" For Secretary of State. * Your December 29, 7 p. m., Navy Department
It is impossible to obtain at once from the Haitian Government as the urgency
of the situation requires, the information necessary to enable me to fiorm an
opinion and report immediately the amount absolutely necessary to defray
salaries of public employees for months of November and December, but tbe
Government now states that to avoid crisis by covering most pressing demands
for November in the Provinces and I>ecember in Port au Prince, $50,000 Ini^
peratively needed. Imme<llate favorable replv urgently requeeted. Blandmrd*
19140. Caperton."
On December 31 I received the department's radiogram, whi<ti is quoted
below, answering my messages of December 20 and 27, requesting instnic-
tlons, etc.:
•* 22220 and 14127. NaUonal Bank of Haiti, which Is operating only soarcee
from which an Immediate unsecured advance could be obtained, stipuUted for
restoration of contractual right before it would consider making an advance.
This was not acceptable to Haitian commission. Oflfer of a temporary loan
stipulated for guaranty by United States which can not be given. Prospects for
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 407
securing any funds In the near future In addition to current revenue are not
bright and probahly nothing can be dime until after a thorough investigation
of liabilities and probable resources. The State Department as evidenced in
its dispatch of the 29th to Minister Blanchard is not satisfied with the purpose
it is purp(>se<l to apply tlie udditlonul funds. For the above reason it is deemed
huidvisable to authorize the payment to the Haitian Government of the reserved
funds in your eusto<ly. Delay in securing advance or loan is not due to cause
which can be controlle<l by the irniteil States, but to unsatisfactory conditions
<>f Haitian finances. Do not tuni over contn)l of public works or any other
duties pertaining to civil government which liave been assumtHl by you to the
Haitian Government until so dlre<*te<l by the department, l)ecause State De-
partment desires that status quo be maintained until the officials provided for
in treaty and modus vlvendi have been appointed and are ready to assume
their duties. MimIus vivendi provides for settlement of certain questions by
Haitian commission and State Department in Washington, D. C, before money
in addition to $25.00() per week Ite ]mid over to the Haitian Government unless
department specifically authorizes. The foregoing has been submittefl to the
State Department, which (concurs. Acknowledge. 10180. Daniels."
On this date I also receive<l the following message from the department:
"Confer with Minister Blanchard regarding message 15031 to him sent this
date authorizing disbursement of $r)0,UOO, etc. Obtain verbatim co{)y of this
message ; carry out its ])rovi8ion as outlined by State Department. Acknowledge.
14031. Daniels."
On January 1, 1916, I recelveil the department's radiogram 15031. transmit-
ting a State I>epartment message to the American legation. This message
stated that I would be authorized to make use of $50,000 of the funds in my
IioKsesslon to defray uniiaid salaries of the public employees referred to in
Minister Blanchard's message of Decemlier 30, 5 p. m. It was directed that
this money .should not l>e paid to the Haitfan Government, but should be drawn
against the principal by me or my representatives, who shall pay salaries
dircK^t to the individual public employees, from whom they will obtain receipts
presented in person. Preference slmll be given to minor employees who are said
to be in great want. This message further dire<'ted that all salaries to the
military should be discontinued, including that of the minister of war and
marine; that the so-called palace guard should be Immediately disbanded; and
tliat after January 1, 1916, and until arrangements could be made by officials
appointed under the mo<lus vivendi, I should have complete control of disburse-
ments of the weekly allowance for maintenance of the Haitian Government
and should make ase of my representatives in the various ports to see that a
proper proportion of tlie money reached the public employees in the Provinces.
On January 3 conditions were quiet throughout Haiti. The commanding
officer of the First Regiment at Cai>e Haitlen reported that condif.ons in North
Haiti were better than they had l)een for many years; that cultivation was
l)e:ng resumed; that new habitfftions were being built: nnd that the land, more
or less abandonetl for iT long time, was be'ng iK*cupled again. Rumors were
heard from time to time of proje<*ted revolutions and Imstlle propaganda at
<Hfferent places in the country bnt nothing serious sei»nied to develop. Some
slight brigandage in the nortii occurred but was quickly suppressed. Bandit
leaders were now In hiding or in Snnto Domingo, The attitucle of the governor
of Monte Chisti and the Dominican authorities «t Dajabon was apparently more
friendly, and they seeme<l to be aiding our forces in maintaining order on the
frontier. There was some slight disturbance between the pollcv ami the soldiers
in Monte Cristi on Deceml>er 25. Patrolling by our forces in North Haiti was
being continued.
In view of the department's instructions c<»ntiii'.u»<l in the depnrtnient's i*ad:o-
;rram 10130 of De<*eml)er 30. orders were given to the <-oninian(llng officers of
all marine detachments (»n January 3. informing theni thnt the public works
and activities under militar>' and civil govennnent would not l)e turnwl over
to the Haitian authorities and direct e<l thorn to cease the arrangements pre-
viously ordere<l relative thereto.
The fcdlowing report was made to the Secretary of the Navy on January 5
relative to di^tuiiiances which o<'cnrrc(l in Port au Prince early on that date:
'At 2.30 a. m. We^lnesday barra<ks occupied marines at Port au Prince fire<l
upon by small i>arty of Haitians. This wns foUoweil by firing in other parts of
<-ity. Patrol officer was fired (»n several times. All disturbances .suppressed in
iii)out one-half hour. One Haitian killed and some wounded. Corpl. Wed<»r,
«2260— 21— PT 2 20 ^ j
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408 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Marine CJorps, slightely wounded in foot. Disturbance apparently of political
nature against Dartiguenaye government and American occupation. Sixteen
arrests of leaders and bad characters made to-day by marines and some arras and
rifles captured. Precautionary measures umler martial law taken. Port an
Prince now quiet Secnav, Washington, an<l Klag M'yominff. 22205. Caperton."
With reference to preparing a system for paying Haitian employees aud
creditors as directed in the department's radiogram of December 31, I sent tlie
following to the Secretary of the Navy :
" In preparing system for paying Haitian employees and creditors as flirected
in 15081. It is Important to know whether sj-stem is to be continued under
treaty after appointment of necessary offlclalH. Plans laid now should be com-
prehensive in character in order to insure efiiciency. but if system is to be Intw
discontinued such plans must be less comi>rehensive with partial sacrifice of
efficiency. It is recommended that, if practicable, treaty arrangements Inclnde
this method of disbursements. 15107. ('4ii>erton."
In connection with the disturbance on the morning of January 5 at Port
au Prince, it was discovered that the outbreak was part of a well-organl«ed
plot, etc., and on January 8 I sent the following message relative thereto to
the Secretary of the Navy :
" Disturbance Wednesday morning, Port au Prince, part of wrfl-organized
plot covering Port au Prince, Les Cayes, and South Haiti in general. Those
engaged belong to black party as distinguished from mulatto. Leaders in
Port au Prince were Pierre Paul, Misael Codio, Pradel, Annabel Hilaire, and
PhilQgene. Lntter three, with several other minor leaders, have been captured
and confined. Pierre Paul and Mlsiiel Oodio escaped. This movement appean
was made in favor of ex-S«iator I>aulin or Pauleus Sannon for I»re8ideJit Plot
contemplated assassination of President. North Haiti entirely quiet; does not
seem to be concerned in this affair. No cause for alarm. Situation well in
hand. Secnav, Flag Wpominff, 14108. Caperton."
On January 9 I received State Department's message "Bomky," in Sttte
Department code, by radio and transmittetl it to the American I^egation. I
also received the department's 18008, directing me to cooperate and carry out
the provisions of State Department's " Bomky," quoted as follows :
"Flag Attention invited to State Department Bomky to American Legation;
cooperate carry our provision. 18008. Daniels."
During this time our patrols continued to work in north Haiti, where all
was reported quiet with the exception of some petty stealing.
The municipal elections were now due in various parts of the country. Minor
disorders were to be expected as the result of them here and there. At Petit
Goave the election lists were stolen, so that the election could not take place,
and in order to avoid disturbance at that place I found it necessary to place the
mayor of the town, who was responsible for the safety of the election lists,
under arrest and take entire charge of the town, I reported the incident to
the department on January 10, as follows :
•* Municipal elections now due ; expect minor disorders. Election list Petit
Goave has been stolen ; to avoid disturbance have found it necessary to place
Mayor Petit Goave under arrest and take entire charge that town. Reward
5,000 gourdes has been offered for Pierre Paul and Misael Codio, Secnav
Wyoming. 22010. Caperton."
The Prairie arrived at Port au Prince on January 10 l!rom the United States.
Commander K. M, Bennett, United States Navy, on this day relieved Com-
mander J. F. Carter, United States Navy, in command of the Ccutine,
In accordance with a request dated January 10, I, on January 11, received
from the American minister a paraphrase of State Department's "Bomky."
This message related to the disbandment of the so-called palace guard and the
State Department's wishes and instructions relative to the gendarmerie takinj:
its place, and Is in substance as follows:
Leoattox ok thk Tnitki) States ok Ameutca.
January 10, J916.
Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton. United States Navy,
Commanding United fftatcft forers u\ Haiti and Haiiian iraters,
• TJ. 8, 8. ^'Washinfftonr
Sir: Uefcrring to your note of January 10, 1910 No. 43-l-1(>. I have the honor
to inf(»rm you that the followin;; message sent by the IVpartnient of Stiitc at
6 p. m., January 8, 1916, referring to the Icjraition's telegran/ i»f .1 p, m., JanuaiT
5, 1916, which I communicated to you and which state<l that reform.^ (lesinnl
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IXQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 409
were n^eed to by tli« (foverniiient aiul thnt you were currying out the provi-
sloiL< as Instructed, has been nnvived and a imraphrase there<»f is herewith
forwardeil for your information:
It is understood in Washinjrton that it has l»een actvptetl lliat llie so-called
palace jniard be abolished.
Tlie I>epurtiueut of State projiose*! to the Haitian Comuiiss.ou, in arranging
with theui for tlie orKanizution of the gendarmerie, tliat tlie followlnjr provision
!« included: **The gendarmerie sliall l)e tlie si»le iH>li<v and military force of
Haiti." The Haitian minister maintained this would be contrary to tlie Haitian
const! tution, which provides for a president's i personal guard. He objected to
(lie words " the sole nrilitary *' and now says that he has telegraphic instruc-
tions under dated of Jauuar>- G which permit him to accept the deiwirtmeut's
I>roiK)setl wording if the words "excepting a palace guard not to excised li.'»()
men" l>e adde<l, daindng this would allow conformance with the Haitian consti-
tution, article 175. The palace guard is an unuetvssary extravagance, and its
lontinuance may in the future well develoj) into a source of danger to the
<iovernment. With it in existencH* it wonld he imiMisshle for the gendarmerie
properly to guiu'd the paUure. And if the iiahice guard remains in existence it
would l)e iniiH>Hsible for any members of this gentlarmerie to be detached on
si)ecial duty In i^ersiaial attendance on the President. I an^ instrut-ti'd t<» bring
tliese facts orally and discTwtly to the attention of the I'resldent and to slibw
hiui that his ])ei'sonal safety may Ihj at stake. The departmcMit therefore 1h»-
lievetl it desirable tiiat the commission accept the following phraseology : ** Mem-
l»t*rs <»f the gendarmerie shall form the iK*rsonal gmird of the Pre-* <lcnt of Ha'tl,
niid the gendarmerie shall l)e the sole iH>lice and nrilitary force of the country."
This ro**ets obje<'tlon raiseil by the Haitian ndnister.
I am instructed to furnish the departnient with a ct>py of the tele;cr:im a<-
ceptiUK the above, which I am also instructtMl t<» snggest to the President to
S4»nd to the commission, and to hasten my reply in order that on ^louday next
the deiiartment can conclude this matter with ilie conim ssion. I have tlie honor
to hi\ sir. '
Your ol>edient servant,
A. Baitxy-Hlanoh.\rd.
American MiniHtcr.
Pradel, who was recently arrested in connection with the outbreak in Port
au Prince, was released on January 12 and this fact so rei)orted to the Navy
Department.
The department's radiogram 17012 in answer to my 15107 of January 7, was
received on January 13 and is quoted as follows :
"Flag 15107. Any system for paying employees and creditors of Haiti that
may be formulated at the present time can only be of a test nature and would
probably l)e subject to revisiim and amplification by the financial adviser as
conten)plate<l in tlie treaty. It is much to be desired, however, that the method
of disbursement now to be put in force shall be as comprehensive and as
efficient in character as the means at your dlsixisal will permit. In this
connection and in view of the fact that no expenditures are now being made
for the army and navy, for the services of the public debt, and for the* treasury
service of the bank, and as the disbursement for the public works and the
cost of collecting customs revenue arc* being met from other sourcvs, it is hoi>e<l
that the sum of $100,000 per month or its equivalent In gounles, which you
liave been authorlze<l to use for ne<!es.sary current exi>enditures of the Haitien
Government, will prove more than sufficient for this puriK)se. It is intended
that $50,000 special advance authorized In department's 15021 shall be used
only to pay salaries in the Provinces for November, and salaries in Port au
Prince for December. Dating from January 1, 1910, it is desiretl that you shall
not make use of the monthly payment of $100,000 to pay the salaries of public
employees or the creditors of the Haltlen Government for services rendered
previous to that date except the siilaries of public employees In the Provinces
for December, 1915, and that payment shall be limited to actual necessary
expenditures for service and supplies incurred subsequent to January 1. Kvery
effort should be made to prevent salaries from being paid to Halt lens whose
services are only nominal, and also to eliminate the present iiernicious system
of discoimting salaries and Government orders. Prom Infonnation in the i>os-
session of tlie State Department it apjK^ars that many of the expenditures con-
templated In former budgetary law. and particularly in the budgetary law of
Dc*cennber 2, 1915, are ill advised and probal)ly in excess of tlie revenues
Digitized by VjOOQIC
410 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
which may be available for swh imri>o8e8 in the futnre. It is cle*«'re<l that yon
use own discretion i\h to the payuientn wliich are to \w made, and you are
not ImuhuI to l>e jjoverne^l l)y the budjretary law^ in mak np these disburse-
nientH. Tlie funds are in tlie nature of trust funds and it is higldy desirable
that proi>er receli»ts and vouchers be obtaineil coverinjr disliursements iu order
that the interest of tliose for whose benefit the revenues have been pled|?ed may
be protected as fully as i>racticable. The foregoing has^ been prepared after
conference with and with the concurrence of the State Deiiartnient, An outline
of the system adopteil should be transmitted by radio if practicable, otber*
wise by mail, and a copy of the detailed instructions issued by you should be
forwarded when available; acknowledge. 17012. Daniels.'*
In reply to the alK)ve, on January 14, I forwarded the following radiogram
to the SwretaiT of the Navy giving a paraidirase of the scheme devise<l for tbe
payment of salaries, etc. :
** 17012. Haitian (Jovernment Ik m>w forwarding all salai*5* lists to admin-
istrator of customs. These are being che<*ke<l against the budget ami duplica-
tions, absentees, etc., are eliminate<l. Corrected lists are then prepared and
individual receipts having functions of checks, but not negotiable, are to be
delivered to individual employees who will <»btain the funds after proi»er
ideptiflcatlon at the bank. Instructions have b«»en Issued to commanders of
Marine detachments in tlie Provinces to investigate lists of employees, and after
insuring that individuals are entitletl to pay, to deliver receipts to them to be
cashed at local branch of national bank as above state<l. Entire system of
payment is lieing carried out under direct supervision my repre-senfatives.
Report covering system forwarded in mall to-day. 14014. Ca|)erton.*'
In connection with the above I wish to add* that on the same day I for-
wardeil to the Secretary of the Navy by mail a letter describing in detail tbe
system proposed for carrying out the provisions of the department's radiogram
of the 12th Instant; this letter containing four Inclosures, including my detailed
instructions to the National Bank of Haiti, the expeditionary commander,
and instructions from the administrator of customs to the collectors of custonw
along the same lines, covering the payment of Haitian employees.
Upon the receipt of the department's radiogram of December 31, the Presi-
dent of Haiti and the members of his cabinet were lnforme<l of the Instructlom*
contained therein, that no further funds would be turned over to the Govern-
ment directly, but that necessary payment of salaries would l>e made to the
individuals concerned under the supervision of Hear Admiral Caperton or hi»
representatives. This information caused much dlssatisfaotion, and the first
reply was to the effect that such a method could not be accepted by the Haitian
Government, in view of the Implied insult contained In the proposal. Various
plans were suggested by the American authorities, intended to soften or miti-
gate the imi)lied insult. But as they all Included the cardinal principle that
the money should actually bo placed in the hands of those to who it was due,
under the supervision above referred to, ncme were accei)table. Finally the
representative of the Haitian CJovernment agreed to turn the business of paying
salaries, etc., completely over to Rear Admiral Oai^erton, and to lend their
assistance in furnishing the lists of employees to whom payments were doe.
As this appeared to be the most direct method of arriving at the desdre<l end
it was decided to so proceed.
Referring to the above objection by the President and cabinet I think It but
fair to make n few remarks for the Information of the committee showlnp
why I considered it necessary to pay each individual employee personally by
my representatives. It will be remembered that I had been instructed to pay
$25,000 weekly to the Haitian Government to meet its current expenses, such
as salaries to Government employees, etc. As I recall the clrcum.stances at th's
late date there came to me many complaints from employees, both of hifsh
and low positions, that they were not receiving their salaries, and I also learned
that much of this weekly allowance was going for i)urposes not intemle*l. To
insure the actual payment of this money to the i>eople and for the purpoe«pF
for which it was intende<l. the foregoing recommendations and plan*: were
inaugurated. Much pains and many instructions were taken in order to make
the first payment under the new regime successful and pleasing to the people-
A special reception or writing room was fitted up in the National Bank of
Haiti, and arrangements made for paying promptly, and at the same time usinp
care to issue new bills in any denomination requeste<l. I was much gratified
shortly after this to receive many letters from people who had strongly ob-
jected in the first place to this mode of payment, and throughout the countrj-
Digitized by VjOOQIC
IKQtriBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 411
the method was highly praised by everj'one, as the employees found out that
in this manner they received all of their pay and not a part of it as heretofore.
It had been the custom to pay to certain " iwymasters " (I believe was the term
tliey used) the whole amount due certain districts, which resulted in the said
"paymasters'* retaining a large percentage of the pay and the individuals
receiving what was left. I believe the first payment of about 14,000 employees
was eflfectetl by the third or fifth of the month, which was very gratifying to
the Haitian Government,
Mt'^ael Codio, military leader and one of the chief men in the attack of
January 5 at Port au Prince, was arresteil near the Dominican border by Ma.l.
Dunhip on the morning of January 16. and was brouglit to Port au Prince,
where he was confined.
()n January' 25 Dartigue, the minister of public worlcs, i*esigned from the
cabinet. The situation otherwise remained unchangetl.
In answer to my request thtit the balance due the gendarmerie on .Tanuairy
31 from the date of its auth<^rizati(»n at the monthly rate agreed upon be
placed to the ci-edit of the gendarmerie to cover exi)enses of e<iuipment and
xtHting that funds were available, the department answere<l that this re(iue«t
would be approved as mnm as the Flaltian conunis.s'on s*gne<l the necessary
agreement. It directed that in the meantime to proceed under previous authori-
zjit'on relative to the gentlarmerie.
On January 26 I receive<l the department's radiogram 1802;"), in which it was
stated that in a ( onvei*sation with the State ivpartment Minister Menos
referred to the alleged i)ressing needs of tlie deiiartment of the interior. He
was informed at Washington that as the State Department had no means of
deciding as to the necessity for meeting these n*H»ds the matter might properly
be suhmitteil to me. The department requested my con.sideration and rect»m-
mendation in this conne<'ti<m antl directe<l that I be guideil by previous instruc-
tions. This message follows:
"Flag. In conversati<m with State Department t<Mlay Minister Menos
referre<l, among other matters, to alleged pressing needs of- the department <»f
the interior and was informed that as the State Dei>artment had no means
of deciding .as to the necessity of these payments the matter might properly In*
submitted to you. Your consideration and recommendation in this connection
should be guided by previous instructions. Acknowledge. 18025. Daniels."
I also recommended on this date to the Secretary of the Navy that the palace
band be authorizetl in the capacity as a band for the gendarmerie. The cost
per annum would be $20,000, including pay, uniform.s, instnmients, and music.
This cost would be additional to the allowance for the gendarmerie. The
President requested the reorganization of this band to add to the dignity of the
(iovemment. My message follows:
"Recommend that palace band be authorisced in caimcity of band for gen-
darmerie. Tost per annum, $20,000, including pay, uniforms, instruments, and
music. Cost to be additional to allowance for gendarmerie. President has
requeste<l organization of this band to a<ld to dignity of Governmt'ut. 22420.
Caperton."
I give herewith a statement of the customs receipts and exi)enditures to
December 31, 1915 :
Office of Administrator of Customs,
Port au Prince, Haiti.
Customn rereipts and expenditurcH.
Customs receipts to Dec. 31
Total eipoMlitures to Dec. 31 :
Constabulary
I*ublic works
Military and civil government
Customs service
Transferred to Haitian Government'.
(Jold.
Gourdes.
Gold.
.$1,266,932.46
$.33, 140. 70 I
.'56,634.73 i
44,862.80 1
l.'»,821.12 '
5.53,000.00
68,814.85
295,084.07
281,934. .33
103,945.96
138, 75a 00
703,450.35
Balance to Jan. I ' 563,473.11
Gourdes.
,026,945.26
888,529.21
138,416.05
> Includes 128,000 P. G. S. Railroad.
NoTE.—The account current for Les Cayes for the month of December, 191.5, had not been received.
expenditures include the December allotment.
Ch
Digitized by
412 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The ooniiiiandor in chief, Admiral F. F. Fiotcher, arrived at Port au Prince
on the \yi/ountiff at 8.30 a. ni. January 27. He paid official calls on the Presi-
dent of Haiti and tlie American minister and held a conference with the com-
mander cruiser squadron. The commander in chief left for Guantanamo at
5 p. m.
In answer to tlie department's radiogram 18025 of .January 25, I reported at
S.IO p. m. January 27 that the department of tlie interior wished to obtain lump
sums for undetiiunl payments ; for example, about $4,000 for secret service and
otlier exi)enses for December. I have insisted on detailed lists giving names
and amounts for salaries only prior to January 1, and so informed the Secre-
tary of the Navy, as follows:
" 1802."). Department of interior wishes to obtain lump sums for undefined
payments ; for example, about $4,000 for secret service and other expenses for
I)e<'tMnl»er. Have insisted on detailed lists givinp names and amounts for sala-
ries only prior to January 1. 20127. Cai)erton."
On Janunry 29 Capt. E. L. Beach, United States Navy, assumcnl commaiul of
the TcnneftHee and ('apt. H. O. Decker, United States Navy, assumed command
of the \ya8hiii{/tofi.
The flap of the commander cruiser squadron was on January 31, 1916, shifted
to tlie TcvucMsee, and so reported to the Secretary of the Navy, commander iu
chief, and forces in Haiti.
On Fel)ruary 2. 1910, local military officials under tbe titles of commandants
of ari'ondissements, chiefs of sections, and connnandants of communes, were
discharpe<l throughout Haiti. Military and police functions were to be carried
on by the jrendarmerie. On the preceding day, February 1, 109 different de-
tachments o<*cupied 109 different stations thnmghout Haiti, with instructions
which would suppress brigandage, disorder, etc.
On this date I sent the following radiogram to the Secretary of the Navy,
reporting conditions, etc. :
" Dr. Audln appointed minister of public instruction. Public works trans-
ferred to charge of Minister Borno. Government discharging many unneces-
sary officials in all departments. New method of paying Government em-
ployees is being received with general satisfaction. This method of paying
direct and on time should break up pernicious system of discounting salaries.
Many demands being made for back debts, but am not considering these at
present. 13402. Caperton."
On February 5. In reporting conditions to the department. I sent the follow-
ing radiogram :
" Kverj'thlng quiet. Thirteen hundred enlisted constabulary and 400 rural
guards not enlisted but under constabulary authority now performing all pa-
trol and police duty throughout Haiti. Bripindage and pillaging stopped.
Complete order everywhere exists. Peasants now have feeling of security and
are planting tlieir farms. General feeling of relief throughout country and
contentment with American occupation and intentions except amongst few dis-
contented politicians. Government and people eagerly awaiting American
a<*tion on treaty and Introduction of American capital. 23105. Caperton."
The Haitian Government, though well aware of the orders of the rn'te^l
States Government regardiifg the payment of expenses of the Haitian Goveni-
ment, and of the amounts that were available, was constantly sen ling man-
dates of ex])end tures entirely beyond the amount allotte<l for the Government's
support. This force<l me to return such maiulatcs to thi' Haitian Government
as they were not payable under my onlers.
In a message to the* department on February 0 I jlescrllK»d the situation «>«
follows :
'* Office of commanlant arrondissement declared abolished by Governnient.
<'iv 1 duties assigned to them are now being discharged by Government court
attorneys. President Informed me personally this morning that matters art*
looking much better now for Haitian Government in the sense that agitat'on
against It by discontented politicians is noticejibly losng force. Pe<»pU*
throughout Haiti glad of assurance of st»<'urity that detachments of gendarnu*^
will give. 2220G. Caperton."
On February 8 I reportel the financial situat On and made rwommendations
to the department in a message as follows:
"Am paying salaries public emph)yees by noiinegotlable nontransferrablf
check.*?. Injunction brought on bank in many cases attaching salaries. Law
permits not more than one-third salary attaduNl any month. If attachment^
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCOUPATIOlff OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 413
allowed and but two-thirds salary paid employee, system of discounting salaries
will continue to tiourish. Should attachments be not allowed, Government and
Jodges say act would show United States had but little regard or respect for
Haitian law and custom. Recommend that I be instructed to inform Govern-
ment that as these attachments Interfere with purpose of United States they
will not be regarded nnd bank w 11 1k» given military ortler to that effect. This
matter of discotmting salaries has been engaged In by comparatively few
speculators. It is believed that this system would entirely stop if it became
known that those who discount will not be aided by Un'.ted States in collecting
their claims. 22408. Caperton.'*
After some correspondence with the department on this question the de-
partment finally, on February 20, sent the following instructions in regard
tiiereto :
•* Flag 22408 and 0U312. Authority granted ; issue mil'.tary order disregard
any fonn of attachment of salary of Government employees, especially attach-
ment by opposition. It is desireil to respect Haitian law so far as relates to
honest debts and you may recognize attachment of one-third salary by court
injunction if based up«kn act on for legitimate debt with discounting of salarj'.
.Vcknowledge. 18019. Josephus Daniels."
As matters at this time were more or less quiet, I took this occasion, in
company with the American minister and the administrator of customs, to
make an inspeeti<m trip of the north and accordingly left Port au Prince
on February 15, Inspecting the following-named places: Mole St Nicholas,
Port de Paix, Cape Haitien, Fort Libertie, Ouanaminthe, Grande Riviere,
Bahon^ Milot, etc., and returned to Port au Prince on February 22, 1916. I
found conditions quiet in all places visited and was received most cordially
evttrsrwhere by the natives. Aftex this inspection trip of north Haiti I became
coDvinoed that the constabulary must be increased about one-third its present
number, and so recommended to the department that it be considered by the
commission and included in the treaty estimates.
With reference to the desire of the Haitian Government to send diplomatic
and consular r^resentatives to the various countries, on February 28 I sent
the following message to the department :
"Haitian Government proposes to send diplomatic consular representatives
ta varioiis European and American posts, in most cases relieving those now
on duty. Each appointee and each one relieved entitled by law to three
months' pay for expenses. Cost of these dianges, $17,725. Recommend that
all changes be postponed for the present and that expenditures be limited to
bringing home representatives not needed abroad. 12428. Caperton.*'
A committee of citissens called on me on March 1 and requested that I for-
ward a communication to the department stating that the resident investors
in the three interior loans were suffering on account of nonpayment of interest.
These bonds were held by many poor people who depended on this interest to
meet expensea There was no market for the sale of these bonds, largely due
to the lack of currency in circulation as pointed out by me before in messages
to the departm^it. This committee requested that payment of this interest,
amounting to about $100,000, be made immediately, thus relieving those de-
pendent on it and also assisting business conditions by placing money in cir-
culation. I reported these facts and approved this committee's request in a
message which I inunediately sent to the department.
With reference to the financial situation, on March 4 I sent the following
message to the department:
"16301. Since all customs funds to my credit are held by bank separate
from other funds, they are not now available for banking operations. If
bank were permitted to transfer part of balance to New York, It could
purchase good drafts when offered and transmit them to New York for credit
there, always at bank's own risk. In this connection attention is invited to
desirability of paying interest on foreign debt. Recounnend that semiannual
interest now overdue be paid as fast as funds are available and that the
bank be directed to commence immediately in order of dates past due. This
would cause demand here for foreign drafts and lower the discount rate and
would release funds now impounded. Consideration shouUi be given to the
question whether service of foreign debt is to be handled entirely through
New York or whether drafts on Europe can also be purchased for this pur-
pose, notably to cover coffee shipments. Latter would make a more free
market here, but might conflict with plans of State Department for reorganiz-
ing national debt. Owing to lack of information here regarding financial
plans for Haiti being developed in Washington it is difficult to make more
414 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SaNTO DOMINGO.
deflnte recommendations, but nuggest that this matter be referred to financial
adviser as soon as selected.
" No room for unfavorable public opinion if funds are to be used for service
foreign debt. Bank has used funds forwarded to purchase drafts, but in
absence of demand for transfer of credits abroad can not help situation much.
11104. Caperton."
In reply to the foregoing messages and recommendations the department
on March 15 sent me the following instructions :
"Flag 21129, 14101, 11104, and 21413. You are autborissed, with the con-
currence of the Haitian authorities, to apply $500,000 of suri)lus revenue of
Haiti now held by you on a per cent basis to the purposes for which the
revenue had been lawfully pledged by the Government of Haiti prior to
July 27, 1915. Statement furnished by the National Bank of Haiti shows the
amount whi(?h should have been apr>lied to each purpose during period of
American ocrcupancy ami proration should be made on basis of these figures.
As payments have been made under your direction for some objects to
which revenues were pledged, such payments should be deducted from the
pro rata share now available for these objects, and- in cases where actual
payments have exceeded the pro rata share nothing should be paid at this
time. It is believed that IVIurch 1 would serve as convenient for prorating
these payments, this distribution being authorized at present time more to
relieve financial stringency than to settle outstanding claims against Haitian
Government, and with this object in view^ the money should be placed in
circulation in Haiti with least possible delay. Should It be impossible to
purcha.se in Haiti sufficient drafts on Paris or Le Havre promptly to remit
money for service of foreign loans, arrange to have manager of bank under-
take purchase drafts on New Y^ork and have money transmitted to France
through New York agent of the bank. It was stated In department's 10130
(December) National Bank of Haiti probably only source from which an
immediate unsecured advancement (*ould be obtained, and it would seem no
steps looking toward securing such a loan should be taken prior to settlement
of controversy between bank and Haitian Government which Is now sub-
ject negotiations with Haitian commission. Assessment of loan and other
financial matters mentioned in your 21413 should await appointment of finan-
cial adviser, which will be made as soon as possible. Trade adviser of State
Department states it would seem that during the present high price on logwood
will probably be maintained until dyes can be obtained from Germany.
If method of prorating not thoroughly understood, further instructions will
be given. Acknowledge. 15016."
In connection with the foregoing, uiy message to the department on March 13
is quoted as follows :
" 14409 and my 16110. Balance in my account February 29, $850,000. Colle*
tions in February were $300,000, and transfers for disbursements were $180,00(1.
It is believe<l that revenues will not fall appreciably dui'ing next six months,
as coffee shipments will continue to some extent during summer and heavy
shipments of logwood are now waiting transportation. Information requested
from Department of Commer<*e as to probability of logwood market holding at
present high prices, with si)ecial reference to possibility of aniline dye Indus-
try Interfering. Exchange between gourdes and gold now 5 to 1, and effort
will be made to hold it there. IMiis can be done if present uncertain conditions
can be remedied. Extremely Important that immediate steps be taken to set-
tle all valid claims against Haitian Government and thus restore feeling of
confidence. It is earnestly hoped that bonded indebtedness will l>e consoli-
dateil and that all .special liens cm various custom revenues will be abolished:
otherwise it will In* impossible to properly revise tariff. If this be done, pro-
rating of available balance as contemplated would be unne<'essary, as all just
claims shoiild be paid regardless of j»artic!ilar affectations involved. If |K)ssible,
reconmiend inmie<liate short-term loan of $500,000. to be expended by American
occupancy in settling Haitian debts, to be use<i in addition to balance of custom
receii)ts available for that purpose. A commission shoidd be appointed as
soon as possible to pass on all claims. This loan should later be Included in
consolidated debt, and any balance should be available for public works. Delay
in appointment of financial adviser and general receiver is having bad effect, af
no permanent steps can be taken pending their arrival. 21413. Caperton."
(\)nditions in Mexico having become acute, the following messages have been
received from the department: "In case circumstances should mate It neces-
sary, IT. S. S. Prairie will be sent Mexico with regiment marines. 130il.*' And:
" Do not relinquish any part military ccmtrol now exercised JiJX^5f|y> ^^ Haiti
INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 415
nor put end to martial law as now in force without receipt further instruc-
tions. Answer. 12011." I on March 12 advised the department In a message
as follows: " Shore forces now in Haiti not more than 1,700 men. This force
minimum possible to maintain present military control of country and can not
be reduce<l by single unit without greatly prejudicing United States control
and prestige here. Constabulary are neither sufflciently trained nor reliable
to be depended upon without support of all forces present. Urgently advise
against weakening our present position this island. 23512. Caperton."
In connection with the approaching s^pision of Congress, which was to as-
semble during tlie flrst part of April, camfmigning was going on amongst sena-
tors and deputies to embarrass the Government. This information came to me
from various reliable sources. It was well aiH>r^iated that with the American
forces present a revolution was impossible, so other means were adopted to force
the Dartiguenave government out, being planned somewhat as follows: When
Congress met in April, if the enemies of the Dartiguenave government were
strong enough to do so-, a vote of censure and lack of confidence in the Gov-
ernment was to be passed and the President imi)eached. The charges were to
be, '* violations of the constitution."
In eonnectiim with this campaigning l*i*esident Dartiguenave made a state-
ment to my rei>reHentatlve, (^apt. E. L. Beach. United States Navy, late In
Februarj-, which was substantially as follows :
'* I do not expect the enemies of the Government will l)e in sufllcient force
to cause such a vote to be passed, I expect to l>e able to control (^ongreas. I
have enemies because of the reforms I have instituted, which have been to curtnil
unnecessary exf)enses and discharge unnecessary employees, cut fraud out of
the pension list and out of Government contracts. Because I have not acc^led
to demands ^lade by siune who rated high the value of their services and for other
personal reasons. Because I have suppressed the war department, army, and
palace guard. Every refusal made was for Haiti's good and with the advice and
confederation of American officers. There is but one thing to do — to revise the
constitution and make it fit the present neeils. The following changes are
imperative : There are 39 senators and 102 deputies — double the number needed.
Their salaries alone amount to one-seventeenth of the entire revenue of the
ctMintry. The number must be retluced to less than half the present number.
Article 6 of the present constitution provides that no foreigner may acquire or
hold propert>\ This prevents foreign capital from entering. Article 6 must be
suppressed. The re^ised constitution must suppress the war department and
army and substitute the gendarmerie. The magistracy and civil sen-ice must be
reformed. And there are other needed reforms. My government will urge the
chambers to take the necessar>' steps to revise the constitution on. these lines.
Should Congress be hostile and refuse there will be but one thing to do. I
do not ask the American Government to advise me to do this, nor to express
any opinion on this matter, but I request the forward assurance of Admiral
Caperton that my Government will receive complete military protection. I
rimll declare both chambers dissolved. I will call for a constituent assembly
which will be formed of about 50. representatives, patriotic Haitians, who
will revise the constitution according to present needs. I request you to explain
this situation to Admiral Cai)erton and state that I dea're from him an
a^urance that should I be forced to disolve the chambers my Government will
receive the protection of the United States, if neetle<l."
Minister Bomo, who was present when the President made the foregoing
i*tatement to Capt. Beach, stated to Capt Beach that the President hoped that
Admiral Caperton would have Capt. Beach explain the situation and purposes of
the Haitian Government In detail to American officials in Washington. This wjis
just prior to Capt. Beach's trip to the l^nite<l States on the Tennesnee.
The above facts were reporte<l to the department in substance, and in reply I
>va8 authorized to support the Government.
About the 10th of March the President sent copies of the following letter to
the various representatives of the Government in the various civil districts
and to the various commissaries of the Government near the various civil courts :
IOTH of MAHrH.
To the representative of the Government in the ciril district of .
^ My Dear Commissioner : The president of the premanent committee of the
Senate, doubtless In accordance with the agreement of a majority of his col-
leagues, has made public call to the members of the legislature with a view
of assuring their meeting on the flrst Monday in April for the accomplishment
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416 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
of w«iik which the Presidtnit hns not yet been nlile to fully unUerstaml tho
diJiracter.
In view of tliis uniiHiiuI net. I Imve thoufrht, and am in njrreenient witli the
nienil)ers of my c*al>inet, that it is ileHirai)le to antii'ipate a niisumlerstandinir
by making known througli ycni to the senators and deputies who live in your
<llstrict the reasons why it will he desirable, in spite of the opinion of the
permaTUMit committee, that the oi^eninjf of the session of Congress for 191G
.should not take phice until the (iovernmont is in possession of full informa-
tion in rejrard to the legislative work for the year. No member of the legisla-
ture may ignore the facts that since the meeting of the convention a commis-
sion has left for Washington with all instructhms and powers necessarj^ in
order to find, with the assistjnice of the gcKHl offices of the Uultetl States,
moneys to liquidate the debts of tlie (iovernuient for 1914 and 1915, to providt*
to the public services sufficient resources f4)r 1915 and 1916; to find capital
to redeem the interior debt and pay the budget of 1916 and 1917 ; to organize
the new public service of Haiti; to ascertain a method- of reconciling tlie duties
of the receiver general with tlie privileges guaranteed to tlie bunk by its con-
tract; to reconstitute the ofllce of the secretary of treasury; to adjust the dls-
4igreement with the national railrcmd ; to harmonize our laws with the nile
4)f the convention ; and in a hiyal etiort, undertaken in common with the offi-
cials of the American Government, to prepare the solutions of problems essen-
tial to national work, which should have the favorable attention of the legis-
lature this year.
But ailthough it has in no sense neglecteil its mission and although it lias
already made appreciable progress, the commission has not yet reached thi*
end of its work, and before it returns the President can not be fully informeil
41S to its intentions. ^
Who under these conditions will compose the legislative body? Is it desire*!
that we shall again have a session of eight or nine months entirely given over
to useless agitations? And, furthermore, where may the money be obtaineil
which will be necessary in onier to pay the salaries of the representatives?
All these considerations, Mr. Commissioner, appear to me to be sufficient to
decide me, in agreement with the cabinet, to recommend to you that you bring
to the knowledge of the members of the legislature actually present lu your dis-
trict that the President has not been convinc*ed by the permanent committee oi
the senate of the advisability of a meeting of the Congress in April, and he
will not accept any responsibility for anything that may result from such a
meeting.
The' President does not ignore his obligations to the National Congress and
he has no idea of taking away their prerogatives. But at a time which is so
completely dominated by the circumstances under which we live at present.
. why should we consider inflexible rules which have never before appeared to
have the inflexible character which it is now considered oppportune to accotti
to them? And while nothing can relieve the responsible officials of their duty
to account for the business of the Uepublic, to prepare the budget for the State,
and to reassemble the elements of the national forces, is it not right that they
should be permitted to choose the time' when this work can be best accom-
plished?
It is with the certainty that these wise reflections will be appreciated by the
members of the assemblies who live in your district that I renew, monsieur the
commissioner, assurances of my high consideration.
DABTiaUENAVE.
Notwithstanding the efforts of the President to have Congress postpone its
meeting until the return of the commission, then in Washington to consult with
the United States relative to the details and operation of the treaty, etc., the
Haitian Congress met on April 3 and 4, but no quorum was present.
The official journal of Haiti, Le Moniteur, issued on April 5, published two
decrees of the President of Haiti dated April 5, 1916. One dissolved the senate
and decreed that the chamber of deputies shall be convened exclusively as a
constituent assembly to, in cooperation with the executive power, revise the
constitution of October 9, 1889, and perform such legislative worlc as may be
called for by the President. The other decree created a council of state, com-
posed of 21 members appointed by the President, whose duties shall be: First,
to give its advice on all projects which the Government deems fit to send to it ;
second, to prepare and formulate laws, decrees, and other acts on matters on
w^hich the Government shall desire its action ; third, to give its advice on all
questions which may be submitted to it by the President JUjd his f ablnet. It
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 417
was understood that this constituent assembly would revise the constitution to
accord with the recent treaty and that the council of state would act with the
Government in drawing up and preparing sudi changes and laws as might be
necessary for this purpose. I therefore, on April 5, informed the Secretary of
the Navy and Commander in Chief of the following by radiogram.
(The following is a translation of the decrees of the President of Haiti as
published In Le Monlteur on April 5 dissolving the senate and creating the.
council of state:)
Decree Concerning the Council of State.
Dartlguenave, President of the Republic.
Whereas it has been shown by experience that legislative business requires
a special preparation, which consequently necessitates the presence of a suitable
organ with the political assemblies and with the executive authority :
DECREES.
Article 1. A council of state is appointed whose functions are :
1. To give advice on all plans which the Government may consider tit to
submit to it.
2. To prepare and draw up bills, decrees, decisions, or other documents con-
cerning subjects in regard to which the Government requires Its attention.
S. To give advice on all questions submitted to it by the President of the
Republic and the secretaries.
Art. 2. Councilors of state may be charged by the executive authority tjo sup-
port before the legislative body the bills which have been passed by the council
of state.
Art. 3. The council of state Is composed of 21 members, appointed by the
President of the Republic. The secretaries of state have tJie power to partici-
pate as a deliberative body at the meetings of the general assembly and sec-
tions.
Art. 4. The bureau of the council of state, composed of a president and two
secretaries. Is elected by the council by secret ballot.
The mandate of the bureau lasts for one year and may be Indefinitely re-
newed. In the absence of the President the council is presided over by the
senior section president.
Art. 5. The functions of councilor of state are Incompatible with every other
public salaried function. Nevertheless, specialists, engineers, jurists, or others
may be detached from a public service to take part in the work of the council
as extraordinary councilors, with a consulting voice; and in this case, during
their special mission, they retain the rights, prerogatives and salary belonging
to their former positions but are not able to draw their salary with that from
the council of state.
Art. 6. The council of state is divided into four sections. A public adminis-
trative regulation will decide on the Interior order of the operations of the
connciL on the division of these operations among the sections, on the func-
tioning of the general asswnbly, on the rotation of members between the sections,
on the organization of the personnel which will be nominated by the President
of the Republic, and in general on nil the measures necessary to the satisfac-
tory running of the institution.
Art. 7. A monthly remuneration of $150 will be handed to each councillor
of state. ^
Issued at the National Palace. Port ati Prince, April, 1916, the one hundre<l
and thirteenth year of the independence.
Dartiouenave.
By the President :
Constantin Mayard,
Tlie Secretary of the Interior.
Ehile Elie,
The Secretary of Finance and Commerce.
E. DORNEVAL,
The Secretary of Justice and Public Worship.
Loins BoRNO,
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Public Works.
Leon Audain,
Secretary of Public Instruction.
A. Andre,
Secretary of War, Navy, and Agnculture. Digitized by GoOqIc
418 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
DKC'RKE.
Dartlj?iienave, I^resident «)f the UepubUc.
Whereiis the life and develoimient of nations obey the natural laws to whidi^
the public* law must adapt itself:
Whereas for a long time pul)Hc opinion an<l tlie <Ure<*tins authoritie^ir haw
i-ecognized the necessity of reforming the existing constituticm : and the tWif
former legislatures have formally manifested their willingness to i\o so;
Whereas to the reasons generally ndniitte<l up to last year there have l>eeii
added others of still more urgent a nature, iTeate<l by the new conditions ini-
I)ose<l upon the Nation ;
AVhereas it Is lndisiH»nsable, in order that the conventiim nf St»pteml>er P».
191;"). may be proi)erly applieil and may pnMluce the advantages eml)odietl in it.
to accomplish the revision at as early a date as iK)ssil>le, of a large number
of constitutional texts, notably those comvrning public defense, flnmices, hK-al
institutions, re|M)rts of the public authorities, tlie number of deputies, ami of
senators, the right of real estate projjerty;
Whereas with the present proce<Uire of this ivvision it Is in nowise i»o»sIbh'
to accomplish, in the proper time, these urgent reforms and a di*cislve measure
of a character conforming best to the national necessities and t«i the <leiuo-
cratic principles governing our institutions, must be intr<Kluced without delay :
Whereas the i)resent chamber of deputies was formed by a siHM'ial iM»pular
c(»nsultation which Invested it directly with constituent authority, and this
distinctive fundamental character is not i)ossesse<l by the sc»nate of the Ue-
pubUc :
For these reasons and 4»n the advice (»f the<c<mncil of the secretaries at state.
r>ECRRE8.
Article 1. The senate of the Uepublic is dissolve*!.
Art. 2. Tlie chamber (»f deputies will be conveneil in exclusive caimcity of
con.stituent assembly to revise, in coopiMiition with the executive authority,
the con.stitution of October 9, 1889, and take In hand organized dcxTees of
public administration and all other acts of an urgent character the plans of
which will be presente<l to it by the executive.
It will consist of an absolute majority <if its members. (A majority of one-
more than half the number of members. )
Art. 3. A salary of $3tK) i)er month will l)e allowe<l to the c<mstitnents pre^tent
in their seat.
Art. 4. The present decree will be publlshe<l and executed by the stH'retaries
of state, each acting with res|)ect to that which c*oncerns him.
Issue<l at the National I*alace, l*«>rt-jlu-I*rince. Ajiril 5, 191 (>. one htindnn!
and thirteenth year of the lndei>endence.
Pa RTir.r kn .wtc.
By the President :
CONSTANTIN Ma YARD.
Secretary of the Interior.
Leon At^datn,
Secretory of Puhlie Intftruetioti.
Km ILK Eli*:,
Secretary of Finance ami Connnerre.
A. Andre,
Secretary of War. \ary, and Ayricntlnre.
E. Dorneval,
Secretary of •/uxtice and Public Worshiih
IX)Uls BORNO,
Secretary of Foreiyn Affairs and Pnhlie WorkH.
The Senate did not meet on April 6. as on coming to the senate building it
found the doors locke<l. The permanent committee met in the house of a mem-
ber a lid deciiled to recjuest the keys from the secretary of the Interior. The
Chamber of Deputies did not meet. On this date the President of Haiti <lirecte«l
a lieutenant of gendarmerie to lock the doors of the senate building. Tliis lieu-
tenant, A. .\ugust DaunuM* by name, locked the building at about 9.45 a. ni.. an.i
then took the keys to the President, who then directed IJeut. Dauiueo to give
them to the minister of interior, who was present. This Daumec did at about
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LNQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 419
10.30 a. m. The Senate considering this measure ratlier irregular decided to
meet on April 7 at 10 a. m. at a prirate dwelling. What action was contemplated
by it was not then known. I tooli no action in this matter other than to pre-
serre peace and order.
I reported the ahove facts to the Secretary of tlie Navy in a message us fol-
lows:
'* In accordance with orders of the President, the senate building was locked
on April 6. The president of the permanent ctmimittee of the Senate have in-
forme<l me that the legislative bmly views this procedure as au attemi^t ui^ui
national sovereignty and that they have decided to meet at a private dwelling,
in-eserving all legal rights. An) taking no action except preserving peace and
<»rder. 11308.
" Capebton."
On April 7 I received a message from the department asking if the Haitian
<»ovemm*ent had agreed to the distribution of the surplus revenue as authorized
by the department, and in reply thereto T advised the department as follows :
'• Haitian Government agrees to distribution, although opposed to payment
interest foreign debt at this time. Government has published in newspapers fact
that distribution is being made and money has been transferred for that pur-
pose. 21407.
" Caperton."
On April 8 members of the i)ermanent committee of the dissolved Senate and
several other senators met in the house of one of the members and decided to
protest against the action of the President in dissolving the legislative bodies.
Some of the deputies ct)llecte<l in the yard of the Senate and decided to take
the same action as the Senate. Some of these deputies were intoxicated.
On April 11 about 60 members of the dissolved Chamber of Deputies, who
were to be convoked in accordance with the President's decree as a constituent
assembly, met in the yard of the senate building. No work was done except the
preparation of a " pn)c^ verbal," stating that no quorum was present.
On this date the President issueil a statement in the official newspai)er, Le
Mtmlteur, in which he stated that if the deputies would not perform their duties
iiH a con.«ititupnt assembly he would call a general election for a new constituent
ns.sembly.
On April 17 at a meeting of the "notables" of the city a committee was
formed, with ex-President Legitime as preshient of the committee, to interview
President I>artiguenave. This committee of prominent nonjjartisan citizens
visited the President in an endeavor to bring alxmt an amicable understanding
l>etween the President and the legislative bcKlies.
On April 19, by appointment, 1 held a conference with the President of
Haiti in regard to the possibility of the Government reaching an agreement *
with the legislative bodies in conne<-tlon witli the necessary changes to th%i
<-onstitution of Haiti. There were present at this conference, l)esides myself,
the President of Haiti: the secretjiry of state for foreign affairs; the com-
mander of the exi)editionar5' forces ashore: Lieut. Col. Charles (t. Long, United
States Marine Corps: Lieut. Commander W. 1). Leahy, commanding officer of
the Dolphin, flagship, wh(» since February 23 had been acting as my chief of
*5taff ; and the official (iovernment interpreter. Depuy.
I i)ointe<l out the extreme desirability that the (Government and the opiH)-
^ition to the Government should reach an amicable agreement. I stated to the
1 'resident that 1 had been told by presumably reliable persons of the opiK)sltion,
lis well as by members of the nonpartisan citizens of Haiti, that such an
Agreement was not inu)ossible. The President agreed Uy receive suggesti<ms
from the op|x>sition and to give such suggestions full and honest consideration
with a view of taking such action as was iH)SsibIe for the welfare of Haiti. In
ortler that any negotiations which ndght be started might not be interfeivd
with, the members of the dissolved chambers were reipiested not to meet in
their assumed capacity as legislative IxKlles.
On April 23 >lr. Borno, secretary (►f state for foreign affairs, came on board
the Dolphin for an interview. Mr. Homo at this conference discusse<I the basis
of agreement proposed by the opi>osition and made a verbal statement of a
** basis of agreement '* which would be satisfactoi-j- to his Government.
On April 25, at a conference consisting of ex-l*resident Legitime, Minister
Bailly-Blanchard, M. Leon, president of the Chamber of Deputies, (-ol. Waller, ^
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420 INQUIRY INTO OCUUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Lieut. Commander Leahy, and myself, a proposed basis of agreement between
the Government and opposition, which had been previously pr^^pared by the
Chamber of Deputies, was discussed at length. The opposition made no mate-
rial concessions to the Government. Following this an appointment was made
with the President, at which the following were present : Ex-President legitime.
Minister Borno, M. Mathon, member of citizens* committee. Col. Waller, Lieut.
Commander Leahy, and myself. After reading the opposition's propose<l basis
of agreement the President of Haiti informe<l ex-l*resldeut Legit! nio tliat it was
not possible for him to consider it, and that further discussion of the paper was
useless. At the completion of this discussion, the President prepanMl a modifieil
statement of the Government's proposed basis of agret»ment, which seemed to
concede to the opposition in every material point which they desired, except
that his decree of April 5 should not be revoked and that the two houses of the
legislature should in this session make a complete revision of the crmstitution in
order that it might be placed entirely in agreement with the Auieri<ran-Haltlan
convention and fit the new conditions which liad arisen in the country liecause
of the convention; and that the two chambers after organizing as a national
constituent assemlily and appointing a coniuiittee to formulate the necessiiry
changes in the constitution, should adjourn for two months In order that in-
formation necessary for the formulation of changes might be received from the
Haitian commission then in Wasldngton. This last stipulation was made by
the Government in order to avni<l the large expenditures of pul)lic money which
would be necessary In order to keep Congress in session landing tlie receii)t of
information from the Haitian commission in Washington, when tliere w^mld
1)6 no useful work for them to perform.
After extended conferences with the two sides of tlie controversy, it was
evident that the President justitietl his decree and action subsecjuent thereto
on the necessity for obtaining a i>rompt and comi)lete revision of the constitution
in order that it might agree with the American-Haitian convention, and the new
conditions which Imd arisen in virtue of this conmiisson ami also other re-
fonns which had for many years been ivcognized as ne<*essary. He was alsa
influenced by the necessity for economy in tlie expenditure of the public funds.
On April 27 the dissolved Senate and Chamber of Deputies met in a rented
house and organized as a national assembly. This was done contrary to an
agreement. I have since been assuretl by the president of the dissolved
Chamber of Deputies that the meeting was due entirely to a misunderstanding
in regard to the necessity for permission to meet. No work was done other
than that of forming a national assembly. It was then stipulated and under-
stood by the dissolved legislative bodies that there would be no further meet-
ings until an agreement was reache<l by the opposing factions.
At 8 o'clock p. m. on the 29th of April the president of the Senate and the
president of the Chamber of Deputies, with several of their colleagues, arrived
at the place of meeting and the president of the Senate showed me a letter
signed by a majority of the Senate directing him to refuse acceptance of -the
basis of agreement, unless it could be stipulated that the legislative bodies
should retain all their legislative functions. The president of the Chamber of
Deputies at the same time informed me that his chamber could not agree to the
proposal without the concurrence of the Senate.
I then informed the President that the failure of my efforts as a friendly
intermediary to obtain an agreement between the Government ami the opposi-
tion made, it necessary, in order to insure the maintenance of i)eace and *»rder,
that I should comply with my orders to support the Government of Haiti, anil
of my intention to support it.
This information was then given to the president of the senate and to the
president of the chamber of deputies, with the request that it be connuunk-attHl
to the members of the two dissolved legislative bodies.
During many conferences with the opposition to the Government the op|x».«i-
tlon had stated that there was much dissatisfaction to certain members of
the cabinet, but none in regard to the President himself. I therefore fully
informed the President of this matter, and he statetl he was aware of thiV;
dissatisfaction and had already prepared the necessary papers for the disiso-
lutiou of his cabinet.
At 11 a. m., May 2, the minister of foreign relations, Borno, called uiK>n me
by appointment to discuss the pres(»nt situation. He informeil me that t!ie
President of Haiti had completed arrangements for dissolving his cabinet,
but had not yet definitely selected all of the members of the new cabinet.
He also informed me that the President was considering the names of men to
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 421
serve on his council of state, which was to be formed In accordance with the
provisions of the decree of April 5. and that It was the President'*; desire to
obtain in this council of state the services of some prominent members of the
opposition to the Government, if they could be induced to serve, his idea
being to demonstrate that he wished all factions to be representetl in the work
of revising the constitution.
At 2.30 p. m., on May 2 I also met on board the flagship, by appointment,
the president of the senate, the president of the chamber of <leputies, and
several members of the two chambers. These men requested that I make a
further effort to continue negotiations looking toward an agreement beAveen
than and the President, and assured me that the two chambers were now
willing to sign the basis of agreement, which they had refused to consider on
April 29. In view of the fact that I had informed both the Government and
the opposition on April 29 that the failure of the opposition at that time to
agree had made further conciliatory efforts on my part useless, and that I
would therefore support the recognised and established Government, and in
view also of the fact that the Government had already taken steps, which
could not easily be withdrawn, to carry out its work of reform with the as-
surance that I would support it, such as dissolving his cabinet, etc., I informed
the visiting members of the opposition that it would not be possible for me
to inaugurate any further negotiations, and that I regretted extremely the
failure of my efforts to bring about an amicable agreement.
With reference to the dissolution of the cabinet by the President, on May 3
I was informed in writing by Minister Borno that the President's cabinet had
taidered its resignation.
During the past few days the reports from Santo Domingo showed that the
situation there was fast approaching a crisis; therefore on May 9 I reported
the conditions to the Secretary of the Navy and stated that I would proceed
with the Dolphin to Santo Domingo at daylight on May 10, to arrive there the
evening of May 11.
On May 11, while en route to Santo Domingo on the Dolphin, I sent the
following message to the department, the information contained therein having
been reported to me by radio from Port au Prince :
"New cabinet announced in papers. Borno foreign affairs, public works,
public instruction temporarily; Edmond Hereaux, finance; Constant Vieux,
Ulterior; Domeval, justice, agriculture. No communication with San Domingo
City. 02211.
" Capebton."
I arrived at Santo Domingo City on the Dolphin at 6.05 a. m.. May 12, 1916.
On July 7 I received by cable a message from the department stating that
the department desired me to relieve Admiral C. McR. Winslow and asked
what was the earliest date possible for me to get away in case my relief was
sent down. They further added that owing to the peculiar conditions it was
desired that my staff remain with my successor, at least, for the present.
On July 18, 1916, at 9 a. m., I turned over the command of the cruiser squad-
ron to Rear Admiral Charles F. Pond, my successor, and proceeded via Wash-
ington. D. C, to take command of the Pacific Fleet, in accordance with my
orders, and on July 28 relieved Admiral Winslow as commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet, assuming the rank of admiral.
Mr. Angell. It is entered in there as a statement that it was requested, and I
was trying to find out the details of the request, if you could recall.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Monday, October 24, 1921, at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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I NQUIRY IiNTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MONBAT, OCTOBEB 24, 1921.
UNiTia) States Senate,
Select (Dommittee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D. C,
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment. Senator
MedlU McCormlck (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators McCormick, Oddle, and Poraerene.
Also present : Mr. Ernest Angell and Maj. Edwin N. McClellan, United States
Marine Corps, in their respective representative capacities as hereinbefore
indicated ; and Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, as counsel for the committee.
STATEMENT OF HAJ. GEN. GEO. BABNETT, UNITED STATES
MABINE CORPS, COMMANDING THE DEPABTMENT OF THE
PACIFIC, SAN FBANCISCO, CALIF.
The Chaibman. General, will you give your name and rank to the stenog-
rapher of the committee?
Gen. Babnett. George Barnett, major general. United States Marine CJorps,
commanding the Department of the Pacific ; station, San Francisco, Calif.
The Chairman. During what period were you commandant of the Marine
Corps?
Gen. Babnett. From February 25, 1914, to June 30, 1920.
The Chairman. This covered the entire period of the American occupation
in Haiti?
Gen. Barnett. Until that time. They are still there; yes, sir.
The Chairman. You began your service before we landed in Haiti?
Gen. Barnett. I did; yes, sir.
The Chairman. So that what transpired in Haiti up to the time of your
transfer to San Francisco was during the period of your command of the
Marine Corps?
Gen. Babnett. It was.
The Chairman. I think, General, if you will proceed to comment upon your
report and upon your communications regarding the allegations of harsh usage
of the natives of Haiti by the Marine Corps, in your own way, that that would
be the shortest road to what we have in mind.
Senator Pomerene. Mr. Chairman, has that report been incorporated in our
proceedings here?
The Chairman. It has been published by the department.
Senator Pomerene. How long is it?
Gen. Barnett. It is 110 pages in this report of the Secretary of the Navy.
It is in there I have not doubt.
Maj. McClellan. It is published in the report of the Secretary of the Navy
for 1920.
Senator Pomerene, Can we each be furnished a copy of that report?
Gen. Barneit. There were plenty of them at headquarters ; I have no doubt
there are plenty yet.
Senator Pomerene. I saw at the time newspaper abstracts from it.
Gen. Barnett. They took a very few abstracts from that.
Senator Pomerene. But I would like to have the opportunity to read it.
Gen. Barnett. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I^ me, then, ask that Maj. McClellan supply to the com-
iirittee copies of all reports to which reference is made — the Mayo report and
Maj. Turner's report — in so far as that has been printed or mimeographed.
fi22e9- -21— PT 2 21 423
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424 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MaJ. McClellan. iTes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I do that seeking to economize in the printing.
Senator Pohebene. That is, Admiral Mayo's report?
The Chairman. Yes.
(Jen. Barnett. Admiral Mayo was the president of the court of inquiry.
Senator Pomerene. Has Maj. Turner's rqK)rt ever been printed or mimeo-
graphed?
Maj. McClellan. No, sir. Maj. Turner's report^ from what I can gather as
to what is in the committee's mind, consists of all the inyestigatlons which were
initiated by Gen. Bamett's order
Gen. Barnett. That is rig^t
Maj. McCi£LLAN. After he had read certain court-martial records.
Gen. Barnett. That is right.
Maj. McClellan. A naval court of inquiry was carried on both in Haiti and
in the United States.
The Chairman. I want all that correspondence.
Gen. Barnettt. I will say here, Senator, that the Turner report which you
mentioned had not been received up to the time I was relieved as commandant
of the Marine Corps ; but since I was relieved, in the headquarters of the Marine
Corps I saw a copy of Maj. Turner's report, as forwarded by Col. RusselL What
action was taken on that report I do not know ; I was not informed.
The Chairman. We want all the correspondence, and that we will incorporate
In the record.
Gen. Barnett. As I remember, an investigation was ordered by Col. Rnssdl
immediately upon receipt of my lette**, and a report by Maj. Turner was after-
wards forwarded to headquarters after I left, and I think in that report as I
remember it — I Just casually glanced over it one day after I was relieved, as a
matter of information — I think Maj. Turner's report was pretty explicit and
recommended certain trials by court-martial.
The Chairman. Did Col. Lay have to do with that investigation?
Gen. Barnett. Col. Lay had this to do with it. In the organization of head-
quarters of the Marine Corps when I was commandant, as always, all court-mar-
tial records, when marines are tried, first are sent to the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy, who, before forwarding them to the Secretary of the Navy for ap-
proval or disapproval, sends them to the commandant of the Marine Corps,
who, by Indorsement, returns them to the Judge Advocate General before they
go to the Secretary of the Navy. Col. Lay was in the office of Gen. Haines, who
was adjutant and inspector of the Marine Corps at that time and therefore in
charge of the records of the Marine Corps, and Gen. Haines had detailed Col
Lay to read all court-martial records. Of course, I did not have time enough
to read all the court-martial records carefully, but it was Col. Lay's duty to
read all the court-martial records carefully, and if they contained any matter
of importance, out of the ordinary, routine matter, instead of Just preparing a
formal Indorsement upon them and returning them directly to the Judge Advo-
cate General, before making any indorsement he would bring them to my atten-
tion, and I would read the records then.
The court-martial cases of Pvt. Johnson and Pvt. McQuilkin were considered
by Col. Lay of such an unusual character that, after he read them, he brought
them to Gen. Haines, his superior in his own department, and Gen. Haines read
them and brought them to me. I read those two cases.
Senator Pomerene. Let me ask you a preliminary question there. You used
the expression, "to read all court-martial proceedings"?
Gen. Barnett. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomerene. How many of them were there? "*
Gen. BARNjrrr. A great many.
Senator Pomerene. Arising
Gen. Barnett. Not In this case. I mean all court-martial jecords in the
Marine Corps. If a general court-martial any place in the world tries a marine,
the record is sent to the Judge Advocate General's office, and then, according to
routine, it comes to me as commandant of the Marine Corps.
Senator Pomerene. These two cases were our own cases, were they?
Gen. BARN>rrT. Our own eases, the cases of two marines who were tried in
Haiti by a general court-martial. Those cases were brought to me, and I read
them over, and was so startled by the disclosures shown in the evidence, and
particularly by the statement of the counsel for the accused, who was a Ueut
Spear, at that time in the Marine Corps
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 425
The Chaibman. Incorporate in the record Lieut. Spear*8 argument.
Gen. Babnktt. Lieut. Spear in his argument for his client stated tliat these
marines — I think he was counsel for Pvt. Johnson — that in this case where they
were tried and convicted, the court should not judge them too harshly, because
they were following a general custom, and that he, Lieut. Spear, had himself
seen many similar cases of executions of that kind.
The Chaibman. Executions without trial?
Gen. Babwett. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomebene. Tou mean down in Haiti?
Gen. Babnett. Yes, sir. Now, I wish to say right here, which has, in my
opinion, a very decided bearing on my act in that case, that in the first place
I was commanding officer of the whole Marine Corps. A certain condition
was brought to my attention by the records in these two cases, and particularly
by the statement of counsel for the accused, and I considered that some drastic
action was necessary at once. I, being commanding officer, it was up to me to
aet, and I took the acti<m that I thought at that time, and still think, regard-
less of any report of the court of inquiry or anybody else, that I had to take.
I settled that case myself, and I settled it promptly and quickly, and I settled
it efficiently. I wrote an official letter on the 27th day of September, 1919,
the day these records came to my attention.
The Chaibman. A letter to whom?
Gen. Babnett. A letter to Col. Russell, the brigade commander of the marines
stationed in Haiti. I took what I considered at that time, and what I still
consider, proper action. I claim that nobody had a right to question my mode
of dohig that work as long as mv work was done efficiently. It was done
efficiently for this reason, because Col. Russell got my letter, and got my per-
sonal letter which I wrote five days later, because I had reread the cases In
the meantime and was so impressed with the importance of these two cases
that I wrote another letter, which I have copied in my report, stating to
CJol. Russell in the second letter, or reiterating, what I said before, the absolute
necessity for investigation.
Senator Pomebene. Nearly all of this is Greek to me.
Gen. Babnett. I will be glad to enlighten you.
Senator Pomebene. Tell me who Johnson and McQuilkin were and what
the charges were.
Gen. Babnett. Pvt Johnson and Pvt. McQuilkin were two privates in the
Marine Corps stationed in the province of Hinche, under the command of a
temporary lieutenant in the Marine Corps in Haiti named Brokaw. Accord-
ing to the evidence produced in these two cases, these
Senator Pomebene. What was the charge against them?
Gen. Babnett. The charge was murder.
Senator Pomebbnb. Of some nativeT
Gen. Babnett. Of two or three natives. The record, which you will have,
shows that these two or three people who were killed — ^two at least were
Haitian prisoners — and that they were taken out by order of Lieut. Brokaw,
in charge of these two marines, Johnson and McQuilkin, and put alongside
of their graves, and Johnson and McQuilkin were ordered to shoot them,
which they did.
The Chaibman. By whom?
Gen. Babnett. Brokaw. Brokaw has since been committed to an insane
asylum, and he is there, I think. I stated in my report, as will appear in this
report, that no action could be taken in the case of Lieut Brokaw because he
was in an insane asylum at that time.
The Chaibman. Who was commandant of the marines or constabulary, or
both, in Haiti at the time?
Gen. Babnett. At that time the commandant of the marines was Col.
Russell, John H. Russell, and In charge of the gendarmerie, as they call it in
Haiti, was CoL A. S. Williams.
Senator Pomebene. What was the pretended reason for the execution of
these natives?
Gen. Babnett. That I have no knowledge of.
Senator Pomebene. By Johnson and McQuilkin?
Gen. Babnett. They never tried to show any reason for it whatever. I would
siJS^e^ there. Senator, that it would be better to get the records of the courts-
martial and read the exact charges rather than rely on my memory, because
this was two years ago last September.
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426 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Chaikman. We have the records.
Gen. Barnett. That was, as I say, over two years ago; but I am perfectly
convinced in my own mind, knowing this case from A to Z, that it was the first
case of any unlawful action by any Marine in Haiti — the first knowledge that
ever came to my desk.
Senator Pomebene. How soon did you learn about It after it occurred?
Gen. Barnett. A very short time. The case was forwarded to the Judge
Advocate General immediately after the trial, and on the same day or the day
after, probably — a few days, anyhow — he forwarded the case to me. That
was on the 27th day of September, 1919, that I got the record. On that same
day I read it carefully and put an indorsement on It returning it to the Judge
Advocate General; and knowing that that case, in the ordinary course of
events, would in a very few days be presented by the Judge Advocate General
to the Secretary of the Navy for approval or disapproval, having put a formal
indorsement on it, and having written the same day to Col. Russell, the com-
manding officer in Haiti, telling him my views, as formed on account of this
testimony and the statement of counsel for the accused, I went to the Secretary
of the Navy and told him that I had gotten two cases from Haiti which dis-
turbed me very nmch. but that I had written the necessary order to Col. Rus-
sell for complete correction of the faults, as disclosed by those two cases. He
said all right.
Senator Pomere:^je. It was pretty hard to correct them if they were dead?
Gen. Barnett. I know ; but to prevent anything of that kind in the future.
Those castas were, as a matte;; of fact, a very few days later taken to the Sec-
retary of the Navy, and he signed them, approving both cases. By that act, of
course
Senator Pomerene. Approvetl them?
Gen. Barnett. No; approved the action of the court.
Senator Pomebene. That meant a disaffirmance of your position?
Gen. Barnett. No ; not at all. There was no question of affirmance at that
time at all — none whatever. I put a formal indorsement on it, just returning it
to the Judge Advocate General. That is all I could put on a case like that,
because the ca.se was finished — settled. I simply showed by my indorsement that
it had pa8se<l before me and that he had carried out the naval regulations in
presenting it to the commandant of the Marine Corps for any remarks he
wished to make.
Senator Pomerene. In what respect were those two men, Johnson and Mc-
Quilkin, to blame if they were simply carrying out the orders of their
superiors?
Gen. Barnett. That was not for me to decide: that was for the court. I
did not have any witnesses before me at all.
Senator Pomerene. But I am asking you for your judgment about it. In
what respect did they olTend?
Gen. Barnett. No man in the service is compelled or has a right to carry out
an illegal order. That is the one case in the service where anybody is justified
in disobeying orders — if he gets an illegal order.
Senator Pomerene. Who is to decide what is an illegal order?
Gen. Barnett. The man himself must decide and take responsibility.
Now, as I say, knowing these cases would come before the Secretary of the
Navy in a very few days, and not wanting him to think I had just passed two such
important cases in a pro forma way, I spoke to the Secretary of the Navy. Two
or three days later — maybe a week later — those two cases went before him,
and he approved them, thereby taking the same action I had. I only mention
this because the public press has done a lot of printing about this matter, and
it was stated that the Secretary of the Navy did not know about these cases
until after my final report was published. He passed judgment on both of those
cases and approved them absolutely a few days after
The Chairman. Approved these decisions?
Gen. BARNfrrr. Approved the findings of the court.
Senator Pomerene. What was that finding?
Gen. Barnittt. That I do not remember. That was of no importance to me
whatever, because I had no remarks to make upon tlie cases.
Senator Pomerene. Has this record been briefed in any way, or must 1 wade
through that whole record in order to find out what the facts are[ •
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 427
Mr. Howe. It has not been briefed. It did not reach my office until last week,
and I have been unable to take It up or touch It so far.
Senator Pomebene. Is it your purpose to brief them?
Mr. Howe. Yes, sir.
Gren. Baknett. But I want to say, and say most positively, that I wrote that
letter on October 2, which Is called the confidential letter, and I marked It " con-
fidential," because It was upon the same subject as the letter which I had writ-
ten him five days before, the official letter, and I wanted Col. Russell to know
how important I considered these cases, and I wanted him to strain every effort
to make a complete investigation of this affair.
Col. Russell got both of my letters. Here is my letter. First, I had better
read the letter of September 27, 1919. This was the official letter. I marked
that " confidential " also, not personal, but confidential, because I did not want
that letter to arrive in Col. Russell's office in Haiti and have all his clerks see
it and be able to warn anybody of what might be expected in the line of an in-
vestigation. This letter reads as follows :
[Con Aden tlal.]
Septembeb 27, 1919.
From: The major general commandant.
To : The brigade commander. First Provisional Brigade, Marine, Port au Prince,
Haiti.
Subject : Unlawful acts by members of the gendarmerie d'Haiti and marines in
Haiti.
1. It appears from the testimony in the general court-martial cases of Pvts.
Walter K. Johnson and John J. McQuilkin, jr.. Marine Corps, and from the
;ii*gument of the counsel for the defense in the case of Pvt Johnson, First Lieut.
F. L. Spear, that unlawful executions of Haitians, called Cacos, have occurred
in Haiti. You will Issue Immediately necessary and proper Instructions regard-
ing: these unlawful actions.
2. It appears that Sergt. Brokaw, lieutenant of the gendarmerie, has been
transferred north to the hospital, so no action can be taken in this case.
3. Make an investigation and submit a confidential report regarding the ac-
tions of Lieut Spear, as stated In his argument as counsel for the defense in
the court-martial case of Pvt. Johnson. A copy of this argument is attached
hereto.
4. Such unwarranted and unlawful actions on the part of officers and men
of the Marine Corps or of the gendarmerie d'Haiti can not be toleratwl imder
any circumstances.
George Baknett.
Senator Pomebene, Now, General, you use the expression there, " executions
of this character."
Gen. Barnett. Indiscriminate killing.
Senator Pomebene. Indiscriminate killing?
Gen. Barnett. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomebene. To what extent had that been going on?
Gen. Babnett. I knew only of tlie.se two cases, and I formed my whole
opinion on what was before me when I wrote that letter, that being the evidence
In those two cases of Johnson and McQuilkin, particularly the statement of
the counsel for the accused, who stated, in effect, that these men should not be
punished for their acts, because they were following the general custom, and
that he himself had seen many similar cases.
Senator Pomebene. Was that all the information that you had, and all the
knowledge upon which you based your letter?
Gen. Babnett. That was all the information I had.
Senator Pomebene. After you had written that, did you make any further
investigation to ascertain what the particular facts were upon which the
lieutenant had based his statement?
Gen. Babnett. That I ordered Col. Russell to make.
S^vator Pomebene. Are you coming to that later on?
Gen. Barnett. I am ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Then, General, will you proceed to answer Senator Pom-
erene's question now, or, if you prefer, make a note of it and go on with your
story.
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428 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Babnett. My letter was received by Col. Russell. Here is the answer
of Col. Russell to my letter :
[Personal.]
HSADQUABTEBS FiSST PBOVISIONAL BbIGADE,
United States Mabine Cosps,
Part au Prince, Republic of Haiti, October 17, 1919,
Maj. Gen. Geobge Babnett,
Major General Commandant United States Marine Corps,
Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, D. C,
Mt Dbab General : I received your letter in the last mall, and am answering
it at once to assure you that I have taken up the matter you mention most
seriously and will go into it thoroughly. I am inclosing herewith a copy of a
confidential order which I have just Issued, as well as a proclamation. The
proclamation will be published in all the newspapers in Haiti, posted in all
towns, and read at the markets to the people of each town by the majistrat
(mayor).
I have gotten out several other proclamations since my arrival, with a view
of quieting the fears of the people regarding ^e bandits.
Almost immediately upon my arrival things began popping here right and
left and, together with an unsatisfactory political situation, kept me on the
jump.
I wrote Gen. Long the other day regarding conditions- here, and I have no
doubt he has informed you.
We have now completely cleared the plain of the cul-de-sac of bandit groups,
and at present they appear to be gathering in Honda Valley, with a view,
possibly, of crossing the border and going to northern Haiti or of another
descent in the plains. The latter I hardly believe, as we get at them too read-
ily when they are in the plains.
I am now making preparations to strike the band from Belladare, Las
Cohobas, Savanette. It will be unable to cross the border If our plans worfe:
out, but those that get away will be forced to scatter and retreat toward the
Grand Bois.
It Is estimated that about 2,000 bandits infest the hills. They are under
Charlemagne Peralte, who styles himself the supreme chief. I estimate that
they are mostly armed with machetes, knives, pikes, a few pistols, and some
200 or 300 nlles. I don*t believe that in all Haiti there are more than 400 to
500 rifles, if that many. They are very short of ammunition. They use our
ammunition and the Krag by tying a piece of goatskin on string around the
base of the cartridge. I have consequently issued very strict orders regarding
the accounting of our own and gendarmerie ammunition.
The Haitians, as you no doubt know, are a very hysterical people. Hundreds
of rumors are circulated among them dally that are simply ridiculous, but,
like children, they believe them and completely lose their heads. It is very
hard, in consequence, to quiet them ; however, I believe I have now succeeded
in bucking them up. Of course, the officials seized the opportunity to make as
much as they could out of the feffair until I sent for the President's brother
(minister of interior), told him plainly that the Government, Instead of coop-
erating with me, was obstructing my work and that I would not stand for U;
then things brightened up as far as the officials were concerned.
Yesterday I accompanied the American minister on a visit to tlie President,
with the result that one of the cabinet members who has been a great obstruc-
tionist has resigned, so that the political situation is also much brighter.
As you know. General, I shall give my very best to the situation here, which
is far from satisfactory ; and with the backing that I know I may expect from
headquarters, I feel confident I can clear it up and make a record for the corps.
With kindest regards to Mrs. Harnett and yourself.
Very sincerely,
John H. Russkll
Then here is the proclamation. It is written in French and then translated.
The translation is not In the original report, as printed, but I have the trans-
lation here.
(The proclamation referred to, both in French and English, is here printed
in full, as follows:)
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 429
notjvellb adbesse a la population.
Heaoquastebs Fibst Pbovisional Brigade,
United States Marine Corps,
Port au Prince, Republic of Haiti, 15 Octobre, 1919,
CrroYENS : Vous etes tous convaincus maintenant que le regime de la corvde
a 4t6 d^flDitivement aboli. A une certaine 6qoque, un tel travail par votre
goavernement a 4t^ Juge n^eesaire, ce alln de vous ouvrlr certaines parties de
votre Pays qui ^taient presque inaccessibles ; mais 11 y a de cela plus d*un an
qu'il a 6t6 d6cld6 que la n^cesslt^ pour de tels travaux n'existant plus, la
corv^ coDs^uemment a 4t6 abolie et ne sera plus envigueur en Haiti.
L*occupatlon entend 6tabllr pour vous, dans votre Pays, une paix permanente,
afln de bous permettre de vous engager dans les travaux agricoles et autres et
de gagner par la une existence honnete.
A cela Je vous adjure de continuer & vaquer ft vos occupations usuelles, dans
la persuasion que vous estes enti^rement et sinc^ement prot4g6s par Toccupa-
tion.
L*occupation est d6tennin6e & falre que les lois d'Haiti soient respect^es et
elle assurera de son enti^re protection tous les bons et paisibles citoyens, tandis
qu'elle pourchassera les bandits.
John H. Russell,
Colonel du Corps d'Infanterie de Marines Commandant de la Brigade.
new address to the population.
Headquarters First Provisional Brigade,
United States Marine Corps,
Port au Prince, Republic of Haiti, October 15, 1919.
GmzENs : You have now all been assured that the reign of corvee has been
definitely abolished. At a certain time a certain form of worls had been Judged
as necessary by your Government, which was the means of open certain parts of
your country which was almost Inaccessible, but a year ago it had been decided
that the need for such worlc was not necessary. Corvee, consequently, has been
abolished and will never be in usage in Haiti.
The occupation intends to establish for you, in your country, a permanent
peace, In order that you may engage yourself in your agricultural enterprises
and others, and thus be able to earn an honest living.
To this I pray you to continue your former occupation with zeal in the per-
suasion that you are entirely and sincerely protected by the occupation.
The occupation Is determined to enforce only the laws of Haiti and have
them respected, and it will assure its entire protection to all the good and peace-
able citizens while it will drive out the bandits.
John H. Russell,
Colonel, United States Marine Corps,
Commandant of the Brigade.
Headquarters First Provisional Brigade,
United States Marine Corps,
Port au Prince, Republic of Haiti, October 15, 1919.
Confidential Order :
1. The brigade commander has had brought to his attention an alleged
charge against marines and gendarmes in Haiti to the effect that in the past
prisoners and wounded bandits have been summarily shot without trial. B\ir-
thermore, that troops in the field have declared and carried on what is com-
monly known as an "open season," where care is not taken to determine
whether or not the natives encountered are bandits or "good citizens" and
where houses have been ruthlessly burned merely because they were unoccu-
pied and native property otherwise destroyed.
2. Sach action on the part of any officer or enlisted man of the Marine Corps
is beyond belief ; and if true, would be a terrible smirch upon the unblemished
record of the corps, which we all hold so dear.
3. Any oflScer, noncommissioned officer, or private of the Marine Corps, or any
officer or enlisted man of the United States Navy attached to this brigade, or
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430 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
any officer, noncommissioned officer, or privaae of the gendarmerie d'Halti,
guilty of the unjustifiable and illegal killing of any person whomsoever will be
brought to trial before a general court-martial or military commission on a
charge of murder or manslaughter, as the case may warrant.
4. The unjustifiable malteatment of natives and the unlawful violation of
their person or property will result in the trial and punishment of the offender.
5. All officers and noncommissioned officers are enjoined to see that the pro-
visions of this order are most strictly enforced, and anyone having a knowledge
of the violation of this order and not promptly reporting it will be considered
an accessory to the crime.
6. This order will be furnished all commanding officers, and the contents of
this confidential order will be carefully and fully explained to every officer,
noncommissioned officer, and private in the Marine Corps and gendarmerie
d'Haitl in Haiti.
7. Commanding officers will report in writing to the brigade commander when
every officer and enlisted man In their respective commands have been thor-
oughly informed and are fully aware of the contents of this order.
8. The chief of the gendarmerie d'Haltl Mill report in writing to the brigade
commander, when every office and enlisted man In the gendarmerie and coast
guard Is fully conversant with the contents of this order.
9. Upon arrival in Haiti, all commissioned officers and enlisted men of the
Marine Corps will immediately be fully Informed of the contents of this order
and the commanding officer of units to which they are assigned will report ia
writing to their Immediate senior In command that this has been done.
10. The chief of the gendarmerie dllalti will have the contents of this con-
fidential order carefully explained to all officers and men joining his organiza-
tion and will be held strictly responsible that all officers and men In the
gendarmerie d'HaitI are at all times thoroughly familiar with It.
John H. Russeix.
The Chatbman. General, I think it would be useful if you would Indicate,
provided you can, how the committee may pursue an Investigation to determine
the truth of the general allegations that there were punishments or killings
without trial.
Gen. Barnett. As I stated before, the two cases that I know of positively
are these two cases of Johnson and McQuilkln. In my opinion, no progress can
be made, and no legitimate report by a court of inquiry or anybody else can
be made, as to the justification for my letter, without the testimony of Jneiit.
Spear. Whether they had him or not I do not know, but, in my opinion, a
report of anybody as to whether or not I was Justified in writing that letter
is foolishness, unless the testimony of Lieut. Spear can be obtained.
The Chairman. Now, General, we know where Lieut. Spear Is. The case at
issue is not the justification for your letter.
Gen. Barnett. Not a bit, sir.
The Chairman. You mentioned Lieut. Spear. Are there other persons,
officers of the Marine Corps or not, for whom this committee ought to send to
find information bearing on this subject?
Gen. Barnett. As I stated before, the only cases I knew of were those two
cases. Now. as I said In answer to my letter to Col. Russell, an Investigation
was ordered, as I understand, by Col. Russell, in direct compliance with my
letter, and was ordered made by Maj. Thomas C. Turner. That report was
I'eceived. As I stated to you a moment ago, I saw that report after I was re-
lieved as commandant. The report was not received until afterwards. That
rt»port was made by order of Col. Rus.sell, and forwarded by him to the Marine
(N)rps headquarters. I read that report over very carefully several days after
I was relieved and after this whole business was up. As I remember it, Maj.
Turner, in accordance with the report forwarded by Col. Russell, recommended
the trial by court-martial of certain people. I have not the records In the case,
because they never came to my notice. I was not commandant of the Marine
Corps at that time, consequently the papers did not come to me, but I was
shown that report at headquarters, and I know that certain people were recom-
mended for trial by court-martial, I do not remember definitely who they were,
except, I do think, Maj. Wells was one man recommended for trial by court-
martial.
The Chairman. What Maj. Wells?
Gen. Barnett. Clark H. Wells. I think Maj. Clark H. Wells was ordered
tried by court-martial by the Navy Department, and the court was ordered,.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 431
but whether he has been tried or not I do not know. I will state, prompted by
Maj. McClellan, that he was not tried ; for what reason I do not know.
I have heard rumors — I do not even know where they came from — but this
whole question was talked about a great deal at headquarters, and I heard
rumors at that time that Lieut. J. P. Adams or Oapt. J. P. Adams, who is now
out of the service, and probably at Charleston, S. C, would make a very good
witness before the committee. I do not know what he would testify to. I never
knew him, and never saw him in my life, never had a word with him. I have
heard that Maj. Woodworth knows something about it.
With the permission of the committee, I would like to continue my statement
just enough to show what communications I had with the Secretary of the
Navy about this.
The Chaikman. Continue.
Cren. Babnettt. When I wrote my original letter I said that I spoke to the
Secretary of the Navy about the two cases in general terms. No more knowl-
edge came to me of this case until in the summer of 1920. When I was on leave
at home I got an order from the Secretary of the Navy to come to Washington
and make a report of what I knew about the trouble In Haiti. Thinking that
he meant about these two cases, I brought with me copies of my letters of
September 27, 1919, and October 2, 1919, and took them to the Secretary of the
Navy and sat down with him at his desk. He read that letter absolutely from
" whereas " to " amen," and we dlscussod it fully, giving full knowledge to him
of my letter and what had been done In Haiti.
A few days later the Secretary of the Navy told nie to make a report on Haiti.
I made a report, and my two letters were attached to that report, which only
dealt with these two cases of Johnson and McQullkln, and those two* letters
were on there as appendages. Appendages A and B. The Secretary of the Navy
said he did not have time to read it then, but that he would take it home with
him and see me the next day. He sent for me the next day and said to me,
" General, this is all right as far as it goes, but what I want Is a complete
report on Haiti, showing In that report everything that has happened, every
order that has been given, every letfrr that has been written or received at
the headquarters of the Marine Corps or Navy Department from the first occu-
pation In 1915-to the time when you were relieved on June 30, 1920."
Those two letters, as I have said, were appendages. He went on to say,
"When you make your final report, Instead of putting these letters on as
appendages, put them in the body of your report, so that whoever reads the
report will not have to look bnck and see what the api)endage is, but can read it
with the report."
When I made this final report I put them in the report.
A few days after that the Seoretary'of the Navy sent for Gen. Haines and me
to discuss affairs in Haiti again, and again and in Gen. Haines's presence I
.showed these two letters to the Secretary of the Navy. In my final report, as
I say, \ put that letter in the body of the report as directed by him, because
he told me to put everything I had received or written with reference to Haiti,
or anybody else had written or received from Haiti, in the report.
The Chairman. In the report?
Gen. Babnett. In this report: yes, sir; in my final report. After I had
handed In this final report of 110 pages the Secretary of the Navy said to me,
" This is too long to read now ; I will take it home with me to-night and read it
and see yon to-morrow." I was under orders then to San Francisco and I was
simply waiting his permission to go. In accordai\ce with my orders.
The next day. about 3 o'clock In the afternoon, he sent for me, and he had
tbls report in his hand, and he said, * General, this Is all right. You may carry
out your orders to San Francisco." Again, this letter was in this report.
WTiether or not the Secretary of the Navy read my report that night I do not
know, but I Imagine" that he had turned it over to Mr. Jenkins, his publicity
man, '^ho was on duty in the Navy Department, because Mr. Jenkins—
The Chairman. His publicity man?
€ren, Babnett. Well, whatever he called him. He was a newspaper man origi-
nally from the Baltimore American. I do not know In what capacity he was
in the Navy Department, but he attended to a great deal of personal matter
for the Secretary.
The Chairman. The Secretary's personal publicity?
Gen. Babnett. I do not know what it was. Maybe Maj. McClellan can tell
us what his duty was there.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
432 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MaJ. McClellan. It was not personal, although he may have done personal
work. He is a well known man there.
Gen. Basnett. He was on duty in the department and is a well known man—
■a fine fellow.
The Chaibman. What was his correct duty?
Gen. Basnett. I do not know. Immediately when I saw the Secretary he
«aid to me, " You may carry out your orders and proceed to San Francisco."
Immediately when I left the office Mr. Jenkins came up to me and shook hands
with me and said, " General, that is the most complete report I ever read since
I have been in the Navy Department." He shook hands, congratulated me,
and said good-bye to me. That lead me to believe that Jenkins read the report
and reported to the Secretary that it was all right
I left that evening for San Francisco. I was called back from Chicago be-
<»iuse the morning papers had published my letter and made a considerable
furore about this. I was surprised to find by the morning papers that the Sec-
retary of the Navy had stated that he had never seen my letter until this report
was published that morning. I immediately took the newspaper article and
went to the Secretary's office and in the presence of Gen I^Jeune and Asst. Sec-
retary of the Navy Mr. Woodbury I said, " Mr. Daniels. I see in the morning
papers that you have stated that you never saw my letter until it was pub-
lished." He said, " I never saw it." I said. " Excuse me, sir, but you did see
it." And then I said to him Just what I have said to this committee, that he
saw it in my presence, read it, and discussed it fully the first time. He said,
-" I never saw it" I said, " Again let me say to you, you did see it. I showed
it to you again when you told me to make a report. I made the report and
had these two letters appended, and you, in your own words, told me that
when I made a final report to put these letters in the body of the report instead
of as appendages, so that whoever read it would not have to look back and read
the appendages' but would see them in the body of the report." He said apain,
" I never saw it." I said, "Again excuse me, but you did see it another time.
You sent for Gen Haines and me to come here to your office and discuss affaire
in Haiti and again, in Gen. Haines's presence, I handed you those letters and
Gen Haines saw me hand them to you." He said, " Of course. General, if you
say I saw it I Aust have seen it, but I forgot it." I said. " You did not say
that you had forgotten it, but that you had never seen it"
I simply make this statement to show that I was not makmg any secret of
this business, but I was informing the Secretary of the Navy of everything I
did, because I thought it was a most important matter. . , , ^ ,^,
While you said a moment ago that this was not an Investigation to show the
justification for my letter, I do want to say to this committee that I took the
very best means that I knew of as coramnndlng officer to correct a fault which
had come to my notice in an official manner. I was the one to Judge, and I
judged and acted, and my letter was thoroughly understood by my junior, CJol.
Russell, who acted so promptly and so well that a few months later when Gen.
Leiuene, the commandant of the Marine Corps, went to Haiti to make an in-
spection he found everything correct and in apple-pie order, and I say that
largely responsible for that was my letter which had brought the facts to
Col. Russell's attention, and his prompt action, showing that he thoroughly
understood my letter, was the result
The Chairman. This condition, subsequently corrected, grew up then under
Russell's command before It was brought to his attention?
Gen. Babnett. Yes, sir. Col. Russell was one of the best officers I knew, and
would always take every action possible tocorrect every fault which he
The Chairman. I did not ask that. Please answer my question, General.
These killings, indiscriminate or otherwise, took place under Col. Russell?
Gen. Babnett. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. He did not bring them to your attentloh ; you brought them
to his attention?
Gen. Barnett. They were brought to ray attention by
The Chairman. He did not clean things up and put them In apple-pie order
until you called the matter to his attention?
Gen. Babnett. I do not suppose he ever knew of them until it came to his
attention through nie, and then he took prompt action. Senator Pomerene a
few moments ago asked a question about what these people were tried for.
On page 236 of the Navy Department's record I find the following :
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 433
PRIVATES ACCUSED WEBE PBOMPTLY BEOUOHT TO TRIAL.
Johnson and McQuilkin, the privates named In Gen. Bamett*s letter, were
charged with being members of a firing squad which "unlawfully shot and
caused the death of" two Haitian prisoners on May 22, 1919. Johnson was
brought to trial June 26 and McQuilkin July 1, 1919. At the court-martial it
was in evidence that Louis A. Brokaw, a marine who was serving as a lieuten-
ant in the Haitian gendarmerie, ordered Johnson and McQuilkin, with three
graidannes, to shoot the two prisoners; that they, doubting his authority to
order such an execution, but fearing to disobey orders, shot " wide " so as not
to kill, and that, seeing the prisoners were still alive, Brokaw with his own
pistol shot and killed them. The privates on trial were convicted of striking
the prisoners, but it was testified that this was done by Brokaw's orders.
That is what Senator Pomerene asked a few moments ago — about the trial
and what they were tried for.
The Chairman. Maj. McClellan, will you learn how it was that Brokaw
appears not to have been tried ?
MaJ. McClellan. He is insane.
* The Chairman. I want to find out by whom he was adjudged Insane.
Maj. McClellan. All right, sir.
Gen. Harnett. In this connection, I wish to state that when this conversation
took place with the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy, both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary said to me that I was at
fault in my statement that certain testimony and the statement of the counsel
for the accused showed me that illegitimate killing had taken place. They said
it could not show me that, because this Statement of counsel for the accused was
not evidence but was a statement of counsel, and it was perfectly well known
that counsel in criminal cases often made statements which could not be taken
as evidence. I want to say here that I felt, and still feel, that I was perfectly
justified in taking his word, which was an official report made to that court-
martial by the counsel for the accused, and because he was an officer in the
Marine Corps it was a statement made to me, because he knew, and everybody
else in the service knew, that the record would come to me, and I would read
his statement ; he also knew that It was a statement made to the Judge Advo-
cate General of the Kavy, because he knew the record would go to him, and it
was a statement made to the Secretary of the Navy, because he knew that the
record would go to the Secretary of the Navy for final action. I therefore claim
that I was justified in taking the word of a commissioned officer and in believing
what he said was true.
The Chairman. Where was this court-martial held?
Gen. Harnett. I do not remember the exact place; in Haiti.
The Chairman. Did it pass through the hands of the Judge Advocate?
Gen. Harnett. It had.
The Chairman. And the occupation in Haiti?
Gen. Harnett. It did.
The Chairman. Did he make any Indorsement on it?
Gen. Harnett. No, sir ; not to my recollection.
The Chairman. Will we get the name of the judge advocate in Haiti who
thought it was not Important enough to call to the attention of Col. Russell,
or of the Judge Advocate General in Washington?
Gen. Harnett. That would be on those two cases. I say that I took this
statement as true because, in all my experience of 44 years in the service I have
taken it as a matter of course that a statement made to me by a commissioned
officer was true. I will admit that in civil cases or criminal cases counsel may
make statements prejudicial or In favor of a certain man whom he Is defending,
hat I can not conceive of an officer acting as counsel for an enlisted man or
other officer making a statement other than true. I took that statement as true,
and therefore I wrote my letter, believing that it was true.
Now, to go on, when this whole thing was over, as far as these letters are
concerned, and this report came in from lilaj. Turner, forwarded by Col. Rus-
sell, which I never saw until afterwards, after this thing was brought to
public attention, a court of inquiry was ordered to Investigate the Haitian afl^air.
I was before that court about five minutes and asked three or four questions
with respect to why I wrote this letter, etc. I was also asked three or four
<Iuestion8 with reference to the number killed, etc., and a correction was made
because Maj. McClelland, who had compiled the data for me from the Navy
I)epartment files, had made a mistake in addition, and instead of being 3,250
gitized by Google
434 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
there were 2,250 killed. I never saw the precept of that court of inquiry, but
from their report I Judge that one of the things they were ordered to report
on was whether or not I was justified In using my phrase that indiscriminate
killing had gone on for some time. They found in their report that I was not
Justified, although that is a question of opinion. As I stated a moment ago, my
opinion is entirely different, as well as entirely different from the evidence that
was before me, largely because of the fact that I think I was Justified In believ-
ing as true the statement of the officer.
In the final paragraph of that report they said that the publishing of these
charges and the statement with reference to Indiscriminate killing in Haiti
was most regrettable, unwarranted, and everything of that kind. That state-
ment was taken by every newspaper In the United States, and by every Indi-
vidual, especially outside of the service that I know about myself, as a severe
censure of me for having written this letter. Knowing the Navy regulations,
I knew that no court of Inquiry could censure an officer without having made
him a party to the trial and allowing him to appear and introduce evidence. I
was not made a party to the trial, and my conduct was not under investigation ;
but the concluding paragraph of their report was so badly worded — and I say
that advisedly, because a thing must be badly worded that Is misunderstood by
everybody, and a report oft anything can only be for the purpose of giving the
idea in the minds of those making the report — as I say, it was so badly worded
that every paper In the United States, especially the Army and Navy Register
and the Army and Navy Journal, took it up as meaning severe censure of me.
They were not Justified In that, well knowing that after I was furnished with au
official copy of this report of the court of Inquiry, containing this so-called
censure of nje which the papers had taken to be a censure, I wrote a formal
letter to the Secretary of the Navy, of which I wlU give a copy to the stenog-
rapher, and I stated In that letter that I had read this report of the court of
Inquiry
The Chairman. If you are going to give the letter to the stenographer, do you
want to summarize It for the committee?
Gen. Bar?^ett. I think you had better hear it right here in general terms. In
that letter I stated to the Secretary of the Na^'y that I had read this report of
the court of Inquiry, and that I was shocked to find that every paper In tlie
United States, and hundreds of friends of mine who had written to me condoling
with me for having been censured by this court, had taken it for granted that I
had been censured. Well knowing that this could not be so, and could not be
Intended so by the court, I requested him, as Secretary of the Navy, as an act
of Justice to one of the oldest oflicers in the service, to disavow this statement
and give it publicity the same as the other had been given publicity, because
I had been seriously Injured by this report of the court of Inquiry.
The Secretary of the Navy received this letter, and after some time wrote me
an answer, failing to comply.
The findings and conclusions of the court of inquiry and my letter to the Sec-
retary of the Navy are as follows :
[Navy Ncw8 Burpau. Release morning papers of Sunday, Dec. 10, 1920.]
Secretary Daniels authorizes the following:
•* The court of inquiry which convened on October 19, 1920, by order of the
Secretary of the Navy to inquire into the conduct of the personnel of tlie
naval service that has serve<l in Haiti since .Tune 28. 1915, ha?? submitted its
findings, which (ien. Lejeune, major general, commandant of the Marine Corps,
and Secretary Daniels to-day approved."
Following are the conclusion?? of the court :
" The court, having thoroughly inquired into all the facts and circumstances
connected witii the allegjitions contained in the prea>pt and having considered
the evidence adduced, finds as follows :
" FINDING OF FACTS.
" 1. The court finds that two unjustifiable homicides have been committed,
one each by two of the personnel of the United States naval service which has
served in Haiti siiu^e 28 July, 1915, and that 16 other serious acts of violence
have been prepetrated against citizens of Haiti during the same perloil by indi-
viduals of such personnel.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 435
" 2. The court finds further that these offenses were all isolated acts of indi-
viduals and that in every case the responsible party was duly brought to trial
before a general court-martial, convicted, and sentenced.
" 3. The court has found no evidence of the commission of any other unjusti-
fiable homicides or other serious, unjustifiable acts of oppression or of violence
against any of the citizens of Haiti, or unjustifiable damage or destruction of
their property, caused by any of the personnel in question.
"4. In view of the fact that the only unjustifiable acts found by the court to
have been committed are those wherein disciplinary action has already been
taken and where no further proceedings could be had in the matter, the court
has not deemed it necessary to report further upon the quesjion of responsi-
bility. Q
" CONCLUSIONS. J
" Referring to paragrai)h 2 of the pi'ccept, it is the conclusion of the court
that there have been no proper grounds for the statement that ' practically
indiscriminate killing of natives has been going on for some time,' as alleged
in the letter from Brig. Gen. George Barnett United States Marine Corps, to
Col. John H. Russell, United States Marine Corps.
'* Referring to the amendment to the precept calling for the conclusions of
the court as to the general conduct of the personnel of the naval service in
Haiti since July 2S, 1915, the court does not consider that the small number
of isolated crimes or offenses that have been committed by a few Individuals
of the service during the period in question are entitled to any considerable
Tveight in forming a conchisi«)n as to the general conduct of such personnel. It
was inevitable thflt some ofl*enses would be committed. However, considering
tlie conditions of service in Haiti, it is remarkable that the offenses were so
few in number and that they all may be chargeable to the ordinary defects
of human character, such defe<*ts as r^^sult in the conmiission of similar offenses
in the United States and elsewhere in the best-regulated communities.
*' The general conduct of our trooi>s of m-cupation can be fairly judged by
the results of that occupation.
*• Now. for the first time in more than a hundred years tranquillity and secur-
ity of life and property may be said to prevail in Haiti.
"The Haitian people themselves welcomed the coming of our men and are
unwilling to have them depart.
'*The establishment and maintenance of tranquil conditions and tli(» ser-urity
of life and property all over tti^ Republic of Haiti has been an arduous
and dangerous and tliankless task. That task our marines have i)erformed with
fidelity and great gallantry.
" The court can not refrain from re<onling its oi)inlon of much, and that the
most serious part, of the reflections which have been made upon the officers who
have served in Haiti.
" The outstanding characteristic of those ofllcers, from the brigade coni-
roander down, has been their sympathetic attitude toward every step that
would lead to a betterment of tlie country and to improvement in the physical,
mental, and moral conditions of the population.
•* With slender resources and inadequate administrative authority they have
accomplished much, where anything more than suppression of organized insur-
rection seemed impossible.
** The above remarks apply witli particular force to those officers and enlisted
men of the Marine Corjjs who luive been serving as officers of the gendarmerie
of Haiti.
•* After a careful study of (he matters hi issue, based not only on the evidence
ill the record but also upon other origiiml and reliable sources of information,
and the court's own observations while in Haiti, the court regards the charges
which have been published as 111 considered, regrettable, and thoroughly un-
warranted reflections on a portion of the United States Marine Corps which
has performed difllcult, dangerous, and delicate duty in Haiti in a manner which
Instead of calling for adverse criticism is entitled to the highest commendation.
" The record of the proceedings of this twenty-first day of the inquiry was read
and approved; and the court having finished the inquiry, then, at 11 o'clock a. m.,
ailjourneil to await the action of the convening authority.
*• II. T. Mato,
** Rear Admiral, United States Navy, President,
"Jesse F. Dyeb,
''Major, United States Marine Corps, Judge Adx^oeate:'
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436 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Unith) States Makine Corps,
San FrancUco, Calif., December SO, 1920.
From : Brig. Gen. George Barnett, Marine Corps.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via : The Major General Commandant.
Subject : Findings and conclusions of the Haitian court of Inquiry.
1. I have i"ead carefully the " Navy News Bureau release morning papers of
Sunday, December 19, 1920," author!ze<l by Secretary Daniels and containing
the findings of facts and the conclusions of " the court of inquiry which con-
vened July 28, 1920" and "approved December 19, 1920," by Gen. Lejeune,
major general commandant, and Secretary- Daniels.
2. I note the flr8t paragraph under " Conclusions" reads as follows:
" Referring to paragraph 2 of the precept, It Is the conclusion of the court
that there have been no proper grounds for the statement that 'practical^r
indiBcrlminate killing of natives has been going on for some time,* as alleged
In the letter from Brig. Gen. George Barnett, United States Marine Corps, to
CoL John H. Russell, United States Marine Cx)rps."
3. No officer in the Marine Corps can be more pleased than I am that these
allegations of indiscriminate killings have been disproved.
4. In this connection I invite attention to the fact that while the phrase
"indiscriminate killing" was my own, the allegation of such misconduct was
not made by me, and I preferred no charges against any person, nor did I pub-
lish or authorize the publication of anything.
5. In reviewing a court-martial cose I read a statement of a commissioned
officer, Lieut. Spear, in substance that he had personal knowledge of numerons
cases where Haitians had been executed without any legal process. I Immedi-
ately directed the local commanding officer to fully Investigate and report, and
in order to avoid tmnecessary publicity I sent these directions in an envelope
marked " Personal and confldentlaL"
6. It is, of course, evident that I would have been neglectful of my duty as
commandant of the Marine Corps had I failed to order an investigation.
7. I note also paragraph 11 of the " conclusions " of the court (next to the
concluding paragraph), which reads as follows:
"After a careful study of the matters In issue, based not only on the evidence
In the record but, also, upon other original and reliable sources of Information,
and the court's own observations while in Haiti, the court regards the charges
which have been published as 111 considered, regrettable, and thoroughly
unwarranted reflections on a portion of the United States Marine Corps whld»
has performed difficult, dangerous, and delicate duty in Haiti In a manner
which, instead of calling for adverse criticism, Is ^itltled to the highest
commendation."
8. Unfortunately (for me) numerous newspapers and numerous Individuals,
having read In conjunction paragraphs 1 and 11 of the conclusions of the court
of Inquiry, have construed them to mean. In substance, that " Brig. Gen. (3eorge
Barnett has made Ill-considered, regrettable, and thoroughly unwarranted
reflections on a portion of the United States Marine Corps which has performed
difficult, dangerous, and delicate duty in Haiti in a manner which, instead of
calling for adverse criticism, is entitled to the highest commendation."
9. I am constrained to believe that this Is not the construction Intended by
the court or the reviewing authority. Otherwise It Is certain that I wonld
have been made party to the Inquiry and accorded the right of an attempt
at vindication, as provided by Navy regulations.
10. The record will show that I was not made a party to the Inquiry and that
I received no Intimation that my conduct was under Investigation. Hence
I must assume that neither the court nor the reviewing authority intended
that the court's findings and conclusions should convey the Impression that I
had been guilty of making unfounded, unwarrantable, and ill-considered charges
against others of my corps who were entitled to commendation rather than
censure.
11. I am thoroughly convinced in my own mind that the court did not have
me or my conduct In mind when they drafted the eleventh paragraph of their
conclusions, but that they had In mind the numerous newspaper articles pub-
lished, with the publication of which I had nothing whatsoever to do.
1 2. The records will show, and the Secretary of the Navy has personal knowl-
edge, that on numerous occasions, in my annual reports and In other ways, I
have accorded and in my capacity as commandant of the Marine CJorps awarded
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 437
praise and commendation for the conduct of marine officers and men in Haiti ;
that I thoroughly realized the dangerous and delicate nature of their duties
and pointed with pride to their accomplishments. This especially in my final
rqwrt to the Secretary of the Navy.
13. The published report of the conclusions of the court of inquiry has been
construed to mean that my personal conduct in connection with the case has
been severely animadverted upon by the court and through their approval by
the major general conmiandant and the Secretary of the Navy.
14. I have read in a number of newspapers (vide attached clippings from the
Army and Navy Register, dated December 25, 1920), this construction of the
court's findings and have received dozens of letters from friends and acquaint-
ances offering condolence that I should be so censured.
15. If my assumption is correct I request as an act of simple Justice to an
oflftcer of 43 years* honorable service that the Secretary of the Navy give out a
statement to the press to correct the impression that has gone broadcast over
the country in effect that the court found me guilty of misconduct and the com-
mandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of the Navy approved the
findings.
Geobgb Barnett.
The Secretary's reply to that letter is as follows :
Navy Depabtment,
Washington, January 10, 1921,
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Brig. Gen. George Bamett, United States Marine Corps, commanding
D^mrtment of the Pacific, No. 86 Annie Street, San Francisco, Calif.
Via : The Major General Commandant.
Subject : Findings and conclusions of the Haitian court of inquiry.
Reference: (a) Brig. Gen. George Bamett's letter 12-30-20.
Enclosure: (1).
1. In connection with reference (a), there is transmitted herewith for your
information a copy of the Navy News Bureau release of December 19, 1920.
It will be noted that tliis release does not contain any news items other than
the findings and conclusions of the court of inquiry and the fact of their ap-
proval by the Major General Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy.
2. The comments complained of by you which appeared in certain new^
papers did not emanate from the department, and the department therefore
wUl take no action with reference to them.
3. With reference to paragraphs 4 and 5 of reference (a), your attention is
invited to the fact that your official report of Haitian affairs shows that the
Investigation of the affairs mentioned in the general court-martial proceedings
in the cases of Pvta Walter E. Johnson and John J. McQuilkin, jr.. was directed
in your ofiDcial letter to the brigade commander in Haiti, dated September 27,
1919, while your personal and confidential letter was not written until October
2, 1919, five days later; also, that the following allegations are contained in
^onr personal and confidential letter above mentioned, namely :
" The court-martial of one private for the killing of a native prisoner brought
out a statement by his counsel which showed me that practically indiscriminate
Wiling of natives has gone on for some time."
And —
" I think this is the most startling thing of its kind that has ever taken place
in the Marine Corps, and I don't want anything of the kind to happen again.
I think, judging by the knowledge gained only from the cases that have been
brought before me, that the Marine Corps has been sadly lacking in right and
justice, and I look to you to see that this is corrected, and corrected at once."
4. Your attention is also invited to the fact that while you did not publish
your personal and confidential letter above mentione<l, yet you did Includo it in
your ofllclal report, a public document, which you had been lnforme<l and wlileh
it had been publicly announced would be given to the press In its entirety upon
its completion and submission by you.
5. In conclusion, you are Informed that, although the court of Inquiry was
instructed in its precept to investigate and determine whether there had been
practically indiscriminate killing of natives in Haiti for some time, as alleged
in your personal and confidential letter to Col. John H. Russell, It was not
directed to inquire into your conduct, and that, therefore, the court did not
make you a party to the inquiry.
Joseph us Danikls.
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438 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Chairman. The controversy between you and the Secretary does not
concern tlie committee.
Gen. Barnett. Entirely so ; I understand that. I am simply showing this to
allow that he did have knowledge, the same knowledge that I had; that is
all. As I have stated before, this letter shows that he refused to accede to my
request to. state whether or not that Unding referred to me, which he well knew
it did not, be<;ause it wf.s one of the most positive regulations that it could not
refer to me in any possible way. I thought, and still think, that a fuir-minded
man, appealed to officially by one of the officers wlio had at least done honorable
service for 45 years nearly, m-jis entitled to a statement from the Secretary of
the Navy
Senator Pomekene. With regard to these executions, is it claimed now that
these men were shot by direction of this sergeant who was demented at the
time?
Gen. Barnetf. Oh, no, sir; that has nothing to do with the case at all. The
only question that ever came up at all about the whole aflfair was whether or
not there had been any indiscrindnate killings in Haiti, and how many.
Senator I'oMEur.NE. Your opinion is. I take it. that these two were illegiti-
mate?
Gen. Barnett. Yes.
Senator Pomerene. Has your futher Investigation enabled you to state how
many others there were?
Gen. Barnett. Only as I have stated in my letter, only the ones referred to
as having been seen personally by Lieut. Spear, counsel for the accused, and
then fi'om, the report on file at the Marine Corps headquarters by Maj. Tumw,
who was directed by Col. Russell to make a report. I do not know how many
are in tJiat.
Senator Pomerene. Are you able to state just briefly here what, in your
judgment, were the causes which led up to this state of affairs?
Gen. Barnett. No, sir; I was not there, and the only knowledge I have of
the cases were these two court-martial cases.
Senator Pomerene. Who can give us that information?
Gen. Barnett. Col. Russell, I have no doubt.
Senator Pomerene. Have you any one else to suggest?
Gen. Barnett. Maj. Wells, I have suggested, while you were out. I was asked
and I mentioned three or four while you were out.
Senator Pomerene. I will not ask you to repeat them, then. Are these men
In tills country now, or down there?
Gen. Kahneit. Some of them are here and some of them are down there.
Senator Pomerknk. You. I believe, matle the statement before we were called
to the Senate Chamber thixt you took charge down there at the heginnincr of
our occupation; did I understJind you correctly?
Gen. BARNJjrT, The marines?
Senator Pomeiwne. Yes.
(ien. Babnktt. Yes; they were landed at once.
Senator Pomkkkne. What were the general orders which were given to you at ,
that time? In other wortls, what were the reasons for sending you down there,
if you know?
Gen. Ba«nett. That was given to Admiral Caperton, who was In command.
He has been before this committee for a week and probably stated everything
of that kind.
Senator Pomkkenk. Well, I was not able to attend the hearings, because I
have bt»en atttMiding two or three other committet^s.
Gon. Barnett. The orders were given from the Navy Department to Admiral
Caperton, who was In supreme command down there.
Senator Pomkkkne. You have not been down there?
Gen. Barnett. Yes; I was down there on a tour of inspei'tion in January,
1017, with the Assistant Sern'tary of the Navy. Mr. Roosevelt.
Senator I'omekene. And how long was that after the marines hatl landed
there?
(;en. Karnktt. They landed In 1915, and I was there in 1017.
Senator Po.mkkenk. What conditicm did yon find then?
(ien. BAHNK-rr. I found an excellent condition. It is so stated in my report
made to the Secretary of the Navy, when I got hack. I went from one end of
Haiti to the other on horseback through the mountains.
SiMiator Pomerknk. Did you have* any knowledge at that time that there
V pre any undue aggressions by our marliu's or others against the natives?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 439
Gen. Babnett. I had no knowledge, nor did I hear of any case, and I dis-
cussed the matter with the President of Haiti and with other prominent men in
Haiti, with the parish priests and the local officials in the different towns
through which we passed.
Senator Pomerene. They were nearly all Negroes, were they?
Gen. Babnett. All of them, and I heard no complaints whatever.
Senator Pomerene. Was there any objection at that time to our possession of
Haiti?
Gen. Babnett. I heard none. I heard many remarks to the contrary.
Senator Pomerene. Was there any outbreak, revolutionary or otherwise,
while you were there?
Gen. Babnett. None whatever.
Senator Pomerene. Or have you learned of any since the time the marines
took charge?
Gen. Babnett. There had been many occasions.
Senator Pomerene. That was early after they took possession?
Gen. Babnett. Yes. Once after that there was a concerted attack on Port au
Prince in the night.
Senator Pomerene. By natives?
Gen. Barnett. By natives, and was repulsed by the marines, and followed
up pretty ruthlessly, and properly so.
S«iator Pomerene. From a military standpoint, did you see anything to crit-
icize in the defense by these marines?
Gen. Barnett. I did not, and so stated in my report to the Secretary of the
Navy. In fact, I came back very much pleased. I heard it stated by numerous
people in Haiti that for the first time in a long, long time the people felt at
liberty to go to the markets, and the markets were full of Haitians. Thereto-
fore they had felt unable to go to market because they would be robbed, etc., or
lield up.
Senator Pomebenb. Then the burden of yonr complaint grows out of these
alleged illegal or improper executions?
Gen. Babnett. Entirely from those two court-martial cases and the state-
ment of the counsel for the accused. That was the only knowledge I ever had,
as commandant of the Marine Corps, of any trouble in Haiti.
Senator Pomerene. Has the department made any further investigation?
Gen. Barnett. The department sent Gen. Lejeune down there. I made this
final report in the summer of 1020, and Gen. Lejeune went down later on and
made an investigation, and reported everything in good shape. I miderstand —
and I think it is true — that the Secretary of the Navy has been down there
since. I know that the court of inquiry, of which Admiral Mayo was presi-
dent, went there.
Senator Pomerene. You mean Secretary Denby, do you?
Gen. Babnett. Yes, sir. Of course, I do not know what they found. I have
never seen their report, or heard any statement from them, but I have read
in the public press that they found things in good shape.
Senator Pomebene. Well, did you find any objection at that time that you
went down there to our marines being there?
Gen. Babnett. I found none whatever, and I am sure that Secretary Roose-
vdt, if he were here, would make exactly the same statement, because we made
our trip together.
Senator Pomebene. You think, then, it was the consensus of opinion up to
the time you were there that the marines were a good influence there for law
and order?
Gen. Barnett. I think entirely so, with a very large portion of the population.
Senator Pomerene, Did you find any sentiment there to the effect that the
United States were trying to take possession of the island for the purpose of
keeping control of it, or anything of that kind?
Cfen. Barnett. I never heard any such remark.
Senator Pomerene. Of course, you knew there was no such disposition on the
part of the United States authorities?
Gen. Barnett. I certainly felt It, and think so yet. I think the landing was
originally made, and the marines have been kept there ever since, in my opin-
ion, for what the United States considered was for the good of Haiti. And,
far from criticizing in any way the Marine Corps for their action in Haiti, no
man has ever given them more praise than I have given them in my annual
62269— 21— FT 2 22
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440 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
reports and in my report of my inspection down there, and in my final report.
I saw ttie construction of roads, I saw prisons cleaned up as clean as a table
Senator Pomebene. You speak of the construction of roads. Were those
roads being constructed under the supervision of the marines?
Gen. Babnett. The gendarmerie.
Senator Pomebene. How was the labor performed, and who paid for it?
Gen. Babnett. They were under the corvee system at that time.
Senator Pomebene. Who was it that issued these orders for that? Did the
marines do it?
Gen. Babnett. The gendarmerie, which was a part of the Haitian Govern-
ment ; that is accordinbg to Haitian law.
Senator Pomebene. As I understand, under that system down there, the na-
tives may be directed to do a certain number of days* work on the roads?
Gen. Babnett. That Is the cor\'ee system.
Senator Pomebene. And did you find any opposition to that order?
(xen. Babnett. I heard none.
Senator Pomebene. How were these men fed?
Gen. Babnett. Fed by the gendarmerie.
Senator Pomebene. Who furnished the provisions?
Gen. Babnett. The gendarmerie.
Senator Pomebene. And that was by the Haitian Government?
Gen. Babnett. That is a part of the Haitian Government ; it is an institution
of the Haitian Government.
Senator Pomebene. No part of that was furnished by our marines?
Gen. Babnett. The officers of the gendarmerie were marines.
Senator Pomebene. Were they furnished good food?
Gen. Babnett. As far as I saw. I only saw one meal. I saw one road gang
working on the road, and when I passed there it was lunch time. That was
the only meal I saw.
Senator Pomebene. There have been conflicting statements made before this
committee, so far as I have heard them. One was to the effect that these men
were eager to work there on the road, because they got better food than other-
wise. The other was to the effect that many of these men were forced to work
there under what was something akin to a peonage system, and under protest
Did you observe anything which would
Gen. Babnett. I heard nothing and observed nothing to that effect. As I
have stated in this final report of mine, I had heard rumors only, but I had no
substantiation for them whatever. I do not even remember who it was that
said it. but I heard rumors to the effect that the corvee system was the cause
of trouble, on account of abuse by having natives from one province working
on the roads in another, contrary to the law. I do not know whetlier that w^as
true or not.
Senator Pomebene. We had a rule, or did have until very recently in this
country, in different States, that the taxpayers or men who were votws would
work a certain length of time on the roads?
Gen. Babnett. At one time I remember the Secretary of the Navy pot word
about some objection to the corvee system, and I happened to be in his office
at that time, and the Secretary of the Na^T made practically the same state-
ment that you have made, that that was the common custom in this country.
It was done under Haitian law. Whether or not the corvee system was ever
abused I have no knowledge whatever except these rumors, and I can not sub-
stantiate them in any way whatever. I do not even know where they came
from. But the offirer.s who were on duty in Haiti with the gendarmerie ought
to be able to state fully about that.
Senator Pomebene. I^et me ask you another question. As I understand it,
we have charge of the customs down there, have we not?
Gen. Babnett. That, Senator, I can not answer any questions on legitimately,
because it was under a different department entirely. We had nothing what-
ever to do with It.
Senator Pomebene. You got no information which would lead you to express
an opinion as to whether it was satisfactorily administered or not?
Gen. Babnett. None whatever, because I never had the .slightest report or the
slightest knowledge with respect to the customs. That was because it was
under the — I forget what thoy call him — I think it is the receiver.
Senator Pomebene. Well, from the standpoint of law and order, at the time
you were down there last was there then a necessity for our marines staying
there?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 441
Cren. Babnett. I think so undoubtedly.
Senator Pomebene. Why?
Gen. Babnett. Because I think that Haiti has the best Government and the
best administered that it has had in 100 years. I think the improvements we
made in the orphan asylums, In the prisons, in the schools, and in the hospitals
were very marked, and almost entirely due to the marines.
Senator Pomebene. Well, you had the different revolutionary factions there,
I take It?
Gen. Babnett. I think so.
Senator Pomebene. And you think the demoralized condition of the island
was due to that fact?
Gen. Babnett. It seemed so to me. I think it got to be in a condition where
it was absolutely necessary to have a stable government.
Senator Pomebene. Is it your Judgment from what you have seen down there
that it is necessary for us to continue our marines there?
Gen. Babnett. For the present I unhesitatingly say so.
Senator Pomebene. For how long a time would you say?
Gen. Babnett. That I think is utterly Impossible to answer. It depends on
conditions entirely.
Senator Pomebene. Did you discover that the nationals of other countries,
for instance, the Germans, or British, or French, had any objection to our having
our marines there?
Gen. Babnett. I heard none. I went to a dinner given by the American min-
ister, and I went to another luncheon given by the President.
Senator Pomebene. Who was the American minister at that time?
(Jen. Babnett. Mr. Bailly-Blanchard, a man from Louisiana. He had been
for many years secretary of the legation in Paris, and was afterwards made
American minister at Haiti.
As I was go'ng on to say, I went to a dinner given by him, and to a luncheon
given by the President, where we met practically all the different representa-
tive i)eople in Port au Prince, and I heard of no complaint whatever.
Mr. Howe. Since the interchange of letters between yourself and Col. Russell
in September and October. 1919, have you heard anything from which you could
judge whether L:eut. Si)ear'8 statements before the court-martial gave an
exaggerated or an accurate account of the conditions there on which he was
commenting?
Gen. Babnett. I have not heard. As I say, shortly after these letters were
written, in September and October, 1919, Col. Russell was ordered to make this
investigation. Up to the time that I was relieved as commandant of the Marine
Cori)s, h's report had not been received, and I have not seen, except in a casual
way, a copy of his report, and that is the only information I have had, because
I have not seen the report of the court of inquirj', of which Admiral Mayo was
pre-sident.
Mr. Howe. General, you understand my question was wider than one directed
to your know^ledge of reports. What I would like to know is if since the time
in September and October, 1919, you have heard from any source whatsoever any
facts which would allow you to judge as to the accuracy of I^ieut. Spear's state-
ment?
Gen. Babnett. I have heard no facts whatever. T have beard rumors that
certain people knew of certain affairs down there, but they were the merest
rumors.
Senator Pomebkne. Let me a.sk you in that connection. General, following
along the line that was just bong asked you, how long has Lieut. Si)ear been
in the corps?
Gen. Babnett. I do not know. I do not know when he resigne<l.
Senator Pomebene. Is he a West Pointer?
Oen. Babnett. No, sir ; he came in the Marine Corps during the war.
Senator Pomebene, He was a civilian before tbat?
Gen. Babnett, Yes, sir; and I think he is a civilian now.
Senator Pomebene. Do you know him personally?
Gen. Babnett. No, sir: I never saw him.
Senator Pomebene. You have no means of judging of him temperamentally.
then?
Gen. Babnett. Xone at all. I never saw tlie man and never heard of him
except in that connection.
Senator Pomebene. Do you know what his business was prior to going into
the service?
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442 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Babnett. No.
Senator Pomerene. Do you know whether he had any experience In court-
martial matters or legal matters?
Gen. Babnett. No knowledge whatever.
Mr. Howe. Do you know what Lieut Spear's duty had been in Haiti before
the time he acted as counsel for these accused?
Gen. Babnett. I do not.
Mr. Howe. Do you know what regulations, If any, there were calling for the
report by the Marine Corps of any occasions when natives met their death at
the hands of members of the Marine Corps, either by authorized execution or
by battle casualty?
Gen. Babnett. I only know the custom of the service which would require, of
course, a report of any deaths. Even after an engagement, a report would con-
tain the number killed, as far as they could get at it ; killed and wounded, as
far as it was possible to find out, of course, in a short time, and the general
regulations, without any specific orders whatever, would absolutetly call for
reports as to killings.
Mr. Howe. Did you understand Lieut. Spear's remarks to the court-martial
to refer to killing by marines not subsequently reported officially?
Gen. Babnett. I d'.d.
Senator Pomebene. You have referred to these illegal killings, etc. Of course,
that statement seems to apply to the higher or more severe class of penalties
which were inflicted upon these prisoners. Did you see anything or hear any-
thing that would lead you to believe that there were other cases, so far as the
lower grade of penalties are concerned?
Gen. Babnett. No. My letter contained everything that I knew.
Senator Pomebene. Let me ask you another question. In answer to a ques-
tion which I asked, you said that you discovered what you regarded as an im-
provement in their educational facilities, etc. I wish you would go more into
detail and tell the committee what led you to believe that, or on what facts
you based that conclusion. Let me say that I ask this question particularly
because it would appear from the testimony of one or more witnesses before
this committee that there was no improvement in educational matters, etc.,
and that the marines and our occupancy there was simply a drain upon the
island's revenues.
Gen. Babnett. I think that statement is absolutely wrong. I think un-
doubtedly that Improvement has been made In many ways. I said in my re-
port, and I say to you now, that during this trip acro.ss Haiti that I made
with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Roosevelt, we stopped at every
little village and town we passed through and sent for the head man of that
village, and for the parish priest, and we discussed these matters with the
physicians at the hospitals, and we discussed them with the nurses and with
the people in charge of the hospitals, and we visited the prisons and inspected
them ourselves, and we who had been in Haiti before saw the improvement our-
selves.
Senator Pomebene. And you had been there before?
Gen. Babnett. I had been there before, and I did not need anybody's state-
ment to show me whether or not Improvements had been made.
Taking the matter of the prisons alone, I know that years before the prisons
at Port au Prince and Cape Haltien were very vile places. I know that when
I inspected them, you could eat your dinner with perfect safety in any part of
the prison, off the floor or off any bed. The beds were bunks made of boards.
And I talked with numerous people, as I say, the parish priests, and the head
men of every village, and we invited any criticism or question that they wanted
to ask. Mr. Roosevelt was very much interested in this thing, and. of course,
he being my senior, he conducted these questionings wherever, we went, of the
parish priests and the head men of these villages. I do not think he had ever
been there before, but I say that any man who had ever been there before
would see himself the improvement in these places, in the market places, in
the prisons, and in the hospitals.
Senator Pomebene. Did these priests there have charge of the education of
the children?
Gen. Babnett. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomebene. They had control of that, I suppose? Were they parochial
schools, do you know, or were they public schools belonging to the island ?
Gen. Babnett. I think probably they were parochial schools, because aU that
I saw were Catholic priests.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 443
Senator Pome&ene. Did any of these priests or other head men make any
complaints with respect to educational facilities, or hospital facilities, or any-
thing of that kind?
Gen. Basnittt. I do not think so, from the fact that. when we came back, the
Secretary of the Navy and I were both very much pleased with our inspection
trip, and very much pleased with the conditions down there.
Senator Pomekene. Then, as I understand you, the statements you got from
these priests and head men were merely corroborative of what your own eyes
showed you to be the condition?
Gen. Babnett. Yes, sir.
As far as the school and hospital business is concerned, I do not know of
a better man to have as a witness than Gen. E. K. Cole, who was in command
at Port au Prince at that time when we made our inspection there.
Senator Pomerene. He is of the marines?
Gen. Babnett. A marine — one of the best officers in the Marine Corps. He
was there and devoted his whole undivided time to it, and went from one end
of Haiti to the other frequently, and he was very well thought of throughout
Haiti, because on that trip wherever we went he was received most heartily
and kindly.
Senator Pomerene. Well, is it your belief that these people down there are
anxious to advance and appreciate the benefits to be derived from increased
educational facilities?
Gen. Barnett. I do not think the mass of the people have a thought on that
subject even. I do not think the whole mass of the people have a single thought,
or have ever gotten that far in thought at all. They are absolutely illiterate. I
think the only people to-day who would vote for a change in the conditions in
Haiti would be the people who are of a little higher class in education, etc.,
and want to run the Government themselves.
Senator Pomerene. Then you think it is a sort of conflict between the high
brows down there, do you?
Gen. Barnett. I do entirely. I do not think the mass of the people have any
more thought on the subject than children would.
Senator Pomerene. And, in your Judgment, they are sort of treated as such,
is that the idea?
Gen. Barnett. That is my idea. They should be given every consideration
compatible with good government, and should be given every facility for im-
proving and possibly In the future coming into control, but the people are
certainly, in my opinion, not fitted for it yet.
(•Whereupon, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2.30 o'clock p. m. )
AFTER RECESS.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. hl, pursuant to the taking
of recess.
Senator Oddie. I understand there is a matter you would like to put in the
record regarding education in Haiti.
Gen. Barnett. In the session this morning I was asked whether any im-
provement had been made in the educational facilities in Haiti. I stated that
there had been. I wish to state that my knowledge of that came from this trip
that I made through Haiti with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr.
Roosevelt.
Senator Oddie. What year was that?
Gen. Barnett. That was in January, 1917, and with Gen. Cole, who was in
command of the marines in Haiti at that time. I wish to say that the im-
provement was largely, if not wholly, due to the general uplift of conditions
in Haiti, and particularly, as far as I could see, from the warm personal regard
in which Gen. Cole was held by everybody wherever we went, and the influonoe
}ie liad for good in lending his personal assistance and general approval of
this work of the priests wherever we went. They were largely, as far a« I could
see, as I said this morning, Catholic schools. There was no law for it. We
had no right, as I understand it to take charge of education at all, no more
than we had in the hospital work, but I wish to state that at a big hospital in
charge of the head man of the Catholic Church in northern Haiti — we visited
this hospital, and I have never seen greater affection displayed than what
Gren. Cole got for what he had done, not oflioially, but for the general help he
had given them in the way of moral help, moral uplift, and little things he had
been able to do in a personal way.
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444 INQUIRY INTO OGOUPATION OF HAITI AND SA2^0 DOMINGO.
I think I stated very explicitly what knowledge I had with reference to the
educational system. The school there was not, in my opinion, in the same
status as the hospital part. They did a great deal of work there, but not because
of any treaty provision ; it was done by general good feeling and uplift
Senator Oddie. What fs your opinion regarding the action of the Marine
Corps in ths matter?
Gen. Babnett. I can say that outside of the knowledge that I gained from
the two court-martial cases of Johnson and McQuilkin, together with the state-
ment of Lieut. Spear, the counsel for the accused, it is the only thing I have
heard in my official career against the action of the marines in Haiti. Their
work, in my opinion, has been splendid, and nobody has praised them more than
1 did in all of my annual reports, and in my report which I made to the Secretarj'
of the Navy when I came back from my visit to Haiti, and I say unreservedly
that I think they have done the country a great deal of good, and that the
country is much better off for their presence there than it would have been
without them.
Mr. Howe. General, going back to the statement made by Lieut. Spear In the
Johnson-McQuilkin investigation, was it ever proved that the facts alleged in
that statement of Lieut. Spear were actually facts?
Gen. Babnett. I have no investigation to prove that, one way or the other.
Mr. Howe. Has it ever been shown by any reliable information that indis-
criminate killings by marines had ever taken place in Haiti?
Gen. Babnett. That is all the knowledge I have on the subject. As I stated
in my original letter, and in my final report to the Secretary of the Navy, the
whole knowledge that I have is the simple statement by Lieut. Spear on that
record. I have no other corroborative evidence whatever.
Mr. Howe. And the subsequent investigations you are familiar with, are you
not?
Gen. Babnett. I am not familiar at ail with the court of inquiry. I have no
knowledge of that. I have not seen their report or had reported to me what they
found.
Mr. Howe. Were there any other pro<'eedings besides the proceedings of the
court of inquiry, which would have a bearing
Gen. Babnett. Yes; as I stated this morning, after I was relieved as com-
mandant of the Marine Corps I saw the report of Maj. Turner, but it was not
before me as an official paper. I never passed on it, and therefore It is not as
clear in my mind as it probably would have been if I had been in charge of it ;
and I suggest, of course, that the committee get that report and read it, because
my opinion is that in that report Maj. Turner stated some cases of killings other
than these ; I am not sure of that.
Mr. Howe. Were there any other investigations?
(len. Babnett, No ; I know of no others.
Mr. Howe. This, then, is really your statement and testimony ; you refer the
committee to tliose published reports, making no comment of your own on them?
Gen. Babnett. None whatever. I have no comment to make, because I have
not seen them, except in the most Casual way.
Mr. Howe. And you have no independent knowledge of your own as to that
state of affairs or facts?
Gen. Babneit. None whatever.
Mr Howe. Did the entrance into the war of the United States have the result
of changing the personnel of the higher Jklarinc Corps officers in charge in
Gen. Babnett. It did change a great many; it changed the officers and men,
because it was my desire, when the war came on in Europe, to send as many
of the older, deserving officers and men to France as possible, because I n»cop-
nlzed the fact that they had had a couple of years or three years' pretty active
service in Haiti, and therefore they were well fitted for the work in France.
Mr. Howe. Those oflicers who had been in charge up to the time we weni
into the war were experieucetl officers of the Marine Corps, were they not?
Gen. Babnett. Certainly.
Mr. IJowE. And, in your opinion, well qualified for their duties in Haiti?
Gen. Babnett. That is the reason I sent them there, sir.
Mr. Howe. After we went Into the war, and after this necessary change m
personnel, were their successors down there men of equal experience, in your
opinion?
Gen. Babnett. I should say almost; yes, sir. I did not weigh them in tne
balance at all. Like all detaUs in the Marine Corps, they took their turn,
as far as possible, for foreign service. r^^^^T^
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 445
Mr. Howe. Let me Just ask it in this way : Those then who were there before
and after our entry into the war had al)Out the same rank, did they not, when
they were there?
Gen. Bahnett. Very near.
Mr. Howe. Is It true, however, that those who came there after our entry
Into the war had received more rapid promotion than their predecessors; in
other words, were younger men?
Gen. Babnett. That applied particularly not until about 1918, when our first
big increase came, and the promotions came along with that, and naturally
the officers then of the rank of colonel would not have been of the rank of
colonel in 1916.
Mr. How£. They had had shorter periods of service In the different grades?
Gen. Harnett. Yes ; but God knows they had all been long enough.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether the important steps during the occupation
of Haiti, such as the dispersal of the Haitian Senate in 1916 and 1917, were
originated in the State Department, or in the Navy Department, or in the
Marine Corps?
Gen. Babnett. I know it was not in the Marine Corps; otherwise I have no
knowledge of it, because that was done by the admiral, and the orders did not
come through me.
Mr. Howe. And you do not know where that determination originated?
Gen. Babnett. I have no knowledge whatever. My people were there simply
as military people, to obey the orders which were received through the Navy
Department.
Mr. Howe. And that reply would be the reply to questions about most of the
important policies taken?
Gen. Babnett. All with reference to finances, all with reference to the occu-
pation, all with reference to everything except the purely military handling of
the situation.
Mr. Howe. On all those things you have no knowledge as to what department
of the Government the orders originated in?
Gen. Babnett. The orders did not come through me at all. I only got the
orders that referred to the marines.
Mr. Howe. Take a slightly different question. Was the employment under
American auspices of the institutions of the corv^ ever referred to the head-
quarters of the Marine Corps?
Gen. Babnett. Never.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether it was ever referred to the Navy Depart-
ment?
Gen. Babnett. I think not. I can not answer positively as to that. I know it
was never referred to the Marine Corps.
Mr. Howe. When your Marine Corps officers down there were in doubt as to
how to proceed, whom did they consult? Did they consult through Marine
Corps channels, or did they ask information of the naval authorities?
Gen. Babnett. Up to a certain point they would ask their own superior
officers, and if it was a thing beyond his power to decide, he himself would
refer it to the senior naval officer.
Mr. Howe. To the senior naval officer in Haiti?
Gen. Babnett. In Haitian waters.
Mr. Howe. It is possible, then, that the employment under the United States
anthorities of the corv^ system may have been referred to the Navy?
Gen. Babnett. That I am utterly
Mr. Howe. I say it is possible it may have been ; you have no knowledge as
to whether it was or not?
Gen. Babnett. I have no knowledge as to whether it was or not. I do not
even know whether it was possible, because I have no means of stating one way
or the other. Possibly it might have been referred to the financial advisor, but I
flo not think it would. As I stated a while ago, my understanding of it is that
the corv^ system was, under proper conditions, carrying out a Haitian law,
and it was done under Haitian law by the Haitian troops, the gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. And the question may never have been raised and presented to
hitler authority?
Gen. Babnett. It may not.
Mr. Howe. As far as you know?
Oen. Babnett. As far as I know. I know that certain orders were issue<l
about doing away with the corv6e system by the marine officers.
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446 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. To what extent was the gendarmerie under the control of tiie
Marine Corps?
Gen. Babnett. The gendarmerie was officered by Marine Corps ofBcers. The
commissioned officers were of the Marine Corps.
Mr. Howe. And what authority was there for that arrangement?
Qen, Babnett. It was a treaty arrangement, approved by Congress, by tiie
Haitian Government and by order of the Secretary of the Navy, which, I under-
stand, was approved by the Secretary of State, and certain additional pay was
allowed the officers in Haiti and Santo Domingo, and that was passed upon by
Congress, too. That is an act of Congress.
Mr. Howe, To what treaty do you refer?
Gen. Barnett. I refer to the treaty between the United States and Haiti.
Mr. Howe, Of what year?
Gen. Babnett. I have forgotten the year. It never came to me before or
after its adoption, but I know there was a treaty, and I know Congress passed
an act in 1916 authorizing the employment of marine officers in the Haitian
gendarmerie, and stating definitely that their increased compensation would be
from the Haitian Government. They got their regular pay as marine officers,
and then this additional compensation. The act of Congress authorized them
to receive compensation, because an officer in the United States service can not
receive remuneration from a foreign Government without a special act of
Congress.
Mr. Howe. Do you know who gave the order for the original landing In Haiti
at Port au Prince and at Cape Haltlen?
Gen. Babnett. I have understood It was Admiral Caperton. I never saw
the order.
Mr. Howe. You have no personal knowledge of that?
Gen. Babnett. No.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether the Navy Department or the Marine Corpe
ever advanced any plans in connection with the promotion of education In
Ham?
Gen. Babnett. I do not think they had authority to, according to law. I
think it was all done by moral suasion, by general example, and by personal
encouragement of the officers.
Mr. Howe. Do you know of any recommendations which were made, If any,
to obtain the authority of law?
Gen. Babnett. They have tried to get authority of law, but it lias not been
granted yet, according to my understanding.
Mr. Howe. By " they" whom do you mean?
Gen. Babnett. Congress.
Mr. Howe. Who has tried?
Gen. Babnett. The Navy Department
Mr. Howe. What did you understand to be the function of the Marine Ck)rps
in HaiU, General?
Gen. Babnett. I understand the function of the Marine Corps in Haiti to be
two things: First, that a portion of the officers and the men of the Marine
Corps are detailed to the gendarmerie by special order. That is one function.
Although the gendarmerie officer gets pay from the Haitian (Jovemment, In
general term In any emergency he Is still a marine and still under the com-
mand of the senior marine officer there. The senior marine officer there fun^
tlons with all the marines under his command, and the function of the marines
In Haiti is for the preservation of general order, which would mean putting
down any attack by the Cacos, so called, who are a sort of bandits, and for the
general preservation of order throughout the country.
Mr. Howe. What is the relation, for Instance, between the Haitian Govern-
ment and the marines?
Gen. Barnett. So far as I know, there is no principle connection between the
Haitian Government and the marines proper, except the marines were employed
in the gendarmerie. I do know that the senior marine officer in Haiti has,
while In Haiti, been In frequent conferences with the President of Haiti and
his cabinet, giving them advice, but how strong the advice was I do not know.
Mr. Howe. Did the American minister exercise any control over the mi-
rlnes?
Gen. Barnett. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did any of the Anierican-ai^pointed civilian officials exercise an>
contn>l over the marines?
Gen. Barnett. Only the financial advisor, with reference to the allotment of
money. The gendarmerie and the marine officers of the gendarmerie got their
Tie
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 447
money, their pay, through the financial advisor, and the financial advisor from
time to time, in fact, I think, quarterly, allotted to the chief of the gendar-
merie, who was a marine officer, an allocation of funds for the upkeep of
the gendarmerie in every capacity — m-lltary stores, building equipment, arrns^
ammunition, horses, and everything for the quarter.
Mr. Howe. But the financial advisor was not authorzed to give any direc-
tions to the commandant of the marines down there?
(Jen. Bamkettt. None whatever.
Mr. Howe. To the commanding officer, I mean.
Gen. Baknett. None whatever.
Mr. Howe. What were the general or specific instructions issued through
your office to the American forces in Haiti, regarding armed confilcts and deal-
ing with bandits and similar subjects?
Gen. Babnett. I did not give the order. A man was sent down there to
take charge, and the country, most of the time, if not all the time, was under
martial law, and the man on the spot, where there is martial law, has absolute
control of the military situation, and he reported to heatlquarters, the Navy
Department, and only reported to the Marine Corps practically through head-
quarters, and with reference to the orders I gave. We did not attempt in any
way to dictate the individual action of any body of troops in Haiti. That
was under the military commander, who was a naval officer. The naval
officer, however, as I understand it, did not in any way attempt to take charge
or Interfere with the military procedure, per se. That was left to the senior
marine officer.
Mr. Howe. Your last direct knowledge or opportunity to judge of the feeling
of the Haitians toward the American occupation was in 1917, during your
visit there?
Gen. Babnett. That was the last time I have ever seen or talked to a
Haitian.
Mr. Howe. Have you any means of judging or saying whether or not there
has been any change in the attitude of the Haitians since that time?
Gen. Babnett. I have not.
Mr. Howe. General, is there any matter which you think you could or should
testify to at the present time which would be of ass stance to the committee
in getting a thorough understanding of the affairs in Haiti?
Gen. Babnett. I do not think so. I think I have state:! everything that
came within my knowledge, and the action that I took on the things which
reached me. I do not know of anything. As I have stated before, I have no
first-hand knowledge of any trouble in Haiti. I know simply from official re-
ports that came to me, and I have told you this morning the action I took
with reference to them.
In further reply, Mr. Howe, I will say that naturally, being given orders
from the Secretary of the Navy to make a report on everything that happentxi
in Haiti from the time the marines first landed there until I was relievetl as
commandant of the Marine C3orps, I made this report, which certainly con-»
tained about everything I could find in the Navy Department assisted l)y
Maj. McClellan, of the h'storical section, everything relating to what occurred
In Haiti while I was commandant of the Marine Corps.
Senator OomE. Capt. Angell has asked permission to ask some questions, and
he is doing! this as he did the otlier day, and we are not establishing any
precedent by doing this, but it is simply as a matter of courtesy.
Gen. Babnett. I am willing to answer any questions anybody asks me.
Mr. Anoell. As to the gendarmerie. General, you have testified that the
officers of the gendarmerie were of the Marine Corps, and so provide<l for
under the treaty. Do you know who chose, or rather, who was responsible
for the choice and organization of the personnel of the gendarmerie? I do not
mean of the specific officers of the Marine Corps,
Gen. Babnett. I was responsible for it, I think. I signed the orders, but I
naturally got the suggestions from different officers and different members of
the profession. From time to time officers were sent to Haiti, and from time
to time the officer in command of the gendarmerie in Haiti would state to
the commanding marine officer in Haiti that there were certain vacancies in
the gendarmerie, and the senior marine officer in Haiti would make a report to
me recommending certain people. These people had to be mentioned by name to
get authority from the President of the Ignited States to l>e detail**d to tlie
gendarmerie before- they could draw the extra pay as gendarmerie ofiicers.
In every case where an officer was detailed to the gendarmerie the final order
had to be approved by the President of the United States. .^.^^^ byGoOQlc
448 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angell. When you used the expression " these people," you meant the
members of the Murine Corps who were detailed to duty as officers in the
gendarmerie ?
Gen. Babnett. Certainly.
Mr. Angell. I referred more to the whole plan of organization and training
and choice of the general personnel of tlie gendarmerie.
Gen. Babnett. That was sent by the senior officer of the gendarmerie to
the senior marine officer and approved by him and sent to me and approved.
Mr. Angell. In other words, it was done by the Marine Corps, not by the
Haitian Government at all?
Gen. Babnett. Not at all ; it was done by the Marine Corps, of course.
Mr. Angell. Did the officers of the gendarmerie choose the enlisted personnel
of the gendarmerie?
Gen. Babnett. Undoubtedly ; they were all Haitians.
Mr. Angeu.. Did they take and train men from among the Haitian popu-
lation ?
Gen. Babnett. I do not know what their scheme of enlistment was, but
they had tliat in charge the same as officers here who were in charge of en-
listments for the Marine Corps.
Mr. Angell. Do you know what attempts, if any, was made. General, to
make native Haitian officers in the gendarmerie, as provided or suggested by
article 10 of the original treaty?
Gen. Babnett. Our intention was originally as fast as possible to make tho
Haitians junior officers and see if tliey could not noon be in a ix)Sition to become
captains of companies. That was thought of at that time.
Mr. Angell. Do you know how far that original plan was pursued?
Gen. Babnett. I do not know. That was left entirely to the gendarmerie;
it was under Haitian control entirely.
Mr. Angkli^ When you say under Haitian control
Gen. Babn^ht. I mean under Haitian control according to the treaty. They
were essentially Haitian troops and they were iiaid by the Haitian Govornineiit.
Mr. Angell. And the choice?
Gen. Babnktt. Entirely with the marines.
Mr. An(jell. This morning you made reference, (ieneral, to the building of
roads?
Gen. Babnett. Yes.
Mr. Angell. In Haiti?
Gen. Babnett. Yes.
Mr. Angell. By or under the direction of tlie marines or gendarmerie?
Gen. Babneti\ Yes.
Mr. Angell. And for what jnirposc were tho.se roads built?
Gen. Babnett. For the general purpose that they would be built in any
country in the world. You can not have good military control; you can not
have good business; you can not have good anything in any country without
roads. It took me four days to go from Port au Prince to Cape Haitien, riding
through the mountains, over a road which originally had been a splendid
carriage road, according to history, and in many places it was almost Im-
possible to get over it on horseback, and it was utterly impossible for any sort
of traffic to go over, except tlie roughest sort of pack animals. A trip was
made from Port au Prince, up through St. Marc, up around the coast, to Cape
Haitien and Ouanaminthe, and they made such a good road there that It was
rei)orted to nie later that the chief of the gendarmerie took the President of
Haiti from Port au Prince to Ouanaminthe in 13 hours in an automobile.
Senator Oddie. How many miles is that?
Gen. Babxktt. I do not remember the number of miles, but it is a good many.
It took us four days, traveling on horsebaok, on a hard ride, riding 11 hours
a day.
Mr. Angell. Was the principal purpose of building the roads that of mklitary
necessity?
Gen. Babnett. I think that was the first thing that would naturally occur
to a military man. and did occur to them, that before they could keep up any
IMists out in the interior tlu-y had to have roads whereby they could suppl^*
the commands with the necessary eciuipment and food, and everything that goes
to keep up a military establishment, and it was much easier for us to supply
our troops in the interior by truck than it was by pack animal* and therefore
we had to get the roads in such a condition that a truck could go over them.
Mr. Angell. Was the statement contained in paragraph 3 of a letter or report
of the brigade commander, dated June 19, 1919, appearing in pftragraph 234
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 449
of your report to the Secretary of the Navy of October 11, 1920. and reading
as follows : " Soon after the American occupation of Haiti it was realized that
g^ood roads between the principal towns were a military necessity," a'ccording
to your understanding, an accurate statement?
Gen. Babnett. I think so. I think that is the first thing that would occur
to any military man.
Mr. Angeli» Do you know why the building of roads was stopped, or largely
given up, in 1918?
Gen. Babnett. As I stated in my report, you will remember, in one para-
graph of my report, I had heard rumors about trouble on account of the
abuse of the corvee system, but I had no official report whatever; I had no
statement of anybody, except I do remember that some rumor was to the effect
tliat there was trouble with regard to the corvee system, and the corvee system
was alt stopped about that time you mentioned.
Mr. Angeix. In 1918, had sufficient roads been constructed under the direc-
tion of the marines and the gendarmerie to meet the major requirements of
the military necessity?
Gen. Babnett. I think so. That road I spoke of, from Cape Haitien to Port
au Prince — I mean via St. Marc to Cape Hatien and Ouanaminthe — ^was finished
some time in the spring or summer of 1917.
Mr. Anoell. Is it your understanding, General, that the so-called abuse of
the corvee law or custom came into being after your trip to Haiti in 1917?
Gen. Babnett. That I do not know. I say I have no reports whatever on
that subject.
Mr. Anoell. At the time of your trip In January, 1917, you heard no com-
I)laint then about the corvee law?
Gen. Babnett. No.
Mr. Anoeli^ It was only after that that complaints came to you directly or
Indirectly?
Gen, Babnett. No ; I had heard some rumors before that.
Mr. Anoell. Before January, 1917?
Gen. Babnett. Yes: but where tliey came from or anything about it I
knew not.
Mr. Angell. You do not remember what those rumors were?
Gen. Babnett. No ; just simply some trouble about the corvee system was all
I heard, and there was no report made about it, so I never heard anything
more about it.
Senator Oddie. General, may I ask a question here in regard to the roads?
Did you consider the ultimate benefit to the country from an economic stand-
point in laying out these military roads?
Gen. Babnett. I did, and you will see every evidence of the good of it,
because I do not know whether you happen to know it or not, but a large part
of the produce of Haiti consists of logwood, which is used for dye purposes, and
with the roads they had there at the time when the marines first went there
the only way these people could get this into market at all would be in small
amounts on pack animals. It is very heavy stuff. From an economic point of
view I think it is absolutely essential that the roads should be in such a condi-
tion there that they could haul this stuff on wheel vehicles.
Mr. Howe. Then. General, one of the purposes of the military control of the
Island was to permit commerce to pro<*(»e<l unhindered, was it not?
Gen. Babnett. I do not think there was a single officer who went down there
who was not thoroughly imbued with the fact that that was one of his prin-
cipal duties, to see to the well-being of the country not only peacefully but
commercially.
Mr. Howe. So that the roads, then, naturally followed the proper arteries
for. the commercial development of that country?
Gen. Babnett. Entirely.
Mr. Howe. That was where there had to be military protection, and that was
where, when peacefulness was established, there should be the means of
transportation?
Gen. Babnett. I think Haiti is no different from any country in the world,
and the world is full of cases, especially France, where they have the good of
the roads built by Napoleon, built for military purposes, and they are just as
good now as they were then and just as essential for (M>mmercial purposes.
Mr. Angell. In your report. General, In paragraphs 1(59 to 171, you refer to
reports from Gen. Cole In May, 1917, discussing the changed attitude toward the
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450 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Ajnericans on the part of many classes of the people. Do you recollect, or can
you give us any of the causes of that changed attitude in the spring of 1917?
Gen. Babnett. I have no doubt that the report referred to in those para-
graphs was largely the result of the trip (5en. Cole made with' us when we went
from Port au Prince to Cape Haitien overland on horseback in January, 1917,
which gave Gen. Cole a chance to see all parts of Haiti with us. I think at
that time he saw the changed conditions, and saw they were as I reported when
I came back, very favorable indeed.
Mr. Anoeix. Paragraph 171 reads :
" On May 29, 1917, Brig. Gen. Cole reported that he had made efforts to
locate causes for hostile attitude, but without success ; and while admitting its
presence "
Gen. Babnktt. It was constantly changing from day to day. We had re-
ports all the time that there would be an uprising here and an uprising there,
when things had been very quiet.
Mr. Angell. Have you any recollection, then, as to what the causes were
for this change, this newly hostile attitude?
Gen. Barnett. No; I would not have known.
Mr. Ajvoeix. At the time of your trip to and through Haiti in January, 1917,
when you, as you testified this morning, spoke to a great many people in tbe
towns, was there no mention made to you and did you hear of no complahits
of the forcible closing and dispersal of the Haitian Senate and Legislature in
1916?
Gen. Babnett. It was never mentioned to me. Secretary Roosevelt was
with me, but whether or not he discussed anything of that kind with the
Haitian officials or Haitians in general I do not know. I was not present at
any such discussion.
Mr. Angell. Did you converse directly with the natives or through an
interpreter?
Gen, Babnett. Through an interpreter entirely. Secretary Roosevelt spoke
French very often, and very often he conducted the questioning.
Mr. Angell. To come back once more to the question of the Improvement
In educational conditions in the schools, can you give us specific instances of
such improvement as you say took place or along what lines was the improve-
ment?
Gen. Babnett. We visited the big hospital and school particularly, to
mention one of the most pronounced cases, in north Haiti. I have forgottwi
the old gentleman's name now, but he was one of the old type of Catholic
priests, and he collected around him all of the sisters, and had charge not
only of the hospital work but of the school work, and he was most enthusiastkr
about the improved conditions and what Gen. Cole personally had done for
them.
Mr. Angell. Do you know what Gen. Cole had done, or what this gentle-
man said he had done?
Gen. Babnett. No ; I only know that he was expressing himself as perfectly
delighted with Gen. Cole's attitude and what Gen. Cole had done for them.
Mr. Angell. So far as you know there was no fund placed at the disposal of
the marines or gendarmerie for educational purposes, was there?
Gen. Babnett. I do not think so.
Mr. Angell. So that Gen. Cole could not have done anything except by
personal Influence or
Gen. Babnett. Sympathy.
Mr. Angell. Sympathy?
Gen. Babnett. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Nothing tangible that could have been accomplished in tlie build-
ing of schools or
Gen. Babnett. I think not.
Mr. Angell. Or the hiring of additional teachers?
Gen. Babnett. He had no authority for that. I stated In my testimony some
time ago that the Navy Department had been trying to get something through
which would give them authority to allocate money for that, but I do not
think they have gotten It yet.
Mr. Angell. It Is true, is It not, General, that a number of marine officers
in Haiti have made recommendations or requests for permission to be allowed
to attempt to improve educational facilities in Haiti?
Gen. Barnett. I think so; undoubtedly.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 451
Mr. Angell. General, scattered through your report are various official re-
ports of engagements between the marines and gendarmes, on the one hand,
and Haitian natives, principally cacos, upon the other hand, as the result of
which conflipts there were casualties amounting to 2,250, I believe are the
official figures?
Gen. Babnktt. Yes.
Mr. Angell. For the natives and either 14 or 16
Gen. Babnett. A very small number.
Mr. Angell. A very small number for the marines and gendarmes during
the period covered by your report, which is five years?
Gen. Babnett. Yes.
Mr. Angell. What have you to say. if anything, regarding the striking con-
trast between those figures covering tlie casualties?
Gen. Barnktt. It was largely like it was in the Philippines. There were a
great many natives down there who would be friends to-day and 8o-calle<l Cacos
to-morrow. They ha<l no uniform, and it was hard to distinyuish one from the
other, and they were not well arine<l. They were brave, but they would have
no show against well-armed troops, especially with machine guns, and it is
perfectly natural to supi>ose that the contrast would be very marked and that a
very great number should be killed in comparison with the number of white
lieople who were killed.
Mr. Angeij- To what extent were nmchine guns used, do you know?
Gen. Baknett. I do not. They had tlieni there and used them if they found
iie<"e8slty for it.
Mr. Angell. Was there an artillery battalion?
Gen. Babnett. Yes; and they likewise used airplanes.
Mr. Angell. Do you know to what extent they used airplanes?
(^en. Babnett. No.
Mr. Angell. Were airplanes used to bomb out supposed nests of Cacos?
(^n. Babnett. I do not know the particular uses to which they were put. The
reports which came to the commanding officer from them would not necessarily
come up here at all.
Mr. Angeix. So, in your opinion, the contrast between the figures of the re-
spective casualties on both sides were due largely to the superior military
armament and equipment of our forces?
Gen. Babnett. Entirely so, I think. Every marine is a good shot, almost of
necessity got to be.
Mr. Angeli^ To what extent. If you know, were offensive operations, in the
narrow, military sense, taken by our forces in Haiti against the natives?
Gen. Babnett. One particular one was the capture of Fort Riviere. That was
really quite an affair.
Mr. Angell. That was the affair when there wore 51 Haitians killed but no
casualties on our side?
Gen. Babnett. It was quite an affair. The Haitians were not well armed,
but they stood up and fought to the best of their ability.
Mr. Angell. That is covered by paragraph 118 of your report?
Gen. Babnett. Fort Kiviere was captured on November 17, 1915, the message
of Col. Cole to Col. Waller containing the following description :
" Capture of Fort Riviere effected by four colunms. Campbell, Thirteenth
Company; Barker, marine detachment Connecticut; Low, Fifth Company;
McCaughey, seaman company from Connecticut ; and automatic machine-gun
company from Twenty-third ( 'ompany. All companies were in their position at
the time specifiefl and Butler and Low's company made the assault, supported
by live other companies. Hand-to-hand confiict in fort lasted 10 minutes.
Twenty-nine killed and twenty-two juni]>ed parapet, but all were killed by
fire from the automatics, all avenues of escape being blocked. F'orty-seven
rifies and considerable ammunition f(mnd in fort after capture. Fort of mortar
and brick of most substantial construction. The fact that this fort was taken
witliout a single casualty on our side speaks worlds for the ability and good
Judgment of all officers concerned. Have sent to the cape for dynamite to destroy
fort, as its complete destruction by blowing up will have great moral effect.
All quiet Ba jon ; i)eople returning to town."
Mr. Asgeij- Was that operation fairly characteristic of the operations in
general conducted by our forces against the natives?
Oen. Babnett. I should say that was a sample. They had a little better pro-
tection there than they wouhl have ordinarily, it being an old fort on a high
mountain.
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452 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Anoell. The operations conducted by us were, in tlie strict military sense,
offensive operations?
Gen. Barnett. Yes; except In one case, where the natives attacked I»ort au
Prince one night.
Mr. Angeix. Do you know what tlie approximate casualties the natives
suflPered in that attack on Port au Prince were?
Gen. Baknett. In the attack itself and the subsequent operations, where they
were followed out into the mountains, etc.. I tliink the exact number was 1,76H
killed.
Mr. Angell. Those oiHU'ations extended over a considerable period of time
afterwards?
Gen. Baknett. Several months.
Mr. Angell. In your opinion. General, was the method of operations pur-
sued by our forces against the natives as typitied by the attack on Fort Riviere,
genuinely necessary in the best intert^sts of the maintenance of order in Haiti?
Gen. Barnett. I think it was. I have great confidence in the iiarticular
officer who was there at that time, Gen. Cole, and Gen. Waller also.
Mr. Angell, Referring to tlie proclamation which was published in Haiti on
August 22, 1919. by the brigade commander, as appears and is reproduce<! in the
record on page 83, reading, "Citizens of Haiti: The time has come to put a
stop to further bloodshed. It has been necessary to use stern measures to re-
press the disorders in the north, and with the recent arrival of mil.tary engines
we can use even sterner methods.'* Do you know to what that proclamation
makes reference wlien it says, " The time has come to put a stop to further
bloodshed"?
Gen. BARNtm'. Tlie time to close the thing out, to stop this thing of the
cacos coming down from the hills.
Mr. Angell. What is meant by the recent arrival of military engines?
Gen. Barnett. I imagine that means airplanes that arrived alwut that time.
Mr. Angell. If I understood you right. General, this morning you testifie<I
that largely as the result of your two letters to Col. Russell a correction of
that state of afTairs was made in Haiti. Can you tell us what correction or wlint
specitic steps were taken to correct such abuses as they had existed?
Gen. Barnett. That was in the hands of Col. Russell, and, as I have state<I
this moniing, the evidence that correction had been made was that in October
or November, 1920, Gen. Lejeune and Gen. Butler went there, under orders of
the Secretary of the Navy, and made an inspection and found things in fine
shape.
Mr. Angell. You have no knowledge as to what particular steps Col. Russell
took to change the state of affairs in Haiti?
Gen. Barnett. He issue<l this proclamation and made it very drastic. As
I read it to you this morning, it was a very drastic proclamation indeed, which,
as he said, was to be read personally to every marine in Haiti, or marine
officer, and to every marine arriving in Haiti at any time, apd must 1>e carrie<l
out. He got out his proclamation as the result of my letter and stated that if
anything of that kind had existed, it nmst cease or they would all be court-
martialwl. That is probably just what the result was.
Mr. Angell. Referring now, sir, to the corvee system, can you tell us in any
detail what abuses there were of that system?
Gen. Barnett. I can not. As stated in my report, I had simply heard rumors
that there was trouble about the corvee system, but I had no report whatever
of any specific cases as long as I was commandant of the Marine Corps.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether or not men were taken, native Haitians
were taken and forced to work outside of the district in which they lived?
Gen. Barnett. I do not.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether they were forced to work more than a
period of three days?
Gen. Barnett. I do not. That I have stated in my report. The rumors were
that there was trouble on account of the abuse of the corvee system, but wbere
it came from, or what it was. I do not know.
Mr. Angkll. So, you have no knowledge as to how widespread that abuse
w^as, or in what particular it consisted?
Gen. Barnett. I have not.
Mr. Angell. Nor who was responsible for it?
Gen. Barnett. I have not.
Mr. Angctx. Have you any knowledge at all as to why the corvee system was
continued, as seems to be the case from ofliicial corresi>ondence and reports, in
the Hln,he district? Digitized by GoOglc
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AJND SANTO DOMINGO. 458
Gen. Barnett. I have understood from the reports I have seen since that
time and the report I spoke of this morning, the report made hy Maj. Turner,
that in one particular Province, Hinche, it was continued contrary to orders,
and the officer who was responsible for it probably was the officer in command
of the troops in northern Haiti.
Mr. Angell. Who was that?
Gen. Barnett. Maj. Wells, I think.
Senator King. Do you know definitely that it was continued in violation of
orders?
Gen. Barnett. Senator, when you were not here this morning I stated that
this report that I just mentioned, which was made by Maj. Turner, did not
come to my office up to the time I left the Marine Corps headquarters, but
since that time, and this committee is going to request it, and that will probably
show. I have no knowledge whatever first hand of the abuses of the system.
Mr. Angell, in connection with what I stated a moment ago about Port Riviere,
I think it might be well to read here paragraph 119 of my report :
"General Order No. 319, August 25. 1917, announces the award of medals
of honor to certain officers and enlisted men for gallantry in capturing Fort
Riviere. The general order reads in part as follows."
Then it shows for what they were given this medal of honor. There are
four of them, thus showing the approval of the Navy Department of that
action.
Mr. Angell. General, do you know how thorough an inquiry the court of
inquiry presided over by Admiral Mayo made into the Haitian question?
Gen. B.\rnett. I have no knowledge of that I only know, as I stated this
morning, with reference to their finding, that that was the only part that
came to me, but the record of the court of inquiry is before this committee.
Mr. Angell. Who were the members of that court?
Gen. Barnett. Admiral Mayo. Admiral Oliver, and Gen. Neville.
Mr. AN0ET.L. Gen. Neville was of the Marine Corps?
Gen. Barnett. Of the Marine Corps, and Maj. Dyer was judge advocate.
Mr. Angell. Where was Gen. Neville on duty at that time he was assigned
to this court?
Gen. Barnett. On duty at the headquarters of the Marine Corps as as.sistant
to the commandant
Mr. Angell. That was after you were relieved as commandant?
Gen. Barnett. After I was relieved; yes, sir. I was relieved on June 30,
1920.
Mr. Angell. Had Admiral Oliver been governor of the Virgin Islands?
Gen. Barnett. He had two of three years — two years, I think.
Mr. Angell, Do you know whether there were any charges, official or un-
official, which had been made or suggested against him arising out of his admin<
Istration of the Virgin Islands?
Gen. Barnett. I heard rumors. I never saw any trouble or paper on the
subject at all. I never heard anything definite at all. I never saw any official
paper of any kind.
Mr. Angell. So you do not know whether in that particular he was to a
certain extent an Interested party?
Gen. Barnett. I had no knowledge of any trouble in the Virgin Islands at all.
My only Interest In the court of inquiry — I do not know how they conducted
their affairs or anything of that kind — ^but my only interest in it was in their
faulty wording of their report. It was worded so badly that everybody mis
understood it I do not say a few people, but I say that everybody misunder-
stood it and thought it was a severe censure of me.
Senator King. While Mr. Angell is looking at his notes I would like to ask a
question. When I was in Haiti a little over a year ago I was told that a
number of marines had been butchered, and their bodies had been devoured,
in part at least, by the natives. Did you, when you went down there, learn
anything of that?
Gen. Barnett. I did not. I heard nothing up to the time I left I do know
that there was a report that two American engineers down there were tied
op to trees and hacked to pieces by the natives. Those people were tried by
military commission, sentenced to be shot — or hanged, I have forgotten which —
but the sentence never was approved in this country.
Senator King. Did you not discover that a number of marines had been killed
hk amft>Q8h?
Gen. Barnett. I have, undoubtedly.
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454 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Kino. You reported that?
Gen. Babnett. Yes; I reported it in liere. That was to be expected in any
<!ountry where war was going on.
Senator Kino. This was told me by the natives as well as by Americans,
that one marine in particular had his head cut off, and his skull had been used
in some of their incantations there ; did you hear of that?
Gen. Babnett. I did not hear of it, but I can well understand it might be true.
Senator King. In performing their libations they had used the skull of the
marine. I was told also that there were a number of natives in the prison
at Port au Price — ^possibly in some other city, I am not sure which — awaiting
trial for the butchery of one or more little children, whose blood was necessary
in their rituals, in their pagan, religious ceremonials.
Gen. Babnett. Yes.
Senator Kino. Did you learn what became of those natives that were held
awaiting trial?
Gen. Babnett. No, sir ; I did not ; I have no report on that subject at all.
Mr. Howe. General, in answering Mr. Angell's questions concerning these
engagements and casualties in Haiti you, of course, rely on the reports of your
officers down there?
Gen. Babnett. Entirely; it is all in here.
Mr. Howe. You had no personal knowledge of it?
Gen. Babnett. None whatever ; I took the official reports,
Mr. Howe. Mr. Angell used the expression " offensive operations " in the
strictly military sense, and that was the expression used in connection with his
question to you with regard to the capture of Fort Riviere?
Gen. Babnett. Yes.
Mr. Howe. You did not conceive that to mean an unprovoked operation or
unnecessary operation?
Gen. Babnett. Not at all. I used " offensive " in the strictly military sense,
meaning that they went after them ; they did not wait to be attacked, but went
after them.
Mr. Howe. And the operation being carried out had the approval of the Navy
Department?
Gen. Babnett. Not only the approval of the Navy Department, but had such
approval of the Navy Department that for that affair alone they awarded four
medals of honor.
Mr. Howe. You were asked a question by Mr. Angell as to w^hether that
operation was characteristic of the many other operations in Haiti and you said
it was. In what respc^ct was the capture of Fort Riviere characteristic of the
other operations?
(Jen. Babnett. Simply because they went after them. They went after the
Cacos wherever they met any of them.
Mr. Howe. Not after the Haitians in general?
Gen. Babnett. Not at all. They only went after the Cacos, and it was not
typical in that as I said, at Fort Riviere the Haitians had much better pro-
tection than they had in most cases, because it was an old fort up on top of a
high mountain.
Mr: Howe. General, in connection with a question asked by Mr. Angell con-
cerning Gen. Cole's investigation for a hostile- attitude toward the United
States, I would like to read you sections 169 and 171 of your report. Section
169 reads as follows:
" On May 28, 1917, Brig. Gon. Cole rep(>rte<l that the British charge d'affaires
had informed him that he was much worried over the propaganda that was
being spread against the Americans and the changed attitude toward tiie
Americans on the part of many classes of people."
" 171. On May 29, 1917, Brig. Gen. Cole reported that he had made efforts to
locate causes for hostile attitude, but without success, and while admitting its
presence believed the belief of the British charge to be caused by the fact that
he lived with an * alarmist.' "
Do you not think those two sections which I have just read you constitute a
full reply to the quest icm nskwl you by Mr. Angi'U?
Gen. Barnktt. I think undoubtedly they are a very good answer, indeed. We
heard rumors constantly about propaganda started liy German citizens down
there.
Mr. Howe. But the fact remained that a rumor of a grievance against the
Americans led, on an investigation, to the discovery of no specific cases?
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 455
Gen. BABi<ncTT. No specific cases. I find here in the report, in reply to the
question asiced by Senator King abont marines being cut up, that there is one
case reported as follows:
"All clothing had been removed from the body of Lieut Muth. The body had
been badly nmtilated, heart cut out, and head cut off. The underclothing had
been replaced. The head and heart had been taken away, and the latter prob-
ably eaten."
That is a part of paragraph 251 of ray report.
Senator Kino. &Iay I Inquire, relative to the same military operations to
which Mr. Angel 1 directed your attention, whether those against w^hom you
were operating were seeking the overthrow of the existing government, and
whether tlie operations of the American tr(M»ps or marines was with the knowl-
edge, consent, and approval, if not the direction, of the Haitian Government?
Gen. Barnett. It was in both cases.
Senator King. Were any of the military operations there contrary to the
wishes of the President and the native officials?
Gen. Harnett. I think not.
Senator King. Were they in harmony with their views?
Gen. Barnett. As far as I know.
Senator King. And aimed at the protection of law and order?
Gen. Barnett. I think that without a force of marines there they would not
have lasted long, and they knew it.
Mr. Anoell. In connection with Senator King's last question, do you know
whether or not the military seizure of the customhouses in August and Septem-
ber, 1915, met with the approval of the President and Government of Haiti?
G«»n. Barnett. I do not. You will have to ask, if you have not already, Ad-
miral Caperton that I was not there, and Admiral Caperton was.
Mr. Howe. In one of Mr. Angell's questions he asked you about the abuses
of the corvee system. You know that the c<)rvee did exist there as a system, do
you not?
Gen. Barnett. I do.
Mr. Howe. But have you any knowledge of any abuse of that system?
Gen. Barnett. Not the slightest first -hiiiul knowledge at all, sir.
Senator King. Did it exist as a system before the American troops went
there?
(ien. Barnett. It is Haitian law. Just when it had bet»n invoked I do not
know, but I imagine whenever it became nece>«ary to build roads'.
Senator Oddie. Do you know whether there is any comparison between that
system and the poll-tax system in some of the States?
Gen. Barnett. I have understood it is largely the same, where a man may
work so many daj-s or pay so much tax. I know out West it was quite a com-
mon custom when I was a boy.
(Whereupon, the committee adjourned until Wednesday, October 26, 1921, at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
62269— 21— PT 2 23
Digitized by VjOOQIC
Digitized by VjOOQIC
LNQIIRY INTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Ck>HMiTTEB on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D, C.
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment. Senator
Tasker L. Oddle presiding.
Present: Senators Oddie and Pomerene.
Also present : Mr. Ernest Angell, Mr. Horace G. Knowles and Maj> Edwin N.
McOlellan, United States Marine CJorps. and Walter Bruce Howe, Esq., in their
respective representative capacities as hereinbefore Indicated.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. T. C. TUBNEB, XTNITED STATES MABINE
COBPS.
Senator Oddie. Major, give your full name and rank and your position in
the Marine Corps.
MaJ. Turner. T. C. Turner, major United States Marine Corps ; In charge of
marine aviation, headquarters, Marine Corps.
Mr. Howe. Major, how long have you been in the Marine Corps?
MaJ. Turner. Since January, 1901.
Mr. Howe. Were you in Haiti In the years 1919 and 1920?
MaJ. Turner. I arrived in Haiti October 1, 1919, and left there on November
12, 1920.
Mr. Howe. Did you, while down there, make an investigation of certain
alleged irregularities in Haiti?
Maj. Turner. I did.
Senator Pomerene. Were you the commanding officer?
Maj. Turner. I was not; I was the brigade adjutant and acting chief of
staff.
Senator Pomerene. Who was the officer in command at that time?
MaJ. Turner, Col. John H. Russell.
Mr. Howe. Will you state, please Major, In connection with this Investiga-
tion you conducted, when you received your orders and when you began the In-
vestigation?
Maj. Turner. The orders came through Col. Russell, from the headquarters
of the Marine Corps. I started the Investigation about October 5, and I think
I ccHnpleted it
Mr. Howe. Of what year?
Maj. Turner. 1919. I think it was compleeed sometime during the month of
November of the same year.
Mr. Howe. The investigation which we are now talking about, covered did
it not, among other things, the actions of Lieut. Williams, Lieut Freeman
Lang, and included testimony by Lieut Van Horn? '^"'«"
Maj. Tinner. I do not remember that Lang's name was mentioned Wil-
liams s was. but I do not remember that Van Horn's was
Mr. HowR I think there is a sworn statement of Lieut. Van Horn's here In
therecord ; I am not certain whether it was taken by you. I merely asked the
question in order to identify this report. ^
Senator Pomerene. You made a written report?
Maj. Turner. I did.
Senator Pomerene. To whom?
Maj. Turner. To Col. Russell.
Mr. Howe. We have that report here. Will you please give us a full descrio-
Uon of your methods.of making this Investigation and taking the tesdmonr?
457
Digitized by VjOOQIC
458 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Maj. Turner. As I remember It. Col. Russell called me and showed me a
letter received from the major general commandant and at the same time issued
an order to me to make an investigation 09 the contents of the letter from the
major general commandant.
Mr. Howe. Does this document which I hand you contain the results of your
investigation [handing document to Maj. Turner]?
MaJ. Turner. It does.
Mr. Howe. Is this the original?
Maj. Turner. No; it is not
Mr. Howe. I notice here that there appears to be the signatures of witnesses
to some of the sworn statements. It occurs to me to ask. Is this a duplicate
original in so far as these sworn statements go?
Maj. Turner. This is a part of the second part of rth» investigation, in which
Lieut. Col. Hooker and myself took part. This is not the tirst investigation
.at all.
Mr. Howe. Will you, taking that document by pages, indicate where your
report begins and where it ends — where the first part begins and where the
second part begins?
Maj. T^^NER. This is in reference to an investigation made by Col. Hooker
and myself.
Senator Pomerene. I would like to have the major give the substance of
the charges made, which he was to investij^te, and give us a general r^sum^
of the conditions as he found them. I can understand how he will want to
verify his memory by referring to the record lat^r, but he can give us the
substance of that, which will give us a bird's-eye view of it, and -then he can
give us a reference to the record afterwards and read such parts of the record
as will be of assistance.
Mr. Howe. As I understand it, a part of this document which constitutes
this report will be put into the record later?
Senator Pomerene. Yes ; but he can state what the charges were.
Maj. Turner. As I remember the letter, it stated that during a court-martial
the counsel for the accused had made various statements about killing Cacos.
I took this letter and attempted to investigate the contents of the letter, but
was unable to get anything on that one particular case.
My invesigation brought nie to other matters that l(K)ke<l as if there had l>een
irregularities coinuiltted by marines down there.
Senator Pomkkene. Now, be more specific. That is a very general terra.
What kind of irregularities were they?
Ma.j. Turner. The killing of prisoners.
Senator Pomfu^ene. Go ahead.
Maj. Turner. I went to Col. Russell and spoke to him about it, and lie told
me to go to the bottom of it and get everything out of it I could get. It made
no difference what happened.
I examined a great number of witnesses, and the more I examined these
witnesses the more firmly convinced I became that there was little or nothing
to the whole thing.
The reports would come to me that certain prisoners had been killed, and
the deeper I went into it it looked as if the killings were a fact. As a matter
of fact
. Mr. Howe. The killing of prisoners?
Maj. TURNJ3R. The killing of prisoners. As a matter of fact, there is only
one case, and that is in the case of Lavoie, where I considered that prisoners
had been killed in an irregular manner.
Senator Pomerene. Cive us the particulars of that case.
Maj. Turner. That was some time in January. 1919, where it wsl9 all^^
that Lavoie had machine-gimned some 15 or 19 prisoners in a graveyartl outside
of the town of Hinche, but there was no evidence, nor could I find any witnesses
to that.
Senator Pomerene. Was this man Lavoie a marine?
Maj. TiTRNER. Lavoie was a sergeant of marines, and during the time
mentioned, in .January. 1919, he was a captain in the Haitian gendarmerie.
Senator Pomerene. How many were killed at that time?
Maj. Turner. I am inclined to believe it was 19.
Senator Pomerene. Nineteen native prisoners?
Maj. Turner. That was the report
Senator Pomerene. What was the irregularity about it?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 459
Maj. Turner. The Irregularity was that I^voie was alleged to have taken
these men out of Jail and shot them in the graveyard outside of Hinche.
Senator Pomerene. What was their offence?
MaJ. Turner. None.
Mr. Howe. Proving there had been no trial; is that it?
Maj. Ti»NER. They were captured caco prisoners..
Senator Pomerene. Do I understand you to say that a marine had done this
without any court-martial proceeding?
Maj. Turner. That is what was alleged.
Senator Pomerene. Where is this man Lavoie?
Maj. Turner, I^vole left HaiU, and I do not Ijnow where he is now.
Senator Pomerene. Is he still with the Marines?
Maj. Turner. No, sir ; he is not ; he left Haiti some years ago.
Senator Pomerene. That is one instance, and there were 19 men killed?
Maj. Turner. So it is alleged.
Senator Pomerene. That was something of an irregularity, was it nof
Maj. Turner. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomerene. Now, did you talk with Lavoie yourself?
Maj. Turner. I did.
(Senator Pomerene. What did he say about it?
Maj. TURNEB. I would like to take a look at his testimony before saying that.
I do not remember exactly just now. This was a couple of years ago.
•^ Senator Pomerene. I can understand how you will want to be accurate about
that, and we want it accurate. I thought perhaps you could give us, in a gen-
eral way, what his claim was, and then you could supplement that later.
Maj. Turner. As I remember it, I think he denied it, but I am not sure of
that
Senator Pomerene. Then you had better look that up and get all the facts
with regard to it. You say there were other irregularities complained of.
What other irregularities were there?
Maj. Turner. Everything, Senator — everything; but, traced down, it was
nothing.
Senator Pomerene. Go into the details as to what they were.
Maj. Turner. Rape, murder, and robbery.
Senator Pomerene. Did you satisfy yourself that there was nothing in these
charges, or are we to understand that you were not able to get any proof as
to whether or not they occurred?
Maj. Turner. I was satisfied after the investigation that they were untrue.
The witnesses would tail off to an end without being able to give me any defi-
nite proof.
S^iator Pomerene. When you speak of your witnesses, do you speak of na-
tives or marines?
Maj. Turner. Natives and whites. Quite a number of these were not called
before the Investigation because after talking to them I was convinced that
their testimony was of no value whatever. I put in the investigation the testi-
mony of those which was of value. The rest was all hearsay.
Senator Pomerene. Did you trace that hearsay evidence down to get hold of
the mati who had primary knowledge of it?
Maj. Turner. Yes, sir ; and could not get them ; there was not anybody.
Senator Pomerene. Let us go back to this Lavoie matter again. Did his su-
perior officers have any knowledge on this subject?
Maj. Turner. I do not think so at the time ; no.
Senator Pomerene. Did they make any attempt to investigate this matter?
Maj. Turner. That I do not know. I think there was an investigation by
Gen, Catlin in March, 1919. I believe — this Is my belief — that that matter was
taken up at that time, but how deeply he went into it I do not know.
Senator Pomerene. I think you ought to go very carefully into that record.
This is a mighty grave matter and we ought to know exactly what the facts are
with regard to it.
Maj. Turner. Yes, sir. Lavoie was discharged from the Marine Corps in
Haiti and accepted a position with the sugar company down there, and later
was with the Government in the customs service, and later on left Haiti.
Senator Pomerene. What other investigation did you make? You say there
were a lot of other alleged irregularities, and you found nothing.
Maj. Turner. I Investigated to find if I could put anything in this rei>ort of
mine that would be of any value. But there was nothing else found.
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460 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Pomerene. What was the substance of your conclusion?
MaJ. TuBNEB. I made no conclusions. I was ordered to make an investiga-
tion, but not to give an opinion or a conclusion. The conclusions were made by
Col. Russell^
Senator Pomebene. Have you since gone over his conclusions?
MaJ. Tubneb. Col. Russell's?
Senator Pomebene. Yes.
MaJ. Tubneb. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomebene. Do you agree with them?
MaJ. Tubneb. Yes, sir.
Senator Pomebene. Col. Russeli, in his letter says:
Headquabtkbs First Pbovi signal Bbtuade,
United States Mabine Cobps,
Port an Frince, Republic of Haiti, March IS, 19tO.
Confidential,
From : The brigade cH)mmander.
To: The Major General Commandant.
Subject : Report of Investigation of certain irregularities alleged to liave lieen
committed by officers and enlistetl men in the Republic of Haiti.
1. From a careful reading and study of the attached testimony, statements,
and other reports, I am reluctantly forced to the opinion that MaJ. Clarke H.
Wells, formerly gendarmerie department commander in nortliern Haiti, is re--
sponsible for the conditions in northern Haiti as found by Brig. Gen. Catlin
on his inspection of the Hinche-Malssade districts in March, 1919. If such con-
ditions were not actually due to his orders and instructions.
2. I am further of the opinion that these gendarmerie officers under Maj.
Weirs command who were enlisted men in the Marine Corps, on duty in said
districts, were acting in accordance with what they believed to be the policy of
their department commander.
3. It is difficult to believe that Capt. Doxey was not fully aware of MaJ.
Weirs policy and of the existing orders and conditions in the Hinche-Mnissade
district.
4. There is no doubt, however, in my mind, as to whether or not the evldem-e
as here brought out is sufficient to warrunt a trial before a general court-
martial on charges of such a serious nature. It is extremely doubtful if further
evidence can be procured.
5. The event referred to herein occurred 4)ver a year ago. Many changes have
taken place in the i)ersonnel of the gendarmerie since that time. Nearly all the
interested parties have either returned to the United States or have l>een dis-
charged from the service. Mr. I-.avoie, former captain G. D. H. and private
Unltd States Marine Corps, has left the service arid Haiti, and his whereabouts
is unknown.
(5. It Is therefore recommended that these papers be referred to the of^e^ of
the Judge Advocate (General, United States Navy, where the sworn statements
and other evidence may be carefully sifte<l and weighed with a view of de-
termining whether 4)r not it is sufficient to warrant a trial.
7. If the decision is in the affirmative. It is requested that si>eclnien .charges
and siM»cltications be prepared by the Judge Aclvocate's General's offi<*c, ami
that a coniiK»tent officer be assigne<l to tenuK»rary duty with this brigade to act
as judge advocate of the court. At present, there is no officer attached to the
brigade who is considered to have sufficient legal knowle<lge to conduct a trial,
to the best interest of the Government, where skilled opjmsing counsel is present.
8. The return to Haiti of all witnesses and interested parties would, of
course^, l>e necessjiry.
John H. RrssKu..
This sergeant certainly did not u.se the machine gmi himself, but be must
have Imd some privates doing it; did he not?
Maj. Ti'KNKR. 1 do not remember whether the gendarmerie privates did it.
but I am inclined to believe that Lavoie was suppose<l to have done it. as I
remember.
Senator Pomerene. I wish you would look up that re<'ord and refresh your
memory about that. We want to know what did occur down there, and we
ought to have the facts.
Maj. Tubneb. Yes, sir.
(Thereupon a recess was taken until 2 o*clock p. m.)
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 461
AFTEB BECE88.
The committee reassembled, pursuant to the taking of the recess, at 2 o'clock
p. m^ Senator Medill McCormick < chairman) presiding.
Mr. Howe. Maj. Turner, how many investigations did you make down there
in Haiti, or could you subdivide any of your investigations?
MaJ. TuBNEB. There was one main investigation, and later on, in January or
February, 1920, Col. Hooker was ordered to assist me in making further investi-
gations, due to the fact that my duty at that time would not permit me to go
into the hills and visit the different points where information might be gained.
The main investigation was made by me between October — I tliink about the
5th or 7th — ^and I think it lasted until the latter part of November.
Mr. HowK. Your first investigation was begun at the direction of Col. Rus-
sell, was it not?
Maj. Turner. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And in connection with that letter sent by (Jen. Barnett t<) Col.
Russell, the letter being dated September 27, 1919?
Maj. TuR.\ER. Yes.
Mr. Howe. That was referre<l to you and you were told to investigate, with
tliat letter as a starting point or basis
Maj. TuKNER. Of the investigation ; yes.
Mr. Howe. Then, as I understand it. major, you investigated during tlie re-
maining part of the month of October and began to take written testimony on
the 3d of November?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe, And that written testimony, when it was completed, you turned
over to Col. Russell, did you not?
Maj. Tub NEB. I did.
Mr. Howe. It was after that had been turned in that Col. Hooker was directed
to cooperate with you in the taking of further testimony?
Maj. TuBNER. Yes ; considerably after — ^two months.
Mr. Howe. I am going to ask you if this document whlcli I hold in my hand,
from i>ages 109 to 131, is not the written testimony to which we have referred
as having been begun to be taken on Noveml)er 3, 1919?
Maj. TcBNKB. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, I offer for the record pages 109 to 131, inclusive,
of this report.
The Chairman. Without objection, that will be inserted in the record.
(The matter referred to is as follows:)
Confidential. November 3. 1919.
From : Maj. Thomas C. Turner, A. A. & I., U. S. Marine Corps.
To: The brigade opmniander.
Subject: Report of investigation of certain irregularities alleged to have been
coDMnitted by officers and enliste<l men in tlie Republic of Haiti.
Reference: (a) Major general commandant's confidential letter dated Septem-
ber 27, 1919.
1. On receipt of reference (a) I immediately procee<led to Investigate the
alleged Irregularities. I called in Sergt. Richard R. Siegert, United States Ma-
rin Corps, who was duly sworn as stenographer.
2. Capt. Laurence Bolte. Gendarmerie d'Haltl (corporal, I'nited States Ma-
rine Corps), was called ?is the first witness, was duly .sworn, and testifltnl as
follows :
1. Question. State your name, rank, imd present station.
AnsH'er. Laurence Bolte, corporal. United States Marine (^>rps, and a captain
in the Gendarmerie d'Haltl, stationed at Hinche. Republic of Haiti.
2. Question. Statements have been made that both marines and gendarmes
have been In the habit of having wounded cacos shot. Do you know anything
about this?
Answer. No, sir.
3. Question. You never Issued an onler of that kind?
Answer. No, sir.
4. Question. Do you know that this has been done?
Answer. I don't know about it. but I have heard of it being done.
5. QwstloiJ. Where did you hear this, and from whom?
Answer. I heard It from Lieut, Floyd, Gendarmerie d'Haltl ; Mr. Baker ; and
Maj. Hayes. Gendarmerie d'Haiti. ^g.^.^^, .^ GoOglc
462 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
6. Question. Who was In command at Hinche when the last rebellion started ?
Answer. Capt Kelly had it in October.
7. Question. Who relieved him?
Answer. Capt. Lavigne.
8. Question. Who relieved him?
Answer. Maj. Doxey.
9. Question. Were you ever instructed to make private reports to anybody in
reference to operations in the Hinche district?
Answer. Not private reports, but telegrams received through Ouanamlnthe by
telephone were to be kept on file at the third company office under lock and key.
10. Question. Who gave this order? '
Answer. Col. Wells.
11. Question. Why was this order issued?
Answer. I do not know if it was caused by this investigation which took place
at Hinche.
12. Question. Did Col. Wells ever instruct you to disregard c^ertain orders
received from the chief o^ the Gendarmerie d'Haiti?
Answer. No, sir.
13. Question. Do you know whether these or any other ordei"s were disre-
garded ?
Answer. No, sir.
14. Question. Do you remember when the first order against corvee came out?
Answer. The first order came out in the latter part of August.
15. Question. Was tills order ever disregarded?
Answer. I do not know that this was done. I heard it from the priest at
Hinche (Belliot) and a chief of section named Josei»h Marcellia, and one naincKl
Albert.
16. Question. Did the priest at Hinche ever inform you that In^fore you came
there that Cat^os had been killed after they had surrendered?
Answer. Yes.
17. Question. Did anybody at Hinche tell you that?
Answer. No one at Hinche; but a marine named Sasse told me that prisoners
had been taken out of the prison at Hinche and shot, and the priest at Hinche
told me the same thing.
18. Question. Who issued the order for the shooting. Do you know?
Answer. No, sir.
19. Question. You do not know whether this was reporte<l to Col. Wells or not,
do you?
Answer. No. sir.
20. Question. While you were at the cape d'd a telegram show that there was
any considerable trouble at the district of Hinche?
Answer. Yes.
21. Question. Between what months were those telegrams Coming in?
Answer. From the 1st of January to the middle of March.
22. Question. Do you know what became of those telegrams?
Answer. They were left in the desk of the district commander at the cape.
3. Second Lieut. Edward J. Sieger, (Jeudarniferie d'Haiti (corporal, Unitetl
States Marine Corps), was called as a witness, was duly sworn, and testified as
follows :
1. Question. State your name and rank.
Answer. Edward J. Sieger, second lieutenant. Gendarmerie d'Haiti, corporal.
United States Marine Corps.
2. Question. How long hifve you been with the (Jendarmerie d'Haiti?
Answer. Since October, 1916.
3. Question. What duty were you performing between the months of .Tanuarv
and March, 1919?
Answer. Patrol duty in the Hinche district.
4. Question. Did you ever see wounded ( 'acos killed by marines or gendarmes?
Answer. No.
T). Question. Did you ever hear that it had been done?
Answer. No.
6. Question. Did you ever hear of an order abolishing cor\'ee?
Answer. Yes.
7. Question. When was it issued?
Answer. September or October, 1918.
8. Question. Did you know of any corvees after that time?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 463
Answejr. I uii'lerstand they were running corvee in Malssade.
9. Question. Who tohl yoii that?
Answer. Only Haitians.
10. Question. Who was in command of Maissade at this time?
Answer. Lieut Williams.
11. Question. What were your reports to HaJ. Wells as to the conditions of
the natives during your time in command at Thomasslque?
Answer. I only made reports to Capt. Lavoie. I reported conditions very bad.
12. Question. Did you ever hear that Maj. Wells had ordered Lavoie or any-
one else at Hinche to disregard Ma}. Wells's orders at Hinche?
Answer. No.
13. Question. Do you li^now that they had corvees at Maissade after the order
abolishing it had come out?
Answer. Just from what Haitians had told me.
14. Question. Do you approve of killing wounded prisoners?
Answer. No, sir.
15. Question. Do you really think that conditions were good in the gen-
darmerie in the early part of 1919?
Answer. No.
16. Question. Why not?
Answer. Messages cam^ in that telephone lines were being cut and houses
burnt
17. Question. Do you consider the Gendarmerie d*Haiti responsible for this
condition?
Answer. Not absolutely responsible.
18. Question. But In a way?
An8\i-er. Well, I don't know.
4. Captain Frank Verdiek, Gendarmerie d'Malti (sergeant United Stateis
Marine Corps), was called as a witness, was duly sworn, and testified as follows :
1. Question. State your name and rank.
Answer. Frank Verdier, captain, Gendarmerie d*Haiti (tiergeant, United
States Marine Corps).
2. Question. Did you ever hear of any prisoners — that is, Cacos — being shot
without proper trials?
Answer. No, sir.
3. Question. Where were you stationed in 1919, up to date?
Answer. I have been in Ouanaminthe since September, 1918.
4. Question. Did you ever hear that Caco prisoners were being treated
roughly?
Answer. I never heard any remarks about it
5. Question. When did the order against corvee come out?
Answer. October 1, 1918.
6. Question. Did you ever hear that this order has been disobeyed?
Answer. I heard that It had been disobeyed at Maissade by the magistrate.
7. Que>ition. During early part of 1919, did you have any trouble with cacos
in the Ouanaminthe district?
Answer. Yes; in July, 1919.
8. Question. Did you ever he^r that cnoo prisoners had been shot In the
cemetery at Hinche?
Answer. I heard that some people had been shot in the cemetery at Hinche,
but I don't know whether they were prisoners or cacos.
9. Question. Who told you?
Answer. Some Haitian ; I don't know his name.
10. Question. Did you ever speak to anyone nbout It?
Answer. I spoke to Ciipt. Kelly about It, but he said that it was not so.
11. Question. This was the only conversation you had on this subject?
Answer. Yes.
12. Question. Who told you of the corvee at Maissade?
Answer. I don't remember.
13. Question. Was he white or Haitian?
Answer. I think he was white.
14. Question. Did you ever have any conversatu^n with Capt. Bolte about
shooting prisoners or maltreating them?
Answer. I think that I told Capt. Bolte that I had heard n rumor that they
had not been shot at Hinche.
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464 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOBflNGO.
5. Second Lieut. P. Jttjcs Andre, gendarmerie d'Haiti, was called as a
witness.
Mr. Alfred J. Holly was called as interpreter and was duly sworn.
Lieut. Andre testified as follows :
1. Question. What is your name and rank?
Answer. I*r Jules Andre, second lieutenant, Gendarmerie d'Haitl.
2. Question. It has been reported that there has been a lot of killing of caco
prisoners. Do you know anything about this?
Answer. I never witnessed any shooting, as I was at Thomonde ; but I heard
there was some executions at Hlnche and at a suburb of Hinche called Latte.
3. Question. Who was in command at these places?
Answer. Capt. Lavoie.
4. Question. Did you ever hear of any other murders of any prisoners in the
district of the north?
Answer. Yes ; at Maissade. one named Garliner.
5. Question. By whose orders was the murdering done by at Maissade?
Answer. I don't know.
6. Question. Wasn't it generally known throughout the gendarmerie that
these murders were the result of orders from Maj. Wells?
Answer. No.
7. Question. Can you give any reasons for these killings?
Answer. These officers acted pretty much as they* liked, as they were not
seriously controlled by their superior officers.
8. Question. Do you know whether they had corvee at Maissade during die
months of January, February, and March of this year?
Answer. They had it in December last year and in January and February of
this year.
9. Question. By whose orders was this corvee ordered?
Answer. I don't know, but I ilresume It was by the order of Maj. Wells.
10. Question. Is it not generally known that this corvee was ordered by
Maj. Wells?
Answer. I presume it was as he was in command of that district and the
orders came from him.
11. Question. What effect did this corvee have on the feelings of the people
of the north?
Answer. A very bad effect, and I think that it was the cause for the revolu-
tion in the north.
12. Question. Did you see much of Maj. Wells?
Answer. I know him very well because he was my captain, major, and
colonel.
13. Question. Was he in the habit of using Intoxicating liquor very much?
Answer. I never saw him Intoxicated, but I know he drank.
14. Question. Do you know Maj. Doxey?
Answer. Yes, sir ; very well.
15. Question. Was Maj. Doxey responsible in any way for the corvee?
Answer. I thihk not, because he never had anything to do with corvee.
16. Question. Did Maj. Doxey know anything about the killing of the
prisoners at Hlnche?
Answer. I don't know, because I was at the Cape and so was Maj. Doxey.
17. Question. Is there any bad treatment of prisoners In the north at the
present time, and if not, what is the last case of that kind that you have
heard of?
Answer. No; not at the present time. The last case was in March, this
year.
18. Question. Did the maltreating of prisoners stop when Gen. Oatlin issued
that order?
Answer. Yes.
6. Fbederick O. Bakkr was called as a witness and was duly sworn and
testified as follows :
1. Question. What Is your name?
Answer. Frederick C. Baker.
2. Question. Have you ever been connected with the gendarmerie d'Haltl
and if so, for how long?
Answer. I have ; I was attached to and serving with the gendarilierie d'HaitI
for a period of three years, my service terminating April 1, 1919.
3. Question. It has been reported that marines and gendarmes have been
killing caco prisoners. Do you know anything a*>out this? QqqqI^
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 466
Answer. Only from hearsay.
4. Question. Dnrlng your time in the gendarmerie, were you ever ordered to
"bump off" or not to take any prisoners?
Answer. I was on one occasion. About November 1. 1918, while serving as
district commander, District of Gonsivee, Haiti, Maissade was attached by
cacos and certain destructions committed there. On the date following this
attack my then department commander, Maj. C. E. Wells, called me by phone
from Cape Haitien to Gonaivos, and related the details of. the attack and
ordered that I proceed with a patrol from Gonaives to Maissade. He further
ordered that prisoners. If any were undesirable, useless, and he desire<l them
bumped off, by this expression of course meant to kill them. I followed out
his orders so far as going to Maissade and making a general patrol : no
prisoners were captured, therefore none killed.
5. Question. Do you know of juiyone eLse who rece'ved like order?
Answer. FYoni (\\pt. Ernest I-tjvoie, G. D'H., Lieut. Sieger, G. D'H., and
Lieut. Williams. U. D*H.. I learned that they had received the same and similar
onlers.
6. Question. D.'d you (»vei- hear that an.v of the above-named officers carried
out those or<lersV
Answer. I have been informed and iK-lieve that Capt. Lavo'e carrieil out these
orders and was act im under the orders «if Maj. Wells when he executed 19
prisoners at H^nche in .lanuary, 1919.
7. Question. Was it generally talked about, among the marine officers and
gendarmerie officers, that prisoners were being **bumpe<l off"?
An.swer. In close circles among the gendannerie officers whom I knew best
and with whom I most associated it was understood, I believe, to be the
Iiopular thing to "bump off'* as nearly as possible all prisoners taken. It was
more or less discussed by them all and it was generally understoml among them.
8. Questi<m. Was this understanding cau.sed entirely by orders recelvetl from
Maj. Wells?
Answer- To the best of my belief the whole incentive behind Hie execut'ons
referred to wei-e the prders an<l sanction given the act by Maj. Wells.
9. Quest'on. Were you very well acquainted with Maj. Wells?
Answer. I was. I was clo.sely associated with Maj. Wells from Noveml)er,
1917, until January, 1919, serving as his assistant on road construct on in the
di.strict of the north, and by virtue of nature of this I became close to him,
siK»n<l"ng, as it were, weeks at a time c(mtinually in h's company and with him
in the country.
10. (Question. Wluit was the attitude f»f Maj. Wells with reference to reports
of trouble in the north?
Answer. ^laj. Wells often instructed me. along with others, to use the soft
IMHliil on all rer»orts. and excei)t in cases of necessity or to comply with some
regular order to make n«i reiM)rts at all. He often explained th's by saying
(bat Port au Pr'nce was too busy and had no time to receive or i^ad reports
on details. He stated that he would be satisfied as long as the country was in
a state of good poli«\ and he neither cared nor wanted to hear of the <letails
of execut'ons to accomplish this end.
n. Question. Did Maj. Wells ever express anv desire not to hear of these
killings?
AiiHwer. He often stated that he did not want to hear of these th'ncrs.
12. Question. Have yon ever seen Maj. Wells under the influence of I'quor?
Answer. I have, numerous times. ,
13. Question. Is it possible that some of these " bunii)ing-off " orders were
duo t-o the fact that he had been drinking?
An.«5wer. I wouhl think it possible that .some were, although at the time he
gave the order to "bump off" pr'soners taken in or around Ma'ssade, I do not
believe that he was in the sliirhtest affected by the influence of liquor.
14. Question. Wns Maj. Doxey entirely fam'liar with everyth'ng that was
go nir on in the north?
Answer. It is my opinion that he was. He was closer to Maj. Wells than
any other officer in the department of the north, and api>eared always to coun-
sel* and advise with Maj. Wells in all matters of importance pertaining to
service. He was In and cmt of Hinche freciuently, and it would seem Incon-
ceivable that he was entirely unconscious of the things that were going on.
15. Question. Did he ever express any orders as to bumping off prisoners?
Ans^eer. Not to my knowledge.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
466 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
16. Question. Was it generally known or talked about t|iat all the conditions
that you referred to had been explained and gone over by Gen. Gatlln on hi»
visit to St. Michel in March, 1919?
Answer. It was. From others and all practically who had been interrogated
by Gen. Catlin I learned that practically every phase of the conditions which I
have related were brought to the attention of Gen. Catlin at some time during
his investigation at St. Michel and Hinche.
17. Question. At any time after Gen. Catlin's conference was an order issued
by either Gen. Catlin or Lieut. Col. A. S. Williams or Maj. Wells that these
conditions must change?
Answer. There was. I received an order from the chief of the gendarmerie
prohibiting in detail the execution of Caco or other prisoners.
18. Question. What date was the order against corvee issued?
Answer. October 1, 1918.
19. Question. Was this order ever disobeyed?
Answer. It was. This order was disobeyed in the districts of Maissade and
Hinche from October 1, 1918, until some time in March, 1919.
20. Question. Was this order dlsobeye<l by instructions from anybody?
Answer. Capt. Lavoie and Lieut. Williams, when I inquired of them in my
capacity as inspector of roads in the north as to by whose authority and from
whence funds were coming to carry on their work, informed me that Maj. Wells
liad ordered them to construct roads between St. Michel and Maissade and
between Maissade and Hinche with corvee labor, and that he had Induced the
magistrates of Maissade and Hinche to make a certain contribution from which
the corvee would be fed.
21. Question. What effect did the breaking of this order against corvee labor
have on the people in the north?
Answer. It is my opinion that the corvee illegally formed after October 1,
1918, and after the Haitian public generally knew and well understood that all
corvees and forced labor had been ordered suspended constituted the chiefest
factor in the dissatisfaction which led to revolution, and it is well understood
that the first Caco forces were largely recruited from the last-*formed corvee.
This opinion is based on my experience of handling corvee labor during the
fall of 1917 and the spring of 1918, when I had under me and personally
directed the largest corvee ever formed in Haiti, numbering 3,000 men.
Under the then existing (conditions the members of my corvee, knowing that
they were subject legally to be called up to do road work, offered no resistamv
and seemed contented during the entire operation — that is, the construction of
tlie road from Gonaives to the Limbe River — and the first discontent over this
subject had its inception In the district of Maissade and Hinche when these
l)eople learned that they were l)eing forcibly (letaine<l, worked under guard, and
knowing that the PresUlent of Haiti as well as the chief of the Gendarmerie
d'Hait' had ordered the susi)ension of corvee labor throughout the Republic.
22. Question. From your conversation with Marine and gendarmerie offlt*ers,
can you give an estimation of illegal exe<*utions in the district of the north?
Answer. Aggregating all rei>orts and rumors, I would judge the niinil)er to ex-
ceed over 400 at least, and in this number there are include<l a large x)ercentage
of persons suspicione(l or whose Identity was never known.
23. Question. Was this estimate a low or high estimate?
Answer. Thi.s is a low estimate.
7. First Lieut. Harold H. Wood, (Gendarmerie d'Haiti (cori)oral, Tniteil States
Marine Corps), was called as a witness, and whs duly sworn and testifie<l as
follows :
1. Question. What is your name and rank?
Answer. Harold R. Wood, first liuetenant, (Jendarmerie d*Haiti (corpt>ral.
United States Marine Corps).
2. Question. Do y<m know anything of the unlawful killing of caco pri«)ners?
Answer. No, sir.
.3. Question. Have you heard in any way of the unlawful killing of aico pris-
oners.
Answer. I had heard of some of them being kllle<l.
4. Question. Where?
.Answer. In Hinche and Maissade.
5. Questicm. Did you ever hear by whose instructions this was carrie<l out?
Answer. I know nothing of instructions about actual killings of any fwlsoners.
but instructions were said to have been issued not to take anv prisoners.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 467
6. Question. By whom were these orders issued?
Answer. Tht*y were said to have heeu issued by the department comuiantler,
Col. Wells.
7. Question. Wiis Maj. Doxey cognizant of these instructions wliich you had
heard had been issue<lV
Answer. As to that I don't know, l>ecause at that time I saw Maj. Doxey but
once, having passed him on a road.
8. Question. Do you know whether Maj. Doxey was in or around Hinche alxnit
this time?
Answer. No, sir ; Maj. Doxey was not there.
9. Question. Do you know Lieut. Spier?
Answer. No, sir.
8. Capt. John L. IK)xey, United States Marine Corps, was calle<] as a witness,
and was duly sworn an(i testitiecl as follows:
1. Questhm. State your name and rank.
Answer. John L. Doxey, captain, Unite<l States Maiine Corps.
2. Question. What duty were you perforndnp between the month of October,
1918, and March, 1919?
Answer. I was district commander of the district of Cai>e Haitien.
3. Question. Did this w^ork take you into the Hinche district; that is, into
the towns of Maissade and Hinche?
Answer. I was directed to go into the Hinclie district on about October 18,
1918, and remained there until October 30 or 31. Aj^aln, I was ordered to
Hinche about February 17 and remained there until March 31, 1919.
4. Question. While in the Hinche district did you at any time hear of the
unlawful killlnK of caco prisoners?
Answer. Some time in March I heard rumors of this.
5. Question. What were these rumors?
Answer. All that I rememl)er was killing of prisoners, and that there would
be an investigation.
6. Question. Where did rumors say these prisoners had been killed?
Answer. Just in the Hinche district.
7. Question. Not in Hinche?
Answer. No; not neces.sariiy in the district of Hinche.
8. Question. Can you give the approximate date?
Answer. No, sir.
9. Question. What attempt, if any. did you make to Investigate these rumors?
Answer. None.
10. Question. Can you give any reascms for not investigating these rumors?
Answer. None, except that I was not directed to investigate these rumors,
and I understood there would be an investigation.
11. Question. Your theory is, then, that if you heard of something wrong in
your district that you would not investigate It unless ordered. Is that correct?
Answer. No, sir ; that was not In my district at that time.
12. Question. Do you say that some time in March you were ordered out in
the Hinche district again?
Answer. About the 17th of February until the 7th of March.
13. Question. Then you did not hear these rumors in tlie Hinche district but
at the cape?
Answer. Yes, sir. .
14. Question. Did you ever mention these rumors to Maj. Wells?
Answer. Not that I remember.
15. Question. Did you ever hear that certain gendarmerie officers had re-
ceived orders to bump off prisoners?
Answer. No, sir.
16. Question. Was the killing of prisoners you referred to the killing of nine-
teen men who were shot In the cemetery at Hinche?
Answer. No, sir; I do not recall any particular incident in regard to these
riiraors, but understood that there was to be an investigation of conditions In
the district of Hinche.
17. Question. There was an Investigation, was there not?
Aii.swer. Yes, sir.
18. Question. You had nothing whatever to do with the district of Hinche
when you heard these rumors?
Answer. No; I can not recall just when I heard these rumors. I don't know
whether it was before or after.
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468 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
19. Question. Well, had it been wliile you were iu charge of that district
wouid you have investigated it?
Answer. Yes ; I would have if I were in charge of the district.
20. Question. Do you know Oapt. Lavoie, G. d*H.?
Answer Yes
21. Question. Do you know Capt. Bolte, G. d*H.?
Answer. Yes.
22. Question. Do you know Lieut. Williams, G. d'H.?
Answer. Yes.
23. Question. Do you know Mr. Baker, formerly of the gendarmerie?
Answer. Yes.
24. Question. Have you ever had any conversation with the above-named
people with reference to the killing of Caco prisoners or the unlawful killing of
any Haitians?
Answer. On about Marcli 10 I received written orders in regard to what
disposition would be made of prisoners, and I personally instructed Lavoie and
Williams and others in district, as I recall now iu this order, and explained
its meaning to each officer and each gendarme before they left on patrol. There
may have been a conversation that I can not recall at this time.
25. Question. You state positively, then, that you do not remember of any
conversation held with the gendarme officers aforementioned with regard to the
killing of prisoners or Cacos in the Hinche district
Answer. I don't recall any, as I stated that I did not have anything to do
with any kilUngs.
26. Qoestion. If you had had any conversation with any one of the afore-
mentioned gendarmerie officers before March, it would surely have arrested
your attention, would it not?
Answer. Not necessarily, because during this time there was a great deal of
rumor and gossip going on, and I did not go in for either.
27. Question. Did you not consider it necessary, then, to consider the rumors
or gossip in the district you command?
Answer. I did not command the district of Hinche until about March 7 or 8,
and did not interest myself in anything that happened prior to this date, but
did after this date, and every rumor or report of killing hiul made nn investiga-
tion or report of it.
28. Question. Did you ever And that on an investigjitlon that any of these
rumors were true?
Answer. I remember of one prisoner who was killed — I believe March 13—
while on a detail getting sugar cane. I investigated this and made a written
report of It, as required then by regulations, and later was directed to make a
more detailed report, which I submitted and was accepted.
29. Question. Who did the killing?
Answer. A private in the gendarmerie.
30. Question. What duty were you performing at Hinche between October 18
and October 31?
Answer. To operate patrols and try to capture Charlemagne.
31. Question. Were you in conmiand of the Hinche district at this time?
Answer. No, sir.
32. Question. Were you the senior officer present?
Answer. After the 22d I was.
33. Question. The second time you went to the Hinche district was al)out
February 17, was it not? What was your duty then?
Answer. To see that there was no friction between the gendarmerie and the
marines.
34. Question. Were you the senior officer present then?
Answer. No, sir ; not at all times. Col. Hooker would come in and out.
35. Question. If you heard any rumors of killings of prisoners between Feb-
ruary 17 and March 7, would you have investigated them?
Answer. Not necessarily. I would have reported it to MaJ. Wells.
36. Question. Did you ever make any report to MaJ. Wells with reference
to killing of cacos, or priscmers, before the investigation of Gen. Catlin?
Answer. I would have, i>erhaps, told him that I heard humors of killings in
the district.
37. Question. Do you know of any investigation he ever made on your reports?
Answer. I don't recall if he did or did not make nn investigation.
38. Quest "on. Would you know if he made an investigation?
Answer. No ; not necessarily.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 469
39. Question. Will you state positively that you knew absolutely nothing
of the killing of certain prisoners in Hinche in January, 1919, by Capt. Lavole?
(Capt Doxey was informed of his rights in this question and that he had a
perfect right to refuse to answer It If It in any way incriminated him.)
Answer. I heard rumors, but of no specific case. It was reported that Capt.
Lavole had something to do with the killing of prisoners in January, and, If I
remember, it was in conversation with Gen. Catlln.
40. Question. Will you make the positive assertion that you did not know of
this occurrence before your conversation with Gen. Catlln?
Answer. No, sir ; but I believe it to be correct.
9. Mr. Ebnest J. Lavoie was called as a witness, was duly sworn, and
testified as follows:
1. Question. What is your name?
Answer. Mr. Ernest J. Lavoie.
2. Question. Have you ever been connected with the Haitian constabulary?
Answer. Yes.
3. Question. During your connection with the gendarmerie, were you ever
cognizant of the fact that there was any unlawful killing of cacos?
Answer. Yes.
4. Question. Can you state whom these instructions with reference to the un-
lawful killing of cacos were given by?
Answer. That is a very difiScult question to answer.
5. Question. Were you ever given instructions to bump off prisoners?
Answ^. Yes.
6. Question. Who gave you these instructions?
Answer. Col. Wells.
7. Question. Please state the circumstances.
Answer. It was in conversation at Hinche the first night I was back from
leave, in the presence of Capt. Verdler. "The only way to stop the uprising
was to make it as hard as we could for them, as the gendarmerie had to handle
the situation. Such men as Saul Peralte should be bumped off. On your
return to Ouanaminthe you can tend to that Verdler.'* And he said, " Never
mind sending any prisoners into Cape Haltlen; you can handle them yourself
at Hinche."
8. Question. Will you state positively that you never received any instructions
from Col. Wells to bump off prisoners?
Answer. In substance, he told me that I shouldn't send any prisoners on into
the Cape; that I could handle them right In Hinche, and not take them to the
Cape; that they could be bumped off.
10. Lieut Col. Richard S. Hookeb, United States Marine Corps, was called
as a witness, was duly sworn, and testified as follows :
1. Question. State your name, rank, and present station.
Answer. Kichard S. Hooker, lieutenant colonel, United States Marine Corps,
and serving as assistant chief of Gendarmerie d'Haltl, Port au Prince, Haiti.
2. Question. What duty have you been performing since your arrival in
Haiti in January of this year?
Answer. From January, 1919, to July 20, 1919, I resumed my duties at Cape
Haltlen as regimental commander of the Second Regiment and district com-
mander of northern Haiti when I was appointed assistant chief of the Gend-
armerie d'Halti. 1 continued the same duties until October 9, 1919, when I
took up my duties in the gendarmerie in Port au Prince.
3. Question. State fully all you know of the disturbances In northern Haiti
as they came to your knowledge as district commander, stating particularly of
any killing of prisoners, corvee, or other treatment which would be likely to
cause discontent and tend to continue the trouble.
Answer. When I arrived in Port au Prince from the United States, January
15, 1919, Gen. Catlln told me that he was not satisfied with conditions in the
north and stated that his information was not direct. He directed me to look
into affairs Iq the north and let him know. I arrived in the cape January 20.
Prom rumors and general gossip I gathered that in the district of central
Haiti some rough treatment was going on and from several Haitians that
corvees was still in force. Maj. Wells, then colonel In the gendarmerie, prac-
tically told me in the presence of Maj. Doxey that they, meaning the bandits,
were getting hell and were being bumped off, and that no ofllclal reports were
being made. I did not take this seriously at the time. I went to Port au
Prince in the latter part of January or early part of February, and in conver-
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470 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
sution with Gen. Catliii told hliii that I knew tliere was too uiucb rough work
and that the corvee was still in existence. Gen. Catlin then gave me verlxil
instructions to go into the Hinche district and submit a report to him ug to
what I found there. This report I forwarded about the middle or latter iwrt
of February, in writing, and in which I stated that I had seen 150 men actually
doing corvee labor and had seen gendarmes maltreating inhabitants. In
Hinche I stopped a gendarme from whipping a woman in the open market
because her price for tobacco w&s more than he thought it should have cost. I
reported this case to CTapt. Lavoie in Maj. Doxey*s presence. I saw a prisoner
being beaten by three gendarmes with the butts of their rifles. I heard from
Pere Belliot, of Hinche, and from Pere I^rue, of San Michel and Maissade,
that the inhabitants were in a state of terror and being killed ad libitum. The
bishop of the cape told me the same thing. This I did not see nor could find at
that time witnesses to prove, but f could see that a reign of terror existed.
When my report was received by Gen. ('atlin I was sent for and had a discus-
sion, in which Gen. Williams and Maj. Wells were present.
My report was discussed and the existence of corvee was denied by Maj.
Wells. From this time to March 6 or 7 verbal report.s and ronfereure^
were held, when Gen. Catlin, on account of conflicting testimonies, decideil to
make a personal investigation himself. On March 7 he arrived in San M diel.
accompanied by Gen. Williams and Mr. Holly, where I met him. Maj. Wells
and Maj. Doxey were also there. We all started the next morning: we went to
Maii^sade. On coming into the town there were some workmen on the road.
Gen. Catlin stopiied and after being told by several that they had lieen work-
ing for nothing, that some had been working since Fe!>ruary, and that in tli»*
early part of their work they spent the night in pr son. They stated that scmu'
of them had received 30 cents Haitian a day for about a week, hut that Lent.
Williams had promised them a gourde a day on the f'tMuing Monday. (Jen.
Catlin told them that those who were not there v(»luntarily to step to the other
side of the road. All but three dd so. Two of these three stated that they
were chiefs of the work an<l well imid and the <»ther stated that he hnil not
stepi)ed over because he lived in Maissade proi)er. The general took verbal
tefrtimony for about three or four houis, ami the gist of the whole testimony
was that corvee had b**en going on and that several persims had ]mm k lle<l
through the false testimony of the magistrat, Martial Preval. to I/eut. WilliariK
There was no direct proof to many of the stories, hut L'eut. Williams admitte*!
to having executed thr(»e or four and later five or s'x. Several witnt»sses testi-
fied to the death of Garnier. the notary, and Lieut. Williams admitted that tht»
man had died. A report made against the magistrat by five citizens of Maissade.
They were confined in Hinche and tr.ied in Maissade without being pres<»nt.
Garnier state<l in the court that this was not justice, or words to that effect.
That night about 7 or 8 o'clock Garnier was taken to WilliamsV house with
the magistrat, and at 2 o'clock the next morning was found dead in a chair in
the barracks yard, beaten with a club. •
In Hinche that same day testimony was received from the priest, P^re
Belliot, the magistrat, Savlque Perlate. ami .luge de l*alx Moncey Malary that
many iiersons had been executed with a machine gun and that the corvee had
been continually In operation. The first statement wsis corrobonited hy Mr
Lang in a statement to Gen. Catlin and niy.s(*lf at the San Michel plantation.
Capt. Lavoie admitted to having taken six prisoners and executed them f'""
disobeying orders. Both L'eut. Williams and ('ai)t. Lavoie were silent as to
where their instructions came from allowing maltreatment during Gen. Cnt
lin's investigation. Marines were placed in all the towns as garri.soas and to
give more men for patrols to the gendarmes in Mart'h, and I issued instructions
to thi»m dated March 12 conceru'ng their treatment of inhabitants.
(Copy of order attached. A. Copy of C(»mmanding ollicer. Fifty-third 0«»ni
pany, B.)
These Instructions were rei)eate<l on many <»c<'aslons and all officers and men
thoroughly understood them. Such maltreatment of Inhabitants as came to
notice or were subject to proof and not Idle rumors were punished by general
court-martial. On June 7 I investigated a reiKirt made against Capt. HaiuiUon
as to his giving orders to shoot prisoners if sure they were Cacos. On question-
ing him he stated to me before Col. Wise that he had an order in his files from
Gen. Williams dated March 10, forbi<lding the shooting of prisoners, but that
Maj. Wells had ver!)ally toU\ him that that order did not apply unless the
prisoners were actually in prison, and that he should go ahead exectitioJ-'
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 471
prisoners and say nothing about it. I recommended and Capt. Hamilton was
brought to trial before a general court-martial for murder. This is the only
direct case where I personally was told by one who had himself received MaJ.
Weirs order to execute prisoners. There were many rumors and the impression
throughout the north was that such orders existed. I have heard many stories
of prisoners being wantonly killed, but upon investigation I have found that
they were untrue and usually circulated by men who were trying to make them-
selves out to be bad men. I heard that Lieut. Ryan had killed two natives with-
out cause and recommended and brought him to trial before a general court-
martial for murder.
4. Question. Do you know anything of Lieut. Spear's actions?
Answer. No ; I was at Hinche and in the north. He was in the south. I know
pothing about him except that there was such an officer.
5. Question. Do you know of any order forbidding corvee?
Answer. Yes. On October 1, 1918, the chief of the gendarmerie issued such
an order, and later, on October 18, he Issued an order stopping it all over.
This was because the corvee was going on in the Hinche Maissade, San Michel
district, because these places were not mentioned in his first order. There was
a proclamation or notice from the brigade commander to the same effect.
6. Question. Do you know positively that the corvee continued after the
order?
Answer. Yes. In February, 1919, I myself saw the corvee in operation near
Bfaissade. Two groups of between 50 to 75 men each were working on the roads,
and a third group of about 45 in the market place at Maissade.
7. Question. Do you know if MaJ. Wells gave orders or knew that the corvee
was still in operation there?
Answer. I don't know ; but MaJ. Wells was in command of that department,
and the roads were being built, which Maj. Wells knew; therefore he must
have known that there was corvee.
11. Mr. Alfred Holly was called as a witness and testified as follows, after
being duly sworn :
1. Question. What is your name and occupation?
Answer. John Alfred Holly; translator at brigade headquarters, Unite<l
States Martne CJorps, Port au Prince, Republic of Haiti.
2. Question. In March, 1919, did you act as interpreter for Gen. Catlin in an
investigation at Maissade?
Answer. Yes.
3. Question. Repeat as nearly as possible the conversation you translated for
Gen. Catlin.
Answer. At Maissade the greater part of the investigation was devoted to
the hearing of evidence as to the continuance of and manner of conducting
compulsory corvee, as to the treatment of the men, and the manner in which
they were recruited, and as to the wages paid them.
Briefly stated, the evidence tended to show that the peasants were " invited "
(convened) to assemble at a certain place to attend an "audience" to be
given by Lieut. Williams, then in command at Maissade. When the country
folks arrived at the place of rendezvous the lieutenant was not there and they
were told to go on to Maissade. When they arrived at this place they were
locked up in prison for the night, and the next morning they were put to work
on the roads. At the time the general was speaking to them the majority
of the men had been kept at work for two months or more. Every night they
were locked up in prison to keep them from running away.
Some of the men declared that, as a matter of fact, they had been Invited
(asked) to come and work on the roads; that they considered the invitation as
an ocder, because such was the custom in Haiti and because they knew of
instances where those who refused to respond to the invitation were beaten
and compelled to go, and that some who tried to run away were fired at.
All of the men of the gang, with one exception, on being asked the question
by the general, replied that they would much prefer to return home and work
in their gardens, which, they said, were going to ruins. All of them owned
lands In their own rights. The exception was the gang leader, who explained
that he was, to a certain extent, responsible for bringing the men there ; he could
not consistently say that he preferred to be at home. In this case his presence
with the gang was entirely voluntary.
62209—21— PT 2 24
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472 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
It was found that up to the time that the general was i^)eaking to the men
none of them, with the possible exception of the gang leader, had been receiving
wages to which he was entitled.
On being given permission to do so, the whole gang broke up and went home.
There were complaints of illtreatment of the natives, and of persons being
beaten to death. One instance is that of the public notary of the place, an old
man by the name of Garnier. This man was arrested at the investigation of
the Justice of the peace and of the mayor of the commune (magistrate com-
munal) taken to the bureau of the gendarmerie at about 7 o'clock in the even-
ing and was beaten by the lieutenant himself until after 9 o'clock, when he was
put in a rocking chair in which he died sometime during the night. The notary's
offense was that of having remonstrated with the Judge as to the severity of a
sentence rendered by him in a case in which the magistrate communal was the
plaintiff. I can not recall the particulars of the case, but I do remember that
the sentence was heavy fine plus imprisonment, and the notary thought that, in
view of the fact that there were serious doubts as to the justice of the case, the
fine should have been considered to be a sufficient penalty.
Lieut. Williams's action in this matter seemed to have been due to his friend-
ship or sympatliy for both the mayor and the Judge.
There were complaints of unlawful capture of cattle and other animals, that
were sent to the pound and which, under various pretexts, the lieutenant re-
fused to return to the owners. Many, and among them all the gendarmes sta-
tioned at Maissade at the time, testified that Lieut Williams had summarily
executed some 12 or 16 persons, some with his own hands, and buried their
bodies in the yard back of his ofiice. The spot where the bodies were burled
was pointed out, but the grass had been leveled down when it was learned that
Gen« Catlln was coming to hold an investigation.
Maissade was the only place among those that was visited where the gen-
darmes bitterly complained of being illtreated by their chief.
All the evidence taken at this place showed that the lieutenant, the mayor,
and the judge all worked together and that the one was the accomplice of the
others.
The above is, to the best of my recollection, a true and faithful relation of
the conversation that took place at Maissade in the month of March, this year,
between Gen. Catlin, then chief of the occupation, and the inhabitants of that
place, that nothing has been added or withheld that in one way or the other
might alter the value of the facts as they were given to the general.
11. The undersigned question many others, both civilian and commissioned,
but while they all admitted of hearing many rumors of murdering caoo pris-
oners none of them were able to testify under oath that such was so, and where
they had heard it. Almost everyone stationed in Haiti during the early part of
this year seemed to have some knowledge of the fact that both marines and
gendarmes were killing prisoners. It was very difficult to get any witnesses
to testify directly as, in the opinion of the undersigned, they were all equally
culpable. As far as Lieut. Spear is concerned, no one seemed to know anything
about him, and I am inclined to believe that his statement before the court,
that he had killed prisoners, was deliberately untrue.
12. That there were killings and many of them is undoubtedly true, but J
believe that all of these can be directly traced to Maj. Clarke H. Wells, who
was in command of the district.
13. The gendarme officers in the district were all noncommissioned officers of
the old Marine Corps, men who believed In their officers and to whom an order
was to be obeyed to the letter. These officers received instructions from Maj.
Wells to bump off caco prisoners, and they carried their orders out to the best
of their ability. I do not feel that under the circumstances they should be held
responsible, and that the responsibility should be placed where it belongs, on
the shoulders of Maj. Wells.
14. Capt. Doxey's testimony was undoubtedly colored by the fact that he was
attempting to shield himself, and even if his testimony was true he showed the
greatest disregard for his duty when he neglected to report all rumors to Maj.
Wells. His work in Hlnche seemed to be to get by and do nothing.
' 15. I am convinced that Corpl. Edward J. Sieger, United States Marine Corps,
deliberately lied in his testimony. Sufficient evidence was brought out to show
that he was included in the ones who received the '* bump-off " order.
16. Sergt. Dorcas R. Williams, United States Marine Cor|is, who was in
charge of Maissade as a litnitenant of the gendarmerie, could give quite a lot of
evidence, if he desired, but he is now in the Ignited States, probably disrharge<l.
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INQXHRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 473
17. Further, the fact that Gen. Catlin made an investigation at San Michel
would tend to prove that something wrong had happened. I have searched the
files for any correspondence on this subject, but found none.
18. Attached marlced *'A," ** B/* and " C " is the only data on this subject in
the files of the brigade.
T. C. Turner.
Maj. Turner. I am not sure of this, but, as I remember, a letter came from
the headquarters of the Marine Corps directing CoL Russell to make further
investigation, and that is why Hooker was called in, because of his knowledge
of the Haitians. He probably Had a better knowledge of the Haitians .than any
other man down there. And it was also due to the fact that I could not go out
into the hills.
Mr. Howe. You could not go out into the hills because you were acting as
brigade adjutant and chief of staff?
Maj. Turner. Yes ; because of my duties I could not be away for any length
of time.
Mr. HowK. I wish to offer for the record, Mr. Chairman, a copy of letter
dated February 12, 1920, from the brigade commander. Col. Russell, to Col.
Hooker, directing him to investigate. That Is on page 30 of the report. I also
desire to offer a letter dated January 11, 1920, from the same to the same,
which is found on page 31 of the report, directing the cooperation of Col.
Hooker with Maj. Turner.
The Chairman. Col. Hooker was in command where at the time?
Maj. Turner, He was assistant chief of the gendarmerie at the time.
(The letters above referred to are as follows:)
Headquabters First Provisional Brigade,
United States Marine Corps,
Pott au Prince, Republic of Haiti, February 12, 1920,
From : The brigade commander.
To : Lieut Col. R. S. Hooker, United States Marine Corps.
Via : The chief of the gendarmerie d'Haiti.
Subject : Investigation by adjutant and inspectors department.
Reference: (a) Letter from this office, No. 5-18, dated January 11, 1920.
1. The brigade commander desires that every effbrt be made by you to expe-
dite the investigation mentioned in reference (a).
2. This investigation will be completed before the end of the present month.
3. If your present duties are such as to interfere with this work you will so
inform the brigade commander in writing, and the necessary action will be
taken.
John H. Russell.
Copy furnished Maj. T. C. Turner, assistant adjutant and inspector. United
States Marine Corps.
January 11, 1920.
From : The brigade commander.
To: Lieut. Col. Richard S. Hooker, United States Marine Corps.
Via : Chief of the gendarmerie d'Haiti.
Subject : Investigation by adjutant and inspectors department.
1. You are hereby ordered to cooperate in the investigation of certain irregu-
larities now being conducted by Maj. T. C. Turner, assistant adjutant and
inspector. United States Marine Corps.
2. Your report will be made direct to the brigade commander.
John H. Russell.
Mr. Howe. Major, I will show you pages 55 and 59 of this report and ask you
If, to the best of your knowledge, that is the written testimony which resulted
from Col. Hooker's investigation ?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Then, Mr. Chairman, I offer that for the record.
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
GoNAiVES, Haiti, February 19, 1920.
Joseph O. Van Horn, lieutenant, gendarmerie D'Haiti, was called as a wit-
ness, was informed that he need not answer any incriminating questions, testi-
fied as follows :
1. Question. What is your name?
Answer. Jos€i)h O. Van Horn, lieutenant, gendarmerie d*Haiti,/^ationed at
St Michel, Haiti. Digitized by y
474 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
2. Qaestion. Where were you stationed In the letter part of 1918 and the
early part of 1919? .
Answer. At Ouanam*nthe, Haiti.
3. Question. During the trouble at Hinche from October, 1918, was Ouana-
mintbe used as a relay station for telephone messages to and from Hinche?
Answer. Tes, sir.
4. Question. Do you remember the nature of those messages?
Answer. Some messages were written and placed on file at Ouanaminthe and
- some were verbal over the phone and relayed to their destination. They re-
lated to transportation activities and some were reports from Capt La vole to
Col. Wells.
5. Question. Did these reports from Levoie indicate that he was having
trouble in his district or not?
Answer. Yes ; some did and some were to the effect that all was quiet.
6. Question. W^hat were the nature of these reports during January, February,
and March, 1919?
Answer. I don't remember exactly what the reports were, but I knew that
things were not quiet. This was during December, when I was stationed at
La Meille, Haiti.
7. Question. Do you remember any instructions from Col. Wells to any
officer as to the treatment of Cacos or Caco prisoners?
Answer. No; I never heard him say anything about that, because when he
came up here he always told me he had to tell to the district commander.
8. Question. Hnve you spoken to other officers on the treatment of Cacos or
Caco prisoners; and if so, what was their idea on the subject?
Answer. I remember speaking to several officers, but I can't recall who they
were now or exactly what was said. But I was under the impression that
when I went out after an armed band of bandits I was supposed to go and get
them and get rid of them. When the prisoners were taken I always treated
them the same as other prisoners, like prisoners in the civil prison, and I
brought them in to stand trial.
Joseph O. Van Hobn,
Lieutenant Oendannerie d' Haiti.
Subsoribcil and sworn to before me this 19th day of February, 1920.
' R. S. HooKii».
Lieutenant Colonel, L'nited States Marine Cot^s,
Sous Chief Gendarmerie d'Haiti.
A true copy:
R. S. Hooker.
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corpn.
Statement of Sebgt. Lamabtine Toussaint, Fifteenth Company Gendabukbik
d'Haiti.
F'iFTEEXTH (Company (Jendarmerie d'Haiti.
Ouanaminthe, Haiti, October 26, 1019.
I.ieut. Van Horn. Oendarnierie d'HtutI, had turned over to me one prisoner,
named Saul IVralte, to conduct to Mount Organise. On arriving at the River
C'anarie he asked mo permission to drink s<mie water. I refuse<l him. On
crossing said river ht* trieii to escape. I cried out " halt " on him three times ;
he (lid not want to stop. Seeing that ho was gaining ground from me, I fired
four times, the first time in the air and the last three times uiwn him. The
bullets attained him in the back and went through his stomach, under which
he foil, and in the space of three he expired.
Ortifiwl a true copy :
.Joseph O. Van Horn.
Lieutenant, Gendarmerie.
Capk Haitien, Fehnwry 17. J920.
Frank Verdi kk, captain, (»endaruierie d'Haiti, was called as a witness, was
informed that he need not answer any incriminating questions; testified before
me as follows :
1. Question. What is your name?
Answer. Frank Verdier. captain. Gendarmerie d*Haiti, stationed at Ounan-
mint he since September, 1918.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 475
2. Question. Were you present at a conversation between CoL Wells and
Capt. I^vole? If so, state the subject matter of this conversation, as far as
you can remember It.
Ans^^er. Yes, sir; I was present at this conversation, and most of the con-
versation was on the Caco situation. I don't remember the exact conversation,
but Col. Wells did say that such men as Saul Peralte should be gotten rid of.
3. Question. Was any mention made to the effect that either you or Capt.
l4ivoie should handle your district and that it would not be necessary to make
reports on your activities?
Answer. It may have been mentioned, but I can't recollect.
4. Question. Were any instructioas given to make it as hard as possible for
the Cacos?
Ansi^'er. Yes sir ; instructions were given to make it hard for the Cacos, but I
don't know exactly what they were.
5. Question. In your opinion, what was meant by making It hard? What did
yon think was meant?
Answer. I think that Col. Wells meant to convey the Idea to get rid of them,
to bump them ofT.
6. Question. Have you spoken to other officers on this subject; and if so,
what opinion did they have relating to these instructions?
Answer. I think I spoke to Bolte on this subject, and he had the same
opinion as myself.
7. Question. During this trouble in Hinche, from October, 1918, on was not
Ouanaminthe a relay station for niessages from the cape to Hinche?
Answer. Yes.
8. Question. Do you remember any reports from Hinche to the department
commander at the cape relative to the situation in Hinche?
Answer. I remember receiving some telegrams regarding activities.
9. Question. Were those messages confidential?
Answer. Yes; some to and from Col. Wells and La vole at Hinche, and per-
haps some to Kelly at Cerca la Source. They referred to operations against
Cacos and detailing of officers. I had verbal instructions not to let you see them
if you came through Ouananminthe.
10. Question. Have you copies of those messages?
Answer. I'm pretty certain I have. I will try to find them and give them to
you if they are stJll there.
11. Question. Did these Caco telegrams state that the situation In Hinche was
serious or not?
Answer. I should consider so.
12. Question. Do you remember whether La vole was ner\'ous over the situa-
tion or whether he thought he could handle it without outside aid?
Answer. At the time I was in Hinche, in November. 1918, Lavoie thought he
could handle it without aid, but later he requested thnt machine gims be sent
him with marine crews.
13. Question. Did you transmit any messages from Maj. Doxey to the depart-
ment commander at the cape after he went to Hinche In January or February,
1919. to relieve Lavoie?
Answer. Yes, sir.
14. Question. What were the nature of those?
Answer. Mostly regarding the shipment of suppllea
15. Question. Nothing regarding the Caco situation?
Answer. I think there was something regarding the Caco situation, but I
can't think what it was.
16. Question. Do you remember if .these messages said that all was quiet, or
that he was having trouble with the Cacos?
Answer. He reported all was quiet.
Captain Omdarnt'erie d* Haiti.
Sworn to and subscribed to before me, this 17th day of Februarj-, 1920.
Lieutenant Colonel United States }farine Corps,
Sous-Chief de la Gendarmerie d'Haitl
^_'^^<^y- R.S.HOOKKB,
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps.
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476 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Now, Major, I want to go into your method of pursuing this
inquiry, beginning in October, 1919, and beginning with the letter of Gen.
Barnett dated September 27. 1919. How did you go about it. Major?
Maj. TuBNEB. I interrogated everybody I could find. I started out by asking
if they had heard of any of these things, and particularly that part referring
to the letter. «
Mr. How5. That part of what?
Maj. TuBNEB. The part that the letter referred to about Lieut. Spear.
Mr. Howe. In his statement in reference to killings?
Maj. Tubneb. Tes; before a general court-martial. I could find nothing
about Lieut. Spear. I did find rumors and statements that there had been kill-
ings. So I considered, in view of the major general commandant's letter, that
I should continue with that, and I did so.
Mr. Howe. Did you, in the course of your investigations, run down any facts
which were alluded to or may have been alluded to by Lieut. Spear?
Maj. Tubneb. No.
Mr. Howe. Did you see Lieut. Spear?
Maj. Tubneb. No.
Mr. Howe. Did you find anybody who knew Lieut. Spear?
Maj. TtJBNEB. No.
Mr. Howe. You did, however, run across other rumors of killings?
Maj. Tubneb, Yes.
Mr. Howe. What were the prinicpal ones of those rumors?
Maj. Tubneb. The only ones I could seem to get any information on was the
alleged killing at Hinche in January, 1919.
Mr. Howe. In order to identify that, what was the name of the marine
officer who was su^wsed to have directed this killing?
Maj. Tubneb. Capt. Lavole, of the Haitian gendarmerie; Ernest L. Lavoie.
The Chaibman. Was he an enlisted marine?
Maj. Tubneb. He was a private in the Marine Corps, detailed for duty as an
officer in the Haitian gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. Was the name of Lieut. Williams, of the gendarmerie, connected
with any one of these rumors?
Maj. Tubneb. Yes ; at Maissade.
Mr. Howe. Was there any connected with the alleged killing of one Gamier?
Maj. Turner. Garnier was a notary; yes.
Mr. Howe. You then proceeded to try to trace down these two rumors and
any other rumors you came across?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did you, as a matter of fact, learn of any other definite rumors
beside these two?
Maj. Turner. No. There were many rumors, l)ut you would run them all
down and there would not be any foundation for them. You would go as far
as you could — I remember one case where a man told me he had heard of two
murders at Grande Riviere, and I ran it down and found his mother-in-law
had told him, so he said, and his mother-in-law had been dead for 10 years,
which would have been about six years before- it possibly could have happened.
Mr. Howe. Was that sort of luck you had in tracing a rumor typical of what
you ran into as to many of these statements made to you by witnesses?
Maj. Turner. In almost all of them, yes.
Mr. Howe. If, for instance, some one down there whom you were interrogat-
ing umntioned an occurrence or killing, and .said some one had told it to him,
wliat would you then do?
Maj. Turner. I would try to get the person who was supposed to have told
. him.
Mr. Howe. If you got that person, what would he, in general, say?
Maj. Turner. That some one else had told him, in almost every case.
Mr. Howe. Did you, under those circumstances, follow out as far as you
could, in turn, everyone who was quoted?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did this written testimony, which appears on the pages of the
report which you have seen, embody the most definite part of what you learned?
Maj. Turner. Yes ; it was the only definite part I could learn, and I took that
testimony in writing.
Mr. Howe. And that is all the definite part of it that you learned?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 477
Mr. Howe. Can you give us an idea as to about how many individuals you
interviewed, whose written testimony you did not take during this investiga-
tion?
Ma J. Turner. Yes; I think about 50— probably 40; it may be 40.
Mr. Howe. The report states, as an instance of these hearsay reports which
you ran across Ihe testimony of Bolte at the bottom of page 109 :
"2. Capt. Laurence Bolte, gendarmerie d*Haiti, corporal. United States
Marine Corps, was called as the first witness, was duly sworn, and testified
as follows :
"1. Question. State your name, rank, and present station.
"Answer. Laurence Bolte, corporal, United States Marine Corps, and a captain
in the gendarmerie d'Haitl, stationed at Hinche, Republic of Haiti.
**2. Question. Statements have been made that both marines and gendarmes
have been in the habit of having wounded Cacos shot. Do you know anything
about this?
"Answer. No, sir.
"3. Question. You never have issued an order of that kind?
"Answer. No, sir.
"4. Question. Do you know that this has been done?
"Answer. I don't know about it; but I have heard of it being done.
"5. Question. Where did you hear this, and from whom?
"Answw. I heard it from Lieut. Floyd, gendarmerie d*Haiti, Mr. Baker, and
Maj. Hayes, gendarmerie d'Haiti.
"6. Question. Who was in command at Hinche when the last rebellion
started?
"Answer. Capt. Kelly had it in October.
"7. Question. Who relieved him?
"Answer. Capt. Lavigne.
"8. Question. Who relieved him?
"Answer. Capt. Doxey.
" 9. Question. Were you ever instructed to make private reports to anybody
with reference to operations in the Hinche district?
"Answer. Not private reports, but telegrams received through Ouanamlnthe
by telephone were to be kept on file at the Third Company office under lock
and key.
"10. Question. Who gave this order?
"Answer. Col. Wells.
•*11. Question. Why was this order issued?
"Answer. I do not know if it was caused by this investigation which took
place at Hinche.
"12. Question. Did Col. Wells ever Instruct you to disregard certain orders
received from the chief of the gendarmerie d'Haiti?
"Answer. No, sir.
"13. Question. Do you know whetlier these or any other orders were dis-
regarded?
"Answer. No, sir.
"14. Question. Do you remember when the first order against corvee came
out?
"Answer. The first came out in the latter part of August
"15. Question. Was this order ever disregarded?
"Answer. I do not know that this was done. I heard it from the priest at
Hinche (Belliot) and a chief of section named Joseph Marcellia and one named
Albert.
"16. Question. Did the priest at Hinche ever inform you that before you
came there that cacos had been killed after they had surrendered?
"Answer. Yes.
"17. Question. Did anybody at Hinche tell you that?
"Answer. No one at Hinche but a marine named Sasse told me that prisoners
had been taken out of the prison at Hinche *ind shot, and the priest at Hinche
told me the same thing.
"18. Question. Who issued the order for the shooting? Do you know?
"Answer. No, sir.
" 19. Question. Yon do not know whether this was reported to Col. Wells or
not, do you?
"Answer. No, sir.
"20. Question. While you were at the Cape did a telegram show that there
Mrns any considerable trouble at the district of Hinche? r^r^r^n]i:>
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478 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
"Answer. Yes.
** 21. Question. Between what months were these telegrams coming in?
"Answer. From the Ist of January to the middle of March.
" 22. Question. Do you know wliat became of these telegrams?
"Answer. They were left in the desk of the district commander at the Cape.*"
Did you find and interrogate Floyd, Hayes, or Baker?
MaJ. TuBNKB. I did.
Mr. Hows. All of them?
MaJ. TuBNEB. All of them ; yes.
Mr. Howe. What did you learn from Floyd?
MaJ. TuBNER. From Floyd — ^he stated that he had heard rumors ; he did not
know where they came from, and he did not know anything about it
Mr. Howe. You do not include Floyd's testimony among your written testi-
mony.
MaJ. TuBNEB. No ; neither Floyd*s nor Hayes'a Hayes stated the same u
Floyd.
Mr. Howe. That he reallj' did not know about it?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And Hayes*s written testimony was not taken?
MaJ. TuBNEB. No.
Mr. Howe. What about Baker?
MaJ. Turner. I took Baker's testimony. Baker's testimony was mostly
hearsay, too.
Mr. Howe. And that you included, because there was something in it more
definite?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Is that example typical of the way you went at the investigation,
and of the thoroughness with which you went at it?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did you have any Instructions from Col. Russell as to the extent
and thoroughness of your investigation?
MaJ. Turner. I did. When I first took up the investigation, the rumors
were so bad that I went to him and told him what these rumors were and
asked his advice on the subject He told me, never mind, to go straight ahead
and get to the bottom of it and get everything in hand on that subject
Mr. Howe. And you proceeded to do so?
MaJ. Tubneb. Which I did.
Mr. Howe. Did anybody direct you to discontinue your investigation?
MaJ. Turner. No.
Mr. Howe. Never?
MaJ. Turner. Never.
Mr. Howe. Then why did you stop investigating?
Maj. Turner. Well, I could not find anything more. I could have filled thoo-
sands of pages with Just that kind of stuff, hearsay. There was no use goinp
any further because I could not get anything definite.
Mr. Howe. Major, as a matter of fact, were you trying to get something
definite there?
MaJ. Turner. Yes ; I was. I had a feeling at first that there had not been
fair treatment to the Haitians. I thought it was up to us to straighten it out,
but I did not know who was responsible, and it did not make any difference,
and, as I say, I had had this talk with Col. Russell, and I went as far as I
could into the case and got everything out of it that I could.
Mr. Howe. And when you hande<l in this written testimony which begins
with the date of November 3, you felt you had pursued the investigation as
far as you profitably could?
MaJ. Turner. Exactly; as far as It could possibly be taken by me.
Mr. Howe. Now, I am going to read from page 130, paragraph numbered 11
of this report of your written testimony :
*• 11. The undersisgned questioned many others, both civilian and commissioned
but while they are admitted of hearing many rumors of murdering Cftco pris-
oners none of them were able to testify under oath that such was so, and where
they had heard It Almost everyone stationed in Haiti during the early part
of this year seemed to have some knowledge of the fact that both marines and
gendarmes were killing prisoners. It was very difficult to get any witnesses to
testify directly as in the opinion of the undersigned they were all equally
culpable."
The Chairman. Who were equally culpable? ^ j
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 479
Maj. Turner. Kverybotly who was tellinp these yams down there, if they
were true.
The Chairman. They were culpable of misrepresentation or cnlpabU» of hav-
ing killefl Haitians?
Maj. Turner. Just telling rumors that might have been true or might not
have been true.
Mr. Howe. Did you mean here that they were equally culpable of killing
natives?
Maj. Titiner. Yes; if it had been true, they were.
Senator Oddie. Or culpable of misrepresentation?
Maj. Turner. The people I had been able to get who had talked would not give
u»e any information, so I felt they were all equally culpable If it had been true.
Mr. Howe. There were some of these witnesses you d:d not believe In their
denials of knowledge or denials of crime?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr, Howe. Paragraph 11 continues : "As far as Lieut Spear is concerne<l, no
one seemed to know anything about him, and I am Inclined to believe that his
statement before the court that he had killed prisoners was deliberately untrue."
Have you any further comment to make on paragraph 11?
Maj. Turner. No.
Mr. Howe. Paragraph 12 says: "That there were killings and many of them
l8 undoubtedly true, but I believe that all of these can be directly traced to
Maj. Clarke H. Wells, who was in command of the district."
Maj. Turner. I would like to state that these killings were in the corvee and
escaped corvee prisoners. They were people who attempted to escape, and in
my opinion they were killed.
Mr. Howe. And those were the many killings to which you referretl ?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howt:. You are certain that in this paragraph 12 you did not refer to
the deliberate and cold-blooded removing of a prisoner from prison and shoot-
ing him?
Maj. Turner. No.
Mr. Howe. But to the killing of escaped prisoners or people escaping from the
corvee?
Maj. Turner. People escaping from the corvees or people who had jumi>ed
and were running and were killed. In these different Caco bands throughout the
country.
Mr. Howe. Paragraph 13, at page 181, says:
"The gendarme officers in the district were all noncomnilss'one<l officers of
the old Marine Corps, men who believed in their officers, and to whom an order
was to be obeyetl to the letter. These officers received instructions from Maj.
Wells to bump off Caco prisoners, and they carried their orders out to the best
of their ability. I do not feel that under the circumstances they should be held
re^wnsible, and that the responsibility should be placed where it belongs, on
the shoulders of Maj. Wells."
Have you any comment to make at this t'me on paragraph 13?
Maj. Turner, No.
Mr. Howe. Are you at the present time of the belief that Maj. Wells did issue
these orders to bump off prisoners?
Maj. Turner. No; I am not.
Mr. Howe. Were you, at the time you submitted this report, of that opin'on?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What, if anything, have you learned which has changed your
opinion?
Maj. Turner. I had only been In Haiti a short time when I made this investi-
gation, and I was not thoroughly familiar with the character of the Haitians
down there. The more I saw of them the more I became convinced of their un-
reliability, as far as any statement was concerned.
Mr. Howe. Any statement they might make?
Maj. Turner. Any statement they might make, yes. All their statements were
made for their own benefit or to gain something.
Mr. Howe. What is your present idea as to the extent to which the fillings
of natives down there went on, without reference to the shooting of natives in
battle or in pursuit?
Maj. Turner. I have no doubt there were many killed in the corvee.
The Chairuan. You mean that many were killed In attempting to escape
from work under the corve^ ^ j
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480 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Maj. TuRNEB. Yes.
The Chairman. When they would jump and run they would be shot?
Maj. Turner. They were shot.
The Chairman. Do you think that there were any executions without trial?
Maj. Turner. Yes ; I think there have been executions without trial. That Is
my opinion, but I have no facts to substantiate 1;hat.
The Chairman. Does your report cover the harsh treatment, the brutal han-
dling of any prisoners, apart from killings?
Maj. Turner. Yes ; as far as I could find out ; yes, sir.
The Chairman. Were prisoners frequently or habitually roughly used?
Maj. Turner. Not that I could find out.
Mr. Howe. If you had heard any rumor or accusation of brutal treatment of
prisoners, would you have Investigated that?
Maj. Turner. I would.
Mr. Howe. You would have conceived that to have been in the scope of your
investigation ?
Maj. Turner. I would. The word was " Irregularity," and I considered any
ill treatment of prisoners as coming under that word.
Mr. Howe. What is your present Impression or belief as to the incident at
Hlnche, where it was said that from 15 to 10 prisoners were taken to a cemetery
and machine-gunned by Capt, I^avoie?
Maj. Turner. I believe something actually happened there.
Mr. Howe. Is It not true that a further investigation of that incident was
made later on?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Was that Gen. Lejeune*s Investigation?
Maj. Turner. Gen. Lejeune and I also believe the* Mayo Board made an In-
vestigation of that.
Mr. Howe. You took the testimony of La vole yourself, did you not?
Maj. TiTiNER. Yes.
Mr. Howe. As I recollect it, in that testimony it does not appear that you
asked La vole the direct qut»stlon as to whether or not he had killed these people
at Hlnche. That Is so, is It not?
Maj. Turner. No. There is a lot that did not go into the testimony. In talk-
ing back and forth, which was not put down, and I know Lavole denied having
done any of that killing.
Mr. Howe. Your present recollection Is that although It does not appear in
the written testimony, the question was asked as to whether he had killed
natives?
Maj. Turner. I do not know whether it was asked in a question, but I do
know he denied it.
Mr. Howe. He denied it to you?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether or not In any of the other investigations he
admitted or partly admitted that occurrence?
Maj. Turner. No ; I do not.
Mr. Howe. Some of these witnesses made a more favorable impression on you
than others, did they not, as to telling the truth?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How would you characterize the testimony of Jule AndrC?
Maj. Turnkr. I was very favorably impressed with Andre's testimony.
Mr. Howe. He was a Haitian, was he not?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And a second lieutenant in the gendarmerie?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. He states In his testimony
Maj. Turner. I would like to state right there that I questioneil Andr4 as to
whether or not he could give me the names of anybody who had actually seen
tlu^se murders or killlnj^s, and he told me he could not
Mr. Howe. He made a statement In his testimony that there was no serious
control of the officers of the gendarmerie by their superior offlcers In some of
the districts of Haiti, did he not?
Maj. Turner. Yes. * *,, r
Mr. Howe. What comment have you to make on that answer of his— I numn
from knowledge gained In your investigation?
Maj Turner. I should say some of the officers had positions that they were
not capable of holding. They were young in the service qrditi not have the
capability of handling these jobs they had. ^''"^° ^^ ^
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 481
• Mr. Howe. Whiit period of time is most closely connected with these rumors
of klllingB?
MaJ. Turner. Between October 15, 1918, and March 13. 1919.
Mr. Howe. Was the date of October 15 after some particular outbreak down
there?
MaJ. Turner. October 15 was after Charlemagne had started his revolution
in the north of Haiti— after the attack on Hinche by Charlemagne.
Mr. Howe. Daring that time prisoners were taken and safely sent back, were
they not?
MaJ. Turner. Yes ; lots of them.
Mr. Howe. And at other times many prisoners were taken, were they not?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And that fact appears in certain records, does It?
MaJ. Turner. It appears in my testimony in the Mayo Board investigation.
Mr. Howe. Have you gained any impression as to what was the custom down
there when a patrol would come upon Cacos with guns in their hands?
MaJ. Turner. The Cacos would Jump immediately; they would never stand,
and there would be firing on both sides right away. Most all of the attacks
were surprise attacks. They would find out where the bands were and would
look for them and Jump them.
Mr. Howe. How many prisoners were taken who had guns in their hands?
MaJ. Turner. I do not know, but I do know that not Just at this time, but
later on many thousands were taken who had guns.
Mr. Howe. Who had guns in their hands?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did you investigate any abuses of the corvee that you might
have heard of in this inve.stigation?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. You questioned individuals and witnesses about that?
MaJ. Turner. I did.
Mr. Howe. Did you find difficulty there in locating witnesses who had
actually seen the corvee in operation?
MaJ. Turner. No.
Mr. Howe. In your opinion the corvee was in operation, and after it had been
ordered discontinued?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Where was that?
MaJ. Tttrner. In the Malssade and Hinche district.
The Chairman. Who were the commanding officers there?
MaJ. Turner. Lieut. D. L. WlUinnis at Mai.**sade and l4ivoie at HInclie.
The Chairman. What became of Lavoie?
MaJ. Turner. I do not know, sir.
Mr. Howe. Have you any direct knowledge of your own as to the employment
of the corvee system?
Maj. Turner. No.
Mr. Howe. But you did come across witnesses and interrogate them who
had seen it?
MaJ. Tttrner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. You also come across witnesses who reported it from hearsay
only. Is that correct?
MaJ. Turner. Oh, yes ; many of them.
Mr. Howe. In his testimony Lieut. Andr^ refers to the corvee as the direct
cause of revolutionary outbreaks there. Would you agree with him In that?
MaJ. Turner. No. The corvee. I believe, might have made conditions harder
for the occupation down there, but it had nothing to do with the outbreak.
Mr. Howe. It was an aggravating circumstance always, was it not?
MaJ. Turner. Yes; they were nble to rwrult lots better, because there was
the corvee to recruit from.
The Chairman. Was that diw to the corvt»e or to the use of corvee workers
away from the neighborhoods In which they lived?
MaJ. Turner. T think it was due to the fact that they were taken away
from the neighborhoods in which they lived.
Mr.. Howe. The testimony of Frederick C. Baker appears in your report, and
ill that testimony he refers either ns of his own knowledge or by hearsay to
orders issued by Maj. Wells to bump off prisoners. Did you yourself examine
MaJ. WeUs?
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482 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MaJ. TiniNiSB. No; MaJ. Wells was not in Haiti at the time. He was later
examined by Col. Lay, I believe.
Mr. Howe. In this country?
Maj. Turner. In this countryi yes.
Mr. Howe. That was the reason you did not examine Wells?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did other witnesses besides Baker corroborate the statement
that Wells had issued orders that he did not want prisoners sent in?
MaJ. Turner. Yes; I think Lavoie corroborated it, and probably Bolte.
Mr. Howe. Let me ask you this question: In other words, this written
testimony you took includes all such statement as to Major Wells's responsibility
for any such order?
MaJ. Turner, Yes.
Mr. Howe. No Information you got on that phase of the subject was omitteil
from your written testimony?
MaJ. Turner. No.
Mr. Howe. You also examined Capt. Doxey, did you not?
MaJ. Turner. I xlid.
Mr. Howe. How would you characterize his testimony? Did you believe
it or not?
MaJ. Turner. I did not.
The Chairman. .Was he another enlisted man who was detailed to the
gendarmerie?
MaJ. Turner. No ; he was a captain of the Marine Corps, a Regular.
Mr. Howe. He denied knowledge of conditions there pretty generally, dirt
he not, in his testimony?
MaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And would not say whether or not MaJ. Wells was familiar with
those conditions?
MaJ. Turner. He was very evasive in his testimony.
The Chairman. These incidents which you were investigating took place
during the period of the command of the gendarmerie by whom?
Maj. Turner. You mean the chief of the gendarmerie?
The Chairman. Yes.
MaJ. Turner, By Col. A. S. Williams.
The Chairman. They did not antidate his command?
Maj. Turner. No ; because I do not think anything I was told to investigate
antedated October 15 ,1018.
Mr. Howe. Major, if you had that Investigation to make over again, would
you go at it in any different way ; would you have been more thorough?
MaJ. Turner. I would have gone at it in an entirely different way. I do
not know that I would have been any more thorough, but I would not have
placed as much faith in some people as I had placed at that time, and I might
have placed more in others.
Mr. Howe. In general, which one would you not have placed more faith In?
Maj. Turner. One or two of the witne-sses I culled, and I would put verj' little
faith whatever in any of the Haitians' testimony.
Mr. Howe. Tell us a little bit more about that, about the nn trustworthiness
of the Haitians' testimony.
MaJ. Turner. I was chief of staff down there, and we would get letters and
reports from Haitians on different subjects, inaknj? requests, and want'ng in-
vestijjatlons. Almost invariably it turned out that their reports were false.
Mr. Howe. Do you know the methods that Ool. Hooker pursued when he be-
gan to coo])erate with you in this investigation?
Maj. Ti'RNER. Yes. Col. Hooker went all through the north. He knew more
about the Haitians, I think, than any officer down there and was more popular
with them than any officer dcnvn there. He went all through the north looking
for information. He took the matter up with the gendarmes, who were supposed
to be stationed around Hinche and lilaissade and attempted to find out somethinf:
definite. All he found was letters from Van Horn and Sieger and a sergeant
name<l Touissant Sieger had already been examine<l by me.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether or not he interviewed other people besides
those three men?
MaJ. Turner. Lots of them ; yes.
Mr. Howe. About how long was he on that investigation?
MaJ. Turner. I do not remember ; I could not even state approximately.
Mr. Howe. Was it a few days or a couple of weeks? r^^^^I^
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 483
Maj. TuBNER. It must have been a couple of weeks, because he received his
orders on the 11th and 12th of January. His first report came in on the 1st of
February, 1920, so he must have been quite some time on that.
Mr. Howe. That is more than six weeks after lie got his orders?
Maj. TuBNEB. Yes. That was his first report.
Mr. Howe. Let me say this for the record : This report, the pages of which have
been quoted in putting certain matter into the record, is a carbon copy and not an
original. The original of Maj. Turner's report, as I understand it, was lost
There was a carbon copy of that brought up by Gen. Lejune to Washington.
This document which we have had actually before us to-day is not that copy.
This copy has been introduced here for the convenience of the witness and of
the reporter. That copy of Oen. Lejune*8, I am informed, is in the Navy De-
partment and it is now being searched for, and when it is found it will be offered
itself.
Maj. TmNER. This Is a correct copy, however.
Mr. Howe. But the original carbon will be produced and offered and will be-
come a part of the record. That is the copy brought up by Gren. Lejune, but the
originnl of Maj. Turner's rei)ort, a.s I understand it, was lost in transit from
Haiti to the United States.
Now, Mr. rhairnian, I will offer in evidence pages 64 to- IOC, inclusive, of this
same compilation, or report, being the testimony taken by Lieut Col. H. R. Lay,
of the Marine Corps, including a sworn statement by Gen. Catlin, and consisting
of the testimony of Lieut Col. A. S. Williams, Maj. Clarke H. Wells Capt
John L. Doxey, Sergt. Dorcas L. Williani.s, and also a sworn statement by Col.
A. S. Williams in addition to his testimony.
(The matter referred to is as follows : )
Januaby 12, 1920.
From : Lieut Col. H. H. Lay, assistant adjutant and inspector, Marine Corps.
To : The Major General Conmiandant, via the adjutant and Inspector.
Subject: Confidential investigation.
1. In obedience to verbal instructions from the Major Generaf Commandant,
I submit the following sworn testimony of Lieut. Col. A. S. Williams. Maj.
Clark H. Wells, Capt. John L. Doxey, Sergt Doreas L. Williams.
2. There is also submitted the sworn statement of Lieut. Col. A. S. Williams,
Marine Corps, regarding conditions existing in Haiti during his service as
chief of the Haitian gendarmerie.
Statement of Bbig. Gen. A. W. Catun, United States Mabine Cobps, Ke-
TiBKD, Relative to Cebtain Ibbeguij^bities Alleged to Have Been Com-
mitted BY OfFICEBS and En LISTED MeN OF THE RePUBOC OF HaITI.
I relieved CJol. John H. Ru&sell, United States Marine Corps, in command of
the First Brigade of Marines in Haiti, December 1, 1918. At this time marines
were stationed only at Port au Prince, Cape Haitien, and Guanaminthe, while
the gendarmerie of Haiti were scattered all over the island and were handling
the policing of the island. Bandits had been causing trouble in the Hinche
district and the gendarmes were operating against them. The chief of gendar-
merie. Col. A. S. Williams, United States Marine Corps, assured me that the
gendarmes could handle the situation. Toward the end of January, 1919,
rumors reached me that *' corvee '* was still being used in the Hinche district,
although It had been ordered stopped on October 1, 1918, and also that the gen-
darmes were treating the country people in such manner that many of them
were joining the bandits. Col. Williams denied this and assured me that
there was no " corvee " being used in the country. Rumors continued to come
in and I sent Lieut. Col. Hooker, United States Marine Corps, to Hinche to
investigate and report to me the actual conditions there. He reported to me
that he found " corvee '* going at both Maisade and at Hinche, and that the
gendarmes used. the natives so brutally that many had left their gardens and
either joined the bandits or had come into the towns for safety.
Col. A. S. Williams, chief of gendarmerie, and Maj. Clarke H. Wells, district
commander of northern Haiti, were shown the report, and both denied that
conditions were as reported. I questioned Maj. Wells as to the manner of
obtaining labor and the methods of payment; he did not seem to be sure,
although he stated that he had inspected within a week. I then directed Maj.
Wells to proceed to Hinche and investigate thoroughly the labor question and
to report to me the number of men being worked, the manner of obtaining the
lat)orer8, what they were paid, and who actually paid them. About 10 days
484 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
later MaJ. Wells returned to Port au Prince and reported to me verbally that
he had made the investigation directed, and that he found only 45 men work-
ing on the road at Maisade, and that these men were all voluntary laborers;
that they were paid a half gourde a day, and that the gendarme officer at
Maisade paid them personally; that at Hinche there were no laborers except
prisoners. Col. A. S. Williams and Lieut. Col. R. S. Hooker were present when
this report was made. MaJ. Wells stated on being questioned that he felt
sure that there was no ** corvee " in force anywhere In his district.
This report was so contradictory to the one made by Col. Hooker, who stated
that he found at least 150 men working at Maisade and that man^*^ of theiir an
being questioned by tlie interpreter stated that they were brought there and
forced to work, that I de<-ided to go to Hinche in persqn and find out the true
conditions there. Accompanied by Col. A. S. Williams, Lieut. Col. R. S.
Hooker, Maj. Clarke H. Wells, and Maj. Doxey I visited St. Michel, Maisade,
and Hinche. I found conditions as Col. Hooker had reported, except that the
force of workmen had apparently been cut down, as I found only about 40
men working on the road near Maisade under guard of several armed gen-
darmes. I stopped and questioned these men, and they all stated Uiat they
were not working voluntarily ; some claimed to have been, brought there by
gendarmes, while others said that the chief of section had brought theui.
The gendarme officer denied this, but on being told that they were at liberty
to go to their homes or remain and work at a gourd a day they all but three
left. At Maisade I intervieweil the local priest, as well as the magistrate com-
munal, the judge de pais, and a number of the inhabitants, also a number of
gendarmes. The priest accused the gendarme officer, Lieut D. B. Williams
(sergeant. United States Marine Corps), with having killed a number of prison-
ers and also with having beaten a notary of Maisade to death in his office. The
only substantiating testimony of this latter charge was from three privates of
gendarmes, who also claimed to have been beaten by Lieut. Williams.
The charge was denied by Lieut Williams, as well as by the first sergeant,
the magistrate, and the Judge de pais, all of whom stated that the said notary
was shot the night before during au attack by bandits on the town and had
died from the effect of the wound. Lieut. Williams admitted that he had
killed several prisoners, but only when they attempted to escape.
At Hinche I found a mwllfieil " wrvee " had been in force, both of the roads
and in building the gendarme barracks. All the inhabitants of a certain
section (Zeb Guinea) had been rounded up and brought into Hinche as sus-
pected bandits and had been put to work without pay, but had bet>n allowed
30 cents Haitien (6 cents gold) per day for food; they had been released a
few days before my arrival. I also found that practically all the gardens
and farms out»;ide of the towns had been abandoned and the inhabitants bad
disappeared, nniny probably having Joine<l the bandits. The priest, Father
Belliot, stated that this was partly on account of their fear of the gendarmes
and of the " corvee." The appearance of a gendarme uniform was sufficient for
the peasant to take to the brush and hide.
The priest and the nmgistrate of Hinche stated that a number of prisoners
had been shot. On being questioned Capt. Ernest J. Lavoie (private, United
States Marine Con^) admitted that six prisoners had been shot. He said tliat
the cacos had attempted to escape several times; that they were a bad
lot and had caused trouble among other prisoners. They were taken to the
cemetery outside of the town and shot by gendarmes. He stated that he had
no orders to shoot prisoners, ami he had not rei)orte<l the matter to anyone.
Maj. Wells state<l that no report had Iwen made to him, but admitted that be
would not exi)ect a report in case of shooting of prisoners.
Upon the admission of Capt. Lavoie that prisoners had been shot, Col.
Williams imme<liately wrote an order, a copy of which he had sent to all gen-
darme officers in Haiti, forbidding the killing of any prisoner, even if attempt-
ing to escaix% and direc'ting tlKit in case a prisoner should be killed n foH
report with names of witnesses be submitted at once.
I considered that the action of the gendarmes in this section had had a very
bad elTwt on the inhabitants, and I directed Col. Williams to tran.sfer the
officers, Capt. Lacoie and Lieut. Williams, and all gendarmes at Hinche and
Maisade to Port au Print»e, and replace them with othei"s from a quiet part of
the island. I also directed that marines be stationed immediately in Hinche
Maisade. San Michel, Cerca La Source, and Thomond, with an officer at eaoh
place, and directed Col. Hooker to assume command of all troops in the field.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 485
I directed that all officers and men be instructed to treat tlie natives kindly
and to make every effort to regain their confidence. I also directed that all
patrolling by gendarmes cease and that they be restricted to the towns (in this
section). I found that the gendarme officers had made no attenii)t to propitiate
the priests; in fact they were in most cases antagonistic to them and treated
them without any respect and had gained tlieir ill will, wlien they might have
liad their good offices in dealing with the natives.
I questioned Maj. Wells carefully, and whilj? I was unable to get anyone to
state that he had given any orders for " corvee " or the killing of priscmers, I
was .satislie<1 that the officers un<ler him understood that they were to get
results, but were not expected to umke any rejjorts. I tronsidered Maj. Wells
principally responsible for the conditions as found. He stated that he made
frequent inspections of all posts, and it is inccmceivable that he should not have
known something of the conditions. I directeil that Maj. Wells l)e relieved of
the command of the northern district Maj. Meade arrived about this tine and
was assigned to command at Cai)e Haitlen. Maj. Wells applied to be relieved
from the gendarmerie and was ordertMl to the States.
In my oi^inlon the young gendarme officers performe<l their duties tt) the best
of their abilities according to the orders they received. They were all marines
and, according to. the custom, never questioned any orders given them by regu-
lar officers. It is also my opinion that the actions of many of the ytmng gen-
darme officers in treatment of natives is due to the methods taught them in
handling the *• corvee " workmen.
A. W. Catlin,
Headquarters Afarine Corpn, WnHhingioti, D. V.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of December, 1919.
H. C. Haines,
Coloneh Assistant Adjutant and Inspector,
Vnited states Marine Corps.
Washington, D. C, January 8, 1920.
John L. DoxEY, captain. United States Marine Corps, having been called as a
witness, and having been informed of his right to decline to answer any crim-
inating question, was duly sworn, and testified l»efore me, Lieut. Col. H. R.
Lay, assistant adjutant and inspector, Unite<l States Marine Corps, as follows:
1. Question. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
Answer. John L. Doxey ; captain, United States Marine Corps; stationed at
Marine Barracks, navy yard, Philadelphia, Pa.
2. Question. Have you recently been on duly with the Haitlen Gendarmerie ;
and If so, what was your rank and title while on such duty; also, where were
you stationed and what duties were assignecl to and performed by you and
between what dates?
Answer. From Januai-y 2.1, 1910, to about June, 1918, I held the rank of
captain or inspector, but my principal duties have })een as a captain. From
June 25, 1916, to about February, 1917, I was stationed at Port au Prince;
from about February, 1917, to February 13, 1918, I was stationed at Hinche;
from February 13, 1918, to March 8, 1919, at Cape Haitlen ; from March 8 to
June 28, 1919, at Hinche ; from June 28 to September 17, 1919, Cape Haitien ;
from September 17 to November 8, 1919, Port au Prince; from about October
18, 1918, to October 30 or 31, 1918, at Hinche; from about February 22 to March
8, 1918, I was in and out of Hinche, but not assigned as district commander at
that place at that time.
3. Question. During your service with the Haitian Gendannerie in Hinche
and Haisade and elsewhere, were you aware of the existence of any compul-
sory "corvee" subsequent to the receipt of the order of October 1, 1910, sus-
pending the corvee law? If so, please state particulars.
Answer. To my knowledge there was none. I personally questloneil D. L.
Williams, the lieutenant at Malssade, the magistrate of Maissade, Martial
Breval, and a number of natives working on the road at this time, and all told
me that no forced labor was going on. I questioned these i>eople sonie time be
tween the Ist and 6th of March, 1919. In this connection I would like to state
that corvee is a Creole expression for any work by either a small or large
body of men, whether they are working for the gendarmerie, the Marine Corps,
or for themselves or other natives, and in case you should ask if corvee were
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486 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO D0B£INGO.
going on the natives would naturally answer " yes/* whether it was voluntary
or forced labor. My understanding of corvee when questioned by an Inspecting
officer is that a body of men are working against their wishes and that they
may be paid or not paid, while it may or may not be with a native. The
native, when questioned, thinks that any work, whether paid or not paid,
whether voluntary or not voluntary, is corvee. To my knowledge of the defini-
tion of the word " corvee ** it was not going on in the district at this time.
During my investigation, which was about March 3, 1919, I personally ques-
tioned natives working on the road at that time near Maissade, about 15 mm
out of 45, and each one told me in substance that he was glad to work on the
road, because he could not work his garden on account of the bandits, and
that he would rather make a little money until the banditism was over. A
few days later I was with Gen. Catlin. and through his interpreter some of these
same men personally told him that they were forced to work, although they
were paid, and would rather be at home working on their gardens. At this
particular time in that section there was no particular work for them to do,
even in preparing their gardens to be planted, as it was very dry. During
my duty with the natives I have found that practically all, educated and un-
educated, will work for you Just because they like you, and at the same time it
may be against their wishes, and you would not know about it Another cause
would be through fear that they might displease the chief, and later the chief
might persecute them, would influence the native to work for you. However,
in this case, if an opi>ortunity occurred, another inspector might find out that
the natives had a dislike for this work. At this time, as far as I know, every
one was being paid for the work performed. At this time I personally carried
up 600 or 800 gourds to pay the native road workmen, and at this time, and
before this time, there were about 3,000 gourds available for paying these road
workmen, and after my trip, as I remember it, there were 1,200 gourds left at
Hinche. This money was kept at Hinche for safe-keeping only — it belonged to
the commune of Haissade.
4. Question. Did you at any time observe personally, or receive any report,
of instances of abuse or ill treatment of members of corvee by members of tiie
gendarmerie?
Answer. No, sir.
5. Question. Did you ever see or hear that caco prisoners had been taken
out and executed without trial?
Answer. I never did see this, and I don't remember of ever hearing of It up
until March 19, 1919, when Gen. Catlin's investigation was made.
6. Question. In your position which you occupied, did you ever hear of any
cases where any persons were shot without trial in or near Hinche or Maissade?
Answer. No, sir. However, when Maj. Turner made his investigation, I
did hear from Maj. Turner that 19 prisoners had been killed in January in
Hinche. I personally did not believe this; for, in numerous conversations with
the natives, they never mentioned that anything of this kind had occurred. I
had personally known the natives in the district of Hinche, and the priest,
and if anything of this kind had been on their ni^nds they, perhaps, would liave
brought it up in some of these conversations. From all my dealings with the
Haitian, it is absolutely impossible to tell whether an occurrence actually took
place or not ; they may tell you that an incident took place, which is absolutely
incorrect; they may tell you that an Incident happened and implicate other
natives ; and upon investigation yiu will find their statements untrue.
7. Question. Did you hear it spoken of among the gendarmerie that it waa
customary to execute, " bump off," caco prisoners and to make no report of such
affairs to higher authority?
Answer. No, sir.
8. Question. Have you any knowledge of the circumstances attending the
death of Gamier, the notary, at the house occupied by Lieut. Williams at
Maissade?
Answer. Only from hearsay, after Gen. Catlin's investigation. Gen. Catlin
investigated this case himself.
9. Question. What, in your opinion, were the principal causes for the spirit
of unrest prevalent in the Republic of Haiti?
Answer. The natural dislike of the Haitians toward any white man (for-
eigner) in Haiti and the changing of article 6 of the constitution, which in
Hubstanoe allows a foreigner to own laud in Haiti. This change was made in
June. 1918. My |)ersonal feeling and the intimate knowledge I have of the
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 487
naUves leads me to believe that the changing of article 6 of the constitution
was the cause of this banditlsni in Haiti.
10. Question. Do you consider that the Haitians residing in the district of
Hinche were subjected to ill trentihent or were unduly oppressed by the Haitian
gendarmerie?
Answer. No, sir.
11. Question. Did you ever see or hear of any confidential reiiorts, confiden-
tial telegrams, or confidential messages being received in MaJ. Well's oflice
relating to the alleged killings and the corvee after the order al)ollshing corvC^e
had been given, in the vicinity of Hinche or Maissade?
Answer. No. air: so far as I know no such messages ever came to his office.
12. Question. Would you have been in a position to -have known had such
confidential messages or telegrams been received?
Answer. Not necessarily, although Maj. Wells usually gave me all reports to
read.
13. Question. Did you ever hear of any confidential reports, confidential tele-
irrani-s, or confidential messages of any kind disappearing from Maj. Wells's
office?
Answer. No, sir.
14. Question. Were you intimately associate<l with Maj. Clarke H. Wells
while he was department commander?
Answer. Yes, sir.
15. Question. During that time did you live with him?
Answer. No, sir: but I lived In the same town with him and saw him prac-
tically every day.
16. Question. During this time did you ever see Maj. Wells under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor?
Answer. No, sir.
17. Question. Do you know Mr. Frederick Baker, formerly an officer in the
Haitian gendarmerie?
Answer. Yes.
18. Question. Please state what you know in regard to his character and
jireneral reputation among his associates in Haiti?
Answer. By hearsay from American business men and gendarmerie Ileu-
tennnts, he is an agitator and is not loyal to his superior officers and always
exaggerates any incident that he may have personal knowledge of. I personally
would not believe any statement he ever made to be a fact, and I have heard of
statements made by him that were absolutely incorrect, according to different
jionrces of hearsay information.
HH\DQUARTKRS MARINE CORPS.
Washington, /). C.
Stibsoribe<l and sworn to belore me this the Sth day of January, 1920.
H. Lay,
fAnitenant Colonel, Aasistant Adjutant and Inspector,
United States Marine Corps.
Washington, D. C, January 7, 1920.
CuiBKE H. Welxs, major, United States Marine Corps, having been called as
a witness, and having been Informed of his right to decline to answer an>'
incriminating questions, was duly sworn, and testified before me, Lieut. Col.
H- B. Lay, assistant adjutant and inspector, Unlte<l States Marine Corps, as
follows :
( Note. — Before commencing the testimony of Maj. Wells attention is invited
to tlie confidential report of the brigade commander, ^irst Provisional Brigade,
United States Marines, Port au Prince, Haiti, to the major general commandant.
datetl December 7, IfllO. In paragraph 2 it is stated that from an investigation
of the report it appears that in the north of Haiti, in violation of the order of
October 1, 1918. suspending the application of the corvee law, this law was put
In effect in certain sections after that date by order of the gendarmerie district
commander, Maj. Clarke H. Wells, Unite<l States Marine Corps. This is mis-
lenclin^, as Maj. Wells at that time was department commander and Capt.
Lavoic was the district commander where this corvee was alleged to have been
62269— 21— PT 2 25
Digitized by VjOOQIC
488 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
put into effect. Maj. Wells was in command of the entire department, comprii-
ing seven districts, and was 90 miles away from this district at this time.)
1. Question. Pleaso state your name, rank, and present station.
Answer. Clarke H. Wells, major, United States Marine Corps, in charge of
the Marine Corps recruiting station, Washington, I). C.
2. Question. Have you recently been on duty with tlie Haitian gendarmerie,
and if so. what was your rank and title while on such duty? Also where were
you stationwl and what dutit^s were assigned to and performed by you and
!)etween what dates?
Answer. I was detached from the Haitian gendarmerie on May 17, 1919. At
that time I held the rank of^ colonel in command of the Department of the North,
with headquarters at Cape Haltien, Haiti. To the best of my knowledge, I
Joined the gendarmerie' on May 6, 191G, and was on duty all the time l>etweeii
those dates. I joined the gendarmerie first as an inspector, and had charge of
the road .system In north Haiti and also in command of the civil pr son at
Ca{)e Haitien, which was then In process of construction. I was also assigned
to regular iusi)ection duty in that department. I was appointed colonel in the
gendarmerie on the 16th of December, 1918.
3. Question. Can you give the names and rank of some of the gendarmerie
officers un<ler your command and subject to your orders?
Answer. In the north I had Capt. Bartel as insjiector, Capt. Chaffee as quar-
termaster, Maj. Hayes as quartermaster, Capt. Doxey in command of the Third
Company at Cape Haitien, and Lieut. Bowley, his assistant ; at Grande River.
Capt Hamilton at Ouanaminthe, Capt. Verdler ; at Hinche, Capt. Lavoie ; Lieut.
Wdliams at Maissade ; Capt. Howell at Port de Paix ; Capt. Hannigan at the
remount stat'on; Capt. Hartinan at Letrou; Lieut. Cates at the civilian prison.
Cape Haitien ; and Capt. Gibbons at Gonaives.
4. Question. During your service with the Haitian gendarmerie In Hinche
and Maissade and elsewhere were you aware of the existence of any compul-
sory ** corvee " subsec^uent to the receipt of the order of October 1, 1918, sus-
pending the corvee law? If so, please state particulars.
Answer. After the receipt of the order of October 1, 1918, abolishing corvee,
to the best of my knowledge, as far as I could find out during my inspections,
there was no compulsory labor, meaning ** corvee."
5. Question. Between what dates, approximately, were corvee lawfully oper-
ated in the department under your charge?
Answer. Corvee was first started when the road system of Haiti was in
process of c<mstructiou, bv order of the chief of the gendarmerie; that was the
latter part of 1916.
6. Question. Did you at any time observe personally or receive any report of
Instances of abuse or 111 treatment of members of corvee by members of the
gendarmerie?
Answer. I visited Hinche as frequentlj* as my other duties would let me, and
no complaint ever reached me from any civilians or anybody in authority there
of the ill treatment of natives or members of the corvee, nor were any members
of the conee ill treated by members of the gendarmerie.
7. Question. Did you at any time subsequent to October 1, 1919, issue any
orders or give your tacit consent for the convening of compulsory corvee for
construction work in your district?
Answer. No ; I had personal charge of 65 miles of road between Cai>e Haitien
and Gonaives. After the corvee was abolishe<l these laborers were paid by me
each wtvk. The road to Hinche was in charge of tlie district commander of
Hinche. Capt. Lavoie. who as a member of the communal council at Maissade
used the taxes which the i>eople were required to pay for bringing in their
goods to sell for the puriiose of paying for this labor. This was with the con-
sent of the magistrate there, as the people were very desirous for this road.
8. Question. Did you ever .»4ee or bear that Caco prisoners had been taken out
and executed without trial?
Answer. When Gen. Catlin made his inspection in Hinche the latter part of
March, 1919, It was found that several prisoners had been shot. This was told
to Gen. Catlin by several natives, who were Interrogated by him at that time.
This was the first intimation that I had had of anything of this nature. No
compla'nts ever reached me fi*om any source as to any shootings up to this time
9. Question. Following the attack by bandits upon Mais.*<ade on or about
November 1, 1918. did you express the wish to any of your junior officers that
Caco prisoners, if undesirable or worthless, be *' bumi)ed off "?
Answer. Never.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 489
10. QueBtioD. Did you hear It spoken of among the gendarmerie that it was
customary to exeiMite ** bunip-olT " Caco prisoners and to make no reiwrt of such
affairs to high authority?
Answer. Never.
11. Question. W'as any report made to you, or did you ever hear, that Capt.
Ernest Lavois had executed some 19 caco prisoners in or near Hinche in Jan-
uary, 1919? If so, was any investigation made by you at the time and what
notion taken?
Answer. Gen. Williams and myself visitetl Hinche in January, 1919, and found
tilings in good order, with the exception that roring bands of bandits, in that
district who robbed the market workmen, burned the houses, and io general ter-
rified the natives, was reported. The strength of the gendarmerie detachment
on duty there in central Haiti was^ approximately 100 men and officers. Hinche
was 90 miles from Cape Haltien ; all supplies had to be sent through on pack
trains. It was my opinion that the officers on duty there were very active.
They had completed one of the finest barracks buildings in the gendarmerie.
An dectric-light plant was installed there, and the place was generally in
excellent condition. Numerous bands of bandits were reporter! from time tO'
time; some of these reports were nimierous, and rumors travel very fast in that
country, while other reports were actual facts. I think the natives had the
habit, in fact I know they had the habit, of exaggerating and lying to a great
extent The garrison was rewiforced by the cavalry from Port an Prince, and
several additional officers would come up for two or three weeks for patrol
duty and then return. On my numerous visits to Hinche the officers seemed
interested in their work ; especially the construction work of building up the
country. The natives seemed contended In the vicinity of Hinche, and there
were no reports or evidences of any forced labor, except by prisoners. The Jail
contained approxlnmtely 00 men and w<mien during my trips there. I never
saw any mistreatment of prisoners or the inhabitants.
12. Question. Were you well acquainted with Capt. Doxey, and, if so, what
was your opinion of his ability as an officer and reputation for veracity? Were
your personal relations friendly or otherwise?
Answer. Capt. Doxey and myself were good friends ; we were together in
northern Haiti during all of our service down there, and I would not doubt
what be said for a minute. He was always truthful and conscientious in his-
work; he was very thorough, painstaking, and a good all around dependable
man. My personal relations with Capt. Doxey were always very friendly. He
is of a retiring nature, sensitive, and a man of few words. He was resi)ected by
the better element of natives. The bad element during his service in Hinche
tried to kill him because he was doing his duty. On account of his upholding
the law and looking out for the interests of the better element of the people,
he was attacked in his house one night at Hinche by bandits who were armed
witti rifles and knives. At this time he displayed great courage. He was by
himself, and finally succeeded, after the alarm had been sounded, in quelling
the disturbance and driving the bandits out into the country. He sent a report
to Cape Haiten recounting the circumstances, saying that he was all right and
did not need help. A number of bandits were killed during this attack. I
consider I>oxey one of the most dependable officers In the service. He was very
patient with the Haitians, listened to all their troubles, and had many friends
among the better element.
13. Question. Have you any knowledge of the circumstances attending the
death of Gamier, the notary, at the house occupied by Lieut. Williams in
Halssade?
Answer. It was reported to me verbally that this man had been shot during
a daylight attack on that town. The officer in charge, Lieut. Williams, seemed
to think that Garnier was implicated in the attack, as the bandits came
Into the town through his house and were firing from his house. Lieut.
Williams was alone in Malssade at this time. This affair took place about
3 o'clock in the afternoon. Lieut. Williams was In his own house, across the
square; he heard the shots and imme<liately went outside to find out what
was going on. He stated to me that the bandits were firing all around him,
and that in order to protect himself he got his men in the best shape he
fould on short notice and returned the fire, and finally succeeded in driving
them off after a number had been killed. Just how many actually were killed
I do not remember. It was during this attack, It was reported, that Gamier
was killed. He was found dead in his house.
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490 IXQriRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
14. Question. What was the attitude of Frederick Baker toward you while
he was a gendarmerie officer?
Answer. He was my assistant in the road business; had command of the
district of Gonalves. which is 65 miles from Cape Haltien, oyer the mountains,
and our relations were always pleasant. When his enlistment expired from
the Marine Corps he was releaseil from the gendarmerie and joined the
Haitian Products Co., which was then organizing in Haiti. I saw him very
seldom after this, as he was working in a different part of the country. I
did notice, however, and it was talked about among the other officers of the
gendarmerie, that he seemed to avoid further relationship with any of the
officers attached to the gendarmerie.
15. Question. What, in your opinion, were the principal causes for the spirit
of unrest prevalent in the Republic of Haiti?
Answer. The principal cause, I think, when Charlemagne escaped fromr prison
at Cape Haltien by bribing a gendarme. This man had great influence over
a large number of people. He was educated, and circulated all kinds of propa-
ganda about the American occupation. There was no trouble, except the
generl police cases, throughout the north until his escape from jail. The people
were all afraid of him and he got recruits every place he went by telling
them that he was there to drive the whites out of Haiti. Before the corvee
was abolished he spread great discontent by circulating the report that the
Americans were there to make slaves out of them. The Haitians are very
•excitable, rumors and news travel very fast, and they have the habit of lying.
Northern Haiti composed six districts of the most mountainous part of the
island, about 150 miles across and about 90 miles wide. The quota of gendarmes
for this territory was about 960 men divided between the different districts.
16. Question. Do you feel Justified In stating that there were no illegal execu-
tions of native prisoners in the departm^t under your charge?
Answer. Yes ; except in the instance of the investigation at Hinche by Gen.
Catlin in March, 1919, of which I never knew the outcome, what the final
decision was, or the attendant circumstances. About this particular instance
I knew nothing, it having never been reported to me. If it took place at all*
17. Question. Admitting that natives w^ere in some instances executed with-
out trial and without official report of same being made to higher authority. Is
it your opinion that such killings were Justifiable under the circumstances?
Answer. I do not think that any killings are justifiable without trail, except
in the case of bandits in the hills who are armed and trying to escape with rifle
and ammunition in their possession, as happened in numerous cases.
18. Question. Do you consider that the Haitians residing in your Department
were subjected to ill treatment or were unduly oppressed by the Haitian
gendarmerie?
Answer. I do not; I think they wore better treated than they had ever been
before in their lives. During the time that I commanded In the north nobody
was put in jail without a trial, as had been done before the gendarmerie was
established: the communes had more money; the taxes were collected regu-
larly; the trails and roads were made passable both for automobles and carts;
bandits were stopped from pillaging the inhabitants ; disputes among the natives
were setted ; and everything was done to improve conditions.
(At this point the witness submitted to the examining officer certain letters
which he requested be made a part of his testimony. The letters are as follows :)
Gkndarmekie D'HArri, Quabtier Generau
Port au Prince, Februarf/ U, J 9 27.
From : Cliief of tlie Oeudaruierie d'Haiti.
To : Commandant Clarke H. Wells, inspector, Gendannerie d'Haiti.
Subject: Road work.
1. The following indorsement, signed by the commander, D^artment of the
Cape, appears on your road report for the manth of January, 1917:
" The attention of the chief of the gendarmerie is invite<l to the fact that under
the supervision of Maj. Wells tlie amount of work accompUshed in road repair
has greatly Increased per month. This is undoubtedly due to the constant
attention given tlie work by this officer and to the efficient manner ip which he
has expended the funds given him."
2. Gen. Colo, to whose attention this indorsement was brought by the under-
signed, stated to me tliat you are doing exceptionally fine work at the cape, and
it gives me great pleasure to add my approbation to that of all others Avho hare
visited your Department.
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 491
3. Upon good road work largely depends the future of this country^ and it
is for that reason it is particularly gratifying to hear such praise as is given
your work.
4. A copy of this letter will be appended to your official gendarmerie record.
S. D. BuTMini.
GENnABUEniib i/Hatti, Qijartij^ General '
Port au Privre, March 3, 1917.
From : Chief of the Geudarinerie d'Haiti.
To: Commandant Clarke H. Wells, inspector, Gendarmerie d'Haiti.
Subject : Inspection of barracks, prisons, etc., at Cape Haitien.
1. The following extract appears in a report made by Col. H. L. Roosevelt,
general inspector, G. d'H, on a recent trip made through your district:
" I found the prison in a most excellent condition ; in fact, it is easily the
finest institution of its kind in Haiti and would be a model anywhere. It
was absolutely spotless, and the buildings are admirable for the purpose and
the discipline was remarkable. The greatest credit is due to all who have
been in any way connected with the maintenance and operation of this prison
and special credit is due to Commandant Clarke H. Wells, G. d'H, who is in
charge."
2. The excellent condition of the Cape Haitien prison is a subject of
enthusiastic comment by everyone who has seen it, and I take pleasure in
thanking you for your work In connection therewith.
3. A copy of this letter will be appended to your official gendarmerie record.
S. D. Butler.
I l^'ifHt iiuloi Rom»»n 1. 1
Headquarters Department of the Cape,
Gendarmerie d'Haiti,
Cape Haitien, March 9, 1917.
To: Maj. Clarke H. Wells, G. d'H.
1. The undersigned is much pleased to note the contents of this letter, which
reflects great credit upon you.
J. M. Tracy.
Gendarmerie d'Haiti,
QuARTiER General,
Port au Prime, Haiti, December 21, 1917,
From: Commanding officer, constabulary detachment, United States Marine
Corps.
To: Capt. Clarke H. Wells, Unite<l States Marine Corps.
Subject: Commendatory letter.
1. Attached hereto is a radio from the major general commandant, United
States Marine Corps, transmitted to these headquarters by the brigade com-
mander.
2. A copy of this will be appended to your Marine Corps record.
S. D. Butler.
I Fii'Ht indorsiiin'iit.]
Headquarters Department of the Cape,
Gendabmedue d'Haiti,
Cape Haitien, December 27, 1917,
Proni : Department commander. Department of the Cape.
To: Capt. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps.
1. Forwarded.
J. K. Tracy.
Headquarters First Provisional Brigade,
United States Marine Corps,
Port au Prince, Haiti, December 20, 1917,
From: Brigade commander.
To : Chief of gendarmerie.
Subject: Road repair.
1. The following radiogram has been received in reply to one sent from this
office reporting the successful run of nn automobile from Port au Prince to Cape
Haitien on the 17th Instant. r^^^^l^
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492 INQl'IRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
"Brigrade Port au Prince, infonuation contained radiogram 00518 most
)2Tatifying. My sincere con^atulations to all who have been instrumental in
doing this great worls. 13319.
" Maboobps."
2. It is with great pleasure that I am able to forward this iX)ngratulatory
dispatcli to the organizati(m which is solely responsible for the successful
acconiplishnient of the work in question.
John H. Russeli^
(iKNDAKMEltIK D'HaITI. (il'AKTIKR (rKNERAL.
Port au frinrr. Jfaiti. Dvvcmher >0. 19tf<.
From : Cliief of the Oemlarinerie d'H«iti.
To: Maj. Clarke H. Wells, O. d'H.
Subject: Letter of conimendation.
Inclosure: One.
1. This othce takes pleasure in forwarding to yon the attached copy of a letter
dated November 16, 1918, from the American minister. Port au Prince, Haiti.
2. A copy of tliis letter and inclosures will In* appended to your ivcord.
Ai.Ex. S. Williams.
Lkoation oi THK CNrrKi) States ok America,
\ovciMher /6\ /.Q/.S.
Gen. Alexandeh S. Williams.
Chief of the dcudarwrrie (VHaiii, Port au Priuve.
SiK : In reply to this legation's dispatch transmitting your report for the week
ending August r». 1918, addre.sseil to the Secretary of State, in which you stated
that ** the road work is progressing satisfactorily and that Maj. O. H. Wells.
Capt. C. F. Baker, and Capt. Krnest I^avo'e, of the gendarmerie, can not l>e praised
too highly for their energy and resourcefulness," the Department of State
<llre<'ts me to Inform you that because of its desli'e for tlie improvement of con-
ditions in Haiti it is particularly pleased to learn of the progress whM'h is being
made in road construction and to request you to express to the offic*ers afore-
mentioned the real appreciation of the department for their work in conne<*tion
with the road between Cape Haitien and Hlnche.
I am, sir. your obedient .servant.
A . P» A I LEY - B LA N C II A Rl>,
, I m erica n }fi» i> ter.
(JE.NDARMEKIK I»'HaIT]. (irAKTlER (tENERAI..
f*ort au Priuee, RrpuhJie of Haiti, .lanuary .?/, 19 19,
From : Chief «»f the (Jendarmerie d'Haiti.
To: Col. Clarke II. Wells. O. d'H.
Subject: In.siMHtitm «»f the Department of the Cape.
1. On the complethm of my recent insi)ectlon of the Department of the CUipe.
which you «'<anmand. I have to inform you that I found little to criticize and
much to ctimmend. The great improvements made in barracks and quarters, in
enl'sted personnel, in roads, in prisons, in hospitals, and in the communes ad-
ininistert»<l by your officers reflect great credit on your conduct of affairs,
especially as much of the bnpri»venient. even allowing for the work of your
predecessors, is evidently due to your ability, energy, and initiative.
2. A copy of tills letter will be attache<l to your record.
A LEX . S. W 1 LL I A M S.
UK (Question. I>id you ever receive any eonhdential messages as to conditions
existing in your <lel»artment : and if so, were those confidential reix»rts ever
taken from your files or lost?
Answer. I never received any confidential reports.
20. (^uestloiL Did yon ever receive any confidential telegrams or iiK*ssages
reporting the actual state of afTairs at Hinche and Mnissade In regard to ctirvee
being carritHl on after the onhT was i.ssued abolishing it, or about any unlawful
killing of natives in or lu^r tlios** towns?
Answer. No ; no telegrams of this nature were ever received by me.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCVPATION OK HAITI AND SANIX) DOMIXOO. 498
Headquarters Marink Corps,
Washinffton, I), C, January 12, 1920.
Maj. Clarke H. Wells, Cnited States Marine Corps, was recalled as a witness,
and havinp been informed that his previous oath was binding, and of his right
to decline to answer any criminating question, further testified, as follows :
1. Question. Did you ever intimate to any member of the gendarmerie that
you did not care to receive rei>orts about prisoners?
Answer. I never intimated that I did not care to receive sucli reports. The
gendarmerie regulations called for regular inspections and reports about
prisoners by the inspecting officers attached to the department, and these re-
ports of insiK»ction were always written up and remain in the department
commander's files at Cape Haltien. The district c<mimanders made written
reports of the conditions existing in their districts at the end of each month
through me to the chief of tlie gendarmerie. These reiK)rts are on file, by the
month, with the records of the gendarmerie.
2. Question. Did you ever receive any mes.*<ages?
Answer. Ix>ts of messages were n»ceived eacli day (»ver the telegrapli from
4»utlying stations and districts.
3. Question. It has been stated by witnesses that the telegrams and ortlers in
the department of the north hav<» disappeared. Do you know what be<'ame of
rhem?
Answer. At the time I was detache<l from Cape Haitlen. May 17, 1919, all
orders and telegrams were there as I had receiveil them. I know nothing about
the loss of any of them.
4. Question. Why were the papers referred to kept under lock and key V
Answer. The drawer of the department commander's desk was kept locked,
and paiM»rs relative to watching the activities of certain natives were kept there:
also personal letters from the chief of the gendarmerie, all of which remain
there.
5. (Question. Vou stateil, in answer to Question 20, that no confidential tele-
grams were re<'eived by you. How do you account for the discrepancy between
the answers to questions 9 and 10 in the testimony of Capt. Laurence Rolts?
Answer. l'i>on visiting the Third Company's office one time, which was used
as a police station also, in which there were always a number of natives
lounging, I instructed Lieut. Bolts to keep the telegraph file out of sight, as it
often related to watching the movements of certain natives who were under
sospichm, and I thought that it might be read by those about.
6. Question. After Gen. Catlin's visit to your department, in which he ftmnd
that it was allege<l that corvee was practiced after the issuance of the order of
October 1, 1918. and also that some pri.*<oners had been unlawfully kilbnl. what
steps did you take to correct this?
Answer. In order that there would be no further (hmbt about how the work
was carried on, all work was suspended. Oen. Williams, who was also present,
issue-l written orders on the spot that no prisoners under any clrcumtances
would be unlawfully shot, and these orders were dispatclunl by me, by si)ecial
nies.senger throughout the department.
7. Question. laeut. Williams has testifie<l that certain escaping prisoners
had been kille<l and that he had ma<le written reports of these killings, and
any operations, to the district commander: were any of these prisoners killed
ever reported to you hv the district commander under whom T.leut. Williams
was serving, and If so, did you make any report to C*o\. Willams?
Answer. I remember certain reiM>rts of operations made by Lieut. Williams ;
I <*an not say whether they mentiontnl any killings of prlscmers, but I for-
\var<le<l these pai»ers to (*ol. Williams. These reiM)rts were concernng the
general bandit situation, so far as I remember. T also made several trips to
Port an Prince during this time and talked over the situation with Geii.
Williams.
8. Quest'on. Did you ever tell Capt. Handlton that (Jen. Williams* orders
prohibiting shooting of prisoners did not apply unless the prisoners were
actually In prison?
Answer. No; I gave im instructions whatsiwver to Capt. Hamilton concern-
ing this, as he alrea-ly had the gendarmerie orders.
O. Quest on. Did you tell Capt. Hamilton tluit he shouhl go ahead executing
prisoners and say nothing about it?
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494 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Answer. No; I never mentioned to any officer or man during my tour of
service in Haiti anything about executing anybody. The question never
entered my head.
In this connection I would like to supplement my answer to quest'on 19, ia
my former testimony, by saying that I did receive confldential reiwrts and
telegrams in code, all of which remain on file.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this January 12. 1920.
Lieutenant Colonel, Assistant .idjutant and Inspector
United States ilarine Corps.
Washington, D. C, January 6.
Alexander S. Williams, lieutenant colonel, United States Marine Con>».
having been called as a witness, and having been informetl of his right to de-
cline to answer any criminating questions, was duly sworn, and testified l)efoi*e
me, Lieut. Col. H. R. Lay, assistant adjutant and inspector, United States
Marine Corps, as follows :
1. Question. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
Answer. Alexander S. Williams, lieutenant colonel, Unitetl States Marine
Corps, stationed at Marine Barracks, navy yard, Philadelphia. Pa.
2. Question. What duty were you performing from May, 1915, to July, 1919?
Answer. I was chief of the Haitian gendarmerie from May, 1918, until July.
1919, and I was assistant chief from organization of tlie gendarmerie in 1915
until May, 1918.
3. Question. Did you ever hear that Caco prisoners had been taken to a
cemetery in or near Hinche and shot ; if so, please state what steps were taken
by you to verify this statement.
Answer. Yes ; during a visit of inspection made by Brig. Gen. Catlin and my-
self to Hinche in January, 1919, Gen. Catlin interrogated gendarmerie officers,
local officials, the loOal priest, enlisted gendarmes, and Inhabitants, relative to
certain reports which he told me had been received by him. These reports
alleged that certain prisoners involved in bandit ism had been taken from a
prison in Hinche, led to a point outside of Hinche, near a cemetery, and there
executed by a detachment of enlisted gendarmes. This allegation was sup-
ix)rted by the statements of one or more gendarmes interrogated by Gen. Cat-
lin. To the best of my recollection, Oapt. Ernest Lavoie who was at the time
district commander at Hinche, acknowledged that such an execution had taken
place. He offered in explanation of this action the fact that it was impossible
to obtain conviction In the local civil courts, and that after their trial by a
provost court in Cape Haitien and the expiration of the sentences adjudged
by such court, that they would return to the neighborhood of Hinche. rejoin the
bandits with whom they had been originally identified and make the pacification
of the region more difficult. The entire investigation was conducted by Gen.
Catlin, and the allegations seemed supported, except as to the exact number
executed. No steps were taken by me to verify this statement or to investigate
the allegations, for the reason that Hinche at that moment, and up until the
date of my departure from Haiti, was undojr the direct military control of
the commander of the district of north Haiti, who received his orders from the
brigade commander. First Provisional Brigade, United States Marines, Port
au Prince, I was not a party to this investigation, but was present during
part of it
4. Question. What duty was MaJ. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine
Corps, performing during the latter part of 1918 and the beginning of 1919?
Answer. Maj. Clarke H. Wells at that time was department commander,
department of the cape, which department included the district of Hinche.
5. Question, Did you consult with MaJ. Wells from time to time as to how
matters were going on in his department ; and was the killing of prisoners or
others ever mentioned?
Answer. Yes; the killing of prisoners in custody was never discussed, but
instructions were given that every effort should be made to distinguish between
those who were actually involved in operations against bandits and those who
were in the vicinity of the operations or who might have become associated
with the bandits against their will.
6. Question. Would It have been possible for 6 or 19 prisoners to have been
executed at any one time in the Hinche district without your knowing about it?
Answer. Yes,
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 495
7. Question. In conversation with Oapt. Lavoie and Lieut. Williams was tJie
question of execution of prisoners ever mentioned?
Answer. No ; except along the broad lines of general treatment of natives and
the suppression of bandltlsm.
8. Question. During your service witli the Haitian gendarmerie did you ever
see Maj. Wells under the influence of intoxicating liquor?
Answer. No.
9. Question. What is your opinion as to the character and veracity of Maj.
Doxey?
Answer. I consider Capt. Doxey — then major in the gendarmerie— to be an
officer of very fine feeling. He was noted among gendarmerie officers for his
understanding of and sympathy with the natives. He was successful in his
administration of gendarmerie afftilrs, and had the confidence and respect of
the natives to a marked degree. This was not due to his temperament entirely
but to his thorough understanding of the native dialect (Creole), which he
spoke and understood better than any commissioned officer of the Marine
Corps serving in the gendarmerie. I have found in every official and per-
sonal dealing with Capt. Doxey this ofllcer to be very careful in his state-
ments, and have never had any reason to suppose or believe that he was not
absolutely truthful in all of his statements.
10. Question. Did you ever see or hear of any order being issued by Maj.
Clarke H. Wells putting Into effect the corvee law, after October, 1918, in his
northern department where he was commanding?
Answer. No.
U. Question. It has been stated that corvee was seen in operation in Feb-
ruary, 1919, near Maissade, where two groups of between 50 and 75 men each
were working on the road and a third group of about 45 men In the market
place near Maissade ; please state what you know about this?
Answer. Oen. OatUn informed me that Col. Hooker had reported the exist-
ence of corvee In the neighborhood of Maissade, and directed me to have an
investigation made. I assured him at the time that no corvee was In opera-
tion, and that my orders relative thereto were being carried out throughout
Haiti. I had passed through Maissade two or three times and had seen no
rotd gangs the composition of which, or the attitude of which, led me to be-
lieve that corvee was being carried on. I had seen road gangs working under
the charge of a single gendarme who was In charge of the road constniction.
The belief Inspired by my observations was borne out by reports to the effect
tiiat the road work In this neighborhood was being conducted by volunteer
labor, and that the cost of this labor, which was not paid for from federal
funds, was being paid from communal funds. On the occasion of Gen. Catlln's
visit In January, when I was present, a road gang of perhaps 50 men were
working to the westward of Maissade. Members of this gang were interro-
gated by Gen. Catlln through the Interpreter, a Mr. Holly, a Haitian, and
practically all stated that they were forced to work. Gen. Catlln asked those
who had been forced to work and wanted to return to their farms to step to
the front Practically the entire gang stepped to the front.
While the party was still present, Capt. Doxey, if I remember correctly,
without the aid of an Interpreter, relnterrogated them ; and Capt Doxey told
me at that place and time, that with the exception of a very few men all had
stated that they were not forced to do this work; that they were free to
leave when they wished, and that from time to time they took advantage of
this freedom and returned to their farms in the vicinity. The report as to
the number stated in this question I believe was made by Lieut. Col. R. S.
Hooker. As a result of the contradictory statements made by the men In the
road gang I could form no definite conclusion at that time as to whether or
not these men had been as alleged forcibly collected, forcibly detained, or
rordbly worked; and as stated in an earlier question the military control of
thla district having devolved upon the district conmiander of the district of
tte north of Haiti, I made no further Investigation. I did, however, direct
mat all road work in that neighborhood cease. I further directed Lieut,
wuiiams, an enlisted man of the Marine Corps serving as officer of the gen-
darmerie, to let me know how many men of this gang returned to work or
wanted to work at the beginning of the following week. My recollection is
that he reported that a fair percentage had shown up the following week for
road work.
12. Question. Do you know If Maj. WeUs knew that corvee was still in
operation after October, 1918?
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496 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Answ(»r. Assuming that corvee was in <>iH»ratii»ii after the date stated, with
the exception of corvee which, due to a misinten»retation of my onler. was
carried on for ahout a week sul>se<iuent to that time, I can not state.
13. Question. Would it have heen iM)ssihle f<»r corvee to have been iu iu<€
after October, 1018. without the Icnowledfre of Maj. Wells in his department?
Answer. To a very lindteil extent : yes.
14. Question. Do you know of any conlidential telejframs or messages liavins
been sent to the gendarmerie department commander of the north reporting the
actual state of affairs at Hinclie and Maissade: if so, i)1ease state the substance
of such conlidential telegrams or messages?
Ans^ver. That question can only be answere<l in a general way. Much of the
gendarmerie telegraphic work, esi»ecially that involving trtnip movements and
the operations of patrols, are tnmsmitted in cmle. Every department com-
mander and district conmiamler had a copy of this cmle, and I presume thai
messages were recelvetl by Maj. Wells that were conlidential to an exteut at
least of warranting co<ling. I have no knowledge of messages sent by district
and department commanders, excvpt where the message was sent in duplicate
to me or a reimrt bastnl utMm the message referre<l to the message or incor-
porated the mcHsage in a connnuiilcation. i have no knowledge of conlidential
communications to which I ndght not proi)erly have had access.
15. Question. Please state what you know of Maj. Wells's duty in connection
with the gendarmerie.
Answer. Maj. Wells served under me from early in the organization of the
gendarmerie until early in 1919; for the first part of this i>eriod he was in
general charge of the road construction in north Haiti ; this was <luruig the
operations of con'ee. He relieved Maj. R. (). UnderwtKul. United States Ma-
rine Corps, as department conunander at a date sulMseguent to the alwlition of
corvee. During Maj. Wells's incumbency he devoted himself to road constrm"
tlon, barracks and prison constructh>u. and the general well-l)eing of the
gendarmerie and the civil inhabitants in the north. He brought about marked
improvements in the n)ads. prisons, ami barracks, and the welfare of the
prisoners. The improvement of conditltms in the gendarmerie of north Haiti
and in the adminintrathtn of the eommunals was marked. To accomplish these
results he worke<l harder and worke<l his officer under him hanler than any
senior officer in the gendarmerie.
16. Questi<m. Do you consider that he efficiently occupied his jKJsition as
deiMirtment commander of the north 'r
Answer. Maj. Wells I consider the most efficiently and successful deimrtmenl
<*ommander who lias ever served in the gendarmerie.
17. Question. Did you know Mr. Fre<lerick Baker, formerly in the gend-
armerie; and if so, please state his attitude toward Maj. Wells?
Answer. Mr. Baker, who had a conunission finally as captain iu the jjend-
armerie, and who was, 1 believe, a sergeant in the Marine Cori>8» was aa»o-
ciated with the gendarmerie almost frcmi the beginning. As a junior officer
and as district commander of (5onaives he had a model command and post.
He was assigned to road work. I think, by (Jen. S. D. Butler, but this assign-
ment may have l)een made subsequent to my assuming command. He was in
charge of the road work from Gonaives over the mountains toward Cape
Haitien, and during this work oi>erated what was probably the largest tt)rvee
ever used. He was highly successful in his conduct of road work. and. except
for such abuses as were incidental t<» the operation of corvee. I never heard any
complaint of his action. Latterly he was associated with Maj. Wells as his
assistant in road work, and to the best of my knowledge his relations with ^I«j
Wells were amicable, as they were with all officers of the gendarmerie — myself,
notably. He was considei*ed at that time one of the most efficient officers in
the gendarmerie, so much so that I endeavore<l to obtain for him a temi>orary
commission in the Marine ('on>«. Some time in 1918 Ca|)t. Baker, who ex-
tended his enlistment from one year on the strengtli of my pnuuise that he
would be put in charge of growing castor beans, which the gendarmerie was to
undertake at the retpiest of the War Department, was offered a position in ci«il
life in Haiti which was very attractive. He was discharge<l from the Marine
C'orps uiKm my rt*commen(lation and took up his new work. From his entry
into civil life Mr. Baker stopi)eil i>ractically all relations with the officers under
whom and with whom he had serve<l. This attitude was so marked «s to vim^
'comment, and no rea.son was ever advanced f«»r it.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF FfAlTI AND SANTO l)OMJX(J(). 497
Washington, D. C. Januari/ .7, J920.
Statement of Lieut. Uol. A. S. Williams. Uuitefl States Marine Con)s, rela-
tive to certain irrejjnlarities alleged to liave been committed by officers and
enlisted men in the Republic of Haiti :
1. I was placcMl cm duty in connection with the organization of the gen-
darmerie in August or September, 1915 ; I wjis commissioned by the President
of Haiti as assistant chief of tlie gendarmerie about the middle of 1917. In
that capacity I served until May. 1918, when I was commissioned chief of the
gendarmerie, relieving Gen. S. D. Butler at that date. (Jen. Butler had been
on leave for about two months prior to this, so that my actual conduct of
gendarmerie affairs began about March, 1018. I served as chief of the gen-
darmerie until July 19. 1919. when I was relieved and ordered to tlie Unite^l
States.
2. In order to build certain public roa<ls which were considered ne^-essary
for tlie commercial development of Haiti and also for the military control of
the Kepublic, free labor, known as corvee, was used. This free labor was
available by virtue of certain provisions of the Haitian laws containetl in the
Code Rural. The necessities of the public works demanded a greater supply
of labor than was available in any one locality, and it was therefore necessary
in obtaining the supply of labor to ignore, to a certain extent, the letter of the
law bearing on this matter. This consisted principally in ignoring that pro-
vision of the law which provided that country i)eople were to work in or near
the locality in which they lived, in holding them for longer periods than the
law permitted, and on work not contemplated by law.
The results of this exploitation of labor were two: First, it created in the
minds of the peasants a dislike for the American occupation and its two
instruments — the marines and the gendarmerie — and, second, imbued the native
enlisted man with an entirely false conception of his relations with the civil
population. As the corvee became i»ore and more unpopular, more and more
difficulty was experienced in obtaining men ; and this difficulty causeii the
gendarme to resort to methods which were often brutal but quite consistent
with their training under Haitian officials. I soon realized that one of the
great causes of American uiifiopularity among the Haitians was the corvee
and determined to put a stop to the i»ractice. For various reasons it was not
c^msidered a good i)olicy to stop it before certain rmid work had been com-
pleted. After consultati<m with the military commander, the American min-
ister. American treaty officials, the President of Haiti, and his cabinet, 1
announced that corvee would shortly entirely cease. This anncmncement, if my
raemor>' serves me, was followe<l by a formal annomicement that corvee would
cease; and in October, 1918, I think, I issue<l an order definitely stopping all
corvee of any .sort throughout Haiti. This order was not issued by the Presi-
dent of Haiti, but was issued by myself, ou my own responsibility. The order
was enthusiastically re<*eived not only by the Haitians l)ut by the gendarmerie
officials in general, practically all of whom realized the evils which corvee
had brought about, and welc<mied the opi)ortunity to reestablish themselves in
the goml graces of the inhabitants as well as to take up their more legitimate
work of organizing and training a military jwlice.
On the date set, so far as my i)ersonal investigation, official rei>orts, and
information from other sources could inform me, all corvee stopped with one
♦exception. The original order stopping corvee was drawn so as to indicate
certain road work, and the road work listed in tlie order did not cover, although
it was lntende<l to cover, road work being carried on with local funds. It must
he iindestoo<l that the road work in general was being carried on with what
might be callefl Federal funds. I found that my onler, despite the general knowl-
edfje that it was intended to stop corvee throughout the island had been misin-
terpreted by the department commander of the Department of the Cape. I
think at that date that this officer was Maj. R. (). Underwood, United States
Marine Corps. As soon as this was lnought to my knowledge, perhaps a week
after corvee had st(»pptMl throughout the island, 1 directed the department com-
mander of the Cape by telephone to cease all corvee of whatever nature, paid
for from whatever funds. This order was carried out to the best of my knowl-
♦*dge. The work which was being carried on with the aid of conmuinal funds.
and which was in violation of my order, was road work on the roatl Maissade-
Hinclie. From that date on I heard no rei>ort or any knowUnlge of corvee being
nse<l in Haiti,
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498 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
8. Some time subsequent to this Gen. Catlin told rae he had reports of corvee
being used in the neighborhood of Maissade — this, I believe, was during Novem-
ber, 1918. He directed that I make an investigation or have an investigation
made; I directed the department commander, Maj. Wells, to investigate. Be-
tween the date when corvee was stopped, by order, and November, 1918, work
had been continued on the Maissade-Hlnche road, but with paid labor and pris
oners. During this period I had been over this road two or throe times and
saw no evidence of corvee being used. I saw gangs of natives, aggregating, per
haps, 50 or 60 men, working on the road wltliout other guard than the single
gendarme, in charge of the work. These gangs in no way resembled the corvee
gangs working in this region or in any other part of Haiti ; and their manner
of working, their remoteness from the towns, and the absence of guards found
so necessary in corvee work, led me to believe that these were volunteer paid
laborers. If coercion was used at all it is probable that the coercion consisted
simply In the issuance of an " invitation '* which is the only word that could
have been used in French or Creole for men to work. How this notice was con-
veyed to the country people I do not know positive, but I presume it was made
known to them by enlisted genda|*mes and local representatives of the Haitian
Government. This would be perfectly regular, and provided they were ade-
quately paid, and free to leave the work when they chose, would not be open to
criticism. It is alleged that force was used in bringing these men to work;
that they were restrained by force, and kept at work long after their little
farms called for their presence.
Aside from the difficulty of dollniug just what is forced labor under these
circumstances, I am not convinced that corvee was actually used on that road.
Maj. Wells reported that no corvee was used, but in view of reports submitted
to Gen. Catlin, Gen. Catlin decided to investigate himself, and informed me
that he wished to visit northern Haiti, and further, that he desired me to go
with him. I do not remember whether or not any notice of the proposed visit
was given ; I think it must have been, however, for Maj. Wells met us at
Gonaives. Together with Gen. Catlin the party visited St. Michel, Maissade,
and Hinche. At all three places Gen. Catlin interrogated gendarmerie olficers,
local officials, priests, and gendarmes, prisoners, and certain inhabitants. I
was not present at all of the investigations, but enough was brought out, even
allowing for the unreliability of native testimony, to indicate that very severe
measures had to be taken to put down banditism; and even allowing for the
inexperience and youth of the officers involved, they did not always exercise
good judgment. Without entering into a defense of such errors of judgment
it must be borne in mind that a single white officer placed in military and police
control of a district embracing 400 or 500 square miles and 50,000 Negroes,
swarming with bandits, and having at his disposal a very hisufficient number of
ill-trained native police, was apt to take the most direct coui'se under any
circumstance.
The case of Lieut. Williams, at Maissade, is a case in point. Gen. Catlin
asked if there were any gendarmes who wished to complain of the treatment
they had received, and one at least testified that he had been kicked or stmck
by Lieut. Williams. This would seem an inexcusable exhibition of brutalits',
but when it is considered that Williams was living in a town situated in a
country full of bandits, which had been jumped twice by bandits (on one of
which occasions the gendarmerie garrison had been driven out), his action In
striking this man, who was the only sentinel by night over the gendarmerie
barracks, and who was found by him to be asleep on post, the action finds
an explanation. I can not remember that I ever issued up to this time any
fornml or informal order bearing on the killing of prisoners. The gendarmerie
regulations provided for this, and gendarmes who were guilty of ill-treatment
of prisoners, or killing of prisoners, were always tried by either the gendarmerie
court-martial or by the civil courts of Haiti. The sentences adjudged were
always very severe, as I controlled the policy of the gendarmerie courts, and to a
certain extent could influence the civil courts. Several sentences of death were
adjudged, and these sentences upon my i)ersonal presentation of the case to
the President of Haiti were always ai)proved by him and the sentences carried
out by firing squads. The action of these courts is referred to because the
president invariably commuted the death sentence of civilians to life imprison-
ment, and In this matter realizing the racial defects of his own people aided
rae in enforcing discipline in the gendarmerie in the one matter which gave us
the greatest trouble ; that is, the abuse of authority by Haitian officials when
free from superior control.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCn'PATIOX OF HAITI AND SAXTO IX)MING1). 499
4. While every order issued from j?ondarinerie headquarters and bearing upon
the relations of the gendarmerie with the civil population was designed to
create good feeling between the gendarmerie and the civil population, and every
attempt was made by myself and many (»thei*s to cultivate such good feeling,
the allegations made to (leu. Catlin on this inspection trip were such as to
cause the issuance of an order bearing directly ui)on the treatment of prisoners.
Whether or not the suggestion of such an order be issutnl came from Gen.
Catlin or myself I can not say, but an order was issued which in its phniseology
was considered foolproof. The expression ** in custody " was use<l in the order,
if I ronember correctly, and this expression was used in the order to cover (he
easea of prisoners actually conflnetl, prisoners being talcen over the trail, and
prisoners captured during a fight. To the best of niy knowledge no report or
rumor worthy of credence had ever been received to that date which would
Ti-arrant the issuance of such an order; and, as before stated, by example, by
advise, and by order, the policy of th(» gendarmerie to gain the gtiod will of the
people had been stressed. It is practically certain that prior to this time gen-
darme patrols operating against bandits and not led by an American had killed
prisoners, and such patrols were therefore not sent out unless absolutely neces-
sary. Wherever possible an American officer went with all patrols. During
the visit of inspection of Maissade several of the inhabitants complained of
brutal treatment ; some of them could not substantiate their statements, which
is not remarkable considering the utter ignorance of the Haitian countryman ;
others I believed at the time, and still believe, were inspired in making* these
reports by the local priests. This priest, it may be stated, was not on goo<l
terms with the gendarmerie officer, in consequence of the gendarmerie officer
having cut off certain allowances which the church received from the cfHumune.
It may be stated at this time that the relations between the priests generally
and the officers of the gendarmerie, while personally pleasant, were officially
very unsatisfactory. The lack of good official feeling was due to the fact that
with the coming of the American gendarme the priest lost the prestige which
had been his before. In the department of the north this feeling, I believe, was
largely due to the influence of the bishop of north Haiti, Mons. Kersusan. I am
more convinced of this regrettable relationship and the causes which le<l to it,
f«>r the reason I succeeded myself in establishing pleasant personal and official
relations with the archbishop of Haiti, the bishop of Port an Prince, and the
papal legate. As a residt of these relations I was able to bring about a certain
amount of teamwork between the priests and the gendarmerie officers in cen-
tral and southern Haiti. I have often discussefl with the papal legate the atti-
tude of the northern priests, and particularly that of the bishop of the north.
From what they said I am le<l to believe that the bishop of the north was con-
sidered to be by his colleagues an " infant terrible."
It was spcifically charged at this time that Lieut. Williams had executed a
number of prisoners in his own back yard, but such testimony as I heard bear-
ing on this was Indefinite and contradictory. Williams did acknowledge hav-
ing killed one escaping prisoner under circumstances which in the absence of
evidence to the contrary would seem to have justified the act. It was also
alleged, and not contradicted, that one man at least had been killed incidental
to making an arrest in the country. In this particular case it is difficult to
decide whether or not the arrest could have been made without shooting.
Allegations were made that Williams had collected cattle which he impounded
and either held for exorbitant. fees or else refused to give up. I do not know
whether or not the communal laws l)earing on lost, strayed, or stolen animals
were properly enforced, but it may be stated that these laws were not enforced
with any uniformity in Haiti, and that their application ran from neglect of
the law to using it as a means of graft. This is a matter which lies largely
with the local civil officials though subject to gendarmerie control.
5. The mayor of MaLssade, Martial Preval, was complained against by the
inhabitants. He was accusefl of extortion, of grafting, of misappropriating
communal funds, and of what was more imi>ortant from a gendarmerie view-
Point, of using corvee on his private properties. It was allegecl specifically,
though perhaps this allegation was made at a later date, that he used forced
labor for the construction of a house for one of his various women. Preval
l8 a very high type of Haitian and remarkably well educated for interior
Haiti. He belongs to the ruling class, and his family has always been Identified
with civil affairs in that region. His father is or was mayor of a small town
In northern Haiti. This man, from the very beginning of Amercan occupa-
tion, showed himself more than friendly to the Americans, and was te^t brought
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500 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
to our favorable notice by his action in organizing a i)os«e and capturing a num-
ber of iieople who participate<l in the first attack on Hlnche. His action in tliis
matter won him a commen(lat«)ry letter from tlie President of Haiti. Having
thus definitely identified himself with the Americans he incurred the dislilce
of his countrymen, and as time went on and tlie communal revenues were col-
lected with greater regularity, the local laws enforced us they had been enforced
before, Preval's attitude gaine<l him the native hostility of the 14,000 or 15,000
Haitians in his commune. It is nn>re than probable that Prcval was guilty of
extortion and that he did use force<l labor on his outlying properties.
These faults I found to be prevalent among Haitian communal ofliciaU
Just what efforts were made to control his actions I can not say, but until this
visit I had no reason to supiH)se that anything was radically wrong with the
conduct of communal affairs in Maissade. I did know, however, from a per
soual inspection, that the entire as{)ect of the small town was changed. The
streets were clean, a proper market established, and the communal revenue*
increased. If, however, Preval was guilty of all with which he was charged
his actions must have borne heavily on the inhabitants ; and as he was appar-
ently doing these things with the knowledge, consent, and active aid of the
gendarmerie officers any feeling of hostility held by the natives against the
gendarmerie must have been intensified.
6. While vi-siting Ilinche, Gen. Catlin interrogated people of everj' class,
including the oflicers and men of the gendarmerie. It was alleged that a num-
ber of natives had been executed in an open space in front of the gendarmerie
quarters by maichine-gun fire. This allegation was denied by the district com-
mander, Capt. Levoie, and all knowledge of such an occurrence was denied by
enlisted men of the gendarmerie who should have been cognizant of such an
affair.
At the. time the alleged exccutiton took place two cnlisttHl men of the Marine
Corps were stationed at Hinche with a Lewis machine gun. 1 can not state posi-
tively whether or not these two men were in Hinche at the time of (ieiL Catliu's
visit. I do not remember at the time who made these allegations, but 1 believe
they were made by a local official. It was further alleged and substantiated,
as I remember, that a number of prisoners were taken from the jail where
they had been confined and executed about a half a mile outside of town. I be-
lieve the gendarmes who took part in this executiton were examinecl by (»^n.
('atlin and acknowledged the charge in part, differing from the allegation in
respect to the number of prisoners.
7. While the use of corvee tm road work had been alleged, its use in the
neighborluxHl of Hinche was alleged mostly in connection with the construction
of the gendarmerie barracks. Si>ecifically it was sUUed that all the male in-
habitants of a c'tTtain rural section called ** New (xuinea " had bt*en collected,
brought tc» Hinche, placwl at work on the constructhm of a barracks well, and
kept on this work for a c<msiderable time. There was some question as to the
amount of money i)aid these men, but they were paid something. This action
had been taken by Capt. Lavoie as a military measure and designed to clear out a
sec'tion touching on the no nuiu's land between Haiti and Santo Domlnjro.
which was an asylum for bandits for both Haiti and Santo Domingo. Capt-
Lavoie stated that working these men on barraclo? construction was simply
incidental.
8. It was alleged generally by the civil oflicials, and I believe by the priests,
that the ban«litisni in central Haiti was the result of the illegal acts committed
by the gendarmerie in this region, and that between the bandits and the gen-
darmes tbe inhabitants did not know which way to turn. This to a certain
extent is true. The bandits were only partly armed, wore no uniform, and
would scatter usually at the approach of a gendarmerie patrol. When such a
patrol established contact with a group of bandits a few shots would be fired
by these and the bandits would scatter in all directions and with them would
go the inhabitants of that particular locality, especially those who had will-
ingly or otherwise furnished food to the bandits and who felt that they were
guilty with them. In the pursuit it is more than probable that innocent in-
habitants wtre killed. So far as my own orders were concerned and so far
as concerns tln»se orders issued by officers under me. every att^npt was made
to distin;:uisli between bamlits and those who were Involved in banditisui ajaiinst
their will. I have no knowledge that Maj. Wells, the department commander,
ever issui'd any oi\ler contravening ndne or of his own initiative issiie<l auv
onler contrary to my expressed and generally known wishes reganliui: the
treatment of natives, whether under arms or not.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 501
9. Ou the returu of Geu. (Ratlin and myself to Port au Prince in January,
1919, Gen. Catlin desired tliat Capt. Levoie and Lieut. Williams be removed
from Hinohe and Maissade. I ordered to Hinche Capt. Doxey, whose dispo-
sition and reputation was that of kindness, sympathy for the natives, and more
perfect knowle<lge of native dialects than any other senior officer of the-
gendarraiere.
10. Meantime marines had been ordered to Hinche and outlying posts, the
gendarmes restricted to ordinary police work within town, and Lieut Col.
R. S. Hooker placeil in military command of the affected central region..
What investigations were made subsequent to that by Gen. Catlin, by Col.
Hooker, or by other marine officers I do not know.
11. Knowing Haiti as I do it is difficult for me to believe that the bandltlsm,
which had its origin in or about Hinche and was spread rapidly north, east,,
south, and west from there, attaining Its maximum in Mirabaldis and Lasca-
hobas, was due to specific misconduct or misadmlnistratlon on the part of any
officer. Hinche. even during Spanish colonial times, has been a nexus of
revolution and bandltlsm. Long before corvee was used In this region Hlnclie
was attackeil by organized bands, the tlrst attack taking place while Capt.
Doxey. who, as before stated, enjoyed the confidence and liking of the natives
to a marked degree, was In command. It Is impossible for me to believe that
the application of corvee within a llmlte<l area would have such an effect. 1
am therefore led to believe, and my belief Is founded on most careful thought,
that the banditism in central Haiti, which grew almost to the proportions of a
revolution, was due to other causes.
12. The first of these causes was the illegal general application of the corvee;
second, the racial antagonism between the Negro and the white; third, the
virtual loss of national independence; fourth .the economic conditions brought
about by the war.
Id assigning these reasonas I wish to make It clear that had these causes
fur dissatisfaction not been stressed and played upon by Haitian leaders the
recent outbreak would never have occurred and the natives would have
remained quiescent under almost any system of abuse, as they rested quiescent
for over a hundred years under graver abuses Inflicted by their own people.
13. Assuming that the corvee was illegally applied in the neighborhood of
Hinche and Maissade, and in defiance of my clear orders on the matter, and^
further, assuming that the allegations of indiscriminate and unjustified killings
are true, it Is not difficult to understand how these things could have been
tlone wfthout the knowledge of resiwnslble seniors. With the best of wiU In
the world the amount of adndnistratlve work thrust uix»n all gendarmerie
officers made it impossible to properly supervise the details of local administra-
tion. If reports and rumors seemed to justify an Investigation Into any c»om-
plaint^ the Investigation itself was attended with every difficulty.
Generally, In the interior the native has no knowledge of the time, dates, or
UistJince (his stupidity as a witness caused me to approve gendarmerie courts-
martial with more or less reluctanife), and the amount of work Involved In
any investigation was very often out of all proi)ortlons to the results obtained.
It was therefore necessary in making an Inspection trip to judge condTtlons
by what one saw and what one was told. Another index, and one upon which
I myself depended largely as showing the mental attitude of the natives, which
attitude was of necessity a reflex of the attitude of the gendarmerie toward
them, was whether or not the imtlves when met on tlie road showed no desire
to avoid meeting my party. This was not true where the corvee had been
worked. At the very time when cori'ee was alleged to have been terrorizing
the natives In Hinche and Maissade. the weekly markets in Maissade were
crowded by country people as they never had been before. Than this at-
tendance on market days there is no better barometer of the state of feeling
among the natives with regard to protection and security. If there were any
underlying signs of dissatisfaction among the well disposed country people I
failed to see them ; and while the inspection trips of my subordinates could and
should have gone more Into detail it Is quite possible that they too failed to
uote any reasons for suspecting that affaire were not well.
14. In conclusion, it may be stated that the efforts of practically all
gendarmerie officers were devote<l to improving the condition of the natives and
to gain their gootl will. This they did I>ecaus4» of a liking for, and sympathy
with, the natives, and to make the coiidithms of their own senice more pleasant.
Officers who failed to conduct themselves In this fashion, whether commissioned
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602 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
or enlisted In tlie Marine Conw, were detachetl from tlie gfnd?™«^?:,. J
havlno knowledge of corvee carried on contrary to orders, or of the kilUng
of prisoners" eS as stated, nor have I knowledge of any orders wWch would
encourage or justify any such action.
HKADyUABTfaiS Mabine Cohps.
Washington, I). V.
Subscribed uiid sworn to before uie. tliis 7th day of -lanuary, 1920.
Lieutenant Colonel, A»»istant Adjutant and Intpector,
Vntted atatc* Marine Corp*.
Washington, I.>. C, January 9, 19H>. .
iw.=..»a I WiijiAMs sereeuut. United States Marine Corps, having been
ca^as'awitneS and h^Wng been informed of his right to decline to a^s*^
anvcnminnting question, was duly «worn and testified before me. UeatW.
H V Lara^^«tent adjutant and lnspe<.tor U. S. Mari.ve 0<.ri«, «« f"U»w«-
1 Question What is v.uir name, rank, and present station.
Answ^ Dorcas Le WiUiams. sergeant, Unitetl States Marine Corps, sta-
"Tlulstr'Harv;:^ mS ^^^"^^ t\e Haitian gejKlan^le
and ?f«« what was" your rank and title while empK.yed on such duty abo
where w"you stationed an.l what duties were asslgne,! to you and per-
'"Z^e^f Yw^ir; as a sec-imd lieutenant of the Haitian geiulannerie I «as
8t^t?oT«l in Trie district of Hinche from November W, 1918, to March 18 or
?9 1919 \vis r^rforming patrol duty. 1 was in Maissade from December^,
1918 to soiS^ tune in March, 1919; the rest of the time I was In Cerce CorH
which U^rthe district of Hinche, guarding the town and Pertorml^ patto^
duty While I was In Maissade I was In charge of road work; I was sub-
drst^lct^mander and looked out for the duties of the disWct «n gm«L
1 Question Who was your immediate commanding officer while servn*
wUh thrSarmerie- « more than one state names and dates between whWj
youser^JT under each? Did you at any time have independent command of
anv forces or any commune or district? .
Answer Capt Ernest Lavoie; he was the only one who was really win^
mediately commanding officer, I never liad any command that could be called
^^4^ Qaelt"on. While serving with the gendarmerie, did you ever see, or hear,
of the killing of any caco prisoners; if so, state particulars?
Answer. No, sir; except prisoners trying to escape.
5. Question. While serving with the gendarmerie, were you aware of me
convening of any corvee, compulsory or voluntary, subsequent to the receipt
of the o^er of October 1, 1918, suspending the corvee law? If so, state your
knowledge of the facts In the premises.
Answer There was no corvee as I would call it, as Uie i)eople who workeu
were all paid for the work they did. My understanding of corvee is compul-
sory work or labor, feed, and imprisonment The men who were workmg on
the road or for the commune were paid by the magistrate from communal
funds, and I witnessed all payments. From the time I came into the Maissade
district all work which was being performed by native labor was paid for ano
was not corvee.
6. Question, bid you, i)ersonally, subsequent to October 1, 1919, Issue m
orders, directly or indirectly, for the convening of any compulsory (*onee fi»r
construction work in your district?
Answer. No, sir ; I never did,
7. Question. It has been allegetl that you had personal knowledge of the Kill-
ing of a number of caco prisoners near Maissade. Is tids allegati<»n romjdwi
on fact, and, if so, what were the attendant circumstances?
Answer. There were no prisoners killed except escaping prisoners ; tliat is,
prisoners who were attempting to escape. Several prisoners were killed in at-
tempting to escape. Between December. 1918, and March, 1919, there wert
several attempts by prisoners to escape, and quite a number escaped— I think
15 or 20. During that time we i>rohably killed between 10 and 15 men who
were trying to escape.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 508
8. Question. Do you know of any other prisoners being killed in or near
Maissade during your duty tliere?
Answer. No, sir.
9. Question. Have you any knowledge of the circumstances attending the
death of one Gamier, a notary, who, it is alleged, was found dead in your
office under peculiar circumstances?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I have some knowledge of this man. He was found wounded
in his house, concealing his wound with a towel wrapped around his abdomen.
He was brought to the barracks and I questioned him, asking him why he had
not reported for treatment; why he had not made some report of his being
wounded, so that we could have treated his wounds and all he would say was
that " I don't know." He wanted to go back to his house, and would not talk
of his wound, so I left him sitting in front of the barracks in a chair. The ser-
geant gave him first-aid treatment. He would not agree to anything being done
for him. At first he denied being wounded.
Durhig the attack that came through GarnJer's house, or about 3.30 o'clock in
the afternoon, there was an attack by the bandits on the town, and the barracks
were attacked. The bandits came through Garnler's house and took cover be-
hind his house — we were firing from the barracks and they were firing from
Gamier's house. After the skirmish was over, I chased the bandits out of the
town, and it was dark when I returned to the town ; so I went into my house
and shortly after I went into my house the sergeant came over and told me that
he believed Gamier had been wounded. I sent the sergeant to see if he could
find Gamier.
When the sergeant returned he brought Garnier with him. I asked Gamier
if he was wounded and he said that he was not. The sergeant unbuttoned his
vest and I saw blood on the towel. I asked Gamier who had wounded him
and he replied that he did not know. I asked him why he didn't report so that
we could give him treatment, and all he would say was that he didn't know. I
asked him if he knew anything about the attack and he said he didn't know.
I asked him if he wanted to lie down and he said he would rather sit up. I
left him sitting in front of the barracks. I went to bed and left the sergeant
to look out for him and do what he could for him. Some time in the night
they awoke me and said that Garnier was dead. The sergeant awoke me
again the next morning and asked what I wanted done with Garnier's body ;
I told him to inform the Judge de Paix, which 'was done. Everything was done
to save Gamier's life that could be done. .1 gave him the best I had In medical
treatment to save his life.
Gamier was a very good inhabitant of the town and friendly toward us.
He must have gotten in the way of a stray bullet during the fight. After this
fight, I would like to state, all the civilians left the town.
10. Question. Was any order, written or verbal, ever received by you, or did
you ever hear of such an order, to summarily execute (bump off) caco prisoners
and to make no report of such executions to higher authority ; and, if so, from
whom did you receive such orders ; or, if no order was received, what led you
to assume that such actions would meet with the approval of your superior
officers?
Answer. No, sir; I never heard of anything like that; the orders we had
were to scatter, disband, or capture organized bandits. The bandits were all
thieves, traveling from place to place in bands of from 30 to 150 men, and
when I went into the district we were instructed to scatter these people and
capture as many as we could, and any stolen property that was recovered I
was instmcted to return it to the owners, if the owners could be found. These
bandits were all armed with machetes and rifles, and when attacked, or when
you came up to them, they would always fire on you.
11. Question. Did you ever hear that Capt. Ernest Lavoie had executed some
19 caco prisoners in or near Hinche, in January, 1919 ; and, if so, from what
source was your Information gained?
Answer. While I was in the district I did not hear that any prisoners had been
killed by Capt Lavoie, but after I left the district and returned to Port an
Prince I did hear rumors — sometimes that 40 prisoners had been killed, and
sometimes that 8 or 10 prisoners had been killed In the district of Hinche.
There were always rumors floating around that bandits had attacked this town
and that town, and mofe fals^ rumors than anything else ; every man that came
in had a different tale to tell.
12. Question. Did your duties i»lace you in direct contact Avith Maj. Clarke
H. Wells?
62269— 21— PT 2 2G Digitized by GoOglc
504 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SAXTO DOMINGO.
Answer. Only during: inspections and his passing through tlic place.
13. Question. Tlien you saw him quite a number of times during your tour
of dut>'?
Answer. Yes. sir.
14. Question. During these times did you ever see Maj. Wells drunic or under
the influence of liquor?
Answer. No, sir; I never did.
15. Question. During your tallc with Maj. Catlln. at the time of his hivesti-
gatlou at Hinche and Malssade, you acknowledged that some prisoners in yoar
district had been killed.
Answer. The only prisoners tliat were killed were those prisoners attempting
to escape.
16. Question. (Jen. Catlln has made the statement that on his visit to Mais-
sade he found about 45 men working on the road near Maissade under guard
of several gendarmes. He further stated that he stopped and questioned these
men and that some of them stated that they had been brought there by gen-
darmes and others said that the chief of section had brought them. Can yon
explain this?
Answer. The cliief is known as a justice of peace or some official assistant
to the justice of the peace. This chief of section would send to me from time
to time as many men as were needed to work on the road. He would notll^
the people that I had work, and that If they would report to him he would send
them into town. Some would work and some wouldn't. Every Saturday or
Sunday the sergeant would notify the magistrate as to how many men he had,
and the magistrate would come to me to get the money, and I would go with
the magistrate to pay the men. They were all paid In my presence. The ser-
geant was the timekeeper and figured out how much each man had dne him,
and after payment everybody went home or stayed over for the next week's
work, whichever they preferred. The forty -five men that Gen. Catlin questioned
were all paid, to my personal knowledge, from my house on Sunday. Some
of these forty -five men had not been paid up to the time when Gen. Catlin
was talking to them because they had not been working long enough — only two
or three days — in other words, they were paid once a week and pay day hadn't
come round.
17. Question. Did you ever know an officer in the gendarmerie by the name
of Frederick Baker; and if so, please state your opinion as to his general
reputation ?
Answer. He was knoAvn as an agitator ; he was not sincere ; he would give
Information he thought people wanted to have to them. In other words, he
was referred to by all the people who knew him as a man not to be depended
upon for truthfulness. He was known as a squealer, and after he got out of
the service he turned against the gendarmerie and has been a great agitator;
that is the general talk of everyone in Haiti that knows him.
18. Question. During your service in the gendarmerie you had fi^equent con-
versations with the natives?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I was associate<l with them continually.
19. Question. Did you ever hear the natives refer to Capt. Doxey, of the
Marine Corps?
Answer. Yes, sir ; I have had all kinds of natives tell me that they liked Ca|>t
Doxey ; in fact, he was referred to by them as " the old man," as he was alwa>'8
ready to accommodate them and assist them In any way he could.
Headquabtebs Mabine Corps,
Washington^ D. C
Subscribed and sworn to l>efore me this the 9th day of January, 1920.
JAeutenant Colonel, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector,
United States Marine Corps-
Sergt. DoK(^A8 I.. Wiujams was recalleil as a witness, and having been in-
formed that his previous oatli was still l)in<llng. and having been informed of
his right to decline to answer any criminating question, further testified as
follows :
1. Quejrtion. Referring to your answer to quesHon 5, of your previous iesa-
mony, wherein you stated that the natives working in your district were paid.
state how much they were paid?
Answer. They were paid 40 cents a day, Haitian money, and their meals.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 505
2. Question. Could labor not be paid and still be coniinilsory?
Answer. It could be if it was that way, but I obtaine<l the labor the same im
I did l)efore corv^ ever existeil by notifying some good inhabitant that I had
work, or the chief of section.
3. Question. Were any of the prisoners referred to in your previous testimony
killed after recapture?
Answer. No. sir; not after recapture — none.
4. Question. Referring to question 7 of your previous testimony, was any re-
port of the killing of these prisoners made to the higher authority?
Answer. All prisoners killed were reported to my district commander, ami all
operations were reported in the same way.
5. Question. What was the name of the sergeant who gave (iarnier lirst aid?
Answer. Absalo Kies.
6. Question. Did you ever re<*eive any hint, directly or indirectly, from Maj.
Wells, that he did not care to receive reports about pris<mers?
Answer. No, sir ; I never did.
7. Question. What 'reports, if any, were mu«U» to your suix^riors reganllng the
conditions in your district?
Ans>ver. All rei>orts, even down to rumors n'ported.
8. Question. Were any or all of these rei)orts confidential ?
Answer. All reports were in writing and forwarded to my district commander;
they were not marketl conlitlential. They were all written and sent through by
messenger.
9. Question. Do you know personally of any brutal or improyier treatment of
natives by either the gendarmes or the marines during vour tour of duty in
Haiti?
Answer. No, sir; I wish to state here, however, that on several (K'casions
while my men Avere working they were molested by bandits, and on one occa-
sion the working men chase<l the bandits. Any of the workmen captured by the
bandits were badly treate<l. and even some were killeil.
Headquaktkrs M.\rink (Jorph,
Washinylon, D» C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me. this the 12th day of January, 1920.
Harry Lay,
TAeutenant Cofotief, AMniMtant Adjutant and InMpetrtor,
Initnl St at en Marine Corps.
Mr. Angkll. Major, did you hear rumors or reports of anv connection of
Lieut. Cukela with killings?
Maj. Turner. None that I remember ; no.
Mr. Angell. You do not rememl>er any specilic investigation being pursue<l by
> ou in regard to any such rumors?
Maj. Turner. I am under the impression that I wrote an order to Col. Little
ui investigate somebody, but I have forgotten now who it was ; I do not believe
it was Cukela. I do not remember who it was. I am inclined to believe it
was not Cukela, but the leader of a patrol of a district somewhat in the north
of Haiti, where it was rei)ortftd that some killings had happened.
Mr. Angeix. Turning back now, Major, to the alleged killings at Hinche,
under Tapt. La vole, will you tell us a little more in detail than you did upon
direct examination just what investigation you made of those reports, so far as
you can now remember.
Maj. TuRX>3. I questioned everyone who seemed to have any knowledge on
the subject or whose names Avere mentloneil.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember whether or not you learned of the names of
the gendarmes serving under Copt. Lavoie, who were alleged to have actually
performed these killings.
Maj. Turner. I tried at the time to get the names of the gendarmes from the
gendarmerie, but the records were such that I was unable to get them.
Mr. Angeix. You did interview Capt. Lavoie?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Anoetx. And he denied to you having committed the killings?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Angell. You were not pres«Mit at the prior investigation of this in.stance
made by Gen. Catlin and Col. Williams?
Maj. Turner. No.
Mr. Angell. So you have no knowledge of the declarations made at that time
by Capt. I^vole, except
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506 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MaJ. Turner. Exoopt throiijrh Invostipation and tlirough testimony of one or
two of the witnesses,
Mr. Angelt.. Did you make any Investigations of any .rumora or allegations
of killings by or under the direction of Lieut. Freeman Lang, of the gendarmerie,
In and about the district of Hinche?
Maj. Turner. No.
Mr. Anofll. In C)ctol)er and November, 1918?
Maj. TiTRNER. No ; tliat was om» which never came to my notice.
Mr. Angell. Did you make any investigation of any allegations regarding the
supi)ose<l killing of Gamier by Williams at Maissade?
Maj. Turner. Yes ; I tried to connect up the Gamier killing at Maissade, but
wns unable to get any Information on that subject. I tried to get the names of
ftome of the gendarnjes who were there, but the records at Port au Prince were
such that at that time I could not get any. Williams was not In the country at
the time.
Mr. ANiiKLL. Had Williams \teeu in the Marine Corps service?
Maj. Tttrner. Yes.
Mr. Anoelu But he had left Haiti at the time you made your investigation?
3^IaJ. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Howe. He had also been in the gendarmerie?
Maj. Turner. He was a lieutenant in the gendarmerie.
Mr. Angell. He was an enlisted man in the Marines?
Maj. Turner. He was a sergeant.
Mr. Anoell. So you never had an opiwrtunity to inter\iew Williams?
Mr. Turner. No.
Mr. Angeix. Yo\i said you believed that something actually happened at
Hinche in regard to this supposed killing of natives under Capt. La vole's or-
ders or command?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Anoeli^ What is your belief regarding that incident?
Maj. Turner. I believe somebwly was kllle<l at Latte. Latte is a section of
Hinche.
Mr. Angell. You say that somebody was killed? What is your belief as to the
number that were killed?
Maj. Tttrneb. That I do not know.
Mr. Angkll. What Is your belief as to the circumstances under which they
were killed?
Maj. Turner. That I do not know.
Mr, Angell. W-hen you say somebody was kille<l at Latte, do you refer to
iombat?
Maj. Turner. Oh, no; I mean
Mr. Angell. You mean unlawful killing?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Unlawful killing under the direction and with the connivance
of Capt. La vole?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. AN(iELL. Is It a fact, then, that you belfeve his denial of such killings
made to you was not true?
^laj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. An(}ell. And of course an admission by hlni of such killings would have
be«*n self-incri minatory?
Maj. Turner. Yes. I told them all in any questions they were asked that
they did not have to incriminate themselves ; that they could refuse to answer
jiuy Questions which might incriminate them.
Mr. An(5kll. You said a little while ago in answer to a question that you
heard, but could not get any definite information regarding brutal treatment of
priscmers. In answering that question did you haA'e in mind prisoners who
wore taken from the Cacos or did you refer to men working under the con*ee,
or both?
.Mh j. TuKNKu. I had In mind the idea of prisoners from the prison more than
anything else.
Mr. AN(JKr.L. You were not referring to those working under the corvee?
Maj. Turner. Yes; I was, in a way, too. Yes; that was considered, too.
Mr. Anokll. Did you find any definite information regarding brutal treat-
ment of men working under the corvee as distinguished from prisoners?
Maj. Turner. No.
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 507
Mr. Howe. You are distinguishing brutal treatment from the killings you
have discussed?
Maj. TuBNEB. I was thinking that taking them on the corvee might be con-
sidered brutal treatment, but I did not consider that part as brutal treatment.
Mr. Angell. In the course of your investigation and of the performance of
your duties in Haiti, did you learn of the extent, if any, to which airplanes
were used in combating the native force?
Maj. TuBNEB. Yes.
Mr. Angeix. Do you know how many airplanes our forces had down there
which they used in combat against the natives?
Maj. TuBNEB. Approximately
Mr. Angell. How many were there?
Maj. TuBNEB. Three to five. There was one case where as many as three
were out at one time.
Mr. Angell. For what purpose were those airplanes used?
Maj. TxTBNEB. For information and scouting, locating the bands of Gacos^. and
I brieve in one case they attacked them.
Mr. Angeix. Attacked them with what?
Maj. Tttbneb. With machine guns.
Mr. Angeix. Were they ever used for bombing, as far as you know?
Maj. TuBNEB. I believe some homemade bombs were used, but that wa»
immediately stopped.
Mr. Angeix. Was the use of l)ombs uik)u orders from headquarters or upon
the responsibility of ofiicers immediately in charge of the airplanes.
Maj. TuBNEB. I do not believe that any orders were ever issued to use
bombs ; that is, orders from headquarters. In fact, I am sure none were issaetf
while I was there.
Mr. Angeix. Why was it stoi^[>ed, if you know?
Maj. Ttjbneb. I do not know why they were stopped, but I do not believe they
were effective anyway. There were not enough Haitians together to make it
worth while to drop a bomb.
Mr. Angeix. Did you know of specific instances where bombs from airplanes
were used?
Maj. TUBNEB. No.
Mr. Angell. Your knowledge on that point is confined to knowledge of the
fact in general, that airplanes had been on some occasions used as a means of
dropping bombs?
Maj. TuBNEB. Y'es; I know of only one case, and I do not believe it hap-
pened while I was there — I know it did not — but they dropi)ed a bomb, I heard
talk about it
Mr. Angeix. Did it result in any deaths, as far as you know, in that par^
ticular instance?
Maj. TuBNEB. I do not remember. I remember the talk among the aviators
down there; they had no success whatever with bombs. They never got
enough Haitians together to make it worth while to drop bombs.
Mr. ANGEIX. Were the bombs dropped on villages?
Maj. TuBNEB. Oh, no.
Mr. Angeix. You testified that when our marine or gendarmerie forces came
upon the Cacos they jumped them, and that there was firing on both sides?
Maj. Ttjbneb. Yes.
Mr. Angeix. That, you say, resulted sometimes in the death of natives — of
Gacos?
Maj. TUBNEB. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Have you any idea of the number of Cacos killed under those
circumstances?
Maj. Ttjbneb. Altogether, you mean, throughout Haiti from the time we
occupied it?
Mr. Angeix. What is your understanding of those figures?
Maj. TuBNEB. I should say about 2,100. I know almost exiietly how many
were killed between October 1, 1919, and October 1, 1920.
Mr. Angel. Can you tell us what tliat number was, approximately?
Maj. Ttjbneb. It was 1,132.
Mr. Angeix. That is the number of Haitians killed between October 1, 1919r
and the foUowhag October, 1920?
Maj. TuBNEB, Yes.
Mr. Angeix. Those are the ofiicial figures?
Maj. Ttjbneb, Those are the official figures.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
508 INQUIRY INTO 0(M'rPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angell. Yon think those fijmres are accurate?
MaJ. Ti^RNEB. Except probably for the tirst two months, October and Novem-
ber, and they are approximately accurate. You can call the figure of 1,132
accurate. They were all killed In action, every one of these.
Mr. Angetx. You testified, if I remember correctly, that you had no doubt
there were many killings of men working under the corvee while they at-
tempted to escape. Have you any idea, even approximately, of the number
killed in this manner?
MaJ. TURNEK. At first I thought there were quite a lot but later I have been
paring it down, and I should say probably a hundred or less.
Mr. HowK. During the whole occupation?
Maj. Turner. Yes. I have no figures to prove that at all ; it is merely my
opinion on it. At first, in taking the testimony, it was a good deal worse thaii
it was later. As I got to learn them better I scaled do^vn my figures a lot on
everything.
Mr. Angell. Those would be native Haitians who had been killed, presumably,
while trying to escape from the forced labor on the roads?
Maj. TuBNi-m. Yes. I would like to say that the 2,100 approximately wen*
what our figures gave when I was down there. I am also of the opinion that
that is exaggerated, particularly the number of deaths that happened prior
tp October 1, 1919. I happene<l to know of a case where It was reported that
no were killed, and on Investigation only one dead body was found at the
scene of the action. Before we took these records and made them correct.
quite often reports would c(mie in that cacos had been jumped and a certain
number killed, and the number killed seemed to be such a great percentage
of the number supposed to be in the band that orders were issued that the re-
ports of killings would include only dead bodies found, and the percentage then
dropped back to normal or below normal, conshlering the actual nunibiT of
deaths.
Mr. HowK. The estimates turned out to he higher than the actual number?
Maj. Turner. Yes. As I say. In this case Avhere a major was killed down
there a report came in that they had l>een attackefl and that they had killed
about 50, and that was acceptetl on the records. An investigation was made,
an«l when they looked It up they found one dead body and no sign of anybody-
else having been hurt. I also know that reports had come in that, for example,
75 Cacos were met at a certain point and 25 were killed, and on investigation
I fn\ind sometimes that they fountl straw hats, and considerefl that the men
who lost their hats were killed.
Mr. Angell. Referring to the letter signed by Lieut. Col. Hooker, which is
addressed to the brigade conmiander, dated BVbruary 2K 1920. which was the
report of your investigation, and particularly referring to paragraph 2 of that
letter f reading | :
" We are of the oplniim that Maj. Wells and Capt. Doxey knew that con'ee
exIsttMl : that inhabitants were being maltreated and killed: and to a certain
extent we are convinced that some reluctance was sho^-n In keeping Port an
Trince fully posted as to the true conditions."
I woul<l ask you whether that represented your final opinion as to those points
or whether you have had any occasion whatever to change your opinion?
Maj. TmNFR. Yes: I am quite well satisfied that the iniiabitants were take"
in the corvee and some were killed in jumping the corvee. There Is no
questhm about that.
May I go back again and say also tliat between October 1, 1919, and Octo^
her l! 1920. there were exactly 298 encountei*s with bandits, and in those 298
encounters there were 1.132 killed, which averages less than 5 killed per
engagement.
Mr. Angell. During the course of your investigation of the cor\-ee system,
were you able to learn for how long a period the natives were kept at work
under forced labor?
Maj. Tt^rner. Yes; I think some of them were kept at work as long as two
months.
Mr. Angell. And were you able to form any opinion as to the general way
of keeping these natives at work in districts other than tho8(» in which they
lived?
Maj. Ti'RNER. The corvecs existed only at Malssade and Hinche. I think
that was after the order of September 1. 1918. forbidding the corvee. I did not
take the corvee Into consideration before that at all.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINIJO. 509
Mr. Anoell. So, as to the corvt'e, yotir report deals with its contiiuiinu-e after
October 1. 1918?
Maj. TuBNER. Yes.
Mr. Angell. In yuur opinion, based ni)on your investigation of the eorvee
system, did the men who were lahorinj? under tlie system as ytni found it, or
learne<l of it, in tlie Hinelie or Maissade distriet, after October. 191 S. <»bject
to being kept at worlv tliere for i>eriods running up to two months?
Maj. TuRXEK. Yes : I thiiilv they did object.
Mr. Anoell. Tlieir hdmr tlien under those <'onditions was not in any proiMM*
sense voluntary labor?
Maj. TuBNER. No.
Mr. AnGELU I>id you hear rumors or rei>orts of cruelty or al)uses or Icillings
attributed to one Capt. Fitzgerald Brown at St. Marc?
Maj. TmNER. Yes; tliat was Fitzgerald Brown. I did liejir soujeildng about
tliat, but it all turned out — this was after my investigation that I came on
Fitzgerald Brown — that Fitzgerakl Brown was a l>oasier and just a plain fool.
He bad no .standing whatever.
Mr. Angell. Did you hear any reports of complaints by natives that he Inid
killed or abused prisoners at the prison in St. Marc?
Maj. Turner. No.
Mr. Anqell. Was he an enlisted man or a noncommissioned otticer of the
marines and a captain of the gendarmes?
Maj. Turner. He was a sergeant ; yes.
Mr. Angeli.. And a captain of the gendarmes?
Maj. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Anoelu Have you had occasion to see the Haitian memoir printed in
the record, in which, on pagi^s 30 to 32 of the printed record, are 20 specific
alleged cases of iclllings and abuses of natives on the part of gendarmes and
marines?
Maj. Turner. No ; I never saw that before.
Mr. Anoell. Glance over this list, and refer particularly to the instances
numbered on these p^ges, 1, 2, 4, 5, and 11. I will ask you whetlier you heard
at the time of your investigation of afterwards any complaints or reports re-
garding those 8i)ecific instances, and if so, what investigation you made of them.
Maj. Turner. No; I have never heard of any of them. If they had been
reported, I certainly would have heard of them. If anything of that sort was
heard of, it was reported and investigated.
Mr. Anoell. Major, have you read the statements or are yt>u familiar with
the statwnents of Gen. A. W. Catlin, dated l>ecember 31, 1919, and of Lieut.
Col. A. S. Williams, dated January 6, 1920, both sworn and contained in the
Lay report on pages 65 to 07 and 85 to 99, respectively?
Maj. Turner. I have read them, but I am not familiar with them.
Mr. Anoell. From your recollection, having read them, can you state whether
or not you agreed substantially with the statements and conclusions therein
made and reached?
Maj. Turner. I would like to read them over again before (inswering that
question. I read those a year and a half ago, and I do not remember the matter
at all at this time.
(Thereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned to meet to-morrow,
Thursday, October 27, 1921, at 10.80 o'clock a. m.)
Digitized by VjOOQIC
Digitized by VjOOQIC
lAQUIRY IKTO OCCUPATION AiND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
THTJBSDAY, OCTOBEB 27, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Waahington, D, C.
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment Senator
Tasker L. Oddie presiding.
Also present: Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and MaJ. Edwin N.
McClellan, in their respective representative capacities as hereinbefore indi-
catad.
STATEMENT OF BBIG. GEN. SMEDLEY D. BVTLEB, XTNITED STATES
MABINE GOBPS, COMMANDING MABINES, QTTANTICO, VA.
Mr. Howe. General, will you give your name, rank, and present station,
please?
Gen. BxTTLEB. Smedley D. Butler, brigadier general. United States Marine
Corps, commanding marines, Quantico, Va.
Mr. Howe. General, how long have you been in the Marine Corps?
Gen. Butler. I have been in the Marine Corps 23 years and 6 mon&s.
Mr. Howe. Were you in Haiti in 1916?
Gen. BxHTJER. I was.
Mr. Howe. About when did you go to Haitiat that time?
Gen. BxrnjEB. I landed in Haiti on the 10th of August, 1915, and remained-
there continuously until the 9th day of March, 1918.
Mr. Howe. You were conmiander of the gendarmerie of Haiti?
Gen. BuTLEB. I was the first commander and organizer of the gendarmerie of
Haia
Mr. Howe. When did you assume those duties?
Gen. BxTTLER. I was detailed by the commanding officer of the naval forces
operating In Haiti on the 3d day of r>ecemb€r, 1915, to (Organize the gendar-
merie. Subsequent to the passage of the act of Congress In June, 1916, author-
izing officers of the United States service to serve with the Government of
Haiti, I received my regular appointment In an order from the commandant of
the Marine Corps, dated September 1, 1916, and during the period between
December 3, 1915, and September 1, 1916, I served as such, but only under the
orders of the commander of the naval forces. Admiral Caperton.
Mr. Howe. Between August, 1915, and December, 1915, what were your
duties?
(Jen. BuTiEB. I was commanding the forces In the field In the north In various-
places.
Mr. Howe. In the north?
Gen. BUTUEB. My forces operated from Gonaives to Cape Haltlen, and from
Cape Haltlen to the Dominican border, and south to the line running east and
west through Gonaives, known as the district of the north.
Mr. Howe. When you, in September, 1916, got your orders from the com-
mandant of the Marine Corps, was your status then changed ; and If so, how,
by the operation of those orders?
Gen. Butler. My status was simply ehange<l in this respect, that what I
had been doing previously, under the orders of the occupation, I proceeded to
do under the orders of the President of Haiti. I had always acted under the-
President of Haiti, but had consulted with the American commander.
Mr. Howe. Before those orders in September, 1916?
511
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612 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Butler. Yes, sir. After that I still consliieretl myself, due to the pres-
ence of martial law in Haiti, a member of the forces of the oeeupation, but did
nothing with respect to the Haitian people without first Uiseussinj; the matter
with the President of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. And receiving his directions?
Gen. BUTLEB. And receiving his directions.
Mr. Howe. During the time you were organizing the gendarmerie — thai is
to say, from December, 1915, to Septenil)er, 1910 — ^will you please give us a
little more definite Idea «s to the extent to which you consulted tlie President
of Haiti and took his directions?
Gen. Buti<j:b. During the period from the 3d of I>e<vniber, 1915, to the 29ti»
of January, 1916, the gendarmerie performed no functions whatsoever except
those necessary to its own organization. It was assembled in a number of
towns for drill and organization and equipment puri)ones only. It i>erfonmetI
no police functions ; it was nothing but a school.
Mr. Howe. And consequently you, as its organizer, were in charge of no
police functions?
Gen. Bxjtleb. No polic*e; and had no connection whatsoever with the Uaitiun
President, except as to its future develoi)ment and status. During this perio<l,
with the assistance of the President of Haiti, we wrote an<l prepared for pro-
mulgation, U|>on the confirmation of the service by our own Congress, a set of
rules and regulations for tlie government of the geu<larnierie. in accordance
with the treaty, which rules ainl regulations were prouuilgate<l ami enforced
in the name of the President of Haiti, and the whole con<luct of the force of
the gendarmerie during the whole time I was in it Avas directly in accortlance
with the directions and orders given by the President (►f Haiti Idmself.
Mr. Howe. And in the preparation of those orders lie was consulteil?
Gen. BuTLEit. Every day.
Mr. Howe. Did those early iirders and regidatious met»t with his approval?
Gen. BuTijsia. Absolutely, or they could not have been published, because the
treaty stated that they had to be promulgated by the President of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. You are referring to Article X, no doubt, of the treaty?
Gen. BUTLEK. I am referring to the gendarmerie agi*eement here, which has
the same effect with us as the treaty.
Mr. Howe. Will you give a reference to that gendarmerie agreement?
(len. Butler. It Is an agreement date<l the 24th of August, 1916, in which
apfjears this provision :
" Itules and regulations for the administration and diticipline of the gendar-
merie sliall be issued by the conmiandant after being approved by the President
of Haiti."
That was strictly carriwl out. That is article 7 of the protocol of the 24th of
August, 1910.
Mr. Howe. While you were organizing the gendarmerie did you perform any
other duties? «
Gen. Butler. I did not
^Ir. Howe. After you were duly appointed commandant — is that the correct
terni, or commander?
fien. BuTLm. I would like to bring this in. On the Ist day of Fel)ruary, 1916,
the following proclamation was issued by Admiral Caperton :
PROCLAMATION.
Whei'eas the President of Haiti and his cabinet have decreed that on this date
the commandants of communes and the chiefs of sections are abolished, and
also that all military and polic*(^ duties of the commandants of arrondissements
are taken away, it is hereby ordered that from this date all the military and
r)olice duties heretofore i>erformed by those officers be i)erformed by the gen-
dnrmerie of Haiti, supported by the expeditionary forces under my command.
By oixler of Hear Admiral W. B. Caperton, United States Navy, commnndlng
Ignited States forces in Haiti and Haitian waters.
Littleton W. T. Walleb«
Colonel, United States Marine Corpi,
Coin maud iii(f I nitcd titnten Expeditionary Forces Ashore in Haiti.
Port au Prince, Haiti, Fchrudri/ /, JlUd.
Mr. IIowK. The date of that pnalaniation was Februarj- 1. 191CV
(Jen. Bi'TLKR. Yes.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCrPATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 518
Mr. Howe. How did that affect you, sir?
Oen. Bi'Ti,ER. That made me chief of police in Haiti. I aasumed all n*siK)nsi-
bility for the safety and proper policing of the Republic of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Throusfh what Instrumentality did you operate?
Gen. BuTLKR. The gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. Then the gendarnieri*' did begin to 0|)erate before September,
1916?
Gen. BuTTJCR. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. I had misunderstood you. I thought I understood that they did
not operate until September, 1916.
Gen. Butler. I thought I put that in there: I intende<l to put it in; until
the 1st of February.
Mr. Howe. Then the gendarmerie, as a going operating institution
Gen. BiTLFai. Commenced to perform its legal functions
Mr. Howe. On February 1, 1916. Is that correct?
Gen. Bx^TLER. Yes, sir ; to perform its functions, under Article X of the treaty,
on the 1st of February.
Mr. Howe. So the formative iwIcmI, as such. laste<l from IVceml>er. ir*!.*), to
the Ist of February, 1916?
Gen. Butler. Under my control. Previous to my control it had ht^u in
procetttj of organization for six wcH»ks. but when I took command of tUo gen-
darmerie it had a total personnel of about 60(), and on the 1st of February.
wh«i we as.sumed police charge, we had 1,500.
Mr. Howe. Will you describe the i)rganizntion of the geiwlarmerlo. pleas<»?
Gen. BuTLFJi. It is orgnnize<l exactly as laid down here In the proto<'ol which
is in evidence.
Mr. Howe. As In the protoc'ol of August 24. 1910?
Gen. Butler. Yes.
Mr.' Howe. How wjou after that protocol came into eflfe<*t <lid Ihe or?:jn>ization
c»onform with it?
Gen. Butler. About seven months.
Mr. Howe. Early, then, in 1917?
Gen. Brn.ER. Yes: late in 1916, if I remem1>er correc-tly, on tho ist cf
October. 1916. the gendarmerie was completed.
Mr. Howe. Then from Felinuiry 1, 1916. up until that time in 1917 the gen-
darmerie was in course of organization?
Gen. BrTiJOL 1916. sir: the 1st of October. 1016. There were only <!\' or
seven months in thei*e.
Mr. Howe. I^t us get this straight. You were detaibnl to organlz«» and
command the gendarmerie in December. 1915?
Gen. Butler. Yes, sir,
Mr. Howe. By proclamation on February 1. 1910. the gendarmerie l)egiui to
operate and function?
Gen. Bvtler. Right.
Mr. Howe. On August 24, 1910. the stJit\is was somewhat change<l bv Ihc
protocol, was it not?
Gen. Butler. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Which outlined the extent of the organization and made d*»Hnlte
many of its functions : is that right?
Gen. BVTI.ER. Correct.
Mr. Howe. And some seven months later
Gen. BrTLER. No. sir: only two months later.
Mr. Howe. Two months later on. in Octobt^r. 11*10. tlu* gendarmerie attained
its ' *
Gen. BmjER. Its full strength.
Mr. Howe. Its full strength.
Gen. Bttler. Yes. sir : that is right.
Mr. Howe. I will .lust ask you, General, to describe how you went ubo\it
building that up, how you recruited and how you selected your officers.
Gen. Buttjcr. The marine forces in Haiti were distributed throughout the
Republic, different sized organizations, from a platoon to a battalion, being
stationed in the smaller towns, preserving peace. There was no Haitian police
force: there was no Haitian order; there was nothing but pillaging and riot
until the marines arrived, when they took over this police, and martial law
was declared by the United States.
Mr. Howe. You took over the police duties?
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514 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. BuTLEB. We took over the police duties and performed them until tlie
formation of the gendarmerie made it possible for them to take it over.
Mr. Howe. General, I want to get back later on In the examination to a few
of the facts about the selection of your forces — enlisted men and officers.
Gen. BuTLEB. That is, the organization of the gendarmerie and how It was
done?
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Gen. BuTLEB. In each town where a considerable force of marines was sta-
tioned— that is, a company or more — one ^commissioned oificer of maiines and
certain noncommissioned officers and privates w^ere detailed by the commander
of the marines in Haiti to enlist and organize and train Haitians for tliis
gendarmerie, so that each body of marines resolved itself into a little training
camp?
Mr. Howe. And recruiting station?
Gen. BuTLEB. And recruiting station, the Haitians voluntarily enlisting on
enlistment papers similar to those used in our corps. They were dressed Id
our clothes. The Haitian Government bought the excess marine clothing, in
order that we might have some distinguishing mark for them, and dressed
them just as marines were dressed, with the exception that we did not give
them the Marine Corps device. They had no Marine Corps devices, and they had
plain Haitian buttons.
That system continued until the 1st of February, 1916, when it was necessary
for the gendarmerie to stand on its own feet. On the 29th day of January
Gen. Waller, commanding the marines in Haiti, notified me that the Haitian
Government had decided to give up trying to maintain law and order and had
said, "Now, you Americans do it with your gendarmerie"; and Gen. Waller
gave me t>vo days to garrison Haiti.
Mr. Howe. With the gendarmerie?
Gen. BuTLEB. With the gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. What did the Haitians mean, then, by saying to the Americans
to preserve law and order with their gendarmerie, when the gendarmerie was
the Haitian gendarmerie?
Gen. BuTLEB. It was the Haitian gendarmerie. We understood it to be an
effort on their part to embarrass us, because they well knew that onr gen-
darmerie, or their gendarmerie that we were organizing for them under the
provisions of a treaty already confirmed, was not complete; but in two days
we established 117 posts around Haiti, and on tlie night of the 1st of February
I reported to the conmiander, to Col. Waller, that the police force of Haiti was
complete, but in reduced numbers. We did not have a sufficient force.
Mr. HoAVB. Did you have any difficulty in getting recruits?
Gen. BuTLEB. Absolutely none. We took the best men in the country.
Mr. Howe. Was there competition among them for recognition?
Gen. BUTI.EB. Very great competition. An actual blood test taken by me of
1.200 gendarmes selected at random, which gendarmes had been previously
selected from 50,000 of the best Haitians, showed that 95 per cent of them were
diseased. That is the material with which we worked.
Mr. Howe. But you had plenty to select from, and you tried to select the best?
Gen. BuTLEB. Yes ; and we made every effort to cure those that we had, so
that they would not go to sleep standing up in the daytime. That was the one
test. I have frequently found a sentry on a aost in front of an Important
building sound asleep, standing up with the sun shining in his face. That Is
not his fault. He was diseased. An examination showed that 95 per cent of
them had blood diseases and 85 per cent had intestinal worms, and we took
immediate measures to cure it, and before I left Haiti the gendarmes could
keep awake for two or three hours.
Let me say something about the faithfulness of the gendarmes ; I have said
something about what they can not help. Never during the time I was In Haiti,
nor from any reports I have received since, has any disloyalty on the part of t
gendarme occurred. I never heard of a case. I gave the Haitian medal of
honor to three gendarmes who gave their arms and their legs for their white
officers. They are sergeants and kept at headquarters on light duty as show
pieces or examples of the most devoted loyalty. The action of one of them is
particularly affecting.
Mr. Howe. I think we would like to hear that
Gen. Butler. At a little place called Circa la Source a gendarmerie ofllcer
— med Kelly — this was in the early days, early in 1916, shortly after tlie occa-
'on of the country by the gendarmerie and the taking over of the police
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO TX)MINGO. 515
dudes— Kelly was stattoned at this town in a little native hut that we rented
for police purposes. With him were 16 gendarmes as the police force of that
subdistrict. He personally lived in a small mud hut next to the police station.
One night while asleep his house was attacked by a large number of bandits.
The gendarmes in the station next door were surprised, and the sentry, due to
physical or other reasons, was asleep, and they fled. They did not run away,
but they Just fled out into the bushes and re-formed. But the bandits were not
after the gendarmes ; they were after the American officer, so they attacked his
little house. Kelly was a very bold, gallant fellow. He grabbed his pistol when
he heard the firing, and rushed toward the door. His gendarme orderly, who
was sleeping in the same room with him, got up and threw his arms around
Kelly and spoke to him in Creole. It must be remembered that none of us
spoke their language, yet we taught them to drill in English. All the com-
mands were In English. Kelly was unable to understand all that this gend-
arme said to him, but he gathered enough to know that the gendarme did not
wish him to go out of that door to be killed. Kelly did not agree with lilm,
but threw him t^> one side and grabbe<l the door and pulled it open. The
gendarme knew the habits of his friends. He had been a Caco himself. My
orderly In Port au Prince was the worst Caco In Haiti, and I picked him out
because he was the ugliest brute I ever saw. and I trusted him with my
children, my wife, and everything. He was the most faithful man I have ever
known. This gendarme knew the habits of the men outside, and that they
would Are through that lighted door the moment Kelly appeared in it, and when
Kelly opene<l the door he threw himself in front of him and they put five
bullets through him. They did not kill him, but he had to have one leg ampu-
tated, and one arm.
Now, you see why the American officers like these gendarmes. They will give
their lives for you any time, and there has never l)een one instance of their
failing loyalty to us. never once.
There is a major here at Quantico who with five of them was beset by 250
OacoR, and these five stuck right by him. Never once have they gone back on us.
Whenever I had an inspection to make In the woods, I left my family with
this ugly Caco sleeping on a couch on the front porch of my house, and he never
would move for two weeks. They would take his food to him. And nobody
would come into the yard either. I trustecl him al)solute1y. It is a great army
that gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. What kind of a country did you liave to operate In? Tell us how
Haiti looks.
Gen. BuTLKR. Haiti has about li90,000 acres of flat land, and the rest is moun-
tains. Haiti looks like a crumpletl-up piece of paper, as a French admiral said
when Naiioleon sent him over. The highest peak in Haiti Is 7,000 feet, and It is
divided into three sections. There are the plains of the north along the Atlan-
tic Ocean, facing to the north. They run in width from a quarter of a mile to
10 miles. Then you come to a range of mountains running east and west,
mountains about 3»000 feet high, a ridge range. You cross those, make a slight
dip, and arrive at another range of iK»aks, 4,000 feet high. You drop on the
other side to what is known as the valley of tlie Artibonite River, which is
appn>xiniate]y 90 miles long and 8 miles wide. It is not flat, but it is rolling
country. It could not be character! zchI as flat, tillable land, without a great
deal of work, not all of It. Then you come to a small range of hills — this is
going south — ^which yon cross, and you come to tho plains of Cul de Sac, at the
eastern end of which lies the city of Port au Prlnoe. The plains of Cul de Sac
are 10 miles wide and 20 miles long, and they are perfectly flat. Then you cross
another high range of mountains, running from 1,.100 ff»et to 7,000 feet. It is
there you find the highest mountains, and you drop from there over to the
South Atlantic, over the top right down. There is i»racticnlly no flat innrl on
the. other side at all.
Mr. Howe. How much flat land is there in the whole place?
Cen. Birrwai, About 190.000 a<*n»s absolutely tint la ml.
Mr. Howe. The rest of it is up and down hlU?
Gen. BUTT.KR. I will take that back: 180,000 acres.
Mr. Howe. How many people live In the country?
Gen. Bi'TLKR. Two million and a half, approximately.
Mr. How?:. Are they getting more numerous?
Gen. Butler. No; I should say the [>o]>ulation will never become very much
larger. Perhaps it will go to 3.0<X).<K^. They increase very rapidly, but they
die off very. rapidly. They are not a hardy, sturdy race at all.
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516 INQUIRY INTO OCH'VPATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Are tliey all col(ire<l people?
(ien. HuTLKR. They were ori^nally brought over from Africa. The importa-
tion of the black man into Haiti commenced about 1565, or the importation of
slaves from Africa, about the same date as the founding of St. Augustine, ac-
cording to my recollection of it — it has been several years since I read tlie hls-
torj' — and the importati(m continue<l during the whole of the French r^me,
and by 1789, when the Frencli Kevolution i)roke out in France, with its reflection
in Haiti, the first overt act in France, you i*emeni!)er, was on tlie 14tli of .Iul>%
tlie fall of the Bastlle, and the first ouU>reak in Haiti was in ()ctol)er. oa the
plains of the north. At that time the black populatiori was about 40(),OUO and
the white or foreign population about 40.<XKK i)f course, there had been consid-
erable mingling of the whites and blacks, and about 20 i^ev cent of the 4O0.0(H>
were mulattoes.
Do you Avant the caste system? Woidd that help you any?
Mr. HowK. Yes; I would like to have it. At the present time how many
whites are there in Haiti? I mean living there.
Oen. BUTT.KB. Counting the Americnn occupation?
Mr. Howe. Not counting the American occupation.
Gen. BuTLEB. Not counting the military people?
Mr. HoAVE. Not counting the military people.
Gen. Butler. Two hundred or two hundred and fifty.
Mr. HoAVE. And the rest are colored or various degrees of mulatto?
Gen. Butler. Various degrees of dark blood.
Mr. HowE. Now, how about the caste .system that you mentioned?
Gen. Butler. What we tried to provide for in the formation of our gendar-
merie was a system which could be passed over to the Haitians, because it was
well understood by us all that there was a limit to our treaty, and the country
did not belong to us, and I never heard any American officer in Haiti express
the desire to take it. We were all embued with the fact that we were trustees
of a huge estate that belonged to minors. That was my viewpoint; that was
the viewpoint I i)ersonally took, that the Haitians were our wards and that
we were endeavoring to develop and make for them a rich and productive
property, to be turned over to them at such time as our Government saw fit.
before the expiration of the treaty. So in order to profit by the mistakes of
the French w^e, of course, read the history of their gendarmerie and their caste
system, which was the cause of their downfall.
As I told you, the original colore<l man in Haiti was a black African slave.
The French settlers in the early days were adventurers. For 50 years no French
women came to Haiti, and the blood became mixed until in 1789 about 20 per
(?ent of it was mulatto. By that time the French had set up their caste system:
that is, the rich plantation owners formed one set. They only came to Haiti
during the sugar and coffee harA'est season, and indigo was another part of
the crop. They spent the rest of their time spending the proceeds of their
lalmr. or the other man's labor., in Paris. A certain number of poia* French
farmers lived in Haiti all or most of the time. They were known as coloalsts.
The French plantation owner, or Frenchman as he calle<l himself, w<nild not
associate with the planter. That made the planter more or les.*? unhapi>y, and it
kept down his associates, and he had a tendency' then to seek a i»er.son nearest
his own color, and gradually an associatitm sprung up between the nudatto and
the French colonist which tied them together, and they intermarried. The
blacks were out of it, the pure blacks. They were the best, and are still the most
reliable, but they were entirely out of it, just pure slaves.
It had been a custom on the part of the French planter when a child appeared
who had his blood in his veins to free that child and perhaps the mother. That
gave the mulatto or the octoroon — the name depending on the degree of black
blood in his veins — ^property. According to the law in Haiti, a person with
one thirty-second black blood in his veins was a black ; if he had one sixty-
fourth black blood, he was white. That is published in the decrees of the Kli«.
That gave a certain number of mulattoes property, due to this freedom, and
they soon became quite prondnent and prosperous, and they formed a league
with the colonists. The planter was busy traveling back and forth to Pari.<? and
<'aring very little for what occurred in Haiti until the French Revolution. Then
the legislative bodies in Paris, the revolutionists, called on Haiti to equalize and
not have any color line or any quality. They said, " We are all free nnd equal**
and they took over to France a lot of representatives of the mulattoes, who
told their grievances, and the French rulers — I do not remember just who thej
were, RobespieiTC, perhaps — who were in charge at the time .sent over orders
to abolish all distinction. r. . u
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The planters resented that, and in tlu» end the planters and the blacks hmde
a combination against the mulattoes and the colonists. That is the way the
Hne-np o<»curre<l. Anions the nuilattoes was the gendarmerie for the maln-
tf-nance of law and order, in addition to the reiB:nlar French garrison. It was
composed of the better nuilattoes, but tliey had mixed blood among tiieir officers.
The troops were l>lacl{ and some mulatto, but their officers were natives with
Idack blood, and when the test was put ni>on them they did not stand. So, in
forming ours we had but three colore<l officers until we could teach the Haitians
to ol>ey an order, irrespective of the giver, profiting i>y the failure of the pi*evious
gendarmerie and the snbs«Hpient massacre of women and children that followed,
due to their turnover. We followe<l that princii>le. The three coloreil officei*s
were appointe<l by the Presiilent, as he appointed us ali. as officers in his personal
bodyguard : and they were the three most trustworthy noncotumissionecl officers
tliat we have had after six months drill.
Mr. Howe. That you have develoi)ed in six months drill?
(leii. BiiTiJER. That we develop^nl in six n)onths. We ass'sted him in select-
ing them. They were all men of so-called good family', and most desirable to
the President. We had very little success with the Haitian offic*»r. I triwl
two or three others, without success. I did not give them regular conunissions,
in order not to bruise their feelings by having to reduce them, so we gave them
tbe position without any of the emoluments to try them out. and gave them
districts; and we found they were brutal with the people, uimecessarlly harsh;
that a little authority encouraged them to square old accounts witii any pei*son
with whom they had had any difficulty, which they remembereil for yeare, so
it was not entirely successful, although as noncomndssioned officers, controlled
by the marines, they were most excellent. When independent authority was
handed them, they became too brutal. I do not mean that they ever killed any-
body, but they were always imprisoning people and causing us considerable
worry. Never once during the time I was in command of the gendarmerie did
I ever fail to severely punish, even going si) far as to execute, gendarmes who
abused the people. The executions, of course, required the sanction and aii-
proval of the President of Haiti. He signeil the death warrants. On one occa-
sion we shot a gendarme for shooting a prisoner. We never tolei'ated abuse of
prisoners or the public.
Mr. How^E. What about the public there? How could you des<'ribe tliose.
General, the Haitians?
Gen. Butler. The Haitian i)eople?
Mr. Howe. Yes. '
Gen. Butler. The Haitian people are divided into two classes : one class wears
shoes and the other iloes not. The class that wears shoes is about 1 i^er cent.
I should say that not more than one-fifth of 1 i>er cent of the population of
Haiti can read and write. Many of those that wear shoes can not read and
write. In fact, many of the teachers can not read and write. I remember one
instance, in sending to a certain district money to pay a school-teacher who had
a claim against the Government, the gendarmerie officer took the money to the
school-teacher, and he said, " I can not sign that receipt ; I can not sign my
name." He said. "You are a teacher, are you not?" He said, "Yes; I am
a teacher of reading, but not of writing."
Ninety-nine per cent of the people of Haiti are the most kindly, generous,
hospitable, pleasure-loving people I have ever known. They would not hurt
anybody. They are most gentle when in their natural state. When the other
1 per cent that Avears vici kid shoes with long poiuteii toes and celluloid collars,
stirs them up and Incites them with liquor and voodoo stuff, they are caiMible
of the most horrible atrocities; they are cannibals. They ate the liver of one
marine. But in their natural state they are the most docile, harndess people
in the world.
Mr. Howe. W'hat were your relations with the ones thnt «li<1 !»ot wc:u- ^boes?
Gen. BUTT.ER. Those that wear shoes I took as a joke. Without a sense of
humor you could not live In Haiti among those people, among the shoe class.
Senator Oddie. What else did they wear besides shoes and collars?
Gen. Butler. They wore cut-away coats, brass-head canes, stove-pipe hats
3 inches in diameter, and anything they could put on to make themselves
conspicuous. But the people who were barefooted, the women wearing mother
hnbbards and the men dungarees half way up to their knees, with scarre<l
feet, indicating the hardest kind of toil, and witli great blisters on their hands,
and with the palms of their hands as hard as a piece of sole leather — those
people you could absolutely trust. I went all over Haiti, living with them
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^18 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
in their shacks, and they always gave you the best they liarl — food and any-
thing they had in the world. They did not know the value of anything. They
did not know anything about time, distance, or value.
Mr. Howe. How did you protect yourself when you went among them?
Gen. Butler. I never carried a gun the whole time I 'Was there ; it was not
necessary. They would not hurt you. I took the President all over Haiti
without a gun. He made speeches to them, encouraging them, and in every
public work we wanted to undertake the President led the procession. I was
his chauffeur. We rode in a Ford, but we carred an enormous Haitian flag
In front, with the President's coat of arms, and we went with a great fanfare
of trumpets, in a modest car, to be sure, but it was just exactly what they
wanted. My object down % there was to do what they wanted, not to make
out of Haiti an America, but to make out of Haiti a first-class black man's
country, and Instead of import ng our style of architecture down tliere, to
develop a style of architecture suite<l to the colored man and to the country.
When you go to Haiti, Senator, as you should, in order to properly under-
stand this, you must see Chrlstophe Citadel, which is one of the wonders of
the western hemisphere. It is a perfect piece of Ha'tian architecture, de-
signed by a Frenchman and an Englishman, both engineers and architects, but
built to match the countrj'. The average Haitian who gets a little money
goes to France, and brings back some conception of a French palace and builds
it, and destroys Hati. What we wanted was clean little towns, with tidy
thatch-roofed dwellings. That is what the country can afford, and that is what
it ought to have, and then there would never be any temptation to auylKxly
to grab it either.
Mr. Howe. Whom did you have to contend with down there — whom were you
fighting?
Gen. BuTLEB. We were not really fighting anybody. We were endeavorinj;
to overcome certain obstacles created by the polifcal element, obstacles in the
road of accomplishment of the object I have just pointed out.
Senator Oddie. What percentage of the Cacos wore shoes?
Gen. Butler. None of the Cacos except the leaders and the politicians and
the officers who put up the money, etc. They were the only ones.
Senator Oddie. How was a Caco created, trained, and developed. Cxeneral?
Gen. Butler. He just grew ; he had no training at all.
Senator Oddie. How did he grow?
Gen. BuTLEB. How did the revolution run?
Senator Oddie. Yes. The revolution developetl the Cacos ; is that it?
• Gen. Butler. All the discontented element that had nothing else to do and
wanted a little loot would join up at this little town called Bodeaux, about
1 mile to the westward of the Massacre River, and there have a season
of drinking, carousing, and debauchery, which would correspond in our m'.li-
tary service to a training i)erlod. and then this f«>rco would move on 14 miles to
Fort Liberte.
Senator Oddie. Who would stnrt this. General?
Gen. Butler. This would be started by anybody who wanted to be Pre<«i<lent.
and could get enough money to provide rum and the sustenance of war. and
get enough rifles together.
Senator Oddie. Where did he get them from?
Gen. Butler. They would be brought over from Santo Domingo, and loaned
for this revolution, and when Santo Domingo had one they would be sent back.
Being near the boundary line between autcmonious Republics side by side, a
man was perfectly safe in jumping over the boundaiTi so they e.stabli.she<l them-
selves right near the boundary, so that In case they got caught with the poods
they could jump over the river and be safe, and likewise they could be supplied
from the rear. Then, when the movement received sufficient strength, it passefl
on to Fort Liberte, which they captured, and published all over Haiti that the
customhouse was in their haiuls, which would indicate to us a certain amount
of revenue, but, as a matter of fact the customhouse had no revenue, l)ecanj5e
there were no exports or imports, as it was a closed port. But it gave them a
certain prominence, and attracted more recruits to the colors, and the army
would then move on 1o a town called I^e Tron. After spending about a weelJ
In Fort Liberte, burning the town and getting some more rum, they would move
down to Le Tron, which they would burn and announce the capture qf. Then
In order to get to a railroad .nnd save some walking, and to give them more
prominence, they would cross the mountains on the trail, and stop at a plnf**'
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 519
calIe<J St. Suzanne whero they would establish headquarters, and the govern-
ment, wouhl semi out a proclamation for three or four days, a notice to join
them. They tlien went <lown and into the valey of the Grande Riviere and
toolv and captured the town of Grande lliviere. That was the regular course of
eventa
By this time the President in power would be th«)roughly alarmed, and he
would take the Haitian navy, consisting of an old Ward liner called the Nord
Alexiff, and put on board his army of 600 or 700 men, and send them up to
Cai^e Haitien, tlie principal town in the north. There they would disembark,
and would march out, or ride out on the railroad, the officers or leaders in
little hand cars, or with a locomotive, if they could persuade the American
authorities to give them one.
Mr. Howe. The American authorities?
Gen. BfTiJiR. This railroad is owned by Americans.
Mr. Howe. Not the American (iovemmeut authorities?
(ien^, BrTLBiR. No. And they would march out to the crossroads, which was at
the kilometer post 17, where a battle would occur, and you will see the evidence
of the battles liy the graves all around, hundreds of them, and the Government
forces in the last seven revolutions were always licked. 1 do not know whether
tliere were any previous accounts of a victory or not, but in the last seven
revolutions they got licked there, and those that were too tired to run would go
over to the revolutionists, and those that c<mld get transportation on the way
back to (^ape Haitien, would take what was left in the custondiouse, quite a
fjood custi>mhouse, board the Sord Alexis, and sail back to Port au Prince with
the discouraging news that their army had not betni successful. The President
then would organize another army, and lie in wait for them. In the meantime
the revolutlcmisis wouhl advance on Cape Haitien, and of course, there would
l)e no fighting, and they would cai)ture Caiie Haitien and take over the custom-
house, issue more proclamations, have a great many speeches, and set up an-
other government.
By this time the movement would be quite large. Then it was a question of
marching across the mountains that I have described to yon, those ranges, down
to the valley, to Gonaives. At one time, in one revolution, at Gonaives there
was a fight, but generally there was very little trouble encountered there, and
they wouUl progress farther down along the railroad track to the town of St.
Marc. They would progress overland to St. Marc, take that with its customs
houKc% and then down the railroad track to a place called Arcahaie, which was
the approved jousting place for the final scene of the revolution. There the
President's army — ^iiot tlie President, but his army — would meet the victorious
revolutionists, and be defeated and absorbed and the tragedy would be rei)orted
to the President, who, if he were fortunate and were agile, would get on a ship
and leave with the treasury for Paris. If he were not very agile, or if he had
some personal friends near him who did not care much about him, they killed
him, as the record of the Presidents shows.
Here is a list of the I'res.dents of Haiti. I might give you a few of the fig-
ures. Between 1911 and 1915 they had seven Presidents. Those are the sc^ven
revolutions of which I si>eak.
Mr. HowK. Did those seven revolutions follow this general course you out-
lineil?
Gen. BiTTLER. Yes; they followed the general course, but sometimes there
would be a little diversion. In the last revolution the slaughter l)y Vilbnin
Gtiillaume Sam of the prisoners in the jail brought it to a head before the
army came in from Arcahaie, and he could not get away. He took refuge in the
French legation, but was finally pulled out. A mob searche<l the French lega-
titon, ttK)k him out and threw him into the street, where he was cut up into
200 pieces and dragged around the streets on pieces of string, what was left
of his body. That was when we landed.
Mr. Howe. During the American occupation have any such revolutions broken
out — ^any organized revolutions?
(ten. BiTLKR. No.
Mr. Howk. What was the nature of the active operations of the gendarmerie
(inrmg your time there?
Gen. BiTTLEB. Just the ordinary police duty. We had two instances such as I
spoke of in ctmnectlon with the heroism of that gendarme, little local affairs,
those two, during my period.
Mr. Howk. Were there liny ('acos around then?
62269—21 — PT *? 27
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520 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Butler. :So ; there were these bands that might be called Cacos, but
they went up in thin air. They were very small, and there was no concerted
movement.
Mr. Howe. Were they troublesome?
, Gen. BuTLKR. No. After that one attack on Kelly the whole thing disappeared^
the whole band disintegrated, and after the attack on Hlnche, about a year fol-
lowing that, the band dispersed, and we never heard anything more of it
Mr. Howe. Was the attack on Hinche before or after you left ; you left in
March, 1919?
Gen. Butler. That was before I left. I will describe that to. you. A captain
immed Doxie, a captain of the gendarmerie, had brought $1,200 gold in Haitian
money, which made an enormous pile of Haitian bills. This money was to pay
his gendarmes and to pay the iwllce of his post. It was in a wooden box, and
on the day he received it he counted it, and while counting it the lid of the
box was open and in walked «ome Haitian citizens and saw this money. The
next morning. at 2 o'clock, a large number, approximately estimated ar57, of
Haitians attacked this little house in which he was living, and he was awakened
by a hammering on the front door. He thought It was a drunken man, and
called, ** Go on away," in Creole. As he did so the hammering became more
violent and the door fell in just as he got out of his bunk, and he saw in the
bright moonlight a number of men armed with spears, rifles, and swords, push-
ing into the room. The door was narro>v, so that not a great number could
come in at one time, and he reached for his pistol and shot three of them dead.
This provided a little discouragement to the rest, and they hesitated just
long enough to give him an opportunity to face about and fire into the crowd
which had broken In the rear door. I do not remember how many he killed,
but two or three. His pistol was then empty, and the crowd moved on in In
front, but fortunately he had a riot gun at hand, with which he shot a few
more. The crowd then scattered. The gendarmes were in their barracks two
squares up the streets, and it only lasted two or thi*ee minutes. The gendarmes
then pursued the scattering band, and the leader was shot by a sergeant of
the gendarmes. The next day the whole thing was over, and there was no
further trouble, and the investigation through our own secret service Indicated
that It was an effort to get the $1,200; that Doxie was very popular with the
people, and that nobody had any desire to kill him if he would hand out the
$1,200.
Those were the two Instances of any serious trouble until I left Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Was it necessary for you to send out patrols with any frequency?
Gen. Butler. The whole of the country was patrolled every day, for various
reasons. One was to obtain from every citizen any complaint that he might
wish to make. The patrols were both mounted and on foot. They went along
the trails, and listened to the stories of the natives, and they had a certain
system of little cards, by which we could keep a record of their movements,
but not an accurate record.
Mr. Howe. Of the movements of the patrol?
Gen. Butler. Of the patrol. They would be ordered to a certain man's
plantation, and the man would be asked to indorse on the card that the patrol
had been there. That was the system that we tried to carry out Of course,
It was not entirely successful in certain places.
Mr. Howe. Then, outside of these two outbreaks that you mentioned, the
Instances that you have mentioned, there was no serious disorder for the gen-
darmerie to cope with during the time you were Its commander?
Gen. Butler. No.
Mr. Howe. That would carry us back, then, to December, 1915?
Gen. Butler, Between December, 1915. and March, 1918, there were just the
two Instances I spoke of. At Area hale, in January, 1918, five shots were fired,
but the firers were not seen, and although it created a sufficient excitement to
warrant a telephone call, we never found out who did It, and no one was hurt
They were the only shots that were fired.
Mr. Howe. Now, General, who was responsible for health, education, and
public works on the island, the Americans or Haitians?
Gen. Butler. The Americans.
Mr. Howe. Now, let us take them one at a time. First, let us take health.
Gen. Butler. That was handled by the Americans. Under the treaty of 1915
there was a sanitary engineer who was responsible for the health of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Who was in charge of carrying out any health regulations that
were in existence?
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 521
Gen. BuTJJCB. During my time the wishes of the sanitary engineer were car-
ried out or enforced by the gendarmerie, provided they did not in any way
endanger the public peace. Frequently I considered that certain wishes of the
sanitary engineer were unreasonable and put an unnecessarily heavy burden
upon certain individuals, and I would not carry them out, not have the police
enforce tLem.
Mr. Howe. Illustrate that.
Gen. BuTLEB. For instance, on John Brown Avenue in Port au Prince was
a poor woman who lived in a house on a sloping hill. She was ordered by one
of the local' sanitary inspectors, a subordinate of the sanitary engineer
Mr. HowK. A Haitian?
Gen. BuTLKB. A Haitian — to have her yard filled up to a certain level. This
would have cost her considerable money, and she was very poor, so I notified
the sanitary engineer that I thought it was unreasonable and could not see my
way clear to have the police arrest and punish this poor woman.
Mr. Howe. Officially to whom did the sanitary engineer report?
Oen. BuTLEK. The minister of public works.
Mr. HowK. A Haitian?
Gen. BuTLEB. A Haitian. The chief of the gendarmerie did not report to
anybody but the President
Mr. Howe. The health department?
Gen. BuTi-ER. That was a public work.
Mr. Howe. Was under the Haitian Government, directed by the Americans,
as provided in the treaty?
Gen. Butler. As provided in the treaty ; yes.
Mr. Howe. Whence came the funds for the health department?
Gen. Butler. Those were derived from the collection of the external revenue,
the customs. They were provided by the general receiver, who comes under
the direction of the financial adviser.
Mr. Howe. They did not come from American ai^ropriations, then?
Gen. Butler. No.
Mr. Howe. You had this much money to spend, that you could get from that
one source, and no more?
Gea. Butler. In the beginning we had a certain amount.
Mr. Howe. I mean for health work.
Gen. Butler. For health work we had Just as much as was allotted.
Mr. Howe. But that was not your business, except in so far as your gen-
darmerie had to carry out the directions of the sanitary engineer?
Gen. Butler. Yes ; with several exceptions. Out in the smaller towns, where
it would have been too expensive to maintain a direct sanitary representative^
the officers and noncommissioned officers of the gendarmerie acted as sanitary
officers to save expense, and their reports were made to the sanitary engineer,,
tlirough the chief of the gendarmerie.
Senator Oddie. What policy, if any, was definitely adopted in regard to im-
proving the health conditions?
Gen. Butler. Up to the time I left Haiti the steps were these: All towns
were cleaned up, sewers were opened, drainage effected, wells were covered in
order to keep the water as pure as iwssible, little dispensaries, wherever pos-
sible, were set up, with American doctors or members of the Hospital Corps
of the American Navy to administer to the people. The quarantine service had
been started and was in operation to guard against the introtluction of diseases;
from other countries.
Mr. Howe. How were the dispensaries paid for, and the quarantine stations?
Gen. Butler. Generally the dispensary was in the jKjJice station, because it
cost less money than maintaining it elsewhere, or if the town owneil a public
building the police would be in one part, the judge in one part, and the dis-
pensary in one room. Every gendarmerie post had a certain amount of medi-
cines and supplies on hand, and frequently there was no American person to
disp^ise them, but we had a native hospital corps consisting, as I remember,
of 24 Haitians, who showed an aptitude for medicine and whom we had trained*
and they were distributed around, in addition tx) the Americans.
Mr. Howe. When the Navy doctors furnished their services there were they
in the employ of the Haitian Government?
Gen. Butleb. They were in the employ of the Haitian Government.
Mr. Howe. As part of the gendarmerie?
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522 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Butler. No; some of them. Three of them only were commissioned
officers of the Kendorinerie. The rest were with the sanitary engineer. Then,
of course, all the medical officers and all the medical personnel of the marines
there on dnty. who had nothing whatsoever to do with the Haitian Government,
were constantly nirlng for and improving the condition of the Haitian people.
Everybody was working for the same end, no matter who employee! him.
Senator Oddie. In this matter of conserving and improving the rrt»l>H<* health
t\nd sanitary conditions do you consider that everythlnff was done that could
have been done, In the light of rao<lern science and energy and thoroughness?
(Jen. BuTLEB. With the funds on hand; yes, blr. I might mention that the
hospital in Port an Prince, which was in a deplorable condition u])on our ar-
rival, was restiore<l and was c*onducted by Americans, with the Haitian assist-
ants and nurses. That Is true also of the hospital at Cai>e Halt hi n, and Ui
adiiition we had little gendarmerie hospitals in the principal towns which were
open to all civilians, where they were taken in case of emergency.
Senator Oddie. I want to diverge a little. General, and ask you for your
definition of a caco.
Gen. Bi'Ti^EB. Well, you can get fifty different definitions. The one popularly
given to me by the Haitians In whom I had the greatest trust was this, that
the caco was a bird of prey tJiat lives off the weaker fowl. It has a red plume
and makes a sound "caco," as It is called, and these bandits live entirely off
the weak, so they adopted that name. They wear a patch of red on their
clothing, either a little re<l stripe <m their trcmsers, or a red hatband, or some-
thing tjo Indicate the fact that they are cacos. You can get. Senator, any num-
ber of reasons for the term. There Is a bird that says " caco." I have heanl
the bird and seen It.
Senator Oddie. How about the prisons? ,
Gen. Bi'TLER. The prisons were under the gendarmerie, I think, under some
presidential order.
Mr. Anoetx. I have here two petitions in the form of letters from the Tuion
Patriotique, addressed to the conmiittee, regarding particularly that portion
of the Investigation which the commitee exiHK'ts to make In Haiti. The peti-
tions are in French, and, in substance, they are Iwsefl upon the existence of
martial law In Haiti at the present time, and the censorsliip of the press. These
petitions stress the opposition which, as Is there claimed, is now being offered by
the military and civil agents of the United States to a full, fair, and thorough
investigation l)y the committee in Haiti. What the specific facts are on which
the Union Patriotique officials rely I am not personally Informed. Whatever b«
the reasons for It, and whether the reasons be justified or not by past events,
particularly the events surrounding the Inquiry conducteil by the Mayo court
last year, it is a fact, of the existence of which I am personally convinced
from all that I can learn, both from Haitians and from disinterested Ameri-
cans, that the Haitian i)eople generally do not at this moment feel free to
come forward before this committee with testimony adverse to the American
occupation of the island. The existence of martial law at the present moment
obviously plays a large part in such a feeling.
As an example of how martial law oi)erates at the present time to suppress
the legitimate acts of a people jealous of any infringement upon their iwlitical
rights throughout 100 years of absolute Independence, I respectfidly call your
attention to the fact disclosed by the second petition to the committee, which I
present herewith, dated October 9 of this year. This petition and the letter
accompanying it discloses the fact that the officials of the Union Patriotique
have made a respectful request of Col. Russell, the brigade commander of the
marines in Haiti, couche<l in the most moderate terms, for permission to hold
a public manifestation at Port an Prince In honor of the arrival of the com-
mittee, the manifestation to consist of a parade, but without speeches or any
other demonstrations which could be in any wise conceived as inflamumtory.
This request was made in writing to Col. Russell on September 28, and I pr^
sent herewith a copy of that letter of request. In reply Col. Russell says— and
I have here his original letter, which I will offer:
" I have to Inform you that I have recelveil no ofl!icial information regardinj;
the visit you mention, and until such is receiveil no action will be taken by me."
The visit he refers to In that letter is the visit of your committee to Haiti.
A similar request addresse<l by the Union Patriotique officials to the Haitian
department of the interior has brought a reply, under date of October 1, like-
wise postponing any decision, upon the same ground.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO, 523
I submit, in all confidence, that it is inconceivable that the Haitian i)eople,
the attainment of whose entire political independence the United States has
Boleninly pledged by treaty and by rei)euted assurances to maintain and to
respect, should be continued to be subjected to such humiliation. The investi-
gation now being made by this committee can be a great step •forward in re-
gaining the confidence of the Haitian people as to the aims and methods of the
Unite<l States in Haiti, but this investigation can not in that respect be a suc-
cess if the Haitian people, during the visit of the committee to the island,
continue to be bound by the repression and fear of martial law. To the end,
therefore, that the visit of the committee to Haiti may l>e regarded by the
I)eople as a genuine earnest of the desire of our Government to regain the
confidence of Haiti and to accomplish permanent l>eneftts of an absolutely con-
structive character, I, as counsel for the Union Patriotique, respectfully urge
ujwn the connnittee the present innneiliate neetl for such action initiating with
your committee as will result in an ofticial proclamation from the headquarters
of our military forces in Haiti, announcing, following the i>endlng arrival of
your connnittee In Haiti, the raising of martial law for the i)eriod of its stay
there, and publicly inviting a free ai)i>earance before the committee of all
Haitians who have reascmable complaints to make regarding the occupation or
testiuKmy of value to offer without fear of let or hindrance, and without such a
pnH'lamatlon I am convinced that the Haitian people will not regard the investi-
gation made by this committee as fair and full as to them.
(The i>etitions find letters above referred to by MP. Angell are here printed
in full, as follows:)
UNION PATRIOTIQl'E.
PoBT AU Princb, 11 Septembre 1921.
MoN.siKra lk* PTif:siDKNT. Mrssikuks les (^oMMiKSAiRii^R: I^ o Aoftt dernier,
h<»tre n^l^gu^, M. Stenlo Vincent, ft la tin de son Kxpos«\ avalt I'honneur
ri'attirer I'attention de votre ('onnnisslon sur les conditions sp^*iales et tr^s
i> ^' ret tables faltes au i)euple haitlen par le i-^gime de terreur qu'entretient
Tapplication de la Loi Martiale. II nous incombe aujourd'hul le devoir de
vous signaler Je danger (prentratne une telle situation pour le succ^s de
r<)*^uvre (le v^rltA ^'t de justice cpie Ton attend unlversellement de Tinitlatlve
pris*' par le S^nat des Knits Tnls. Nos populations out <lepuls six ans tene-
ment souffert qup leur defiance s*<>ten(l ft tout ce qui est Am^ricain. I>es gens
les plus inti^resses ft lEn^iuPte sont obliges ft toutes sortes de pr^k'autions,
pnisqne l>eaucoup d'entre eux se rapi)ellent les persecutions dont lis avaient
^te Tobjet pour avoir seulenjent demand^, sans succes d'ailleurs, A Hre
entendus par la Commlsshm Mayo.
I^ies agens militaires et civlls des Ktats-Unis, sachant que TEnqu^te du
S^nat seni autrement s^rieuse <iue celle.de I'Admiral Mayo et teiumt beancoup
(ce qui de leur part est assez naturel) ft ce qu>lle n'ait pas de r^sultat.
8*ing4nient ft d^moraliser compl^tement les poi)ulations par la propagan<le, la
corruption et la terreur. L'Unlon patriotique serai t, en consc^niuence, recon-
Tiaissante ft la Commission (renqu(^te de falre dt^s maintenant une dMaratlon
I>ublique au aujetdes garanties qu'elle compte offrir aux citt»yens luutieiis et
A toutes personnes qui se pr^senteront devant elle iKmr d(^poser sur les
atrocit^s et aux autres abus conunls dans ce pays par les agens militaires et
civlls des Ktat^Unis.
Cette declaration pourralt (^tre contenue dans la r^ponse que la Commission
voudra faire ft la prest»nte suppliipie <le I'Union i)atriotique. Kile serait port^
ft lu reitmnaissance du public haitien par la pul)Ucatlon <les deux places.
Dans Tespolr que nous n'aurons pas fait inutllement appel ft la pr^voyance et
d la k-yaute de la Commlslon d'enquOte, nous vous prions d'agreer.
Monsieur le Pr^ident,
Mes^sieurs les Commlssalres,
I'assurance de notre haute consideration et de notre profond respect.
Pour le Comlte central de direction:
Gfx)rgks Sylvain,
A dm in intrateur-d^ligu^.
Monsieur le Senateur MacCormick,
PrMdent de la Commission.
Mehsieurs les Membres de la Commission
n'ENQUfiTE SfeNATORTALE SI^XEANT AU CAPIT0IJ5,
Washington.
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624 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
RtPUBUQUE D'HAITI,
Hecb£taibkbie d*£tatde lInt^rieur,
Port au Prince, 1 Octohre, 192t.
MooRieur Geobges Sylvain,
Administrateur D^Ugu^ de VVnion Patriotique, En ViUe,
Monsieur le Dtufzavrt : Je vous accuse reception de votre lettre en date du
29 Septembre 6coul^, m*irifornmnt que 1* "Union Patrlotlque ** se propose
ilVir^aniser, avec le'concours de la population de Port au Prince, une prande
manifestation en Thonneur de la Commission d'enqu^te s^natoriale et cette
manifestation consistera en un d^flie ft travers les rues de de la ville, du
Champ de Mars, au bord de mer avec fanfares et banni^res, sans discours ni
vivats.
Men DCpartement en prend bonne note. Relativement au concours que vous
hii demandez, en la clrsconsftance, il vous informe qu*ll n'est pas encore saisi
officiellement de Tarriv^ de la Commission Senatoriale America Ine en Haiti.
En attendant, veuillez lui faire avoir un programme de cette manifestation.
Ueoevez, Monsieur le d^l^gu^, Tassurance de ma parfaite consideration.
B. Dartiguenavez.
UNION PATBIOTIQUE HAITIENNE.
Pobt-au-Pbinck, 9 Ociobre J9tl,
Monsieur le President,
ct Mef(Heur8 les MemhrcH de la Commision
d'enquHe senatoriale si^oeant au Capitole. Washington.
MONSTET'K I£ PRESIDENT, MESSIEURS LBS COMMISSAIRES .' NqUS aviOUS rilOnneUf,
le mois dernier, de signaler ft votre haute attention les diflicult6s que le maintien
de la lo'i niartiale oppose ft la pr^parat'on de I'Enqu^te senatoriale en notre
pays, (^es d fficultes s*aggravent chaque jour du fait que les Agents militairer?
des KtatH-Unis, aflfectant de consid^rer comme des atteintes ft Tordre publ'c les
manifestations d'opinions (nmtraires ft leurs int^rOts, usent de tous les pre-
cedes <rintimidatlon pour fausser Tesprit de nos populations et les eloigner de la
(^ommiss'on d'enquete. C'est ainsi qu'ft la date du 3 de ce mois. Monsieur
Eugene Vieux, admin strateur du Courrier Haltien, journal dont les deux
directeurs, Messieurs Jh. Lanoue et Jolibois flls subissent pour deiit d'opinion.
depuis bientOt 6 mois, une condemnation immeritee aux Travaux forces et ft
Tameiide, a ete arrete pour un article que nous expedions ci-joint ft. votre
adres.se. afin de vous perinettre d*en apprecier par vous-meme le caract^re
inoflfensif.
Monsieur Vieux est un vieillard de 67 ans, des plus honorables, ft qui personne
n'a jamais eu ft rien reprocher jusqu'ft ce jour. En meme temps que lui a com-
paru devant le Tribunal milltalre de TOccupation un autre citoyen haitlen.
auteur de Tartlcle incrimine, Monsieur ifitienne Mathon. connu pour ses opinion.^
moderees, ancien Bfttonnier de I'Ordre des avocats de Port-au-Prince, ancien
Mln'stre des Relations Exterieures et de la Just'ce. I^e seul crime ft tous les
deux est d'etre des militants de notre cause nationale et des membres devones
de notre Union Patriotique. dont Monsieur Mathon est un dirigeant.
Par les deux lettres dont nous vous envoyons egalement cl- joint communfca-
tion, vous forstntoroK qu'ft IVHM-Hsiin d'une nianifestntion que projette la popu-
lation de Port-au-Prince pour falre accueil ft votre Commission, le jonr de son
arrivee, le Colonel Russell, Ches des forces expeditlonnaires des Etats Unis ft
Haiti et Monsieur B. Dart'guenave, Secretaire d'Etat de Tlnterieur, convies ft
nous preter leur appui, se sont rencontres pour declarer quMls s'en abst«endraient
tnnt qu'ils n'auront pas re<;u notification offlcfel^e de la visite de la Commission
d*Enquete. C'est une situat'on certainement anormale. T^ voyage de la Com-
mission en notre pays devralt-il jusqu'ft cette heure constltuer un sujet de doute
pour les autorites locales?
En se r>i(iuant de n'en rien connaitre, ne contribuent-elles pas a en falre
Huspeoter Is sincerite -et pnr 1ft ft entraver toute preparation serieuse a Penquete
que voiis comptez diriger sur les leux?
Du jour ou rUn'on Patriotique, representant le Peuple Ha'tien, a ete adm?se
ft deposer les plaintes et les desiderata de sa Nation devant la Commission
d'Enquete formee par le Senat des Etats-Un's et qu'en meme temps les repre-
sentants du Departement de la Marine out eu ft y produ^re leurs repliques, la
situation juridique s*est trouvee la suivante : d'une part, le Peuple Haitien,
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 525
partie plaignante: de I'autre, le D^parteiuent de la Marine Etats-Unls, partie
d^fenderesse, et conune arbitre entre les doux part'es, le S6nat des Etats-Unis,
actuelleDient repr^ent^ par votre Commiss'on. II n'est pas adin'ssible, dans ces
conditions, que la balance ne reste pas 4gale entre les deux parties, au moment
oH lea arbitres poursuivent leurs investigations. II est partlcull^rement intoler-
able que, dans Tlntervale du d^placement de la Commission d'Enqu(^te, les
Agents du D^partement de la Marine, abusant de Tautorit^ dont lis sont les
d^posltaires, s'emploient de toutes les mani^res ft entretenir le trouble dans les
esprits ft regard de TOeuvre de la Coumli^8ion s^natoriale, sous pr^texte que sa
venue leur reste officlellement douteuse.
n nous suffira.. e8p(^rons-nous, Monsieur le President, Messieurs les Commis-
saires, de vous avoir signal^ cette anomalie, pour que vous j mettiez bon ordre,
car elle tend ft miner toute conflance dans la justice et la loyaut6 qu*on doit atten-
dre de Tinterventlon su S^nat des Etats-Unis, et dont nous sommes heureux, pour
notre part, de vous renouveler Tji^bninlable attestation.
Veulllez agr^r, Monsieur le President, Messieurs les Commissalres, les assur-
ances de la haute consideration avec laquelle nous avons Thonneur d'etre vos
bien devours et obeissants servlteurs.
Pour les Comites r^unis de TUnion Patrit'que L'Adminlstrateur-
deiegue du Coraite central, George Sylvaln, anclen E. E. et
Ministre pienipotentiaire d'Haiti en France et aupr^s du St
sie^ oflSoier de F Instruction Publique, officer de la r.egion d'hon-
neor; Le Secretaire general: P. Thoby, ancien Secretaire de
Legation d'Ha-ti a Washington, Deiegue de I'Un'on Patriotique
aux Etats-Unis; L'Archiviste : Ch. Rosemond, Notalre; F. L.
Cauvain, ancien Secretaire d*Etat, ancien Senateur, ancien
Bfttonnier de TOrdre des avocats de Port-au-Prince ; Leon Nau,
anc'en Doyen du Tribunal Civil de Port-au-Prince, avocat. ancien
Juge au Tribunal de Cassation de la Republ'que; D. Jeannot,
ancien Secretaire d'Etat, avocat; Stenio Vincend avocat, ancen
Secretaire d'Etat, ancien President du Senat, Deiegue de TUnion
Patritoque aux Etats-Unis, ancien ministre I'llaitien Hollande.
UNION PATRIOTIQUE.
Port au Prince, 28 Scpternhre, J92I.
Monsieur le Colonel Russell,
Chef des forces exp4diti<yiinaires des Etats-Vnis en Haiti.
Monsieur le Cx)lonel: Neus avons I'honneur de vous informer que VUnlon
patriotique so propose d*organizer avec le concours de la population de Port-
au-Prince une grande manifestation en Thonneur de la C<mimisslon d'enquete
senatoriale, — au moment de son debarqueraent — Cette manifestation cons stera
en un defile ft travers les rues de la ville, due Champ de Mars au herd de mer,
avec fanfares et bannieres, sans discours ni vivats.
EUe sera une attestation de nos sentiments patriotiques et un hommage de
conflance en la justice et en I'lmpartialite du Senat federal.
Tenant essentiellement ft ce que nos futurs botes sorent, des leur premiere
prise de contact avec le pays, favorablement impressionnes par Taccueil de la
population, nous nous plalsons ft comptr sur Tappul de toutes les autorltes et
vous prions d*agreer, Monseur le Colonel, Tassurance de mes sentiments de
haute consideration.
(Slgnee) Georges Sylvain.
Administrateur-d^Ugu^.
United States Marine C^orps, First Brigade.
Office of the Brigade Commander,
Port au Prince, Haiti, October 5, 192 1,
Sir: Replying to your letter of 29 September, 1921, I have to inform you that
I have received no official information regarding the visit you mention and until
fuch Is received no action will be taken by me.
Very truly, yours,
John H. Russell.
M. George Sylvain,
Port au Prince, Haiti,
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526 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Oddie. Let me ask a question. Do you not think that that request
assumes tliat this committee will have rendered its decision to a certain extent
before completing its investigaticm? In other words, you realize that the inves-
tigation IS to be a very complete and thorough one, a part of which is behig
made now, and the balance of which will be made in Haiti, and that the issuing
of such an order may be begging the question somewhat?
Mr. Howe. And committing this body to a conclusion in advance of the com-
pletion of its investigation?
Mr. Angell. In reply to your question, Senator, I would say that I do not
think that such a request or move emanating from this committee looking toward
the raising of martial law in Haiti for the i)er:od of the visit trf the committee
there, accompanied by the other declarations wliich I have suggested, would be
in any sense a decision, nor even suggesting a decison in any ultimate and final
sense on the part of the committee. Such a move looking toward the temporary
raising of martial law, and the publishing of such a proclanmtion as I have
suggested, would only be taking proper and, as I regard them frankly, neces-
sary steps by this committee In orde- to obtain a fair opportunity to ascertain
in Haiti what has taken place during the occupation, to afford the Haitian
people a full and fair opportunity to come before the committee with whatever
testimony they deem i>ertinent and important, and therefore such a move by
the conmi:ttee would not presage in any sense its final conclusions; it would
only be a stej) taken by it to afford it an opportunity to pursue its inquiry in
Haiti.
Mr. Howe. How would a fair opportunity for this committee to continue its
investlgat'ons in Haiti be prevented by the continuance of martial law? Please
develop y(mr reasons on that.
Mr. Angelu As I have not been in Ha'ti personally. I am at a disadvantage,
naturally, when calle<l upon to give .specific reasons or detailed fact<. I am,
in the first instance, advancing the request of the organization which I repre-
sent before this conmiittee: in the second Instance, I venture to express my
personal c<mviction, somewhat in support of those requests, to the effect that a
large portion of the Haitian people do not feel free at the present time to come
forward and offer testimony.
Mr. Howe. For fear of what?
Mr. Anoell. They fear — whether Justified or not, I am unable to state— re-
prisals of some nature on the part of either the American forces there, the gen-
darmes, or the Haitian Government officials and those who symi)athlze with
the Haitian Government and with the American occupation, rei)ri.<«als directed
against those who may testify adversely to the occupation.
Mr. Howe. What would be the effect of the removal of martial law? Would
it not be to remove from authority the American gendarmerie commander and
officers, ami the control of all other military ofllcers In Haiti?
"Mr. Angela I fall to .see why the raising of martial law would result In such
a state of affairs, because the presence of the marine forces there i.s, at least
as stated In the oplnicm of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy in 1920,
authorized In the treaty of 1915. and that the gendarmerie forces are specifically
provlde<l for by that treaty and the subsequent conventions, and by the act of
Congress of June 3, 1916, so the raising of martial law would not have the
effect, as I understand it, of susi>ending the legality of the presence of the
marines and nmrlne ofllcers and gendarmes.
Mr. Howe. That was not what I meant to get j-our opinion on. Would not
the snisi)enslon or tennlnathm of martial law i>ermlt arrests, trials, and Im-
prisonments without the supervision or control of our military authorities, or
of our officers of the gendarmerie In the employ of the Haitian Government?
Mr. Angell. I do not think j<o. I think that the gendarmerie would still con-
tinue to be the local police of the country, and the suspension of martial law
would be merely the restoration of c^vll as distinguished from military law.
Mr. Howe. \nd such civil law to l>e administered by whom, Haitians or
Mr. Angell. By the Haitian Government, the Haitian native and civil courts,
and by the gendarmes as the indice force of the Government.
Mr. Howe. Do the organizations which you represent prefer the administra-
tion of civil law by the present Government to the administration of law
under martial law as It Is now being carried on?
Mr. Angell. Speaking, generally, I believe they do.
Mr. Howe. In your opinion, is there more danger of i)ersecution of witnesses
who appear before this committee from the uncontrolled authorities of the
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 527
present Government or from ttie military officers in control of the administra-
tion of martial law?
Mr. Anoell. Your question calls for an answer based on facts of which I
have not sufficient knowleflge to form a personal judgment.
Mr. HowK. In your opinion, has this committee carried its investigation far
enough along to have a knowledge of the facts on which to base its recom-
luendation for the 8usi»ension of martial law? I understand you have been
present at most of the hearings before this committee?
Mr. Anoelt^ All of the hearings. I do not think thai question has been
touched on, one way or the other, so far as I can recollect.
Senator Oddie. If martial law were withdrawn, do you consider that there
would be danger of vai^ous factions in Haiti taking advantage of that condi-
tion and starting their factional fights again?
Mr. Angell. Such as disturbances?
Senator Oddie^ Yes.
Mr. Angell. Subject to the limitation which I have previously referred to
in my own particular unfamiliarity with the detailed facts there arising from
the unfortunate fact that I have not hud the opportunity to be in Haiti, I would
answer that question to this eflfect. that I can not conceive that the Haitians
who are in large part pressing for a restoration to them of the easence and
substance of (lovemmenf now controlled by the United States would be so fool-
ish as to give way to factional disturbances, riots, and the like at the very time
of the committee's visit to Haiti, and thus afford the more foo<l for the claim
that the Haitians are not fit to govern themselves, and that martial law must
be continue<l there indefinitely by the presence of our military forces.
Mr. Howe. Is your recommendation, or the recoumiendation of the society
that you represent, for the susjieiision of martial law only for the visit of this
<^mniittee to Haiti?
Mr. Anoelu Entirely. They do not go beyond that, and the publication of
some sort of a proclamation such as I referred to In the beginning of my
statement.
Mr. HowB. Would you, on your owii responsibility, with no more informa-
tion than you now have, order the susi>en8ion of martial law during the visit
of this committee?
Mr. Angeix. If I were in a position of authority to do so?
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Mr. Angell. And based only on such knowledge as I have and such repre-
sentations as have been made to me?
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Yes; I think I should. In doing so I might concededly err on
the side of laxity from the military iK>int of view, but since you ask the ques-
tion of me personally I will reply that from my own personal point of view I
would prefer to err upon that side rather than do anything or refuse to do
anything which would, even apparently, and whether I agreed with the opin-
ions of the native Haitians or not, militate against their feeling that the in-
vestigation now being conducted by this committee will be full, fair, and
thoniugh as to them.
Mr. Howe. Now, do you think that this committee has sufficient knowledge
of present conditions down there, gained from its investigations which you
have heard, to justify any request from it for the suspension of martial law?
Mr. Angell. As I have said before. I recollect no testimony which has been
offered thus far on that subject, so that It Is really a question de novo which I
have presented here this morning, and simply baseil upim the two petitions pre-
sented in the record here and the letters to and from the Union Patriotique,
the Department of the Interior, and Col. Rus.sell.
In fairness to the questl<m asked and to such responsibility as might attach
to the committee in making such a request, I should say that I feel that the
conunittee might, very proi)erly hear some evidence up<m that point at this
time. I do deem it of vital Importapce, (m the psychological ground — that is,
as to the feelings of the Haitian people reganling the investigation being con-
ductetl by this committee — that if such a recjuest is to enuinate from this com-
mittee it must be done very shortly. Here we are at the end of October and the
committee proposes to go to Haiti in about three weeks, as I understand. It
takes s<une time to get these things done, and if the conunittee delays until a
few days before its departure from the Unite<i States any de<'ision on this point
or the taking of any testimony which it might feel necessary in order to ^rive
Digitized by VjOOQIC
528 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
at any fair conclusion, then I feel fairly confident that the opportunity would
have slipped by to make the Haitian people feel that this is going to be a thor-
ough investigation down there. In other words, if it Is to be done, it must be
done now or In the very immediate future,
Mr. Howe. Have you any witnesses Immediately available who could give
such testimony?
Mr. Anokll. Yes ; I have ; not here in Washington, that I know of, but there
are some witnesses — civilian witnesses — disinterested Americans in New York,
who are willing and- ready to offer information on that point based upon their
knowledge of Haitian conditions.
In connection with the question which you put to me, Mr. Howe, I think I
should say that the request is not merely for the raislni? of martial law but is a
little wider or further than that. For example, the letter of Col. Russell which
I read — possibly you did not hear it at the moment — said he had received no
official advice as to the coming of this committee to Haiti and consequently he
could not take any action at all upon the request of the Union Patrlotique for
permission to stage a parade in honor of the arrival of the committee. My re-
quest, then, would be as much addressed to the desirability of having the mili-
tary forces In Haiti Informed officially of the arrival of the committee, so that
such a reasonable request as that for permission to stage an honorary demon-
stration upon the arrival of the committee could be granted. Col. Russell re-
fused to grant it, saying he has no knowledge of it.
Maj. McClellan. As I understand, the date of the request made on Ool. Rus-
sell to ascertain the date of the visit of this committee antedated by some time
the date on which this committee decided tentatively on November 19 as the
date of sailing.
Mr. Angeu.. I believe so.
Maj. McClellan. Then the reply of Col. Russell to that request was boat
fide and proper, was it not?
Mr. Angelt.. I have no doubt but what it was. I have no criticism what-
ever to make of Col. Russell's reply.
Mr. Howe. Has the society which you represent made any request through
the Government of Haiti for It to make a request of the Government of the
United States to suspend martial law?
Mr. Angell. Not that I know of. It has made a request in this particular
♦ Instance of the Department of the Interior for permission to hold this parade
which they desire to stage there, and the Department of the Interior has
replied likewise that it has no official knowledge of the arrival of the com-
mittee and can do nothing.
Senator Oddie. I would like to ask Gen. Butler for an opinion as to the
raising of martial law.
(xen. Butler. If you raise martial law down there, Senator, while there
are any United States troops at all In Haltl^ you are going to have some of
them murdered.
Senator Oddie. Some of the United States troops murdered?
Gen. Butler. Yes, sir. We are only paid soldiers ; we have notliing to do
with the policy of our Government. We are only sent to these places to per-
form acts. We have nothing to do with the reason for which we are sent, and
if we have no method of protecting ourselves you had better keep us home.
I feel strongly, because I have seen men cut up on the streets when I was in
Port au Prince last year, unarmed marines, two of them, cut with bolos from
the rear. Of course the Haitian courts did nothing. Why would they punish
their own people for jumping on us? You raise martial law, and you will have
a fight, because tlie marines are human and they will not be butchered. Wher-
ever the fiag goes we have got to have protection for the soldier, otherwise you
should bring us away.
Senator Oddie. Another question, General. In your opinion, is there danger
of tlie rival factions in Haiti starting trouble if martial law is raised?
Gen. Butler. No, sir; I do not think the rival factions will start trouble,
but any person who has been harboring a grudge against a marine would
take it out of him. The marines would be the ones that would suffer. The
marines have the strictest orders about the use of their arms. They are not
allowed to go at liberty under arras ; they are perfectly helpless.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Monday, October 31, 1921, at
10.30 o*clock a. m.)
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
MONDAY, OCTOBEB 31, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D, C.
Tbe committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment, Senator
MedlU McCk)rmick presiding.
Present: Senators McCormick and Oddie.
Also present: Mr. Walter Bmoe Howe and Maj. Edwin X. McTlellan, Un'tod
States Marine Corps, In their respective representative capacities, as herein-
before indicated.
STATEMENT OF BBIG. GEN. SMEDLEY D. BXTTLEB, XTNITED STATES
MABINE COBPS, COMMANDING MABINES, QXTANTICO. VA.— Be-
sumed.
Mr. Howe. General, at the end of the hearing last Thursday we were, as I
recollect it, about to take up the so-called corvee system in Haiti, and I
think the best way to get at it would be for you to tell us briefly whaft the
corvee system was by law, and how the gendarmerie proceeded, with the
knowledge of that law, to build roads.
Gen. Butleb. The rural code, which was one of -the Haitian laws, contains a
law which requires every citizen of Haiti to either pay a road tax or work for
the maintenance of the roads a certain length of time each month on the roads
which he uses. It is the same law which we have In the United States. You
either pay a tax or work. The law had not been enforced for some time prior
to our arrival, ami they had no roa<ls. When we landed in Hnit there wf^p li
railes of roads built, at a cost to the Haitian Government of about $51,000 a mile.
This was told me by members of the Haitian cabinet. This road was hardly
passable In order to facilitate the bringing of products to market, and to
bring the north and south closer together, we decided to build roads. There
was a very distinct feeling of antagonism on the part of the people in the
north against the people in the south, mainly because they could not communi-
cate with each other. There were no roads. There were rivers that they
could not cross, except at great danger to themselves, and this feeling had
caused one revolution after another until, as I said before, they had had seven
in four years, resulting in the death of thousands of people. The Haitian Gov-
ernment had no money for the construction of the roads, and without roads
you could get no money except by borrowing it. and nobody would lend them
any money, which was perfectly proper. They were unable to pay the interest
on the national debt they already had, and it was perfectly reasonable that
no one else would lend them any money except under the old system of getting
concessions, which we stopped. That is, a collection of bankers would lend
them money with the provision that they should have all the revenue from a
coffee crop, and that system of borrowing money was ruinous to the country,
90 we stopped it We decided that we would attempt to market what products
we had and try to raise money in that way. The only way to get those products
down to the seacoast where they could be sold was over the roads. We then
counted our money and found that we could afford $8,000 a month for the
construction of roads.
Mr. Howe. Where did that money come from?
Gen. BtTTT.ER. That money came from the collection of external revenues in
the han<ls of the general receiver of customs, an American official. That amount
529
Digitized by VjOOQIC
530 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
\vaj3 allotte<I monthly. We (Ii<l uot build one new road in Haiti. You could not
build a new road in Haiti, l)e<'aus4» tlie French had had a complete network of
roadK.
The ('HAiRMAN. How many years ago?
(xen. Bi TLKR. The French were driven out in 1804, hut tlie signs of the grading
and of tlie old bridges and ohl culverts were still evident everywhere, so it
requireii no new engineering on our i>art. We simply repaired and put into
condition the old roads as proviiled for in the rural code.
The Chairman. Let nie interrupt to ask if the general can supply tlie couiinit-
tee with a map, at this or a sub.setiuent session, which will show the roads
l)assahle for motor tralHc before tliis work was undertaken, and after it was
undertaken?
(len. BtTTLKR. I can show you right here on that map. There were just 3
miles of n)a<l before we started, from the city of Port au Prince to a place 3
nnles from Port au I'rim'e called Mardissant.
Tile Chairman. How many roads did you build?
(Jen. BuTLi-at. During the time I was there we rei)aircd approximately 470
miles of road.
The Chairman. How much money did y«iu expend on tlmt work?
(ieii. BrTij-:R. The roa<ls c<»st about .$205 a mile. We had a certain amount of
hired skille<l labor to buihl culverts, and we bought our cement and used what
road machinery wc owne<l, ami the rest of the money was used for food for the
corvee.
Mr. Howe. (Jeiieral, what was your source of information for tlie statement
that tlie 3 existing miles of road cost ^^51.000 a mile?
(Jen. Bi'TLKR. The statements made to me by members of the Haitian cabinet.
Mr. HowK. During what iieriml were these 470 miles of road rebuilt or built?
(ten. Bi'TLKR. From the 1st of July, 191(5, until the date on which we left
Haiti— the Oth of March, 1018.
Mr. Howe. Does the revival of the corvee system, or the employment of the
CHJrvee system, date from about July, li)l()?
(Jen. BuTLKR. From July, 1010.
Mr. HowK. Will you describe the working of the corvee system?
(Jen, Bt'TKKR. The (H»rvee w.<irked in this way while I had charge of it. We
had little cards printed, notification cards, ami lists of the names of citizens who
sliould work on the roads given the gendarmerie officers of the Haitian civil
otfic als of that district, and the gendarmes then delivered these little cards
notifying them that on a certain date. they would reiwrt at a certain place and
do their work (»r [»iy a certain tax.
The Chairman. They had the option?
(wen. Bi'TLKR. They had the option. Nobody had any money, so they reported
for w<»rk. During the period they were w«)rking they were housed and ftsl. and
in order to amuse them dancvs were given them in the evenings, and it was
somewhat like a barn raising here in America. I t«K)k the Presdent ami mejn-
hers of his cabinet at least *)nce a week to call on the corv^^e parties and to
nmke si^eeches to them, and imi)ress upon them that they were doing this for
their own country and not for the white men.
On the 7th of November, 1917, the road work on the main highway, Routft
r)artlguenave, namXHl after the President of Haiti, had progresse<l to such an
extent that 7."» ndles of the 182 had been complete<l between Port au Prince
ami Cape Haitien.
The Chairman. Di<l tlie barn raising niethml and the si)eech making methoil
of i»re.Kervlng the esprit de corps of the corvee continue; did that go right
straight through to the end of your tour?
(Jen. Bi'TLKu. To the end of my time. We opened the Las (^ahobas Road
with great ceremony, the President and all the members of his cabinet and 18
automobile loads of distinguishtHl citizens being present, on the Sunday before
I left Haiti or about the 3d of March.
The (.'hairman. And during all that time ha<l the corvee been fe<l?
(Jen. BrxLER, Fe<l?
The ('hairman. And house<l?
(Jen. BrxLER. And housed ; and not a single complaint on the part of any-
bcxly had ever rejiched my ears.
The Chairman. Were there during that time instances of inhabitants of one
district performing work in another district?
(Jen. BiTLER. Not to my knowknlge, and there were the strictest orders
against it. I was well aware that this thing was acpable of tremenduous abuse.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 531
and had been abused by the HnitianR previously, and was determined that tliere
should be nothlnjf of that kind, and the men were only used on the roads that
they themselves used. There were plenty of people to do it, and there was no
object in taking them from one place to another.
The Chaibman. There- was a density of population along the line of these
roads?
Gen. Butler. There was a density of population all along the line of these
roads to do this work. May I give some instances of the enthusiasm of the
people for this road work?
The (^HAiRMAN. Yes.
Gen. Butler. We had little prizes of flags to hang on the gate posts where
the roads were particularly well done, in front of the properties.. The Presi-
dent, when traveling with me, would stop at my request and make speeches to
the families that had done particularly well in front of their property, and
that encourage<l them very greatly. Men, women, and children would lay
stone on the road to keep the little holes filled up.
I would like to give an instance. On the 7th of November, when we had
reached this stage where 75 miles had been built, and about 100 more had to
be completed to the cape, war had broken out in the United States, and I was
anxious to go home, and I wanted to see the road finished.
On the 7th of November, 1917, I took the President and two members of
his cabinet and many other members of tlie Government to Gona'ives on the
(government yacht and sent a band up ahead. He had been invited by the
town of (Jonaives, although no President liad ever been there before, and they
said they would shoot him if he came. But we all went up without any fire-
arms and had a big demonstration. We went to church on Sunday morning,
and on Monday morning we all rode out to the end of the road being then
ct>n.Mtructed. We walked up along the road where all the corvee were working,
and the Presidwit made a speech to each gang of the corvee. They had the
internal, revenue. I said to him, ** If you w 11 trust me with some of your
money, in addition to the $8,000 a month I am getting, on the 1st of January
I will take you and your cabinet and anybinly eUe you want to ('a()e Halt en.
We have 100 miles of road to build, but we will build It in six or seven weeks,
if you \\ill give us that money out of the taxes and tiike this additional road
on your shoulders and issue a pn)clamatlon." They promptly voted at a meet-
ing of the cabinet to turn over $400,000, which was given me on Wednesday
morning, for additional food and addlti(mal effort, and after a lot of noise,
dancing, and praying the soldiers and the Government started immediately to
put their shoulders behind the wheels, and <m the 17th of December, five weeks
and four days later. I went t(^ (^ape Haitien in an auto, and on tlie 1st of
January the President and the Goverimient, 27 truck loads of people, went to
Cape Haitien, for the first time that wheeled vehicles had ever traveled that
ill.stance, for in the French days there was a gap about 6 miles across a
swamp, where they had to get out of their carriages and ride over on horseback.
The Chairman. You filled that in?
Gen. Butler. Yes, sir; we drained it and cut the water off and embanked it.
Mr. Howe. Who first proposed the use of the corvee?
Gen. Butler. I do not know, but I think it was a member of the Haitian
cabinet who produced this old law. The Government was heartily in favor of it,
and I would 1 ke to introduce a letter of congratulation from the President of
Haiti to me which indicates his approval.
The Chairman. By all means.
(Gen. Butler thereuixm read the letter referred to, as follows:)
PRftSIDENCE he LA RfePUBLIQUE,
Port au Ptince, le 10 janvicr, J9J8.
Gen. S. D. Butler,
Chef de la Gendarmerie d* Hatti, 'En Ville.
MoN Cher G^n^ral: Ma courte tourn^ du Nord s*est accomplie dans des
conditions trop agr^ables pour^que je n'^prouve pas le plaisir de vous exprimer
toute ma satisfaction et de vous remercier de la i)art que vous avez que dans
cet heureux r^sultat. CVst, en effet, grftce aux grands travaux de refection et
de r^aration des routes publlques entrepris sous votre intelligente et 6ner-
getlque <llrection que j'ai pu, en un si court espace de temps, me rendre dans le
Nord ott .1*ni constats, ft ma vive satisfaction lea progrfts r^alis^s dans les
regions vislt^s et Texcellent esprit qui anime leurs population. J'en augure
pour mon pays un brlllant ftvenir de prosp^rlt^ dans I'ordre et la paix.
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532 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
En vous adressant mes plus cordlales felicitations, il m'est imponnible de ne
penser k vos d6vou^ auxilliaires k qui vous vondrez bien transmettre Texpres-
slon de tolte la gratitude de mon Gouvemement.
VeuiUez agr^r, mon cher G^n^ral, mes meilleurs remerciements joints i mes-
sentiments toujours cordiaux.
Dabtiguenate.
[Translation.]
Presidential Seat of the Uepublic,
Port au Prince, January 10, 1918.
To Gen. S. D. Butler, •
Chief of the Qendarmerie,
d^Haiti, City.
My Dear General : My short tour of the north has been accomplished under
conditions so agreeable that I hasten to express my entire satisfaction and ta
thank you for the part that you have had in this gratifying result. It Is, in
fact, thanks to the extensive work of reconstruction and repair of the public
roads undertaken under your Intelligent and energetic direction, that I was able
in so short a time to reach the north, where I \dtnessed, to my lively Batisfac-
tion, the progress realised in the regions visited and the excellent spirit that
animates their inhabitants. I predict for my country a brilliant future of pros-
l)erity, amidst surroundings of order and peace.
Whilst tendering you my cordial felicitations, it is impossible to forget your
devoted assistants, to whom I beg you to express the gratitude of my Govern-
ment.
Kindly accept my sincere thanks and kind regards.
Dartiguenave.
Mr. Howe. Dur:ng the continuance of this system, until your departure, did
you ever receive any protest against the use of the corvee?
Gen. Butler. I never did, except in the case of employers who would come
and ask that the dates of the working of the men might be shifted from one
date to another in order that they might work on the plantations.
Mr. Howe. But there was no protest against the system?
Gen. Butler. No.
Mr. Howe. How long did the corvee workers have to work?
Gen. Butler. I do not remember the exact time prescribed by the law.
The Chairman. That is in the record, in the statement originally filed by
the department.
Gen. Butler. They worked exactly according to the Haitian law, no longer
and no less.
Mr. Howe. Did they ever attempt to escape or run away before their time
was up?
Gen. BuTLEB. No; and, in fact, after the completion of the road to Cape
Haitien, it was with the greatest difficulty that we got 4,000 of them to go home.
They were on our hands for a month, and it worried me to death to get food
to feed them. They enjoyed this dancing ; they enjoyed the footl ; and tliey
enjoyed the housing.
Mr. Howe. How far away did they live?
Gen. BuTiER. Right around in the neighborhood; but they liked this collec-
tion, they liked the big assembly, they liked the voodoo dancing, they liked the
visits, and, in fact, when I visited Haiti last year I visited a cotton planta-
tion run by a former gendarmerie officer, who hatl had these 4.000 men building
the road from Ennery to St. Michel, and he stUl had in his employ and had *
never been able to get rid of 1,200 of the original corvee laborers. I went out
and made speeches to them through an interpreter, and there was great shout-
ing and yelling. He had never been able to get them to go home.
There was not one single thing we ever did relative to the inhabitants of
Haiti that did not have the full knowledge and consent of the President of
Haiti, because I took it all to him ; I saw him dally.
Mr. Howe. Do you know of any instances where people escaping from the
corvee, or attempting to escape, were shot?
Gen. Blt-ler. I do not.
Mr. Howe. Did you ever hear of such instances?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 533
Gen. BuTLEB. I did, but upon investigation I found tlieiii to be groundless
rumors.
Mr. Howe. Through what instrumentality did you recruit the corvee?
Gen. BuTi.£R. The corvee was hardly recruited ; it was notified, and It came.
Mr. HowK. Who notified it? Who carried the cards?
Gen. BtjTTjai. Tlie cards were carried around by the local patrols, by the gen-
darmes who went out every day, but, as I said before, in this connection we
worked entirely with the local Haitian ofl)clals, who knew the people much
better than we did.
Mr. Howe. When you left the corvee system was in full blast?
Gen. Butler. In full blast, and, as I said before, Just before I left we made
a trip of 125 miles, the President and his cabinet and mj^self, in order to see it.
Mr. Howe. You have no particular knowledge of anything which might have
happened to lead to the stopping of the cor\'ee system?
Gen. BuTLEB. I have not, except that I have heard It was abused.
The Chairman. That is not your personal knowledge?
Gen. Butler. No; that is not my personal knowlwlge. I have no personal
knowledge. It .was stopped about seven or eight months after I left. I, know
nothing about that.
The Chairman. You were present in Haiti when the legislature was dis-
banded in 1916, were you not?
Gen. Butler. I was, sir.
The Chairman. The testimony of other witnesses has indicated that if men
^'orking on the corvee, or prisoners, were harshly used, that harsh usage was
attributable in great part to the native gendannerie. How were the gendarmes
recruited? Wliat method did you have for selecting men for service in the
gendarmes?
(»en. Butler, We had recruiting reguhitions and requirements. We took the
very best applicants.
The Chairman. What was the standard?
Gen. Butler. The standard was 5 feet 4 inches, if I remember correctly, to 6
feet. We started originally to take only those who could read and write, but
we could not find sufficient men to fill the gendarmerie. We examined theni
physically and mentally, and as nearly as we could, morally, and inquired about
them from the people among whom they lived In order to get the bestj»nmterial
we could.
The Chairman. How much were they paid?
Gen. Butler, They were paid .$10 a month and food and clothing — that is,
privates.
The Chairman. How would that compare with the going wage in Haiti?
Gen. Butler. That was 50 gounies a month, and the wage for an ordinary
mborer was a gourde a day, or about 25 gourdes a month.
The Chairman. And he fed himself?
Gen. Bun.ER. And he fed himself ; but we fed them.
The Chairman. You had every reason to get the best men obtainable at that
wage?
(Jen. Butler. Yes, sir. It cost us $275 per gendarme per year to feed, house,
and clotlie him, and give him his medical and dental attention.
The Chairman. The noncounnlsaioned officers of the gendarmerie were
drawn from the gendarmerie?
Gen. Butler. From the best class of privates.
Tbe Chairman. The greater part of the commissioned officers were enlisted
men or noncommissioned officers of the Marine Corps?
Gen. Butler. Originally, sir, all the captains and their seniors in the gen-
darmerie were commissioned officers of the Marine Poq^s. All the lieutenants
were noncommissioned officers in the Marine Corps, first and second lieutenants.
The Chairman. Have any Haitians been made connniasioned officers of the
gendarmerie, do you know?
Gen. Butler. During my time there were two or thre<» who wt^re made, at the
request and solicitation of the President, to act as lieutenants of his jx^rsonal
bodyguard. They were not in command of the body^nnird. We had Aniorican
officer?? and noncommissiontxl officers, but these were add tional lieutenants.
The Chairman. Since your departure do you know whether any Haitians
liave been made commissioned officers of the gendarmerie?
Gen. BUTT.ER. I believe there have been some, but I am not sure.
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534 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Chaibman. If under the treaty the American Government remains re-
sponsible for the gendarmerie, have you any Idea about the establishment of a
school for the training of officers of the gendarmerie?
Gen. Butler. American officers?
The Chaibman. Well, Americans, or natives?
Gen. BuTiJCR. If I had charge, I would apiwint no Haitian officers of the
gendarmerie, bec»ause they will abuse the natives. It is instinctive with them
to abuse the inhabitants whenever they are given |>ower. 1 would not liave
them, except as personal aids to the President.
The Chairman. In that connection, will you not give the comuiittee your
impressions of the administration of justice In Haiti, whether in the magis-
trates' courts or the courts of general jurisdiction of first Instance?
Gen. BuTi^ER. You mean, sir, whether it is well done?
The Chairman. Whether justice is sure
Gen. Butlkr. No, sir.
The (Mi airman. And prompt?
Gen. Brxi^ER. No, sir.
The Chairman. And easy to be had by the iMKjr man as well^as the rich?
Gen. Butler. No, sir. In numbers and numbers of instances pristmers had
been in jail years without trial, we discovered when we t(M)k over the prison
system.
The Chairman. 'When you took over the prison system you found in the
prisons, held by the Haitian authorities, numbers of prisoners who had been
there for years p«»ndiug trial?
Gen. Bt'tler. There was no reconf of when they had been put In, but, judging
l»y their physical ctmdltlon, they had bet»n there for years, with no records of
trials and charges of any kind.
The ( 'hairman. And in civil cases are the ccuirts intelligent ami Impartial?
Gen. Butler. No, sir. May I give you an Instance?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Gen. Butler. When an owner of a house desires to recover his proi>erty from
a renter
The Chairman. A delinquent tenant?
Gen. Bi^TLEK. A delinquent tenant, who has paid no rent probably for years,
the cour^ will an<l has, to my knowle<lge, made several decisions (»f this kind,
that the tenant can not be evicted until the tenant has found a suitable other
place to live, ami the court has fixed as much as six years for a tenant to find
other acconuiiodations.
The (^HAiRMAN. Do you think the whole judicature ought to be reformed?
Gen. Butler. I do, sir.
The Chairman. Do you believe It can be reformed without Amerlcjm as-
sistance?
Gen. Butler, It can not.
The (Chairman. Is there anything more Important to the tlevelopnient of
Haiti and its progress than the reformation of the judicature?
Gen. Butler. No. sir; It is the most important thing they have to (U).
The Chairman. You regard the establishment of order, the opening of com-
nmnleatlons, ami the Impartial administration of justice as the three funda-
mental things that are necessary?
Gen. Butler. The three fundamental things that are necessary.
The Chairman. Is there any officer among the Judge Advocate General's
subordinates, who, through his exi)erlence, Is competent to give the ctmimittee
a report on the adnnnlstratlon of justice In Haiti?
Gen. Butler. Not that I know of, sir. The Haitian courts, we did not trifle
with. We never Investigated them.
The Chairman. You mean y<m had nothing to do with them?
Gen. Butler. Nothing to do with them. We kept our hands entirely off the
Haitian courts. We advised with the President, and urged him to appoint
proper judges, but we never Interfered with the Haitian courts.
The Chairman. You do not know of any officer who might, outside of the
regular line of his duties, have observed the administration of justice in Haiti,
so that he might render an informed opinion?
Gen. Butler. No, sir ; no officer any more than any other. They all witneseed
the functioning of the Haitian courts.
The Chairman. I thouglit that possibly somebody under the Judge Advocate
General, with a natural bent for the profession, might have studied Ut
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 535
Gen. BtJTLER, No, firtr. The provisions of the treaty and the gendarmerie
agreement gave us no control over the Haitian courts, and we did not attempt
to exercise any.
The Chairman. General, a moment ago you agreed that the establishment of
order and the opening up of communications, and the impartial administration
of justice were the three bases of any progress. You have spoken of the
470 miles of highways which have been opened up. I have been interested to
learn what, if anything, had been done during the occupation for the Im-
provement of agriculture, including the improvement of live stoclc, whether
any breeding animals had been brought in, whether any experts In cotton or
cane growing had been brought in by the occupation to improve the quality of
the live stock owned by the peasant, and to improve the methods of agriculture
In the country?
Gen. BuTLEB. During my time, sir, the American Government sent down from
the Department of Agriculture two agricultural experts who spent, If I remember
correctly, two months in Haiti, and traveled all over It, accompanied by a
gendarmerie officer. They pointed out to us certain sections of land that should
grow certain products. On the strength of their recommendations, the gen-
darmerie then took government land in those sections and set up, or attempted
to set up, model farms for the growing of beans and potatoes. We grew potatoes
at an altitude of 6,800 feet, and made a number of experiments. The gen-
darmerie had two principal big farms, one near Cape Haitien In the north,
which you will see when you go down there, and one outside of Port au Prince.
These two farms were very successful during my period, and, as I understand
now, but one of them Is continued. The smaller district farms all disappeared,
as there was no money to support them, and there may have been a lack of
interest; I do not know. For the breeding of cattle we made several efforts
to Import breeding stock, but we were never able to get sufficient funds.
The Chaibman. From the Haitian Government?
Gen. Butler. From tlie Haitian Government, to bring In the cattle, but we
did have cotton men and cane men, and private cotton concerns establish
plantations.
The Chairman. Well, the sura, then, of the official effort was the study of the
country for some 8 or 10 weeks by two representatives of the Department of
Agriculture in Washington, and the creation of the experimental farms of
which you spoke?
Gen. Butler. You see, sir, the Department of Agriculture took a part of the
funds of the gendarmerie. We were doing this.
The Chairman. I understand that.
(Sen. Bm-ER. What funds we had we had to take from the gendarmerie in
order to do this. W^e had no support from the Department of Agriculture. It
was an independent effort on our part.
Mr. Howje. Had anything of the sort ever been undertaken by the Haitian
Government, to you knowledge?
Gen. Butler. Not that I ever heard of. The Haitian Government, except on
the part of the President himself, was not Interested In our efforts.
Mr. Howe. Now, as to the assembly, as I understand it, ordinarily there are
the .senators and the deputies in the Haitian (Congress? When they function
separately, they are known as the leg slature, is that correct?
(Jen. Butler. Yes, sir ; they have the legislative corps.
Mr. Howe. And sometimes they meet together, and then they are known as a
national as.sembly, is that the correct term?
Gen. Bltler. That Is correct, the national assembly.
Mr. Howe. And then sometimes they have met In a constitutional jlssembly?
Gen. BuTi^B. That Is correct.
Mr. Howe. And in April, 1916, there was a national assembly terminated by
the President of Haiti?
Gen. Butler. That Is correct
Mr. Howe. And in 1917 tliere was a constitutional assembly terminated by
the President of Haiti?
Gen. Butler. That is correct.
Mr. Howe. Did you have any personal part in, or have any personal knowl-
edge of, the termination in 1916 of the national assembly ?
Gen. Butler. I did not.
Mr. Howe. The assembly met in Port au Prince, is that right ?
6226^—21— pt 2 ^28
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536 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Butler. That Is correct.
Mr. Howe. Were you in Port au Prince at the time?
(Jen. Butler. I was.
Mr. Howe. But, in your official duties you had no official connection with that?
Gen. Butler. No official connection.
Mr. Howe. Or private connection?
Gent. Butler. No private connection either.
Mr. Howe. In 1917, when the constitutional assembly was terminated, did
you have any connection with It?
Gen. Butler. I did. ^, . . u
Mr. Howe. In 1916, what American officer or officers had anything to do with
the termination of the national assembly?
Gen. Butler. I do not remember. I think a lieutenant of the gendarmerie
serving directly under the orders of the President of Haiti, had something to
do with the keys of the assembly room, but I do not remember. It did not
come under my notice, officially or privately. .
Mr. Howe. Did you order officers on any detail connected with the closing of
that assembly?
Gen. Butler. No ; I did not order any one, and I knew nothing about It
Mr. Howe. And if any of your officers had been employed on any such work,
you would have known It, Is that correct?
Gen. Butler. Officially; yes. No order passed through me. Anything that
a gendarmerie officer did at the palace under the personal direction of the
President might not have come through me at all. They were under his per-
sonal orders, his bodyguard.
Mr. Howe. In 1917, will you describe what the President ordered, and what
part you took in carrying out his orders?
Gen. Butler. Shall I give you a detailed description, Senator?
About 10 o'clock, on the morning of the 19th of June, 1917, two members of
the Haitian Cabinet Dr. Heraux, Minister of Finance, and Mr. Cham, Minister
of the Interior, came to the headquarters of the gendarmerie, and Dr. Heraux,
speaking English very fluently, or quite fluently, said to me: "The constitu-
tional assembly Is making nasty remarks about the President"
Mr. Howe. Would that be the constituent assembly?
Gen. Butler. That is the constituent assembly. He said : ** The constitutional
assembly is making nasty remarks about the President. They are saying he is a
bad man, and he is dishonest, and that he is pro-American, and that at 1
o'clock they are going to impeach him, and the President, he do not want to be
Impeached, and he say to me, * You tell Gen. Butler to take the gendarmerie
and go down there and break them up? " I said, " That Is none of my busi-
ness. Dr. Heraux, and you know It I can not take the gendarmerie and go
down there and break up your legislature If the President wants that done,
he will have to do it himself. However, if he Issues a decree dissolving the
assembly, that is his own business." He said, " Let us go to the palace and
see what the President wants."
So we went to the palace, and on going upstairs an aide met us In the hall
and whispered that the President was sick, but that he ordered me to go down
with the gendarmerie and dissolve the assenibly. When I saw the President he
said, " Good morning," and said he was sick. I said I was very sorry, but that
I would like to find out what these orders were he was trying to Issue to rae
relative to the use of the gendarmerie. He came out of his room and went across
the hall into the Cabinet room and he said, " I want the assembly dissolved."
I said, "All right sir, then you must write a decree. It Is none of ray business.
I can not use the gendarmerie for that purpose without your written order."
He said, " I give you my order." He said he could not sign a decree without the
presence of the members of his cabinet, but that the assembly must be dissolved.
I said, " Then secure the member.*? of the Cabinet, and sign the decree." He said
that was imiwssible because (»ne of the members was In Cape Hatlen, and the
simplest way would be for me to go down with the military force and dissolve it
I positively refused to do It He then sent out and secured four of his five
ministers, and a decree which had been previously written, the original of which
I have here in my hand, was brought in to the Cabinet room, and the President
and his four cabinet ministers signed it, the President being the last one to
sign It He held it In his hand and said, " How shall we deliver it?" I said,
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 537
** Mr. President, it is customary for a member of your cabinet to take tbis and
read it' to the assembly."
The cabinet ministers looked from one to the other, and Dr. Heraux said,
"They do not want to take it. They will be hissed, and maybe they will be
shot" The President looked at me and said, ** You take it." I said, " I am per-
fectly willing to take it : I am Just a messenger, but there may be bloodshed."
There were gendarmes in the assembly room, sent there each morning before
the session to preserve order, at the request of the presiding officer, Mr. Stenio
Vincent, who was president of the Senate, and a man named Hillaire, who was
the presiding officer of the House of Deputies. When meeting as a constituent
assembly Vincent presided, but the two sat together behind the speaker's desk,
and at the request of the presiding officer the gendarmes were sent each morning
ns police to preserve order: and that same force — the police force — was at that
moment in the assembly room.
The Chairman. Under the conmaand of an American officer?
Oen. Btttler. Under the command of ^an American officer, a captain of
^farines and a major of gendarmes. When 1 said I was willing to carry this
message, I knew full well there might be shooting, as on one occasion a revolu-
tion started over the casket of a murdered President right in the church, so
they never stood on ceremony when they started to shoot. It was not desired
to have a cabinet minister shot, so I offered to take this down, which I did. I
walked into the assembly amid hisses and jeers, which had no effect, of course,
and nofified Mr. Vincent that I had a communication from the President of the
Republic. He came down from behind the speaker's desk, walked over to me
and said, " Let me see it," and I handed it to him and he read it and said, " 1
would like permission to read this to the assembly." I said, ** That is the reason
I brought it down here, so that you might read it" He went up behind the
desk, and Instead of reading it he entered into a vicious assault upon me
and all other Americans, and referring to us as foreign dogs 'and devils
dissolving the assembly. The gendarmes, who had previously been Haitian
soldiers, and who had taken part in this dissolving function about every six
months, had alwa.vs been accustomed to shoot at this stage of the game, and
when the President was criticized they all commenced to load their rifles, which
created consivierable confusion, and we had to susi>end operations until we ran
around and took all the cartridges out of their guns. I was their chief, and
they were Interested in my cause, because I paid them and fed them and treated
them squarely. Again we started, after the cartridges were withdrawn, and the
members settled in their seats.
The members were quite alarmed, and some of them took refuge under their
chairs, because on previous occasions a number of them had been shot by the
President*s soldiers. He started In again to make remarks derogatory to the
Americans, and the second time the gendarmes thought to themselves, as was
told me by one of their sergeants, " Surely the time has now come to shoot," and
they loaded the second time, which resulted In much confusion. We unloaded
them a second time and told the officers not to allow them to do that any more ;
that we wanted to finish with the meeting. And then Mr. Vincent read this, at the
conclusion of which he came down from behind the desk and advanced upon me.
The others were milling around and picking up their hats and their notes and
going out of the door. The meeting was out, and the presiding officer came
toward me waving this paper, and with a look of intense hatred upon his face,
and I thought to myself, "Now I am in for a cussing." Instead of that he
rushed at me and said, " General, I am hungry." It was the end of his political
career, that remark. He was waiving the paper around, and realizing that
soonor or later the Haitian (Government down there would dodge the Issue and
put the blame of this on the Americans, I just reached over and took it out of his
hand, and here It is.
The Chaibman. He said, " I am hungry? "
Gen. BuTiJCK. ** I am hungry," which was an invitation for me to Invite him out
to lunch.
Ths original decree belongs to the files of the Government of Haiti but not
i'aring to be held responsible or chargeil with exercising undue force In dis-
solving the assembly, and well realizing they might deny the existence of this,
I have kept it, and wish to place it in the files of the United States Senate, if
you will allow me to do so.
The Chaibman. File the original and the copy.
Gen. BuTLEB. This is the original and the translation.
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538 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
(The original of the decree referred to was filed with the committee, a
translation of which is as follows:)
[Translation.]
Decree — Dartigi'enave, President of Haiti.
C<>nsidering that in order to efficiently develop its agricultural, mineral, anJ
commercial resources, and to prepare a better chance of success for the gen-
erations to come, the Republic of Haiti has signed a convention with th«'
Republic of the United States.
Considering that in order to arrive at the application of this convention an«l
to derive all the benefits that it admits, certain constitutional reforms are
necessary, free of party spirit and inspired by the desire to launch the nation
into the channels of progress and civilization.
Considering that it is with this purpose that the two branches of the
Legislative Corps have been organized and called upon to achieve the consti-
tutional reform In the National Assembly, and that, far from being inspired
with the Idea which gave birth to the convention of September 16. 1915, and
(far from) offering to foreign capital the guaranty which it has the right to
expect, the National Assembly has had no other preoccupation than to 0ve
free rein to political rancor and to hinder the realization of the regenerative
program underfaken jointly by the two Governments. •
Considering that the national welfare makes It Imperative to end the spirit
of anarchy which animates the National Assembly and to adopt fitting meas-
ures in order to facilitate the development of agriculture, to organize seriously
the public education, and to stabilize the finances of the nation.
With the advice of tlie council of the Secretaries of State.
DECREE.
Article I. The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic are
dissolved.
Art. II. The present decree will be published and enforced with dispatch by
the Secretaries of State wherever concerned.
Delivered at the national palace at Port au Prince the 19th day of June. In
the one hundred and fifteenth year of Independence.
Dartigitenave, President.
OsMiN Cham,
Secretary of State of the Interior and Justice.
Ft^CY-CHATELAIN,
Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs.
Dr. Edmond Hkravx.
Secretary of State of Finances and Commerce,
Charge par interim icith PuUic M'orks and Agrii-uiture.
Secretary of State of Public Instruction.
Mr. Howe, Were there any subsequent developments to this prorogation of the
constituent assembly?
Gen. Butler. There were. One member of the cabinet resigned the next
morning, and all the members called upon the President In large bodies for
several days asking for other jobs. He was much worried by them. He had
no other Jobs to give them. There was no disorder. I was present when they
called, and saw the show. The old gentleman was much worried because he
had no positions for them. There was no disorder. In fact, the majority of the
people were well contented, as they expressed It
Mr. Howe, Was there any need for any action by the gendarmerie?
Gen. Butler. Not the slightest.
Mr. Howe. Did any other members of the United States Marine Corps take
any action Imlependent of the action of the gendarmerie in connection with this
prorogation?
Gen. Butler. No ; there were no marines present except those who were senr-
ing as officers in the gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. Were you personally armed w^hen you went down there?
Gen. Butler. I was not. ♦
Mr. Howe. You carried no weapons of any kind?
Gen. Butler. I carried no weapon, and never did while going around Haiti
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 539
Mr. HowK. Did you while you were at the chamber, during the time when
Yincent was talking or at any other time in the chamber, have a weapon in
your hands?
Gen. Butler. I did not, nor on my person. None of the other officers, except
as marks of the uniform, ever carried firearms except in line with troops. The
conntry was perfectly peaceful, and I went everywhere without arms and
took the President personally without firearms and never had a guard for him.
I took him all over Haiti in a Ford automobile without firearms of any kind.
Mr. Howe. What do you know about the state of the prisons down there
before the occupation, and what, if anything, was done about the condition of
the prisons during the occupation?
Gen. Butler. When the prisons were turned over to us by the President, they
were vile beyond description. There were no records to show when the prisoners
had been confined, and why they were confined, and when they were to be re-
leased. They were rotten with disease and filth, and it is impossible to de-
scribe them.
We rebuilt every prison in Haiti. \Ve had an allotment of $8,000 a month for
the maintenance of the prison system, that allotment being made by the financial
advisor from funds under his control derived from customs receipts. We started
two prison schools, one in the penitentiary in Port au Prince and one in the
prison at Cape Haitien. We reorganized the prison system, so that prisoners
with long terms to serve were transferred to the penitentiary in Port au Prince
under my personal observation, and I personally visited that prison on an aver-
age of once a day. Those with over 30 days and less than 6 months to serve
were placed in the prisons at Cape Haltlen and Aux Cayes, the two very big
ones. Those with 30 days to serve, the short timers, were placed in the local
district lockups. In the two big prisons at Cape Haitien and Port au Prince we
started industrial schools. The prisoners built the prisons themselves. We
taught them to do concrete work, and you will see when you go down there, -
Senator, that it is a model prison, with concrete cells. We taught them to make
furniture, to repair automobiles, to make shoes, to make clothing, to make
baskets, and taught them the tinner's trade.
The Chairman. Parenthetically, are there any trades in the island? Are
tiiere any handicraftsmen?
Gen. Butler. Yes ; those that I have mentioned.
The Chairman. You taught them, but there were none before?
Gen. Butler. Oh, yes ; they had certain trades, not very well performed, any
of them, but under the instruction of the commissioned or noncommissioned offi-
cers of the Marine Corps who had known these trades on the outside before
entering the service, these men were taught. The prison system developed to
such an extent that we granted prisoners liberty in the evening to go home,
and nearly every morning the roll call showed more prisoners than we were en-
tlUed to.
Mr. Howe. How do you account for that?
Gen. BuTLKR. Because they were well fed, well cared for, and well housed
and attended to medically. We attended to them and took care of them. There
was a regular uniform given them — to the liberty prisoners — and all except the
munierers would go home in the evening and spend the night with their families
and come back. The earnings which we derived from the sale of their products
we gave to their families, that weie naturally destitute during the time they
were in jail — such earnings as we c<mld get We made all the clothing for the
gendarmerie, shirts, trousers, and blouses, and made ourselves nearly self-
supporting.
Mr. Howe. Did you correct the records so that everybody in prison had a rec-
ord as to when he got in and as to when his term was up?
Gen. Butler. Unless there was some charge against a man or something defi-
nite, we released him and started afresh.
Mr. Howe. And thereafter kept these records?
Gen. Butler. And thereafter kept very accurate records.
It might be interesting for the Senate to know that during the year 1917,
when most of this prison work was done, there were about two violent deaths
in Haiti, which was considered by the President and all Haitians with whom
I talked as indicating a remarkably quiet state. Those were not shot by the
gendarmes; those were murders.
Mr. Howe. During that year, 1917, were there any engagements between the
gendarmerie and marauders or Cacos?
Gen. Butler. Not that I remember.
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540 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. To go back again to the prorogation of the constituent assembly,
I have one more question to ask. Did you at any time, or any one acting under
your orders, search the archives of the two chambers and remove certahi docu-
ments?
Gen. BuTLEB. I did not nor did anybody under my orders.
Mr. Howe. On June 20 or on any other date?
Gen. BuTLEB. No.
Mr. Howe. The document which you have produced here this morning, the
order of the President, you obtained from Vincent?
Gen. BuTLEB. Vincent himself.
Mr. Howe. At the moment?
Gen. BuTLEB. At the moment.
Mr. Howe. And in the presence
Gen. BuTLEB. Of all the assembly.
Mr. Howe. Of all the assembly?
Gen. BuTLEB. Yes.
The Chaibman. There are three points we want to cover — education, sanita-
tion, and a word about the physical condition and aspect of a town before and
after taking it
Gen. BuTLEB. Senator, I wonder if I might be permitted to go back and read
this decree of the President, dissolving the senate?
The Chaibman. We had It once ; It is in the record.
Gen. BuTLEB. Will you read It?
The Chaibman. Yes ; I read It in French Just now.
General, will you say something, first, about the physical condition of the
towns when you assumed command and at the termination of your command
of the gendarmerie, something about the sanitation, and, finally, something
about education?
Gen. BuTLEB. When we took over the police of Haiti on the 1st of February,
1916, we found no sanitary precautions In any town In Haiti. There was no
sewerage system even in Port au Prince.
The Chaibman. Had the streets of Port au Prince at that time been paved?
Gen. BuTLEB. Partially paved, sir, under a concession, and the pavUig was
continued throughout the time I was there. There was no water system In any
of the towns, with the exception of Port au Prince and Gonaives. There was a
water system In several of the larger towns, but very poor pressure. There was
one fairly good hospital In Haiti, and that was run by tlie sisters at Cape
Haitien. The others were abominable. There was absolutely nothing of a
sanitary nature. We immediately commenced to Influence the people in the
little towns, as well as the large ones, to clean up their habitations. In many
of the little towns, whenever the communal magistrate would allow us a little
money from his internal receipts and when we could spare any from the gend-
armerie funds, we bought little hand pumps and made little covered wdls,
instead of the open bucket well which was filled with disease. We put up little
street lanterns so that they might be able to see and go about to a certain time
at night; we built gutters and did whatever we could in a poor way, without
the expenditure of money, to make the towns more sanitary and inhabitable.
The Chaibman. Would they do any work, under your influence, in surfacing
the streets?
Gen. BuTLEB. Yes ; they worked very well under our influence.
The Chaibman. Did they surface the streets in the towns?
Gen. BuTLEB. Yes, sir; we surfaced the streets in the towns and built little
sidewalks, and we found in 90 per cent of the cases the heartiest cooperation on
the part of the civil officials and of the townspeople.
Mr. Howe. Who did the actual lat>or?
Gen. BuTLEB. The people of the towns themselves. We had no money to pay
them, and they would simply fix up in front of their habitatipns. It was their
own movement, just like the roads. Then, when a town had reached a certain
degree of cleanliness, and when they were very i)roud of it, tlie civil oflldals
' invited the President to come to see it, and it was an occasion of great rejoicing.
That was one of the methods used by us in encouraging them to dean up— the
promise of a big f^te day, with the presence of the President anil the gen-
darmerie there. They would make great efforts to clean up.
Mr. Howe. Under whose supervision wa« that work done, under the local
gendarmerie officer?
Gen. BuTLEB. Under the local gendarmeT-e officer. We had little diqiensarie^
with medicine, in every town. In which we had a medical officer or a membw of
the Hospital Corps of the Navy. r^^^^T^
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 541
Rather to show the confidence of the poorer people, the peasants, in our gen-
darmerie officers, one instance I would like to quote : In a town called Las
Cohobas a native woman brought her baby to the gendarmerie office for safe-
keeping while she went to market. That became in the towns quite the custom,
and we set up little nurseries where we took the babies and cared for them
while the women went out to work. The women do all the work; the men
do not work. The women are the hard workers.
The men do not do any work except what they have to do in accordance with
the law. They sit around and toast in the sun. Our sympathies were entirely
with the women, because they really did work. They walked miles and miles
to the markets. The life of the market women is rather interesting. One of
the curses of Haiti is the market system, because they are on the road all the
time. A woman left Las Cohobas one morning with a bunch of bananas, and
after traveling a whole week she came back one night with a bunch of another
fruit very similar to the banana. She spent a whole week, and she had one
less bunch of bananas when she got back than when she started out, but she
had all the gossip of that end of the world and she was well repaid.
The Chairman. Was there any complaint of the corv6e system on the part of
the women?
Gen. BuTLEB. No; the women enjoyed seeing the men work; they had been
sitting around so long. In fact, the market women developed this. They were
so anxiou.s to have decent places to walk, instead of scrambling down the stream
beds, that when they came along they would almost invariably stop and throw
stones on the roads. They were not required to work. They kept the nation
running while the men built the roads.
The school system was deplorable. In fact, there was no school system. They
had one on paper, with thousands of instructors, and the other day I quoted
the instance, to show the character of the instructors, of sending a check for
delivery to a school-teacher at Fort Liberty and instructing the gendarmerie
officer to get a receipt, and the school-teacher could not sign the receipt. He
said he was not a teacher of writing; he was a teacher of reading. From that
you can judge the character of their school system. We brought from Louisiana
a man who had knowledge of the Creole language. There are two languages in
Haiti, one Creole and one French.
The Chaibman. Could he speak the Creole patos?
GJen. Butler. Quite well.
The Chairman. Where did he learn that?
Gen. BuTT^ER. In Louisiana. It is similar to the Louisiana Creole. He had
to make a few changes, due to the distance. It changes a little. He became
a commissioner of education and an adviser to the minister of public educa-
tion. His work was not very successful, because advising a minister, unless
you have some power, is futile. So we in the gendarmerie branched out as
we did in agr'culture, and began to erect modest little schoolhouses of ma-
terial which we could obtain on the ground.
The Chairman. Where ditl you get the labor?
Gen. Butler. The labor was provided in the same way that we built the
streets.
The Chairman. The people volunteered?
Gen. Butler. They volunteered, and it was a long process. We hired one
stonemason to put it together, and then the rest, in the afternoons or some
time, would deposit b'g piles of stone, and he would work the next day. 1
hunted around and found quantities of scrap, corrugated Iron from burnt
buildings, some of them Government buildings, and collected that at the ja'ds,
and what was left after rebuilding the old jails, we used in the construction
of the schoolhousea We had no windows or doors, but simply high-walled tent
houses. During the time I was there we built 17 of the schoolhouses.
Mr. Howe. How about the teachers?
Gen. Butler. We had no direct control over the teachers. We simply made
recommendations when the teachers were unfit to teach, hut, of course, you.
could not get a very good teacher for 80 cents a month. Some of the salaries
were only 4 gourdes, or 80 cents a month, and you could not expect a very
good teacher for ttiat. They recommended that their pay be Increased, but
there was no money to do it.
Mr. Howe. Who brought about the sending of that adviser on education
that you have mentioned?
Gen. Butler. That was done by Gen. Cole, who commanded the American
marines there.
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542 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Are there any other matters which you believe the committee
should hear about as to the administration of the occupation in the island?
Gen. BuTi^EE. I do not think of a thin^. I touched the question of martial
law. That is the one danger point we have, Senator. You were not here.
The Chairman. You might take that up again. In connection with what I
have said with respect to the administration of justice, you might tell the com-
mittee whether you believe, in the event of a re-formation of their judicature,
the continuance of martial law would be necessary, provided, of course, that
the civil magistrates would do their duty without favor and without fear.
Gen. Butler. As long as the American troops stay in Haiti, an:l their courts
are as they are and will rema'.n, unless you change the Haitian characteristics,
it is unfair to our soldiers not to give them the protection of martial law.
The modified martial law that is now in existence makes a marine compara-
tively safe. That is, only offenses against the safety of our troops are triable
.or punishable by the martial law courts.
The Chairman. Do you not think it might be interesting. In this connection,
to study the capitulations between the foreign bureau of Turkey on .the one
hand, and Egypt on the other, and the system of the administration of justice
in Egypt, before the administration commits itself to a policy?
Gen. Butler. I think that might be welL I am not familiar with the
Egyptian system.
The Chairman. It Is a long time since I have studied it, but I am und»»r
the impression that in Egypt an assessor sits on the bench with the Egypt an
judge, and advises him in the formulation of his decisions.
Gen. Butler. That system is all right. Under the present system in Haiti,
the murder of a marine would call for nothing but commendation on the part
of the Haitian courts.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Thursday, November 3, 1921, at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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INQUIRY IKTO OCCUPATION AND ADMLMSTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
THTTBSDAY, NOVEMBEB 3, 1921.
Unjted States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Wathkiffton, D, C.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Senator
Medill McCormick (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators McCk)rmick and Oddie.
Also present: Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and Maj. Edwin
N. McClellan.
STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COL. ALEXANDER S. WTTiLTAMS, UNITED
STATES MARINE COBPS, ABMY WAB COLLEGE, WASHINGTON,
D. C.
Mr. Howe. CJolonel, will you give your name, rank, and present station,
please?
CoL Williams. Alexander S. Williams, lieutenant colonel, Marine CJorps,
Army War College, Washington.
Mr. Howe. You, as an officer of the Marine Corps, succeeded Gen. Smedley
Butler as commandant of the Haitian gendarmerie, did you not?
Col. Williams. Yes.
Mr. Howe. At what date?
Col. Williams. I was appointed chief of the gendarmerie on the 2d of May,
1918.
Mr. Howe. How long did that term of duty last? When did you cease 'to
be chief of the gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. I left Haiti on the 19th of July, 1919.
Mr. Howe. How long before you left did you cease to be chief of the gen-
darmerie?
Col. Williams. I was chief until the date of my departure.
Mr. Howe. Is that the correct title, chief of gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. That is the exact translation of the French title.
Mr. Howe, Had you been serving in Haiti before you became chief of the
gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. I landed in Haiti on the 15th of August, 1915, and was in
Haiti continuously, except for two periods of leave, until the date of departure.
Mr. Howe. That means just short of four years, then, Colonel?
Col. Williams. Just short of four years.
Mr. Howe. The gendarmerie, when you succeeded Gen. Butler, was recruited
up to substantially its full strength?
Col. Williams. Pra-ctlcally its maximum authorized strength.
Mr. Howe. Had you served with the gendarmerie before you became its
chief?
Col. Williams. Yes ; I was appointed assistant chief of the gendarmerie on
the 31st of August. 1916.
Mr. Howe. So you were assistant chief for a little less than a year and chief
for a little more than a year?
Col. AViLLiAMS. Assistant chief for nearly two years; but prior to that I had
been associated with the native police, which was developed into the gen-
darmerie, from the 2d of September, 1915.
Mr. Howe. At the time you became chief of gendarmerie, what were the
methods in use by which the chief could receive reports and communicate with
543
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544 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
his subordinates throughout the country? Can you give us a general descrip-
tion of your methods of communication and your methods of reiforting?
Col. Williams. When the organization of the native iK>lice, with a view to
its development into a national military police, was begun, the methods of com-
munication available throughout the Itepubllc were by telegraph, telephone,
mall, and mounted messenger. The wire communications were extremely ineffi-
cient, the mail communications were utterly unreliable, and courier service was
very slow and not dependable. The post did not increase in efficiency notably
until about three years of American occupation had passed. Wire communica-
tions increased in efficiency from the very beginning, because the l^nes were put
in repair by the marine personnel, and certain wire lines were erected and oper-
nte<l by marine personnel, so that the wire communications increased progres-
8lv*»ly in efficiency from the very beginning until the end, when they were nor-
mally fair. Communication by courier increased
Mr. Hov^. Just before you get off the subject of the wires, what type of cir-
cuit was there In use there? Did you have a metallic circuit?
Col. WiLi.iALis. No ; all the wire lines were ground return — that is, a single
wire, with an earth return — and subject to «»onstant interruption because of
the climatic conditions. The insulation would be largely lost because of rain;
and as in many stretches the wires were fastened to trees rather than to poles,
a windstorm would carry them away. In addition to that, the wires them-
selves were in a very bad state through constant breaks and splicing. I
counted between two poles at one time 110 splices.
Mr. Howe. AVhy was not a more efficient system in.stalled, do you know?
Col. Williams. Because the Haitian administration was not competent to
install one.
Mr. Howe. Were the funds available to the gendarmerie for the restoration
or improvement of the lines?
Col. Williams. The military commander, who disbursed certain Haitian
funds turned over to him by Admiral Caperton, I believe, allotted a small amount
for the purchase of material and for labor, but most of the repair was done with
marine expeditionary material and by marine personnel.
Mr. Howe. Is it correct to say that It was a lack of funds which really pre-
vented a further improvement In the wire communications?
Col. Williams. By the Haitian Grovernment, you meafa?
Mr. Howe. By the Haitian Government or by our military authorities?
Col. Williams. In the case of the Haitian Government, funds could have
been found for this purpose. In the case of repairs made by the American
military authorities, we were undoubtedly hampered by the lack of fimds and
personnel.
Mr. HowK. You were iroing on to speak of the road communications, or the
messenger communications.
Col. Williams. As we became faraUiar with the geography of Haiti and the
existing rond system, and found that certain couriers were reliable, and others
were not, and had determined approximately the necessary time for the trans-
mission of messages by courier, we were able to more efficiently conduct a
courier service, and also hold up the couriers themselves to a better standard
of performance.
Mr. Howe. How would you characterize the development of your courier
service? Did it become efficient?
Col. Williams. Its development to the point of efficiency was never reached,
because we finally brought about a fairly satisfactory system of wire com-
nninicaton. In the interior, however, we were dependent upon couriers to a
great extent, especially when the wire lines went out, and for limited distances
the courier service might be said to be fairly efficient.
Mr. Howe. Colonel, with these means at your disposal, what system was
possible by which you could supervise your command, and by which you could
learn of the performance of its duties by your command? How did you ke^
in touch with it?
Col. Williams. In the very beginning the headquarters of the gendarmerie
can hardly be said to have kept In touch ; communications were so bad. and ac-
cess to the more remote posts so difficult. With the improvement of the service
certain reports were called for. All officers who were charged with any in-
dividual responsibility were required to make, first, a monthly report which
gave every contact which the gendarmerie made with the Haitian society or
with Haiti. That report was divided into heads and subheads, and was very
complete, and was designed to give the chief of the gendarmerie a cross section
of the gendarmerie activities in any area.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 545
In addition to that» the ordinary mllftary reports of strength, health of the
<H>mmand. progress of barrack construction, progress in road worlc» condition
of the prisons, the inmates, etc. Also reports were obtained informally from
every available source. It was customary, for instance, for travelers of the
])etter class visiting Pourt au Prince to call on the chief of the gendarmerie,
Had when they did this they were cross-examined so far as possible regarding
conditions. In addition, the Haitian Government received from its various
officials reports covering their administrative work, and from time to time,
where these reports touched on the activities of the gendarmerie, either in
the way of favorable or unfavorable comment, excerpts from the reports
would he forwarde<l by the minister of the interior to the ch'ef of the gendarmerie
for his information, and sometimes with the request that an investigation be
made. The best means, however, that the senior officers of the gendarmerie
had of obtaining knowledge of what was going on in the country was by
visits. These visits were unannounced, followed no particular schedule, and
were consdere<l the most valuable means of keeping in touch with the work.
On these visits the chief of the gendarmerie, or the department commander
find the assistant chief, who also inspected, wa^ called upon by all the local
officials, and he discussed with them tlie conditions obtaining in their districts,
with particular reference to the work of the gendarmerie. These occasions
were considered very valuable indeed as a means of obtaining information,
and the local officials never hesitated to speak frankly, and often In a critical
fashion, of anything to which they might object.
Mr. Howe. Did the district commanders make reports of these meetings to
the chief and the senior officer as a rule? Say, If a district commander held
one of these meetings which you have described was that meeting and anything
that developed in It, reported to headquarters?
Col. Williams. Yes; If anything of note developed, mention would be made
of It Ordinarily, however, there would be perhaps three or four of these meet-
ings In one day, and they were, in certain respects, rather tiresome. No formal
report would be made that a meeting had been held In such a State and loca-
tion.
Mr. Howe. If anything unusual, however, came up, it would be reported?
CoL Williams. It should have been reported, and it usually was.
Mr. Howe. And were these visits comprehensive? Did they cover all posts?
Col. WnuAMS. In my own case, I visited all but three, I think, of the
gendarmeries posts, and they were so remote and of so little Importance that
I could not spare the time for the detour necessary to visit them.
Mr. Howe. Did the district commanders, however, visit the posts In theh*
command with fair frequency?
Coh Williams. The district commanders were required to visit all posts
in their commands quite frequently. I have forgotten what the regulation
«aid in the matter. The subdlstrlct commanders made more frequent visits
than the district commanders, and the department commander visited all
h^dqoarter posts in his department at certain intervals, and all subdlstrlct
posts in his department at certain Intervals — ^just what they were I have
forgotten.
Mr. Howr. But these visits were systematized?
Col. Williams. The visits were systematized In that they must be made
within certain periods, but they were not on a schedule of dates.
Mr. Howe. In case any emergency came up, were there no means available
for the officer in the outlying country to receive Instructions or to ask them
from headquarters?
Col. Williams. In the large cities It was comparatively easy to get In
communication with headquarters. In many of them It was possible to get
into direct telephonic communication. I speak now of the later development
of the wire lines. In the smaller posts It was sometimes very difficult, but
unless the methods of communication had been Interfered with by hostile na-
tives, there would be but one post, I think, more than two days beyond com-
munication with headquarters. That means that a courier from that post
would probably take two days to reach the nearest reliable wire station.
The CHAIRMAN. How many of such posts were there?
CoL Williams. I think there was but one, I may say, however, that an
officer might wire with full confidence of receiving an answer and the mes-
sage never go through. There were a good many relay points on these wire
lines.
The Chairman. Who were the operators?
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546 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Col. Williams. The operators were Haitians.
Mr. Howe. Under those conditions, Colonel, what confidence cojild head-
quarters have of knowing of all cases of irregularity in the conduct of the
gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. Its confidence in l^nowing of the regularities Immedately
following their occurrence was fairly good ; of knowing of them eventually it
was excellent. No irregularity, and I speak from recollection of personal
instances, could ohtain over any considerable period without knowledge coming^
to headquarters from unofficial sources, or from the Haitian Government itselt
Mr. Howe. When serious irregularities were heard of, or reported at head-
quarters, was an investigation always made?
Col. WnxiAMa An investigation was made of any report, however al)snrd
it might seem on its face. A great part of our officers' work was Investigating^
reports which on their face were unworthy of credence.
Mr. Howe. In general, all these answers of yours would apply to the tinie
during which you were chief of the gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. Yes ; except where I spoke specifically of the great inefficiency
of the wire communications.
Mr. Howe. During tlie time you were commander how many Instances were
reported to you of the killing of natives who, at tlie time they were killed, had
already been taken prisoner, and without trial?
Col. Williams. I can remember two instances. The dates I can not give, but
the location and the attendant circumstances I remember fairly well.
Mr. Howe. Those are the cases of which you heard, as distinguished from
cases investigjited and either disproven or confirmed?
Col. Williams. These were both investigated.
Mr. Howe. Is two the total number of which you heard?
Col. Williams. Oh, no.
Mr. Howe. I-^t me qualify that question a little bit more. KUlings for which
the responsibility was attributed to white officers of the gendarmerie? I am
excluding any killings which you may have heard of, unauthorized killings by
native members of the gendarmerie, but I am referring to reports of unau-
thorized killings of native prisoners on the responsibility of white officers of
the gendarmerie. How many such reports did you receive? If you can not re-
member exactly an approximate answer would suit my purposes for the present
Col. Williams. I am trying to remember whether or not any came to my
notice. I do not remember any report ever having been made of the killing of
prisoners on the responsibility of a white officer.
Mr. Howe. You mentioned a moment agr) two cases of which you could not
remember the precise dates, but where you could describe the attendant circum-
stances. Which were those two cases? Can you give the names of the officers
involved for the purpose of identifying them?
Col. Williams. In neither case was a white officer involved. They y/ece
unjustified killings of pris(mers by gendarmes, and in both cases the gendarme
was court-martialed and punished. I think in one case sentenced to death and
executed, but in the other case I do not remember what the punishment was.
Mr. Howe. Before we get to those, let me ask you if you are, in general,
familiar with the contents of the investigation conducted by Maj. Turner, Col.
Hooker, and Col. Lay, with the investigation conducted by Gens. Lejeune and
Butler, and with the Mayo court of inquiry?
Col. Wi.lliams. I am familiar with the investigation conducted by Maj.
Turner to the extent to which I was a party. I was i)er8onally interrogated by
Col. Lay. I was at that time given an opi)ortunity to hastily look over the
testimony of other witnesses. Of the proceedings of the Mayo court and of -the
investigations conducted by Oens. Ix»jeune ^d Butler I know nothing.
Mr. Howe. Then, let me ask you this : In those three investigations there were
charges investigated and testimony taken which brought in the names of Lieut.
Brokaw, that, in the first Instance, came up in the Johnson court-martial record:
the case of (^apt. Lavole, charged with having prisoners killed ; of Lieutenant,
I think it was Lang, who was charged with killing a native unjustifiably; Lieut
Williams, charged with killing the notary, Garnler — I do not mean in the strict
sense charged, but accused in some manner — and an officer about whom a resi-
dent called Liftshitz testified, he referring to that offic»er by the name of
Koskoski. Did you learn anything of the circumstances connected with these
accusations against those officers whom I have mentioned?
Col. Williams. Your question makes it necessary that I amend my answer
to a previous one where I stated that I had received no reports of any un-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 547
authorized killings under the authority of a white officer. I meant by that
that I had received no reports of such killings when action lay in my liands.
With the cases you mention I am more or less familiar.
Mr. Howe. Will you please explain a little bit further just what you mean
by that?
Col. Williams. The status of a gendarmerie officer in Haiti was rather
anomoloos. He was serving under a commission issued by the President of
Haiti on the nomination of the President of the United States, and in this
capacity he was subject to such control as the Haitian Grovemment chose to
exercise. At the same time he remained a member of the American naval
forces. As such he was included in the personnel of the Marine brigade serv-
ing in Haiti, and all American officers and noncommissioned officers serving
with Haitian commissions were organized as the constabulary detachment of
the United States Marine Corps and were a part of the brigade organization.
The Ohaibman. They were subject to the orders of the commandant of the
gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. They were subject to the orders of the commandant of the
gendarmerie, both under the gendarmerie regulations which had Haitian sanc-
tion and as members of the constabulary detachment, which was an organiza-
tion of the Marine Corps.
The Chairman. The commandant of the gendarmerie, then, was responsible
for the discipline and tiie conduct of the Marine Corps officers and men de-
tached for service in the gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. Within the limitations of the authority laid down in the
Navy regulations for the commanders of small organizations when Included In
larger ones. The authority of the chief of the gendarmerie with respect to
the American personnel of the gendarmerie was that of the commander of a
company post. He could, for Instance, order summary courts on the enlisted
personnel, and he could pimish officers to the extent permitted by the Navy
regulations.
The Chairman. What steps were necessary for him to bring olfenders before
general courts-martial?
Col. Williams. He would have to recommend their trial to the brigade com-
mander, who was authorized to order general courts.
The Chairman. Who was responsible for the regulations of the department
governing the conduct and discipline of officers in this detachment? W^hence
were they issued?
Col. Williams. They were never Issued; they always existed. We were
still officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps and were governed in that
status by the existing Naval regulations and orders.
The Chairman. Who, then, was responsible for the orders governing the
discipline of the gendarmerie?
Ool. Williams. The gendarmerie regulations were prepared largely by Gen.
Butler and myself, and after approval by the President of Haiti became oper-
ative for all who were serving In the gendarmerie, either American officers or
^enlisted men.
The Chairman. Then you and Gen. Butler were responsible, or If he was in
command at the time he was responsible, for the regulations of the gendar-
merie?
Col. Williams. If you mean the regulations of the gendarmerie
The Chairman. Well, for the rules governing their discipline?
Col. Williams. The rules were prepared by Gen. Butler and myself with the
advice and counsel of various people, and submitted to the Haitian Govern-
ment, and the Haitian Government approved them, an approval which was
required, I believe, by the treaty, or the gendarmerie agreement, and then be-
came the regulations for the interior administration of the gendarmerie.
The Chairman. The rules governing the discipline of American officers serv-
ing with the gendjirmerie, then, were those of the American Navy In force be-
fore the occupation began, of course?
Col. Williams. Yes.
The Chaibman. Supplemented by those authorized by yourself. Gen. Butler,
and others, and sanct'oned. by the President of Haiti?
Col. Williams. Not supplemented. Senator; they were concurrent.
The Chairman. Well, concurrent. If you please.
Col. Williams. There were two sets of regulations for the regulation of the
personnel.
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548 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. The gendarmerie regulationfl did not authorize a general court-
martial. Was that right?
CJol. Williams. They did.
Mr. Howe. For American officers?
Col. Williams. Not for American officers, but for members of the Haitiaih
gendarmerie whose conduct merited such trial.
Mr. Howe. Would that include American officers?
Col. Williams. One test case was made, and a lieutenant whose name I have
forgotten was tried by a gendarmerie general court-martial, and I believe
sentenced to dismissal. He protested against this. How far his protest was
carried I do not know — I was not chief at the time — ^but it was not sustained,
and he was separated by the sentence of the court from the gendarmerie and
reverted to the status of an enlisted man in the Marine Corps. He was thea
transferred from the constabulary detachment 'to the brigade and continued
to serve, I assume, as an enlisted man In the brigade. No other officer was
tried. We did not have the available material for their trial.
Mr. Howe. Now, Colonel, to illustrate that explanation which you gave a
while ago as to your knowledge of these cases which I mentioned, as I under-
stand it, you said that none of these cases was reported to you during the
time in which you could take action?
Col. Williams. I meant by that that the report was either investigated by
the brigade commander who assumed jurisdiction, and that was true in the
case of Brokaw
Mr. Howe. Who was brigade commander?
Col. Williams. Gen. Catlin.
Mr. Howe. He assumed, as I understand it, Jurisdiction before the report
had reached you or before you had had an opportunity to investigate. Was
that correct?
Col. Williams. That was true in the case of Brokaw. In the case of Lavoie,.
Williams, and Lang Gen. Catlin made the investigations liimself and assumed
jurisdiction. Of Lang's case I do not know, except as I heard incidentally.
Mr. Howe. Then the first report, or the first action in the case of theae
officers whose names I have mentioned, Brokaw, Lavoie, Lang, Williams, and
one more mentioned by Lifshitz, was taken, in the first place, by the brigade
commander?
Col. Williams. By the brigade commander.
Mr. Howe. Did you learn officially, or at first hand otherwise than officially,
of any of the circumstances in any of these cases? For instance, take the
Brokaw case, Brokaw being the officer alleged to have directed Pvts. Johnson
and McQuilkin to shoot prisoners.
Col. Williams. In the case of Brokaw I know nothing at first hand. The
investigation of that case was conducted by the brigade commander, and
final action was taken by him. Do you want the circumstances of that case?
investigation of that case was conducted by the brigade commander, and
ordered the court-martial of Pvts. Johnson and McQuilkin?
Col. Williams. The brigade commander. I had no authority to order gen-
eral courts on members of the marine personnel.
Mr. Howe. Did the brigade commander, however, take action in those cases
on your report or suggestion?
Col. Williams. I know nothing whatsoever about those cases, except as I
have heard.
Mr. Howe. Did the killings allege<l In those cases take'|)luce while you were
commander of the gendarmer.e?
Col. Williams. Yes; but the men involvetl were not miMuhers of either the
gendarmerie or the constabulary detachment.
Mr. Howe. That is it, they were out as members of the Marine Corps, on
telephone duty, is not that it, and not under your jurisdiction?
Col. Williams. On what duty they were I do not know ; they were not under
my command.
Mr. Howe. In the case of Capt. Lavoie, as I understand it. he has never lieeii
court-martialed. What did you learn d*re(ftly about the case of (^apt. Uivole?
Will you go into that fully?
Col. W^illiams. Early in March, 1919, I visited central Haiti with Gen. Catlin-
Gen. Catlin wished me to go along, and letl me to believe that he had receive*!
reports in regard to conditions in central Haiti which warrante<l an Investiga-
tion. I accompanied him on this trip, but was not present at his examination of
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' INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 549
Williams or Lavoie. In fact, his investigation was conducted without my
presence designedly.
The Chairman. How designedly — designedly on his part or yours?
Col. Williams. Designedly on his part, and I agreed with him. It was
thought that the presence of the chief of the gendarmerie, who had consider-
able prestige among the natives, would perhaps influence the native witnesses
to reticenc-e. I agreed with Gen. Catliu in this, and also pointed out to him that
the exclusion of the chief of the gendarmerie would have a reflex so bad as to
more than offset, In my opinion, any benelits which followed my absence. That
reflex would be in the minds of the natives, that the chief of the gendarmerie,
the biggest man they ever met, was now ent.rely discredited, and the Haitian
being an opportunist by tradition and dlspos.tion, would see an opportunity to
phice himself in favorable light in the eyes of the new man by telling things
discreditable to the old one and his administration.
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, how was this tour of investigation or
inspection conducted?
Col. Williams. Gen. Catlin first sent for the local officials and questioned
them regarding conditions in the district. He sent for the local priest and
questioned him.
The Chairman. Were you, as a matter of fact, excluded from most of th^se
investigations?
Col. WiiJ-iAMS. I was, as I said, designedly excludeil.
The Chairman. Now, in the case of Capt. Lavo.e, did you take any part in
that investigation whatsoever?
Col. Williams. I took no part in the investigation, but after Gen. Catlin
had interviewed Lavoie over a considerable period, privately. Gen. Catln sent
for me and told Lavoie to repeat before me that which he had told liim relative
to the execution of certain prisoners.
The Chairman. And what did Capt. Lavoie say then in your presence and
that of Gen. Catliu?
Col. Williams. Lavoie stated that he had caused to he executed a certain
number of prisoners. Six or seven is in my mind — how many he exactly stated
I do not remember. That concluded the investigation so far as I was Involved.
The Chairman. Did he say nothing of the circumstances under which the
execution was done?
Col. WiLLL\MS. He explained how this execution had been carried on.
Mr. Howe. And where?
Col. WiLLLVMS. And where.
Mr. Howe. Will you tell lis what he said as well as you can recollect it?
Col. Williams. He said these men
The Chairman. Where was he stationed, at Hlnche?
Col. WnxiAMS. At Hlnche. He said that the men were well known Cacos,
as he called them ; that«they had been captured re<ihanded ; that the civd courts
of Haiti gave no assurance that they would be punished ; that the only agency
for their punishment was the marine provost court in Cape Haitlen.
Mr. Howe. The marlno provost court?
CoL Williams. The marine provost court, and that that court had been lim-
ited by recent orders to six months confinement, and a very considerable gold
fine, which would be beyond the capacity of any Haitian to pay, that Is any
Haitian of the peasant class; that if sentenced to six months, good conduct
would reduce it to four, and then they would be back on his hands and aug-
ment the bands which he was then trying to put out of business. That was
his explanation of his reason. He did not go Into the details of the execution,
but said that It had been carried out a short distance from town.
Mr. Howe. Prom what town?
Col. WiLUAMs. From the town of Hinche, on the road leading to Maissade^
and that It had been carried out by a detachment of gendarmes. That was, as
far as I recollect It, what he said.
The Chairman. By his orders?
Col Williams. Yes; the execution.
Mr. Howe. The execution had been carried out by gendarmes by his orders?
Col. Williams, py his orders.
Mr. Howe. Did he fix this by date at all?
Col. Williams. I do not think he did ; If he did I do not remember.
Mr. Howe. It was, however, the only occurrence of that kind of whirh he
spoke to you and Gen. Catlin?
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550 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND ^ANTO DOMINGO.
CJoL Williams. I do not know what he said to Gen. Catlin.
Mr. Howe. To you and Gen. Catlin together, I mean.
Col. WiLUAMs. Together, that was the only case of which he spoke.
Mr. Howe. Before you and Gen. Catlin?
Col. Williams. The only case of a killing that was spoken of.
Mr. HowB. Is that all that you recollect of the talk there between Capt
La vole, you and Gen. Catlin?
Col. Williams. I think Gen. Catlin and I discussed the extraordinary as-
pects of this case.
Mr. Howe. But was that in the presence of Capt. Lavoie?
Col. WnxiAMS. No.
Mr. Howe. So that was all of what Lavoie said at that time, in yom presence?
Col. Williams. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Then you did have a discussion with Gen. Catlin thereafter?
Col. WnxiAMs. I believe we did.
Mr. Howe. Do you know why charges were not then preferred against
Lavoie? What is. the reason they were not? Why did you not prefer charges
at that time?
Col. Williams. I did not prefer charges because the case was out of my
hands, my immediate military senior having taken cognizance of it Why
Gen. Catlin did not prefer charges I can not state, because he never told me
directly. From the general tenor, however, of the entire investigation, I am
led to believe that, despite Lavole's statement, who is a wild talker, Gen.
Catlin was not convinced of the truth of it. That, however, is an assumptioD
on my part.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, Gen. Catlin will be called as a witness, I hope
next week, before this committee, and will, of course, be interrogated on this
point when he appears as a witness.
As to L'eut. Williams, did you make any investigation yourself, or were you
present at any investigation in his case? I mean the Lieut. Williams who
was charged with killing the native notary, Garnler?
Col. Williams. Lieut. Williams is the subdistrict commander at Maissade. Gen.
Catlin and I, with several other officers. Gen. Catlings interpreter, and a priest
from St. Michel, went to Maissade by motor. There Gen. Catlin interrogated cer-
tain of the civil officials and asked if there were any gendarmes who wished to
make any complaint against Lieut. Williams, their commanding officer. What
Gen. Catlin heard from the civil officials I do not know. I was again
desgnedly excluded. In the case of the gendarmes I was also excluded
designedly, but was asked by Gen. Catlin to be present when they repeated what
they had told him. Their complaints about Lieut. Williams were not pertinent
to Catlin's investigation of conditions, so the allegations made against Williams
were founded upon an investigation at which I was not present I must modify
that. One of the witnesses whom Gen. Catlin interrogated was also directed
by Gen. Catlin to repeat what he had told them. That was in reference to the
death of Gamier Jean. The allegations made against Williams were not, as
far as I could make out from my part in the investigafon and subsequent in-
vestigation.s, substantiated in any degree by the witnesses, but the investiga-
fon having been taken over by Gen. Catlin, I made no official investigation in
the sense of having a board investigate it ; I investigated it myself.
Mr. Howe. The Lang case you know nothing about?
Col. Williams. Of the Lang case I know nothing.
Mr. Howe. The Mayo court of Inquiry heard the Lang case, and, as I un-
derstand it, Mr. Chairman, exonerated Lieut. Lang entirely, but the facts
of that will api)ear when the record of the Mayo court is put in evidence here,
as it will be.
These cases, I believe, Colonel, that I have mentioned are all of the principal
cases which were developed in the course of these investigations. Do you know
whether the statements made by these witnesses before you, when "requested to
do so by Gen. Catlin, were substantially the same statements as they had nmde
before Gen. Catlin previous to mak'ng them before you?
Col. Williams. In the case of Lavoy, Gen. Catlin did not indicate in any
way that what he told me differed substantially from what he had told him.
In the ca.se of those witnesses who were asked to repeat before me that which
they had told Gen. Catlin in the case of Williams, I think there were some dif-
ferences, and I think they were substantial. I do not remember just what the
details were. There were some questions that came up in regard to the in-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 551
terpretation. If I may explain at this time, Creole Is the language of the
Haitian peasant, but Creole differs in the differ^it parts of tlie country. There
is the south Creole, the north Creole, ai>d central Creole. The interpreter, a
Haitian named Holly, at that time did not seem to well translate central
Creole, but whether the differences in statement between those made to Gen.
CatUn alone and to Gen. Catlln and me together were due to the interpreter or
to being entirely different, I do not remember.
Mr. Howe. These were, of course, the cases of native witnesses that you are
referring to now?
Col. WiujAMS. These were all native witnesses. There were no other
witnesses.
• Mr. Howe. Then, aside from Brokaw, Lavoy, and Williams, you know of
no other accusations having been made against any of the white gendarmerie
officers in connection with the killing of native prisoners; is that it?
Col. Williams. I believe one officer was tried by general court-martial in
connection with a killing. That was Hamilton.
Mr. Howe. Then, adding the name of Hamilton, those were all that you
heard of?
Col. Williams. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Then the only killings of prisoners under the orders of white offi-
cers down there or by white officers are the ones of which these people that I
have mentioned were accused, these officers that I have mentioned?
Col. Williams. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Do you believe there were any more killings than those, suppos-
ing even that those took place?
Col. WuuAMs. From my knowledge of the gendarmerie American personnel, a
very intimate knowledge gained during the close association of four years,
my belief is that the gendarme officer was inspired by a very high sense of
duty; tlmt he considered his paramount duty, first, to do everything which
would advance the interests of the Haitians; second, to do everything which
might reflect credit on the Marine Cori)s. Aside from this conception of duty,
they all showed the greatest friendiliness and sympathy for the natives. They
identified themselves witli every local movement for the betterment of their dis-
tricts, and not only developed an acquired national spirit but a district pride,
which made them jealous and resentful of what they would consider favoritism
shown in allotting more funds to one district than to another. Their relations
with the natives were vei*j' friendly ; they were spoken of highly by all classes,
though criticized from time to time for what might not meet with the approval
of the people, and it is difficult for me to believe that any gendarme officer
would deliberately kill or cause to be killed a native who was under his control.
I except those when in military operations.
Mr. Howe. And you referred to what might be described as cold-blooded kill-
ings of natives after they had become prisoners?
CoL WnxiAMs. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And you, therefore, do not believe that, aside from these possible
cases which have been mentioned, that there were any of those cold-blooded
killings under the direction or by gendarmerie officers?
Col. Williams. I not only do not believe that there were any others, but I
am far from convinced that the ones alleged occurred.
Mr. Howe. As alleged?
Col. WnxiAMs. As alleged. I may say in this connection that I have no
doubt whatever that many natives were killed by the native personnel of the
gendarmerie. I say that because I had occasion to try a number by court-
martial, and turned over to the civil authorities for trial by the criminal courts
a number who, without any good reason, had killed prisoners or people whom
they were about to make prisoners.
Mr. Howe. I want to come back to that branch of your testimony and go into
it thoroughly. Before we get there, there is just one other matter I want to
ask you about, Colonel, in connection with the white officers of the gendarmerie.
Had you reason to suppose while you were chief of the gendarmerie that any
officers under your fommand directly or indirectly encouraged the killing of
prisoners?
Col. WiuJAMS. I had no reason to believe it and every reason not to believe it.
I attempted by personal conversation and in written communications to in-
doctrinate all the officers, and I hoped through them to indoctrinate the native
personnel with the idea that no life must be taken and that no suffering must
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552 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
be inflicted unless it was absolutely necessary to the legal carrying out of
police duties or military operations.
Mr. Howe. To be more specific, have you any reason to believe that Maj.
Wells encouraged officers under his command to kill natives after the natives
had been taken prisoner? I refer to Maj. Wells, who was, I believe, a district
commander.
Col. Williams. He was a department commander in north Haiti. From an
intimate association with Maj. Wells, I do not believe that Maj. W^ls ever
encouraged, much less directed, the killing of prisoners. I say that from a
knowledge of his character, from a realization that such things would be
counter to gendarmerie policy, and, thirdly, because Maj. Wells would have con-
siderable difficulty in having such orders carried out. The subordinate officers
I do not believe would lend themselves to any such program. And, moreover,
the fact that such orders had been issued or such things resulted would sooner
or later come to me.
Mr. Howe. And it did not come to you?
Col. Williams. And it did not come to me.
Mr. Howe. Later on in the course of some of these investiagtions, the inves-
tigation by Maj. Turner, some witnesses testified that Maj. Wells had used
language to this effect to them : " I do not want to have any prisoners taken ;
you know what to do with the prisoners." You never heard of Maj. Wells using
such language to his subordinates, or giving such directions to his subordinates,
or making such suggestions to his subordinates, during all the time he was
under your command?
Col. Williams. No.
Mr. Howe. Or at any other time?
Col. Williams. Such parts of the investigation that have come out or come
to my knowledge informed me of that allegation.
Mr. Howe. But that is your only Information?
Col. Wilijams. That is all I know of it. *
Mr. Howe. On the subject?
Col. Williams. On that subject.
Mr. Howe. Is there any further statement you care to make about Maj. Wells
or the accusations against Maj. Wells? What was his first name — which Maj.
Wells?
Col. Williams. Clarke H. Wells.
Mr. Howe. That is the Maj. Wells to whom we have been referring hei:e?
Col. WnxiAMS. Yes. Maj. Wells, I understand. Is further alleged to have
Informed his district and subdistrict commanders that they were to report tran-
quillity in their districts, whereas, in fact, conditions were far from peaceful.
I can not reconcile that with the common sense which distinguishes Wells.
It was unnecessary. I knew, and it was a matter of common knowledge, that
conditions were not tranquil in these districts, and, moreover. It would be im-
possible for the attack of a small gendarmerie post and the killing of several
gendarmes to be passed over in that fashion. A knowledge of that would have
to coine to me. Wells could not conceal it, and I therefore do not believe that he
Issued such orders.
Mr. Howe. Now, as to killings of natives by native members of the gen-
darmerie, have you any reason to believe that such killings occurred — I mean, of
native prisoners?
CoL Williams. I know they occurred. I had occasion to investigate a great
many ; and where there was any hope of obtaining evidence sufficiently credible
to warrant trial, these gendarmes were brought to trial. Sometimes they were
convicted and sometimes acquitted.
Mr. Howe. Before what tribunal?
Col. Williams. Before the gendarmerie general court-martial, authorijsed
by the gendarmerie regulations, which could give the death sentence, subject
to the approval of the President.
Mr. Howe. The President of Haiti?
Col. Williams. The President of Haiti.
The Chaibman. Were any men executed as the result of these trials?
Col. Williams. My recollection is that only one man was executed, and he
was executed, I believe, in the town of Ouanarainthe. He had been convicted
by the gendarmerie general court-martial of murder. Whether it was a pris-
oner, or what not, I do not remember. You must understand. Senator, thiat I
had hundreds and hundreds of <!ourt8 to look over, and I do not remember the
details.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 553
The Chaibman. In that connectioD, Ck>lone], I want to ask if, in killing
prisoners without trial, the gendarmerie did something which had never before
been done in Haiti, or If, in your judgment, they d^d that which, under the
old administration, had been done by the forces subject to the command of the
generals arrondissement, etc.?
Col. Williams. For the unauthorized killing of prisoners, there Is an unin-
terrupted series of precedents running back to that established by Cacique
Caonabo in 1492.
The Chaibman. Is that a Caribbean chieftain?
Col. Williams. Columbus discovered Haiti in 1492, and the Santa Maria
was lost in the waters near what is now Cape Haitien, and out of the timbers
of the Santa Maria he built Fort Nativity. He left in that fort, not being
able to accommodate them on his reduced fleet, about 29 Spaniards. These
Spaniards were so brutal in their treatment of the natives, a very harmless
lot, and so exigent in their demands that gold be produced that the natives
in the north, under the leadership of the Cacique Caonabo, massacred every
last one of them, and destroyed the fort
The Chaibman. You think, then, that certainly during the period of the
existence of the Haitian Republic executions without trial were customary?
Col. Williams. I would not say customary; I would say they were very
usual. Our greatest problem In the organization of the gendarmerie was the
gendarme. Our little experience with him had led us to believe that he was
utterly indifferent to the value of human life; that he was prone to make
the most of his police authority, and very liable to exceed it. His treatment
of prisoners was generally brutal. The earlier arrests were attended by great
ill treatment of the prisoner, usually by clubbing, and it was with the greatest
difficulty, by the Infliction of the severest punishments, that his attitude
toward prisoners became materially modified. One of my best noncommissioned
officers,^ an Engllsh-speaklns: gendarme, made an arrest in the town of Leogane.
For some reason which I have forgotten I was Interested in this particular
arrest, and sent for the corporal when he returned to the capital. He said
that the prisoner had been left by him in Leogane. Why? Because the prsoner
had attempted to escape, and he had shot him in the leg. I had hlra explain
the circumstances of the attempted escape, and the corporal told me, and
they seemed reasonable and would have justified firing on the escaping pris-
oner. I then asked him what measures he had taken to hold the prisoner,
and he said he had arranged for his burial, and it developed then that he had
shot him in the leg, and not being able to stand the sight of his suffering, he
shot him through the head as he lay on the groimd. This early instance was
a great shock because this man was a representative of the 3,000 with whom
we would have to police Haiti.
The Chaibman. Did you have that case investigated?
Col. Williams. That case was Investigated In more or less of an Informal
manner, because in the beginning it was impossible to Investigate every thins:
that came up. I was satisfied, however, that the occurrence was substantially
as I have stated.
The Chaibman. That the prisoner really was trying to escape?
Col. Williams. Yes; that statement was later substantiated when I visited
Leogane and made an Informal investigation.
The Chaibman. Did you ever turn over your native gendarmes for serious
offenses to any tribunal than the gendarmerie general court-martial?
Col. WnxiAMS. The Haitian law did not provide for military courts, as I
remember it, and the institution of gendarmerie courts-martial not subject to
review by the civil courts created considerable opposition among the lawyer
class and the jurists of Haiti. We, however, belleve<l that It was essential that
the conduct of discipline In the gendarmerie must be under the control of the
American oflicers, because the only regenerative Infiuence in the gendarmerie
was the American influence, and If we were not free to organize, train, dis-
cipline and operate the gendarmerie according to our American conceptions of
what was right and proper, we felt that the gendarmerie would remain what
the Haitians desired it to remain, a Haitian organization, and consequently of
little efficiency, so we Insisted, in discussions with the Government, the Haitian
frovemment. that the gendarmerie courts be not subject to review by the
Haitian civil courts. First, the limitation of punishment was life ImprLson-
ment at hard labor.
I subsequently, in view of the bad conduct of the gendarmes on several oc-
casions, used my influence with the President to have him approvea modifica-
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554 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
tion of the regulations which permitted the gendarmerie courts-martial, sub-
ject to presidential approval, to adjudge the death penalty. That was because
life imprisonment was not bringing the disciplinary results which we had hoped
for. However, as a matter of policy I exercised my discretion, and turned ovei
to the civil courts several cases where the evidence against the gendarme was
so complete and the crime had been attended by such publicity, that I thought
conviction would follow, and the death penalty be adjudged and the good faith
of the American officers shown. The only case of which I recollect the details
was that of a gendarme in the town of St. Michel, which comes within the
jurisdiction of the criminal courts of (Jonaives. The district attorney, as he
may be called, in Gonaives was one of the most efficient I had met
The Ohaibman. Among the Haitians?
Col. Williams. Among the Haitians. The judges seemed good and the town
had a rather high cultural development. This gendarme had shot and kifled
a woman about 60 years old. She was a professional beggar. She was an
idiot, and she l)egged about the streets of the town, half naked, and was a
nuisance. The gendarme's defense before the court was self-defense in that
this woman had thrown a handful of pebbles at him. The gendarme was ac-
quitted. This acquit4»l was in what I thought probably the best judicial dis-
trict of the Republic. I think that was the last important case that I turned
over to the Haitian courts.
The Chairman. Have you any idea, or have you any means of estimating,
how many native prisoners were illegally killed by Haitians in the gendarmerie
without or against the orders of their white superior officers?
Col. Williams. So far as my recollection serves me I think 9 or 10 were
brought to trial. I think I caused to be investigated perhaps 50 reports of such
killings, but most of them, because they were not true or because it did not seem
possible to obtain sufficient evidence, were handled in some other way than by
taking disciplinary raeflsures, such as the transfer of the man accused from the
IMMst wliere he was serving to another post, or his discharge from the gendar-
merie.
The Ch a IBM AN. You refer now to cases where you felt you could not prove a
capHal crime?
Col Williams. Could not prove any crime. Investigations in Haiti are con-
ducted with so much difficulty, and the native witness is so utterly unreliable
that an investigation of a serious charge was, according to our American 4deaa
of what an investigation should be, almost impossible. I think I am safe in say-
ing that at least 50 per cent of the gendarmerie officers' time was spent in in-
vestigating. A native witness, in the first place, while not meaning to lie, but
simply because he argues directly from cause to effect without in any way con-
sidering the modifying intervening circumstances jumps to conclusiona What
he hears once or twice becomes a belief. If he hears it more than that, it is a
firm conviction, and he is prone to relate as a fact that which has come to his
knowledge only as a bit of gossip.
In connection with the killing of native by a gendarme, a case where the cir-
cumstances Feemed to warrant the trial of the gendarme by court-martial, the
principal witness for the defense testified that he had been standing beside the
gendarme during the events leading up to the killing, at the time of the killin?,
and immediately subsequent thereto. He stood en)ss-exa mi nation on tht» «ie^aite
of his testimony, and when he had completed h*s testimony, following our Ameri-
can system of court-martial procedure, his testimony was read aloud to him, and
he was asked if it was correct, and to correct it. if necessary. He said, yes: that
those were exactly the words of his friend, so nearly «s he could remember them,
and he tried to stick to his friend's statement.
It then developed that he had not been anywhere near the neighborhood at
the time of the event, but that his friend, who was the real witness, was about
to draw irrigating water for his little farm on that particular day, and if he
missed it the week would go by and all of his bananas die. and he had asked
this witness to testify in his place, and the witness, in perfect good faith, per-
mitted himself to be identified as the real witness and sworn, had. testified and
stood cross examination, and it was only by the merest accident that his utter
ignorance of all the facts in the case became evident
That was a striking instance, but there were many others less striking, whi«
led us to believe that the native's testimony was not reliable unless it could be
substantiated by many witnesses.
The investigations themselves were conducted under the greatest dlfficulti«,
especially in the case where the officer charged with the investigation did not
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 555
speak Creole fluently. Even a knowledge of French would not help much, be-
cause the native in the interior did not understand French. Two gendarmes
were put in charge of a prisoner one day, a prisoner who had stated that he
knew where arms were hidden. He was a civil prisoner, but we promised him
his pardon, knowing we could persuade the President of Haiti to pardon him, if
he would show where the arms were buried. The two gendarmes, accompanied
by a local civil officer, went to the town of Croix des Missions, and they came
back the following day and reported that the prisoner had attempted to escape
and was about to run into the cane fields where they could never get him, and
they fired on him and killed him, and they buried him.
They had a list of witnesses to this. Not only because it was the proper thing
to do, but in order to get a side light on the gendarmes, I ordered a board of
three officers, who proceeded to the place of the killing, and interrogated the
witnesises through an interpreter. At that time few, if any, of the gendarmerie
officers spoke Creole fluently. The witnesses testified substantially to the same
facts, and the board then proceeded to the place where the man was buried,
and dug up tlie body. They submitted a written report The only thing
suspicious in their conclusion that the gendarmes had been justified in this
shooting was that the body was rather badly decomposed. We sent for a
prominent undertaker at Port au Prince, and asked him about this, and he
said that perhaps tl^e condition of the soil and the drainage might bring about
such a decomposition in three or four days, but it was ratlier doubtful. How-
ever, there was no time to make a further Investigation. Three officers of
the very few available had spent two days on this, and their services were
badly needed in the rather amorphous organization we had at the time. About
six months later the prisoner was arrested 30 miles from the place where*
he had been buried. I sent an officer who spoke Creole fluently to Croix des
Missions. He collected most of the original witnesses, who stated that they
had not told the truth at the time of the first invt stigatlou ; that they had told
what the gendarmes told them to tell, but that now that they had satisfied the
curiosity of the American, would the American be good enough to tell them
what had bothered them for many months, that Is why the three white men
had insisted on digging up the body of a man who had been burled, having been
run ov^" by a train three months before.
That investigaticn in all its phases Is characteristic of the investigations tliat
were carried on to the very last. Witnesses were willing to identify themselves
as anybody. They would try to determine what the court wanted to find out, and
then try to please the court or the board. If they disappeared from the
control of the investigating officer. It was difficult to get them back, because
the name under which they identified themselves was Just the name of the
day. On the following day they would perhaps have another name. They
drifted around the country so nmch that it was hard to find them. They knew
the meaning of an oath, and they were informed of the pains and penalties of
perjury, but they would recite as facts things which they imagined.
Mr. Howe. Is perjury a crime In Haiti?
Cbl. WnxiAMS. Perjury, as I remember the code, is not defined as such,
but, of course, false testimony is punishable.
Mr. Howe. Colonel, were all reports of unauthorized killings by the
gendarmerie investigated?
Col. Williams. Every report against the gendarmerie body or Its Individual
members, however foolish the reports seem on Its face, was investigated as
thoroughly as we could possibly investigate them, and in many cases we found
that tlie complaints were justified.
Mr. Howe. And in the case of justified complaints there were trials where
you felt them to be proven?
Col. Williams. If the circumstances justified a trial, they were tried.
Mr. Howe. And there were, as you say, about nine convictions there, you
think?
Col. WiLUAMS. My recollection is that the gendarmerie courts convicted some-
where In the neighborhood of ten people for serious crimes.
Mr. Howe. For the killing of prisoners and other crimes?
Col. Williams. They must have been for the killing of prisoners, because
otherwise I would not have brought them to trial by general court. We had
other courts, departmental courts and districts courts, with more limited
jurisdiction and more limite<l power of punishment They handled the minor
offenses.
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556 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. There were other classes of killings down there, were there not,
where the individual resisted arrest, or where he was out in that way, and
he ran away and was shot as he was running, classes of killings which would
come under the head of killings incident to military operations? That is,
of course, true, is it not, that there were in those military operations many
killings?
Col. Williams. The repression of banditism involved the killing of very
many Haitians.
Mr. Howe. What was the attitude of the white officers in the gendarmerie,
in general, toward the killing of natives in the field?
Col. Williams. Of extreme regret. It was realized that the bandits, or, as
they came to be called, the Cacos, were probably 75 per cent natives who did
not want to do what they were doing. The bandit leaders had a system of
selective draft which worked about in this way: A bandit leader with a few
ex-criminals or bad men would come to the remote house of a native and tbey
would offer him his choice between joining the bandits, the patriot army, as
they called it, or having his head cut off.
The Chairman. Colonel, upon what evidence or report do you make that
statement? Did the peasantry tell this to your marines or officers?
Ool. Williams. The i)easants in many Instances told it It was a matter of
common knowledge among the educated Haitians that ih\» was the method
employed in gaining recruits. It was the direct testimony of certain natives
who had elected to remain peaceful and in whose cases haste or some other
consideration had interfered with the completion of the head-cutting job, and
we fixed them up in our hospitals. I have spoken of the unreliability of
Haitian testimony, but the testimony regarding this particular point was so
universal that one could not but believe it. . Few resisted this form of recruit-
ment and the bands grew very rapidly, and as they grew the recruiting caimc-
ity increased ; and I think it is conservative to state that at least 75 per cent
of the natives in the field were there against their wills, but, of course, as
soon as they became committed by having operated in this fashion, then they
felt they could not desert. Deserters from a band or gang were looked upon
with a natural degree of suspicion and they had to prove their case before
they were permitted to go loose, and when they were turned loose they »vere
quickly murdered by the members of the gang or some other gang which they
deserted ; so we realized that in an attack on a bandit gang or in a stand-up
fight between bandits and gendarmes, if there were 10 men killed on the side
of the natives, probably 7 of them were innoceat of any real animosity or
hostility to the Americans.
Mr. Howe. So the natural result from that was that your officers were
loath to kill unless it seemed to them necessary, is that correct?
Col. Williams. They were loath to kill, but It must be understood that in
the jungle and in the morning twilight it is impossible at 200 yards to tell
exactly what a man's inclinations are.
The Chaibman. When you captured bandits what disposition was made of
them?
Col. Williams. Various dispositions. The most usual disposition was to try
them by the American provost courts. We had found that the Haitian courts
generally were not able, where willing, to punish in such a fashion that the
punishn^ent would act as a deterrent. The sessions of the criminal courts
were held at points very distant from the scene of the bandit activities; the
cases were tried months, perhaps, after the occurrence, and the deterrent
effect of the criminal court's action, where It could be obtained at all, was nil.
The provost court acted promptly and the punishment was, I think, limited
to hard labor — six months at hard labor. I am not quite sure of that
Mr. Howe. Were there any killings that came to your knowledge In connec-
tion with natives escaping from corvee gangs?
Col. Willjams. I had reason to believe, and received reports, that natives
had been killed in avoiding corvee work, but In no case was I ever able to
collect sufficient data to justify more than such Investigation as I made myself
or directed some other officer to make. In other words, I never made such a
thorough Investigation as is incident to the trial of an accused by court-mar-
tial. I have no doubt, however, knowing the native personnel as I do, that
men were killed.
Mr. Howe. Were the corv^ gangs guarded by gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. The corvfie gangs were always guarded by gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. For what purpose, to protect the gang or to prevent their escape?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 557
Col. Williams. I know of oiily one instance where the gang had a guard for
the purpose of protecting it, and that was in the Massade district.
Mr. Howe. And in the other case it was
Col. Williams. In the other cases they were guards to uisure the continued
presence of the laborers and to furnish subbosses for the road work.
Mr. Howe. What were the instructions of the guards? What were they in-
structed to do in case some of the gang made a break and started to run away?
Col. WiLLLAMs. To recapture them.
Mr. Howe. Did their instructions justify them in shooting them?
Col. Williams. No.
Mr. Howe. As they ran away?
Col. Williams. No.
Mr. Howe. Then, any killing of a member of a corvee gang who was running
away was an illegal killing, was that right?
Col. Williams. Any killing of a member of a corv^ gang who was engaged
in some other crime than a criminal assualt on a member of the guard or a
member of the gang, would be a crime.
Mr. Howe. You refer to killings or to possible killings of escaping members of
the corv^. You mean those killings were by native guards?
Col. Williams. By native guards.
Mr. HdWE. Did you ever hear of such instances in which such a killing was
countenanced, ordered, or accomplished by the white officer of the gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. No.
Mr. Howe. Or in the marines?
Col. Williams. The possibility of those killings was recognized, and such
supervision as was possible was given.
Mr. Howe. To prevent them?
Col. Williams. To prevent them; not specifically to prevent those, but to
prevent all abuse of authority by the gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. Did you hear of any cruelty by the native gendarmerie to the
corv6e gangs.
Col. Williams. I heard of cruelty ; that is, the beating of corv^ men by
gendarmes. Where it was possible to do so, those cases were punished. This
inherent tendency to abuse authority was the subject of constant effort toward
repression. We never succeeded In repressing it entirely.
Mr. Howe. Your officers were directed to \ise their efforts to repress any of
their subordinates' acts of oppression against ^he natives, is that correct?
Col. Williams. As I said before, our greatest problem in organizing and
administering the gendarmerie was the gendarme, and we realized that the
good will of the people could not be gained if the gendarme were to comport
himself according to his inclinations.
The Chaibman. I may interject that that Is a difficulty which confronts
every organizer of constabulary In the Tropics the world around.
Col. .Williams. I think It Is characteristic of the lower races to exceed au-
thority, If they are Invested with It. We had the same trouble hi the Philip-
pines.
Mr. Howe. Can you estimate the number of natives who were killed by the
native gendarmerie while trying to escape from the corv6e?
Col. Williams. I can not, because I do not know of any.
Mr. Howe. But you believe that such killings were possible?
Col. Williams. I believe that such killings were possible and probable.
(Whereupon, *at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)
AFTEB BECESS.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m. pursuant to the taking of
recess.
Mr. Howe. Colonel, can you give us a brief definition of the term " corvee "
as it is known under the Haitian law?
CoL Williams. Corvee, in a general sense, is forced manual labor, or perhaps
I had better put It nonvoluntary manual labor.
Mr. Howe. In Haiti was there a law authorizing that?
Col. Williams. The code rurale provided that the repair of the roads, and
I believe also the repair of dikes, was to be performed by the labor of the
Inhabitants; that whenever the commandant of a certain commune or depart-
ment wished this work done he would take the Inhabitants of the district in
which the repairs were to be made and put them on this work. There were
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558 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
other improper uses made of the corvee under the Haitian administration, and
in the more remote districts frequently it was the custom of officials to collect
the men of a certain neighborhood and put them to work on their private
property.
Mr. Howe. You are speaking of times previous to the occupation?
Col. Wflltams. The code rurale was adopted, I think, in 1863, or in the
early sixties.
Mr. Howe. And these abuses of the law of the corvee that you refer to were
before the American occupation?
Col. Williams. Before and during.
Mr. Howe. Was the term " corvee " ever used except in its strict legal sense
which you have defined?
Col. Williams. Yes; the word had such general currency in Haiti that It
became an expression descriptive of anything a person did not care about doing.
An unwelcome reception would be referred to by a Haitian perhaps as a corvee
which he must go through. The usual sense, however, in which it was used
was work on the public roads.
Mr. Howe. Was it used in common parlance for work on the public roads
whether that work was being done for wages or whether it was being done
strictly as a legal corvee?
Col Williams. The natives almost always referred to road work, whether
paid or unpaid, as corvee.
Mr. Howe, Paid road work was not corvee?
Col. Williams. Was not corvee in any sense.
Mr. Howe. A previous witness. Gen. Butler, has given the committee a
description of the use of the corvee law by the occupation, and of the repair
or reconstruction of a considerable road system under the corvee, and he
brought his description up to the time of his relief. Will you begin with the
time you became chief of the gendarmerie and tell the committee as to the
operation of the corvee from that time on?
Col. Williams. The inspiration for the application of the corvee was the
definite recognition that the commercial and social regeneration of the Haitian
people and Haiti called for roads which would bear wheeled transportation.
Such roads, except in small stretches, hardly existed. The French had built
a splendid system of roads, uniting nearly all the principle towns, but this
had fallen into such disrepair that in many places it was difficult to find even
the traces of the roads.
Mr. Howe. May I interrupt you? Gen. Butler devoted a good section of his
testimony to informing the committee as to the necessity for the repair of
roads. Just let me perhaps go over the ground of some of his testimony. With
a few questions we can take up your observations of the ^rvee work from
the time you became chief.
First of all what is your view as to the necessity for reconstructing the
old French system of roads?
Col. Williams. As I say, the commercial and social regeneration of the
people called for communication. When we landed in Haiti, while the inhabi-
tants were homogenous, the north Haitian knew nothing of the central Haitian,
nor the central Haitian of the southern Haitian, and local interests had become
so strong because of isolation that there was no national unity other than
that founded upon a common race. I believed that the roads were very
necessary. The military aspects of the case also appealed to me strongly,
because, as I have stated this morning, the most reliable means of keeping
in touch with what was going on in Haiti was by personal inspection. That
on horseback was utterly impracticable, and some more rapid means of getting
around must be devised. That, in my mind, however, was inddental to the
main object.
Mr. Howe. As I understand it, your chief mlitary mission in Haiti was the
preservation of law and order, was it not?
Col. Williams. That was why the gendarmerie was organized.
Mr. Howe. And when you speak of the roads being a military necessity, the
implication is strong, is it not, that roads were necessary for the preservation
of law and order by the gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. For the development of the gendarmerie into an efficient or-
ganization, personal contact with all parts of Haiti was necessary. This could
only be facilitated by the construction of roads, but, as I say, the conditions
which obtained during most of my tour of duty made it possible for me to con-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 559
gider this as an incidental result of the road building, rather than that which
was my reason for believing them necessary.
Mr. Howe. And your reason for beUevlng them necessary was-
Col WnxiAMS. The social and commercial regeneration of Haiti.
Mr Howe. Is there any distinction to be drawn between work done on roads
as a national project and work to be done on roads as a communal project?
Col. Williams. The law, as I remember it, classified the roads, but the
classification can not very well be applied because there are no physical dif-
f^ences between what might be called a communal road and what might be
called a national highway. None of them was passable for wheeled vehicles.
Mr. Howe. This work on the roads under the corv^ required also, however^
a certain amount of money, did It not?
Col. Williams. Yes. The central Government appropriated, starting, I
think, with $30,000 a month, and dropping finally, toward the end of my tour,
to $10,000 a month, for the repair and upkeep of the roads.
Mr. Howe. In addition to that, were any of the communal funds available or
made available for the construction or repair of roads?
Col. WnxiAMS. The Federal appropriations were quite Insufliclent, and a
connnunes appropriated money for the work on roads which wouhl Immediately
benefit that particular town, and. In addition to that, a good-roada campaign
was conducted, which led to the receipt of very substantial contributions from
civilians. In the town of Aux Oayes, for instance, in one meeting the people
subscribed over $1,800 in gold, which Is quite a bit of money In Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Was that money allotted out in connection with corv4e labor?
Col. WnxiAMS. It was allotted out In connection with corvee labor, or in
connection with paid labor, or in connection with both.
Mr. Howe. As the case might have been In the particular locality?
Col. WnxiAMS. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Is It not a fact that during the time when the corv^ was In
operation some road construction was also done by paid labor?
Col. WnxiAMS. Oh, yes.
Mr. Howe. In more than one Instance?
CoL WnxiAMS. Yes. We found It necessary where the work approached real
road work, I mean excellent road work and rock work, to have organized
gangs which we had to train and keep together by the only possible means; that
is, by paying them.
Mr. Howe. Do you recollect how many days* labor the corvee law exacted
from the individual?
Col. WnxiAMS. Without the code rurale I would not care to state exactly,
but my recollection Is that It did not cover the entire week, and that when the
repairs were completed the corvee, or the workers, were dismissed.
Mr. Howe. Was the recruiting, as we might call It, of the corv^ more dif-
ficult as time went on, or less difficult under the occupation?
Col. WnxiAMS. It became more difficult. The population of Haiti is very
irregularly distributed. Along the coast It Is relatively dense; in the interior
it Is very, very small. In those districts where water Is available for irriga-
tion the population Is dense ; In the arid stretches It is very sparse. Naturally,
the first roads constructed were those through the more populous districts.
They were the more important roads, and there was little difficulty found in
obtaining a sufficiency of labor for them, but where the road stretches passed
through districts where the population was only a few to the square mile — I
could not say how many — the labor supply did not begin to meet the labor
requirements.
Mr. Howe. And the recruitment became Increasingly difficult?
Col. WnxiAMS. And the recruitment became Increasingly difficult, because
it was necessary then to go well back from the roads Into the hills and moun-
tains and forests to get the people to work on these particular stretches.
Mr. Howe. And they came less willingly?
Col. WnxiAMS. And they came less willingly as the work continued.
Mr. Howe. Was this operation under the corvee conducted by the gen-
darmerie?
Col. WnxiAMS. Our first attempts at recruitment were conducted largely
by the lowest civil officer, who is known as the chief de section, or by the
marshal de champs. This led to so many abuses, and so much brlberj-, cor-
ruption, and dissatisfaction that we ceased using these agents, and collected
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560 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
these laborers with the gendarmes. These gendarmes were sent to the varions
localities to notify the people who were due for road work.
Mr. Howe. When that recruitment came to be conducted by the gendarmes,
was it conducted without abuse, in your opinion?
Col. Williams. Knowing the gendarmes, I do not see verj* well how it
could have been conducted without abuse, and instances came to my knowledge
where the gendarmes had committed abuses.
Mr. Howe. Will you give us one or two Illustrations?
Col. WiiXTAMS. In the t*^wn of Arcahaie the gendarme was to c*oUe<n laborers
for a stretch of road in the immediate vicinity. He went to a brickyard and
collected the entire personnel of the brickyard, thereby, of course, making
it impossible to attend the baking, or whatever you call it, of the bricks. In
the same neighborhood a gendarmerie sent out to collect corv^ men for work
on the roads collected the entire crew of a small coasting schooner. I must
say, in the first place, that there has never been a census made In Haiti.
The election laws provide for a registration, but the law has never been
carried out, so it was impossible, except in a very rough fashion, to estimate
the laboi* supply in any one district, and as for listing the population for
work, so that the work could be properly distributed among the inhabitants
who were due to perform it, we tried that, and the only result was that the
natives thought the registration was a preliminary step to placing them In
slavery, and they took to the woods. We issued cards to corv^ men who had
completed their tour of duty. These cards stated. In effect, that so and so
had completed so many days corvee, and was not available for further work.
I am afraid these cards did more harm than good, because the native furnished
with such a card, having had its meaning explained to him, instead of trying
to evade work, when he saw a g^idarme in that district charged with the
duty of recruiting, would come forward confidently and show his card to the
gendarme. The gendarme's reasoning in that case was, " Well, this is easy ;
I do not need to go any further." And ,he would take the man's card and
tear it up, and send him on to work.
Mr. Howe. Did you learn of instances of that happening?
Col. Williams. I was unable to prove any instances of it, but the report was
so general as to the practice that I was convinced that it existed.
Mr. Howe. What effort did you make to put an end to this abuse of recruit-
ing in the corvee?
Col. Williams. By the instruction of the gendarmes as to their duty in rela-
tion to recruiting, by talks with the officers, who realized even more clearly
than I did what the dangers were, and by the punishment of any gendarme
whom we could prove guilty of any sort of abuse.
Mr. Howe. When the gangs were recruited were they harshly treated in any
instance that you know of?
Col. Williams. I do not know of a specific instance of harsh treatment
There undoubtedly were instances. There were many thousand men engaged
at a time, and they were working over hundreds of miles of road. They were
under native foremen, and in some cases they were under gendarme noncom-
missioned officers who had qualified as road builders after a f/ishlon. and I
have no doubt that they committed abuses, but there was no way of listing
these laborers. A certain stretch of road would necessitate the employment, we
will say, of 100 men. They came and they went without registration. There
were no pay rolls, there was no time to make them up, and no one could hare
signed them had we had them, and the identity of individuals in the gang was
absolutely lost, and I have been present when gendarmerie officers directly In
charge of road gangs have attempted to investigate cases of alleged 111 treat-
ment, and if we found the witnesses we could not find the gendarme, and If
we found the gendarme we could not find the witnesses. That was about the
way it ran. It was an extremely difficult thing to do.
Mr. Howe. With the number of white gendarmerie officers at your disposal
vrfif> it physically possible to closely supervise the corvee work and at the same
time keep your territory patrolled and policed?
Col. Williams. The gendarmerie officers were given such stretches of road
to supervise that it was utterly impossible for them to closely supervise the
work, except in those instances where rock work was being done, and in those
cases the gendarmerie officer was usually present, because the native foreman
of labor could not be trusted with the handling of explosives.
Mr. Howe. Under the occupation there was far more corvee work done per
montli or per year than had been customary under the Haitian |Government
before the occupation; is that correct? OOQIC
INQUIRY IIJTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 561
CJol. Williams. That Is correct
Mr. Howi:. I had understood so from Gen. Butler's testimony.
Col. Williams. The repair of roads under the Haitian administration was
carried on in a most casual fashion. They would throw a lot of rocks into a
mud hole, and that is all It amounted to.
Mr. Howe. We learned from Gen Butler's testimony the other day that at
the outset of tJils repair work under the corvee the gangs were fairly contented
and were ready to stay and work, and at the outset there was no dissatisfac-
tion among the workers themselves. Would you concur in that view?
Col. Williams. That is absolutely true. There was a campaign for good
roads. The local officials were encouraged to take part in the work, and they
were given credit always for what had been accomplished, even though the
gendarmerie officer had done it The laborers were brought together, and the
code rurale, which prohibits public dances on work days and cock fighting ex-
c^rt; I think, on Sundays and holidays, was suspended in the labor camps, so
that the pleasant evenings and the companionship during the day made the
work rather attractive to the Negro, who is a gregarious creature.
Mr. Howe. Were the Haitian laws against public dancing and against cock
fighting, except on Sundays and holidays, rigidly enforced by the Haitian
Government at all times?
Col. Williams. No • they were not enforced. The laws were on the statute
books, but under theTIaltlan administration -it was simply a means of oppres-
sion or extortion. Even during the day drummers were provided so that the
road work, the pick and shovel work, was syncopated. The men were paid a
small sum, based upon the value of the gendarmerie ration, or else were fur-
nished food. That was not called for by the code.
Mr. Howe. Did that contentment lessen and disappear as time went on?
Col. Williams. Yes; it lessened very materially. As the road system be-
came developed and It was necessary to call laborers a second time to work
on a road which to their eyes was a magnificent boulevard, they could not see
the point and they objected to doing the work.
Mr. Howe. It became drudgery?
Col. Williams. It became drudgery and the old-time attractions disappeared.
Mr. Howe. Did the continuation of the corvee. In your opinion, act as a
serious irritant and was that irritation a serious factor to be considered by
those directing the occupation?
Col. Williams. It would be interesting to note to what extent it was a seri-
ous factor had the corvee existed as the sole basis for antl-Amerlcan propa-
ganda, but there were factors which came Into action at the same time and
which, to all seeming. Joined in with the corvee and made a complete whole,
upon which was based a very strong antl-Amerlcan feejing.
Mr. Howe. After you became chief of the gendarmerie, did you reach any
conclusion as to the continuance of the corvee system?
Col. Williams. I had reached a conclusion regarding the corvee system be-
fore it was put in operation. I did not believe In It. I believed that It was
an uneconomical way of producing results and I did not believe that the people
had reached a sufficiently high cultural state — and I speak now of the peas-
antry-^to realize the benefits which would accrue from their labor. On becom-
ing chief of the gendarmerie I immediately took under consldetatlon the ques-
tion of stopping it That was the first time I had been in a position to do so.
I discussed the matter with everyone, officers of the gendarmerie, officers of
the Marine Corps, the Haitian Government the President, and civilians all
over the country, and the other treaty officials. I wanted to stop it at once,
but among other things that I had in mind was to disabuse the Haitian from
the idea that a change of chiefs meant a complete reversal of policy. That
of course, was what obtained in their own administration. I wanted them to
realize that the coming of the Americans meant a continuing policy ; that they
need not play up one official and then play up the next. In other words, I
wanted the administration to appeal to them as Impartial, so far as the policy
was concerned. At that time the road system had been projected to a point
which I believed would serve the material and social neecls of the people and
the country fairly well, and I thought that the time to stop the corvee would
be when its reason for being no longer existed.
Mr. Howe. That is to say
Col Williams. When the projected road system had been virtually com-
pleted. I figured out that that would be in October and issued an order stop-
ping all corvee of whatsoever sort throughout Haiti.
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562 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTQp DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. May I call your attention to this letter and ask if that is a copy
of that order to which you refer?
- Ool. Williams. It is nearly three years ago. I think it is.
Mr. Howe. Tou might take a moment to look through it to make sure.
Ck)l. Williams. Tes; that is mine.
Mr. Howe. Was the order issued on the day it was dated?
Col. Williams. No; my recollection is that the order was issued sometime
prior to that, and even before its Issuance I had been lessening the employ-
ment of corvee and increasing the amount of paid labor.
Mr. Howe. This letter which I have just shown you, or the order, rather.
General Order No. 22, Is dated September 2. 1918, and it refers to General
Order No. 21, dated May 10, 1918. As far as you know, is that a correct copy
of General Order 21?
CoK Williams. I believe that is correct. It sounds right.
Mr. Howe. I should like to have this order and the order to which it refers
In the record.
Senator Oddie. Without objection, we will put them In the record.
(The orders referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)
FROM GENERAL ORDER NO 22, 8KPTEMBER 2, 1018. (SINCE REVOKED.)
1. Beginning October 1, 1918. the use of corvee on the national roads as listed
in General Order No. 21, of May 10, 1918, will be discontinued, and the mainte-
nance and improvement of these roads will be curried on with paid labor and
prison labor except when a real emergency calls for emergency repair beyond
the available appropriation, in which ease corvee will be used.
2. The paid labor will be organized into gangs and every effort will be made
to keep together a permanent personnel. A maximum of 1.10 gourdes per day,
without food, or 1 gourde per day, plus a meal at cost — 10 centimes — will not be
exceeded, and wherever possible labor will be obtained at a lower per diem.
Shelter, to l>e constructed by the labor gangs themselves, will be always provided,
and the better the shelter, keeping in view its temporary 'nature, the more eon-
tented and efficient will be the workers.
3. Holidays and fOtes will be recognized and celebrated with moderation, tbe
idea being to take advantage of all possible means to build up an organization
which will be attractive to the Haitian laborer.
4. "Pile use of corvee for other roads than those listed will be restricted by
the provisions of articles 52 and 65, Code Rural.
5. The use of corvee or free labor for other road building will be conducted
under the restrictions of law, and care will be exercised that none is called by
local officials for illegal work.
6. When prisoners are used, only prisoners physically capable of hard work
will be employed, and gangs of prisoners will be put on work separated from that
performed by paid gangs. The cost of feeding and clothing prisoners will be
paid for from prison funds.
7. UiK)n the receipt of this order the district and subdlstrict commanders will
inform the officials and notables that its issuance is made possible only by tbe
patriotic and earnest efforts of the Inhabitants of the rural sections who have so
fully given of their labor, and that to each and every one of these the gendar-
merie owes a debt.
Alex. S. Williams,
^ Chief of t?ie Oendarmerie.
extract from gendarmerie general order no. 21, MAY 10, 1918.
(8) For the present, funds for road repairs alloted from these headquarters
will be used as far as possible on the following roads :
Department of the Cape. Gros Morne-Port de Paix.
Mapou-Gonaives. Cap Haitien-Ouanemlnthe.
Gonaives-Ennery. Ouanaminthe-Fort Liberte.
Ennery-Saint Michel. Post Chabert
Gonaives-Gros Morne.
(9) Such other roads and trails as serve to define general economic needs will
be repaired when there exists a condition which seriously impedes the trans-
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INQXTIKY INTO OCCnpATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 563
portatlon of goods or passengers by horse, park, or cart. When communes and
public-spirited individuals are contributing to the repair or development of cer-
tain roads, such work will be continued and every encouragement given to the
end that such contribution increase.
Mr. Howe. Now, that General Order No. 22 orders work stopped on the
roads mentioned in General Order No. 21; that is the gist of it, is it not?
Col. Williams. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Were these roads mentioned in General Order No. 21 all the
roads on which corvee was in progress at the time of the issuance of Order
No. 22.
Col. Williams. I believe so.
Mr. Howe. Was work -stopped, as a matter of fact, on all those roads after
the issuance of your order No. 22?
Col. Williams. Free labor was discontinued on all those roads ; corv^ labor
was stopped on all those rop.ds.
Mr. Howe. As a matter of fact, did this order have the effect of stopping
corv^ labor absolutely in Haiti at that time?
Col. Williams. No; it did not.
Mr. Howe. Will you tell the committee, please, about instances of where
the corv6e labor continued after the issuance of this order, and what steps
were taken in that connection?
Col. WnxiAMS. Shortly after the order had been issued, and, as I said, it was
welcomed by all the gendarmerie officers who had operated under the old
system, I should say within a week of its Issuance reports came to me from
various sources that corv^ labor was continuing on the road which we re-
ferred to as the Maissade-Hinche road. I called up on the telephone the de-
partment commander at the Cape — I had a very good connection — and asked
him about It, and he said, "Yes," that corv6e labor was continued on this
stretch of road — it was not a large stretch — because he had not understood
the order to refer to that particular road, where corv6e had always been used,
and the expense incidental to feeding or paying the men came from communal
funds, and not from the funds which I myself allotted from headquarters.
Mr. Howe. It may be noted, may it not, that the Maissade-Hinche road does
not appear as one of the roads listed in General Order No. 21?
Ool. Williams. It was not listed. I thought my order was foolproof, but it
was not. I remember the instance very well, because the officer who made the
mistake was very much chagrinned over the mistake, and did not care for the
way in which I spoke to him over the phone, and protested against it That
was the only instance where the corvfie continued on any of the public roads in
the gendarmerie project, or the roads leading into them, so far as I was ever
able to find out
Mr. Howe. I have here a copy of a telegram as follows :
Department Commander,
Qendarmerie, Cape Haitien.
From letter dated October 8 from magistrate, Malsaade, believe order stop-
ping corvee after October 1 may not ha\e been reeceived at Hinche. If order
not received, notify Hinche of same by telephone. 120112.
Tracy, Acting.
Who was Tracy?
CJol. Williams. Tracy was assistant chief of the gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. And these figures, 120112, would be the serial number of a tele-
gram?
Col. Williams, i think that is the time and date cipher. We had some
sort of a date and time cipher, but Just what it was I could not translate it
now.
^1v^^!!"' '^® presence of those figures in the telegram would indicate to
you tnat it was an official telegram sent on official gendarmerie business
kJ^/V^^^^V."^!?; ^ ^*^*°^ ^® ^^° ^^^^^ something up there. Malssade Is
a subdistrict of the district of Hinche, and so when they referred to the corvee
not being understood at Hinche, the way in which Malssade would be Informed
of its cessation would be through Hinche.
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564 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Then here is another telegram from the department commander
of the cape to the chief of gendarmerie:
Your 120112. Corvee labor has not been stopped on the Hinche-Maissade
and St. Michel Road, for the reason that this road Is not Included In Gen-
eral Order No. 21. Unless corv6e is worked on this road little can be done
toward opening up this section of the country. Request its continuance. 10114.
Undebwood.
Who was Underwood?
V^\. Williams. Underwood was the man who misunderstood the order in the
first place, and with whom I had the telephone conversation relative to it
Mr. Howe. And on this piece of paper I see the typewritten entry, in paren-
thesis, at the bottom of this telegram, in ('ol. Williams's handwriting, in
pencil, the following : " October 8. Orders given by telephone to cease ail
corvee. A. S. W."
Does that recall that incident to you ?
Col. Williams. We were our own file clerks largely in the gendarmerie.
It Is quite possible that I may have made a notation of that sort on the
telegram.
Mr. Howe. Then, by the Issuance of that order, all corv^ on the Hlnch-
Massade road was finally stopped; Is that correct?
Col. Williams. That Is my belief.
Mr. Howe. Did you learn of any other instance where the corvee was
employed thereafter?
Col. WirxiAMS. When I say the corvee stopped on October 1 I speak In a
Haitian fashion. It took some days, we will say, after that for the order
to filter down to the more remote road gangs, and I have no doubt that in
certain instances it may have continued for a week or 10 days.
Mr. Howe. We will say, then, that by October 15, 1918, corvee had ceased
In Haiti?
Col. Williams. Yes ; and on October 1 it had practically ceased.
Mr. Howe. And thereafter did you hear of any instances of its being revi\'^l?
Col. Williams. Yes.
Mr. Howe. During your administration?
Col. Williams. During my administration I visitetl central Haiti with Gen.
Catlln, in March, 1919. Gen. Catlin, among other things, wished to investigate
the reports that corvee, despite orders, had contlnueil on the Massade road,
particularly in the vicinity of the town of Massade. I motored into Massade
over the incompleted road, on which a large gang were then working. Gen.
Catlln, through his Interpreter, Interrogated first the gendarmerie officer, Lieut.
Williams, then the foreman of the gang, and then Individuals of the gang.
The gendarmerie officer 8tate<l that "these men were not corvee men; that
they were paid from communal funds; that they were free to come and go
as they chose. The foreman, a native foreman, stated substantially the
same thing. Several individuals state<l they were not i)aid; they were not
allowed to go home when they vvlsheil. and they were forced to work. The
entire gang was then line<l up and they were asked or told that those who
were corvee were to step forward. I think all but one slow thinker stepped
forward. The conclusion which (}en. Catlin very naturally arrived at was
that corvee was in existence on the road, contrary to orders. At the same
time Capt. Doxie, of the gendarmerie, an officer who enjoyed the confidence
and esteem of the natives to a very high <legree, and one senior officer of the
gendarmerie, who spoke Creole very fluently, interrogateil the men In my
presence, and they all declare<l that they were well paid ; they were contented,
and they were perfectly free to attend to their domestic affairs, gatliering
the crops and attending to their wives an<l children. The difference of
statement, I think, was not due to any intention of the men to deceive Gen.
Catlln. but simply because of the use of the word "corvee." Corvee was road
work. If you work on a road you belong to a corvee gang. And I Investigated
It further and aske<l other questions and was convinced at the time — and am
convinced to-day — that so far as any Investigation, at least, determined, corvee
was not in existence at that time at that place.
Mr. Howe. Were you, at the time you and Gen. Catlin were out to see this
gang at work, aware that road repair was going on in that district?
Col. Williams. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And was it your impression that that road repair work was
being done by paid labor?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 565
Col. Williams. 1 knew what was going on, and I knew It was being paid
for largely through the very much increased revenues of the town of Massade,
an increase brought about by the municipal administration conducted or
supervised by the gendamferie subdistrict commander.
Mr. Howe. In other words, Ck>lonel, is this what we should understand, that
these particular men who were interrogated were unable to distinguish be-
tween paid labor and nonvoluntary labor, when the word used in the question
to them was " corvee,** meaning road work?
Col. WnjjAMS. That is the only way in which I can explain the discpreancies.
Mr. HowBL Were there other gangs of paid laborers working in that district?
Col. Williams. No; that was the only gang that was doing it. In the
other parts of the district the gendarmerie was altogether too busy with the
bandit situation to go in for road building.
Mr. Howe. Were the gendarmerie officers in charge of disbursing those
communal funds? In other words, would there be any record? Was there
any record at that time in existence which would show the payment to
those men?
Col Williams. Only the disbursement of lump sums, and the bookkeeping
was very crude.
Mr. HowB. Was a pay roll possible?
Col. Williams. A pay roll was not possible.
Mr. HowB. Bven where there was paid labor?
Col. Williams. Even where there was paid labor.
Mr. Howe. Please tell the committee why it was impossible.
Col. Williams. Because none could sign it had one been in existence. I
may sny In connect on with these gangs working on the Massade road that
there were no guards about it. The only gendarmerie representative present,
I think, was a gendarmerie sergeant who had either been enlisted and pro-
moted to sergeant because of his ability in this line — road building — or had
been detailed from the command because of his ability.
Mr. Howe. Under the real, true corvee under the law, or forced labor, was
it your experience that the gang could be left working by itself without guards,
and still remain a gang?
CoL Williams. There was no uniformity in the practice. It depended upon
the amount of work to be done, the character of it, and the date on which we
consider it.
Mr. Howe. Were there any other instances, or seeming instances, of the
violation of your order than the. ones you have mentioned?
CoL Williams. I heard of none. Subsequent to that investigation the only
report of corvee that was made was made by the inhabitants of a certain
district, who protested against the fact that the French priest had corveed
them to either build or repair the church.
Mr. Howb. If that was so, it would not be any shortcoming of the gen-
darmerie?
Col. Williams. It was a shortcoming of the gendarmerie, because upon inves-
tigation I found that in this village, garrisoned by, I think, a corporal and
two privates of gendarmerie, a very remote place, the priest was of so strong
a character, and so great was his prestige that he was enabled to use the
gendarme corporal as an agent in the collection of these workers. That was
promptly stopped.
Mr. Howe. Were there any other instances that came to your knowledge?
Tol. Williams. I know of no others.
Mr. Howe, Was there any abuse of the corvee consisting in having an
individual do work on roads outside of the district in which he lived?
CoL Williams. Yes; the law was exceeded in that it was impossible from
f-ertain districts to draw the labor for the roads which passed through
that district, and men had to be brought from other districts. I speak of
political districts.
Mr. Howe. And that was done, was it?
Col. Williams. That was done.
Mr. Howe. Was there any law in Haiti prohibiting the taking of corvee
laborers from the district of their residence into another district to work?
(\>l. WllJJAMS. No.
Mr. How*:. Simply the law of corvee did not authorize that?
CoL Williams. The law provided they should work in their own district.
Mr. Howe. Since the corvee wa« abandoned, has it been possible, in your
opinion, to keep up the roads in repair?
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566 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Col. WiLLLAMa So far as labor is concerned, yes; but the money available,
even when I left, had to be spread very thinly over the system.
Mr. Howe. A thin spreading of money, plus plenty of free labor, made it
possible, is that correct?
Col. Williams. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Was there less money, when available for a certain length of
time, at the time you left than there was available earlier in the occupation?
Obi. Williams. Yes; I thinly the original monthly allotment was about
$30,000; I am not sure of that.
Mr. Howe. A month?
Col. Williams. Yes ; and It dropped to $10,000 before I left
Mr. Howe. And at the time you left that $10,000 were the only funds
available for road repair?
Col. Williams. The only funds available, except such as the communes might
allot and some which public-spirited individuals turned over.
Mr. Howe. Then the greater part of your money would, of course, have
to go for wages; Is that correct?
Col. Williams. It would have to go for wages.
Mr. Howe. Instead of for supplies, as formerly?
Col. WiLUAMS. Instead of for supplies, as formerly. In the very beginning
the labor demanded of the peasant was of the very simplest kind, ditching,
carrying dirt, filling in holes, chopping a way through the Jungle, and after
some Instruction we were able to have them use the ordinary tools, the pick,
the ax, and wheelbarrow with some success, and for that work the corvee
was suitable, but after the roads approached virtual completion, when they
became real roads, and they required surfacing, draining, ditching, the placing
of culverts, and the building of bridges we found corvee labor was very un-
satisfactory. They simply did not know how. And we gradually as the
roads Improved, placed them, for repair purposes and final completion, under
paid labor, and 'it* worked very well.
Mr. Howe. Up to the end of your administration, were the roads kept In fair
repair — such as had been restored?
Col. Williams. The roads were becoming better dally.
Mr. Howe. What can you tell us about the vote for the adoption of the con-
stitution, how it was conducted, and if it was conducted under your direction
or under the direction of the gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. Who decided and when and how It was decided to have a
plebiscite to determine whether or not the constitution should be adopted, I do
not know; but when the question came up about holding the plebiscite there
was but one agency by means of which the mechanics of the operation could
be carried through. The administrative system of Haiti is so nebulous that
no uniformity of performance can be expected from the minor officials In the
various parts of the Republic, but the gendarmerie had in nearly every com-
mune an American gendarmerie officer who, by this time, had learned to speak
Creole in most cases very well, always sufficiently well to make himself un-
derstood, he had learned the people, he had learned the officials, he knew his
way around, and It was proposed, by whom I do jiot know, that the gendarmerie
conduct the plebiscite. The President informed me that this was the decision
of the (Government, and I had several discussions with him and with his
ministers, notably the minister of the Interior, regarding the methods to be
followed. They had no suggestions to make, because such things as a plebis-
cite was unknown in Haiti, and I had no suggestions to make, because 1 had
never heard of one.
However, it was necessary, in my opinion, that a constitution of some sort
should be adopted, and I sent circular letters to all gendarmerie officers in-
forming them that they would soon be called upon to supervise a vote of the
people for or against the adoption of the projected constitution ; told them that
It was desirable that this constitution pass, but that In presenting it to the
people they must inform them that while there might be valid objections to
the constitution as published, that It provided for its own amendment, and
that however they might dislike the constitution. It was better than no consti-
tution at all, and that the stability of the Republic called for such an instru-
ment. I do not remember how long before the plebiscite was held that these
iiistruct.i H"* were fjivon, but there was a considerable time, ample time, to
enable t^e p* nchini.erie oliicers to conduct this campaign, which was frankly
procoiistitutioiial.
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<
I also sent out other circular letters, furnishing them with ar^nient^ for
■and a^inst the constitution. I allotted from gendarmerie funds a small
amount which enabled each gendarmerie district and subdistrict commander
to have a popular meeting prior to the date on which the vote was to be held ;
and, I think, of I recollect correctly, that I made some references to earlier
American political campaigns where barbecues were features of the meeting.
On these occasions the gendarmerie officer mixed with the people, sometimes
addressed them, freely advocated the adoption of the constitution, told them
of the conditions which would obtain when the vote was talten; and insiste<l,
in season and out of season, that every voter would be i)erfectly free to vote
as he chose, and that, moreover, he might be certain that he would not suffer
be<*ause of making a negative vote.
The plebiscite was held on the same day throughout Haiti. At every voting
place there was a gendarmerie officer, except at four or live where I was unable
to supply officers and where I placed marines, whom I borrowed from the
brigade, and who were thought qualified to act in such a capacity. The gen-
darmes were not allowed near the voting places but were allowed to vote. The
gendarmerie officer, I believe, was directed to remain in the voting place dur-
ing the entire period. Some question came up about meals, and, I think, I
directed that they should make arrangements to have their meals brought to
them, and their duties were to see that every person who api)eared to vote had
not vote<i before on that day, and to see that he received the ballot which he
asked for. The ballots were roughly printed : " Oui,'* and " Non." I do not
remember whether they were of different colors or not; but the voter would
come in and ask for a ballot, negative or affirmative, and the gendarmerie
officer
Mr. Howe. All the " Yes " votes or affirmative votes were printed on paper
of the same color, were they not?
Col. Williams. I think so.
Mr. Howe. And all the ** No " votes were printed on the same coloretl paper?
Col. Williams. That Is my recollection.
Mr. HowB. Do you remember whether the ** Yes ** and the " No *' were on
different colored paper?
Col. Williams. I do not think they were ; I do not remember. I may say that
the ballots themselves were turned over to me by the minister of the Interior or
delivered by the public printing office and sent by me in sealed packages to the
various gendarmerie officers who would have to act In the voting places. They
were not to be opened imtll the day of the election, when they were turned over
intact to the Haitian officials who were directly charged with the conduct of the
voting — I believe the Judge de paix, the local police Judge, the local mayor, and
some other official. I think that was the composition of the voting committees.
All the ballots reached their destination, except one batch intended for a little
town in the north, and the gendarmerie messenger who was to deliver these
ballots — we found his horse, rifle, and stuff but never found him or the ballots.
Whether he was murdered or bribed to desert I do not know.
The balloting was conducted with the utmost order. I spent the day in Port
au Prince, going from one balloting place to another, and, so far as I could de-
termine, everything was running perfectly smoothly. There was considerable
drunkenness, as there always is on an election day in Haiti, but from all points
I received reports that the plebiscite had gone through very nicely, without any
trouble, except in one town, the town of Aquin, where a drunken row resulted in
some disorder, but it was in no way connected with the political situation.
Mr. Howe. How did the vote come out?
Col. Williams. The ballots were counted after the closing of the polls, in the
presence of the gendarmerie officer and. after having been counted, were sealed
and k^t imtil orders were issued for a recount, in case of a dispute, or their
dstruction after a time. They were finally all destroyed, I believe. The count
came out roughly, 98,000 in the affirmative and seven hundred and odd in the
n^ative. Those figures would seem on the face of them to indicate fraud or
coercion, but, as a matter of fact, they do not indicate anything except a very
peculiar feature of the Haitian disposition. It was believed by all hands that
the plebiscite would go through without a large dissenting vote, and this belief
was so generally held that the Haitian who wanted to vote negatively, rather
than identify himself with a losing cause, failed to vote at all. In Cape Haltien,
the largest city after Port au Prince, the number of votes cast, both affirmative
and negative, was ridiculous in comparison with the size of the electorate.
e22e^— 21~pt2 30
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568 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. So much smaller?
Col. Williams. So much smaller. The plebiscite I considered in every phase,
those which led up to it, and the phase of operation, and the events subsequent,
to be absolutely and entirely creditable to the gendarmerie. I am real^ very
proud of the plebiscite. So far as supervision, orders, instruction, indoctrina-
tion could go, it was conducted as honestly as anything possibly could be. I
have no doubt there were many repeaters, but there was no miscounting, no
ballot stuffing, or any such practice.
Mr. Howe. You endeavored to guard against repeating?
Col. Williams. I endeavored to guard against repeating ; but the registration
did not amount to anything, and it very often occurs in the interior of Haiti
that not only are there many men of the same name but the same man will not
have the same name two days.
Mr. Howe. What was the attitude of the Haitian courts toward the occupa-
tion? How did they administer Justice, both civil and criminal? Can you tell
us, Colonel, briefly what your observations were on those matters and on kin-
dred subjects?
Col. Williams. The administration of Justice in Haiti would be a farce if it
were not a tragedy. The lower-court Judges with whom the people are mostly
brought in contact and with whom we as policemen were mostly brought in
contact, are, as a class, ignorant, venal, and utterly and entirely Incompetent.
There are exceptions, of course. I speak generally. The next class of judges
show themselves to be excellent Jurists, but their verdicts, because of the
uniformity with which these verdicts are decided in favor of the Haitian party
to the case, excite suspicion. The very highest court, the court of cas.sation,
is a body of dignified Jurists known for their legal lore even outside of Haiti,
and these men are so wedded to the law, as law, that they have completely dis-
associated themselves from the life of the people. This last court is held in
very high esteem, and the most radical political demagogue In Haiti has never
accused the court of cassation, as a whole, or its membership, of doing wrong,
but they do not qualiftr to pass upon conditions arising from the occupation.
Have you time to hear an Instance that Is pertinent?
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Col. Williams. Admiral Caperton. In first landing, found that there was de-
posited to the credit of the Haitian Government, in the national bank, some-
thing under a million dollars gold. This he seized and directed the bank that
It was to be paid out only on his order. In other words, the Haitian Govern-
ment was not permitted access to the funds deposited to Its credit. The
administration of this fimd and other funds was conducted generally along
the lines provided for In the Haitian law. In 1918, I think It was a prominent
lawyer that presented a Oovenmient check which called for the payment of
75 gourdes, the Haitian monetary unit, for the rental of a house which was
occupied by the Government. The bank had shortly before that received orders
that certain classes of payments were to be made In gold. That was In order
to stabilize the exchanfre which, at that moment, was fluctuating In such a
fasliion as to greatly Interfere with the conduct of business. Mr. Francis,
who presented the check, refused to accept payment In gold, and brought suit
In the courts against the bank, represented in the person of Mr. Scarpa, the
manager. The bank's defense wns simply the production of an authenticated
copy of Admiral Caperton's order and the subsequent order bearing on the ex-
change situation. Of course, other things came into It, but. In the main, that
was the defense of the liank. The court of ca.ssation declined to take judicial
cognizance of the occupation and of Admiral Caperton*s order, and found for
the plalntlfl*.
Mr. Howe. In what amount?
Col. Williams. To pay the check In gourdes, as the writing called for, and
for punitive damnges, I think, of 100,000 gourdes; I am not certain of tliat
amount. It was, like all punitive damages, for a very large amount. ^
Mr. Howe. Tliat being the decree of the court, what happened, if you know.
Col. Williams. Of course, it would be impossible to permit such a decree to
be carried out, because, if so, the whole structure upon which was built the
occupation would fall, so the manager of the bank was told that he would be
protected. I think the rase is in that status now.
Mr. Howe. If he did not pay the 75 gourdes and the damages?
Col. Williams. If he did not. I have mentioned that as an Instance of the
complete detachment of the one reliable court.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 569
Mr. Howe. Did you ever make any observation as to what was the percentage
of convictions in the ordinary police cases y^hich were brought into the lower
courts?
X^ol. Williams. The number of convictions in the lower courts obtained by
the police was largely a reflex of the gendarmerie ofllcer's influence.
Mr. Howe. Wliere did he liave a chance to bring his influence to bear on the
police court?
Col. Williams. By winning the confidence of the people and the oflicials by
making himself popular with them, and by proving to them what we are all
trying to prove, that we are there to help them. Whenever this influence was
not exerted, the percentage of convictions was very small. The Haitian judges
did not care for the new gendarmerie, and they did not c^re for it mostly be-
cause they were subject to a ^rveillance which they had never before experi-
enced. This surveillance was not only carried on by taking an active interest
in the work of the courts, but was carried on by having present in each of
these police courts a gendarmerie representative known as the ministre pub-
lique. This gendarmerie representative was provided for by an obscure
passage in a very long law. I discovered it, and realizing what a powerful
agency this might be for the betterment of conditions in the courts, immediately
Installed them whenever a gendarme of sufficient intelligence and reliability
could be found. In some instances I enlisted ex-ministres publlque, old men
in many instances, to service as gendarmes In the courts. Their duties were
somewhat comparable to those of a district attorney, if you can conceive of a
district attorney in a police court. They rather presented the police side of
the case, and recommended a punishment. The judge was bound to listen to
their presentation of the police side of the case, but was not bound to accept
their recommendation. In fact, he usually did not. But by having these more
or less reliable agents In every court for every trial, we increased the per-
centage of convictions, because in an open-and-shut game, such as police trials
usually are, they hardly dared run counter to the evidence.
Mr. Howe. In the presence of the ministre publlque?
Col. Williams. In the presence of the ministre publlque, who would promptly,
of course, report what he considered without or with reason as a miscarriage
of justice. The presence of these agents, who were authorized by law, and
who, so far as I know, never exceeded their authority except in individual in-
stances, was a source of constant irritation to the whole judiciary, and par-
ticularly the lawyer class. They felt that the gendarmerie was trespassing
on their preserves in having this Haitian institution active, and the Oov-
emment Itself did not like it, and when a new judiciary law was passed by the
conseil d'etat I found, to my dismay, that no mention was made of the ministre
publlque, and I was forced to send telegraphic orders all over Haiti, with-
drawing these people. My order was followed by a flood of protests from the
gendarmerie officers who realized his value.
Mr. Howe. Was there a falling off in convictions after that withdrawal of
the ministre publlque?
Col. Williams. I do not know, because it happened so late in my adminis-
tration that there was no opportunity to ascertain.
Mr. Howe. In your opinion, are the Haitian lower courts capable of them-
selves, under Haitian conditions, and without assistance or suggestion from
the occupation, of so administering justice as to make the carrying out of law
and order and progress possible?
Col. Williams. The Haitian judge, working after the French fashion, has
little discretion. If the evidence indicates that the crime was committed, he
must find the man guilty, and the various classes of crimes are described with
great minuteness in the code. Therefore, if the Haitian Government could
place in the lower courts Haitians of education, and pay them sufficient to make
It worth their while to attend to their business, and to ignore the temptations to
which they are subject, I do not see why the lower courts can not be reformed.
Mr. Howe. Under the conditions which you have named?
CoL WiLUAMS. Under the conditions which I have named.
Mr. Howe. How about the higher courts?
Col. Williams. I think the higher courts must undergo an educational process
which will bring them closer fn touch with the actual needs of the people.
Whether or not that can be done, and the Code Napoleon still remain the Haitian
code. I am not enough of a lawyer to say.
Mr. Howe. And the conditions which you stipulate as to the lower courts,
however, did not prevail, did they, at the time of the occupation, or during
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570 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Col. Williams. They did not.
Mr. Howe. And did the courts, pie lower courts, do their fair share in up-
holding the hands of the police, and In maintaining order and progress in
Haiti?
Col. WiiJJAMS. Spealcing generally, when working under the personal in-
fluence of the gendarmerie officer, whom they may have learned to respect,
and checked by the presence of the ministre publique, they did. Where these
influences and these checks did not exist I do not believe they functioned any
differently from the way in which they functioned years before we came.
Mr. HowB. In his testimony the other day Gen. Butler Indicated In a general
way, and with some illustrations, the work which the gendarmerie carried on
in straightening out and carrying on the affairs of the communes. Can yon
give us some statement of your observations on that?
Col. AViLLiAMS. I think they once reported that the most definite social re-
sults had been accomplished In Haiti by the communal administration conducted
under the direct supervision of the gendarmerie officers. Early in the occupa-
tion the minister of the Interior, under whose administration and control the
communes worked, issued a letter to all the communes, stating they -must place
their financial operations, and some other operations, under the supervision of
the gendarmerie officers. This meant a tremendous amount of work, but the
gendarmerie officers undertook It gladly, and succeeded In time In changing
materially the appearance, the sanitation, and the financial condition of every
commune with which they were brought in contact* Some of them increased
the revenues a hundredfold. In all cases their work was directed along the lines
of developing civic pride. It would be too much to say that he developed
a civic pride, but I could see glimmerings of It In all the towns. A better
class of Haitians was willing to accept public office In the communes. The
books. If crudely, were at least accurately k^t The revenues were In their
collection supervised by the gendarmerie officers, and extortion was not per-
mitted.
Mr. Howe. Had extortion been at all prevalent before that?
Col. Williams. Yes; extortion In a negative sense. That is. the people
without influence had to pay, and the people with it did not. The disburse-
ments were made only on the approval of the gendarmerie officer, and the
Halt'an official made to show results. The Haitians themselves took to this
enthusiastically, and supported, except in the capital where there was a great
deal of friction, the efforts of the gendarmerie officers for the betterment of
conditions in the town. The work was enthusiastically carried out and was
definitely productive of tangible results of a very Important nature.
Mr. Howe. What kind of results?
Col. Williams. The town was cleaned up. In the first place, and proper
market places would be built, and rough slaughterhouses, or, at least, a
slaughtering place would be provided, and stray animals were kept off the
streets. The gutters were cleaned out, the people were encouraged to trim
their hedges and put up fences and whitewash their houses; sanitary measures
of a very, very rudimentary sort were carried out with some success; the
operat'ons of the office charged with the collection of vital statistics were
supervised to a degree which resulted probably in at least one-half of the
births and deaths being registered.
Mr. Howe. Was that better than previously?
Col. Williams. That was much better, but mostly the gain was in civic
pride, so that towns began to compete with neighboring to\^Tis. and, as I say, I
saw the beginning of this pride which I considered so es.sential to a rejuvenated
Haiti coming to be.
Mr. Howe. Did this undertaking of the rejuvenation of the communes in
Itself create any friction In any quarter?
Col. Williams. Naturally, tactless officers sometimes tread on the toes oi
.sensitive offic'als, but those could ordinarily be straightened out. The only
cases of serious friction that occurred were In the capital itself, which u?
probably the only town where the municipal revenues are really worth going
Mr. Howe. Will you compare the prison conditions as you found them vnih
the prison conditions as they became after the occupation?
Col. WiLiJAMS. The condition of the prisons in Hati when we landed were
unspeakable. In the large cities, where they should have been the best, tliey
were probably the worst. There was no provlson made for the feeding of we
prisoners, the sanitary arrangements were practically nonexistent and records
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 571
were so poorly kept as hardly to 6erve as a guide In the segregation and in
the release and treatment of prisoners. A man with Influence or with family
or wth money wouM have a cell to himself, from whicli he would conduct
all his affairs, and the people without money or influence would be Jammed
like sardines in other cells that were extremely dirty.
Mr. Howe. Were the sexes segregated there among the prisoners?
Col. Williams. Yes; except in the smaller prisons. The prison reform was
one of our chief interests, and the oflflcers 1 ked it very much. The prison in
the capital became, I believe, a model for what the prisons of a small country
might be. We not only made a sanitary, livable prison out of it, but had a
tratle school and workshops which made all the gendarmes' uniforms, all the
;fendarme hats, an 1 made a part of the shoes and a lot of miscellaneous equip-
ment. We had an automob le repair shop in there, a blacksmith's shop, a brass
workers' shop, a cari>enter's shop that turned out far better furniture than
the native craftsmen did, and not only were the natives whose term was suffi-
ciently long to make it worth while taught a trade, but they were paid a
I»ercentage of what their production brought in. The gendarmerie, for in-
stance, bought its un forms from the prisons. It did not commandeer this
stuff, and It was often the case tha a prisoner would be discharged with $15
or $20 gold, a very considerable sum for a poor Haitian.
Mr. Howe. Did they receive a fair ration while they were in there?
Col. Williams. The ration was as much as we could buy. The Haitian Gov-
ernment, of course, after discussion, allotted 8 cents gold for the rationing of
the prisoners.
Mr. Howe. That ration means per day per man^?
Col. Williams. Per day per man. In normal times this would have been
sufficient, but under the conditions brought about by the war it was
Mr. Howe. By the World War?
Col. Williams. By the European war; it was very difficult, indeed, to make
this ration work out. We had a scientific ration of 2,400 calories worked out
as well as we could on the calorific value of the native products, and It re-
sulted, this scientific ration, In a marked increase in the general good health
of the prisoners, but I must say that the prison mortality, while less than It
was in the beginning, was still very high.
Mr. Howe. Even in the prisons where these good conditions prevailed?
Col. WiLLiAi^s. Even in the prisons where these good conditions prevailed.
In the prison of Fort au Prince we had a medical officer of the gendarmie who
had practically nothing else to do but look after the prisoners, and we had a
good infirmary or hospital, and every care was given them. That .was our
niotlel prison, but even there the death rate was too high.
Mr. Howk. As compared with the death rate among people who were at lib-
erty— the same kind of people?
C^l. Williams. There was no way of telling what the death rate among the
people was, because the vital statistics were not sufficiently well kept.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether or not the prison death rate was higher than
the death rate outside of the prison? •
Col. Williams. I have no figures to compare.
Mr. Howe. Nobody knows what the death rate in Haiti Is, then?
Col. Williams. Nobody knows what the death rate in Haiti is.
Mr. Howe. Have you any means of knowing what the prison mortality was
before the occupation?
Col. Williams. Before the occupation they had exactly the same prisoners,
with miserable prisons, no sanitary arrangements, no medical care, and no
rationing. I must assume that the death rate was very much higher than it
was under the American direction.
Mr. Howe. What, if any, progress was made In iM)pular etlucation as a result
of and during the occupation?
Col. WiLUAMS. The Haitian Government spends a large percentage of its reve-
nues on education and the money is practically all wasted. There is no training
school for teachers worthy of the name, and therefore the school-teacher is
utterlv and entirely incompetent. Again I speak generally. The superintend-
ents of school districts are equally incompetent to teach, know nothing about
scientific educational methods, and hold their positions largely through political
Influence. They are, however, well educated.
Mr. Howe. Do the gendarmerie, or any of the treaty officials, have the legal
right to change the personnel of the teaching force or the school system?
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672 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Col. Williams. The only relations we had with the pwsonnel of the schoola
were two. The monthly report, to which I referred earlier, had a sec^on de-
voted to the schools, and on which the gendarmerie officer made such observa-
tions on the conduct of the schools as appeared to him pertinent, and If the
case seemed to warrant it, I would send an excerpt of this to the minister of
education. I never received any other answer than a flat denial.
Mr. Howe. But it was a supplementary kind of inspection system?
Col. Williams. It was not an inspection ; it was simply an observation. The
other contact with the personnel of the schools was that established by the
fact that the gendarmerie delivered the cash, the monthly payment of each
teacher to that teacher, and before paying him or her, required the teacher to
sign a little slip which certified that he or she had conducted his or her duties
as such and such a sort of teacher during the month or portion of the month.
Mr. Howe. How did that work out?
Col. Williams. That worked out to this extent that the teachers were present
on the school days during school hours, but as to their competency, that was
not alTected In any way, and my personal experience when, in order to get a
line on the personnel, I paid off a number myself, resulted like this : One woman
teacher came forward to receive her cheek, which was not much — 10 gourdes—
$2 for the month, and she could not sign the receipt. I asked her why not. and
she said that she did not have to write ; that she was a teacher of reading, as
I could see for myself. If I read her ticket. That sort of teacher was not un-
common.
Mr. Howe. There were really a number of Illiterate teachers?
Col. Williams. There were illiterate teachers.
Mr. Howe. And did the American occupation have any legal authority to
change that?
Col. Williams. It had no legal authority whatsoever, and never did any-
thing because of it.
Mr. Howe. Was the occupation responsible for building some schoolhouses?
Gen. Butler told us something about that, but was that work carried -on after
he left?
Col. Williams. Yes; a small sum allotted originally by the military com-
mander, when he had control of certain disbursements, permitted the erection
of what we liked to call model school houses in several of the more important
conununes. With this money we put up a substantial building of a simple
type, with a center partition to separate the sexes and provide the rudiments
of sanitary facilities.
Mr. Howe. Could the school system be improved without a radical reforma-
tion?
Col. Williams. The school system could not be improved ; it will have to be
done over again.
Mr. Howe. Does the Haitian Government spend a substantial amount of
money on it?
Col. Williams. A very creditable proportion of the revenues. I hare for-
gotten what it is.
Mr. Howe. So its reconstruction Is necessar>^?
Ool. Williams. Absolutely.
Mr. Howe. And the treaty officials and the Marine Corps and the constabulary
did not have the legal right to bring about any such reconstruction. Is that cor-
rect?
Col. Williams. We had no legal right. We were all interested in it, and I
believe that one treaty official — ^who it was I am not sure, but I think it was
the financial adviser — persuaded the Haitian Government to engage under con-
tract a qualified American educator. He came to Haiti under a contract and
started out by presenting to the Government a very ambitious program of
school reform. His program was utterly impracticable and fell of its own
weight. He then came around and made such reformation as he could with the
material at hand, but being engaged in a purely advisory capacity, he was
never able to put across any of his recommendations, and subsequently left
without accomplishing anything.
Mr. Howe. There would be necessarily a long wait before competent teachers
could be supplied? They would first have to be educated, would they not?
Col. Williams. There must be a normal school ; there must be a source of
teaching personnel.
Mr. Howe. You will have to wait for your first crop of teachers, will you not?
Col. Williams. Or else Import them.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 573
Mr. Howe. Has there ever been any flnanciiil irregularity attributable to the
frendarme officers in the administration of these communal funds or the pay
of the school-teachers that you know of?
CJol. Williams. The only two cases when an American has been even sus-
pected of dishonesty in connection with the public funds were these: A ser-
vant of marines in charge of some work — I do not know Just what it was —
appropriated to his own ,use something in the neighborhood of $20, I think.
He was court-martialed for that The other concerns the seizure of $1,000,000
by Admiral Oaperton. It was currently believed that Admiral Caperton, when
he left had taken with him that part of the $1,000,000 which he had not turned
over to Col. Waller.
Mr. Howe. Currently believed by whom?
Col. Williams. It was a matter of gossip in Port au Prince, and people who
related this to me — several did — told me they were eminently satisfied with
the action of the United States Government in shooting Admiral Caperton and
hanging Col. Waller for the part they had played in this.
Mr. Howe. You believed them equally well informed on both heads of the
news they gave you — as to Admiral Caperton's peculation and his later violent
death?
Col. Williams. I can not answer that. But, seriously, there has never to
my knowledge been the slightest hint of a suspicion on the part of any Haitian
regarding our administration of finances.
Mr. Howe. Gen. Butler has told us of what efforts were made under the clr-
comstances toward demonstrating agricultural possibilities down there. You
were assistant chief of the gendarmerie during that time, I believe. Were those
expermental farms, or what efforts that were being made, continued during
your Incumbency as chief?
Col. Williams. No; they were not, except unofficially by individual officers
who, in many instances, being farmer boys who had enlisted, attempted to
teach the Haitians something about better methods, particularly in the prep-
aration of the soil.
Mr. Howe. Were early efforts toward instruction in agriculture by the occu-
pation discontinued?
Col. Williams. We attempted to raise potatoes and improve the standard
of potato raising in Haiti, but our efforts were not successful.
Mr. Howe. In 1917 the constituent assembly was prorogued. Did you have
anything to do with that or any direct knowledge of the process!
Col. Williams. I was Gen. Butler's assistant at the time, but except from
what was common knowledge and what he told me himself I know nothing.
Mr. Howe. You took no active part in that yourself?
CoL Williams. I had no active part in closing it
Mr. Howe. There was a similar prorogation In 1916.
Col. Williams. The key, however, which I believe has become prominent in
the discussions of the matter, came into my possession.
Mr. Howe. The key to the chamber?
Col. Williams. The key to the chamber. I had a great deal of difficulty In
persuading any Haitian minister to accept it I did not want it. I have
forgotten whom I finally persuaded to take it.
Mr. Howe. How did they get it Into your hands?
Col. Williams. I was assistant to Gen. Butler, and many details fell to me.
Mr. Howe. Did Gen. Butler hand you the key?
Col. WiLUAMS. I do not know, sir.
Mr. Howe. You do not know how you got it?
CoL Williams. I do not remember how I got it.
Mr. Howe. There was a similar occurrence in 1916, the prorogation of the
legislature. Did you have any direct knowledge of that or take any part in
that?
Senator Oddie, In your opinion, what would be the effect of an order abol-
ishing martial law temporarily while this committee is in Haiti investigating?
Col. Williams. It would permit every liar in Haiti to go to the limit in his
imaginings.
Senator Oddie. Do you think it would do real harm?
Col. WiLLLAMS. I think it would do a great deal of harm.
S^iator Oddie. Do you think it would endanger lives?
OoL Williams. No.
Senator Oddie. The lives of our marines?
OoL Williams. No.
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674 INQUIKl INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Senator Oddie. In what respect would it do harm?
Col. Williams. As I mentioned before, the Haitian is a direct thinker;
what he hears he believes. The raising of martial law, which has never oper>
ated except for the suppression of untrue newspaper articles, would permit
the publication of anything that any Haitian wished to say. It would result
undoubtedly
Senator Oddie. Say or print?
Col. Williams. Or print. It would result in a mushroom growth of news-
papers that would all find circulation, and what the Haitian rgad in these
papers he would accept as gospel. I can see that no useful end would be
gained.
Senator Oddie. Would it have any effect on the testimony given before this
committee?
Col. Williams. I do not think so. On the witness who would appear before
you — ^and I take it that your visit there will permit only of the interrogation
of the better qualified witnesses — the effect would be slight The Haitian,
high class, does not fear punishment or Imprisonment, especially if any tinge
of martyrdom goes with it. I do not believe that the better class of Haitians
would feel honestly that they would suffer because of any testimony, however
disparaging it might be, that they gave before the committee. The censor-
ship, it must be understood, so far as I was able to exercise it — ^and I exer-
cised most of it — was directed only against the publication of libelous articles,
libelous as a marine understands it.
Senator Oddie. Untrue?
Col. Williams. Untrue. There Was not the slightest attempt made to stop
criticism. That was fully discussed by me in a conference I had with repre-
sentatives of all the papers In the capital. That interview was reported and
printed in extenso, and I do not remember a single instance where the papers
were suppressed or their editors punished for printing a critical article that
could be even read as being truthful. I was one of the few officers who read
French, and not only was a good deal of suppressing done but a good deal of
reading was done by me. I tried to get through all the papers every day. It
was not difficult because there were only a few.
Mr. Howe. To what extent would the existence of military tribunals be
affected by the suspension of martial law?
Col. Williams. It would depend upon the phraseology modifying the martial
law or suspending it in whole or in part.
Mr. Howe. It would not suspend the laws of courts-martial, of course?
Col. Williams. If martial law were lifted without qualification, it would
stop the operation of the military courts ; I mean the provost courts.
Mr. Howe. And that would leave only the civil Haitian courts?
Ool. Williams. The civil Haitian courts.
Mr. Howe. Are those, as they are now constituted, adequate for the adminis-
tration of Justice during the occupetloU?
Col. Williams. They are not adequate for the administration of justice, so
far as justice is Involved in the adjudication of cases where the United States
or its representatives are a party.
Senator Oddie. There Is one more question I wanted to ask in connection
with what I asked you before. If martial law were abolished temporarily,
and our marines were still there, do you think there would be any danger
of vengeance being worked against them?
Col. Williams. No; the Haitian is not an assassin. I think in four years
there In Port au Prince, a city of 100,000 people, there were not more than five
or six murders.
Senator Oddie. What would be the effect of suspending martial law tempo-
rarily while this committee is Investigating matters in Haiti? Would it result
In vengeance being taken on the marines and result in harm to the marines,
who would then be unarmed, as far as the law is concerned?
Col. Williams. I do not believe that for a period of two weeks the sus-
pension of martial law would result in any crimes or violence.
Mr. Howe. If the question referred to a longer period would your answer be
the same?
Col. Williams. No; an indefinite suspension of martial law would make
extremely difficult the working of the occupation.
Senator Oddib. If conditions remain as they are in regard to martial law,
do you think that it would mean any trouble In getting fair and truthful
and unbiased statements from the witnesses?
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INQVIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 575
Col. Williams. I do not. The class of Haitians whom I assume you will
mostly interrogate have never had any reason to fear tlie operation of martial
law and are perfectly familiar with its application, and they realize as well
as we do the limitations which we ourselves place on its application.
Mr. Anoell. In connection Avlth these questions in regard to martial law,
the questions here put to the witness, Col. Williams, regarding the lifting
of martial law would seem to take their origin in the request or grow out
of the request which I made last week or 10 days ago for the temx>orary
raising of martial law during the presence of the committee in Haiti, and I
therefore wish it to appear on the record, in order that there may be no
doubt or ambiguity in this connection, that the request was for the lifting
of martial law only during the period of the visit of the comlnittee to Haiti,
which would not be in any event, as I understand the present plans, above two
weeks, and possibly less than that.
(Whereupon, at 4.35 o'clock p. m., the committee adjourned until Monday,
November 7, 1921, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO. .
MONDAY, KOVEHBEB 7, 1021.
United States Senate,
Select Gommitteb on Haiti and San Domingo,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 131 Senate Office
Building, at 10.30 o'clock a. m. Senator Tasker L. Oddie presiding.
Present: Senator Oddie.
Also present: Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and Maj. Edwin
N. McCiellan.
STATEMENT OF MB. EBEDEBICK L. SPEAB, ATTORNEY AT LAW,
FBEMONT, NEBK.
Mr. Howe. Mr. iSpear, how old are you, please?
Mr. Speab. Twenty-nine years old.
Mr. Howe. You went to a law school?
Mr. Speabw Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Before that, did you have university training?
Mr. Speab. Just the law school ; that was all.
Mr. Howe. Where was that?
Mr. Speab. The University of Nebraska.
Mr. Howe. Were you ever a member of the United States Marine Corps?
Mr. Speaa. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. In what capacity?
Mr. Speab. Well, from private to first lieutenant.
Mr. Howe. When did you enlist?
Mr. SPE.VB. Sometime in July, 1917.
Mr. Howe. How soon after that were you commissioned?
Mr. Speab. July, 1918.
Mr. Howe. That was a commission in the United States Marine Corps?
Mr. Speab. The Marine Corps Reserves, first, and a month later in the
Marine Corps.
Mr. Hows. As second lieutenant?
Mr. Speab. Second lieutenant; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Were you afterwards promoted to first lieutenant?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. When was that?
Mr. Speab. I think in about March or April, 1919.
Mr. Howe. That was first lieutenant in the Marine Corps?
Mr. Speab. Marine Corps; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. There has been testimony before the committee here of in-
dividuals who, being members of the Marine Corps, had rank in the Haitian
gendarmerie. These commissions and promotions of which we have been
speaking in your testimony here refer to Marine Corps promotions and grades,
do they not?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Where was your service?
Mr. Speab. From the start
Mr. Howe. From the start?
Mr. Howe. In the United States?
Mr. Howe. You served in the United States and Haiti?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. When did you go to Haiti?
577
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578 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Speak. I thliik I landed in Port flu Prince on April 18, 1919.
Mr. Howe. What duties did you perform?
Mr. Spkab. The next day 1 was sent into the field, in tlie monntaiDH.
Mr. Howe. With what organization?
Mr. Spear. I think I was attached to eitfier the Sixty-seventh or Sixty-ninth
Company, but I was not with them ; I was detached. I was carried on their
roster.
Mr. Howe. When you took the field what outfit were you with?
Mr. Speab. I think with the One hundredth Company ; I am not certain.
Mr. Howe. Did you perform any duty as an officer of the gendarmerie?
Mr. Spear. I had command of some gendarmerie, but I was not an officer of
the gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. Explain that, will you please?
Mr. Spear. I was sent out by the major in command at Mirebalals to a town
called Sauteau, and there I had charge of the town with, I think, about 8 or 10
marines and 3 or 4 gendarmes in tlie barracks? there — a little barracks.
Mr. Howe. You therefore had some gendarmerie under your direction?
Mr. Spear. At that time; yea
Mr. Howe. But you were never given any separate command of the gen-
darmerie?
Mr. Spear. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. About when was it that you had these few gendarmes under your
orders?
Mr. Spear. It must have been the latter part of April and the first part of
May.
Mr. Howe. Of 1919?
Mr. Spear. 1919.
Mr. Howe. When were you discharged from the Marine Corps?
Mr. Spear. About the 1st of August, 1919, I think.
Mr. Howe. Why were you discharged?
Mr. Spear. I asked for it, I guess ; yes, I asked for it. The war was over.
Mr. Howe. How was your health at that time?
Mr. Spear. I had malaria and I weighed 135 pounds, and my average weight
was 175.
Mr. Howe. Are you suffering from some after effects of that malaria now?
Mr. Spear. I just got out of bed a little while ago.
Mr. Howe. From malaria?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Howe. On June 26, 1919. did you act as counsel for the accused in the gen-
eral court-martial of Pvt. Walter E. Johnson, United States Marine Corps?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. -Howe. Mr. Chairman, I want to introduce into the record the court-
martial proceedings of the Walter E. Johnson general court-martial case, of
which I have here the original record. My suggestion would be that the record,
typewritten, possibly printed later on, contain the charges and specifications,
the summing up of counsel for the accused, and the findings of the court in
full, and the action of the convening authority in full, but as to the testimony,
for purposes of the record of the committee, I believe that a carefully prepared
digest of the testimony will serve all purposes equally well, and in the prepara-
tion of the digest I should, before submitting it to the committee, submit It to Mr.
Angell, counsel for the Haitian societies, to obtain his assistance in seeing that
it is a sufficiently full and impartial digest.
Senator Oddie. With a reference made to the place where this can be found?
Mr. Howe. With a reference made to the place where this can be found, so
that although it will be one of the records Introduced in evidence before this
committee the committee by that means will avoid unnecessary typewriting and
printing. Will that be satisfactory, Mr. Angell?
Mr. Angell. Quite satisfactory.
Senator Oddie, If that is satisfactory, it will be so ordered.
(It was understood that the records referred to would be later printed In the
record.)
Mr. Howe. I will remind you that Johnson was tried on charges and specifi-
cations as follows : summarizing : Charge I : Assault Specification : Assaulting
Leonard Placlde^ a native. Charge II : Absence from station and duty without
leave. Si;)eclficatlon : Absence without leave on or about May 22, 1919. Charge
III : Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. Specification 1 : That
Pvt. Johnson, serving with the One hundred and forty-eighth Company. Second
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 579
Hegiment, of the First Provisional Brigade, United States Marine Corps, on
detached duty at Croix des Bouquets, in Haiti, unlawfully became a member of
a firing squad that unlawfully shot the said Leonard Placide. Specification 2 :
That Johnson unlawfully joined a firing squad which unlawfully killed another
native named Destine Jean-, a native prisoner.
I will remind you that the result of the court-martial was that the accused
vras found guilty of the first charge; that the second charge, of absence with-
out leave, was not proved ; and that the third charge, with both specifications
thereunder, were held to be not proved, and that the sentence was confinement
for six months and dishonorable discharge.
Th convening authCH-ity o# this court-martial was Col. U McCarty Little, of
the United States Marine Corps.
Now, having identified the proceedings in that way, I will read to you the
transcript of your summing up or argument before the court-martial in that
case, which appears on page 41 of the record of the court-martial.
(Mr. Howe thereupon read the closing argument of counsel for the accused
in the record of the court-martial of Pvt. Walter E. Johnson)
Mr. Spear, is the tnmscr'pt of your suniminj: up, to the best of your recol-
lection, a correct one?
Mr. Speab. Practically so. The reporter was rather slow, and a few words
he nrissed, but it is practically the meaning of the thing.
Mr. Howe. I draw your attention to your remark to the Cf)urt : " I mj'self
have ordered one or two Cncos shot u|x>n notification of a chief of section."
Was your language th«>re reporte<l substantially correct?
Mr. Spe.\r. Practically; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. You accept that as a transcript of what you said, which would not
be misleading?
Mr. Spear. Yes; if explained.
Mr. Howe. Please explain and also state to the committee what, if any,
occurrence you had in mind when you made that statement to the court.
Mr. Spear. I was In the field in command of about 30 men.
Mr. Howe. You are now describing the occurrence which you had in mind?
Mr. Spear. Yes. About half of them were incapacitated with the fever. I wa«
supposed to go out and make a certain patrol, looking for this band of Cacos.
Understand me, a Caco means the i>eople that were fighting us.
Mr. Howe. Fighting against you?
Mr. Spear. Armed forces, yes; not natives, arme<l forces. When I went out
on this morning I took five men, a Negro guide and nT>\self. all the men that
were available for me at that time.
Mr. Howe. When you ^)eak of men do you mean enlisted personnel of the
I'nited States Marine Corps?
Mr. Spear. Yes; except the Negro guide that I speak of.
Mr. UpwE. What was the Negro guide's position?
Mr. Spear. He was chief of section there.
Mr. Howe. That is a civil office, is It not, under the Haitian law?
Mr. Spear. Yes; something like our sheriff here. We came up with the
nrmed (^acos at about 5 o'clock in the morning, after marching two or three
hours. As soon as it was daylight we turned loose with our Lew:s gun and the -
rifies.
Mr. Howe. How many pieces dfd you have there?
Mr. Spear. One l-.ewls gun, four rifles, and a pistol. I carried a pistol, and
the other men had pistols. These (^acos were in houses and behind trees down
In the valley, and we were on top. We drove them' out of the valley ; at least,
when we got down in the valley there were various dead and woundetl Cacos
lying there.
Mr. Howe. At this i)oint. what was the date of this occurrence, as nearly as
you can recollect?
Mr. Spear. Sometime in May or June, 1919.
Mr. Howe. About how long before you acted as counsel for Johnson?
Mr. Spear. Possibly six weeks.
Mr. Howe. And where did this action take place that you are now describing?
Mr. Spear. The same place, to the east of the little trading point called Petit
Fond.
Mr. Howe. Where is Petit Fond ; what part of Haiti ?
Mr. Spear. I think it is some 45 miles to the northeast of Port au Prince, I
should say.
Mr. Howe. Will you continue with your description of the action?
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5&0 INQUntY IKTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Spear. We were firing as we ran down Into the valley, they firing back
at us.
Mr. Howe. The Cacos?
Mr. Speab. Yes ; we chasing them up the hill, consequently our positions were
reversed ; we were in the valley and they were on- the hill. These wounded
men — I do not Icnow how badly they were wounded or whether they were
faking, these Cacos. I rushed ahead and grabbed the machine gun myself at
that time — the Lewis gun — and detailed two of my men to watch the rear.
That left me with three men.
Mr. Howe. Let me get this correct In my own mind, as far as I can. lou
had at the time that you took charge of the Le>vis gun yourself passed with your
command in your advance beyond the point where lay the dead and wounded
who were struck down in your opening volley ; is that right?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And you were pursuing the others?
Mr. Spear. Pursuing the others.
Mr. Howe. Up the hill?
Mr. Spear. Yes; sending two of my men back to watch my rear.
Mr. Howe. Having at that time pas.sed over and beyond the original position
of the Cacos?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Go ahead, please.
Mr. Speab. One of the men came forward and said, " What are we going to do
with these wounded fellows? " And I said, " Go back and shoot them and pro-
tect my rear. Do not bother with the wounded men."
Mr. Howe. How many Cacos were there In the forces opposed to you at that
time?
Mr. Speab. About 100.
Mr. Howe. Is that an estimate or an actual count?
Mr. Speab. An estimate.
Mr. Howe. How did you estimate them?
Mr. Spear. Our intelligence department had said that there were 100 in that
band I was to attack ; between 80 and 100, they said.
Mr. Howe. Were you able to judge by the volume of their fire whether they
were numerous or not?
Mr. Spear. No ; except that they were unusually skilled rifiemen in that bunch.
They were coming very close to my men all the time. Ordinarily, they did not
Mr. Howe. At the time you gave that direction to your soldier to kill the
wounded in your rear, where were the rest of the enemy with relation to your
force?
Mr. Spear. They had almost completely surrounded us at that time. They
went up on the hills and went around us.
Mr. Howe. Was there firing from front and both sides? .
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Had there been any firing from the rear?
Mr. Speab. I do not know right at that time whether there had or not They
were going there. We could see them getting behind us.
• Mr. Howe. You could see these people?
Mr. Speab. Once in a while a flash through the trees.
Mr. Howe. You say you could see them working around to the rear of your
position, some of them?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How were these Cacos armed?
Mr. Speab. Well, those we killed were armed with rifles, swords, and knives.
Mr. Howe. Did you see arms in the hands of any of the C'acos you observed
running?
Mr. Speab. No; but I could see them shooting.
Mr. Howe. Could you hear the bullets coming near by?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And were you able to judge how near the bullets were coming?
Mr. Speab. Well, some of them hit right between my men sometimes. I could
see the dust fly.
Mr. Howe. How long did this action last?
Mr. Speab. About an hour.
Mr. Howe. Was the firing of the Cacos fairly sustained during that hour?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How near were your supports or reserves?
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iKQuiBY mrro oooupATioisr of haiti and santo domingo. 581
Mr. Speab. We had none ; there were none.
Mr. Howe. You had made a two or three hours' march before you met with
this band of Gacos?
Mr. Speab, Yes.
Mr. Howe. In your opinion, how Important was It to disperse and drive off the
Cacos at the earliest possible moment?
Mr. Speab. Of supreme Importance. That was the object of the campaign.
Mr. Howe. How many dead were there that you counted as the result of the
engagement?
Mr. Speab. I have forgotten now ; I suppose half a dozen, that is that were
there, and the rest of them, some wounded, running. I could see the blood
trails. They carry off their wounded, those Cacos. They think that if a man
is killed on the battle field and lies there overnight he goes to hell, so that they
are very anxious to carry their wounded and dead with them when they retreat.
Mr. Howe. How many wounded were there, do you know?
Mr. Speab. I do not know, a couple or three.
Mr. Howe. Two or three?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. You knew, however, from the report of your subordinate that there
were wounded there behind?
Mr. Speab. Oh, yes ; I passed over them when I went up.
Mr. Howe. Where were they when you passed over them ; were they in a
viUage?
Mr. Speab. Yes ; in some houses ; small, scattered houses ; it was not a village ;
they were outside of the inhabitants.
Mr. Howe. Were there any peaceful inhabitants around in the houses?
Mr. Speab. No.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether or not, as a matter of fact, your subordinate
did kill those wounded?
Mr. Speab. No.
Mr. Howe. You assumed that he did?
Mr. Speab. I assumed that he did ; yes ; they were dead.
Mr. Howe. They were later found dead?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What was the nature of the country there ; was it wooded?
Mr. Speab. Wooded and mountainous; very mountainous.
Mr. Howe. How near could an enemy have approached to your rear and still
have kept under cover?
Mr. Speab. Fif^ yards.
Mr. Howe. These were modern rifles they were armed with, were they not?
Mr. Speab. No.
Mr. Howe. What was the range of these rifles they were armed with?
Mr. Speab. I have no idea.
Mr. Howe. More than 50 yards?
Mr. Speab. Oh, my, yes; they were .45-callber rifles — old French rifles.
Senator Oddib. One of those would kill a man as far as you could see him?
Mr. Speab. Maj. John L. Mayer was hit with one of them, and it killed him
instantly.
Senator Oddie. At how close a range?
Mr. Speab. At close range. It tore his whole side out instantly.
Mr. Howe. A pistol's range Is good for more than 50 yards, is it not?
Mr. Speab. You will have to shoot better thaii I can. I would say yes.
Mr. Howe. You can hit at 50 yards?
Mr. Spear. You can hit at 200 yards and can kill a man with a pistol ; yes.
Senator Oddie. Those guns would be absolutely fatal at a thousand yards,
at least?
Mr. Speab. I should think so. I am not a technical expert, but I should
thhik 80.
Mr. Howb. How did you come out?
Mr. Speab. We carried only the ammunition that we could carry on our
backs, and, of course, that does not go very far in a Lewis gun, consequently
I had to clear the way and get out of there. My ammunition was about gone,
and I could not risk the lives of my men any further, of course.
Mr. Howe. So what did you do?
Mr. Speab. We fired and cleared the way and got out of this valley, and as
soon as we backed out of there we were safe again. We were on the high land
and we could watch them. ^ j
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582 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. That was open ground?
Mr. Speab. More or less open ground.
Mr. Howe. Did you retrace your steps any in order to get to the open grouwl
or did you go to the other side of the valley?
Mr. Speab. No ; we went back ; we could not get to the other side.
Mr. Howe. Did you make a report of that engagement?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Reporting the casualties to the enemy?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. In that report did you make any mention of your order to kill tlie
wounded?
Mr. Speab. No; I did not suppose that was necessary.
Mr. Howe. You counted those as dead?
Mr. Speab. I had to kill them ; I could not leave them there. .
Mr. Howe. Had you at the time or have you now, any doubt as to your justi-
fication in giving that order?
Mr. Speab. Absolutely none — no doubt.
Mr. Howe. You believe you were justified?
Mr. Speab. I certainly was.
Mr. Howe. And if you had not given that order and those wounded had
killed or hurt any of your men, would you have then felt responsible for them?
Mr. Speab. I would have felt responsible and I would have been court-
martialed. It was my duty to bring my five men home.
Mr. Howe. And your reason for that feeling is that this was a critical situ-
aUon in the field?
Mr. Speab. A critical situation in the field.
Mr. Howe. The circumstances of which justified the killing of these wounded
men?
Mr. Speab. Absolutely.
Mr. Howe. When you were addressing the court-martial in the Jolmson case
did you have any other instances of the killing of wounded in battle in mind?
Mr. Speab. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. That was the basis of your remark?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And the sole basis of your remark?
Mr. Speab. The sole basis.
Mr. Howe. Where I left off quoting your remark goes on, ** and I also doubt
whether a treacherous guide need expect a trial if made prisoner." Had you
any occurrence in mind when you made that remark?
Mr. Speab. Not to my personal knowledge.
Mr. Howe. That remark Is, In general, correctly quoted by the reporter?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. What caused you to make that remark? Have you any explana-
tion to give of it further than that you made it?
Mr. Speab. Yes; I understand that a lieutenant in the section next to me
was betrayed by his guide one morning and I do not know whether they bit
him on the head and killed him or shot him or what, but I know there was
something doing there.
Mr. Howe. On the spot you heard it?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. But you have no further knowledge than what you heard, is that
correct?
Mr. Speab. That is it ; and if the guide did betray him, I think he was per-
fectly justified ; there was no other way he could do with him.
Mr. Howe. That is to say, out in the field and in the presence of the enemy?
Mr. Speab. Yes ; you understand we were out in the field.
Mr. Howe. Your views are limited by that circumstance, are they not, when
you expressed them, of the treatment of unfaithful guides in the presence ot
the enemy in the field?
Mr. Speab. Oertainly.
Mr. Howe. I will continue the quotation : " I merely mention these things to
show that marines in the field live in this atmosphere and that it is nothing sur-
prising to receive orders to kill a man. I myself have been second In command
of forces in the field to which prisoners were sent and who — the captain so
notified me — we had orders to execute. The captain detailed one man to shoot
at the prisoner, which he did without question, close beside me; the other
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 583
one was taken back to Mirebalais through mistaken orders regarding his
execution."
What, if any, incident did you have in your mind when you made that state-
ment to the court?
Mr. Sfeab. You mean the times.
Mr. Howe. If you will give us your recollection, I will, with your permission,
hiterrupt you to make as precise as possible the time and the circumstance.
Mr. Spear. This was, I think, in May or June sometime that I was in the
field, under the conmiand of Capt. ESdwards.
Mr. Howe. This was 1919?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Capt Edwards?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Do you know Capt. Edwards's first name?
Mr. Speab. No; I do not.
Mr. Howe. Do you know what outfit his conmiand belonged to?
Mr. Speab. I think he commanded the One hundredth Company at that time.
Mr. Howe. The One hundredth Company?
Mr. Speab. I believe so; yes.
Mr. Howe. Are you certain of that?
Mr. Speab. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. That is your best recollection?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Will you continue what you were goingto say?
Mr. Speab. This was in May or June, 1919, I think, and Capt Edwards and
myself were stationed at this town. Petit Fond, he, of course, being superior in
command. We stayed there at 10-day intervals, and with relief sent out and
they convoyed two prisoners out there.
Mr.* Howe. What was that date? *
Mr. Speab. I say it was May or June ; I could not say which.
Mr. Howe. How long before your relief at Petit Fond had you been with
Capt. Edwards?
Mr. Speab. Well, you see, a part of the time I was in command at Petit
Fond, and a part of the time Capt. Edwards. If you will state your question
again, I will try to answer what you are trying to get at.
Mr. Howe. You said some time ago in your testimony that you left for the
field with a contingent from the One hundredth Company?
Mr. Speab. Yes.*
Mr. Howe. And your departure was very soon after your arrival in Haiti,
about a week, was it not?
Mr. Speab. The next day.
Mr. Howe. And was Capt. Edwards the commanding officer of that detach-
ment with which you went?
Mr. Speab. Well, in the meantime I was out at this little town I spoke about,
when I had command of the gendarmerie, Sauteau. Then I came right back
and went out with Capt. Edwards after that
Mr. Howe. He was your superior officer?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. You occasionally performed duty separate from him, did you not,
or did you?
Mr. Speab. Yes ; he sent me out on patrols, of course.
Mr. Howe. But you reported back to him after those patrols?
Mr. Speab. I reported to him; yes.
Mr. Howe, So at the time of your relief you were under Edwards's orders
directly?
Mr. Speab. At the time of my relief from Haiti, you mean?
Mr. Howe. No ; at the time of your relief at Petit Fond.
Mr. Speak. Oh, yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. How many men did you have there? Were you there under
Capt. Edwards's orders?
Mr. Speab. Thirty-three, about.
Mr. Howe. Those were all marines?
Mr. Speab. All marines, except our guides.
Mr. Howe. And the marines were not on gendarmerie dutv there?
Mr. Speab. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. And neither were you?
62260— 21— PT 2 31 ^ .
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684 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Speab. No, sir.
Mr. Ho>vB. And neither was Capt. Edwards?
Mr. Speab. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Now, go aliead please.
Mr. Spear. Our relief brouglit these prisoners out, and I saw them there.
Capt. Bki wards saw me and said, ** You are responsible for these prisoners."
Mr. Howe. How many were there?
Mr. Speab. Two.
Mr. Howe. Do you remember the names of the prisoners?
Mr. Speab. No; they were Negroes.
Mr. Howe. Haitians?
Mr. Speab. Yes. He detailed me to guard the prisoners. He said, " I am to
shoot one of these fellows, but you are responsible. Watch them. They may
try to get away from you." So I very carefully walked right behind them on
the way, personally myself, as a guard.
Mr. Howe. All the way from where to where?
Mr. Speab. To the place I am going to tell .vou about, and we arrived at a
place there, and he detailed a man to execute this prisoner, and while I did not
personally witness It, he did execute the prisoner.
Mr. Howe. What is your basis for saying he did execute the prisoner? What
did you observe there from which you concluded he executeil that prisoner?
Mr. Speab. I heard the rifle shot, and when I went back there I saw the fel-
low there dead.
Mr. Howe. Do you know any of the other circumstances — that is, how many
men were in the firing squad?
Mr. Speab. One man.
Mr. Howe. How do you know that?
Mr. Spear. I guess the captain told me afterwards — no; I saw him Jaking
the fellow away. I saw the marine taking the Negro out.
Mr. Howe. You saw the marine taking the Negro out?
Mr. Speab. Yea
Mr. Howe. To the point where shortly afterwards the shot came from?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. The sound of the shot came from?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And the marine was taking the Negro out in the direction of the
place where you subsequently saw the Negro dead?
Mr. Speab. There was no question about It ; he shot him, as far as that Is
concerned.
Mr. Howe, Is there any question but that he shot him under the orders of
Capt. Edwards?
Mr. Speab. I could not say. I did not hear the captain give him the order.
Mr. Howe. The captain however, told you he had ordered him shot?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did he tell you on whose authority those orders were given?
Mr. Speab. No ; he did not.
Mr. Howe. These two prisoners were brought out by this relief
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Where were they brought from, do you know?
Mr. Speab. Mirebalals, I think.
Mr. Howe. Do you recollect who was in command, what marine officer was In
command at MIrebalais at that time?
Mr. Speab No; I can not. If you can refresh my memory, perhaps I can
remember He was a major In the Marine Corps, a colonel in the gendarmerie;
I do not know.
Mr. Howe. How could you refresh your recollection?
Mr. Speab. I believe if somebody mentioned his name I could say whether
he was the man or not ; I do not know. He wore a mustache
mafI;i?lT^' -^i^I^ ^^" "^^^h l^" ^'^ ^^ ^^™^ «"y "<><^^«' correspondence, or other
material in which you could hope to find the name of this major'
Mr. Speab. No ; I could not—I could not tell.
for^to Petit^omir^^ ^^^ "'"'"^'^ ""^ ^^^ ''^''^^^ ''''"'^"^ ^"* "^^^^^ ^^ relieving
Mr. Speab. Capt. Brecker or Becker, I do not know which.
Mr. Howe. Brecker or Becker?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
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IKQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 585
Mr. Howe. Of the marines?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Was there another officer with him?
Mr. Spsak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you recollect the name of the other officer?
Mr. Speab. I do not know. I know he went down to the military academy
last year, the Virginia Military Institute. He was a great football player. I
can not think of his name.
Mr. Howe. He went to Virginia Military Institute last year as a student?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Ha^fe you any notes or other material from which you could
refresh your recollection as to the names of those relieving officers?
Mr. Spear. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you know, how the orders to kill these prisoners hal been
transmitted to Capt. Edwards?
Mr. Spear. No, sir. .
Mr. Howe. In point of time, how near did Capt. Edwards's remark to you
coinc de with the arrival of Capt. Becker or Brecker?
Mr. Spear. Oh, it was after.
Mr. Howe. How soon after?
Mr. Spear. Well, he told me to guard these prisoners, and it was half an
hour afterwards, as soon as we started back.
Mr. Howe. Would it be fnir to suppose that the orders to execute these
prisoners were carrie:! by Capt Brecker to (^ipt. Edwards?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did Capt. B<lwards have any other means of re<'eiving an order
from Mirebalais at that time?
Mr. Spear. Yes ; it *s possible by native he could have received those orders.
Mr. Howe. A native messenger?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Would you have known of the arrival of a native messenger with
orders?
Mr. Spear. I believe so.
Mr. Howe. Were you aware of the arrival at that time, or just before that
time, of any native messenger with orders?
Mr. Spear. No, sir ; but I could not say for certain, of course.
Mr. Howe. What hapi>ene<l to the other prisoner? You mentioned two.
Mr. Spear. We took him back to Mirebalais with us.
Mr. Howe. Did you have any conversation w th Capt. El wards about this?
Mr. Spear. That night, yes; after we were back in Mirebalais.
Mr. Howe. About the return of the second prisoner?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What was that?
Mr. Spear. I can not give his exact conversation, but he said he was sup-
posed to have executed that man, but he madi^ a mistake, and did not do t.
Mr. Howe. Before he learne<l of his mistake and Informed you of it, had he
been to any headquarters at Mirebalais?
Mr. Spear. I think he had ; yes.
Mr^ Howe. Before your arrival back in Mirebalais had Capt Edwar.ls told
you that It was a mistake not to have k Ued that prisoner?
Mr. Spear. Oh. no.
Mr. Howe. So It Is fair to assume that he learned that he had mistaken his
orders for the first time when he got to Mirebalais?
Mr. Spear. Oh, yes ; that Is the fact.
Mr. Howe. Can you think of any circumstances by which you could fix the
execution more nearly n point of time? Had you cashed a pay voucher any-
where near that time, or was there any outstanding fact by which you .could
give us tlie date?
Mr. Speab. I was not paid for six months there.
Mr. Howe. Did you have any other incident in mind of the execution of
prisoners when you told the court that you had been second In command of
forces in the field to which prisoners were sent with orders to execute them?
Mr. Speab. I do not understand your question.
(The stenographer read the question as above reportetl.)
Mr. Speab. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. That was the only incident that you had in mind
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir ; except hearsay, you understand, as I tol^ you.
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686 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. By hearsay you refer to rumors of similar occurrences?
Mr. Speab. Well, I would not say similar. I have heard of rumors of people
being executed. I suppose they were bandits; I do not know.
Mr. HowB. Did the rumor which you heard go into particulars as to whether
those executions were before or after the trial?
Mr. Speab. No, sir; I do not know whether this particular one of Capt
Edwards was before or after a trial either.
Mr. Howe. Did you ever inquire of Capt Edwards whether this execution
was authorized after trial?
Mr. Spear. No, sir ; I never asked any questions.
Mr. Howe. Do you recollect whether the Capt. Edwards- to whom you re-
ferred was named Thomas L. Edwards?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Have you in mind anything about the commanding officer at
Mirebalais, the major, acting as colonel in the gendarmerie, which would help
the committee to identify that commanding officer?
Mr. Spear. Well, Gen. Catlln was the commanding officer at Port au Prince
at that time.
Mr. Howe. Had you heard of any previous service in the marines that this
major had performed?
Mr. Spear. Yes; Capt. Eklwards was under him in Mexico as a sergeant
Mr. Howe. In Mexico?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. At what time in Mexico did you hear?
Mr. Speab. About 1914, was it, when they had the trouble there at Vera
Cruz that time?
Mr. Howe. Are there any other particulars that you can give us about this
commanding officer by which we could Identify him?
Mr. Spear. Well, if I could think of the name of that lieutenant in the
gendarmerie that was there, I could identify him by him, but I can not think
of his name.
Mr. Howe. There was a lieutenant of gendarmerie at Mirebalais?
Mr. Speab. Yes; the commander of that district there, and that was the
field headquarters for this major.
Mr. Howe. If you should think of any other circumstances by w^hlch we
could identify the commanding officer there, while you are here as a witness,
please speak of it
Mr. Speab. I will.
Mr. Howe. Now, as to Capt Edwards, had you any information up to this
morning as to his present whel-eabouts?
Mr. Speab. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. What was the last you saw of Capt. Edwards?
Mr. Speab. I saw him in Port au Prince just before the trial of these men.
Mr. Howe. The trial of Johnson?
IS/Lv Speab. Yes.
Mr! Howe. Which was on the 26th of June, 1919?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And you have not heard from him or seen him since then, is
that correct; Edwards, I mean?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Was there any subordinate of this commanding officer at Mire-
balais whose name you recollect?
Mr. Speab. Maj. Pearce.
Mr. Howe. Was it the same Maj. Pearce who was called as a witness In the
Johnson court-martial case?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Maj. McCiJiLLAN. That is Jacob M. Pearce.
Mr. Howe. J. M. Pearce was the witness in the Johnson case. Is that the
one to whom you have reference?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe, Where was Maj. Pearce stationed at the time of the execution
of these prisoners; do you know?
Mr. Spear. I can not remember the name of the town; it was a town east
of Mirebalais some miles.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether he was in Mirebalais or in that to^^Ti to
the east at the time when you got back to Mirebalais with Capt Edwards?
Mr. Spear. I have no idea.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 587
Mr. Howe. Have you any reason to assume that If this commanding officer
whose name you do not recollect was not at Mirebalais, that Maj. Pearce
would have been at Mirebalais?
Mr. Speab. That was the usual custom, yes; and If Maj. Pearce could not
come, Capt. Edwards took charge.
Mr. Howe. In the absence of the colonel, whose name you can not remem-
ber, and Maj. Pearce, Capt. Edwards would go into Mirebalais and take
charge?
Mr. 8PEAR. Yes. * I think he was called adjutant ; I do not know.
Mr. Howe. Adjutant of what?
Mr. Spear. I do not know the whole thing there. I do not know wliat it
was; the whole field.
Mr. Howe. Adjutant of the district?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Angbll. Mr. Spear, do you remember in general the substance of the
testimony in the Johnson trial, in which you acted as counsel for Pvt.
Johnson, the accused?
' Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Anoetj* And that testimony In substance was that a native Haitian,
one Placide by name, had been taken out by giendarmes, under the orders of
I^ieut. Brokaw, and, with another native Haitian, had been shot by a firing
squad without trial?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Angell. Was It your belief at the time of the trial that these one or
more native Haitians had been shot under orders of Lieut. Brokaw without
trial?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. ANGEI.U Was It your belief that the killings were unla>\'ful and Illegal?
Mr. Spear. In so far as Brokaw wns concerned.
Mr. Angell. In so far as Brokaw was concerned?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Angetx. Have you since that time learned anything to change your
belief In the fact of the shooting, or the Illegality thereof, so far as Brokaw
was concerned?
Mr. Spear. Not as regarding the fact of the shooting. However, Brokaw
was adjudged Insane afterwards. That would be a defense, of course.
Mr. Angela. Have you Icarnetl anything since then to change your belief
that these men had been kille<l under orders of Bn>kaw, without previous con-
viction and sentenct* of death by lawful trial?
Mr. Spear, No.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember the comments on the findings and sentence
of the court-martial In the Johnson case, by Col. L. McCarty Little, the con-
vening authority?
Mr. Spear. I never heard them.
Mr. Angell. These findings are a part of the record?
Mr. Howe. They are the ones that will be printed In full.
Mr. Angell. .1 just want at this point to refer to them, to emphasize the
view of the convening authority, Col. Little saying: "The reviewing* authority,
after careful consideration, is at a loss to understand how officers of the serv-
ice and experience of some of those who constitute*! this court could so disre-
gard their oaths and obligations to enforce the laws and regulations "
Mr. Howe. Just a second. Mr. Anjrell. Would it not be better to read the
whole of that, until we get it printed in the record ns a wlioleV Would it
convey the proiK^r idea?
Mr. Angell. All right, I will read the pre<e(ling s«»ntencc. It was just to save
time, that Is all.
Mr. Howe. Were you going to ask a questicm of the witness, based upon
that?
Mr. Angell. Yes.
Mr. Howe. I think It would be better if you would read the whole thing.
Mr. Angell. Very well. [Reading:!
" The proQeedings of the general court-martial, In revision, in the foregoing
ca.se of W'alter E. .lohnson, private, United States Marine Corps, are ap-
proved: the fin<llngs on the first charge and si)e(itication thereunder are ap-
proved; and the findings on the second and third charges and specifications
thereunder and acquittal, are disapprove<l. The reviewing authority, after
careful consideration, is at a loss to understand how officers of the service and
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588 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
experience of some of those who constituted this court could so disregard their
oaths and obligations to enforce the laws and regulations of the military service
of their country, as to find the accused not guilty of the third charge and
specifications thereunder, after the testimony whicli was presented. The plea
of the defense that it was in obedience to the order of a superior ofBcer is
untenable. All regulations state that the order most be lawful. The fact
that the accused dainieil he did not aim at the executed man, does not relieve
him from responsibility In the man's death. He made no protest The very
fact that he aimed and fired led the other members of the firing squad to be-
lieve he was shooting at the man, and the example thus set by him certainly
makes him a party to the execution. Subject to the foregoing remarks the
sentence is npprovetl."
Did you, as counsel for the accused In that case, believe that the order of
Lieut. Brokaw was lawful?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Angell. You belleve<l that IJeut. Brokaw, then, had the right to order
these one or more Haitians to be shot without trial?
Mr. Spear. No, sir; I meant lawful as regards to the privates.
Mr. Howe. You mean lawful authority to the privates?
Mr. Spear. Yes; that is what I mean.
Mr. Howe. For their actions?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Anoell. Did you believe It was lawful in the marine service for an en-
listed man to obey the order of a superior officer to execute a prisoner without
trial?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir. I do not want to get In an unfair position here, Mr.
Angell. I mean that a private should always ol>ey the orders of his superior
officer under all conditions. That is what I meant to say to you.
Mr. Angell. Do you think that the l)ellef which you have just statetl, that It
is the duty of enlisted men to obey orders of a superior officer under any
circumstances was conmion in the marine jiersonnel In Haiti?
Mr. Spear. Absolutely.
Mr. Angell. And irrespective of whether or not the order, as In the Brokaw
Instance to which we have just been referring, was that prisoners, though never
lawfully convicted, should l)e executed?
Mr. Spear. It was the duty of a subordinate to carry out the orders of his
superior.
Mr. Anoixl. And that was the common and usual belief among the marine
personnel In Haiti?
Mr. Spear. In a military force.
Mr. An(;ell. Ueferrlng now to the instance of the shooting of the wounded
prisoners at the time of the attack to which you have just testified, can you
say whether or not, in your belief, the shooting of woundetl prisoners under
similar circumstances was or was not common in engagements with the bandits
in Haiti?
Mr. Spear. Personally, I can not say ; that is, as to my personal knowledge.
Mr. Angell. Have you any belief on that question, based upon your experi-
ence in Haiti, your conversation with brother officers, and the lifte?
Mr. Speak. Yes; I think It was the custom. When you are out there sur-
roundiwl. \o\\ have to do the best thing you can do to get your men out.
Mr. Angell. And that best thing, under such circumstances, may require, la
the judgment of the officer so engage<l, the shooting of prls<mers?
Mr. Spear. \Vell, they were not pri^joners. They were there on the field. They
were not taken charge of yet, ytm see. I will say wounded, not prisoners.
Mr. An(;ell. Had you not in this T»articular Instance lnstructe<l your two mCT
to go back and sh(M)t those woun<led?
Mr. Speak. Well, the one man came up and asked me what they should do
back there \n the rear with those prisoners who were still alive.
Mr. Howe. Wounded prisoners?
Mr. Spear. Yes; they were afraid. They did not know whether they were
faking or what they were doing. I said; "Get them out of the way. and get
back to the rear and watch there, and watch out for your o^vn lives."
Mr. Angell. It is correct, is it not, to refer to them as wounded ^risoners?
Mr. Spjlvr. No ; they were not prisoners. They were there. They might liave
a knife or a gun or something and shoot me or shoot anybody there.
Mr. Angell. You had capture<l them, had you not?
Mr. Spear. No ; they were not capturetl — they were there.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 589
Mr. Angeix. You passed by tUem on your way up to leave this collection of
huts and go up the hill after the Cacos?
Mr. Speab. Yes ; passed over them, you might say, and went right on. There
seems to be a lot of confusion in this whole thing between a Oaco lind a
peaceful native, and I can not understand it. A Caco is a man in the field, a
revolutionist, a bandit, or whatever you want to call him. I do not know
what to call them. They were the fellows who were fighting us. They were
Cacos, and the rest of them were called just Haitians.
Mr. Anoell. Was it your understanding of the general situation in Haiti,
, at the time of the instances referred to, that our forces there were engaged
in regular warfare against the Cacos in the hills?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Anqell. And that the rules and customs of regular modern warfare pre-
vailed?
Mr. Speab. Not entirely.
Mr. Angell. In what resi)ects did they not prevail?
Mr. Speab. Well, those (^act)s were very savage men, and if they had captured
one of our marines they would probably have skinned him alive.
Mr. Angell. Did you ever know of such circumstances?
Mr. Speab. No ; I never knew of such.
Mr. Angell. Did you ever hear of any such instances?
Mr. Speab. It was reimrteil to me that one«of the native guides was found
neatly stacked up by the road one morning in pieces this long.
Mr. Howe. You mean cut into pieces?
Mr. Speab. Yes; I knew what to expect from them.
Mr. Angell. That was hearsay, so far as you were concerned?
Mr. Speab. Yes; of course. I had viewed those Cacos, too, at close range.
I knew what kind of men they are.
Mr. Angell. You never knew, did you, of any formal declaration of war by
this country against Haiti, or the bandits of Haiti?
Mr. Speab. No, sir.
Mr. Angell. There was none, as far as you knew?
Mr. Speab. I do not know anything about it. I did whatever I was told
to do.
Mr. Angeli^ What were the general. instructions that you had upon arrival
in Haiti as to the operations against the Cacos?
Mr. Speab. I had no instructions. I was sent out witli the other officers
first to show me how to take charge.
Mr. Angell. What was your understanding, derived from your conversation
with the.se other officers and instructions from them, as to the attitude to be
observed toward the Cacos?
Mr. Speab. The attitude, from instructions and observations, was tliat we
were there to kill the Cacos, and the quicker the better ; but to be very careful
about peaceful natives. When I went out to this town to take command, they
instructed me, regardless of any belief that I held toward the black race,
to \)e very careful and go to the chief magistrate and take him Into consulta-
tion in this town.
Mr. Howe. Before doing what?
Mr. Speab. Before talking command of the town, and work with him, and
not to be antagonistic toward iieaceful men. But all Cacos were to be killed.
It was guerilla warfare, as I understood it.
Mr. Angeli« Did I understand you correctly to say that you went out into
the field the day after you reached Haiti?
Mr. Speab. Yes. sir.
Mr. Angell. And what general instruction was given, if any, hi your case or
In any other case that you know of, to newly arrived officers in Haiti, regard-
ing the general conditions there?
Mr. Spear. Well, I do not just exactly remember the distinction between the
instructions and the general way of doing things, but I knew that the thing
was to get rid of these cacos. They figured there were from 3,()U0 to 7,000 of
them, they told me, and the qiiiclcer we got them killed the better the whole
country would be off. • They had devastated tJiis country where I was.
Mr. Angell. That was ihe substance of the instructions you had, or the
understanding which you acquireil, ui)on your arrival in Haiti and during the
early weeks of your duty there?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
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590 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angell. And you believe that was the general understanding and the
general instructions that were given at that time to newly arrived officers like
yourself?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Angell. Were there any general or specific instructions given to you or
to your brother officers about the time of your arrival there, so far as you re-
member, regarding detailed conditions In Haiti; that is to say, the political
condition, the social condition of the people, their attitude toward the native
government and toward the American occupation; in other words, details
which might assist you in dealing with the people and performing your duty-
there?
Mr. Spear. No; no more than what I picke<l up from Capt. E<iward&. I
expect he was my tutor ; I do not know.
Mr. Howe. He was your commanding officer?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Angell. In other words, there were no detailed instructions about con-
ditions in Haiti given to newly arrived officers?
Mr. Spear. No, sir.
Mr. Anoell. How long after your arrival were you placed in command of a
town or subdiatrict or other area?
Mr. Spear. Two days ; but it was supposed to be a peaceable area.
Mr. Angell. Was that a fairly common practice; tJiat is, to give newly
arrived officers command duty in the country within a very short time after
they arrived?
Mr. Spear. No. sir; I do not think it was. They picked me out of a bunch
of lieutenants to take command of that town. I was senior lieutenant, I
think; senior first lieutenant there.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether many or most of the marine officers, as
they arrived in Haiti, spoke French?
Mr. Spear. Very few of them. It Is a kind of a patois there, anyway, but a
Frenchman can understand it.
Mr. Angefx. Referring now to the second instance of which you testifie<l this
morning, did I understand you correctly to say that prior to the shoot! ntr of
this one man whose body you saw shortly after the rifle shot. Capt. Edwards
said to you that the man was to be shot?
Mr. Spear, About two hours before that. I was to guard him until he was
ready to shoot him.
Mr. ANGELL. (^apt. Edwards said nothing to you, either before the shooting
or afterwards, as tx) whether or not the man had been convicted by trial or
sentenced to death?
Mr. Spear. No; he said nothing.
Mr. Anoeix. You had no knowledge on that subject?
Mr. Spear. No, sir.
Mr. Angell. How far had the man been brought under guard, to your knowl-
edge, for his execution?
Mr. Spear. Well, they sent him out there. They made him carry some stuff
out to us. I do not know how far it was.
Mr. Angetx. Out from Mirebalais?
Mr. SpExVR. Sixteen miles or so, I think, or whatever it* was.
Mr. Angetx. Do you believe that this man had been lawfully tried, convicted,
and sentenced to death?
Mr. Spear. I do not know anything about it. I believe he was a cnco, tliough.
Mr. Angell. And that was sufficient justification?
Mr. Spear. I was not in it.
Mr. Angell. No; I am asking merely for your belief. I understand you
were not in it.
Mr. Spear. Well, it was claime<l they found this man with a rifle in his hand.
I think he should have been shot right there.
Mr. Howe. Before being taken prisoner?
Mr. Spear. Before being taken prisoner.
Mr. Angell. Is it your belief that the decision to shoot^thls man in question
was made by Capt. Edwards on his responsibility, or came from higher up?
Mr. Spear. Came from higher up.
Mr. Angell. There Is no doubt about that in your mind?
Mr. Spear. No.
Mr. Angell. You said that you had heard rumors of people being executed.
W^ere those rumors common among the marine personnel in Haiti at tJils time?
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOHINGO. 591
Mr. Spjeab. What do you mean by common? Do you mean hundreds of them,
or scores, or tens, or ones?
Mr. Angetx. Well, how current were such rumors? How often did you come
across them?
Mr. Spear. Well, I suppose I heard it four times while I was in Haiti.
Mr. Howe. What rumor?
Mr. Anoell. The rumor that people were being executed.
Mr. Howe. WeU, illegally?
Mr. Anoell. AU right, I will make it specific. What were the rumors which
you testified to having heard about people being executed?
Mr. Spear. I had heard that they had executed people, that was all.
Mr. Anoell. Do you mean lawful executions as the result of trial and convic-
tion and sentence to death, or unlawful executions?
Mr. Spear. Well, they did not state that to me. I could not tell, you see.
Mr. Anoell. Were these rumors those of the death of Cacos in battle?
Mr. Spear. I do not know; I do not think so. It was after they were cap-
tured.
Mr, Anoell. There were exetnitions, then, of prisoners?
Mr. Spear. I suppose they were prisoners, yes ; that is, I do not say that of my
own knowledge, now, you understand.
Mr. Angell. Referring now to the Johnson court-martial record and to the
examination and the testimony of the accused, Walter E. .Tolmson, and particu-
larly to question 38, which appears on page 21, I want to read you the question
and answer, as follows:
" Question. Is It your duty to kill Cacos if taken prisoner and if you recognize
them as such ?
" Answer. The American forces in Haiti are in Wf^r against these Cacos. I
consider it ray duty to shoot a Cacos."
Mr. Howe. Whose testimony is this, .Johnson's own testimony?
Mr. Angell. Johnson's own testimony ; yes.
Mr. Howe. Questions asked by his own counsel?
Mr. Angetx. Yes ; questions asked by his own c»ounsel.
Mr. Howe. That would be question 38 by yourself?
Mr. Anoell. Yes; that would be your own question. Do you regard that
answer which I have just read to you in answer to the question put by yourself
at the trial, as counsel to Johnson, as a fair reflex on the attitude of the marine
l)ersonnpl in Haiti toward the Cacos?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Howe. You said you had not seen the action of the convening authority of
Lieut. Col. Little?
Mr. Spear. I'es, sir.
Mr. HowFi. You left Haiti very shortly after the court-martial?
Mr. Spear. A week after,
Mr. Howe, And the findings of the convening authority are not, under the
practice, referred to accuse<l's counsel, are they?
Mr. Spear. Not that I know of.
Mr. Howe. They certainly were not referred to you?
Mr. Spear. No.
Mr. HowK. And you know the action of the court must be reviewed by the con-
vening authority?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And that even the prisoner himself, or the accused himself, is kept
in ignorance of the action of the court?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. HowK. Until the convening authority has acted on the court?
Mr. Spear. Yes.
Mr. Howe. You left Haiti on what date, about?
Mr, Spear. I think about the 2d of July.
Mr. Howe. The action of the reviewing authority which was read by Mr.
Angell is dated July 18, 1919. You certainly were out of the country at that time?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr, Howe. And a copy of this was not later furnished to you?
Mr. Spear. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. You answered some questions on cross-examination as to the duties
of marines to obey the orders of their superior officers?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
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592 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. You know that to be a general rule of military service, whether in
our Marine Cori>s In our Army, or Navy?
Mr. Speab. a fundamental rule.
Mr. Howe. And not one peculiar entirely to the service of the United States,
the nrilitary service?
Mr. Spear. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. You know, of course, that as a matter of law it is no justification
for a subordinate to carry out an Illegal order of a superior, do you not?
Mr. Spear. No ; I did not know that
Mr. Howe. But you do know, or it was your feeling when you were a Marine
officer, that you were to presume the legality and authority of the orders of
your sui)erior8?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did you yourself, when Capt. Bklwards directed you to guard this
prisoner until he should be executed, inquire of Capt. Edwards whether tlie
prisoner had been duly convicted and sentenced, or ask him for any of the cir-
cumstances of the proceetllngs leading up to that?
Mr. Spear. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Why did you not?
Mr. Spear. I expect I would have got whacked on the head if I had.
Mr. Howe. It was not customary for you to question the orders of your supe-
rior officers. Is that it?
Mr. Spear. Certainly not.
Mr. Howe. By your answers you did not mean to state that a subordinate,
being clearly aware of the Illegality of the orders of a superior, would be justi-
fied to carrying them out?
Mr. Spear. I do not think it Is for him to judge whether it is illegal or not
Mr. Howe. You made sjyme answers about the shooting of wounded iu action.
You would not say, would you, that the killing of wounded was justified under
all and any circumstances?
Mr. Spear. Of course not.
Mr. Howe. You answered that the shooting of wounded would be justified,
in your opinion, under circumstances similar to the circumstances under which
you gave your orders to shoot these wounded?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did you hear of many cases of snrilar circumstances of the de-
tachment of i) men and 1 officer surrounded by 100 Cacos firing at them?
Mr. Spear. In the district next to me there were 33 men who fought 800 of
the others until their ammunition ran out. I think they killed 120. I do not
know whether they killed any of the wounded, or what they were, but I know
they were outnumbered all the time.
Mr. Howe. Is it your opinion that the responsibility is on the commanding
officer iu a unit in battle under those circumstances to take all steps necessary
for the safety of his men?
Mr. Spear. Y'es, sir.
Mr. Howe. And if in his opinion the killing of wounded enemies in his rear
would ren/ove an element of danger to his command, it would be his duty to
order it?
Mr. Spear. It certainly would.
Mr. Howe. But you would say, would you not, that each of those circuw-
stances, each cast\ must be Judgeil on its own circumstances?
Mr. Spear. Of course.
Mr. Howe. Entirely?
Mr. Spear. Certainly.
Mr. Howe. You would agree with me, would you not, that there are circum-
stances when it would be clearly the duty of a commanding officer to shoot a
wounded enemy?
Mr. Spear. Certainly. They had their rifles there yet. We could not carry
their rifles with us or take their arms away from them, or anything.
Mr. Howe. How many men would be a projier prisoner's guard for two
Cacos?
Mr. Spear. I should say
Mr. Howe. The minimun/, the least that you could get along with?
Mr. Spear. It would depend upon the circumstances. One of these Cacos
could lick 10 of our men if he got hold of them with a knife.
Mr. Howe. I^t us assume the circumstances that existeil there.
Mr. Spear. They are powerful men.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 593
Mr. Howe. How many men would It require safely to guard two wounded
Cacos in the presence of 100 armed and un wounded Caco8?
Mr. Sp£ab. I should say two or three men.
Mr. Howe. Well, subtracting two or three men from your forces that you then
had at your disposal, how many would that have left; including yourself, to
fight the other 100?
Mr. Speab. Three. In that case I do not see that there was any question about
it They were there.
Mr. Howe. How much time did you have within which to make up your mind
on this?
(The witness snapped his fingers.)
Mr. Howe. As long as it would take you to .«nap your fingers?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir..
Senator Oddie. And the eleftient of a few seconds or minutes might have meant
the annihilation of all your men?
Mr. Speab. It may have meant the death of two or three of them at least.
Mr. Howe. Let us say. the reduction of your force by 50 per cent?
Mr. Speab. The reduction of the whole thing.
Mr. Howe. Or by 100 per cent. When you arrived in Haiti you were first
lieutenant?
Mr. Sp£ab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did your experience as first lieutenant give you any basis for
learning what the instructions of a colonel or a brigadier general were in arriving
at Haiti — on the social and political conditions in the island?
Mr. Speab. No,- sir.
Mr. Howe, You can not, therefore, say and you do not mean to say what
instructions were given to lieutenant colonels, majors, and brigadier generals on
their arrival in the island?
Mr. Speab. Of coure not.
Mr. Howe. You were assigned to duty in the field the day after you got
there?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir; the day I got there the adjutant called me up and said:
" Take charge of a convoy going out to a certain camp and report to a certain
officer there."
Mr. Howe. And you reported to a certain officer there and there came under
his orders?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. He gave you sufficient directions to let you know what your course
of action would be as circumstances came up?
Mr. Speab. He did not say anything; but, of course, I knew what they were,
and would be in the command of a convoy if I took it, of course.
Mr. Howe. Irrespective of whether the United States was at war with
Haiti?
Mr. Speab. Yes. I presumed they were at war.
Mr. Howe. What was your reflex on that question when the bullets were
striking around you on the day you have told us about, as to whether a state
of actual warfare existed or not?
Mr. Speab. I rather considered it did.
Mr. Howe. You were asked whether you believed that the rules of regular '
warfare were applied there in Haiti, and you said you did not believe they
were applied in all respects, and you later on said that this was guerilla
warfare.
Mr. Speab. I did.
Ml'. Howe. In your opinion, does the kind of guerilla warfare which was
being followed there modify the rules of regular warfare?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. In what re^)ects?
. Mr. Speab. No; I could not say it would, either. I will take that back, I
would not say it does, either.
Mr. Howe. Therefore, the actual conditions of warfare which must govern
one in those circumstances is self-preservation and the preservation of the
forces under his command?
Mr. Speab. Yes ; that is what I am trying to get at.
Mr. Howe. Did the enemy observe all the rules of civilized warfare?
Mr. Speab. What do you call civilized? The warfare at the beginning of the
German war was not civilized, and at the end it was civilized, with resi)ect
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594 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
to iK)l80ii Kas, for instance. It depends on what the other fellow does. We
understood we should expect no quarter from the Cacos.
Mr. Howe. Did you ever hear of Cacos ordering a wounded American shot,
or shooting or killing wounded Americans?
Mr. Speae. I do not believe I ever did, personaliy ; no.
Mr. Howe. Did you form any opinion as to what would happen to you or
your men if you had been wounded or left by the rest of the party there?
INIr. Spear. We would have been killed, of course.
Mr. Howe. You have not any doubt of that?
Mr. Spear. No.
Mr. Howe. Who are the Cacos the enemies of?
Mr. Spear. Of the United States and Haiti.
Mr. Howe. And of law and order in the island?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Were they a good or a bad influence on the country?
Mr. Spear. Very bad.
Mr. Howe. Did you know of any other way to deal with a Caco who was trying
to kill you than to kill the Caco?
Mr. Spear. Certainly not.
Mr. Howe. Y'our experience in Haiti was entirely out in the field, was it not,
substantially so?
Mf. Spear, Yes; except for the last week, when T was in the barracks. I
was sick in the field a part of the time and sick In quarters in town a part of
the time, and then, about a week before I left, I was put on duty as officer
of the day.
Mr. Howe. Do you know, at the time you were down there on duty, over how
large a part of Haiti this guerilla warfare with the Cacos extende<l?
Mr. Spear. I do not just know the distances there. I should judge In a circle
30 miles across each way — or 40.
Mr. Howe. And all the time you were there the brigade commander of
Marines was Gen. Catlln?
Mr. Spear. No, sir; I think he came there after I was there. I think there
was a colonel In command when I came there ; I do not know.
Mr. Angell. Do you think, Mr. Spear, that your beliefs and opinions, as set
out In your testimony this morning regarding the duties of our marine forces
In Haiti at this time, and the duties of marine officers and marine i>ersonnel
when engaged in conflict with the Cacos, fairly conforms to the general opinion
on such sul)Je<*ts by your brother officers and the remaining personnel of the
Marine Corps In Haiti at that time?
Mr. Spear. Well, I think so. Some thought they ought to go a little stronger
with tliem than I thought. I was a kind of middle-of the-roader in those lines.
Mr. Angeix. What have you in mind when you say some of them thought they
ought to go a little stronger?
Mr. Spear. Well, some of them thought the warfare .should be more intensive;
that there should !)e more troops there, and harder fighting; to kill them all
and get rid of them ; kill all the Cacos.
Mr. Axgell. What were the beliefs of the others who, If I understand the
.inference of your answer right, had the view to the other extreme, or In the
other direction from you ?
Mr. Spkar. No ; I do not know of anyone, except some of the marines accused
an officer or two of l)elng more partial to the native troops than he was toward
his own troops ; that Is what I mean.
Mr. Angell, Oenerally si)eaklng, you think your opinion was fairly lypre-
sentative of the general opinion of the other marine ofllcers In Haiti towanl
these questions?
Mr. Spear. Yes, sir.
Mr. Angell. So far as you can remember, did you or your brother oflficers
in Haiti believe that the application and enforcement of the corvee law had
contributed to the numbers of the Cacos operating, or against whom the
marines were operating, or to the attitude of these Cacos?
Mr. Spear. I never heard of the corvee law until I came back to the United
States again and saw It In the paper. I did not know how they recruited those
fellows.
Mr. Anoell. So that so far as you know or knew at that time, the attitude
of the l)andits or Cacos was not affected by the existence or application of the
corvee law?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 596
Mr. Speab. No, sir; I did not know anything about it. I knew that
Charlemagne III, who .called himself the chief of them, broke out of prison
some place.
Mr. Howe. Do you know Maj. Walter N. Hill, or Maj. Woolman G. Emery,
of the Marine Corps?
Mr. Speab. I think I knew Hill. I do not know Maj. Emer>' that I re-
member of.
Mr. Howe. You do not know whether either of those officers whom I have
just mentioned was the commanding officer in Mirebalais at the time of the
execution of this native?
Mr. Speab. No ; I believe Hill was, but I do not know.
Mr. Howe. It may have been Hill?
Mr. Speab. It may have been Hill.
Mr. Howe. Or it might have been Emery?
Mr. Speab. Yes, and it might have been Pearce. I do not know. I never
went to headquarters when I came in. The captain reported.
Mr. Howe. Now, in your views with the views of your brother officers in
Haiti as to the methods of warfare to be employed against the Cacos, you
are referring to brother officers of about your own rank?
Mr. Speab. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. You have no means of knowing the attitude of the senior officers
down there?
Mr. Speab. Well, I knew the commanding officer in the field wanted me to
kill all the Cacos. That is all I knew. And he was very friendly toward the
natives.
Mr. Howe. As a matter of fact, the Cacos were very unfriendly toward the
natives too, were they not?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Unfriendly to the extent of killing them?
Mr. Speab. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Were you able to judge whether the native population in general
was frightened of the Cacos, or not?
Mr. Speab. Very much. They were all gone when we were out there. They
had to hike out to the cities, in other words.
Mr. Howe. Did you ever hear anybody express regret at the death of
Cacos killed in battle?
Mr. Speab. No.
(Whereupon, at 12.30 o*clock p. m., a recess was taken imtil 2.30 o'clock
p. m.)
afteb becess.
(The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking
of recess. Senator Tasker L. Oddie presiding.)
STATEMENT OF LIEUT. COL. ALEXANDER S. WILLLAMS, UNITED
STATES MABINE COBFS— Besumed.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, at the end of the committee meeting last Thursday,
we had completed the direct examination of Col. Williams, and I would suggest
now, if Mr. Angell has any questions, that he proceed to ask them. There may
be^ in the course of the examination, some points that may come up that the
committee or its counsel may want to further question Col. Williams about,
I will postpone that to the end.
Senator Oddie. Very well ; you may take the witness, Mr. Angell.
Mr. Angell. At the beginning of your direct testimony the other day. Colonel,
you said, if I remember correctly, that you could remember only two instances
of the killing of prisoners without trial, and you then went on to say that you
received no reports, except where action by way of investigation or disciplinary
measures would lie in your own hands. That is substantially correct?
Col. Williams. That is substantially correct.
Mr. Angell. Was your position, and were your duties in Haiti such that
there could have been other reports made of killing of prisoners without trial,
which would not have come to you personally?
Col. Williams. It is, of course, iwssible that rei>orts of killings were made to
my subordinates, and those subordinates did not inform me. Of that I can not
speak. When I answered the question you have quoted, I answered it in that
fashion in order to exclude the Lovoie, Williams, and Lang allegations.
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596 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angell. Because those reports did not come to you as head of the-
f^ndarmerie?
Col. Williams. Because they did not come to me as head of the gendarmerie,
but became known to Oen. Catlln and myself at the same time.
Mr. Anoell. Whereupon Gen. Catlin assumed direction of the Investigation?
Col. Williams. Whereupon Gen. Catlln. In virtue of his senloritj*, assumed
charge, or, to put it In another fashion, I took no action.
Mr. Anoell. Referring now to the Lovoie case at Hinche, and the alleged
shooting of the six or more at the cemetery outside of Hinche, on. the Maissade
road, do you know why Gen. Catlin, after his personal investigation of those
allegations, took no disciplinary measures against Capt. Ix)vole other than to
have him transferred to duty in some other part of Haiti?
Col. Williams. I do not know.
Mr. Angeix. Did you ever hear of Gen. Catlin having said that the reason
why he took no action in this case was because this was during the period of
the consideration of the Versailles treaty, and that he did not wish to embarrass
our President by having stories of cruelty appear about our own soldiers while
we were taking a i)oflltion on the side of humanity, or words to that effect?
Col. Williams. I can not recollect any statement by Gen. Catlin to that
effect.
Mr. Angell. Did I understand you correctly the other day, Colonel, to say
that from your own hearing of the statements of the wltnew^es In the Lovoie
case, at the time of Gen. Catlin's Investigation, that you were not convinced
that there had been such an Illegal execution?
Col. Williams. So far as I remember, any testimony given, and I am not cer-
tain that I was even present when such testimony was given, I was not con-
%inced that the allegation was supported.
Mr. Angeu.. There has already been introduced at least formally into the
record the so-called Turner rei>ort, which Is somewhat misleading In terms, and
is called the Turner report for the purpose of identification lagely, but Includes,
for the purposes of the record, the testimony of several witnesses which was
taken in Washington by Lieut. Col. Lay, including your own testimony at that
time, your statement before Col. Lay being dated January 6. 1920. Referring
now to your testimony, as taken by Lieut. Col. Lay on January 6, 1920, or there-
abouts, I quote now from your own statement :
** These reports alleged that certain prisoners Involved In bandltlsm had been
taken from a prison In Hinche, led to a point outside of Hinche near a cemetery,
and there executed by a detachment of enlisted gendarmes. This allegation
was supported by the statements of one or more gendarmes Interrogated by
Gen. Catlin. To the best of my recollection. Capt. Earnest lovoie, who was at
the time district commander at Hinche, acknowledged that such an execution
had taken place. He offered in explanation of this action the fact that It was
Impossible to obtain conviction in the local civil courts, and that after their trial
by a provost court in Cape Haitien and the expiration of the sentences adjudged
by such court, that they would return to the neighborhood of Hinche, rejoin the
bandits with whom they had been originally identified and make the pacifica-
tion of the region more difficult. The entire investigation was conducted by
Gen. Catlln and the allegations seemed sopiwrted, except as to the exact num-
ber executed."
Does that statement, a.ssuming It to be. as read, a correct copy of your state-
ment before Col. Lay, refresh your recollection on that point?
Col. Williams. I do not recollect exactly what I told Col. Lay. I believe I
talked without Interruption for an hour br more, but assuming that that la
correct, the seeming discrepancy Is explainable. When I say that the allega-
tion was supported I meant to convey only the fact that It was testified to.
Does that answer your question? And you will further note In the quotation
I say " seemed to be."
Mr. Angell. Having refreshed your recollection by the reading of this state-
ment, assuming It to be a correct copy, you are still of the opinion that the alle-
gations were not satisfactorily proved, so that you became convinced that snch
illegal executions had been ordered and had taken place at that time, substan-
tially under those circumstances?
Col. Williams. Reserving always an open mind in the matter, I was then un-
convinced and remain unconvinced.
Mr. Angell. You testified on direct examination that on the trip of investi-
gation upon which you accompanied Gen. Catlln you were excluded from the
presence of the general and the witnesses upon the first examination and that
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 597
you agreed thereto, and that the thought was expressed that your presence as
chief of the gendarmerie might influence the native witnesses to reticence.
Will you explain why you felt that would be the result of your presence?
Ck>l. WnxiAiis. I do not remember whether or not Gen. Gatlin stated spe-
cifically why I was to be excluded, but I knew that it was because he thought
that my presence would have a tendency to restrict the witnesses' testimony.
1 agreed with Gen. Catlin as to this being a fact. I believed that my presence
would affect the witness in testifying, l>ecause it was perfectly evident to even
the most ignorant that the tinal responsibility for misconduct on the part of
junior oflicers must fall on the responsible senior, and that to a certain extent
I WHS a party to the Investigation and to any charges which might be ad-
vanced. The Haitian witness in that case, looking to his own future, might
be tempted to avoid antagonizing -a man who, with the exception of Gen. Cat-
lin, had been the biggest man he had seen.
Mr. AinQELL. Speaking generally and without reference to that particular
instance or any other instance, do you or do you not think that it was the
feeling af the Haitian [lopulation generally that the ultimate re8i)onsibility
for what was done by the gendarmerie must, in the last analysis, come back to
or rest upon the titular head of the force?
Col. Williams. To what extent a peasant could work that out in his mind I
do not know, but the better-educated Haitian was fully able to come to such a
logical conclusion. I presume in such an outstanding matter as the allega-
tions against Lovoie or Williams that the peasant might be able to trace the
connection.
Mr. Anoell. Take, for example, the history of the later phase of the corvee
law. Do you think that the Haitian population generally regarded the senior
officers or the chief of the gendarmerie, and ultimately the brigade commander
of the marines and the American occupation in general, as responsible for the
policy of the later corvee law, and, in a general sense, responsible for whatever
abuses may have occurred under it?
Col. WiLLLAMS. The Haitians generally, both ignorant and educated, seemed,
so far as I was able to make out in the many conversations I held with them
on this subject, to hold the occupation — by which they meant the gendarmerie,
the marines, the treaty officials, etc.— jointly responsible with the Haitian ad-
ministration for the corvee. It was well known that the corvee, in its inception
and its continued use, had the tacit approval, at least, of the Haitian Gov-
ernment.
Mr. Angell. Did you have any personal knowledge. Colonel, of the Hamilton
court-martial case — the case of Capt. G. D. Hamilton?
Col. Williams. No personal knowledge whatsoever. I believe that happened
subsequent to my detachment ; at least the development of the case did.
Mr. Anoell. Did you have any knowledge of the general court-martial of one
Lieut. Ryan?
CoL Williams. I do not think I did.
Mr. Anoell. There has been just one passing reference to that somewhere in
the record or the testimony, but I do not think we have any specific testimony
on that yet.
Mr. Howe. Certainly, the court-martial record is not in the record before this
committee yet, and I do not recall any mention of it.
Mr. Angell. There is just one. I am trying to find out what it is. The colo-
nel has no knowledge of it.
Col. Williams. I never heard of it.
Mr. Anoell. At this point I think it becomes necessary to refer to the court-
martial record of Capt. Hamilton, because in there is a matter which I pre-
sume is within the personal knowledge of the witness, and I would therefore
like to offer that in the record, subject to such digesting and shortening as may
be desired.
Mr. Howe. Counsel refers to the court-martial record of Capt George D.
Hamilton. The court-martial record in that case, and in the cases of Johnson
and McQuilkin, will be offered to the committee in evidence, but, with the sug-
gestion that instead of being admitted in full, that it be incorporated in the
printed record by a summary or a digest satisfactory to all parties represented.
Mr. Angell. Mr. Howe and I discussed that general question already, and we
have agreed on that.
Senator Oodie. Very well.
Mr. Angell. For the purposes of further Identification merely, the court-
martial of Capt. Hamilton was the court-martial which took plaoe at the ma-
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598 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
rlne barracks in Cape Haitien on August 4, 1919, and the days subsequent
thereto.
Charge I, preferred against Capt. Hamilton, upon which he was tried, was
for disobedience of a lawful order of his superior officer, of which the material
portions, for our present purposes, are the specifications thereunder, reading as
follows :
** In that Capt. George D. Hamilton, United States Marine Corps, while sen-
ing in the Constabulary Detachment, First Provisional Brigade, United States
Marine Corps and in the Gendarmerie D' Haiti, at Grande Riviere, Republic
of Haiti, having on or about March 10, 1919, had addressed to him by CoL
(then lieutenant colonel) Alexander S. Williams, United States Marine Corps,
commanding the constabulary detachment, aforesaid, and chief of the Gendar-
merie D' Haiti, an order of which he was conversant, in words and figures sub-
stantially as follows:
" 1. No prisoner while in custody, whatever his or her status, will be shot,
executed, or permitted to be shot
" 2. In case of an attempt to escape every reasonable effort will be made to
prevent the escape before shooting is resorted to.
** 3. A report will be submitted to headquarters gendarmerie of all prisoners
shot under any circumstances. This report will contain all available data
brought out by careful Investigation."
Do you remember that order. Colonel?
Col. Williams. I remember an order which I believe to be that.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember the reasons why that order was issued?
Col. Williams. Yes. Incident to Gen. Catlln's Inspection trip to central
Haiti, and the investigation of the allegations made against Lovoie and Wil-
liams, it transpired that there was no written order ever issuing from the
headquarters of the gendarmerie which forbade the killing of prisoners. Gen.
Catlln suggested that such an order should be issued. I protested against iKU-
ing such an order, but did issue it In the form in which It has been presented.
It was delivered personally to Lovoie by me, and on my return to Port an
Prince, I believe, the order was sent out Immediately in regular form.
Mr. Angell. Do you know why Gen. Catlln felt that the Issuance of such an
order was required or proper? Did he give any reasons for that at that time?
Col. Williams. I do not remember that he gave any reasons, but It is a
strong tradition in the military service that every offense is followed by the
issuance of an order forbidding every one else to do the same thing.
Mr. Angell. So far as you know, did the fact of prior reports and allepi-
tions as to unlawful killing of prisoners by gendarmes motivate in any way the
issuance of this order?
Col. Williams. So far as I was concerned, no. What Gen. Catln thought
I can not say. You mean by that reports prior to these particular ones?
Mr. Angell. No; I meant by that question reports coming in prior to the
date of the issuance of this order. In other words, was the cause for the
issuance of this order the mere fact that no such order had ever been issued,
or was it, in addition, the fact that there had been rejwrts of unauthorzed
killings of prisoners by gendarmes?
Col. WiujAMS. The order was issued immediately following the Investigation
of the allegation aganst Ix)voie. But I issue:! it because Gen. Catlin wished it
issued. What I mean is that I did not believe that such an order was necessary
any more than one that housebreaking should not be carried on, but he seeinwi
to think differently, so I issued it.
Mr. Angell. Referring still to the reconl of the Hamilton court-martial, par-
ticularity the test mony of Lieut. Col. Hooker, on pages 4 and 5 of the record.
I will read you a part of the answer to the third question, and ask you n
question based on that:
"I asketl the accused (that is, Capt. Hamilton) what he meant by stating
that a prisoner had been shot, and the accused told me that he had been
shooting all Cacos captured if he was positive that they were Cacos. I sp**^
to him about an order issued by Gen. Williams, chief of the gendarmerie,
dated March 10, the gist of which was that no prisoner, no matter what his or
her status, would be shot or allowed to be shot under any circumstances, and
that In case of a prisoner escaping every possible means would be taken to
recapture before resorting to firing upon, and further, that in case anyone was
shot, no matter what the cause, a full report would be made. I looked through
the tiles of his office and found th's order, which the accused informed me he
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 599
had read and knew, but that he thought the order simply prevented him from
taking prisoners out of a prison and shooting them, that he did not consider
that the order applied to prisoners taken on the trail. He told me that he
had been carrying out this policy snce the order had been issued."
Of course, the order, as framed and intended and issued by you, was not
designed to be so interpreted as Capt Hamilton stated to Col. Hooker, but was
Intended to apply to all cases, was it not. Colonel?
CoL Williams. It was intended to apply to all cases.
Mr. Angell. Turning now to your testimony of the other day concerning the
general attitude of the gendarmerie officers toward the native population,
where you said in substance that they showed the greatest friendliness and
sympathy for the natives, and identified themselves with every measure for the
betterment of the districts and the general welfare, do you think that the
gendarmerie officers succeeded in gaining the good will, generally speaking, of
the native population?
CoL Williams. Almost without exception, the gendarmerie officers, senior
and junior, enjoyed the confidence and the liking of the natives.
Mr. Angell. Would you make the same answer regarding the enlsted per-
sonnel of the gendarmerie?
Col. William^. Generally, the enlisted personnel mixed freely and in a
friendly manner with the class from which It had been drawn. In certain in-
stances noncommissioned officers in charge of small posts conducted themselves
in such a fashion as to be disliked. The gendarmerie represented to the Haitian
peasant to a great extent the old gendarmerie military, and the gendarme had
to prove to the native, before he made his friendship, that he was not operat-
ing on the lines which the old Haitian soldier followed.
Mr. Angell. In your testimony before Col. Lay, reforr'ng to that again, you
said, substantially, that the difficulty of getting men in the later stages of the
corvee law application caused the genilarmes to resort to methods that were
often brutal, but quite consistent with their training under Haitian officials.
That is a fair statement of their relations, is it?
Col. Williams. It is a fair statement of their relations in that part'cular
phase of the gendarme duties, but I must explain that the gendarmerie per-
sonnel had had no training generally under Haitian officials. It is possible
that many of the gendarmes had served In the old army, but probably a small
percentage.
Mr. Angell. How would that use of Brutal methods, then, be consistent with
the training under Haitian officials?
Col. Williams. That statement, as quoted, did not express my thought What
. I meant to convey was that this brutality was In line with that which the
Haitian police and army had learned under Haitian officials. The precedents
were there.
Mr. Angell. Perhaps an inheritance from the slave days of the eighteenth
century?
Col. Williams. The reflexes of slavery were relatively few and did not
seem to manifest themselves in any important fashion. The only relic of
slave days that I was ever able to Isolate was the imiversal habit of carrying
a very large club. This, I always believed, was due to the fact that the code
nolr prohibited Negroes from carrying a stick greater than a certain diameter.
Mr. Angell. In Gen. Catlings statement before Col. Lay, taken about the
same time, December 31, 1919, in speaking of the corvee as it existed in the
later time in the Hlnche district, he says: "All the inhabitants of a certain
section had been rounded up and brought into Hinche, and that all the gar-
dens and farms outside of the towns had been abandoned, and the inhabitants
had disappeared, many probably having joined the bandits," and Gen. Catlin
goes on to say that the priests stated this was largely on account of the fear
of gendarmes and of the corvee; and further, that the appearance of a gen-
darme uniform was sufficient for the peasant to take to the brush and hide.
I want to ask you whether that conforms with your own personal experience
and views of the interrelations of the gendarmes and the population?
Col. WiLUAMS. In part I am in agreement, that central Haiti was largely
deserted.
Mr. Angell. At what time?
Col. Williams. During the period of the bandit activities.
Mr. Angell. 1918 and 1919?
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600 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Col. Williams. 1918. This was due to the fact that the native had to join
the bandit gang or else be killed, so those who did not Join came into the
towns.
In regard to the peasants taking flight on the appearance of a gendarme
uniform, I do not think that was generally true unless there was a bandit
gang in the immediate vicinitj'. The natives, I may say, although they aban-
doned their farms, did sneak out to them and made some attempts to cultivate
them, perhaps to save their crops. If bandit gangs were operating in the
neighborhood and gendarmes came along, it is highly pfobable that the natives
took to flight, because they feared to be Identifled or mistaken for bandits.
Generally, throughout Haiti this condition did not obtain. I personally have
ridden over nearly all the roads in Haiti on horseback or by motor, and only
once do I remember a native running away, and that was in a section of the
country where corvee had never operated.
Mr. Angell. Is it your impression that the natives take to the brush, or
otherwise make themselves scarce, because of the fear of being impressed into
the corvee gang?
Col. Williams. In central Haiti, no; because at the time Gen. Catlin in-
spected it is my belief that there was no corvee there.
Mr. Angbll. Prior then, to the time that Gen. Catlin Inspected, do you be-
lieve that the natives disappeared or took to the brush to avoid being im-
pressed into the corvee?
Col. Williams. No; because my personal experience tells me differently. I
have been over that road between St. Michel, Maissade, and Hlnche any
number of times, once alone, and I never saw anyone run.
Mr. Angell. Why, then, did it become more and more dlfllcult to obtain
labor for the corvee as lime went on?
Col. Williams. The reluctance of the natives to work on the roads.
Mr. Angbll. If it was the practice of the gendarmes to bring these men In
for forced labor, how would their reluctance make any substantial difference
in the ability to obtain labor unless their reluctance caused them to avoid
the presence of the gendarmes?
Col. Williams. All gendarmes were not bad. Many of those sent out to col-
lect the corvee conducted themselves in a perfectly proper manner. If the
natives failed to come in when ordered, or broke away from the gendarme who
had gathered them, that gendarme would bring in no recruits. It was not a
question of finding labor so much as it was a question of bringing it in, and
if the recruits of labor did not want to come in, in very many Instances the
properly conducted gendarme was unable to bring them in. In speaking of the
personnel of the gendarmerie in the condemnatory way in which I did, it must
not be understood at all that all gendarmes were badly conducted. A great
many were, within the limits of their intelligence and training, perfectly good
native police.
Mr. Angell. Is it your understanding that the gendarmes used force of in-
timidation to gather in workers for the corvee gangs as well as keeping the
men at work, once they were there?
Col. Williams. I have no doubt at all but that in many instances force, in-
timidation, and brutal methods were used by the gendarmes.
Mr. Anoeix. To get the men to the roads as well as to keep them there?
Col. WiLLLVMs. To get the men to the road ; yi s. I had occasion to investi-
gate a number of these reports, but rarely found suflielent e^'id*ence to warrant
the trial of a gendarme. In some instances, If my memory serves me correctly,
they were punished.
Mr. Angell. From what class of the lljiltlan i>opulatlon were the g(»ndarnies
generally drawn?
Col. Williams. From the lower class almost entirely. The old Haitian pt>lice
had enjoyed such a reputation that anyone who joined it practically announced
his criminal tendencies. This made it very difficult for us in the beginning to
even recruit the necessar>- educated material which we had to have in order
to develop noncommissioned officers, who must know how to read and write.
3Ir. Angell. Do you think that the reluctance of the upper Haitian class
toward service in the gendarmerie \^as based to any considerable degree upon
opposition to the intervention and pvesen(re of the Unite<l States in Haiti?
Col. Williams. Absolutely not. One of the things which astonished me was
the fact that the Haitians realize<l that the American development of the
gendarmerie would be an excellent thing, and there was no reluctance at all on
the part of the higher class to come in as officer, that is as commissioned
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officers. In fact, we had no end of applicants. The feeling generally of the
better class toward the gendarmerie was a friendly one. They realized, of
course, that we were making mistakes. Some of us did not know the language,
others did not know the laws, others were tactless, but, as the President himself
told me, the mistakes of the gendarmerie have been well-intentioned mistakes,
and it is not held against them.
Mr. Akgell. To what extent were the native Haitians sworn into the gend-
armerie as commLssloned officers?
Col. Williams. When the gendarmerie first came into beginning, in virtue
of the gendarmerie agreement, an annex to the Haitian-American treaty, it was
considered very desirable that Haitian officers be included in the personnel.
With this idea in mind, a number, I think about 20, young Haitians of good
family and education were |»ut in a training school, but the scheme did not
work out well. The training of these young officers naturally was conducted
along the lines of that which we give our own, and the first requirement, that
they strip for a physical examination, was objected to so strenuously that we
had to release many from semiengagement. The next difficulty concerned the
grooming of horses. A gendarmerie officer, an American, qualified to Instruct
in the care of animals, in which tlie Haitians are notably deficient, gave tliem
a practical illustration of the methods, and then told one of them to groom the
horse. The man refused. They all refuse<l. So that school stopi)ed almost be-
fore it had begun.
Mr. Howe. When you say a practical demonstration there, do you mean that
the Instructing, officer groomed the h(»rse himself?
Col. Wn,LL\Ms. The Instructing officer groomed the horse him.self, rubbing
with the hair, the way it lay, and not rubbing against it, and turning it in, mak-
ing a sore skin, all the practical work of grooming.
There were, how€»ver, f(mr or five Haitians commissioned with an acting
commission issued by Gen. Butler. Only one of these four or five lasted
throughout my tour. The first one to go out was detailed as subdistrict com-
mander at Dame Marie, and acting In that capacity he borrowed the connuunal
funds, telling the magistrate in whose charge they were that he needed them
for the pay of the gendarmes. I caused him to resign.
Another one, having had an ordinary police report made against him, which
report came to me, and which I in turn sent out to have investigated, as we
did all reports, promptly brought suit in the civil courts against the man
who made the complaint, for, I think, 20,()00 gourdes damages. I got rid of
him.
Another one who was in charge of Fort Xationale, a little fort that overlooks
the city of Port au Prince, I found had diverted the water supply of the fort
for the purpose of irrigating his garden, which was down on the side of the
hill. I got rid of him.
Another one, having been rep<irted for debt by almost everyone who would
give him credit, I had to get rid of.
That left but one, a perfectly splendid young Haitian, who did very remark-
able work against the barulits, but his value was limited to that, because as
soon as he was put in*a position where be was brought in contact with the
civil officials, friction came about and we couhl not remove him l)ecause the
officials did not like him, luid we could not keep him there because lie could not
get along with the officials, so we put him in the field. I think that was all
the Haitian officers whom I inherited, and of those I got rid of all but one.
Mr. Angell. Was there any further attempt, Colonel, to obtain the services
of native Haitians as officers in the gendarmerie?
Col. Williams. Not during my time. I believed then as I believe now that
the gendarmerie will be good only to the extent to which it is driven by
American ideas, not that there Is not good material in Haiti, but the material
will be Haitian naturally, and with tlie Haitian's way of looking at things,
and they will not bring about a condition of police efficiency such as we sought.
Mr. Angell. Do you think that a reasonable degree of police efficiency is
dependent upon an exclusively American personnel of all coiiunissions?
Col. Williams. Judging from the administrative history of Haiti in the past,
I should say yes.
Mr. Angell. You think, then, there is no reasonable possibility of the
Haitians qualifying as efficient officers, even junior officers, of a gendarmerie
which would, let us say, be officered in its higher ranks entirely by Americans?
Col. WnxiAMS. I do not believe — I will not say that it is not a possibility.
Almost anything is possible. But I doubt very much If an efficient military
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602 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
police can be maintained in Haiti with the commissioned pensonnel largely
Haitians.
Mr. Angeix. Do you know whether any of these young Haitians who made
applications for commissions in the gendarmerie, and you testified there were
a good many of them, if I remember correctly, were graduates of the French
military academy of St Cyr?
Col. Williams. I have a vague recollection of one man — ^I do not think he
was a young man — who had attended St. Cyr. I would not say whether or
not he was an applicant.
Mr. Howe. Could you say whether or not he was a graduate of St, Cyr?
Col. Williams. I can not say that. I do not know.
Mr. Angell. Were there actually any examinations conducted under the
direction of a board to be selected by the senior American officer of the con-
stabulary for native Haitians as commissioned officers?
Col. Williams. No; you refer now to that treaty?
Mr. Anoexl. I am referring to the treaty, to Article X of the treaty of
September 10, 1915, and to Articles II and V of the subsequent gendarmerie
convention of the following year — I have not the exact date.
Is it proper, Colonel, to refer to the operations of our forces in Haiti
against the cacos as being divided into two periods; first, the period in the
early days of the occupation as one of preliminary pacificationj and the
second, from 1918 to 19^, as one of a second period of caco activity, and of
operations by our forces against the cacos, the two periods of the caco activity
and the operations by our forces against them being separated by a period
of comparative quiet and calm in 1916 and 1917?
Col. Williams. The early operations conducted by marines In Haiti were
brought to a close by the native leaders agreeing to cease. I will put it that
way, because there was no surrender.
Mr. Angell. And that was about what time?
Col. Williams. Those operations took place in 1915, and if tliey extended
into 1916, not very long. I do not just remember. If they extended into 1916,
it must have been for a short time. The operations conducted by the gen-
darmes against the bandits in central Haiti, and latterly by the gendarmes
and marines, constituted a distinct phase.
Mr. Angell. This affects the days of 1918 to 1920?
Col. Williams. 1918 and 1919. What happened in 1920 I do not know.
Mr. HowK. Have you been using the term " Caco '* and the term " bandit "
interchangeably ?
Col. Williams. I have not. I have very much not used them in that way.
They connote two entirely diflFerent things.
Mr. Angell. Oen. Cole, in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, date<i
September 23. 1920, which appears, as I believe, as Exhibit 4 appended to the
record of the Mayo court of inquiry, and which I should like to offer in the
record, or refer to now
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, as to the record of the Mayo court of Inquirj'. I
hope that may be introduced in the record in connection with the testimony of
Maj. I^yer, who was the Judge advocate of that courtf and introduced into the
record, in full, and some of it sunimarizetl for tlie printed record, and there
can be no obje<*tion at the present time, in view of the certainty that it must
be in the record
Senator Oddie. There is no objection to the witness referring to it?
Mr. Howe. No, sir. It will be entirely proper, and not confusing, if he
refers to It, with sufficient explanation as to what part he is referring to.
Senator Oddie. There is no objection to that
Mr. Angell. Continuing my que.stlon, then, and referring specifically to
paragraph 2G of the report, which is dated September 23. 1920, reading:
" When the under.<«igned relieved Maj. Gen. (then Brig. Oen.) L. W. T. Waller
as brigade commander on November 22, 1916. conditions throughout the Re-
public of Haiti were generally i^eaceful, there being no armed opposition to the
TTnitod States forces or to the Gendarmerie d' Haiti, though from time, hut
at increjisingly rare intervals, reports would be received of cattle lifting or of
robbing of market women by armed robbers, almost invariably along or in the
vicinity of the border between Haiti and Santo Domingo."
Does that conform. Colonel, with your own recollection of conditions in the
latter part of 1916?
Col. WiT.LTAMs. I can not i^lace the date, but after the operations by marines
in north Haiti had ceased there was a condition of general peace, except in
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.* 603
that no man's land between Haiti and Santo Domingo. There cattle lifting,
robbery, and offenses of that sort were reported from time to time.
Mr. Anqell. That was up in the central and north central region, near the
border?
Col. Williams. The east central.
Mr. Anoell. How long did that general condition of relative peace and quiet
continue after the latter part of 1916?
CoL WnxjAMS. Something under tw6 years, I should say. It is difficult to
say when the relative peace became general disturbance. One condition merged
into the other.
Mr. Anoell. But for a period of approximately two years relative peace and
quiet continued?
Col. Williams. Continued.
Mr. Anoell. And that situation, then, was not changed until some time, well,
along in 1918?
CoL Williams. It did not develop in an important way until some time in
1918.
Mr. Anoell. What, in your opinion. Colonel, were the reasons for the change
in the situation, or the recrudescence of the caco or bandit activity, or our
operations against Cacos or bandits?
Col. Williams. It is necessary in order to answer that question to go bnek a
bit The boundary between Haiti and Santo Domingo has never been defined,
or has never been agree<l upon by the representatives of the two republics. The
result is that over a great part of its length it was a true no-man's land. The
country Is sparsely settled ; it 's generally very mountainous, and very heavily
wooded. This from time Immemorial has been the resort of the Haitian and
Dominican bad man. I believe that the growth of the bandit movement was
because of the success of several of these bands, and also to a great extent
because of the personal popularity of one Hait'an named Charlemagne Perolte.
Perolte belonged to an Influential and verj* large familj', which lived generally
In east central Haiti. He was a very large man, which carries a strong appeal
to the Haitian, and he was well educated. I bel'eve he was inspired by race
hatred. He found men In plenty available for his purposes in no-man's land,
«Dd his system of recruitment, which I described the other day, enabled him
to soon gather Important forces.
Mr. Anoell. May I Interrupt to ask what you mean by race hatred?
Col. Williams. Black against white.. He was able to point out a number of
things which ranged themselves very logically to base his claim, which was
that the Americans were conquering Haiti; and the bases of his statements
were fairly well known to most of the people in that region.
Mr. Anoell. Did he claim, as far as you know, to speak for the population
either of Haiti generally or of that portion of Haiti where he had his activity?
Col. Williams. I belfeve he did.
Mr. Anoell. t)\6 he purport to have a cabinet and attempt to enter into diplo-
matic relations with foreign governments?
Col. Williams. He sent a letter to the British charge requesting that Great
Britain assist in the liberation of Haiti. I think he generally signed himself
as commanding the patriot army.
Mr. Angell. His request for assistance and the liberation of Haiti meant
assistance
Col. Williams. From the Americans.
Mr. Anoell. Assistance to h!m as leader of the native patriotic Haitian army
against the Americans?
Col. WiLUAMS. Yea I believe that the oflFer included a proposition by which
he would aid Great Britain against the Germans.
Mr. Anoell. Do you believe that rrfce hatred specifically — h»s opposition as
a black man, as a Haitian, to the presence of the white man, the American in
Haiti — was the real motive of the organization and continuation of his resist-
ance to our forces and the occupation there?
Col. Williams. I believe that he was inspired to a great extent by race
hatred. My recollection is that he invariably referred to us not as the Ameri-
cajis but as the whites, which is rather unusual In the case of a Haitian of
education. I also came across a copy of a play written by Charlemagne Pe-
rolte when he was younger. In which he was pictured lying on a divan with a
beautiful white girl fanning his feet and another beautiful white girl, described
with considerable detail, fanning his head.
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604 Il^QUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angetx. He was in alliance or supported, was he not, by the other Caco
leader at that time in the south, Benoit, and then after his death succeeded by
Benolt?
Col. Williams. Benoit was one of CharleraaRne's jrenerals. He came iiUo
prominence well after Charlemagne had commenced h.s operations.
Mr. ANGKI.L. Did he succeed Charlemagne as the recognized leader of tlie
irregular forces after Charlemagne's deatli?
Co!. Williams. Charleuiagne's death occurrcnl subsequent to my leaving Haiti.
Mr. Anoell. Do you romember whether It was Benoit who belonged to tlie
10th Haitian regiment, whose members had sworn not to lay down arms until
they liad driven the white man from the Island?
Col. Williams. I never lieard of the regiment or tlie oath.
Mr. Angell. Thei'e is reference to it somewhere. I have seen it, and I was
wondering whether you had beard the story.
Col. Williams. Benoit's father was an armorer. I think. In the Haitian army.
Mr. Angell. Do you know what forces were available to Charlemrtigne in the
course of his operations and of our operations against him?
Col. Williams. You mean the numbers?
Mr. Angell. The numbers.
Col. Williams. I do not believe that Charlemagne could have subsisted over,
perhaps, 2,000 men under the conditions w^hich obtained at the time. These,
of course, were broken up into bands of various size and scattered all over
central Haiti.
Mr. Angell. Referring to a report by Gen. Russell, which is attached to
the Mayo court records and dated August 15, it appears, according to Gen. Ru&-
seirs statement, that the numbers on which Ohariemagne and Benoit could draw
were about 17,000. Do you think that is a fair figure?
Col. Williams. If he means the available man power in central Haiti, I
should say that that was not far wrong.
Mr. Angell. I think he does mean that figure to mean the man power on
which they could draw.
Col. Williams. If he means the men whom he controlled, or had enlisted, or
could enlist, that is a different proposition ; but there were that many people
living around there.
Mr. Angell. In answer to a question by Mr. Howe a few minutes ago, C/Oloael,
you said you had meant to differentiate between Cacos and bandits. Will you
explain that difference?
Col. WiiJLTAMS. Caco is a Haitian word, and it has never been used In
Haiti in any other connection than this. When a revolution occurred, which
in the last 60 or 70 years has almost invariably taken place in north Haiti, the
people who were identified with the movement called themselves and were calleil
by others Cacos. The derivation of the word I was never able to find out. The
people who w-ere operating against the gendarmerie, or against whom we were
operating, more properly, in central Haiti, were not Cacos in the true sense,
because, in the first place, they were not from north Haiti, and, in the second
place, whatever political motives they may have had developed after their dis-
orders had been initiated were not the inspiration of the disorders. I referred
to them as bandits as being most descriptive.
Mr. Angell. Were our activities, for example, In the year 1915, when, accord-
ing to official records, as appears by the letter of MaJ. McClellan of October 25,
1920, in the Mayo court records, the Haitian official casualties are given as 212—
were they against Cacos or against the bandits?
Col. W11J.TAM8. Wlien was the date?
Mr. Angell. In the year 1915.
Col. WnxiAMs. The people who opposed the marines in north Haiti after
our first landing in 191 o had started out by being Cacos. In other words, there
was an uprising already under way, and, originating as it did in north Haiti,
and having a political motive, the people identified with it could be. called
Cacos. Just what they could be called w^hen the marines were operating
against them I can not say. I would say they were not Cacos, but that is rather
quibbling.
Mr. Angelt* Now, for example, in 1919, when the casualties, according to
this same McClellan letter, are reported to have been 1,861, were the natives
against whom our forces were operating and upon whom those casualties were
inflicted bandits in the ordinary sense of robbers and persons guilty of all
sorts of crimes or were they principally the native irregular forces operating
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INQUIKy INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 605
under the leadership of Charlemagne or other leaders actuated by similar
motives?
Col. William. I used the word " bandit " because it seemed more descriptive
of these people than any other word that I know. It is not entirely descriptive.
It does not bring out the bandit as we thinlc of him. These people were
bandits to the extent that they did rob and burn throughout central Haiti, and,
of course, the sufferers were always their own countrymen. They were not
under the leadership and they did not operate under the leadership of Charle-
magne, but Charlemagne, being a mau of a great deal of force, served as a
personality to which they could be tied and with whom they could be asso-
ciated. Whether or not Charlemagne ever attempted to coordinate the activi-
ties of these various generals and their bands I do not know, but there never
was any particular evidence of it.
Mr. Angku.. Do you regard, then, these natives against whom we were operat-
ing in 1919, and upon whom we inflicted these casualties, as, primarily, ordinary
criminaLs, or, on the other hand, rather irregular troops who incidentally
preye<l upon their own countrymen, but whose primary purpose and organization
and operation was to drive out the whites?
Col. Williams. I could not regard them as in any sense irregular troops;
they were too irregular for that. I could not regard them as criminals, because
I knew or believed that the percentage of criminals among them was rela-
tively small and that the great proportion of them had been forced to join
these bands, and, having been forced, of course, were unable to get out. They
did not dare in many instances.
Mr. Angell. Were these bands making offensive warfare of any sort, regular
or irregular, against the gendarmes and marines, or were they solely operating
against their native, civilian countrymen?
Col. WnxiAMS. They necessarily depended upon the countryside for their
subsistence, therefore they robbed their own people. Without any appearance
of unified command, different bands all attacked from time to time the gen-
darmes. They killed a number, and they burned several gendarmerie barracks.
Mr. Angell. Coming now to the corvee, I want to ask you certain general
questions about that, Colonel. You testified that the code rurale of 1863
provided for this labor in connection with the repair of roads and the like.
Do vou know whether or not the corvee law or custom went further back than
1863?
Col. WnxiAMS. Yes; I found a reference to it in Moreau St. Mery's book,
published in 1789, in which the inhabitants of the parish of Grande Riviere
protested against the fact that if they built the roads which they were required
to build in that parish there would be no slaves avail^le for work in the fields.
I take it that was substantially a corvee.
Mr. Angell. Then your understanding is that the '»orvee went back Into the
eighteenth century?
Col. WnxiAMS. I believe it did; and the code rurale, I might say, is taken
from the French code.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether there were traditions among the Haitian
people of abu.ses and hardships imder the old corvee law or custom dating
from the slave days?
Col. Williams. How far back the traditions ran I do not know, but I heard
from various Haitians that the corvee had often been accompanied by abuses.
Mr. Angell. There is a book here published in 1818, from which I would like
to read one sentence, called the History of the Island of Santo Domingo, of
which the author is Sir James Bashett, published In London, and It says on
page 110, regarding the blacks :
"On attaining the age of manhood (they were compelled) to serve three
years in a military establishment called the niarechaussee, and on the expira-
tion of that term they were subject, great part of the year, to the burthen of the
corvees — a species of labor allotted for the repair of the highways, of which
the hardships were insupportable."
That c<mforms with your understanding of the manner in which the corvee
had been applle<l in the past?
Col. Williams. Only in certain Instances. I said that the corvee, I under-
stoo<l. had been accompanied in the past by certain abuses, but that it was
accompanied by insupportable hard.ships I had never heard, except in its use
by the King Christophe.
Mr. Angell. In the early years of the nineteenth century?
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606 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Col. Williams. In the early years of the nineteenth century.
Mr. Angell. Did the code rurale of 1863, under your understanding, provide
for the building of roads as well as the repair of roads by this species of lalwr?
Col. Williams. My recollection of the text is that it provided for the r^^irs.
Mr. Angell. Not specifically for the building of new roads?
Col. Williams. I think it provided for repairs. That is the only way I can
remember it.
Mr. Angell. You testified, Colonel, if I remember rightly, that you were op-
posed at the outset to the institution or reapplication of the corvee law. Why
were you opposed, and what efforts did you make or what opposition did you
express?
Col. Williams. I was opposed because I did not believe that it was the proper
way or the economical way of getting the work done. I was opposed because
I did not like the idea of a corvee. It seemed to me rather un-Americaa I
made no effort to have it stopped, because I was not in a position to do so.
Mr. Howe. You were a subordinate?
Col. Williams. I was a subordinate officer.
Mr. Angell. Who was, then, responsible for its institution by our forces In
Haiti?
Col. Williams. The Haitian Government and the American occupation.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Tuesday, November 8, 1921, at
II o'clock a. m.)
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
TUESDAY, NOVEMBEB 8, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Ck>MMiTTEB on BLaiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D, C,
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 131, Senate Office
Building, at 11 a. m.. Senator Tasker L. Oddie presiding.
Present: Senator Oddie.
Also present: Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and MaJ. Edwin
N. McClellan.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. LITTI-ETON W. T. WAIXEK, UNITED
STATES MA&INE COBFS, BETIBED.
Mr. Howe. General, give your name and present rank and station, please.
Gen. Waixer. Littleton W. T. Waller, major general, Utiited States Marine
Corps, retired; 2500 South Twentieth Street, Philadelphia.
Mr. Howe. How many years ago 'did you join the Marine Corps, General?
Gen. Waller. Forty- two.
Mr. Howe. How long ago were you retired ; tliat was quite recently, was it
not?
Gen. Walleb. I was retired a year ago.
Mr. Howe. In August, 1915, what was your rank in the Marine Corps?
Gen. Waller. I was colonel commanding the brigade.
Mr. Howe. Did you land in Haiti in August?
Gen. Waixer. I did.
Mr. Howe. Was that August 15?
Gen. Waller. I landed there August 15; yes.
Mr. Howe. At the time you landed were you' senior marine officer present?
Gen. Waller. I was senior marine officer, and my orders detailed me to
command the United States forces ashore in Haiti.
Mr. Howe. That Included command over the seamen, did it not, as well as
the marines?
Gen. Waller. On shore; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. To whom did you report directly?
Gen. Waller. To the commander of the cruiser squadron, Rear Admiral
Caperton.
Mr. Howe. You got your orders, however, directly from the Secretary of the
Navy?
Gen. Waller. From the Secretary of the Navy; this refers to my original
orders.
Mr. Howe. Or through the major general commanding the Marine Corps?
Gen. Waller. They were sent through the usual form, but. they came directly
to me — telegraphic onlers.
Mr. Howe. How long did you remain in Haiti?
Gen. Waller. I left in the first part of December, 1916, but I was still at-
tached to that expeditionary force until the lOtJi of January, 1917, but I was
in this country from, I think, the 15th of December, 1916.
Mr. Howe. Therefore, during your last months in that tour of duty you were
in this country?
Gen. Wallkr. I was in this country.
Mr. Howe. Were you continuously in Haiti from August 15, 1915, until De-
cember, 1916?
Gen. Waller. Except once for three weeks, when I was brought to Wash-
ington to consult with the State Department.
607
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608 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. But during all of that time you were commanding the brigade?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. From the time there was a position of brigade commander there,
were you brigade commander at first?
Gen. Walleb. Yes.
Mr. Howe. You had that designation?
Gen. Walleb. That was my brigade. It was sent down, so I simply retained
the command I had — the First Brigade.
Mr. Howe. And after a while the bluejackets were withdrawn from shore?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Then, your command consisted entirely of marines?
Gen. Waller. After tlie completion of the campaign we had In the north,
then it was entirely marines.
Mr. Howe. You were succeeded by what officer in command?
Gen. Waller. Col. E. K. Cole.
Mr. Howe. How long before you landed was President Dartiguenave elected?
Gen. Waller. Two days, I think.
Mr. Howe. Maj. McClellan, when was he elected?
MaJ. McClellan. He was elected on August 12.
Mr. Howe. That would be three days?
Gen. Waller. Three days.
Mr. Howe. What was the situation there when you landed, with especial
reference to peace and order?
Gen. Waller. Conditions were very bad, and the town of Port au Prince
was being controlled by the landing party that had landed from the Wntshinff-
ton, and aLso the regiment that Col. Cole had brought down a few days before
I arrived.
Mr. Howe. You landed at Port au Prince, did you not?
Gen. Waixer, Yes.
Mr. Howe. What shape did the disturbing conditions take?
Gen. Waller. Gatherings of mobs, threatening disturbances, and much prop-
aganda.
Mr. Howe. American propaganda?
Gen. Waixer. Not as much so as against tho Haitinn G<n'erM»'cn* H c'^?
Mr. Howe. You are referring to conditions In town In Port au Prince?
Gen. Waller. In town In Port au Prince. The country at that time was
more or less quiet In the central part.
Mr. Howe. What was the condition in the north?
Gen. Waller. Dr. Bobo had been macU* Prescient by the Cacos, and they
claimed him as their President, and refused to have anything to do with the
Dartlguenave government. Dr. "Bobo came to Port au Prince and remained
probably 10 days, and then, at his own request, was permitted to go to Jamaica.
He was never in any danger there at any time, but could go and come as .he
saw fit. He had some fear of violence, and I saw that he was escorted on
board the steamer, with the British charge.
Mr. Howe. Do you know If before the time you landed there were any
armed conflicts In which the seamen or marines took part?
Gen. Waller. I think there was one In which two of our men were killed.
That occurred the night of the original landing.
Mr. Howe. At Port au Prince?
Gen. Waller. At Port au Prince.
Mr. Howe. After you landed how soon was there any armed conflict?
Gen. Waller. There was a little trouble at Gonalves early In September.
Then, on the 26th of September they ambushed two of my patrols near Cape
Haitien, one of them at Haut de Cap and one a little south of that There wa?
no name for this place.
Mr. Howe. Before the 26th of September had you gone out to talk with the
so-called Caco leaders?
Gen. Waller. I did. I went to Cape Haltlen and got in communication with
them, and they said they would permit me and two others to come out to
Quatler Morin and interview them. They absolutely refused to come to Cape
Haitien. because they said It was only a trap to catch them.
Mr. Howe. T-.et us go back to your reasons for that Interview with the Cacos.
First of all, was there any request on the part of the Haitian authorities or
President Dartlguenave?
Gen. Waller. Yes; from President Dartlguenave.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 609
Mr. Howe. For you or some one else to make an arrangement with the Cacos
in the north?
Gen. Waller. He had authorized me.
Mr. Howe. President Dartlguenave?
Gen. Waller. President Dartiguenave ; to conclude any treaty I could make
with them» even to the extent of purchasing their arms from them. My recol-
lection is that he limited the price of the arms, or the negotiations, anyhow, to
-$400,000. which was to my mind perfectly absurd.
Mr. Howe. Too much?
Gen. W^allek. Entirely.
Mr. Howe. What need was there for reaching any agreement with the Cacos?
Gen. Waller. Well, they were the king makers of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Do you mean that under the conditions wh*ch prevailed at that
time the Haitian Government existed during the ])Ieasure of those Caco leaders?
Gen. WALTJ2R. That had been the case before we landed. What I mean is that
an aspirant for political power, a man who wante<l to l)e President, would go to
the north and make an agreement witli these Caco leaders, and for a certain sum
to be paid from the Haitian treasury after he was successful ; also the privilege
of looting some of the towns on the way down. They would descend from the
iiiotm tains and put the President in power.
Mr. Howe. To what extent were these Caco bands at this time a menace to
the Haitian Government?
Gen. Waller. They had been for a hundred years a menace to it.
Mr. Howe. But at the time you landed were they a menace to the then Govern-
ment?
Gen. Waller. Unquestionably, because they were back of the man, Dr. Bobo,
whom they claimed they had appointed president. Tkey had not marched ui)on
Port au Prince; they had not done so be<*ause our i)eople had landed.
Mr. Howe. Were they doing any actual damage at the moment?
Gen. Waller. They *were stopping all food going to Cape Haitlen ; they cut off
the water supply of Gonaives, and were levying ttixes on all the market people,
and the business of the country without any authority and treating them
l>rutallj'. When the marines were permitted to come into the market places the
Cacos would seize them and take their money from them when they returned lo
their homes. To understand that you would have to understand that the market
places in the towns were rather peculiar. For Instance, the populaton in Port
au Prince on Saturday wouhl probably l)e increase<l by something like 20,0()0
peiiple, and these i)eople had marched from the interior, some of them for three
or four days, bringing their produce into the market places. The dlffen^nt towns
through the central i)orti(m and the northern portion had other market days,
and they would proceed from one to the other. Almost all this work was dtme
by women.
Mr. Howe. Then the existence of these Caco bands tended to paralyze the
commerce from the Interior, in the northern part?
Gen. Waixer. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And the immediate effect of that was felt in the towns in the
northern part?
Gen. Waixeh. It was felt in the towns in the shortage of fo<Ml. It did not affect
us, because we had our own provisions.
Mr. Howe. Will you describe your trip out and what transpired when you met
these Caco leaders?
Gen. Waller. The officers were bitterly opposed to my going out, because they
thought I would be killed ; but I took Col. Cole and an interpreter and proceeded
to Quartler Morin, I think it Is about S miU's from CaiH^ Haitlen.
Mr. Howe. Without any further escort?
Gen. Waller. No.
Mr. Howe. What is the name of that place?
Gen.' Waller. Quartler Morin.
Mr. Howe. That was about 8 miles from where?
Gen. Waller. About 8 miles from Cape Haitlen, as I recollect it. They met
me some 2 miles from this place and esc*orted me in. Their delegation con-
sisted of 136 general.s.
Senator Oddie. How many privates?
Gen. Watjcer. Not many privates. Any one who had command of five or six
men was called a brigadier: If he had lo or 20 men he was a major general, s<»
there were quite a number of generals there.
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610 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. I^t me ask you, sir, did these generals who met you at that place
in turn travel a considerable distance to the meeting place?
Gen. Waller. Some had. Some had come down from Grande Riviere and
others from farther south.
Mr. Howe. How was the time and place of meeting announced to theni, do
you know?
Gen. Waller. They had gathered there prior to my arrival at Cape Haitien.
Mr. Howe. You knew of that gathering there?
Gen. W^ALLER. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How did you find out? Who informed you?
Gen. Waller. Col. Cole had Informed me that Cape Haitien w* surrounded,
and the conditions were very bad, and our orders were to take no overt action.
Anything that happened must come from them first I went out to see these
people and explained to them our purpose in coming to Haiti. They had in
their minds a very fixed idea that we were going to seize naval bases, one of
them being Mole St. Nicholas. They referred to that many times during this
consultation. I explained to them that Mole St. Nicholas was absolutely worth-
less as a naval base, and we never contemplated it for a moment ; it was not
our purpose to take one foot of territory from Haiti; that if, during the time
of the occupation, it became necessary for us to take buildings other than
the Government buildings, that we would pay a reasonable monthly rent,
and we did.
Mr. Howe. To the owners?
Gen. Waller. To the owners; yes.
Mr. Howe. And you did so?
Gen. Waller. We did so always.
Mr. Howe. What else did you say to them and they to you?
Gen. Waller. They told me that Bobo was their president, and they would
not have any other. Dartiguenave had failed — well, I suppose, had gone back
really on the party. They wanted Bobo and no one else. They had been in-
formed that I had him imprisoned. I had great difficulty in convincing them
of the fact that he had left Haiti at his own request, without hindrance of any
sort, and, as far as I was concerned, he could return; that we did not regard
him as a menace in Haiti. They refused to have any dealings with us, and
I told them that I was very sorry ; that I would give them a couple of days
to think the matter over, and the next day I proposed to open the railroad from
Cape Haitien to Grande Riviere, and I would be very glad. Indeed, to take
any of them on the train with me. They became very indignant and said
that we held C^pe Haitien, but that they held the north country and we would
not be allowed to .go. But the train left and we went on to Grande Riviere,
and, except for some menacing attitude on their part, there was no trouble.
Probably three or four hundred of their men had gathereil under their generalis-
simo and made menaces, but there was not a shot fired at all. When I returned
they agreed to come into Cape Haitien and have a further talk.
Mr. Howe. General, what 'date was this first conference you had with tliem,
how long before the written agreement?
Gen. Waller. About a week.
Mr. Howe. Do I understand that you had a second conference after the
railroad had been opened?
Gen. Waller. Yes; they came into Cape Haitien. That was where the
second conference was held, and at that time they were joined by Gen. Charles
Zamor, and the agreement w^as made.
Mr. Howe, Was the agreement formulated in writing at the time of that
second interview?
Gen. Waller. Yes; that is, the English of it, and it was translated after-
wards into French for them.
Mr. Howe. I have here a copy of that agreement, which, Mr. Chairman, is
short, and I would like to read it aloud.
Senator Oddie. Very well.
Mr. Howe. General, is this the text of the agreement, which I am about to
read:
" Cape Haitien, Haiti, September 29, 1915.
"Agreement between Col. L. W. T. Waller, United States Marine Corps,
conmianding United States expeditionary forces on shore, representing the
United States and the Haitian Government, and Gens. Antolne Morancy and
Jean Baptiste Petion, representing the Cacos of Haiti.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 611
"Part J.
" 1. It is hereby agreed on the parts of the Caco chiefs as follows :
**(a) To disarm immediately, turning in all arms and ammunition at Quartier
Morin.
"(6) Caco chiefs and men to go to their homes, not to oppose in arms the
present Government of Haiti, not to interfere with the railroads, commerce,
agriculture, and industries of the country.
"(c) Caco chiefs agree to send delegation to Port au Prince to consult and
confer with the Dartiguenave Government concerning participation in the civil
government of Haiti and to abide by such terms as may be agreed upon.
"(d) Cacos found in arms against present Government after signing of this
agreement to be treated as bandits.
" Pabt 2.
"2. It is hereby agreed on the part of the United States and Haitian Gov-
ernment:
"(o) That the general amnesty granted by the Haitian Government to those
Haitians now in arms be guaranteed by the United States forces to all Cacos
turning in their arms and observing the requirements laid down In part 1.
"(ft) The United States expeditionary forces agree to guarantee the terms
made with the Dartiguenave Government as may be.agreeil upon as indicate*!
in (c), part 1. Such terms being consistent with the mission of the United
States and any treaty made between the United States and Haiti.
"(c) That when practicable, Cacos who have observed part 1 may have repre-
sentatives in such constabulary or police as may or be organized in Haiti.
" Littleton W. T. Waller.
"Witness:
" Eli Cole.
"Ant. Morancy.
"P. Jn. Baptiste.
"Witness:
"C. Zamor."
Senator Oddie. What was the date of that?
Mr. Howe. September 29, 1915.
Gen. Waller. These two paragraphs, part 1, paragraph (c), there was
considerable discussion about at the second meeting.
Mr. Howe. What were those paragraphs?
Gen. Waller. This one, paragraph (o) : "Caco chiefs agree to send delega-
. tion to Port au Prince to consult and confer with the Dartiguenave Government
concerning participation in the civil government of Haiti and to abide by such
terms as may be agreed upon."
They were very much In doubt nbout the frankness of the Haitian Govern-
ment In connection with their participation in the civil government, and the
other paragraph was put in.
Mr. Howe. Meaning which paragraph?
Gen. Waller. Paragraph 6, under part 2. We agreed to guarantee the terms
made with the Dartiguenave Government as may be agreeil upon as indicated
in paragraph (c), part 1.
Then they took much interest in the concluding paragraph, paragraph (c),
part 2: "That when practicable, Cacos who have observed part 1 may have
representatives In such constabulary or police as may or be organize<l in Haiti."
As a matter of fact, some of the best men we have in the constabulary to-day
came
Mr. Howe. Came from those Caco bands who were represented by these
generals?
Gen. Waller, Represented by these generals at that time.
Mr. HowTC That, then, is the text of the agreement which was reached by
' you at Cape Haitien, as you have described ?
Gen. Waller. Yes; but the French of this was not signed at that time.
Mr. Howe. The French copy?
Gen. Waller. It was signed subsequently at Quartier Morin.
Mr. HowE. How long after?
Gen. Waller. It was after the 26th, because they had ambushed the American
patrols on the 26th of September, but I found that these men were not con-
cerned in that.
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612 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SA^TO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Not concerned in the ambush?
Gen. Waixeb, Not as far as I know, and they have, even to tliis day, kept to»
their agreement.
Mr. Howe. The signers of this agreement?
Gen. Waller. Yes. During the campaign in the north' I consulted frequently
with Baptlste Petion, or Petion Jean Baptlste, just as you like. They call it
either way.
Mr. Howe. Did Morancy and Baptiste represent the^te Cacos?
(ieii. Waixer. Yes ; tliey practically hail vic*e i*egal jwwers.
Mr. Howe. You were convinced they were the individuals who actually repre-
sented the Cacos?
Gen. Waller. They were so acknowledged by all of them.
Mr. Howe. To what extent and for how long was this agreement observed by
the Cacos?
Gen. Waller. A number of them broke it on the 26th of September when they
ambushed my patrols.
Mr. Howe. Now, I notice this agreement here is dated September 29?
Gen. Waller. Yes; that would be the date of the actual signature of the
French.
Mr. Howe. Of the French version?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How long before that ambush on the 26th had you formulatesl the
English version? -
Gen. Waller. The date of the last meeting in Cape Haitien.
Mr. Howe. How long before the ambush was that, do you believe?
Gen. Waller. I think that was about five or six days.
Mr. Howe. And that ambush was on the 26th?
Gen. Waller. On the 26th.
Mr. Howe. Of September?
Gen. Waller. Yes. It is positively fixed in my mind, because it was my birth-
day, and T thought it was a nice present to receive.
Mr. Howe. The English version was signed before the ambush?
Gen. Waller. That was signed in pencil. I think the original copy, or possi-
bly one of them, may i)ossibly be in the hands of our consul in Cai)e Haitien now.
He was present at the time.
Mr. Howe. Have you any means of knowing how far the news of the signing
of the English version was spread among the Cacos?
Gen. Waller. (.Considering the time between the actual signing, there must
have been at that time at least 500 of them in Cape Haitien besides the generals.
Mr. Howe. And did they all know about this agreement?
Gen. Waltj^r, They all knew of it. It was very rapidly spread through the'
country, carried by the market people.
Mr. Howe. Did they begin to comply with any of the requirements before
the 29th?
Gen. Waixer. They claimed tliat they had.
Mr. Howe. Had they turned in any arms?
Gen. Waller, Tliey claimed that some arms in the immediate vicinity of
Capo Haitien had been turned in, and, of course, arms were turned in at Port
au Prince. I can hardly say they were turned in. More properly speaking, they
were collected.
Mr. Howe. But, as the result of this agreement, I mean, were arms turned in
before the 2Gth, before the ambush?
Gen. Waller. Very few. They hesitated for a long time, I mean the peasants*
about turning in their arms, because they claimed they were liable to attack at
any nu>n>ent, and sliould be allowed to have tliese arms; I mean attacke^l by
their own people.
Mr. Howe. Aside from this ambush, were there any breaches of that agree-
ment?
(}pn. Wallkh. At Gonaives.
Mv. How]:. W'lefi.
<Jon. Walli:r. That was, T should say, two days after this agreement.
Mr. IlowK. After the Knirlish version of the agreement?
(Jen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What was tliat occurrence?
(Jen. W\LLEK. They had cut off the water supply of Gonalves, and had
practically surroundcnl the town. When I left Cape Haitien I took Maj. Uutler,
now Gen. Butler, with me to Port au Prince. Stopping at Gonalves I found this
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 613
condition. It was nooessarj- for me to go on Immediately to Fort au Prince
and reix^rt to the Government what I liad done, so I left MaJ. Butler at
Gonaives with instructions to protect the water supply and open the railroad,
and I jrave him three days In which to do it, and as soon as this was done, he
was to reiwrt to l*ort au Prince. He completed this work in two days.
Mr. Howe. In those two days he restored the water supply?
Gen. Waller. He restored the supply, and he came to terms, under my
authority, with this commanding general who was there, who also calle<l him-
self the secretary of state for war under the Bobo government, and he promised
faithfully, if he were not put under arrest, that he would carry out these
in.structions. Instead of doing so, however, he moved back into the interior,
attacked a small town and treated the natives very l)adly, and it was necessary
to send a column after him.
Mr. Howe. When was this?
Gen. Walleb. It was probably 10 days later.
Mr. Howe. Tlien this column which was sent up to restore order back of
Gonaives had an engagement with the Cacos?
Gen. Watlek. Th(»y had an engagement with the Cacos. and four or tlve, I
tbink, were killed or wounded. One of my first sergeants was killed.
Mr. Howe. That was on the 26th of September?
Gen. Waujoi. That was on the 26th of September also. That report I re-
ceived Just prior to going back to Cape Haitlen.
Mr. Howe. Tell us something more, then, about the ambush on the 26th, at
Haut de Cap, on the 26th of September.
Gen. W^ALLER. After opening the railroads I instructed Col. Cole to patrol
the town of Cape Haitien for a radius of 16 miles every day, and he sent
out two patrols of probably 30 or 40 men each to and from that point constantly,
In order to permit the food supply for the natives of Cape Haitien to come
in freely without interruption. For some reason it was not done immediately,
and the first patrols were sent out on the *26th of Sei)teniber. and they were
ambushed at two different points. At Haut de Cap the ambush was very
much larger, and there, were 10 of our men wounded, no one killed, but two
died from their wounds afterwards. I do not know how many of the Cacos
were killed at that time; I think probably quite a number, but it has been
my experience that young officers going into action for the first time are very
apt to greatly exaggerate the damage they do to the enemy. Certainly there
were comparatively few bodies found after the ambush was over.
Mr. Howe. Why, do you suppose, did the Cacos set this ambush and bring
this on? .
Gen. Waixer. They had received information about these patrols we sent
out that day.
Mr. Howe. W^hy did they want to attack the patrols?
Gen. Waller. Apparently there had been disagreement between some of the
subordinate people and the commanding generals about the ternis of surrender.
Mr. Howe. After these two engagements, one back of (tonaives and the
other at Haut de Cap, were there for a while any other clashes or conflicts?
Gen. Waller. Not until during about the latter part of October, I think it
was.
Mr. Howe. In the meantime?
Gen. Waller. In the meantime there were no claslies between our troops
and the natives. Many depredations had been conmiitted by these different
bands, and they had robbed the towns and v llages and the market people, and
had interfere<l with the produce coming into these towns.
Mr. Howe. Did that continue?
Gen. Waller. That cH)n tinned. My. idea was to round up these people, if
possible, in the mountains of the north, and to find out exactly where their
headquarters were. There were certain forts that had been l)u It along the old
Santo Dominican border by the French Government, but were used as points
of incubation really for these revolutions. One of them was at Ouanaminthe,
on the Santo Dominican bonier, and there were three forts in the mountains.
It was very difficult to find out the exact h)cation of these, so I ortlered th"8
reconnaissance made, which covered somewhere between 300 and oOO miles
really around, and Maj. Butler's column was attacked, I think, on the second
day of this march.
Mr. Howe. And was that in October?
Gen. Waller. That was In October.
Mr. Howe. Along toward the end of October? r^^^^T^
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614 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Waller. Yes ; because as soon as the reports came in to me I went on
to Cape Haitien with the plan of campaign that I had arranged.
Mr. Howe. Why d*d you order that long reconnaissance by Maj. Butler?
Gen. Waller. For the purpose of finding the exact location of these forts,
and finding the exact location of these bands who would descend into the
plains and go back into the mountains.
Mr. Howe. The continuance of these depredations by these bands was in
itself a violation of this agreement, was it not?
Gen. Waller. Absolutely.
Mr. Howe. Did the American and the Haitian Governments keep their side
of the agreement?
Gen. Waller. To the letter.
Mr. Howe. Did the campaign of November, 1915, start with the long recon-
noissance of Maj. Butler?
Gen. Waller. No; the plan was not made until after h*s report on that
reconnaissance. It was necessary for me to get this information before I
could make this plan. I wanted to get them into the mountains, and then
establish these different bases in the mountains, and operate from the different
bases each day, with rap'd moving columns, small columns. I seldom sent out
more than 40 men In a column, but as they moved in different directions it
kept the other people guessing as to our actual intent and was very successful
I do not think the campaign lasted more than three weeks altogether.
Mr. Howe* That was a campaign, then, to keep the cacos stirred up and on
the run?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Moving from place to place?
Gen. Waller. Moving from place to place. In the meantime we communi-
cated with Jean Baptiste Petion, and told him that he must communicate with
these people and say that it was our intention as soon as order was r^tored
to see that work was started on the roads, and work would begin on the rail-
roads, and that these men would have employment at the proper pay, and I
know that he did so communicate with them, because I captured afterwards
letters from h'm to these other alleged generals.
Mr. Howe. With the substance of that offer incorporated in those letters?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. The reason you began this campaign was on account of these
depredations?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. To put a stop to them?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How many killed did the Haitians suffer, do you believe, in that
three weeks* campaign?
Gen. Waller. Officially, I think I reported about 182. Personally, I did
not see more than 60. They attacked me at my base the morning after I
arrived.
Mr. Howe. That was at Le Trou?
Gen. Waller. That was at Le Trou. They made a mistake in thinking that
I had moved in there with only 18 men. It was true that I had only 18 men
when I had moved in from the base, and they had sniped me from Caracol up
to La Trou, but it did not even halt the march. But they did attack In the
morning with a large force, but unfortunately they did not know that three
companies and five machine guns had arrived the night before. The engage-
ment was of very short duration.
Mr. Howe. How many dead did you count after that?
Gen. Waller, Thirty.
Mr. Howe. Thirty dead Haitians?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Was this 182 total the actual counted number of dead or the
estimated number?
Gen. Waller. Well, I suppose it was the actual count Of course, I had
to depend on the reports of my subordinates in the mountains. I imagine
they counted them, because they reported so many dead and so many wounded.
Mr. Howe. And first to last that campaign was carried out along the lines
laid down by you, namely, patrolling columns based on several different points?
Gen. Waller, Yes.
Mr. Howe. And constantly patrolling?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO, 615
Oen. Waltxr. I have here the plan of campaign, with the origin&l orders.
Mr. Howe. Did you have the authority of President Dartiguenave for your
conference and agreement with the cacos?
Gen. Waltjsb, Yes; and not only his authority, but he requested me to take
charge of it originally. He made the original request that I take charge of
it, and I received a telegraphic dispatch from him conveying the thanks of
the Haitian Government for the services which were performed in the north
in cimnectlon with this agreement, and subsequently the thanks, publicly ex-
pressed, of the Haitian Government for the successful campaign in the north
which had freed these people of the terror that had existed for so many years.
Mr. Howe. General, these letters from the President of Haiti to wMch you
have referred appear in a compilation of orders, etc., which compilation is
already' in the record of this committee, and so we have before us a record of
those letters to which you have referred. They appear on page 57 of that
v"omp!lation.
Now, General, you spoke of having your campaign orders there.
Gen. Waixeb. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. May I look at them? General, I have looked over this order,
and will you please correct me as I summarize it? It made disposition of your
forces?
Gen. Waller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. It directed the capture of certain fortified points in the hands
of the cacos?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And it directed the constant patrolling from designated points?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And in field order No. 9. in order to complete this summary, I will
read paragraphs 1 and 2 :
" 1. The territory inclosed between Le Trou, Ste. SuEanne, Grande Riviere,
Bajon, Gross Roches, Le Trou is Infested with outlaws and bandits; their
operations also extend to the west of the Grande Riviere and to the south of
Bajon. They have strongholds in the mountains south of Ste. Suzanne and a
camp, Berthol to the eastward of the trail Le Trou, Ste. Suzanne; one fort,
Capois, their stronghold, is reported to have stone parapets and Is situated
south of Ste. Suzanne. Strength of the hostile forces is not known, but prob-
ably not less than 1,000. Gen. PInetle Pierre is to occupy La Valliere with
100 Haitians, in support of our troops In that vicinity. U. S. S. Cormecticut
In support at Cape Haitien.
**2. Our troops will occupy positions In readiness to clear the above district
of outlaws, the movement being started Monday morning. November 1. 1915 ;
natives with arms In their possession are bandits and are to be treated as such.
Particular attention will be paid to the capture or destruction of the chiefs."
Mr. Howe. Paragraph 2 of your orders described the mission of vour forces,
did it not?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. These orders also contain a letter of instructions which had prin-
cipally to do with the details as to distinguishing marks of the soldiers?
Oen. Waller. For the safety of our own people In night work.
Mr. Howe. And with water and water facilities, the care of animahj. and all
the other details of a campaign in the field in an unusual country?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. That is a fairly correct summary of those orders, is It not, sir?
Gen. Waller. I think so.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that these orders, dated at Cape Haitien
October 29, 1915, by order of Col. Waller, Field Order No. 9 of the same date,
and general instructions accompanying the field order, as well as Field Order
No. 9a, and a letter from Col. Waller to CoL Cole, dated October 31, 1915, form
a part of the record,, and be kept in the records of this committee, but that they
be not printed in full in the record, as that seems to be unnecessary.
Senator Ooois. It will be so ordered.
Mr. Howe. How successful was that three weeks* campaign in obtaining its
objective?
Gen. Waller. Entirely so. At the end of that time they had given up.
Many of them came in, and we gave them work immediately.
^ Mr. Howe. Were arms turned in In large numbers?
62269— 21— PT 2 BS
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616 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Geo. Wallsb. Arms came in rather rapidly at first, but then, as I say, the
peasants hel'd on for a little while, and they were coming in for probably a
month afterwards.
Mr. Howe. A month?
Gen. Walleb. Yes.
Mr. Howe. About how many rifles were turned in, can you estimate?
Gen. Waixer. I do not remember exactly. I do not remember exactiy what
price we paid for those rifles, for each one. It was according to the condition
of the gun.
Mr. Howe. So the total amount paid would give no indication as to the Dum-
ber of arms?
Gen. Waujsm. No ; l>ecause we certainly got quite a large number of them.
Mr. Howe. Pertiaps it would be more interesting to know your estimate as to
how many firearms were left in the country after this turning in?
Gen. Waller. It was pretty difficult to say, but there were not very many in
the north. At the same time, it was a very easy matter to run arms across
from Santo Domingo into Hinche, across the Santo Dominican border in that
way.
Mr. Howe. After the end of this campaign, were there any more armed con-
flicts for some time?
Gen, Waixeb. Nothing for some time. There was an attempted abortiw
revolution in Port au Prince.
Mr. Howe. But that was started later?
Gen. Waller. That was next year.
Mr. Howe. Then there was a period of quiet?
Gen. Waller. Entirely so.
Mr. Hows. And with the exception of this abortive revolution to which you
have referred, how long did that period of quifet last?
Gen. Waller. .As long as I was there.
Mr. Hows. At least, then, until December, 1916?
Qen. Waller. Over a year.
Mr. Howe. When you speak of the revolution do you speak of the disturb-
ance called the Pierre Paul revolution?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Hqwe. Where was the center of that?
Gen. Waller. In Port au Prince.
Mr. Howe. Did you have any intimation in advance that this trouble was
coming?
Gen. Waller. I had. I knew it was coming and the President kept me vei?
actively informed. He was reporting something about it every day and was
very anxious for me to arrest the people before any overt acts were committed.
Mr. Howe. What course did you take?
Qen, Waller. I told him I was inclined not to do it. I was going to let the
revolution start. I said, " I am going to let them begin shooting and I will
finish it."
Mr. Howe. What was your purpose in adopting that* plan?
Gen. Waller. I wished to find out exactly who the leaders were and who
the people were who were financing this thing and who were back of it
Mr. Howe. Did you gain any information on those points?
Gen. Waller. I captured two letters. I know that some of the German houses
v^ere financing it, and, also, when Pierre Paul escaped the night of the revolu-
tion, he was assisted in his escape by a German, and I have reason to b^eve
that he was taken into the German Legation for awhile. Of course, I couM
not violate that I should have unhesitatingly arrested any German subject
outside, but the legation was sacred.
Mr. Howe. The legation was sacred?
Gen. Waller. Yes; the Haitians did not regard it so fn the case of the
French Legation when they killed the President
Mr. Howe. But you had to regard it as sacred?
Gen. Waller. I did; yes.
Mr. Howe. Did you capture any of the leaders of this outbreak?
Gen. Waller. Yes ; we captured the commanding general in his escape from
Port au Prince. In Port au Prince he escaped from prison.
Mr. Howe. Who? Pierre Paul did?
Gen. Waller. No; Codio did — the commanding general. We captured ateo
another general by the name of Metallus, who was probably one of the mo«t
desperate of characters on the face of the earth. He was a bodyguard of the
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 617
former President and betrayed hlni to the revolutionists. He was accidentally
shut at that time, shot in the am), and we ti'eated him ; but he left Port au
Prince and went up to Fort Liberte and there committed one of the most das-
tardly murders ever committed and escaped and got down to Port au Prince
and was employed by Codio in this revolution.
Mr. Howe. And was captured?
Gen. Wallkb. He was captured.
Mr. Howe. Is he alive or dead?
Gen. Walleb. He is dead, and so is Codio.
Mr. Howe. And were there any other imi)ortant prisoners captured there?
Gten. Waller. When they broke out of prison after the revolution, and prob-
ably 150 men got away, some of them political and others criminal prisoners,
but the majority of the political prisoners simply hid and gave themselves up
the next day. They hid because they were afraid they would be shot.
Mr. Howe. Was Codio taken in that way?
Q&i. Walleb. Codio was recaptured Just as he was making his way to the
Santo Dominican border with Gen. Metallus and another man. I have forgot-
ten his name Just now. He was not of very great importance. He was a
bandit and a political disturber. And there were some pirates who had been
captured. They had killed the captain of their ship and were awaiting trial.
These people, on the march back to Port au Prince, were sent down to get
water one morning, and they attempted to break away from the guards and
get across the shallow stream and escape. Of course, they made the m^take
of thinking the American riflemen were something like the Haitians. The re-
wilt was that they were killed.
Mr. Howe. By the marines?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. As they were attempting to escape?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did that account for the end of all your principal captures in the
Pierre Paul revolution?
Gen. Waller. All except Pierre Paul himself.
Mr. Howe. What happened to Pierre Paul himself?
Gen. Waller. He got away, and subsequwitly communicated with me, prob-
ably after four or five months, and asked for terms of surrender, which I re-
fused to give. I sent word to him that he would have to throw himself -on my
mercy altogether and surrender unconditionally. He complained that his wife
was starving, and we were withholding the rent for a building that we were
using as barracks up at Ouanamlnthe, so the rent was paid to Madame Paul.
Mr. HowB. This building was owned by Pierre Paul?
Gen. Waller. The rent was regularly paid to her. He came in and I told him
that I was going to pardon him, as far as the occupation was concerned, but
it would be necessary to have action on the part of the Haitian Government ;
otherwise a charge might lie against him at any time.
Mr. Howe. Was he pardoned by the Haitian Government?
Gen. Waller. I took him over to the President, and the President pardoned
him, and he was released immediately. He was not in confinement an hour; he
was not In confinement at all; he was In my oflice, or In the President's office,
and came right out
Mr. Howe. After he returned he was not in confinement?
Gen. Waller. No.
Mr. Howe. What hapi)ened to him after that, when he was turned loose?
Gen. Waller. He was politically dead. Our action in not regarding him as
a dangerous character had a wonderful effect, as we knew it would.
Mr. Howe. And there was no more trouble from Pierre Paul?
Gen. Waller. Not at all. There was an alleged political trouble. The In-
formation was given to me by the President Mr. Pradel, who was one of the
leading Haitian lawyers and a very intelligent man, the President kept inform-
ing me was holding communication with people who were opposed to the Gov-
ernment and particularly in the salon of one of the Haitian ladies who was a
political disturber. I had no reason to believe that he was In any way con-
cerned in it, but chey were so Insistent In their reports that finally I said, " I
will have his house searched and see what there is." So the house was
searched, and they did find some arms that were not allowed. I think there
wwe four guns, four rifles, but they were found In the stable which opened
on the street Mr. Pradel was brought to my office and stated he knew abso-
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618 INQriRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
lutely nothing about it, and I am quite convinced that he did not. I think it
was n plot on the part of his political enemies.
Mr. Howe. Did that trouble incident to the Pierre Paul revolution const i tote
the only instance of that kind, the only disturbing incident?
Gen. Wali^er. That is all.
Mr. Howe. During the rest of your tour there^?
Gen. WAixtni. That is all.
Mr. Howe. Did you have any active part in the negotiations of the treaty
with the Ha'tian Government?
Gen. Walli-ui. Simply to carry out the instructions of the State I>ei>artiiH*iit
that were given to me through Admiral Caperton.
Mr. Howe. The customhouses were seiwHl?
(Jen. Wallek. Yes.
^Ir. Howe. Before the negotiations for the treaty, before your particiimtion
in the negotiations for the treaty became effect' ve; is that correct?
Gen. Waujch. I knew that would be agreed upon, that they would take over
the customs.
Mr. Howe. You knew that the Haitians wouM agree to the taking over of
the customs?
Gen. Wau-er. That was underwood.
Mr. Howe. \V«s that agreement reached before the customhouses were tuketi
over?
Geif. \Valleb. The verbal agreement?
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. The treaty later on provided for the taking over of the adminis-
tration of the customs; is that right?
Gen. Waltjcr. Yes; and the appointment of a receiver general and a fiiiaiKc'nl
adviser.
Mr. Howe. (Jeneral. these negotiations in which you took part lastecl over n
considenible i)eriod of time, did they not?
(Jen. \VALiJiR. Yes.
Mr. Howe. The treaty was signed in September, 1916, I believe?
Gen. Waller. I think so.
Mr. Howe. On behalf of Hati?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How so<m after your arrival in August, 1915, dd you begin the
negotiations?
Gen. Walij-ir. They were going on when I got there, two days after ilie
President was elected.
Mr. Howe. During that time did you observe any compulsion being broii^t
to bear on the Dartiguenave government, forcible or other^-'se, to sigrn this
treaty?
Gen. Waller. None whatever.
Mr. Howe. There were, however, prolonged negotiations on many of the de-
tails of the treaty?
Gen. Waller. One paragraph of the treaty would take up sometimes a ^;veek
or 10 days, arguing pro and con.
Mr. Howe. Who took part in those discussions?
Gen. Walli-x. The Haitian Government, our minister, our admiral, in com-
munications from the State Department.
Mr. Howe. Where did you come in. sir?
Gen. Waller. I came in the Naval EiStabllshmeDt there.
Mr. Howe. Were you and the admiral present, both of you, at the $«an)e
negotiations frequently?
Gen. Waller. Frequently ; yes.
Mr. Howe. Did you sometimes take the place of the admiral and represent
him In the negotiations?
Gen. WALI.ER. Yes; occasionally.
Mr. Howe. Under his instructions?
Gen. W^aller. Oh, of course, in a case of that kind I reported immediately
afterwards what was done.
Mr. Howe. Were you present at most of the negotiations, or were you absent
from a considerable number of the meetings?
Gen. Waller. No; because a great many of these were going on when 1 was
in tlie north.
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TNQuIrY into occupation of HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 619
Mr. Howe. You have not, then, from your own knowledpje, any complete
information as to the negotiations of the treaty?
Gen. Waller, No; I have not — only what I would read over an I hear dis-
cusse:! afterwards; from my own knowletlpe. nothing.
Mr. Howe. I want to ask you now, s*r, about the administration of affairs
by the Americans from the time you got there, and I mean by that the collec-
tion of customs, the administration of Justice under martial law, and any other
functions of government performed by Americans, or in whicli Americans
dire<*tly Intervened. When were tlie customhouses sezed, do you know?
(Jen. Waller. I ilo not remember whetlier it was tlie latter part of August or
the first part of September.
Mr. Howe. Is this, according to your rwollection, correct — that the selzaire of
rlie customhouses went on in the last 10 days of August and on the first one
or two days of September, 1915?
Gen. Waller. Yes, sir; according to the distances of the places.
Mr. Howe. According to the distances of the custom liou.ses from Port nu
r*rince?
(ien. Waller. Yes. It was very difficult to reach scmie of those in tlie south.
If we did not have a cruiser available, we would have to send i>eople overland,
an«l the trails were in wretched condition.
Mr. Howe. I understand that martial law was put Into effet^t on September
3, 1915?
(Jen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. S(» the seizure of the custi»mhouses was practically complete<l by
the time martial law went into effect?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What Americans were the agents of this seizure?
Gen. Waller. The officers of the l*ay Cori)s of the United States Navy.
Mr. Howe. And were they under the orders of some one ofllcer In the l*jiy
Corps?
Gen. Waller. The receiver general.
Mr. Howe. The receiver general was in the Pay ('on>«?
(Sen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And the different customhouses were administered by other pay
officers under him?
<;en. Walijcr. I'nder his instructions, and he received his in.structions fn»m
Admiral C^aperton.
Mr. Howe. What did they do vhen they selzetl the customhouses? What di<l
they collect?
Cien. Waller. They collected the exiM>rt and import customs.
Mr. Howe. All of them?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What did they do with the money they collected?
Gen. Walijsr. That was tume<l in to the Haitian bank, the National Bank
<»f Haiti, the depository of the Haitian (tovernment. You see, there Is no bank-
ing system in Haiti. The bank of Haiti is in Port an Prince.
Mr. Howe. Let us say, then. General that the funds were put in the best avail-
able place for safe-keeping, but I wns more interested to know how the funds
were disbursed or disposed of.
Gen. Waller. They were disbursed in this way. At first the Haitian Gov#Tn-
inent was given a lump sum. and thev were supiiosed to do the disbursing.
Mr. Howe. And over and above the lump sum, was there any money left?
(;en. Waller. There was never any money left.
Mr. Howe. After the lump sum was paid over to the Haitian Government,
was there any money left, any balance?
Gen. Waller. Yes: there was a balance left. That was used for e<hicjiti(mal
purposes, and for the hospital, for the external debt, and for sanitary jmr-
IMises — that Is, keeping the towns absolutely cleaiu
Mr. Howe. What was the lump sum turned over to the Hnitiaii (government
supi)osed to cover?
(Jen. Waller. All the salaries of the Hatian officials, from the President
down. That included his salary and his allowance. His Siilary, as I recollect,
was $25,0(X) gold, and he had 3.000 gourdes for his table.
Mr. Howe. How long did the arrangement last by which the receiver general
turned over a lump sum to the Haitian (Government?
Gen. Walij£h. Four or tixe months, I think.
Mr. Howe. Then was that arrangement changed?
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620 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOltlNGO.
(Jen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe, In wliat respect?
(Jen. Walter. We paid all the bills.
Mr. Howe. Instead t»f handing the money over to the Haitians in a lump
sum?
Gen. Waller. Yes ; we took their pay rolla audited them, and paid the bilk
Mr. Howe. Without the money passing through the hands of the Haitian
Government?
Gen, Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Why was that necessary, if it was necessary?
Gen. Waller. Because we were convinced, as well as the general public was
also convinced, that there had been not a proper administration of affairs by
the Haitian Government.
Mr. Howe. Was there reason to doubt that the money turneil over for sal-
aries did not reach those who were entitled to the salaries in all cases?
Gen. Waller. Very strong reason, because many of the clerks and employees
in the Government offices were simply given a certificate of indebtwhiess <»r
chit for a month's salary, and those would he held back.
Mr. Howe. The payment of those would be held back?
Gen. Waller. The payment of those would be held back, and it came to my
notice that there was a sort of exchange in the different caf68 of the town,
quoting prices for the value of these ch ts according to the month In which
they were issued. These were bought up by the capitalists at anywhere from
30 to 40 cents on the dollar, and then the secretary of state or the treasurer
would decide that such and such months would be paid, and these chits w»mld
be s^it in.
Same of them had been bought up, I think, by the president of the senate;
who was a large investor.
Mr. Howe. In these chits? •
Gen. Waller. Yes. of course ; the secretary of the treasury got something, I
suppose.
Mr. Howe. Did this practice which you have described prevail through th«.e
four or five" months during which the lump sum was paid over?
Gen. Waller. It was not a new practice.
Mr. Howe. But it continued on?
(jien. Waller. Simply continued on.
Mr. Howe. Therefore, in addition to the salaried officers not receiving their
salaries, this condition did not tend to keep political conditions stable; Is that
rtght?
Gen. Waller. That is right
Mr. Howe. It was a disturbing factor?
Gen. Waller. Always. There were many little things In that line, very
little things. I did not consider that a very small item, but, as an illu&tratioo.
the concession to the ice plant, which was a German concession, by the way.
required them to furnish 800 pounds of ice a day to the hospital in Port an
Princa I sent our medical officers into the hospital to take charge of it There
were probably 10 or 12 patients. Some of the sisters of the different orders
were acting as nurses in a way, with no provUion for food and no provision
made for the preservation of such food as they might hava Inquiring into
this, the proprietor of the Ice plant informed me of the fact that this 300 ponnds
of ice that was supposed to be delivered at the hospital was delivered at the
palace and to the administrative officers — to the houses of the secretaries of
state, interior, finance. Justice, etc. I ordered him to stop it, and he said they
would come down on him and put him out of business.
Mr. Howe. Who was this — the ice-plant manager?
Gen. Waller. Yes; I told him I would seize his Ice plant as a military ne-
cessity and administer the thing myself. After that the ice was properly
and promptly delivered to the hospital. That is just one of the illustrations.
Another little incident was in the formation of the gendarmerie. I h«d
aptM»inted Maj. Butler as acting commandant of them until his appointment
con Id be approved here, and he came to me on one occasion and said he would
like to have about 2 pounds of scratch paper; that he had seen some in the
official storehouse, which is under the department of the interior. I told Win
that he could have it, but that, of course, he would have to go through the
usual official channels, but I would write to the secretary of the interior and
ask him if he would not pennit him to take 2 pounds of paper.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCTTPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 621
Mr. Howe. Two pounds of paper?
Gen. Waller. Two pounds of paper for use vvitli the gendarmerie for print-
ing his orders. About a week later the payma.ster, Conard, calle<l uie up aud
said the secretary was in his office at that time, and stated that I had author-
ized him to get $1,000 for stationery. I had forgotten this incident at the
time and told him to put him out. There was not anything else to be done.
Then I recalled th.'s item, and I said. ** That must be what he is talking about*'
I interviewed him again to see if he could explain. He came back again and
s<»id that it was arranged between us that I had agreed that the secretary of
the interior was to purchase all of the supplies for the gendarmerie, «nd he
wanted this $1,000 to begin to purchase staticmery.
Mr. Howe. Who was this you are talking about — the secretary of the
interior?
Gen. Walleb. The secretary of the interior; yes. He was the gentleman
who was put out afterwards.
Mr. Howe. These paymasters were succeeded in their duties by civilians.
Was that after the adoption of the treaty or before?
Gen. Walixr. Yes; that was after the formal adoption of the treaty.
Mr. Howe. And thereafter the so-called treaty officials came in?
Gen. Waller. They came in at that time.
Mr. Howe. And the treaty was formally promulgated after your departure;
was that not so?
Gen. Waller. Yes; I think at that time. There was a great deal of delay
on account of the organization of the gendarmerie. There were different
thingH that came up from time to time.
Mr. Howe. I want to ask you, General, about tBe beginning of martial law
on September 3, 1915. To what extent was martial law imposed at that
time?
Gen. Walleb. The proclamation was issued, and all police had been abol-
ished, all of their military had been abolished, and it was absolutely necessary
that martial law should be employed for the protection of the Government and
for the protection of our own men.
Mr. Howe. And for preserving peace?
Gen. Waller, And for preserving peace.
Mr. Howe. Is it correct to say, and please correct me if it is not, that the
system of martial law at that time took over the administration of criminal
justice but left the administration of civil Justice alone?
Geu. Waller. Left it alone, although we were besieged by the people, re-
, questing us to take Jurisdiction in that also.
Mr. Howe. But it is so that it was an assumption of the administration of
criminal Justice?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. The administration of all criminal matters in the courts but of
no civil matters?
Gen. Waller. No civil matters. There were some instances in the north.
For instance, I have heard much about executicms that took place but I never
knew of one. I never heard of any sentence of execution except one that was
>{iven by the Hatlan court itself, in the north, and when it was brought to my
attention by the officer in that district — the offense was really a minor one —
not a capital offense, and I wrote to the President and told him that it would
be a disgrace if this Judgment of execution was permitted to take place.
Mr. HowB. This was an execution ordered by a Haitian court?
Gen. Waller. By a Haitian court
Mr. Howe. During the time martial law was in existence?
Gen. Waller. When martial law was in existence, but it had not taken cogni-
zance of this thing. It was something like petit theft, petit larceny, or a little
thing like that
Mr. Howe. Was the action of that court then set aside?
Gen. Wali.er. It was set aside by the President
Mr. Howe. By the President of Haiti?
Geu. Waller. By the President of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. But with a few sporadic exceptions like that martial law took
over the administration of the criminal law?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Why was that necessary?
Gen. Waller. It was necessary largely for the protection of our own men
there and for the protection of the Government itself.
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622 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Was there not a systeii/ of criminal courts proviclwl for by the
Haitian law?
(ien. Waller. Yes ; I suppose tliere was.
Mr. Howe. Prior to September 3, 1916, liad tlioae Haitian courts been func-
tioning in the administration of the criminal law?
(Jen. Waller. They had existed, but they were not functioning.
Mr. Howe. To any extent?
(ien. Waller. They were not interfered with by u.s.
Mr. Howe. Were they functioning to a sufficient extent for tlie maintenance
of law and order and of the (iovernment?
Gen. Waller. No.
Mr. Howe. And for the safety of our marines?
(Jen. Waller. Not at all.
Mr. Howe. Was that failure to function demonstrated by actual oi'currences?
Gen. Waller. Every day.
Mr. Howe. The proclamation of martial law to which you have referretl ap-
pears on page 67 of the printed i*ecord of this connnittee, i>art 1. What tri-
bunals administered the martial law?
Gen. Waller. The provost courts.
Mr. Howe. Was there any higher court?
(ien. Waltjsr. Yes; tliere was, but I never found It necesnary to convene the
higher one.
Mr. Howk, What would the higher one have been calle<l ?
(■en. Waller. The military commrlssion.
Mr. Howe. The military commission is provided for by law. but during your
time none was convened? '
Gen. W^ALLER. It was not convened. I had the power to do so, but it would
only be convened in capital cases.
Mr. Howe So the provost courts were sufficient for the purpose?
Gen. Waller. Yes. The action of the provost judge, of c'ourse, had to be
approved by me.
Mr. Howe. In all cases?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Of punishment?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Or of acquittal?
(ien. Waller. Yes. Acquittal goes without saying. It would be approved
by me.
Mr. Howe. In other words, all the cases were submitted to you for action?
Gen. Walls*. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And your approval was necessary to sentence or conviction?
Gen. Waller. Yes ; the execution of the sentencv.
Mr. Howe. Who were the officers or the people who ctinducted the i>rov«»st
courts?
Gen. Walu«:h. In I*ort au I'rince, Col. Williams.
Mr. Howe. I did not mean their names, hut were they marine ofticvrs?
(ien. Waller. Gh, yes.
Mr. Howe. In every case?
(Jen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How many such provost courts were instituteil?
(ien. Waller. One at the headquarters of each district.
Mr. Howk. How niuny districts?
Gen. Waller. Or each post, really.
Mr. lIowE. How many provost courts were there?
Gen. Waller. Roughly, about 20.
Mr. Howe. In your opinion, was the operation of the provost courts Siitlsfac-
tory and effective?
Gen. W^ALiJiR. I am very sure it was very effective, and I have a very strong
opinion of the fact that martial law, humanely administered, is the best form
of government I know for the country.
Mr. Howe. Was it humanely administered in Haiti?
(5en. Waller. Absolutely ; I mean as far as I know.
Mr. Howe. On April 6. 3916, the T^egislature of Haiti, consisting of the Senate
and the Chamber of Deputies, was prorogued, was it not?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. By whose order?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 623
Geo. Waixeb. It was done at the order and upon the strong personal request
of the President
Mr. Howe. But did not the prorogation require some formal, legal order?
Gen. Waxleb. Usually the proclamation of the President of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. The President of Haiti issued the proclamation?
Geo. Waller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you know why the President issued the decree?
G«L Waller. He told me that it was on account of the tremendous opposi-
tioD that he was meeting from members of the legislature in the organization
and formation of the council of state.
Mr. Howe. The council of state was necessary for what purpose?
Gen. Waller. For the adoption of the new constitution.
Mr. Howe. Do you believe that was his real reason?
Gen. Waller. It may have been. There may have been something in it, but
I think the general impression was, and it was my own also at the time, that
he feared impeachment. In fact, he said so on one occasion.
Mr. Howe. Let me ask you this question, sir. Did that desire to prorogue
the legislature originate with the President of Haiti or was it inspired by the
United States,
G«i. Waller. It originated with the Haitian Grovemment, the President and
his secretaries.
Mr. Howe. As far as you know.
Gen. Waller. As far as I know.
Mr. Howe. As far as you know, was the prorogation of this legislature de-
sired by our Government?
Gen. Waller. Only to carry out the request of the President.
Mr. Howe. Of Haiti?
G«i. Waller. Personally, I was bitterly opposed to it.
Mr. Howe. To the prorogation?
Gen. Waller. Absolutely; and I worked over it even after the prorogation
with the greatest efforts to get them together again, but I was always con-
fronted
Mr. Howe. Upon whom did you bend your efforts?
Gen. Walldi. On the Haitian Qovernment
Mr. Howe. The President of Haiti?
Gen. Waller. The President of Haiti and his secretaries, but was bitterly
opposed all the time.
Mr. Howe. By what means was the President's decree carried out?
Gen. Wallbb. By the locking of the door — the gates of the inclosure.
Mr. Howe. Do you recollect who locked the doors and the gates?
Gen. Waller. I do not know, personally, who did it. I gave the order my-
self to MaJ. Butler to carry out and he probably sent some marines to preserve
order, as I have a letter here from the President requesting that it be done.
Mr. Howe. I was asking a slightly narrower question than that, as to who,
if you know, locked the doors and at whose orders?
(^n. Waller. At that time there was h lieutenant by the name of Daumet
who wag connected with the gendarmerie, who was acting as aid to the* Presi-
dent I think that he was the one who did the actual locking.
Mr. HowB. And at whose orders, do you know?
Gen. Waller. MaJ. Butler's, but if he was aid to the President, it would
be the President.
Mr. Howe. At the President's orders?
Gen. Waller. MaJ. Butler also received the notice from the President,
because it came through me.
Mr. Howe. What was that notice from tlie President to MaJ. Butler, through
you?
Gen. Waller. To close the doors of tlie chamber.
Mr. Howe. You, however, did give MaJ. Butler directions to make disposal
<if his forces to see that there was no disorder?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. But do you understand that the actual closing of the gates was
done at the orders of the President of Haiti?
Gen. WALI.ER. I know it was.
Mr. Howb. And the marine forces and such gendarmerie forces as were then
*in existence were disposed around under the orders of MaJ. Butler, to preserve
order?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
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624 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Was there any disorder?
Gen. Walleb. None whatever. The marines were not in the indosare at alL
Mr. Howe, Do you know If at any time any of the forces under MaJ. Butler
used any force against the members of the legislature?
Gen. Walleb. No ; it was not necessary at tliat time.
Mr. Howe. Were marines or gendarmerie employed to keev them out of any
inclosure?
(Jen. Wallbk. The gendarmerie were at the gate, and told them they
could not go in the doors, that is the inenil>ers of the legislature.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether any gendarmes or marines put any memb^s
of the legislature out?
Gen. Waller. I do not think so. I should certainly have heard of it, becatiae
I was in verj' close connection both with members of the Senate and the
deputies at that time.
Mr. Howe. Did the Senate or (Chamber of Deputies attempt to reconvene
elsewhere?
Gren. Walleb. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Many times, or more than once?
Gen. Walleb. Four or five times. They stopped it at my request.
Mr. Howe. Who stopped it at your request?
Gen. Walleb. Both the deputies and the senators.
Mr. Howe. You requested them to stop meeting?
Gen. Walleb. I requested them to stop meeting until the final arrangements
could be made. I was confident we could get over this and reestablish them.
Mr. Howe. I see; your idea was that they should be reconvened or re-
established?
Gen. Walleb. That is what I thought.
Mr. Howe. And you used your influence with them to stop these irregnlar
meetings until some conclusion could be reached along those lines?
Gen. Walleb. Yes.
Mr. HowBw Was there any disorder that you know of incident to these at-
tempted meetings?
Gen. Wali£b. Not at all. The senators would come from their meetings to me,
and the deputies also, and tell what had happened. I had particularly asked
them if they would take up only matters concerning the council of state, for
instance, and they agreed that they would take up nothing, that is the deputies
agreed, and I am sure the senators did. I have a letter here from CamUle
Leon, the speaker of the House, in which he agrees to do this, to the holding
of these meetings, but to take up only certain questions nntil this final arrange-
ment could be made, but Mr. Bomo, the secretary of state for foreign affaire,
was so bitterly opposed to it that finally all measures failed.
Mr. Howe. Did you have anything to do with the preparations for the election
of January, 1916?
Gen. Walleb. I wrote the orders.
Mr. Howe. What orders?
Gen. Walleb. For the conduct of the election.
Mr. Howe. Who called the election ; who decided that there should be an
election?
Gen. Walleb. The Haitian Government — President Dartiguenave.
Mr. Howe. How did you come to be charged with the duty of conducting an
election?
Gen. Waller. Because, in addition to the occupation, I was also in charge
of the gendarmerie, not as a Haitian officer, but all the Instructions had to come
from me.
Mr. Howe. What provisions did you arrange for the conduct of the election?
Gen. Walleb. I have it here.
Mr. Howe. You have what there, sir?
Gen. Walleb. I have this proclamation, or my order.
Mr. Howe. That Is in French, is It not?
Gen. Walleb. In French.
Mr. Howe. That proclamation to which you refer appears here in an ISBoe
of Le Nouvelliste. dated Wednesday, the 15th of November, 1916. Your pw
lamation is dated November 10, 1916, at Port au Prince. I offer this In tte
record, Mr. Chairman, and will furnish a translation for the purpose of printing
in the record.
Senator Oddie. It is so ordered.
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 625
(A translation of the proclamation referred to follows:)
HEADQUABTiatS OF UNITED StATKS
ExpirDmoNABY Forces Operating in Haiti,
Port au Prince, Haiti, November 10, 1916.
Ha\injj been informed that considerable anxiety exists In the minds of the
people regarding the attitude of the occupation (expeditionary forces) In respect
to the elections for the month of January, 1917, the following instructions will
be given to the expeditionary forces and to the gendarmerie serving with them
during the ecistence of martial law :
The firm intention of the Haitian Government and of the occupation is that
the elections shall be free and honest; therefore the rftle of the expeditionary
forces and of the gendarmerie will be —
First. To maintain order, to prevent any obstruction in the voting, and to see
that no one shall be hindered in the exercise of his right to vote by any individual
or by any party.
Second. No gathering of persons shall be permitted at a distance less than
30 feet from the places where the ballots are cast, and no gathering shall be
permitted where It can constitute an obstacle to the free exercise of voting.
Third. A representative of the occupation or of the gendarmerie shall be
present at each place where the voting takes place, in order to insure the full
^cecution of the present instructions. He shall decide all disputes which may
arise at the places where the voting takes place, and shall see to it that the
voting or the emptying of the ballot box shall take place without interruption,
making written note at the same time of formal protests which may be made on
the subject of any disputes.
Fourth. Gendarmes who have the right to vote shall do so as ordinary citi-
zens without arms. They shall vote promptly and return immediately to their
duties.
Fifth. The decree of September 22 having been modified by the instructions
to the commissaries of the Government, each candidate or party will be repre-
sented in the bureau of assessors by one Individual of his own choice nomi-
nated by the judge de palx. It is understood that where there are several can-
didates from the same party, they must agree upon the choice of one person
to represent the party in thfe bureau of assessors.
The officers of the occupation and of the gendarmerie will see to the execu-
tion of this plan, and especially that the nominations shall be made by the
Judge de palx, or by his deputy, as the case may be, before the elections.
Sixth. In order to prevent any fraud in the elections, very special attention
sball be given to the question of the true residence of each voter. No one shall
have the right to vote except in the ward where he resides.
Any individual who shall attempt to vote outside of his ward will be arrested
and brought before the court of the high provost.
Littleton W. T. Waller,
Brigade Commander, United States Marine Corps.
Mr. Howe. In general, what did you aim at, sir, in your provision for this
election?
Gen. Waller. The preservation of order and a fair election.
Mr. Howe. This election took place after your departure, did it not?
Gen. Waller. It took place after my departure, but there was no disturbance.
Mr. Howe. That election was for members of the legislature, was it not?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And your orders contemplated those elections being supervised
by the gendarmerie?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. As far as law and order went?
Gen. Waller. As far as law and order went.
Mr. Howe, Now, your proclamation provides that a representative of the
occupation or of the gendarmerie shall be present at each of the voting places.
What is that distinction there, General?
Gen. Waller. The distinction is due to the fact that it was impossible to
famish a representative or officer of the gendarmerie at every polling place In
the country.
Mr. Howe. And to fill his place when you did not have enough to go
around — ~
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626 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Waller. The occupation.
Mr. Howe. What do you mean by the occupation?
Gen. Waller. I mean an officer of noncommissioned officer of the irnited
States marines. I will have to explain the real reason for some of those para-
graphs, perhaps. In Port nu Prtnce alone It took 25 days to hold an election ;
I moan before the establishment of thes*- rules it r<»ok 2.1 daiys to have an election.
Mr. Howe. In previous elections?
Gen. Waller. Yes; such as they ha<l. I think at Cai)e Haitien it took five
or six days, but the result of It all was that the rival candidates were work-
Ing up their following to such a pitch that before the election actually' took
place there were quite a number of casualties, and always rows and disturb-
ances going on. So I changed the number of polling places* of course, and we
made districts of Port au Prince, In other words, wards, from which residents*
would vote, and a resident In a certain ward would vote in that ward, and no-
where else. That Is accounted for.
The only difficulty we had at any time tluring the election, I understand.
and I have every reason to believe it is true, was from the people in the north,
who came down from the mountains to vote, and insisted on voting for the
marines for deputies. I know that is the attitude they had toward me always-
when I went through the country after tlils trouble wa.s over, because they are
a very lovable people and very happy if they are properly treated, but. of
coarse, they have been under this tremendous misrule for so long that they are
suspicious of everything.
(Whereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)
after recess.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
recess.
Mr. Howe. General, the employment of the law corvee was begun in your
time down there, was it not?
Gen. Wau^r. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And you were In command down there at the time it was begun?
Gen. Waller. It continued during my whole stay.
Mr. Howe. In order to save time, may I repeat my understanding of the law
of corvee to be that before the American occupation there, there was in exist-
ance a Haitian law by which the Inhabitants of a district could be required
to work for a limite<l time In the repair of roads in their district without com-
pensation to themselves?
Gen. Waller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. My further understanding, derived from the testimony of pre-
ceding witnesses. Is that the general use of the wonl " corvee " In common
parlance down there applied to any work on roads, whether it was paid M'ork
or not ; that is correct, is it not, sir?
Gen. Waller. That Is correct.
Mr. Howe. But when you answered my first question, which relateil to the
corvee, you meant, did you not, the work under this old law, work without
compensation?
Gen. Waller. Yes, sir. While we employee! other men, and took them out
of their own districts to work, those were the men who had excelled in the work,
and they were regularly paid and went perfectly willingly. It really was? not
corvee, because they were paid and went willingly.
Mr. Howe. In your opinion, was it necessary to employ this Haitian law?
Gen. WALI.EB. Not only necessary, but greatly desired by the Haitians tliem-
selves.
Mr. Howe. It was for the purpose of building roads?
Gen. Waller. Rebuilding roads.
Mr. Howe. There had been, as the committee has learned from other witne:ftses«
here, quite an elaborate system of roads built under the French?
Gen. Waller. A really very wonderful system of roads.
Mr. Howe. Which had been neglected to the point of almost d:sai)pearinff?
Gen. Waller. Impassable, practically.
Mr. Howe. What was the need for roads down there?
Gen. Waller. Intercommunication with the towns for the market people
themselves, bringing their produce into the markets, and also for the quick move-
ment of troops and gendarmes.
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INQUIRY INTO OCX'UPATION OF HAITI AND SANID DOMINGO. 627
Mr. Howe. Was there immediate need for tlie quick movement of trf>ops and
gendarmes?
Gen. Waujcb. Not at that time, because they were very generally dis-
tributed throughout the island. The gendarmes, after they were thoroughly
organized, were distributed in small detachments through the island, so that they
were not very far apart, and the patrols would meet.
Mr. Howe. How about the supply of those detachments?
Gen. Waller. That was done by pack animals.
Mr. Howm They could be supplied on the existing paths or roads?
Gen. Waller. You could not use a wagon on those roads at that time ; it was
absolutely impossible.
Mr. Howe. How soon after you got there was the corvee revived or employed
by the occupation?
Gen. Waller. I think we began it early in 1916.
Mr. Howe. And as I recollect your earlier testimony, that was a period of
comparative quiet?
Gen. Waller, Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did the employment of that system proceed uninterruptedly
throughout your tour down there?
Gen. Waller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did you hear of its leading to any dissatisfaction ainong the
natives, the peasants?
Gen. Waller. On the contrary, they volunteered in such numbers that I could
not possibly use them. The only difficulty was that it was impossible to furnish
the tools and material, as evidenced, for instance, in the correction of the irriga-
tion system, which had been built by the French in the Cul-de-Sac. one of the
most fertile valleys of Haiti. This system had been neglected, and large land-
holders had deprived the small landholders, the peasant«5, of the use of this
water by leading it off on to their own places, so that probably 8,000 varas of
land were pra<'tlcally a desert and produceil nothing. It became necessary to
do something with these, and the Haitian engineer estimatecl that the cost of
repair would be $60,000 gold. As that alleged engineer was an architect, I was
not prepared to accept his estimate, and I sent out my own engineer for an
estimate, and he came back again and said that the native had told him that
they would furnish 1,000 or 2,000 men, or just as many men as we could fur-
nish tools for, to do this work, and the work was completetl and the land re-
stored at a cost of $800 in material
Mr. Howe. With the aid of that native labor?
<Jeii. Walij!:r, Yes. We could not get the tools tt) employ all. They were i>er-
fectly willing to do it.
Mr. Howe. Did this oversupply of labor for the roads continue during the
time you were there, or did it become difficult later on to obtain the necessary
amount of labor?
Gen. Waller. It continued all the time. I have seen hundre<ls of men apply-
ing for that species of work.
Mr. Howe. Applying for it?
Gen. Waller. Applying for It at the public works' office, that Is my public
works office.
Mr. Howe. That is uncompensated?
Gen. Waller. Yes; uncompensated. You know, that sounds a little peculiar
and I would like to tell you.
Mr. Howe. I would like to hear your explanation of that.
Gen. Waller. Frequently, with the Haitian prisoners who were working on
the streets, a guard would take out 15 or 20 of them, and it seldom happened
that he would turn in less than 18 or 22. They would simply fall in and go
back.
Mr. Howe. Why?
Gen. Waller. Well, they got something to eat and they could not get it out-
side.
Mr. Howe. In the employment, what Is the connection between that and the
corvee on the roads, and your supply of labor on the roads?
Gen. Waller. The willingness of these people to do the work.
Mr. Howe. Did you supply them with food while they were working on the
cortee?
Gen. Waller. Not those that were paid.
Mr. Howe. Did you have an oversupply of volunteers for tlie unpaid corvee?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
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628 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. And what was the inducement to them to do their work for
nothing?
Gen. Waller. The Improvement of tlie road itself, for the communication.
Mr. Howe. The unpaid corvee worker — did you give him his subsistence?
Gen. Wallee. No ; we did not. Under their law It Is not required at all. You
know, they subsist largely on mangoes, bananas, and that sort of thing, which
are plentiful everywhere ; also sugar cane, a little rice, and occasionally it was
lish and very small portions of meat. They eat very little meat.
Mr. Howe. While at work on the roads were the corvee gangs contented, or
otherwise?
Gen. Waller. If you could judge by the singing, I should say they were thor-
oughly contented.
Mr. Howe. Were attempts made to escape from the work of the corvee in
any large numbers?
Gen. Waller. Nobody escaped. I never heard of an Instance of anyone
escaping.
Mr. Howe. Or trying to get away?
Gen. Waller. No.
Mr. Howe. Do you know of any negotiations or discussion al30Ut the new
constitution of Haiti?
Gen. Waller. Yes; I had a great deal to do with that — a number of the
articles.
Mr. Howe. With whom did you consult?
Gen. Waller. With President Dartiguenave and members of the cabinet^
with the senators and deputies, and also with what they called the advocates,
who correspond to our bar association.
Mr. Howe. Did you have any conferences with other American officials ou
the subject?
Gen. Waller. Only from time to time, when, sometimes the Admiral would
come and I would talk matters over with him ; but during the time this con-
stitutional change was taking place he was in Santo £>omlngo, and, while I
was also ordered to command the troops In Santo Domingo, as well as Haiti*
the department informed me that my presence was required in Haiti, so 1
could not go to Santo Domingo.
Mr. How^E. Were there any particular difficulties encountered in your con-
sideration of this proposed constitution with President Dartiguenave?
Gen. Waller. I do not recall any, except the question of the right of foreign-
ers to acquire property, and there we had considerable difficulty. They were
willing to put in this article, but I objected to the phraseology very seriously
for the simple reason that It threw everything Into the hands of the Germans
and cut out all of the other nations.
Mr. Howe. How would that have been brought about by the language of
the article?
Gen: Waller. Because the article tliey wished to adopt permitted the ac-
quisition of real property after a residence of five years. W^hat I wished to put
In, and what w'as finally put in, was after a residence of five years after the
enactment of this article.
Mr. Howe. Did you have any instructions from the United States Govern-
ment as to what it wanted in the constitution?
Gen. Waller. A general outline, and communications w^ere held also with
the Haitian Government, through their minister here In Washington, and
through our minister.
Mr. Howe. Through what channels did you get this outline of which you
speak?
Gen. Waller. From the State Department, through the Nav>' Department,
and also through the minister. Sometimes a dispatch w^ould come which would
tell me to confer with him on the subject
Mr. Howe. Did you take up these discussions of tlie new constitution inde-
pendently of our diplomatic representative?
Gen. Waller. We were all together.
Mr. Howe. In what capacity, Cteneral, were you In those discussions?
Gen. Waller. I was in the capacity of commander of the occupation — that is,
the expeditionary forces. It was rather difficult to say exactly what the
minister's position was.
Mr. Howe. You spoke about this one clause In the constitution, as originally
drafted, being advantageous to the Germans?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 629
Mr. Howe. Was that because there were more Germans of long residence
th^re?
Oen. Wallek. That, and the fact that under the Haitian laws the Haitian
woman has control of her own estate, and the Germans married the Haitians.
Mr. Howe. Rather more than nationals from other countries?
Gen. Waller. I do not know of any others at all.
Mr. Howe. Except Germans?
Gen. Walleb. I say I do not. I do know of one Amerk*an; but that is the
only instance I know of.
Mr. Howe. Are we to understand, then, that there were more Germans there
who had had a long residence?
Gen. Waller. They have had a long residence, and, under that clause, they
would have had a very great advantage over any other nation.
Mr. Howe. Had you any reason to suppose that that clause in that form was
Insphred by Germans?
Gen. Waller. I think that everything that was against us was inspired by
them ; I mean as far as the treaty and as far as the constitution was concerned.
Mr. Howe. What, if any, efforts were made to improve sanitary conditions
under the occupation?
Gen. Waller. We originally started in with a house-to-house ln^)ectlon to
clean up each town. Port au Prince, I think, took about two months to clean
up. We built incinerators In many parts of the town, and we compelled them
to bring their refuse to these incinerators and bum It ; and I must say that after
they saw the operation, they did so very, very willingly.
Mr. Howe. Elsewhere were there operations?
Gen. Waller. EUsewhere the same thing.
Mr. Howe. How about out In the country. In the smaller towns?
Gen. Waller. In the smaller towns, when the gendarmes were located In them
they were required to do the same thing.
Bfr. Howe. But that was later on when the gendarmes got In there?
Gen. Waller. Yes; after we had the forces distributed. After we had the
i^ndarmes organized and had them large enough, we distributed them through-
out the smaller towns.
Mr. Howe. Did the natives take kindly to this operation on the part of the
occupation to make the conditions more sanitary?
Gen. Waller. Wonderfully well, I thought
Mr. Howe. Did any friction develop out of these sanitary regulations?
Gen. Waller. None whatever. In one case we built a rest house so that the
women who were coming In from the interior would have a place to rest at
night, at the end of the day*s march, you know, when their animals, If they
had any, were cared for. There was a guard put there to protect these people,
and I do not know when I have ever seen as much gratitude shown as was
shown by these people.
Mr. Howe. Would you regard that as a sanitary measure?
Gen. Waller. Absolutely.
Mr. Howe. A rest house for the market women?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What was the condition of the prisons at the time of the occupa-
tion and what, if any, efforts were made to improve the conditions?
Gen. Waller. When we first got there, of course, they had not yet removed
the bodies from the prison where they had a massacre of 150 people in their
cells. They put them In one large room and tired on them until they was no
more movement at all, and about l.')0 of them were killed. It became necessary
to practically rebuild this prison, reventllate It, put In water and other sanitary
measures, establish the kitchen, because before they had to get their food In any
way they could, and of course we fed them.
Mr. Howe. Did feeding the prisoners represent a change In prison manage-
ment?
Gen. Waller. Very much. That was one of the reasons why so many volun-
teered to be prisoners, you know, when the workmen were being brought In
from the street.
Mr. Howe. What I was trying to find out was did the Haitians before the
occupation feed their prisoners?
Gen. Waller. No. They allowed their families to feed them, but gave them
nothing themselves.
Mr. Howe. In general, what was the condition of the prisons outside of Port
au Prince, if you know?
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630 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO:
Gen. Waller. It was very much the name i\» th> others, except they were
about as sanitary as the old-fashioned pigsty.
Mr. HOWE. Was that sanitary condit!<in In the prisons reniedie<l to any extent
under the occupation?
Gen. Waller. The prisons were made models.
Mr. Howe. What about the prison reconls, I mean as to the length of thiie
the i)eople would remain in prison, and the reciirdw of prisoners on hand under
the Haitians?
Gen. Waijjsr. They were kept in each prison.
Mr. Howe. Under the Haitians, I mean.
Gen. Waller. I do not think there was any. I never heard of it.
Mr. Howe. Were such re<ords institute*! under the occupation?
Gen. Waller. Yes; very complete records, and the same was true about the
hospitaLs.
Mr. Howe. There was an improvement in the hospitals, was there. umh*r tlie
Americans?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Or attempt to improve them?
Gen. Waller. We took over the hospitals, for instance, at Port au Priuce.
I think there were 20 or 30 people In there. When I left there must have
been two or three hundred who were coming there for treatment every daj*,
surgical operations, etc. They were carried on by American doctors.
Mr. Howe. What funds were made available for the hospitals?
Gen. Waller. Haitian funds for the Haitian hospital. Of course, our own
hospitals were financed out of our own funds from the Navy appropriations.
Mr. Howe. Were native Haitians treatetl in the Na\*y hospitals supported by
United States funds?
Gen. Waller. That was not allowe<l, except In an emergency case. If an
accident hapi)ene<l and a man was brought in, near a hospital, he would re-
ceive first ahl there, and be transfMirted by ambulance down to the native
hospital.
Air. Howe. Did the Navy [personnel do anything in the wa>' of care of the
sick of the natives?
Gen. Waller. In the native hospitals?
Mr. Howe. In the native hospltal.s.
(ien. Waller. Yes : they had hospital apprentices, stewaixls, and all of the
medical officers. There was an American medical officer In charge of the
hospital, of course: the native doc-tor practl^ed there also.
Mr. Howe. Did the gendarmerie have anything to do with the care of the
sick, or hospital assistance, or anything of that sort?
Gen. Waller. Only In bringing them in. They had nothing to do with it
outside, except In the country, where they ' liad a meillcal officer attached.
Then they looked out for them.
Mr. Howe. The gendarmerie did?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Howe. I.K)okeil out for the sick Haitians?
Gen. Waller. Yes. We had a great deal of difficulty at first in getting them
Into the hospitals. The voodoo practice had been very general, and, of course,
they told these i)eople that our idea was to get them in there and torture
them, and do all sorts of things, so that even in the case of those we picked
up wounde<l, those that they could not hide away from us, they resisted going
to the hospitals, but we had a great <leal more trouble getting them out of the
hospitals afterwards.
Mr. HowTc. Did the practice of vowloo have any Infiuence on the course of
events down there during the occupation, or was It a thing to be reckoned
with?
Gen. Waller. Yes ; it had a wonderful effect over the peasants and the lower
class of the people, and had some over the higher classes. It is against the
Haitian law» this practice, but they never enforced the law. We did, and we
broke up all their meetings, seised all of their drums, etc., and wherever a
voodoo dnim was heard we Immediately got on the trail and captured It, and
broke it up, as ftir as we could.
Mr. Howe. What was the voodoo drum used for, in connection with what?
Gen. Waller. In calling them to these meetings, In the first place, and also
In the dances that they had. They use<l three or four or five drums. Some
of the drums were 5 feet high, and as big around. It is a wooden log, hollowed
out, with a cowhide over the top.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 631
Mr. Howe. What Is voodoo?
(ten. Waller. It is ver>' difficult to say exactly what It is. It comes really
from the West Coast of Africa originally.
Mr. Howe. Of what does it consist?
Gen. Waixbb. There it consists in the belief that human sacrifice was a
core for all evils, but I do not think that human sacrifice had been resorted
to in Haiti for some years, but they do sacrifice the goat and sheep, and they
do it in a very cruel way.
lir. Hows. In general, with respect to the material side of lif^ down there,
what was the effort of the American occupation?
Gen. Walleb. Uplifting in every direction. That was our attitude toward
than.
Mr. HowB. That was your aim?
Gen« Waixkb. Absolutely so. I am sorry that I have not a copy of an ad-
dress that was made to them there when I came away to show you exactly
what the attitude we had toward them was. Home influence in Haiti is un-
known. Adopting the same mode of expression that the French did, they
refer to the communities as the families, and as long as there is peace in the
families there is peace in the communities, but I am sorry to say that the
majority of the men down there, even the educated men, paid comparatively
little attenticm to the family.
Mr. Anokll. Did I understand you correctly this morning, General, to say
that Bobo had been made president by the Cacos?
Gen. Walleb. They called him president
Mr. Angell. That was simply their declaration of an entirely informal elec-
tion or n<Mnination?
Gen. Walleb. It had been the usual form they adopted.
Mr. Anqell. You did not mean that remark to be understood that there had
been a formal election under the Haitian constitution of Qobo as President?
Gen. Walleb. No.
Mr. Anobll. You spoke of the conditions when you arrived and first landed
in Port an Prince in August, 1915, as being those of threatening disturbances.
Apart from battle casualties during these disturbances were there ever any
Americans or foreigners killed or molested, to your knowledge?
Gen. Walleb. No ; only Haitians.
Mr. A190ELL. At the very beginning of your testimony, when you were giving
the dates of your tour in Haiti, you spoke of coming back to the United States
in December, 1916, and having had a conference with the State Department?
Gen. Walleb. Yes.
Mr. A19GELL. Can you tell us briefiy what those conferences^ were and what
r^KHrts, if any you made, and what ofllcials you saw?
Gen. Waixeb. The official was the one who is in charge of the Latin Ameri-
can Bureau.
MaJ. MoOlellan. Sumnw Wells?
Gen. Walleb. No; Wright. He is now the secretary of the embassy In
London.
Mr. Howe. Butler Wright?
Gen. Walleb. Yes; Butler Wright He had charge of that department of
Uie State Department, but the consultation was largely at that time in con-
nection with the organization of the gendarmerie.
Mr. Anqell. Did you consult with Mr. Lansing?
Gen. Walleb. No ; only through Wright
Mr. Anqelu With President Wilson?
Gen. Walleb. No.
Mr. Anobll. Did you discuss the affairs of Haiti with Mr. Daniels?
Gen. Walleb. Yes; to some extent. I do not recall what, though, because
be had really no Jurisdiction over those affairs, over the State Department
afbdrs, but I had been ordered up here by the Navy Department for this con-
sultation with the State Department
Mr. Angell. And the consultation was chiefly regarding the gendarmerie
organisation?
Gen. Walleb. They were regarding the gendarmerie, yes.
Mr. Angell. Ck>m^ now to the operations in the fall of 1915 against the
Gacos, the campaign which was conducted, do you know whether Admiral
Oaperton received, on or about the 20th of November, 1915, an order or message
from the Secretary of the Navy informing him that the Navy Department
was strongly impressed with the number of Haitians killed, and felt that a
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632 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
severe lesson had been taught the Cacos, and believed that a proper control
could be maintained to preserve order and protect innocent persons without
further offensive operations, this appearing on page 78 of the printed record?
Gen. WALLEa. Did I know of that message?
Mr. Anokll. Yes, sir.
Gen. Walleb. Yes ; my own radio piclced that up.
Mr. Angell. Was that message then communicated to you by Admiral
Caper ton?
Gen. Waller. Yes ; but I piclied it up before he did.
Mr. Angell. It was communicated to you, however, officially by Admiral
Caperton?
Gen. Waller. Yes ; but we appealed from that because the campaign had not
been completed. I wanted to finish it successfully and capture another town
which I stated could be done, I thought without firing a shot, but the answer
was that I was to cease all hostile operations. The town, however, surren-
dered. The commanding general met me outside, and he surrendered without
firing a shot, but the message I remember very, ver>' distinctly, for the simple
reason that we soldiers who have taught and trained our men as we have, and
lived with them and go through all the hardships that they do, resent very
much, indeed, the fact that it Is always the enemy*s casualties that are spoken
of and pitied and not those to our own people.
Mr. Angell. What had been the casualties of our own personnel down to that
time, do you remember?
Gen. Waller. Approximately, about 45, I think.
Mr. Angell. Of those how many were killed?
Gen. Waller. I do not recall exactly ; probably 10 or 12 killed, and some dieii
afterwards. Others would have died but for our medical care.
Mr. Angell. You said that Bobo was opposed to the Dartiguenave Govern-
ment. Did he ever make a statement to you why he was opposed to the Dar-
tiguenave Government?
Gen. Waller. He never made a statement. I think everybody knew that be
wanted to be President. Zamor would have been the same way.
Mr. Angell. What was Bobo*s attitude toward the presence of the United
States forces in Haiti, If you know?
Gen. Waller. When he was at Port au Prince at the meeting of the Senate—
I think when he was elected — I was not there, but after my arrival I saw
him on one or two occasions and he was very much depressed, but he was pe^
fectly free to go and come wherever he chose.
Mr. Angell. You say when he was elected?
Gen. Waller. When Dartiguenave was elected.
Mr. Angell. Did Bobo ever express to you opposition to the presence of the
United States forces in Haiti?
Gen. Waller. No.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether he was publically or personally opposed
to our presence there?
Gen. Waller. Only from the attitude of these people in the north.
Mr. Angell. Would that lead you to believe that he was opposed?
<;en. Wallkr. Yes; he was com nniBica ting with them. After he left Haiti li^
went to .Tanmica, and from Jamaica t<) Cuba. 1 was coinnmnlcated with frtmi
Cuba concerning him.
Gen. Angell. Is he still alive; do you know?
Gen. Waller. I do not know. He probably is. He was a comparatively
young man.
Mr. Angell. Referring again to the campaign which was conducted in the
fall of 1915 against the Cacos, did you regard the opt)osition of these Cacos
to be one against the Haitian Government or against the American occupation?
Gen. Waller. Their own statements were that it was against both tlie
Haitian Government and the occupation.
Mr. Angell. Speaking practically, were our troops down there engaged in
warfare against these Cacos during this period?
Gen. Waller. It dei>ends on what you call warfare. Actual war had not
been declared. We were operating under the agreement. Naturally, when you
get intx) an engagement of that kind both sides think there is war going on.
although it is not formally declared.
Mr. Angell. Did you receive, on or about the end of March or «arly in April
1916. a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, which api>ears as paragraph 144
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 633
of the Barnett report, attached as an exhibit to the report of the Secretary
of the Navy for 1920, one paragraph of which. No. 2, reads a» follows :
" Col. Waller, during? the oi>eratlons of Octiober and November in north Haiti,
with the expeditionary force of marines and seamen from the squadron, effec-
tively crushed all armed resistance to the American occupation and the Haitian
Government, and has maintained peace and order in all parts of the country/'
Gen. Walleb. I did not receive this, but I did receive a letter from the
Secretary of the Navy of commendation and congratulation. This is a letter
that was addressed by Gen. Barnett to the Secretary. The letter the Secretary
senl me was very much shorter, the letter of comm^idation and congratula-
tion was very much shorter, and I think you have the speech of the President,
giving me the thanks of the Haitian Government.
Mr. Angell. There are one or two points I want to ask you about in con-
nection with these campaign orders which have been presented to the committee
to-day. I note in paragraph 1 of your letter of October 29, 1915, to Col. Cole,
constituting the formal campaign order, I take it, the Cacos are referred to as
rebels, the language reading :
** The following disposition of troops is directed preparatory to the nit)V€^
ment against rebels in the vicinity oX Fort Capois, and the forces indicated
must be In the positions Indicated at the time si^ecifled below : "
You regarded the Cacoa as rebels, both against the Haitian Government and
against the American occupation?
Gen. Walleb. They were so designated by the President in conmunii cat ions
with me. He spoke of them as the rebels.
Mr. Anoell. President Dartiguenave?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mif. Anoell. The purpose of my question was tn find out whether or not you
regarded the Cacos as rebels both against the Haitian Government and the
American occupation?
Gen. Waller. I regardeil them as violating the agreement of the Caco gen-
erals, and regarded them more or less as bandits, and I stated they would he
treated as such.
Mr. Angell. Did you or did you not regard them as rebels both against the
Haitian Government and against the American occupation?
Gen. Waixer. They were absolutely opposed to the American occupation
forces. Those forces were what the Dartiguenavi^ jrnvernuient was u.sing.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember the letter of instructions for the campaign
against the Cacos, which seems to l)e attached tjo these so-called (campaign
orders? Was that dnuvn up by you, or under your direction?
Gen. Waller. Under my direction; written by my adjutant general.
Mr. Angell. And formetl a part of the Instructions and orders which went
out at that time?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. On page 2 of this letter of instructicms. as so headed, un<ler the
paragraph " Sanitary arrangements," I find this language :
** 1. Medical Corps will be prepared to care for wounded on firing line, at all
bases, and thansport them via Grande Riviere or Caracol routes to the U. S. S.
Connecticut. Stretchers will be prepared and will be carrie<l by natives, who
will be impressed if ixwsible to hire."
What was the intention of giving such an order? Was it, as the language
seems to imply, that they were to be compelled to carry stretchers if they would'
not voluntarily agree to do so?
Gen. Waller. They certainly were. T would give them an opportunity to do so
willingly, but when we were there to prote<-t them I was going to make them
do something to aiil themselves.
Mr. Angell. Do you know, General, whether or not it was ne<'e.*!sary to im
press the natives as stretcher bearers?
Gen. Waller. No; we had a number of volunteers when the occasion nn»so.
We never at any time had to use stretcher bearers to carry the wounded back.
In the operations in the mountains the woundeil men were carried on horseback
or by their own people.
Mr. Angell. Referring now to the treaty negotiations, the negotiations which
preceded the signature to the treaty on September 30, 1915, you said this
morning, if I understood you cerrectly, that there was a verbal agreement prior
to the signature of the treaty for the taking over of the customs?
Gen. Waller. Yes, sir.
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634 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angell. Do you know who made such an agreement, and when and
where?
Gen. Walleb. President Dartlguenave and the minister and Admtral Caperton.
Mr. Angell. The American minister?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. President Dartiguenave agreed to the taking over of the customs?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. That was after his election as President?
Gen. Waller. Oh, yes.
Mr. Angell. Were you present at the meeting when that was agreed on, or
was it just a meeting between the admiral, the minister, and the President?
Gen. Waller. I do not know that I was present at the original meeting, bui
I was present one time when it was clearly understood, at any rate.
Mr. Angell. And the President consented?
Gen. Waller. Yes. He subsequently wrote a communication to others that
it was a dreadful thing for us to do.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember his proclamation, as published at Port an
Prince, in the early days of September, 1915, protesting specifically against
the taking over of the customs at Port nu Prince?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. That was published, was it not?
Gen. Waller. That was published ; yes. We also knew what his agreement
was at that time. You will find the same attitude, as far as martial law was
concerned.
Mr. Angell. I am glad you mentioned that point. General. Admiral Oaperton,
on the stand, testified that President Dartiguenave had either requested or con-
sented in advance to the declaration of martial law. He said he. Admiral
Caperton, was unable to remember the circumstances under which that request
or consent was given. Do you remember those circumstances?
Gen. Waller. Very distinctly, because the request was most urgent
Mr. Angell. Was It made to you, or. If not. to whom?
Gen. Waller. It was made in my presence; It was made to the admiral
Admiral Caperton did not wish to proclaim martial law.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember when It was made?
(Jen. Waller. When this request was made?
Mr. Angell. Yes.
Gen. Waller. At different times, from 10 days to 2 weeks before the procla-
mation was actually issued.
Mr. Angell. In the President's palace, or where?
Gen. Waller. In the palace ; that is the one he was occupying at that time,
the temporary palace.
Mr. Angkll. Was it held that the customs constituted the chief or practi-
cally the exclusive source of national funds?
Gen. Waller. Yes. They have very little internal taxation ; it Is almost all
from the export and import duties.
Mr. Angell. Did the great proportion of the internal taxes go to the local
communes?
Gen. Waller. They were supposed to go there.
Mr. Angell. It did not come to the National Government?
Gen. Waller. No ; It was not paid at any time to our representative.
Mr. Angell. Is it a fair statement to say, for example, that over 90 per cent
of the national revenues came from the customs receipts?
Gen. Waller. I do not know exactly. I have no means of reckoning what
their receipts were for licenses, and things of that sort, merchants' licensBB,
and other little taxes of that kind, but there was no tax on real estate. Their
charges for water and that sort of thing were practically nil, and very few of
the aristocrats paid any bills at all we found when we took over the water.
Mr. Angell. Is it substantially true, however, that the great proportion of
the national funds came frcHn the customs?
Gen. Waixer. Yes.
Mr. Angkll. Did you say, In your testimony this morning, General, that there
was no compulsion on the Dartiguenave Government to Induce the signing of
the trea^ which was signed in September, and subsequently ratified in October
and November by the two chambers?
Gen. Waixer. I never heard of any. I never dreamed there was any nicb
thing going on. I knew the trouble we were having in different discussions.
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Mr. Anoidx. Would you uot regard the seizure of the customs tnndn aud the
withholding of the funds derived from the customs as compulsion exercised on
the (jrovemment?
Gen. WAIXI9* Why should it he? We were paying the regular salaries they
fot right along, /
Mr. Anokll. Did we pay them at first salaries?
Qen. Wallbb. We paid them afterwards. We found out some of the salaries
were not being paid.
Bir. Angeux Ajad we paid the salaries until after the treaty was ratified?
Gen. Waller. Oh, yes. That is the salaries of .the Haitian officials. There
was no salary paid to the legislative branch, after their prorogation.
Mr. AvQXLL, At this point, may it please the chairman, I want to offer specifi-
cally in evidence certain messages appearing in this compilation, which have
not yet been referred to at any point specifically in the testimony.
S^tor Oddie. Is that in the record at all?
Mr. Anoexl. I have never been able to find out whether this whole compila-
tion is per se and verbatim In the record. I should imagine not, because it
includes, for example, practically all the Barnett report, and a good deal of
other matter which would probably not be necessary to print, to the extent
of 260 long typewritten pages. I think it has been the practice hitherto to
offer specifically certain parts of this, or various messages. In fact. Senator
McCormick himself on one or two occasions read into the record various
messages out of this compilation. I want at this time also to have in evidence,
specifically as bearing upon the testimony we are Just having regarding the
negotiation of the treaty and the ratification of it. certain message.! appearln? in
this compilation.
Senator Oodie. Well, there will be no objection to that.
Mr. Angell. Specifically, then, I wish to offer in evidence the message
appearing on page 47 of this compilation, from Admiral Caperton to the
Secretary of the Navy, on September 14, where he says, that in order to assure
prompt ratification, the Haitian Gk)vemment desires immediate assurances in
such shape as to be effective for use in Chamber of Deputies to the effect that
the United States will exercise its good offices to obtain a temporary loan of
$1,500,000 from the Haitian Government to cover expenses, and goes on to ask
authorization for that.
(The message referred to is here printed In full, as follows : )
"In conversation held between ministers foreign affairs and finance on one
hand and American charge d'affaires and Paymaster Charles Gonard, my
representative, on the other hand; It was agreed that the treaty, now being
translated into French, would be signed and ratified and modus vivendi entered
into.
"In order to assure prompt ratification Haitian Government desires Im-
mediate assurances In such shape as to be effective for use in Chamber of
Deputies to the effect that the United States will exercise its good offices to
obtain a temporary loan of $1,500,000 for the Haitian Government to cover
expenses, first, for approximately three months, pending settlement of details
of receivership, and, second, back salaries and unpaid expenses. Of this
sum $500,000 Is estimated as necessary for covering first head and $1,000,000
for second.
"In connection with amount last mentioned the Haitian Government will
agree to refrain from emitting paper to value of 5,000,000 gourdes, not
authorized, of which 500,000 gourdes are said to be now in transit.
" In view of the fact that the collection of practically all the revenues after
deduction made by me In accordance Navy Department radiogram 20018,
August, will for some time yet not be sufficient to meet current expenses of the
Haitian Government, especially as funds should remain In national bank to
move coffee crops, and as the Haitian Government has at present Insufficient
funds available to meet these expenses; I recommend that the assurances be
given as above requested.
"Opinion was expressed by United States representative to effect that
bonded Indebtedness will be consolidated Into one loan Including temporary
loan referred to above and back unpaid interest on public debt. Confirmation
of this Is requested. 28414.
" Caperton."
Mr. Angell. I wish to offer in evidence also that message of Admiral.
Oapoton on the following day, September 15, to the Secretary of the Navy,
where he Informed the Secretary that If definite assurances c^ ^4^ given
636 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMIKGO.
Haitian Government, that work on national railroad win commence Immediately
after ratification of treaty., such assurances will aid materially In secnring ratifi-
cation.
I wish to offer also specifically certain messages appearing on pages 53 and
r>4 of this compilation, particularly one from Admiral Oaperton to the Secretary
of the Navy, of October 3, in which he refers to a message from tbe charge
(l*ufFaire8, saying. " I approve request and consider Haitian Government should
have immediate financial assistance.'*
(The message referred to is here printed in fall, as follows:)
*• Omrg^ consulted witli me before sending his telegram of t(Mlay, and in
view of ali the facts as they Hpi>ear here I approve request and consider Haitian
Ooveniment whould have inmieciiate financial assistance. Will report more
fully to-morr<»w and submit estimates of receipts and expenditures. 213US.
Mr. Anokll. I also wlsli to ofl'er u long message on pages 53 and 54, from
Davis, tlie charge d*affalrs, presumably tlirough Admiral Caperton. t»> tiR
Navy Uepartraent.
Gen. Walijcr. That, I think, went direct to the State Department.
Mr. Anoell. Was It customary to radio up direct to the State Depart niCDt?
(Jen. Walijcr. They sometimes sent a radio in the State Department cxMle.
Mr. Angell. Without reading all of this, I simply wish to call the attenti^iu
of the conmiittee here to cHie or two paragraphs in the message, where It says
he told the President, tJiat, as before stated, funds would be immediately avail-
able ui)on ratification of the treaty.
** The President seeme^l utterly discourage<] and pointed out once more that
the delay was not <lue to any lack of effort by himself or his c'abinet, tlwt
withhohling of funds only gave another weapon to the opposition and tlmt if
the rnite<l States (iovernment iiersists on withholding all funds, ratification
becomes m difficult that he and his cabinet will resign rather than attempt the
fight in the Senate under this handicap."
Also a further paragraph, in which Mr. Davis says:
*' It is most imiM)rtant that the present administration remain in |K)wer, as ft
is not believed that one more favorable to the United States ccmld he obtained,
and in view of all the facts as they api)ear here that a udlltarj- go>'ernnient
would probably have to be established should this (■overument fall.'*
(The message referrwl to is here printed in full, as foU»ws:)
"Confidential, urgent. October 3, 5 p. m. This morning at 10 and before re-
ceipt of your October 2. /> p. m., I had an interview with the President per-
sonally at his request. He stated that he had asked for this Interview in onler
to ascertain what steps he could take under existing conditions, that the
Haitien Government following its plan to pay back salaries and thereby
strengthen its position before the people and relieve suffering, now finds itself
entirely without funds, and inquired as to the disposition of the Uniteil
States (Government to assist them in this financial crisis. I told him that I
expected nistructions as to the matter and would advise him on receipt thereof.
•*After receiving your October 2, 5 p. m., I told the President that as before
stated funds would be immediately available upon ratification of the treat.v.
The President seemed utterly discouraged and pointed out once more that the
delay was not due to any lack of effort by himself or his cabinet, thait with-
holding of funds only gave another weapon to the opposition, and that if the
United States Government persists on withholding all funds ratification be-
comes wt difiicult that he and his cabinet will resign rather than att^npt the
fight in the Senate under this handicap.
" I fear that I have faile<l in my previous reiwrts to make perfectly under-
stood the existing situation, which is as follows : The vote on ratification by the
deputies will take place probably to-morrow, the committee having unani-
mously re<'ommended ratification. Under the mode of procedure after ratiUca-
tion by congressmen the treaty goes before the Senate and there it is referral
to a senate committee who, after considering, submit a report which is then
printe<l and distributed and three days allowed for consideration before dis-
cussing on the fioor of the Senate begins. Therefore ratification can not be
exi)ected before the latter part of next week.
" The President and cabinet are using every i)ossible effort to secure ratlfion-
tion and seem confident of securing the same if not embarrassed financially.
The Haitan Government realizes that such ratification is absolutely necessary
for the welfare of Haiti. Opposition in the Senate is strong, due to the fact
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 637
that many senators ar«* iins<Tnpuloiis politicians or fanatics and wish either
to embarrass tlie Uniteil States by nouratiticat on or to overtlirow tlie present
administration, hoping to secure possible personal gain thereby. Pressure Is
also being brouglit to bear by outside interests which desire a continuance of
past cond'tions for reasons of financial gain and which will l>e glad to see the
present administration, whicfi is already reorganized and supporte 1 by the
United States, forced to resign.
'* It is most important that the present administration remain in power, as
it is not believed that one more favorable to the United States could be ob-
tained, and in view of all the facts as they appear here that a military govern-
ment would probably have to be established should this government fall.
** Inasmuch as it is necessary to secure a treaty ratified before any definite
financial plan can be formulatetl or permanent peace and prosperity as8ure<l
in Halt*, it would seem advisable to support and maintain the present admin-
istration, which will fail unless the slight financial assistance which they have
requested Is immediately available, and further the progress made during the
last two months w!ll be lost. Although funds i*ollecte<l from customs have
been expended for the first three puriK)8e8 nameil In the department's In.struc-
tlons as to use of money collected, not one cent has been turned over to the
Haitian Government for living expenses, which expenses have been met by use
of gourdes then on hand and not expended. In view of the importance and the
extreme urgency of the case, it is recommended that Admiral Caperton be
instructed to turn over needed sums out of customs receipts not necessary for
the customs service, constabulary, and public works. Request earliest possible
decision and reply.
** Davis.
*• October 3, 1915."
Mr. Anoell. I also wish to offer a message on page 55 from Admiral Caper-
ton to the Secretary of the Navy, of which the last paragraph reads :
** In view of present financial crisis of Dartlguenave government, the lo.ss of
prestige of United States should that government fall, the Inevitably detrimental
effect upon the treaty the fa lure of that government will have, I reiterate my
concurrence In the recommendation of the American charge d'affaires that I
be allowed to turn over to the Dartlguenave government such funds from the
customs receipts on hand and unobligated as I may consider necessary for Its
support.*'
(The message referreii to is here printed In full, as follows:)
** 14002 and 20018, August. Total customs receipts Haiti to September 30.
$170,000. Total expend tures $31,500. under following heads: Constabulary,
$1,500; public works, $9,000; customhouse expenditures, $5,000; military and
civil government, $16,000. which covers expenditures made necessary by mili-
tary and puWlc policies In portu occupied by Unted States, such cost of electric
lighting, expenses of provost martial, prisons, and hospitals. No funds have
been given to Dartlguenave government.
*' Estimate for October under heads ** Constabular>'," ** Public works." " Cus-
tomhouse expenses," ** Military and civil government," amounts to $62,000. In-
crease due to added expense of constabulary now being lntro<luced as rapidly
as possible and to all ports being occupied for entire month. Unobligated
balance of customs funds, $76,000.
" In view of present financial crisis of Dartlguenave government, the loss of
prestige of United States .should that government fall, the inevitably detrimental
effect uiK)n the treaty the failure of that government will have, I reiterate my
concurrence in the recommendation of the American charg<^ d'affaires that I
be allowed to turn over to the Dartlguenave government such funds from the
customs receipts cm hand and unobligatetl as I may ccmsider necess:iry for Its
support. 18204.
" Capkrton.
" October 4, 1915."
Mr. Angeix. I also wish to offer the following messjige from Se<*retary Daniels
to Admiral Cai>erton, dateil October 5. apjiearlng on page 55 of this compilation :
•* 23103. Cable has been sent this date to Charde with full instructions. You
are authorized to furidsh Haitian (Jovernment weekly anxmnt ne<*essary to meet
current expenses. Use funds collected Haitian customs. Question payment
back salary will be settled by departuT.'nt inmedlately after ratification of
treaty. Report what weekly expenditure w II be ne<*essary under these instruc-
tions;, what is full aniiMint back salares now mipald. Acknowletlge. 22004.
^ D.XMEI s."
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638 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SAl^O DOMINGO.
Do you know, (ienenil, whether the hack salaries actually were imid until
after the ratltlcatlon of the treaty? Just to refresli your recolle<tlon, if neces-
sary, the treaty was ratified in December.
Gen. Wallkr. I do not think they were. I recall an interview with Vincent,
who came to my office to see about the back salary for himself and. I think. Iiis
brother.
Mr. Anoelt.. Vincent was president of the Senate?
Gen. Waller. Yes; and also the secretary of the interior. H s brother, I
think, had been the minister to Belgium. He thought it was a great hardship
that he should be over there without any money, and he wanted me to pay
him when the Haitian Government had dismissed hm. Naturally we did not
take up the question r that is, we declined to pay It.
Mr. Anoell. Do you know whether, as a matter of fact, the back salaries ever
were paid until after the ratification of the treaty?
Gen. Waller. No.
Mr. Anoell. You do not know?
Gen. Waller. No. The salaries we paid were the salaries of the people who
were working after we took it up.
Mr. Anoell. I also wish to call attention on the record at this time to the
paragraph on page 68 of this compilation, which seems to be a paraphrase from
. a message from the Secretary of the Navy, reading here as follows :
"On October 13, 1915, the Secretary of the Navy authorized Rear Admiml
Caperton to establish a weekly allowance of $23,000 for the present as reooiff-
mended."
On that same page the further paraphrase, saying :
** On the same date (referring to October 19) the Secretary of the Navy was
advised by Rear Admiral Caperton that he had authorized the payment of
salaries from customs funds to senators and deputies for the current month."
I wish at this time also, with the consent of the committee, to offer upon the
record the messages appearing on page 65 of this compilation, the long one from
Secretary Daniels dated November 10, 1915. being numbered 22010, to Admiral
Caperton, apparently. I should say the treaty was ratified by the Senate on
November 11, Armistice Day, 1915. This message from Secretarj- Daniels to
Admiral Caperton is dated November 10, the day before. It reads as follows :
" 23109. Arrange with President Dartlguenave that he call a cabinet meet-
ing before the session of senate which will pass upon ratification of treaty and
request that you be permitted to appear before that meeting to make a state-
ment to President and to members of cabinet On your own authority state
the following before these oflScers : * I have the honor to inform the President
of Haiti and the members of his cabinet that I am personally gratified that
public sentiment continues favorable to the treaty ; that there is a strong de-
mand from all classes for immediate ratification, and that the tr€»t7 will be
ratified Thursday.
" * I am sure that you gentlemen will understand my sentiment In this
matter and I am confident If the treaty fails of ratification that my Govern-
ment has the intention to retain control in Haiti until the desired end is ac-
complished and that it will forthwith proceed to the complete pacification of
Haiti so as to insure internal tranqullli^ necessary to such development of the
country and its industry as will afford relief to the starving i)opulace now un-
employed. Meanwhile the present Government will be supported in the effort
to secure stable conditions and lasting peace in Haiti, whereas those ofl^rhig
opposition can only expect such treatment as their conduct merits.
" * The United States Government is particularly anxious for immediate
ratification by the present senate of this treaty, which was drawn up vrtth the
full intention of employing as many Haitians as possible to aid in giving effect
to its provisions, so that suffering may be relieved at the earliest possible date.
"'Rumors of bribery to defeat the treaty are rife but are not believed.
However, should they prove true, those who accept or give bribes will be
vigorously prosecuted.
" * Confidential. It is expected that you will be able to make this suffidentl;
dear to remove all oi^>osition and to secure' immediate ratification. Acknowl-
edge.* 22010.
" Daniels."
There follows in this compilation a message from Admiral Caperton, dated
November 11, presumably to the Secretary of the Navy, reading as follows:
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 639
"Carried out instructions in department's 22010 this forenoon. Treaty rati-
fied by Senate by vote 26 to 7 at 6 p. m. to-day. General rejoicing among popu-
lace. 22111.
" Capkbton."
■ Finally, a message from Secretary Daniels, apparently, to Admiral Caperton.
on November 12, the following day, reading as follows :
"22111. Department wishes to express its gratification at the ratification of
the treaty and to warmly commend the able manner in which you have handled
this important matter and the ability you have shown in directing affairs in
Haiti Acknowledge. 11012.
" Daniels.'*
Were you present, General, at the interview which Admiral Caperton, accord-
ing to these messages, seems to have had with the President and cabinet, in
which he read them, on his own authority, this message from the Secretary of
the Navy?
Gen. Walleb. Yes ; at the palace, at the temporary palace, I mean.
Mr. AifesLL. Was that, do you remember, on the date of the ratification of the
treaty by the S^iate?
Geo. Waixeb. I think that was the date.
Mr. Anobll. Was anything else said, so far as you can remember, by Admiral
Caperton?
Gen. Waujbb. Oh, there was a general rejoicing. I tlilnk the charge was
there and several officers of the Navy.
Mr. Anoell. Were any members of the Haitian Senate there?
Gen. Walleb. No.
Mr. Anoell. Just the President and the cabinet?
G«). Walleb. And the cabinet.
Mr. Angell. Did you have any discussion with the President or the members
of the cabinet about the situation?
Gen. Walleb. I had nothing to do with it at all at that time.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember whether the minister had any discussion with
the President and the cabinet at that meeting?
Gen. Walleb. I do not think so. I tliink all the talking was done by Admiral
Caperton at the time.
Mr. Anoell. Just how was it handled? Was it done through Capt. Beach, his
chief of staff, and the interpreter?
G^L Waixeb. Capt. Beach was there, but Admiral Caperton made the talk.
Mr. Angell. In English?
Gen. Walleb. In English, and it was interpreted by the official interpreter.
Bfr. Angell. Then and there?
Gen. Welleb. I think at that time.it was a man whom I had supplied the
President, because the cabinet refused to let him have an interpreter.
Mr. Angell. When I say then and there I mean the putting of this declara-
tion into French was made at that time at that meeting, on the morning of the
11th, prior to the ratification of the treaty by the Senate?
Gen. Walleb. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether or not, apart from the seizure of the cus-
toms and the customs receipts, there was any seizure by Admiral Caperton or
the officers under his direction, of any national funds of the Haitian Govern-
ment?
Gen. Walleb. I do not
Mr. Angell. You do not know one way or the other?
Gen. Walleb. No.
Mr. Angell. The particular reason I asked you was that I asked that question
of Admiral Caperton here in cross-examination, and he said he could not remem-
ber, but he did not think so. But Col. Alexander S. Williams, in testifying the
other day, made a reference to the seizure of the Haitian national funds in such
manner as to give me the belief that it was not the customs he was refer-
ring to.
Gen. Walleb. It would depend. In the first place, Williams would not know
anything about it at that Ume. He must have referred to something else.
Williams had nothing to do with any of the negotiations of either the treaty, or
the constitutional work, or the organization of the gendarmerie.
Bfr. Angbll. WilUams had nothing to do with the organization of the gen-
darmerie?
Gen. Walleb. He was simply on the board, the second member, I think, on
the board. This board received its instructions and considered the^uggestions
gitized by Google
640 INQUIRY INTO OCCrPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
that were sent out from my headquarters to them. I also received sugffestlonx
from them, and they were discussed.
Mr. Anoeix. Conilnj? now, sir, to this proroguing, or dissolution, of the legisla-
ture in 1916, do you know whether or not, under the Haitian constitutiOD, it was
provided that the President could dissolve the legislature in the manner in which
he did it by the decree of April 5, 1916?
Gen. Waller. I do not tliink so.
Mr. Angell. You do not believe that the constitution gave the Preslf!«it that
I)ower?
Gen. Waller, 'that was one of the reasons why I opposed it, but there mi^t
have been necessity for it.
Mr. Anoell. Do you know whetlier or not that decree of April 5, 1916, wa-s
made the subject of court action in the native courts of Port au Prince at that
time?
Gen. Waller. It was made the subject of discussion with this corps of
lawyers, and the l*resident wrote me on tlie subject, stating that they were
opiM)sing him in every way, and wislied me to take action, which I declined do-
ing, but I interviewed them, and they assured me they would fflve every
assistance in their iwwer.
Mr. Anoell. So far as ytm know or reujember, then, there was no <lec*ree in
the civil court of Port au Prince, about April 15, authorizing the deputies and
senators to oi)en the gates of the legislative building, on the ground of the sieged
unconstitutionality of this decree?
Gen. Waller. I do not rememl>er it, l)ut even if it had been issueil no attention
would have lieen i»aid to it.
Mr. Anoeix. Do you rememlier two lawyers. Luxembourg Oauvin and Eklmond
I^spinasse, coming to you al>out this decree and the question of the unconstitu-
tionality of the decree?
Gen. Waller. I remember a numl>er of interviews that we had witli Caovin,
I^spinasse, Bailly, and others, but this was after the legislature was close<l.
Mr. Anoell. That is some time subsequent to May?
Gen. WALr.ER. It followe<l almost immediately after>vards.
Mr. Howe. The legislature was closed on April 6, was it not?
Mr. Angeli^ The decree was on April 6.
Gen. Waller. It close<l on that day, I think. I have a notice here from the
dean to the deputies, by which I can fix that absolutely. My Impression is that
that meeting was on the 8th — two days afterwards.
Mr. Anoell. What meeting, sir?
Gen. Waller. With Cauvin, the first meeting I had with Cauvin.
Mr. Anoell. On the 8th or 18th? The decree. I believe, was on the 15th of
April.
(len. WAW.ER. It was two or three days after the dissolution of the legislature.
Mr. Angell. After the President's decree?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Then, it w<mld have been April 8?
Gen. Waller. April 8 it would be.
Mr. Angell. The decree of the President was that of April 5?
Gen. W^ALi.Eu. It is in hpre somewhere — a placan! from the dean to the
deputies.
Mr. ANGEI.L. I just suggest, General, it Is not of sufficient imiwrtance, perhaps^
to fix the date of this thing exactly. Perhaps we can proceed.
Mr. Howe. What fact are you trying to fix? Perhaps we can stipulate on
that.
Mr. Anoell. I am just trying to find out what representations, if any, were
made to the General by these Haitian lawyers about the alleged unconstitu-
tionality of the decree.
Mr. Howe. Can we not fix that by bringing up the question of how long before
or how long after the decree was passed these representations were made?
Mr. Angell. There seems to be confusion somewhere, for the reason that the
General has it in mind that he had this interview with these men— Cauviii and
I-espinasse — three days after the President's decree, which would have been
April 8. In the Haitian memoir the statement is made that the decree of the
civil court authorizing the opening of the legislative chambers was obtained oti
the 15th of April, 10 days after the President's decree; thereupon these two
lawyers went to the General with this decree.
Gen. Waller. They came to me at that time, too ; but, as I say, I had aeveral
interviews with them on the subject
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I2^QUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 641
Mr. HoAVE. The witiiBss has testified that he knows nothing of the decree
anyhow.
Oen. Walt^b. I do not know anything of the decree having heen Issued at
all, l>e<'ause I had told them I had received instructions.
Mr. Angelf* Instructions from the President?
Gen. Walijcr. From the President.
Mr. Anoelt.. And you would have carried those out, do I understand you
rightly, whether there had heen a court decree as to the unconstitutionality ^of
the President's order, or otherwise?
Oen. Waller. Yes ; as long as martial law existed.
Mr. Anoefx. Appearing on page 24 of the printed record, there are two
letters that I would just like to ask you to look at. General, one of them being
apparently, as printed here, from you to Mr. Laroche, dated April 27, and an
apparent reply from him to you, dated April 28. I will ask you, for the pur-
pose of Identification, whether you sent and received those two letters. I am
just asking you whether that is substantially correct.
Gen. Waller. That is substantially correct.
Xfr. Angell. Those two letters?
Gen. Watxer. I have not read I>aroche*s yet, but we were having a good deal
of communication at that time.
Mr. AxGELL. I just want to Identify these two letters, to show they were sent
and received, there being no formal proof on that subject at all thus far.
Gen. W^AixEB. Yes; that is correct.
Mr. Angell. Then may I consider that these two letters, as identified by the
General, and stated by him to be substantially correct, as having been sent
and received by him, are offered in the record as so identified. They are
already parts of the printed record, but have never been identified or proved.
Gen. Waller. They were sent, and as the Government feared impeachment,
that was the point I made there, that they were to consider those matters
•>nly.
Mr. Angell. Now, the specific order for the closing of the legislative cham-
bers was recelve<l, as I understand It, by you from the President, and trans-
mitted by you to Maj. Butler?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. The chief of the gendarmerie, for execution?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. How far was it customary, General, for you to receive and
carry out orders from the President of Haiti?
Gen. Waller. They were not orders ; they were always considered as requests
and we usually discussed them beforehand. This was not discussed at this
time, the date of his signing of this proclamation, becaue he knew I op-
posed It.
Mr. Angeli* He transmitted it to you, with the request that it be enforced?
Gen. Waller. He transmitted It In a letter. In which he states that he relies
,upon me for my entire support In the preservation of order, Inclosing at the
same time a copy of the proclamation.
Mr. Angell. If that is not in the record already, I suggest that it be put In
the record, the proclamation of April 5, dissolving the le^slature.
Mr. Howe. If It Is not in the record, I think It should be. and also the letter
of the President, accompanying the proclamation.
(The letter referred to is here printed in full as follows, the proclamation
having been introduced as a part of Admiral Caperton's testimony.)
Private Office of the President of Haiti,
Port au Prince. April .5, 19 16.
To Col. Littleton W. T. Walter,
City.
aiY Dear Colonfx: For the good of the Haitian pef)ple. the Government in-
tends, with the Indispensable aid of the occupation, to resolutely carry out the
work of regeneration (uplifting) that it has begim. But, from the verj^ outset
as you yourself have witnessed, it has met with obstacles that have been thrown
in Its way by those who see in the new order of things the destruction of the
baneful state of things which had served their selfish and personal ends.
Ajnong the measures demanded by this state of things, I have decide<l, in
accord with the members of the (]k>vemment, to publish in to-<lay's ofllcial
Journal the two executive orders (decrees) of which I have inclose<l a copy.
I have added an expose setting forth the determining reasons^ which explain
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642 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
and Justify said two orders. I must not let you ignore that a like coQimunica*
tion had been made to Admiral Oaperton and to Mr. Bailly-Blancbard.
After taking into consideration all possible contingencies, I am relying abso-
lutely upon all your help to assure public order and security by paralysing, if
needs be, the evil actions of those who might wish to create popular agitation
for their own personal advantage which they set above the public weal.
In the meantime, I send you, my dear colonel, the renewed assurances of
my very cordial consideration.
Daetiguenav-e.
Mr. Anoell. Ar^ we to understand, General, from your statement about the
corvee law, that the natives flocked in to work upon the roads from the sole
motive of their desire to see the roads improved?
(Sen. Waller. I presume so.
Mr. Anoell. And that it was not the food and it was not the pay wiilch they
were after?
Gen. Waller. No.
Mr. Anoell. They were not paid and they were not fed?
Gen. Waller. Some of them were paid, and a number of the people may
have thought that there was the hope of advancement later.
Mr. Angell. Have you any idea, sir, how long these men were apt to continue
to work in this manner without pay and without food?
Gen. Wallace. When the repairs went through a district the people worked
in that district.
Mr. Anoell. Which would have been several weeks, upon the average?
Gen. Waller. It depended largely upon the weather. You see, in the even-
ings, they had torrential downpours, and sometimes considerable work would
be washed away that had been, done during the day, if the work had not been
completed.
Mr. Angell. Did the work continue in any given district on an average for
a period of several weeks?
(ien. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Sometimes several months, perhaps?
Gen. Wallace. Yes. In the district of Port au Prince, for instance, we were
working on both sides at the same time.
Mr. Anoell. Now, sir, in reference to the new constitution, you said that with
reference to the proposal for the acquisition of the right to acquire land by
foreigners, that they were willing to put it In?
Gen. Waller. I mean the Government.
Mr. Angeix. The executive branch of the Government?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Did that apply to the constituent assembly?
Gen. Waller. That had not met.
Mr. Angell. That had not met at the time you speak of?
Gen. Waller. The Government, the plans they were formulating to put
before the constituent assembly.
Mr. Angell. So the individuals who were willing to put this in were merely
the Dartiguenave government?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. That is the President and his cabinet?
Gen. Waller. The President and his cabinet There were some members,
for instance, Camllle Leon, the chairman of the deputies, who was In favor
of It. .
Mr. Angell. Had the consell d*etat been organized at the time you are speaK-
ing of?
Gen. Waller. During the discussion?
Mr. Angell. At the time of the discussion of the proposed new treaty?
Gen. Waller. Partially so ; yes. He requested them to serve on this.
Mr. Angell. Was there any authorization for such a body In the constltutioD,
if you know, any authorization for the body of the consell d'etat?
Gen. Waller. I think so ; either In that or the prior constitution.
Mr. Angell. The constitution which was then in force was the constitution
of 1889, was it not? ^ „^
Gen. Waller. Yes. I say either that or the one before. I have forgotten
which of the two : but they had ample authority for It, It seems to me.
Mr. Angell. After the treaty went Into effect in June, 1916, by ratification oi
this treaty by the United States Senate, was there any single responsible Amen-
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INQUIRY INTO 0(X^UPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 643
can, civil or military, head in Haiti or was it a responsibility divided among a
nunil>er of military and civilian representatives?
Gen. Waller. Financial affairs were controlled by the financial adviser, who
was appointed under the treaty.
Mr. Angell. To whom did he report in this conntry?
Gen. Waller. The State Department, I presume.
Mr. Angell. To whom did the receiver general of customs report?
Gen. Waller. To the financial adviser.
Mr. Angell, To whom did the commander of the brigade — yourself, for ex-
ample— report?
Gen. Waller. When anything arose to report it was sent in duplicate, one to
the commander in chief of the cruiser squadron of the Atlantic Fleet and the
other to Washington, to headquarters of the Marine Corps.
Mr. AivoELL. The brigade commander, of course, did not report to the State
Department directly?
Cten. Walijcr. No; except in personal communications.
Mr. Angell. To whom did the engineer of public works, the American oflicial.
report, if you know?
Gen. W^ALLER. His final appointment did not get there until after I left.
Mr. Angell. Until after you left, in November, 1916?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. His office was provided for by the treaty?
Gen. Waller. Yes ; there were two engineers provided for. One of them was
called the sanitary engineer and one called the public works engineer. I used
up to that time my own engineer.
Mr. Angell. Do you know what accounting was made to the Haitien Govern-
ment of the Haitien national funds by our civil and military representatives in
Haiti, speaking, of course, up to the time that you left?
Gen. Waller. Yes. The military, strictly speaking, had absolutely nothing to
do with this, except to disburse the funds, except at the request of the financial
adviser and the receiver general.
Mr. Angell. The military made no report or accounting to the Haitian €k>v-
ernment; that was not their function?
Gen. Waller. It was not their function.
Mr. ANGELL. Did the military or naval oflScers make any report to the Haitian
Government prior to the appointment of the receiver general?
Gen. Waller. I do not know whether Admiral Caperton did or not. I know
the man who acted as receiver general made the reports to him.
Mr. Angell. To Admiral Caperton?
Gen. Waller. To Admiral Caperton. I saw these reports from time to time,
considering the resources. The budget was prepared each month, and it was
necessary to see exactly what funds they had in hand.
Mr. ANGELL. I show you what purports to be, General, a copy of a letter from
you, dated June 30, 1916, addressed to the American minister at Port au Prince,
and ask you whether that is substantially accurate?
Qen, Waller. Yes ; I am sure that letter was written.
Mr. Angell. I would like to offer In evidence this letter, as identified by the
general.
Gen. Waller. I can relate to you why the letter was written.
Mr. Angell. I want to read this letter to the Senator.
(Mr. Angell thereupon read the letter referred to, as follows:)
Headquarters United States Expeditionary Forces
Operating in Haiti,
Port au Prinoe, Haiti, June SO, 1916.
From : Expeditionary commander.
To: The American minister. Port au Prince, Haiti.
Subject: Public works.
1. Acknowledging and complying with your note of June 28, 1916, forwarding
copy of a formal protest from minister of foreign affairs concerning the alleged
beginning of certain public works by the occupation, I have the honor to state
that I have already explained the status of the work to the department con-
cerned.
2. The work In question Is a continuation of work begun by us early in De-
cember, 1915. It became necessary for two reasons :
First. To furnish employment to 'Starving Haitians.
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644 INQl^IRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Sec*oml. In order that there might be communication between towns, by land^
for military as well as conmiercial purposes.
3. If, as stated by the minister of foreign affairs, the treaty lias been in
operation since May 3, 1916, I know nothing of it. I must receive my informa-
tion through |)roi)er military channels l)efore I can relax our established rules
under which we have been operating.
4. I was not aware that the agreements had been signed ; in fact, I have
been Informed that this Government would not agree to them.
I^TTLBTON W. Waller.
I want to ask you, in this connection, if you remember when you were
officially notified of the ratification by the United States of the treaty which
is dated September 16, 1915?
Gen. Waller. No; I do not recall the date.
Mr. Angell. You had not l)een notified at this time, on June 30, 1916, that
the treaty had been ratified by the Senate on May 3, 1916?
Gen. Waller. No; on the date of that letter I did not know tlie United
States had ratified the treaty.
Mr. A19GELL. So that, so far as you, the brigade commander, was concerned,
the treaty was not yet formally in effect?
Gen. Walleb. The Haitian Government had claimed from time to time the
treaty had been in effect for months when it had not been ratified by our
Government
Mr. Howe. When did the treaty become formally in effect, on its promulga-
tion or ratification? •
Mr. Angell. It was ratified on May 3, and I believe it was promulgated on
the 3d of June.
Mr. Howe. That is when it became effective, is it not?
Mr. Angell. That is a question of constitutional law. I do not think It
came into effect at that time. Prior to that time there had lieen, had there not,
a modus operandi?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Which was soon after or Immediately following the signa-
ture of the original treaty in September?
Gen. Waller. Frequently they had stated to me that tliey considered the
treaty was in operation before our ratifying It.
•Mr. Angell. The modus operandi was, however, in terms identical with
the treaty, was it not, or substantially so?
Gen. Waller. Not entirely so, because we had charge of public works at
that time. It was after this that they made this claim. When this letter was
written it was because they had sent an architect up to look out for the water
supply of a suburb of Port an Prince, and he had driven away our public-
works officer, and I hj^d sent an officer up to him and apprehended him, and
had communicatetl with the Government. They then wrote to the minister,
and he wrote nie on the subject, aiul I replle<l in that way. That was the
cause of that.
Mr. Angell. When were the public works taken over by the occupation?
Gen. Waller. We took them over at first.
Mr. Angell. In the early days of the occupation?
Gen. Waixer. In the fall of 1915. We took them over as soon as we took
over the customs.
Mr. Angell. Was the occupation requeste<l by the Dartiguenave govern-
ment to take over the public works, or was that done as a matter of military
necessity?
Gen. Waller. It was done for militar>* reasons, but it was done with the
approval of the Dartiguenave government. Many suggestions came from them.
Mr. Angell. And the administration of public works was continued by the
officers of the military occupation until the engineer provided for by the
treaty was nominated and sent down to Haiti?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. And was that prior, do you remember, to the time wh«i you
left In November, 1916?
(Jen. Waller. He came down just l>efore I left, but he did not assume the
office exactly. I think he was there probably a month or so.
Mr. Angell. So at the time you left in November, 1916?
Gen. WalIwEr. It had not been taken over.
Mr. Angell. The military officers of the occupation were still administering
the public works?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 645
Gen. Walleb. Yei.
Mr. Angell. What fuiuls were being iise<l for such exi>eiises as were neces-
sary ?
(ien. Wallkr. Haitian funds, of coui-se. All of the expenses of the occupa-
lion, you see, were paid for by our own Ooveninient.
Mr. Angell. When you say exi)ens(»s of the occupation you mean the pay of
the officers and men?
(ien. Waller. House rent. su|>plies, trans|M>rtation, and everything of that
sort.
Mr. Angkll. The building of roads, public works, sanitation, and such mat-
ters, came
<ien. Waller. From the Haitian (Jovernment, the funds.
Mr. Angell. As administered by, drst, our military representiitives?
(Jen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. And then the receiver general and tinaueial adviser?
Gen. Waller. We had pretty nmch the same phm there that we did in Cuba,
very much the same as we did in Mexico. In fact, that pnKlamati<m of martial
law was almost identical with the one in Vera ('ruz.
Mr. Angeix. To what extent during the time you were brigade commander in
Haiti did the American military' forces interfere, if at all, with local muidcipal
administration ?
(ren. Waller. We never interfere<l with them at all, except probably once in
Port au Frince, when a man had been aptioiuted or suspendetl by the President
and a new man appointed, and there was a little resistance to his occupation
of that office.
Mr. Howe. What office was that, sir?
(len. Waller. It corresponded practically to mayor.
Mr Angell. Was his name Auguste Magloire?
X^en. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Was that the case?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember whether or not he was arrested and im-
prisoned?
Gen. Waller. He was arrested.
Mr. Angell. By wliom, by the niariues, or by the gendai*nierie, or native
c*ourt?
Gen. Waller. I do not remember whether it was the marines or gendarmerie,
but in either case he would have been arresteil, be<*ause he drew a revolver on
the incumt>ent In office.
Mr. Angell. He was the lawful incumbent in office, was he not?
Gen. Waller. He was arrested for creating a disturbance and carrying a
weaiK)n, which he was not allowe<l to do.
Mr. Angell. Do you know how long he was imprisoned?
Gen. W'ALLER. A very sliort while. I do not remember whether it was over-
night. He was released when the matter was brought to me.
Mr. Angell. Do you rememlK*r, General, the difficulties which seemed to have
taken place regarding the proposal to place under the control of the gen-
darmerie the telegraphs, telephones, public works, the lighthouse service, such
as there may have bene, and the i>ostal service?
(4en. Waller. The lighthouse service was always ours. The iK)stal service and
the |)ostal telegraph was the principal thing.
Mr. Angell. Give us, (Jeneral, in brief, that story, will you please?
(Jen. Waijjsr. The proposition was made and accepted by President Darti-
guenave and his (Jovernment. It was made iiecaust^ we would save the (Jovern-
ment a very large sum of money, and we would give efficient sei'vice. We had
our own experts, men who had oi)eratetl everything in Vera ('ruz for nine
months without any hitch, or anything of that sort, and we were prepared to
rebuild and carry the lines all the way through Haiti, so that conmiunication
could be correctly carried on. We also wished to stop the graft in the post
office. The employees of the post t»ffice had stolen quite a large amount of
money. The President said he would do this. He also asked for an engineer
at the same time ; that is, au additional engineer, and he told me that he would
issue instructions to his minister in Washington that day. He failed to do so.
1 saw him the next day, when he made me a solenni jironiise.
Mr. Angei-l. Who made, the President?
Gen. Waller. Yes. He then said that he would send the cable to the min-
ister, and I Informed him that I would be very ^lad to have It sent dowMi by our
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646 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION jOF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINQO.
messenger, but he had it coded and sent down, and it was exactly the reverse of
his promise.
Mr. Angell. It was in code, was It?
Gen. Waixbr. It was in code.
Mr. Angell. How could we tell it was exactly the reverse?
Gen. Waller. Because it Is our business to decipher any code. Very fre-
quently it does not take them but a very few minutes to get hold of the most
intricate code, either in the air or on the wire.
Mr. Angell. You were saying the message was exactly the reverse of what he
promised?
Gen. Waller. Yes ; exactly the reverse ; and when I went to him about it h6
said that there had been an error in coding it, but I told him I knew there had
been no error and that I would be obliged to say to my Government that he was
insincere and unstable; that his Government was insincere and unstable. The
question of removing martial law had arisen, and I said, " Do you wish that
done? " He said, " No; under no circumstances."
Mr. Angell. This all happened during the summer of 1916?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Early in August, was it not?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Was it finally agreed that these various services were to be put
under control of the gendarmerie?
Gen. Waller. Not at that time; no. '
Mr. Angell. Subsequently it was agreed in the final gendarmerie agreement?
Gen. Waller. That was a long time after.
Mr. Angell. After your departure?
Gen. Waller. Yes.
Mr. Angell. So that you have no particular knowledge of the final accom-
plishment?
Gen. Waller. I have no knowledge of that. In fact, I think it had hardly
been done. I mean the postal service. It was not done at the time I left ; that
is, they had not been turned over to the gendarmerie. I believe that in a later
agreement it was agreed to, but I do not think it had yet been done.
Mr. Angell. Was Mr. Augustus SchoUe, the charge d'affaires, present at this
conference in early August, do you remember?
Gen. Waller. He was present at the first one. He was not present at the
final one. There were several interviews that took place about that time.
Mr. Howe. I now offer a certificate by MaJ. Jesse F. Dyer, dated Novwnber
8, 1921, containing true copies of extracts from the muster roll of the One
rundredth Company, Second Regiment, First Provisional Brigade, United States
Marine Corps, which extracts show that Capt. Thomas L. Edwards, commanding
that company, was stationed at Mirebalais, Haiti, throughout the months of
May and Jun^, 1919 ; also an official copy of the report of the death of Capt
Thomas L. Edwards, United States Marine Corps. The report states that
death took place as the result of an airplane accident, and that Capt Edwards
died at Port au Prince on August 10, 1920.
(The papers referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)
Headquarters United States Marine Corps,
Washington, November 8, 1921.
This is to certify that the muster rolls of the One hundredth Company,
Second Regiment, First Provisional Brigade, United States Marine Corps, for
the months of April, May, and June, 1919, show the following remarks opposite
the name of Capt. Thomas L. Eklwards, United States Marine Corps, as
designated below, and that the remarks so shown are a true copy of the
original nnister rolls :
Muster roll of One hundredth Company, Second Regiment, First Provisional
Brigade, United States Marine Corps, for April, 1919. Company at Port au
Prince, Haiti, 1 to 30.
Name : Capt. Edwards, Thomas L.
Remarks: 1 to 30 commanding company, 6 to 30 participating in operations
against bandits in central Haiti.
Muster roll of One hundredth Company, Second Regiment, First Provisional
Brigade, United States Marine Corps, for May, 1919. Company at Mirebalais,
Haiti, 1 to 31.
Name: Capt. Edwards, Thomas L.
Remarks: 1 to 31 commanding company participating in operations against
bandits in central Haiti ; 8 received requaliflcation bar.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 647
Master roll of One hundredtb Company, Second Regiment First Provisional
Brigade, United States Marine Corps, for June, 1919. Company at Mirebalais,
Haiti, 1 to 30.
Name : Capt. Edwards, Thomas L.
Remarks : 1 to 30 conmianding company.
Jesse F. Dyer,
Major, United States Marine Corps.
FORM N.
From: Field hospital. First Provisional Brigade, Port au Prince, Republic of
Haiti :
To : Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Subject : Report of death in case of —
Edwards, Thomas Louis, captain, United States Marine Cori)s, enlisted Marine
Barracks, Port Royal, S. C., July 24, 1917. Relation, name, and address of next
of kin, mother, Martha Edwards, 2496 Carter Street, Baker City, Greg. Bom :
Place, Ogden, Utah. Date, December 10, 1889. White, United States. Eyes,
brown ; hair, brown ; complexion, ruddy ; height, 67f ; weight, 133. Psc. fore-
head. So. }" R. cheek; }" up. lip.
Die<l Port au Prince, Haiti, August 10, 1920, 2.15 p. m. Embalmed at field
hospital ; to be transferred to United States by first available transportation.
Immediate cause of death, fracture at base of skull. Key letter, €r-R. Origin
is in the line of duty. Disability is not the result of own misconduct. Original
diagnosis of last disease or injury causing death or resulting in complications
causing death ; and ship or station to which attached at that time. Fracture at
base of skull. Eighth Regiment, First Provisional Brigade, United States Marine
Coriw.
Facts are as follows : Patient was passenger in plane which stalled at 500 feet
altitude and crashed. Brought to hospital unconscious. Strong evidence of
fracture of base of skull ; left hip dislocated upward and backward. Lacerated
wound in inner aspect of left knee. Many bruises and scratches. Dislocation
reduced and wound sutured. Put to bed; ice cap to head; Murphy drip. Pa-
tient continued to improve during the night, but at 11 a. m. pulse and tempera-
ture rose and he died at 2.15 p. m. from complete dissociation of medullary
centers.
J. R. POPPEN,
Lieutenant, Medical Corps, United States Navy.
Approved :
John H. Russell,
Colonel, United States Marine Corps.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Wednesday, November 9, 1921,
at .10.30 o'clock a. m.)
62269— 21— PT 2 35
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBEB 9, 1921.
United States Senate,
SELEcrr Ommittee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D. O,
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10.30 o'clock a. m. in room
131, Senate Office Building, Senator Tasker L. Oddie presiding.
Present: Senator Oddie.
Also present: Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and Maj. Edwin
N. McClellan, United States Marine Corps.
STATEMENT OF BBIG. GEN. AIiBEBTXJS W. CATUN, UNITED STATES
MABINE COBPS, BETIBED, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. Howe. Gen. Catlin, will you give your name, rank, and present station?
Gen. Catun. Alt>ertU8 W. Catlin, brigadier general. United States Bffarine
Corps, retired ; 1401 Webster Street NW., Washington, D. C.
Mr. Howe. How long ago did you retire. General?
Gen. Catlin. I retired in December, 1919.
Mr. Howe. How long before that had you become a member of the Marine
Corps?
Gen. Catun. I was appointed in the Marine Corps on the 1st of July, 1802.
Mr. Howe. You saw active service overseas, did you not, during the war?
Gen. Catlin. I was over there for about eight months.
Mr. Howe. What was your command in France?
Gen. Catun. I had command of the Sixth Regiment of Marines.
Mr. Howe. Until you were wounded?
Gen. Catlin. Until I was wounded.
Mr. Howe. Then you returned to this country?
Gen. Catun. I spent about six weeks in the hospital in Paris, and then re-
turned.
Mr. Howe. Where was It that you were wounded?
Gen. Catlin. In the first attack on Belleau Wood, June 6, 1918.
Mr. Howe. It was after your return from France that you were sent to Haiti ;
is tliat correct?
Gen. Catun. Yes; I was sent to Haiti in November, 1918, after returning
from France.
Mr. Howe. What was your assignment down in Haiti?
Gen. Catlin. I was assigned as brigade commander of the marines in Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Which officer did you succeed?
Gen. Catun. Col. John H. Russell.
Mr. Howe. That was Col. Russeirs first tour down there?
Gen. Catun. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How long did you remain brigade commander?
Gen. Catun. I remained from the Ist of December, 1918, to the 15th of July,
1919. I came away on leave on the 15th of July, 1919.
Mr. Howe. And were you relieved, and when?
Gen. Catlin. I was relieved in September.
Mr. HowB. Without, however, returning to Haiti?
Gen. Catun. Without returning to Haiti.
Mr. Howe. You were succeeded by?
Gen. Catun. By Col. Russell, whom I had succeeded.
Mr. Howe. What was the state of Haitian affairs when you got down there?
Was it tranquil or was there trouble in the field? ^ j
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650 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Catlin. Affairs in Port au Prince were very quiet Trouble had started
sliortly before I arrived in the Hiuche district, or in the surroundings of
Hinche» and about the date of my arrival, I think it was about November 24.
there had been an attack upon the town of Hinche by bandits, and gendarmes,
extra gendarmes, had been sent up from Port au Prince to pursue the bandits.
Mr. Howe. Lieut. Col. Williams was the commander of the gendarmerie at
that time?
Gen. Catlin. He was during my whole tour.
Mr. Howe. What did you estimate the situation to be around Hinche as to
whether it was possible for the gendarmerie to control it?
Gen. Catun. Well, of course, my estimate at that time, would be entirely
upon information I received from the officers who had been around there, as I
knew nothing of the country myself, and Col. Williams assured me that he
could control it
Mr. Howe. Did you later on send a detachment or company of marines to
Hinche?
Gen. Catlin. Yes; in February, the latter part of February, Col. Hooker,
who was in command of the northern district and the regiment stationed at
Cape Haitien, sent a company of marines on a hike to Hinche, at the same time
making a rei)ort to me of conditions he had found up there, and made recom-
mendations whicli I afterwards approved, and they were kept there until the
marines finally took over operations themselves.
Mr. Howe. When was it that the marines took over operations themselves?
Gen. Ca-wjn. Active operations were started about the 1st of May, and the
marines were sent in there during March.
Mr. Howe. When did you firet visit the Hinche district?
Gen. Catlin. I do not know the exact date, but it was somewhere about the
second week in March.
Mr. Howe. What were conditions up there when you went there?
Gen. Catlin. I found conditions were very bad. I found that the country
outside of the town was practically depopulated. All of the little huts, etc,
were empty, and the occupants had disappeared.
Mr. Howe. What had brought that about?
Gen. Catlin. As far as I could gather from this information, it was brought
about by two reasons : One was the bandits, the fear of the bandits, who had
been recruiting throughout the district, forcing tlie people to join them, and
the other one, I came to the conclusion, was fear of the gendarmes.
Mr. Howe. Please say a little more about that second reason there, the fear
of the gendarmes.
Gen. Catun. Well, the gendarmes were scattered all over the island in small
detachments, generally with one white officer, who was a marine; and it was
necessary, of course, to send out patrols through the districts, of gendarmes,
under a sergeant, corporal, etc., and I found that the native gendarme was very
prone to use his position against other natives; if he was given any authority
at all he was very prone to exceed it, and that the patrols would abuse the
people, and a number of cases were reported where natives were abased
and robbed, and women carried off, and shot, and things like that. And that
was the reason I said I came to the conclusion that one reason was fear of the
gendarmes. Many of them had disappeared, having either gone with the
bandits or gone into the towns for protection.
Mr. Howe. If a native in or near his own house saw another native coming,
armed, what was his guess as to whether it was a bandit or a gendarme?
Gen. Catlin. I do not think he stopped to guess ; he generally took to the
woods.
Mr. Howb. And if a peaceful native was seen taking to the woods by a
gendarme, with no white officer present, what would the gendarme generally ^
at that time in that place?
Gen. Catun. At that time, with bandits in the field, the gendarme would gen-
erally shoot at him, because it was found that the bandits had spies and lookouts
all over the country and had their own men scattered around, and they would
have them out three or four hills ahead of the bands ; so that the chances were
that if you saw a man running he was one of their men running to give them
notice. That was the general supposition whenever a man was seen running.
Mr. Howe. W^as the overbearing attitude of a gendarme who was not under
the immediate control of a white officer sufficient in itself to drive the inhab-
itants away ; I mean at that time and under those conditions up there?
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INQtJIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 651
Gen. Gatijn. I do not know that it was; but there were other things, of
course. There was the corvee, too, which probably had an effect on that, too.
Mr. Howe. In March, 1919?
Gen. Cattjn. Well, in March, 1919, there was a modified corvee working In
that district.
Mr. HowB. And that contributed also to the unsettled conditions?
Gen. Catun. Undoubtedly^.
Mr. HowB. Do I understand that it was on account of those unsettled condi-
tions and the mistrust of the gendarmerie that you sent the marines in there for
station?
Gen. Catun. Yes; I sent the marines in there on account of that; and my
first order was that they were simply to go in and take station in the town, not
to operate in the field in any manner whatever, leaving that entirely to the
gendarmes.
Mr. Howe. Did you take any other steps to restore confidence there?
Gen. Catun. In March?
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Gen. Oatlin. Yef?. When we took over the operations the first thing we
did was to send out a notice or proclamation by means of the priests, market
women, and all means we had all over the island, or that district of the island,
requesting all natives to come in and give themselves up and they would receive
protection ; and we issued a sort of a pass to them which guaranteed protection,
et cetera, and there were something over 3,000, as I remember it, who came in
and received those passes.
Mr. Howe. How many of those that came in were armed?
Gen. Catlin. None of them brought arms at that time. Later men came in
with arms and received passes. That was a period of about two weeks which
was given them to come in.
Mr. Howe. And that was in March ?
Gen. Catxin. That was in March.
Mr. Howe. You spoke of taking over operations. From whom did you take
over operations?
Gen. Catlin. From the gendarmerie. Up to that time Col. Williams had
assured me that he could handle the situation, and it was a gendarmerie job,
not a marine job, but the bandits Increased to such an extent that he found,
although he withdrew troops from Port au Prince, and sent about .^00 addi-
tional gendarmes up there, that he could not handle it, and about the middle
of March, or a little later than that, he informed me thnt he could not handle
it any longer. Then I sent the rest of the marines in and took over operations
personally.
Mr. Howe. How long did those operations remain active?
Gen. Cattjn. Until some time after I left; I do not know the exact date,
but it was going on when I left.
Mr. Howe. What form did the operations of the marines take?
Gen. Catlin. Well, the operations were not strictly military, in a military
sense. The marines were stationed at all the different towns In the district.
A company was divided up. For instance, the Fifty -fourth Company, with
headquarters at Hinche, had detachments at Maissade, St. Michel, and later
at other little places. Another company which came from Ouanaminthe, was
over at Thomaseau and Thoniusique, and three or four towns in there, and a
little later, when it spread down townrd the south, companies were sent to
Mlrebalais and Las Cohobas. These companies there were divided into differ-
ent detachments, and patrols were sent out from these towns. There were no
roads. They were sent out by the ti*ails over the mountn'ns. At first they went
out in search of the bandits, but it was found that it was impossible to find them
in that way. We used native guides, and the farmers wherever we could get
them, and it finally became necessar>' to locate a camp, and then march at
night The patrols would do their niarfhing at niirht and jump the camp at
daylight. That was the only way we could get in touch with them.
Mr. Howe. What was the effect of this patrolling and these morning sur-
prises on camps?
Gen. Catlin. The effect was that the small bands joined in with other bands,
and a niimber of men came in and gave themselves up. A lot of them claimed
they were captured by the bandits and forced to serve with them. But it had
no appreciable effect on the bands themselves. Charlemagne, who was In com-
mand of the outfit, and entitled himself commander in chief of the forces fight-
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652 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
ing against the Americans, sent over tlie island trying to recruit more. I got a
nomber of letters tliat he had sent, one to the magistrate of Plaisance, which
is op near Cape Hatien, and to Gen. Aspelly, telling him that now was the
time for all good Haitians to join In, stating he had 30,000 men in the Md.
Mr. Howe. Did he have 30,000 men in the field?
Gen. Catlin. No : it was impossible to tell how many he had, but I estimated
at that time that there were al)out 5.000 bandits in the field, not over that,
and of those probably not over one-quarter, or less than that, had arms.
Mr. Howe. How many marines were there in the field then?
Gen. Catlin. There were less than 2,000 in the island. I could not give the
exact number, but I imagine probably 500 or 600 in the Interior.
Mr. Howe. Actively engage<l in the interior?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Were the gendarmes cooperating at that time?
Gen. Catlin. Yes ; to a certain extent. I had stopped all patrolling in that
district by tlie gendarmes, for the reason which I gave l>efore, but in the dis-
tricts farther to tlie west, toward Gonaives, I still allowed them to patrol over
there ; it was outside of the district where the conditions had been as I stated.
Mr. Howe. What was the area of these operations?
Gen. Catlin. I imagine from St. Michel to the border was approximately 50
or 60 miles, and it was probably 15 miles across the hills to Mirebalais, the
other way, so I should say, roughly, that ti was about 50 miles by 15 or 20
miles, something lilce that.
Mr. Howe. That region might be described as being in the center of Haiti?
Gen. Catlin. Yes. It belongs to the northern district, but it is practically
in the center of Haiti, I should say.
Mr. Howe. Had Charlemagne been captured or killed before you left?
Gen. Catlin. No. Before I left I had a letter from the bishop at Cape
Haitien, requesting that I allow Charlemagne and Norde, one of the principal
leaders there, to escape from the island.
Mr. Howe. You spoke of the bands of natives getting larger ; that is, by the
small bands joining up together?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Howe. On their part, what did the bandits do?
Gen. Catlin. Well, the bandits — most of their activities, although they said
they were fighting against the Americans, were against the peaceable natives.
They would jump a little town and burn the houses, take all the men they
could gather with them as recruits, and all the provisions and things lilse that
which they could get.
Mr. Howe. Did they commit any brutalities on the women and children?
Gen. Catlin. Not that I know^ of; I know of nothing of that kind. In a
number of cases where there were small gendarme posts they would jump the
gendarme posts to get the arms and tunmunition, principally, and they used
the uniforms which they captuie<l. There were a number of fights there
where gendarme uniforms were seen with the bandits.
Mr. HowB. You spoke of them jumping small towns. Do you mean that
gendarme posts were in those towns?
Gen. Catlin. Not necessarily; no.
Mr. Howe. Sometimes with posts in the towns and sometimes not?
Gen. Catlin. Yes. It would not necessarily be a town. It would be a small
community, like, for instance, near Ennery. They went through a district
there, which is on the road from Ennery to St. Michel — that is, on the niaio
road up to Cape Haitien — went through one night and burned all the houses
in the district for about 3 miles, destroyed the growing crops, and carried
everybody off.
Mr. Howe. Then, from March until the time you left, did the same charac-
teristics mark the operations in tlie fighting up there?
Gen. Catlin. Practically.
Mr. Howe. In Port au Prince what were the conditions?
Gen. Catlin. Conditions were apparently comparatively quiet in Port a"
Prince. There were, of course, the usual rumors always going around that
there was going to be an attack on Port au Prince, but it never materialized;
and there were in P(»rt au Prince undoubtedly a lot of people who were assist-
Ing the bandits in a way, both with money and with information.
Mr. Howe. There were no outstanding political occurrences in Port au Prince
at that time; that was, not during your tour?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 658
Gen. Catlin. Nothing at all; and there was absolutely nothing political In
the nprising of the bandits in the field.
Mr. Howe. Will you explain that a little further, please?
Gen. Catlin. By that I mean tlMt there was nothing against the Government
or the Americans really. The bandit uprising was started by Charlemagne,
who had been a Caco leader before he had been imprisoned in Cape Haitien,
and he escaped in September, 1918, and took to the woods and gathered a
few of the outlaws around him, and most of the leaders of the bandits were
old bandits, old Cacos.
Mr. Howe. He described his operations as being against the Americans?
Gen. Catlin. He did that for recruiting purposes, principally, as far as I
could gather.
Mr. Howe. What do you think started this trouble, aside from the escape of
Charlemagne?
Gen. Catlin. I doubt if there would have been any trouble if Charlemagne
had not escaped. I think he started the whole thing.
Mr. Howe. What feeling existed among the people whom he recruited which-
enabled him to induce them to take up arms and operate against the Americans?
Gen. Catun. W>11, that I do not know. As I say, he was one of the old
Caco leaders, and I have been told that there was a feeling among the natives
that they must follow their old leaders. A lot of the ignorant natives and
many of the natives in the hills there are really almost savages. You see
them up in the hills naked, where they never come down, many of them. They
are really savages.
Mr. Howe. Would you say that the operation of the corvee had anything to
do with the creating of discontent which would have made this outbreak
possible.
Gen. Catlin. I think the operation of the corvee possibly aggrevated the
situation. I do not think the corvee had anything to do with the original
starting of it. I think the operation of the corvee undoubtedly sent a number
of recruits to the bandits.
Mr. Howe. Where were you personally during the greater part of the tour
of your duty in Haiti?
Gen. Catlin. In Port au Prince.
Mr. Howe. Under whose direct immediate control were the operations in
the interior?
Gen. Catlin. Lieut. Col. Richard Hooker.
Mr. Howe. You made, however. General, an inspection trip?
Gen. Catun. I made several inspection trips.
Mr. Howe. I am referring particularly to one up to Hlnche and the Hlnche-
Maissade district
€ren. Catlin. I went to Hinche about four times.
Mr. Howe. You made an inspection trip in which you were principally in-
terested in finding out whether the corvee was going on?
Gen. Catlin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. When did that trip start?
Gen. Catlin. That trip took place about the middle of March; I do not re-
member the exact date.
Mr. Howe. Will you please tell us what led up to your taking that inspec-
tion trip?
Gen. Catlin. Rumors had reached me that conditions were unsatisfactory In
that district, and that the corvee was still running. I questioned the gendarme
commander and he stated that it was not; he had issued an order in October
abolishing the corvee; but I believe it was worded so that it covered certain
roads, and had failed to cover the road to Hinche, and he had discovered that
in November, and issued an order to the commanding officer up there to stop
the corvee; but, according to rumors, it was still going on up there. I sent
Col. Hooker up to make a trip through that district, and find out the actual
conditions and report to me. After his report, or upon the receipt of his re-
port, I sent for Col. Williams and showed him the report, and also Maj. Wells,
who was in command of the gendarmerie of the northern district, which Hinche
was in, and they disagreed entirely on the report of Col. Hooker.
Mr. Howe. What was the substance of Col. Hooker's report?
Gen. Catun. I have it here. You can see it, although it is a personal report.
Mr. Howe.' General, this letter from ('ol. Hooker, which you have just handed
me, is the report which you have been speaking about?
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654 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Catlin. That is the report of the investigation.
Mr. Howe. And on which you invited the comment of Col. Williams and Maj.
Wells?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, I think this report should undoubtedly go in the
record. I offer this report of Col. Hooker's for the record, and wilfread it:
Personal. February 15, 1919.
Mt Dear General: I left for Hinche Tuesday last arriving back here to-day.
I inspected the whole district south of San Michel. I am sending this to you
by special messenger, as I consider immediate action most urgent. The Fifty-
fourth Company will leave here for the Hinche district Tuesday at the latest
on a hike, arriving in Hinche next Friday or Saturday. This will give you
time to approve or motlify my recommendations given later in this letter.
I found the following conditions existing : The corvee is still going on, camou-
flaged either accidentally or otherwise by the payment of one gourde to not
tnore than one gourde forty per week per man. Men are kept for long periods
of time on this work, and in order to escape the draft they take to the hills.
Joining the so-called Cacos. The magistrate of Maissade is a bad egg and should
be removed, being back of the corvee and lising about 50 for his own gardea
This can be taken up later. It was very hard for me to find out anything from
the gendarmes themselves, as the entire district was expecting me. I ques-
tioned all the natives I could get to come to mo, and together with information
I received from the priests I am certain that the corvee is at the bottom of the
whole trouble, as it was in 1917 when Hinche was attacked the first time.
The other cause, which is equally as important as the corvee, is the indis-
criminate strong-arm work being pulled off. A great many innocents have
suffered ; and those who are outside the towns, not necessarily with the Cacos,
are remaining In the bush through fear of the gendarmes, who are given and
helped in their methods by officers of the gendarmerie unqualified by in-
telligence or experience to act in executive capacities. I am sorry to have to
state that I got the impression that the officers higher up were approving
these methods.
I ran into a horrible condition in San Michel. On We<lnesday or Thursday 1
had a talk with Lieut. Haug. He was in a frightful mental condition and on
the verge of a nervous breakdown. He volunteercHl and told me the following,
which I corroborated by the magistrat, his interpreter, and the priof^ts; On
the 4th of February he ordered some prisoners to work on the "plact*." When
15 or 20 minutes had passed and the prisoners had not arriv€Hl he went per-
sonally to investigate. A corporal was standing in front of the prison door,
and when questioned, refused point bjank to either let the prisoners out to
work or to obey any order from Haug. Haug then told him to give him the
key to the prison, and when he reached to take the key from the conwral,
the corporal caught him by the throat, and assisted by two other gendarmes,
held him against the wall. Haug tried to pull his gun and found that other
gendarmes had secured their rifles and had them pointed at him threatening
to shoot. Haug is over 50, and he is in horrible physical condition, his mentality
is not strong, and he does not yet realize the enormity of the mutiny. The
next day, while I was out of San Michel, Capt. (Mbbons, of Gonaives, arrived
to make an investigation. Gibbons was supi)osed to have made an investlpition
much sooner, as he knew at least seven days previously that mutinous or
similar conditions existed at San Michel. He claims that he knew nothing of
the assault. When I arrived in the evening I found that he had ci>nducte<l his
investigaticm by informing Haug that he was going to do his best to dri\Te
him out of the gendarmerie and other like remarks. This was while my
orderly, Sasse, was present. He c<mducted the investigation by calling each
gendarme in separately, excluding Haug, and making him stand outside. My
confidential interpreter told me later that the gendarmes were very much
pleased because they had put their officer in a bad hole and would get a new
■ officer, which they wanted. I, unfortunately, was too late to be present before
the investigation started and to prevent Haug from being placed in the posi-
tion of the accused. I took charge later to the extent of ordering Gibbons back
to Gonaives, with instructions to return with sufficient men to place the muti-
neers under arrest and to regarrison the place with reliable men. Wells now
knows of it, and if the gendarmerie does not act immediately and properly I
will take charge. The news of the affair has spread rapidly and may become
serious, although at present I do not believe so if action is immediately taken.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 655
The situation in that whole district is, to say the least, out of hand, and I
strongly recommend the following :
One squad stationed in San Michel, for the present at least.
One squad at Maissade.
The rest of the Fifty-fourth Company at HInche.
I will personally go to Hinche primarily as nearly all the people know me,
and I believe to a certain extent trust me.
Give the men now out two weeks to return to their farms and towns except-
ing, of course, those who through leadership have placed themselves outside the
law.
Promise and see that these men who return are not proceeded against as the
majority of them have been forced through fear to take to the bush and not
important.
Stop the corvee.
In my opinion, I do not believe it would be proper to ^tart a military cam-
paign immediately until all efforts to regain the lost confidence of the people
in us are tried out.
Very sincerely,
R. C. HOOKEK.
In reading this letter over In stmie respects it does not seem strong enough
and In others too strong, but I can not impress too strongly on you that in my
opinion a change of regime is most necessary and do not believe any gendarme
change will help.
P. S. — Private Sa.sse, the bearer of this letter, wa.s \\ ith nie and can give you
any details not included.
Mr. Howe. Was Sasse a white?
CJeu. Catlin. He was a private of marines.
Mr. Howe. In what respect did Col. Williams and Maj. Wells differ in their
conclusions on the rt»port of Col. Hooker?
(Jen. Catlin. In regard to the corvee, they both stated that there was no
corvee ; that all work was being done voluntarily, and that the men were being
paid. As I remember now, they said they were being paid half a gourde a day.
Senator Oddib. How much is a gourde?
Oen. Catlin. A gourde is 20 cents.
Mr. Howe. That was the general average exchange of the gourde, was it?
Gen. Catlin. Yes; that was settUnl by Admiral Caperton down there, at 5
gourdes for a dollar, and it has practically been tliat ever since, although the
exchange has varied a little. I found when I went up through there that they
were paying the men, and the day before I arrived they told him they would get
a gourde a day.
Mr. Howe. Before we go on to your inspection trip, which we do want to
hear about, let us hear, please, in what other respects there was disagreement
with Col. Hooker's report?
Gen. Catlin. W^ell, as I said, in regard to the corvee, and Gen. Williams did
not believe that the action of the gendarmes had any effect on men going to the
bandits.
Mr. Howe. Do you know how this mutinous incident was handled or dis-
po.sed of?
Gen. Catlin. The mutineers were tried by court-martial. I do not remem-
ber what was finally done with them, but that was a gendarme trial.
Mr. Howe. Do you remember whether the court-martial found them guilty
of anything?
Gen. Catlin. I think they did. I can not say positively. I had nothing to
do with it
Mr. Howe. Is it your recollection that this report of Col. Hooker as to this
mutinous outbreak was later on approved substantially at the court-martial?
Gen. Catlin. Oh, yes; undoubtedly.
Mr. Howe. There is no doubt, then, that the circumstances were accurately
reported by Col. Hooker?
Gen. Catlin. None whatever.
Mr. Howe. After referring this matter as you described to Col. Williams,
what was the next step you took?
Gen. CATI.IN. Maj. Wells stated that he had just been through the district.
and I asked him if he was satisfied that there was no corv^. He stated posi-
tively that he was ; that he had seen the men paid off by the gendarme officer.
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656 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Lieut. Williams, at Maissade, and stated that there were not over 40 men od
the pay roll or working — no ; I am wrong there. It was not at that time that
he stated that. He stated he did not know how the men were paid, but he
was satisfied there was no corv6e. I then sent Williams up personally to find
out who paid the men, as there was some talk of the money being turned over
to the magistrate to pay them, and to investigate on his part and make a report,
which he did.
Mr. Howe. Wells, you mean?
Gen. Catun. Wells.
Mr. Howe. You sent him back?
Gen. Catun. I sent him back for his side, for the gendarme report side.
That report was made verbally, not in writing, and when he came back Col.
Hooker and Col. Williams were also present at the time, and he stated the
manner in which the men were paid, and that he found that there were only
that many working, or they were all on the pay roll, and that there was no
corvee.
Mr. Howe. Was this verbal report made at Port au Prince?
Gen. Catlin. At Port au Prince ; yes. The two reports were so diametrically
opposite that I decided to go up into the district myself and find out, if pos-
sible, what the conditions actually were. So that, I think, it was about the
middle of March that I took Col. Williams with me and went up to Hinche.
Mr. Howe. Your investigations there, as I have heard, were investigations
of the corv6e, and incidentally to that you heard reports of killing of prisoners,
and made investigations along that line?
Gen. Catun. Yes; my object in going was to Investigate the general condi-
tions. As I was practically new to the country and found I could not get from
reports a very good idea, I went up to satisfy myself what the conditions
were, and to satisfy myself in regard to the corv^.
Mr. Howe. Was that your first visit to the Hinche district?
Gen. Catun. My first visit; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. General, will you please describe your inspection trip and just
how you went about it and what you found out?
Gen. Catun. Well, I went up to St. Michel, and was joined there by Maj.
Wells and Col. Hooker, and then proceefled to Maissada first. Just before ar-
riving at Maissada I found a gang of about 45 men working on the road, witli
gendarme sentries over them, and I stopped, and, through my interpreter,
questioned the most intelligent looking members of the gang, and they all
stated that they were not there of their own free will but were there because
they had been ordered there. Several of them stated that they had been
brought by the chief of section. There was no chief of section at that time,
but he had been changed to the chief of agriculture. The old chief of section
in Haiti used to have a great deal of authority in his section.
Mr. Howe. He was a civil Haitian officer?
Gen. Catun. He was a civil Haitian officer, and most of the natives frtt that
they had to do whatever the chief of section told them to do, and they had
been directed to report to the point there for work, and had come because they
did not dare not to come. A number of them stated they had been working
in their gardens, and had been ordered out to come, and their gardens had
gone to the bad because they had not been able to work there.
Mr. Howe. Let me Interrupt you there. Did you gather that these people
had been ordered by the chief of section or the chief of agriculture, and not
by the gendarmes?
Gen. Catun. Most of them; yes.
Mr. Howe. Did you find or did some of them tell you that they had been
ordered there by tlie gendarmes?
Gen. Catlin. Yes; in one or two cases the men had been brought in by
gendarmes.
Mr. Howe. That is what they said?
Gen. Catun. Yes; tlie.v said gendarmes had come out and told them to come
in to work and they had come along. I asked them if they had used any force,
and they said no ; they did not have to use force, because when a gendarme told
them to that was enough for them.
Mr. Howe. According to the answers you got, what proportion were directed
to come by the gendarmes and what proportion were directetd to come by other
officers?
Gen. Catun. I can not remember that, but there were only a few that were
directed l)y gendarmes, as I remember it.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 657
Mr. Howe. And the rest?
Gen. Catlin. The rest were mostly ordered by the chief of section. There
were a few who claimed that they had been told to come into a meeting or some-
thing in town, at Maissade, and when they got in there they were locked up for
the night and then put on the gang.
Mr. Howe. Now, w.U you go ahead, please?
(Jen. Catlin. After questioning a number of these men, I then asked all who
were there involuntarily, not of their own free will, and who did not want to
work on the road to step across the road, and all but three stepped across.
These three I questioned, and they said they were overseers and they lived in
Maissade and they could not say anything else. I then told them that all those
that wante<l to do so could go home, and did not have to work unless they
wanted to; that if they wanted to come back and work for money they could
do it, and the following Monday I understood that six men came to work.
Mr. Howe. What happened on that particular occasion when you told them
they could go home and leave work If they wanted to?
Gen. Catlin. They stopped work ; work was stopped.
Mr. Howe. What time of day was that?
Gen. Catlin. It was in the morning, about 10 o'clock, I should say, 10 or 11
o'clock.
Mr. Howe That was the end of work there for that day?
Gen. Catlin. That was the end of work there for that day.
Mr. Howe. Was the next working day Monday?
Gen. Catlin. The next working day was Monday.
Mr. Howe. And it was on the next working day that only six of them re-
turned?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What else developed on that occasion?
Gen. Catlin. I then proceeded into Maissade.
Mr. Howe Excuse me just a second. I mean at the time you were question-
ing the road gang, were there any other features developed by your ques-
tioning?
Gen. Catun. Not then.
Mr. Howe. Did you learn at that time in questioning the gang as to the resi-
dence of the members of the gang? Were they working in their own district
or were thev there from other districts?
Gen. Catlin. As far as I remember, the majority of them wore working in
their own district. They all came from the vicinity — in the district around
there.
Mr. Howe. Did you strike any cases where they said they came from dis-
tricts farther away? , , u. ,
Gen. Catlin. As I remember It, there was only one man who clalme<l he had
been captured by gendarmes in the foothills, and as far as I could gather from
the information' apparently he was a bandit.
Mr. Howe. What did you learn from them as to the amount of their pay?
Gen. Catlin. They state<l they had been receiving half a gourde, and that
they had been promised the following Monday that they would get a gourde a
day.
Mr. Howe. They had bt*en receiving half a gourde a day?
Gren. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Do you know what the prevailing labor wages were hi that dis-
trict?
Gen. Catlin. A gourde a day was fair pay.
Mr. Howe. And half a gourde a day was less than fair pay?
Gen. Catlin. It was a little less, yes. Although there were districts where
half a gourde a day was paid.
Mr. Howe. Did that pay include subsistence?
Gen. Catlin. No; the men fed themselves.
Mr. Howe How many st»ntries were there, General?
Gen. Catlin. Two, as I remember It
Mr. Howe. Armed?
Gen. Catlin. Yes; armed.
Mr. Howe. Gendarmes?
Gen. Catlin. Gendarmes.
Mr. Howe Could they have been performing any other duty than that of
guarding the corvee gang?
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658 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Catun. The officers stated they were there to guard the conr6e gang^
from the bandits.
Mr. Howe. Which officer was that?
Gen. Catun. Williams.
Mr. Howe. Col. Williams?
Gen. (Utun. No; Lieut. Williams.
Mr. Howe. Dorcas Williams?
Gen. Catlin. Doras Williams.
Mr. Howe. What conclusion did you reach on that. General? Were tliey
there to protect the ganj; or to prevent the pmg from nmninj; away?
Gen. (Utlin. Well, my idea at the time was that they were there to keep the
gang from running away.
Mr. Howe. What led you to that conclusion?
Gen. Catlin. Simply the fact that the men were there involuntarily; and
that there was as I say, one man wlio apparently was a bandit, a caco him-
self, that had been captured near the foothiils, running off some cattle, I be-
lieve, and he would probably take to the. woods when he got a chance.
Mr. Howe. Was Col. Williams present at this time?
Gen. Catlin. Col. Williams was standing beside me ; yes.
Mr. Howe. What, if any, comment did he make on the developments there?
Gen. Catlin. None whatever at that time.
Mr. Howe. Did he offer any explanation of the apparent inconsistency be-
tween the facts as you found them and his report?
Gen. (Ratlin. Yes. A little later he state<l that his idea was that these men
had made the statements to me because they thought that was what I wanted:
that that was the Haitien custom.
Mr. Howe. Did you regard that incident of that gang working there as a
violation of the orders stopping the corvee?
Gen. Catlin. I did; yes.
Mr. Howe. And you still so regard it?
Gen. Catlin. I do.
Mr. Howe. In the course of that inspection trip, or other inspection trips,
did you come across other states of affairs which you regarded as a violation
of that order against the corvee?
Gen. ("atlin. Yes; I found in Hlnche that same day among other ihlngB
that the gendarmerie had been building a prison and barracks at Hinche. I
believe they were very short of money, and the gendarme officer had rounded up
all the inhabitants of a certain district called Zebguinea and brought them into
Hinche and presumably for protection. Zebguinea being at the foothills, also
claiming that it was a bad district and that no one but bandits were left there
anyway and these men were either bandits or in favor of the bandits, and tbat
these men had all been worked on these barracks to build the barracks and the
prison, and paid nothing, but were fed.
Mr. Howe. Were these men prisoners?
Gen. Catlin. They were not prisoners, but they were kept in a compound
there. They had all been releasetl or let go before my arrival.
Mr. Howe. Were they detained in the compound against their will?
Gen. Cattjn. I assumed so. They had no other place to sleep. probabl.v.
The town was full of people. They were detained in the town. The.v were
not allowed to leave the town.
Mr. Howe. How many days' work did they work there, do you know? What
was the extent of that job?
Gen. Catlin. I do not know that. It was quite a building that was put up
there.
Mr. HowK. Masonry?
Gen. Catlin. Masonry.
Mr. Howe. What part did they take in the construction of the building, did
you hear; what kind of labor?
Gen. Catlin. Well, the stone all had to be carried from the quarr.v some
distance.
Mr. Howe. What did you find out about the magistrate at Maissade who Col.
Hooker said was using 50 men for his own garden?
Gen. Catlin. I was unable to get any information on that. The only person
who would mention it at all was the priest of Maissade, who apparently was
afraid of his life and would not go into the town. 1 saw him at St Michel.
He claimed the magistrate had two men hired to kill him and he would not ?o
to the town. I think he was crazy, because his statements were wild.* But
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in Maissade I was unable to get any infarmation, because there was no one
working. If tJiey had been there, they left before I arrive<l,
Mr. Howe. Aside from these instances, were there any further violations of
that order stopping corvee?
Gen. Catlin. Not that I know of — ^not that I heard of.
Mr. Howe. Do you believe these instances marked the end of the corvee in
Haiti?
Gen. Catlin. I think so. •
Mr. Howe. General, in your investigation there did you learn how this road
gang was paid and who paid them?
Gen. Catun. Yes; the road gang was paid personally by the gendarme
officer.
Mr. Howe. And, in your opinion, was there any chance for the chief of sec-
tion or of agriculture to come in on the pay of these men in any way?
Gen. Catun. No ; when I say they were paid in that way, I mean they were
paid that way when I got there, but how long before they started that I do not
know.
Mr. Howe. Did you form any idea as to why these chiefs of section were
sending in recruits for the road gang?
Gen. Catlin. I did not go into that, because I was satisfied myself that the
eor\-ee was going on, and my main object was simply to stop it, but my idea
was that they were probably acting under the orders of the magistrate of the
town.
Mr. Howe. Was there anything in it for the magistrate?
Gen. Catlin. No ; except it was a very nice thing to get a good road put in
there. It was hard communication in that country. I would like to say here
that in regard to this corvee it covered only a very small section of Haiti ; that
this was only in this one locality, not in any other part of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. That is the breach of the orders?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Howe, That leavos nm to ask how much of Haiti the corvee system ex-
tended over when it was at its height?
Gen. Catlin. Well, I was not there at that time, but, as far as I know, it
only extended over on the road from Port au Prince to Cape Haitien. The
principal corvee was in putting through that road. As far as I know, the corvee
was never used in the southern part of the island.
Mr. Howe. I want to go back again and ask you about the chiefs of section.
Was there anything you learned which would lead you to l)elieve that before
you got up there and inspected any money had been paid to the chiefs of sec-
tion for wages for the corvee gangs?
Gen. Catlin. No : I had no reason to believe it had been.
Mr. Howe. Is there anything more that you might add about your investiga-
tion of the corvee at that time?
Gen. Catlin. Nothing.
Mr. Howe. What other subjects did you investigate?
Gen. Catlin. Well, I called for the magistrate, the judge de paix, and the prin-
cipal leaders of the town to come l>efore me, and questioned them on cond'tions,
etc. The magistrate and the judge de paix said everything was all right and
working nicely. There were some cx)mplaints, of course, against the magistrate
by natives, but those were things which I did not take up. It was the busfiness
of the gendarme officer, not mine.
Mr. Howe. Did you hear reports of the killing of prisoners?
Gen. Catlin. At Maissade I questioned a lot of gendarme privates. In fact,
two or three wanted to come before me; and they came and at least two stated
that their officer, Lieut. Doras Williams, had killed a native named Gamier,
who was, I believe, a local lawyer or something like that there.
Mr. Howe. When you say a local lawyer, would he be described down there
as a notary?
Gen. Catlin. A notary, yes ; and these two men, two privates, stated that this
man Gamier had been sent for on the day after the attack by the bandits on
the town, had been brought to the office, and had been beaten to death with
a club. The first sergeant denied it, and Lieut. William denie<l It, and the magis-
trate denied it, and so did others. I found out upon further investigation that
these two men who made the original report had both had a gr\idge against
Lieut. Williams for treatment which they had received from him. One of them,
I believe, was found asleep on a post, and he had been kicked up because he
had been lying down asleep, and the other man something else;^90 I dejcided
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660 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
that there was probably nothing in it, as those two men who had the grudge
were the only ones who said anything about it. The others denied it absolutely,
although Williams admittetl that the man had d.ed in his office, but he and the
first sergeant both claimed that he had been shot. He had been in a house
which was between the gendarmes and the bandits on the night before, and he
had l)een shot in the stomach, and when he came over he was wrapped up with
a towel, and he died from the eflfects of the wound.
Mr. H#wB. Therefore, in this Gamier case, where the accusation was made
against Lieut. Williams, you toolc no action because you did not l>elieve the
accusation ?
Gren. Gatlin. I took no action l)ecau8e I could get no test'niony except from
two men who had a grudge against the lieutenant — two gendarmes.
Mr. Howe. You mentioned talking to other witnesses, and I gathered that
they testified in a way contrary to the statement of the two gendarmes?
Gen. Catlin. Including the first sergeant of the detachment and the magis-
trat of the town and the Judge de paix.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether this case of the killing of Gamier and the
accusation against Lieut. Williams was one of the subjects taken up by the
Mayo court of inquiry?
Gen. Catun. I have been told so. I do not know it personally.
Mr. Howe. MaJ. McClellan, is it your recollection of the Mayo court of in-
quiry ^record, which we are going to put in the record as soon as we have an
opportunity to call MaJ. Dyer, that Lieut. Williams was exonerated of this
charge of killing Gamier?
MaJ. McClellan. Yes ; to such an extent that there is in the record of the
Mayo court, I believe, a copy of a Haitian document which states that it Is
not known how he met his death ; in other words, it was an accidental death.
They do not know whether it was a caco bullet or an American bullet that
killed him in this scrap around there. It is very definitely stated that his
death is not attributable to Lieut. Williams.
Mr. Anoell. What is that Haitian document, do you know, Major?
Mr. Howe. It is in the record here.
Mr. Chairman, I asked MaJ. McClellan that question at this time because it
seemed to me that there should be some mention of the findings of the Mayo
court in the record in connection with this testimony of Gren. Catlin about Lieut
Williams. In other words, in Justice to Lieut Williams, if he was later ex-
onerated after investigation, it would be better for it to appear in the record
at this time.
I will read from page 205 of the record of the Mayo court of inquiry a letter
which, it is there testified, was written by the Judge de paix on Febmarj* 15,
1919, to the commissary government of the city of Gonaives :
" Commissary : I am in haste to inform you that the bandits took the village
yesterday noon. During the fight the notary. Gamier Jean, who was at home
and whose house was between two fires, was wounded. No one can say if the
bullet was fired by the gendarmes or by the cacos.
"After the battle he was sent for to come to the ofl5ce of the gendarmerie,
where he died a short time after. During this time his house and effects were
put under seal. The bandits were repulsed.
" I salute you, commissary, with respect.'*
(Jeneral, in addition to this accusation against Lieut. Williams, did you bear
accusations against other ofl^cers of the gendarmerie for the killing of pris-
oners?
Gen. Catlin. Yes ; upon my arrival at Hinche I sent for the priest, the magls-
trat, the Judge de paix, and several other natives and questioned them sepa-
rately in regard to conditions and their knowledge. Their statements were
rather wild. The priest stated that over 50 persons had been killeii at Hinche.
but he had not seen any of the killings; he only heard it from hearsay. The
magistrat, as I remember, stated that a number had been killed. He did not
state how many, but other people placed the number anywhere from 2 to 10.
After talking with all of these people, I went into the house. I had this hearing
outside on the porch. I went in the house and questioned Capt. La vole, who
had been in command of the gendarmes at Hinche. At first he stated there had
been no killings, but when I informed him of what I had heard from the magis-
trate and the priest, he said there had been six persons killed there at Hinche,
He stateil that they were bandits and had been captured in a fight up in the
hills ; they had since tried to escape several times, and caused a gpod deal of
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 661
trouble In prison and had been killed. I questioned a lot of the gendarmes, but
none of them would admit that they knew anything about any killings.
Mr. Howe. This is Capt. Ernest La vole?
Gen. Catun. Capt. Ernest Lavoie.
Hr. Howe. Of the gendarmerie?
Gen. Catlin. Of the gendarmerie at that time.
Mr. Howe. He was an enlisted man?
Gen. Catlin. An enlisted man in the Marine Corps.
Mr. Howe. Did Capt. Lavoie make any statement as to whether these six
prisoners Who had been shot were shot at his orders, or with his previous
knowledge?
Gen. Catun. I do not remember that any absolute statement was made to
that effect, but that was the understanding, that he was responsible for their
being shot, although he stated that he was not present at the shooting.
Mr. Howe. Did he state whether or not those six killings took place while
he was in command there?
Gen. Catun. He did ; yes.
Mr. Howe. Did you bring any charges against Capt. Lavoie?
Gen. Catun. I did not.
Mr. Howe. Did it seem to you that the other witnesses whom you inter-
viewed there furnished corroboration of the admission of Capt. Lavoie that
prisoners had been shot?
Gen. Catun. Not entirely. The statements made by the other witnesses
were also wild, and a number of statements made were, on the face of them,
false, and I did not consider that ther statements amounted to anything, one
way or the other, as far as corroboration went.
Mr. Howe. However, did you believe Capt. Lavoie, when he told you that
six prisoners had been killed there while he was in command?
Gen. Catlin. I partially believed it, and partially d*d not, because Capt.
Lavoie is a man who sort of loved the theatrical part of it, and liked to brag
about what he had done, and I do not think that the man was entirely right in
his mind ; I dd not think so at that time. I think he was queer, and without
further other corroboration, i would hesitate to believe that they had been
killed. I talked the thing over very carefully with Gen. Williams for several
hours, the whole matter, and finally came to the conclusion that a court-martial
was not the thing.
Mr. Howe. What reasons led you to that conclusion?
Gen. Catlin. Well. In the first place, I did not believe that it could be proved
by witnesses. Undoubtedly if he had been brought to trial he would have
pleaded not guilty, and I did not believe that any court would accept the
testimony of these witnesses that I had heard. I considered that if the man
was brought to trial and acquitted it would have a very bad effect with the
natives particularly, who would say that we hAd whitewashed the man, and I
thought it was better not to try him. It was a question of policy more than
anything else.
Mr. Howe. Do I understand you to say that you feared an acquittal would
have an unfortunate effect?
Gen. Catun. At that time ; yes.
Mr. HowEw At that time, on the natives?
Gen. Catun. On the natives.
Mr. Howe. At that time what effect do you think a conviction would have had?
Gen. Catlin. I could not imagine a conviction would have affected matters
one way or the other — much.
Mr. Howe. To what extent then. General, dfd reasons of policy prevail in your
mind, and also to what extent did doubt as to the ability to convict Capt.
Lavoie influence you in bringing no action at that time?
Gen. Catun. I can not say exactly to what extent, because they were botli
considered and both entered into my final decision.
Mr. Howe. Was there any other aspect to your decision not to bring charges
against Capt. Lavoie w^hlch you would like to mention?
Gen. Catun. Not that I know of.
Mr. Howe. What action, other than bringing charges, did you take in the
case af Capt. Lavoie and Lieut. Doras Williams?
Gen. Catlin. I considered that their services were no longer of any use in
that district; that they were simply harmful, and I directed Col. Williams to
detach them at once, and ordered them to Port au Prince, and to take steps
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662 INQUIRY INTO 0C5CUPATI0N OF HAITI ANI> SANTO DOMINGO.
to have them removed from the gendarmerie, because I did not think they
were proper officers for tlie gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. How soon afterwards, do you know, did they get out of the
gendarmerie 7
Gen. Catlin. They did get out, but I do not. remember now the exact date. It
took some little time. It had to be done in the States ; orders came out from
the States.
Mr. Howe. Orders to relieve tJiem from gendarme service?
Gen. Catlin. Yes ; but they were taken to Port au Prince very shortly, and
were kept In Port au Prince under the colonel's eye all the time, in barracks.
Mr. Howe. When they finally were relieved of duty with the gendarmerie,
they revertjed to duty as members of the enlisted forces of the marines?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Do you know anything of the subsequent history of either Lieut.
Williams or Capt. Lavoie?
Gen. Catlin. Personally, no.
Mr. Howe. Do you know how long either of them stayed in the Marme Corps?
Gen. Catlin. I do not. The records will show that, but I do not know.
Mr. Howe. Did you, on that inspection trip, hear of any other cases of the
killing of natives?
Gen. Catlin. No.
Mr. Howe. Subsequent to that inspection trip, did you hear of cases of the
killing of native prisoners?
Gen. Catijn. The case I heard of was the case at Croix des Bouquets, which
is near Port au Prince, where a man was taken out, a man was captured one
evening and executed that night.
Mr. Howe. Under whose order?
Gen. Catijn. Lieut Brokaw.
Mr. Howe. That was the incident which was the subject, matter of the
courts-martial of Pvts. Johnson and McQuilkin?
Gen, Catlin. It was.
Mr. Howe. What about the case of Ryan?
Gen. Catt.in. Ryan was an officer of the marines stationed at St. Michel. He
was reported for having shot, two natives near Grande Riviere. After investi-
gation by Col. Hooker, I directed his trial by court-martial, and he was being
tried when I left the island. I understood afterwards he was acquitted.
Mr. Howe. Were there any other cases of alleged killings that you heard of
during that time there?
Gen. Catlin. There was a case of a gendarme killing some prisoners, I be-
lieve, one or two being Santo Dominicans, which took place several months
before my arrival but for which I ordered a military commission for the trial
of one man, and he was acquitted by the military commission.
Mr. Howe. That military commission met at?
Gen. Catlin. At Cape Haitlen.
Mr. Howe. Was that the only military commission you appointed?
Gen. Catlin. The only military commission during my regime.
Mr. Howe. Was the case to which you refer the only case In which yon ap-
pointed a military commission?
Gen. Catlin. That was the only case in which I appoint^ed a military com-
mission.
Mr. Howe. I understand that the provost court can not inflict the death
penalty.
Gen. Catlin. No.
Mr. Howe. The military commission is the only body under martial law
which can sentence txy death?
Gen. Catlin. A court-martial could sentence to death, but only for milltarr
people, people under their jurisdiction, not for civilians.
Mr. Howe. Not for civilians?
Gen. Catlin. No.
Mr. Howe. Could a gendarme have been tried — a gendarme private— by a
court-martial?
Gen. Catlin. He could have been tried by a gendarmerie court-martial, not
by a marine court-martial.
Mr. Howe .Why was it that this gendarme, accused of killing prisoners.
\^"as tTie<l before a military commission?
Gen. Catlin. Because — well, it was directed by Admiral Snowden. The
probability Is it was because one or two of the people supposed to have been
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 663
killed belonged to a different country, b^onged to Santo Domingo. It was
right on the border where it took place.
Mr. Howe. So there may have been some doubt as to the Jurisdiction of the
gendarmerie court-martial?
Gen. Catiin. Yes.
Mr. HowB. Is this a correct statement: After you heard these accusations
against Lavoie, did all other accusations of illegal killing of natives lead to
charges and court-martial?
Gen. Catlin. Yes ; every one that was heard of.
Mr. Howe. There are no exceptions to that statement?
Gen. Catijn. No exceptions.
Mr. Howe. Every one that was heard of? •
Gen. Catun. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Do you know of any death sentence Imposed by gendarme general
courts-martial?
Gen. Catlin. No.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether there were any or not?
Gen. Catlin. I am positive there were not
Mr. Howe. During your time you know of no death sentences imposed by any
commission?
Gen. Catlin. There were none imposed by any court with which the Ajneri-
cans had anything to do.
Mr. Howe. General, the other day here before the committee Lieut. Spear,
formerly in the Marine Corps, testified that at a point about 16 miles from
Mirebalais, at a time probably in the month of May, 1919, he was on duty
with, as his- commanding officer, Capt. Thomas Edwards, commanding the One
hundredth Company of Marines, or a part of it, and that a relieving force of
marines under other officers came out near the station of this One hundredth
Company, or a part thereof, and the relieving force brought two native prison-
ers, and that Capt. Edwards informed him, Lieut. Spear, that those two prisoners
were brought with orders for their execution, or words to that effect — ^probably
words not to that direct effect, because one of these men was returned
alive to Mlrebalais. Lieut. Si>ear testified that his commanding officer, Capt.
Edwards, told him to guard these two prisoners, which he did for two or
three hours, and that thereafter one of the prisoners was marched out in
front of one of the marines and shot ; that is to say, one of these prisoners to
whom Capt. Edwards had referred when he said they were received with
orders to execute them, and that May, 1919, was during your tour of duty down
there, was It not?
Gen, Catlin. It was.
Mr. Howe. Did you hear in any way of any sentence of death emanating from
any tribunal, passed on any native during that time?
Gen. Catlin. I did not
Mr. Howe. Whether in the district of Mlrebalais or anywhere else?
Gen. Catlin. Anywhere in the island.
Mr. Howe. You are able to state positively that during your time no sentence
of death was passed by a commission ?
Gen. Catlin. Positive.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether or not military commissions had been con-
vened by your predecessor, or by any of your predecessors?
Gen. Catlin. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Howe. Would you have known of the existence of a prisoner under sen-
tence of death passed by a military commission previous to your arrival?
Gen. Catlin. Previous to my arrival?
Mr. Howe. I mean if there had been in custody during your tour a native
under sentence of death you would have known of It?
Gen. Catlin. Certainly ; I would have known of it.
Mr. Howe. Can you state whether or not there was any such?
Gen. Catlin. There were none, and previous to my arrival there were no
troops or prisoners or anything else In the districts you have referred to, Mlre-
balais and Las Cohobas.
Mr. Howe. The truth is that this One hundredth Company and others to wliich
I referred were some
Gen. Catlin. Were sent there by me.
Mr. Howe. Were put In by you or came In there after 1919?
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664 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Catlin. May probably is the period.
Mr. Howe. Do you know who was in command at Mirebala:s at that time?
Gen. Catlin. I can not state exactly now. Lleot. Col. Walter N. Hill was in
command a part of the time.
Mr. Howe. Was there a Maj. En^ery in command there at any time?
Gen. Catlin. No ; Maj. Emery belonged to tlie gendarmerie and was on road
work, etc., but was not in command.
Maj. McClellan. This man referred to was a gendarmerie officer, was he not?
Mr. Howe. Was Hill a gendarmerie officer?
Gen. Catlin. Hill was a gendarmerie officer, but I had him report to me for
temporary duty and hsid put him in command of that district of the marines.
Mr. Howe. When Hill was absent fron? headquarters was there another officer
there subordinate to him who would act in his place?
Gen. Catlin. Certainly. The next senior officer would act in his place.
Mr. Howe. Do you recollect at this time who was his next senior officer?
(ien. Catijn. I do not at this time.
Mr. How^e. It would be the purpose of the committee to question all officers
who could have given that order for the execution there at Mirebalais. I was
wondering if, besides Maj. Hill or po.ssibly Maj. Emery, there were any others?
Gen. (I'atlin. Maj. Emery could not have given orders to the marines, as gen-
darme officers were not allowed to issue orders to the marine officers. There
was a Maj. Pearce at Las ('ohobas.
Mr. Howe. Was he on gendarme duty or with the marines?
Gen. Catlin. No ; he was a marine.
Mr. Howe. Was I*earce ever performing duty which would permit him to art
in place of Hill during the temi>orary absence of Hill?
Gen. C-atlin. Yes.
Mr. HowB. How far away would Maj. Hill have to be from his headquarters
to make it proper for his next in command to act?
(;on. (^atlin. As soon as he was out of sight, if he was going anywhere. .
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether Maj. Jacob M. Pearce was ever acting at
Mirebalais in the absence of Maj. Hill?
(Jen. Catlin. No; I do not know. I inuigine. though, he must have been a
number of times.
Mr. Howe. Is there anybody else there who could have b€»en during the momh
of May or the early part of June, 1919, acting in command?
Gen. Catlin. Yes; any officer who might have been left. You see. the (h^
tachineuts were being sent out at different times. Capt. Edwards would go out
to his company or a part of it, and some officer would be left with the inx^ps
in Mirebalais. Now, during that time, whenever Col. Hill found If necessary
to go to a different part of the country — Las Cohobas, or anywhere — the senior
officer left would be in command temporarily of the town.
Mr. Howe. Where would be any records from which we could learn who was
in command, or acting command there, during the month of May, 1919?
Gen. (Utlin. Those records would all be in Port au Prince in the brijr^i'It*
headquarters. All records were there in regard to operations and where the
troops were.
Maj. McClellan. Tliey would not show the temporary commands, thou?h.
Gen. Catlin. No; they would not show the tenji)orary commands, but tliev
would show what officers were out there.
Mr. Howe. And what officers could have been in temiwrary command?
Mr. Angell. You testified. General, that to the best of your knowledge the
corvee bad actually been In operation only on the Port au Prince-Cape Haitien
road. Was that just your understanding of it, or are you reasonably confident
of that?
Gen. Catlin. That is my understanding. I know nothing personally of it;
it is only from hearsay, what I heard In regard to it.
Mr. Anoell. Are you able to give us any estimate of the number of men
who had been engaged at any one time in forced work on the roads under the
corvee?
Gen. Catlin. No; absolutely. As I say, all my information is hearsay. I
heard of camps of 2,000 men, etc., but that is all. As to the actual number I
have not any idea. Gen. Butler would be the only man I know of who could
give the actual number, probably,
Mr. Anoell. Did you see any of those camps yourself, or what was left of
them, when you came there?
Gen. Catun. I saw places wiiich were said to have been camps, one or two.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 665
Mr. Angell. Did you ever hear whether or not those camps were surrounded
by barbed-wire inclosures? You never heard of any such rumor?
Qen. Oatlin. Not barbed wire; no. I heard they had Inclosed camps, and
the men were kept in them.
•Mr. AivGELL. And kept in them by armed guards?
Qen. Cablin. Yes.
Mr. Angell, Were those guards, so far as you heard, always gendarmes, ^or
were they sometimes marines?
Gen. Catlin. Always gendarmes. AH the corvee was worked by the gen-
darmerie, as far as I know.
Mr. Angell. Were these camps, so far as you know, in charge of white gen-
darmerie or marine officers?
Gen. Catlin. Yes. As I say, my information is all hearsay on the corvee,
because it all took place before I went down there.
Mr. Angell. All you know of your own personal knowledge of the corvee
was what you found out on this Inspection tour at Maissade and Hinche?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Angell. What is your understanding of the meaning of the word
"corvee"?
Gen. Catlin. The meaning of the word "corvee" in the corvee law of
Haiti was that men could be taken to work in their district upon the roads for
a certain length of time each year, and upon the completion of that time they
were given certificates that they had so worked and completed their work.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember what that period of time was?
Gen. Catlin. I do not remember; roughly, I should say, two weeks, but I do
not remember. As I said, the corvee did not interest me, the corvee itself.
It was simply a question of stopping the corvee that interested me.
Mr. Angell. Was it your understanding that the corvee administered prior
to your time liad been in conformity with the old Haitian law or custom?
Gen. Catlin. As I understood it, the corvee, as first started, was in compli-
ance with the law, and that later, in building the road to Cape Haitien, it was
found, in going through a district where very few people lived, that there was
not enough labor to do the work, according to the law, and that natives were
brought in from 'other districts.
Mr. Angell. And was it your understanding that these natives were kept
beyond the statutory period of service?
Gen. Catlin. I have heard so. These statements I have made in regard to
the corvee are absolutely from hearsay evidence, not from any knowledge on
my own part.
Mr. Angell. Can you tell, General, from your conversations with Haitians and
other American officers in Haiti, particularly from any conversation with CoL
Kussell and among our marine officer, that there had been the policy in the
later period of the corvee of taking men and making them work in districts
other than their own and keeping them beyond the statutory period of time, etc.?
Gen. Catlin. No ; I do not know who did that. All I ever heard was that the
corvee was started under Gen. Butler's regime, and presumably carried on during
his regime as gendarmerie officer.
Mr. Angell. What do you believe that Charlemagne and the other Caco leaders
against whom the operations were conducted in 1919 intended and hoped to ob-
tain by their operations or activities out there in the hills?
Gen. Catlin. It is impossible for nie to state what they believed ; I have not
any idea. Of course, they were outlaws. They could not come in themselves
without being imprisoned.
Mr. Angell. How are they outlaws; in what sense?
Gen. Catlin. Well, Charlemagne was an outlaw, because he was serving a
prison sentence as an outlaw, and escaped at the time. Norde was an outlaw.
Mr. Angell. For the same reason?
Gen. Catlin. Norde had not escaped. Norde had always been an outlaw
in the hills, as far as I could gather.
Mr. Angell. He never had been brought to trial?
Gen. Catlin. To my knowledge he never had been.
Mr. Angell. Was that generally true of the other Caco leaders?
Gen. Catlin. Of the principal ones, I think. Some of them were new. One
of the principal ones down on the southern side of Mirebalais was a young
fellow.
Mr. Angell. Had Charlemagne, by the way, been tried and imprisoned by
our forces?
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666 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Catlin. By the provost court.
Mr. Angell. For some violation of the criminal law?
Gen. Catlin. No; banditry, in 1917.
Mr. Anoell. For being in armed opposition to the Hatian Government and
the American occupation?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Angell. And sentenced to Imprisonment?
Gen. Catlin. For a certain period ; I do not remember the period.
Mr. Angell. From which sentence he had escaped?
Gen. Catlin. He had escaped from the gendarme sentry working over lilm
on the road, and disappeared.
Mr. Angell. To what extent do you believe the opposition to the presence
of the American military forces in Haiti contributed to the existence of the
opposition under the lead or inspiration of Charlemagne and his immediate
followers?
Gen. CatliN'. None.
Mr. Angell. You believe, then, that the sole motive for the activity of
these Irregulars, the Cacos out in the hills, was criminal banditlsm?
Gen. Catlin. The sole motive at first was that, and their motive afterwards,
and their fighting against the Americans, was to protect themselves in tte
hills.
Mr. Angell. Protect themselves from what?
Gen, Catlin. From the Americans who were trying to chase them down.
Mr. Angelt^ Did you ever hear. General, that Charlemagne was actuated
by a very strong feeling of racial hatred against the whites, the Americans?
Gen. Oatlin. I never did.
Mr. Angell. Did you ever hear his forces referred to as the patriot army?
Gen. Catlin. No. He called himself the commander in chief of the forces
operating against the Americans in several letters which I saw of his.
Mr. Angeix. Did he attempt to get into diplomatic communication with the
British charge d'aflPaires down there?
Gen. Catlin. Yes ; and with different people, and he wrote letters to different
public officials, asking them to come out.
Mr. Angell. Did he purport to have a cabinet?
Gen. Catlin. Yes; a cabinet.
Mr. Angell. Is there any distinction. In your mind, between the term
" Cacos ** and the English word " bandits " ?
Gen. Catlin. Yes ; a Caco Is not the proper term for these people.
Mr. Angell. For which people?
Gen. Catojn. For the people who were out In the field at the time. In 1918
and 1919.
Mr. Angell. Who were Cacos?
Gen. Catlin. They were Improperly called Cacos. The Cacos, as I nnde^
stand it, were the old leaders of bands which were not necessarily bandits.
They were really simply separate bands who lived by themselves, while the
people who were In the field In 1918 and 1919 were bandits, according to the
English Idea of a bandit.
^Ir. Howe. The English-language Idea, you mean?
Gen. Catlin. The English -language Idea.
Mr. Angell. Referring, General, to the case which was mentioned In a long
question put to you by Mr. Howe regarding Lieut. Spear*s testimony of an
execution of one man, under orders of Capt. Edwards, can you say. from yonr
own personal knowledge of the sentences of courts-martial and the military
commissions, either immediately prior to the time when you took command In
Haiti or during the time when you were in command, that such an execution
as was mentioned by Mr. Howe in his question, assuming it to have happened,
could not liave been lawful?
Gen. Catlin. I can not, as no military commission or court-martial conW
have been ordered except by me.
Mr. Angell. So that if, tlien. such a killing, In fact, did take place?
Gen. Catlin. It was unwarranted,
Mr. Angell. It was unwarranted?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Angell. General, do you remember the sworn statement which you gave
before Lieut. Col. Lay. I believe, in Washington, at the end of December, 1919?
Gen. Catlin. Before Col. Lay; no.
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ESTQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 667
Mr. Angell. Can you find that. Major?
MaJ. McClkllan. Yes; it is here.
Gen. Catun. That was a statement I made to the Secretary of the Navy.
MaJ. McClkllan. Yes ; he put it under oath afterwards.
Gen. Catlin. I remember mailing a statement to the Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. Angixl. There are two reports or statements. I Just want to identify
them.
MrJ. McClellan. Did the general make two of them?
Mr. Anokll, Yes; he made a statement to Gen. Lay, which it attached to
what we call the Turner investigation, on December 31, 1919 and he also
wrote a letter, at the request of the Secretary of the Navy, dated September
20, 1920. Do you remember having made such a statement?
(5en. Catijn. Yes; I remember now.
Mr. Angell. Could you have written a letter to the Secretary of the Navy,
under that later date, about September 20, 1920?
Gen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Angell. I wonder if you can and will possibly in the intermission Just
read over those two, of which there are copies here, and then Just state on the
record whether the testimony there given or the statements there made are
gabstantially correct, as you now recollect.
Gen. Catlin. That is correct — the testimony I gave there.
Mr. Angell. I want to ask you a few questions, further. General about the
conditions at Hinche and the alleged Lavoie incident there. In your statement
before CoL Lay you said : " I consider Maj. Wells principally responsible for
the conditions as found. He stated he made frequent inspections of all posts,.
and it is inconceivable that he should not have known something of the con-
ditions.** That is, as you now recollect it, an accurate statement of your con-
Tictlons at that time?
Gen. Catlin. Yes ; although this statement was made, of course, after I came
back from Haiti, and my idea in regard to the responsibility of Maj. Wells was
not what my idea was at the time of the inspection at Hinche. Things came up
afterwards which caused me to change my idea in regard to MaJ. Wells and to
consider him more responsible than I did at thnt time.
Mr. Angell. When you say " at that time,'* you mean at the time of the in-
restfgation at Hinche?
Oen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Angell. And later, if I understand you, you became convinced that there
was a greater degree of responsibility attached to Maj. Wells?
GJen. Catlin. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Do you mean by that answer to refer to the cau.ses or to the
general conditions, which?
Gen. Catlin. No; I mean the general conditions and the lack of supervision
and inspection which I found Maj. Wells had.
Mr. Angell. MaJ. Wells was a major of marines and colonel in the gen-
darmerie?
Gen. Catlin. Yes; he was colonel in the gendarmerie and had charge of the
northern district which took in Hinche at that time.
Mr. Angell. Did you, as brigade commander in Haiti, consider that the gen-
darmeiie officers, and ultimately the marine officers not of the gendarmerie,
were generally responsible for conditions as they existed?
Qea, Catlin. No ; I could not say that.
Mr. Angell. To what extent then, would you say that the gendarmerie offi-
cers, for example, were responsible for general conditions?
Cten. Catlin. I would not say the gendarmerie officers were responsible for
conditions. I do say that I consider Maj. Wells principally responsible for his
lack of supervision.
Mr. Angell. In that district?
Qea, Catlin. In that district I think the conditions In the rest of the island
were nndonbtedly very good.
Mr. Angell. That was on the other side, then, to the credit to your mind, of
the gendarmerie officers, and ultimately the marine direction?
Cten. Catlin. It might have been; it might not. It may have been that the
people were different in the gendarmerie. I do not know whether the condi-
tions were different or not.
Mr. Angell. Did you regard the conditions In the gendarmerie and the general
action of the gendarmes to be the ultimate responsibility of the gendarme offi-
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668 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAlTf AND SANTO DOMINGO.
cers and, in a military sense, the final responsibility of the higher officers of the
marine occupation?
Gen. Catlin. Yes ; the conditions In the gendarmerie was the responsibility of
the gendarmerie officers, undoubtedly.
Mr. Angell. And the gendarmerie was, in the last analysis, responsible to
and generally directed by the marine officers of the occupation?
Gen. Catlin. The marine officers were in compaand of the gendarmerie ; they
were the upper officers of the gendarmerie.
Mr. Angell. Was the ultimate responsibility that of the Haitian ciWl Govern-
ment, or of the marine occupation?
Gen. Catlin. Really, the marine occupation had nothing to do with the policy
of the gendarmerie — that is. with their actual work in the field. They were
theoretically under the brigade commander — that is, the general of the gen-
darmerie— ^but the brigade commander had nothing to do with the troops in the
field or with the under officers except through the head of the gendarmerie.
Mr. Angell. Did the brigade commander confer with the chief of the gen-
,darmerie as to matters of gendarmerie policy and discipline? •
Gen. Catlin. No ; that was entirely a Haitian matter.
Mr. Angell. How was It, then, that, for example, you, if I understood you
correctly, had Lieut. Doras Williams and Capt. Lavoie transferred from the
HInche district to Port au Prince?
Gen. Catlin. I did that because I was going into a district with marines to
take command and considered that they were not the proper men to have there,
and the officers of the gendarmerie are still attached to what they call the
constabulary detachment of the brigade. They are under the control of the
brigade commander for disciplinary purposes only, not for other purposes.
Mr. Angell. What effect do you think the change of Article VI of the old
constitution, the article which prohibited the ownership of land by foreigners,
had in the general feeling of the population toward the United States and the
American occupation in Haiti?
Gen. Otlin. I am unable to state. My personal idea is that it probably had a
bad effect in a way.
Mr. Angell. The change?
Gen Catlin. Yes ; I think not so much in the feeling of the natives as In the
feeling which was engendered by certain leaders.
Mr. Angell. I do not understand the difference.
Gen. Catlin. What I mean to say Is that the people themselves, I do not
really think, cared very much, the majority of the people.
Mr. Angell. You spoke of the feeling engendered?
(xen. Catlin. Yea; engendered by the leaders.
Mr. Angell. Engendered among the Haitian people?
Gen. Catlin. Among some of the Haitian people. Some of the propaganda
Issued by Charlemagne was along that line.
Mr. Angell. Was that feeling very strong?
Gen. Catlin. Well, I am unable to state, because I was not In touch with
the Haitian people, and I could not say.
Mr. Angell. You were not in touch with the Haitian people?
Gen. Catlin. No. I, of course, had certain dealings with the people In Port
au Prince, but outside of that I was not in touch.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, it has been the intention all along to get the en-
tire record of the Mayo court of inquiry and exhibits on the record here, bat
that has not been fomially put on the record because it was hoped It would be
put in in connection with the testimony of Maj. Dyer, who was judge advocate
of that court of inquiry, and we are having difficulty finding time to pot In
Maj. Dyer here as a witness. I, therefore, suggest that the whole report be
admitted In evidence now, with the understanding that later on such parts of
it as may be a duplication of other matter which has already been admitted,
mny be left out from the printing or the record, and that perhaps a summary
or digest of the testimony there may be printed in lieu of printing the whole
testimony, but my present proposition is to admit It in evidence so that it may
be referred to now as one of the exhibits.
Si'uator Oddie. If there is no objection it will be so ordered.
Mr. Angell. You testified. General, that you did not believe that a conviction
in the event that Capt. Lavoie had been court-martialed would have afPected
matters very much?
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INQUIEY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 669
Gen. Catun. Yes.
Mr. Anqell. Why?
Gen. Catlin. Well, I do not know that I can give any particular reason, ex-
cept a conviction would be expected in case of a man being guilty in the service,
and if a man is convicted you would naturally suppose that everything is car-
ried through all right, while if a man is acquitted there are always a lot of
people who are willing to say that it was a whitewash.
Mr. AiMOELL. Do you not feel, though, that a conviction, if a man had been
tried and proven guilty, would have had or might have had a beneficial effect
on the attitude of the natives toward the gendarmes in that district?
Gen. Catlin. I did not consider it so. If I had considered his conviction as
probable, I would undoubtedly have ordered the court-martial.
Mr. Angell. In this large compilation of the Mayo court of inquiry records,
attached thereto as Exhibit 5, is an official report from Gen. Lejeune and Gen.
BuUer of their investigation in 1920 into conditions in Haiti, and as a part of
that Lejeune-Butler report. Exhibit 5, there is attached a r6sum6 of testimony
taken by tliose officers wherein, at page 5, I find the r^sum^ of the testi-
mony of Lieut. Col. Richard S. Hooker. Col. Hooker at tliat time was not
assistant chief of the gendarmerie?
Gen. Catlin. No. You mean at the time of this?
Mr. Angell. At the time you were brigade commander in Haiti?
Gen. Catun. No ; he was in command of a regiment of marines stationed at
Cape Haitien in the north of Haiti.
Mr. Angell. He was later assistant chief of the gendarmerie?
Gen. Catlin. He was assistant chief after I left.
Mr. Angell. I want to read from one paragraph of this report and ask you
about it. This is Col. Hooker's testimony, or a r^sum^ of his testimony, in
which, referring to the investigation which he made upon your order, he says,
" That he wrote a note on a Corona typewriter to Gen. Catlin, setting forth the
result of his investigation ; that he kept no copy of his notes ; and that no record
of it could be found in the files of the brigade headquarters at Port au Prince,
Haiti.*' That, presumably, is the typewritten letter which you have introduced^
* Gen. Catlin. That is the letter which has been introduced to-day.
Mr. Angell. "Col. Hooker further states that Gen. Catlin, before leaving
Haiti, said to him (Col. Hooker) in substance as follows: *I suppose you
wonder why I never did anything about the Hinche matter.* Hooker said,
* That he did.* Whereupon Gen. Catlin further stated in substance : * That he
did not do anything because it was during the period of the consideration of
the Versailles treaty ; and that he did not wish to embarrass our President by
having stories of cruelty appear about our own soldiers when we were taking
a position on the side of humanity,' or words to that effect**
Do you remember whether or not you did make such a statement to Col.
Hooker?
Gen. Catlin. I do not remember making any such statement.
Mr. Angell. Would you say that you did not make such a statement?
Gen. Catlin. To the best of my knowleclge -and belief I did not, because I can
say that no such statement had any influence on my action in regard to the
case. To the best of my knowledge and belief no such statement was made.
Senator Oddie. I would just like to ask you one question. I want to ask what
is your personal opinion of the value of Haitian testimony?
Gen. Catlin. I do not think it has any value, sir. My idea, from seven
months down there, is that a Haitian, as a rule, will testify to whatever he
thinks is to his best interests.
Mr. Awgelu Were you called before the Mayo court?
Gen. Catlin. I was not.
Mr. Angell. Do you remember where you were on dufy in the fall of 1920?
Gen. Catlin. I was living in Washington at that time.
Mr. Angell. You were retired at that time, and were living in Washintgon?
Gen. Catlin. I have been in Washington since I retited in December, 1919;
I have not been out of the city.
Mr. Howe. Why did you retire, General?
Gen. Catlin. I was retired by a medical board as being not fit for active
service on account of wounds received in France.
(Whereupon, at 1 o'clock 4). m., a recess was taken until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)
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670 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATIOfN OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
AFTER RECESS.
The committee reassembled at 2.80 o'clock p. ni., pursuant to tbe taking of
recess.
STATEMENT OF BBIG. OEN. ELI K. COLE, TTNITED STATES MABIKE
GOBPS, PABIS ISLAND, S. G.
Mr. Howe. General, will you Rive your name, rank and present station?
Gen. Cole. Eli K. Cole, brigadier general, Marine Corps. Paris Island, S. C.
Mr. Howe. How long have you been in the Marine Cori>8, General?
Gen. Cole. Since 1890 ; in the Naval Academy before that.
Mr. Howe. General, you went down to Haiti in 1915, did you not?
Gen. Cole. I sailed on the 3lst of July and arrived there on the 4th of August.
Mr. Howe. On what ship?
Gen. Cole. The Connecticut, and took about 500 men.
Mr. Howe. You were in command?
Gen. Cole. I was in command of the Second Regiment.
Mr. Howe. When did you land in Haiti?
Gen. CoLB. On the 4th of August.
Mr. Howe. Were you at that time the seniormaciii«^ofl*€eri» lajuLia-Baiti?
Gen. CoLB. Yes ; until August 15, N^twirt^rnTWaller arriveil.
■^ Mr. Howe. And then he was senior to you?
Gen. Cole. He was senior to me. I had taken down a regiment and Coi.
Waller had followed on the Tennessee with another regiment, and upon landing
he took command of the brigade, which was then formed, and I was then trans-
ferred to Cape Haitien and took command of the Second Regiment there and
ncte<l as military governor of northern Haiti and conducted the operations in
northern Haiti.
Mt. Howe. You remained with that assignment until when?
Gen. Cole. I remained with that assignment until early in November, as 1
remember it, 1916, when I went to Port au Prince to relieve Gen. Waller, possi-
bly the latter part of November ; the 22d of November I think was the exact
date on which I relieved him and on which he sailed.
Mr. Howe. From that time what was your position?
Gen. Cole. From that time I was in command of the brigade, and was termed
there ** chief of the occupation." That was the name the Haitians had for me.
Mr. Howe. Until when?
Mr. Howe. Until about the 1st of December, 1917. As a matter of fact I was
actually attached to the brigade until the end of January, 1918, I having been
sent up here with the constitution for the State Department about the 1st of
December, 1917.
Mr. Howe. So after the first few days after the landing you were about
16 months In the north?
Gen. Cole. Approximately.
Mr. Howe. And approximately *a year after that as brigade commander?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; a little over a year ; very little.
Mr. Howe. What was the situation In Haiti at the time you landed In Port
au Prince?
Gen. Cole. In Port au Prince?
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Gen. Cole. The landing force of the Wdshington was on shore and In posses-
sion of the city. There were Government troops and revolutionary troop?
around there. Conditions were quiet but unsettled In the city Itself. There was
no government whatsoever other than the committee of safety.
Mr. Howe. There was no President of Haiti at the time?
Gen. Cole. There was no President of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. The last President of Haiti had Just before that been killed, had
he not?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; he had taken refuge, I think, on the night of the 27th or
morning of the 28th In the French legation,* which was right next to the then
palace, and had been wounded, as a matter of fact, that same night. On the
morning of the 29th a mob of about 60 Haitians, under the leadership of Charles
Zamor, had entered the legation— I might go back' a little bit. The day before
the mob had gone In the legation, but the French minister and his two daughters.
H the possible assistance later of Mr. Cohn, the British charge, and Mr.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF iSAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 671
Meyer, our charge, had protected the President. The next morning, the 29th,
Zamor, with these same 60 people, actually Invaded the legation, pushing aside
the one or two Mademoiselles Gireau, the daughters of the Frenrfi minister, and
going through the bedrooms and bathrooms they found him I think under a
bed, and he was taken out and cut to pieces and his body dragged through the
streets. This cutting into pieces, as far as I know, was done actually outside
of the legation compound.
Mr. Howe. How long after that occurrence did you learn that the Washington
landed her party?
Gen. CoLEL Well, I was in the United States, and the first I knew of it
was on the morning of the 30th.
Mr. Howe. Here is what I am getting at. How long had the Washington's
landing party been on shore when you got there?
Gen. Cole. The Washington's landing party — I think I have the date, or
I probably could get it. I got there about five days later, approximately; it
may have been four or five days. I got there on the 4th.
Mr. Howe. Was there active disorder going on at the time you landed?
Gen. Cole. The city was quite quiet, although there was a decidedly tense
atmosphere there, and during the time I was there there were disorders. There
was some shooting at our people, but after the landing there was very little of it
Mr. Howe. What, if any, Haitian was in authority or control in the city?
Gen. Cole. The only control was the revolutionary committee, called the
committee of safety, of which I think Mr. Polynice and Gen. Zamor were
the two principal members. Mr. Polynice was a merchant but not, so far as I
know, a member of the revolutionary forces.
Mr. Howe. Under whose direct orders were you after you landed?
GJen. Cole. Admiral Caperton's.
Mr. Howe. You spoke of revolutionary troops being in the vicinity of the
city. Where were they and what were they?
(sen. Cole. I never saw many of them. They were around outside of the city,
but we did not go outs.'de of the city, except on one or possibly two occasions.
About August 7 I sent Capt. Fay some 12 or 15 miles outside of Port au Prince,
to the Plain of the Cul de Sac, to hunt up a bandit by the name of Desgantes,
who was said to have 15 or ^ followers and who was pillaging and robbing on
the plains, and Capt Fay captured him and a lot of his followers. They were
armed.
Mr. Howe. Were there any other troops other than the United States forces
near by?
Gen. CoLB. There were Government troops in the city, and Government troops
and revolutionary troops on the plain, and particularly around St Mare and
Gonalves.
Mr. Howe. That was farther north?
Gen. Cole. That was farther north.
Mr. Howe. Was there any fort or garrison in the city of Port au Prince?
Gen. Cole. There was ITOrt Nationale, which was on a commanding eminence
right close to the city and which was occupied by the Haitian forces.
Mr. Howe. As distinguished from the revolutionary forces?
Gen. Cole. As distlnguishefl from the revolutionary forces. I landed on the
4th, and on the 5th we took Fort Nationale. There we found 14 cannon, 450
rifles, and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition. We tried to do everything we could
to prevent bloodshed or armed resistance, and I got hold of one of the leading
generals left in Port au Prince, and after considerable discussion and a great
deal of hesitation on his part, and a promise to do it. and a backing out, and
then a promise to do it — and we in the meantime were making preparations
to take the fort if It became necessary, because It dominated the city, and with
the ammunition, etc., there, it would do untold harm — he agreed to surrender
the fort and a lieutenant of the Navy, who had command of two of the com-
panies from the Washington, was detailed as the officer to receive the surrender,
and he and this general entered the fort by the drawbridge, and the surrender
was made. However, quite a good many of the people jumped over the para-
pet and ran away, but we did nothing In regard to them, because what we were
after was the arms, so that there would be no fighting.
Mr. Howe. As a matter of fact, what disposition was made of such of the
' garrison as did stay to surrender?
Gen. Cole. Those that surrendered, as I remember it, were placed for a short
time in the old barracks, the Dessalines Barracks. On the 6th we disarmed
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672 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
all the soldiers we could find in the city. We rounded them up. There was a
general division of the city into sections, and a rounding up in those sect.ons
of the soldiers, and the taking of their arms, and they wei*e held for a short
time ; those who belonged to Port au Prince were sent to their homes, and those
who belonged outside were held for a time and then sent to their homes. As a
matter of fact, it was rather a laughable situation at one time, because whenever
we counted the prisoners we always had more. We turned them loose and they
would find their way back, l)ecause they were getting fed, and Port au Prince
at that time was almost on the verge of 8tar\ation. As a matter of fact, it
was very badly undernourished and there were a considerable number of deaths
from starvation, so much so, and the situation was so bad, that I recommended
to Admiral Caperton that a dispatch be sent to the United States to the Red
Cross requesting that funds be furnLshed so that we could have money to 8i)end.
Mr. Howe. For feeding the population?
Gen. Cole. For feeding those who were in actual want The Haitian officials
had not been paid for a long time. The school-teachers had not been paid for
an exceptionally long time, because education was the last thing they thought
of, and I remember one case of a family of some 12 or 13, the mother a Bchool-
teacher, as I remember it, or the sister, possibly, and it was apparent to me that
this family was practically starving, so we provided food from our own 8ur»-
plies in all cases of that sort where we found them. But she had been a school-
teacher and had not received any pay for 18 months. Nobody could live under
conditions of that sort
Mr. Howe. In the occupation of the fort no shots were fired, and there were
no casualties; is that correct?
Gen. Cole. There were no casualties, and I do not think any shots were fired.
If there were any shots fired, they were shots fired from the fort I do not
think there was any resistance whatever, and no attack whatsoever on the fort
Mr. Howe. In the disarming of the other soldiers in and around the dty
were there any casualties?
Gen. Cole. There were two. Two Haitians were killed, one at the custom-
house and one on a street outside what they call the Ecole Normale.
Mr. Howe. That brings you up to the day
Gen. Cole. That brings us up to the 6th.
Mr. Howe. To the 6th of August?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What was your mission in landing. General?
Gen. Cole. My mission in landing was to preserve peace and order in the
city of Port au Prince, to protect property, and protect lives; knowing or
suspecting the irresponsibility of those people who had arms, the only thing to
do was to get the arms away, and there were vast quantities of arms in the
city, and a steamer came in just about that time and it had a lot of arms on
also, which we naturally did not allow to get to the Haitian authorities.
Mr. Howe. What conditions were there prevailing which justified, if you
think they did justify, the landing of the marine forces there or American armed
forces there at all?
Gen. Cole. That, of course, is a question to be decided by the State Depart-
ment. I can give my own opinion in the matter.
Mr. Howe. That is what the committee wants.
Gen. Cole. First and foremost right then and there, was the fact that withhi
a few days there had been a massacre of some 240 prisoners, mostly political, in
the municipal prison of Port au Prince, and a condition of anarchy which
existed throughout the whole of Haiti. In 1908 a President was elected, and
in 1911 he was deposed or poisoned. If I may turn to some notes I have, I
can give you
Mr. Howe. Will you refresh your recollection from them and state what those
condit:ons were prevailing?
Gen. Cole. I have the following memorandum : " In Haiti in 1915 the country
was in a state of anarchy, with all attendant ills.
**A. Some 240 Haitians, including many of education and influence, were
massacred in the prison at Port au Prince on the night of July 27, 1915, for
political reasons, by order of the then president of Haiti, Guilluame Sam, in an
endeavor to stamp out revolution, which apparently was going to overthrow hii
administration. *
** B. Owing to constant civil warfare, the crops had not been equal to tne
needs; produce was seized by armed bands whenever the owners tried ^^^
to the larger towns, particularly Port au Prince and Cape Haitien, and in these
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 673
towns many were without adequate food, apd some were actually starving to
death.
•* C. Roads had ceaseil to ejcist, heing impassable for vehicles at all seasons,
and in rainy seasons only donkeys could go over the trails, and then only with
small loads and in danger of being drowned in mudholes.
" D, Telegraphs and telephones were practically destroyed.
" E. The postal service was dishonest and inefficient and the mails unsafe,
due to dishonesty of employees and to the operation of revolutionary bands.
** P. Prisons were pestholes and lilletl with prisoners whos^e only sources of
food were charity and relatives an<l whose only offenses were enmity of officials.
" G. Hospitals were nonexistent or absolutely lacking in means of support
and for providing treatment to the sick.
** H. Practically no sanitary measures were taken by the Haitian officials,
and with few exceptions funds collected were used for benefit of officials and
their followers.
** I. Practically all male persons were under arms (forced levies) or in
hiding.
•* J. The school system was entirely a political affair, and, with the exception
of tlie schools maintained hy the church, there were practically no e<lucational
facilities for the poorer classes, and these in a few localities only ; probably 95
per cent were illiterate.
" K. Such police as there were were politico-military in their character and
tools in the hands of their chiefs.
'* L. The Judiciary was venal and generally only responsive to political favor
or to litigants who could pay for decisions.
" M. Revenues, including customs, were spoils of political success.
" N. Voudauxism was rampant
" O. But for the fact that a great war was raging in Europ**, there seems
but little doubt but what a European country would have attempted control
in Haiti — at least unless we took control ourselves. German Influence was
^oing to predominate, and unless conditions set forth above were checketl we
would have faced an aggressive enemy at our doorstep or have given way to
one, with the attendant ills of such a procedure or backdown."
Mr. Howe. Was that paragraph 3 you just read?
Gen. Cole. Paragraph 2.
Mr. Howe, Will you read paragraph 3?
Gen. Cole. Paragraph 3 is a question as to how the situation has changed
now.
Mr. Howe. You need not go into that.
Gen. Cole. I did not think you wanted to go into that at this particular time.
(Thereupon, at 3 oclock p. m., a recess was taken until 4 p. m.)
AFTER RECESS.
The committee reassembled at 4 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
recess.
Gen. Cole. I think you had asked me a question as to my opinion of the
reasons for landing, and I think I had stated that there had been this mas-
sacre, that the President had been killed, and that there was no government.
Mr. Howe. And you gave a number of items as to the
Gen. Cole. As to the general condition of the country.
Mr. Howe. Which, as I take it, would demonstrate a lack of systematic gov-
ernment.
Gen. Cole. There was no government at all. The courts had practically
ceased functioning, and it was a state of each man for himself so far as he
had a chance. Foreign lives had never been troubled by the Haitians. They
had been very careful In regard to that. Foreign property was generally
Mr. Howe. Please let me interrupt there. Do you think if there had been
no active intervention there that foreign lives would have been taken?
Gen. Cole. Not at that time ; but it was a case of disorder piling on disorder,
and conditions were getting worse and worse, and the longer anarchy and where
a condition of that sort exists the worse It is going to become, and it probably
would have been a question of time only before there would have been destruc-
tion of foreign lives and, without any question, destruction of foreign prop-
erty ; but the past history of Haiti had been that they had been very careful
in all their revolutionary activities not to direct them against the property of
foreigners or against the lives of foreigners. They had milked the foreigner
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674 IXQUIBY IXTO OCCCTATION OF HAITI AND SAIJIX) DOMINGO.
whenerer they could in their eonrts and tn tbeir demands — this Is what I am
toUI — In demands for conlribations! etc^ In the way of payments for concessions,
but they had been very careful in regard to property. I do not know how mnch
this had to do with It — this is simply one of my opinions — but the World War
was on, and the condition of anarchy existing in a country of that sort at onr
front door, In the first plat-e, made an intolerable condition against everybodj*,
and, in the second place, the (lerman influence in Haiti predominated. It was
greater than- our OTim influence and it was beyond the FYench. although tbe
French were the o^-ners of practically all of the Haitian loans; but the sob-
marine campaign was getting along about that time, and I believe that one
justiflcation of it would be that we could not have our commerce attacked by
Hubmarines from submarine bases in the West Indies. Of course, that is simply
a personal opinion.
Mr. HowK. That was, of course, before our entry into the war?
Gen. Cole. That was before our entry into the war, but signposts were point-
ing that trouble was going to come sooner or later. Well, it was simply a
general conglomeration of intolerable conditions, a civilization which had gone
absolutely to ruin.
Mr. Howe. In your opinion, was some intervention necessary?
(ien. Cole. Absolutely, unless you wante<l to allow what I think to be almost
the richest part of the globe to become an African Jungle. In the time of the
French the whole country had l»een the richest and best-cultivated colony in the
world. It had financed one or two of the French wars. It was wonderfully
cultivated, and the French had mile after mile of fine roads, and when we
lan(le<l the whole thing was a jungle. As I say, the roads had gone to ruin.
The men had either l>econie soldiers or were Cacos. The lands alongside the
roads were desolate. The iH»ople had moved back into the hills, because either
the (iovemment or revolutionary forces going along the roads wouhl pillage
them. Men were never seen in the towns, except those who live<l there. The
women did all the marketing and things of that sort. On the n>ad between Fort
Lll)erte and Ounamlnthe, al>out 15 or 16 miles, on the trip when we went over
there we did not see one single habitation, we did not see one single hut, and
yet it was said that that stretch of the road on either side of it had supported
a population of al)out a,0(K), and before I left Haiti approximately 10,000
IHMJple hjid come back into the area surrounding Ounaminthe.
Mr. Howe. Were there any other foreign Governments who were interestod
directly in that state of affairs in Haiti?
Gen. Cole. The French were materially. They were the only ones besides
Germany. As I said, the French were the owners of the Haitian loans.
Mr. Howe. After you landed there what did you learn about the movement of
Bobo?
Gen. Cole. Bobo had been in the north of Haiti, around Cape Haitien; and
under arrangements made by Admiral Caperton he was embarked, as I remem-
ber it, on the Jason, some time about the 3d or 4th of August, because he
arrived in Port au Prince on the 5th.
Mr. Howe. Who w^as Bobo?
Gen. Cole. Dr. Bobo was a Haitian physician, a man who was educated abroad,
of considerable ability, inordinately, I understand, vain, and I guess he stood
away above the majority of the Haitians in intellect.
Mr. Howe. Was he a presidential candidate at that time?
Gen. COIJ2. He was a presidential candidate at that time and had declared
himself the p*)P8essor of ihe executive power. I have forgotten the term he
used for It, but he had declared himself in that position ; and, without any ques-
tion, If we had not landed In Port au Prince 1 think Bobo would have been the
President of Haiti and that he would have brought his revolutionary army into
Port au Prince; and, as always was the case, the national assembly would have
elected him as President. The su(*cessful revolutionary leader usually declared
himself the iK)ssessor of the executive jiower, and then, upon his arrival In
Port au Prince, the national assembb' gave legality to his claim by electing
him President. They had to do it.
Mr. Howe. Had the town and the fort been disarmed bv the time they had
arrived?
Gen. Cole. The town was disarmed. I think, the day after Bobo arrived, and
the fort was taken the day he arrivetl. That is my recollection of it
Mr. Howe. What relations did Bobo establish with you or Admiral Caperton?
Gen. Cole. Personally, there was practically no relation between Dr. Bobo
and niysclf. I gave him protection and gave him a guard. He came there under
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 675
the safeguard of Admiral Caperton, and I had instructions to safeguard him,
and he was informed that I would safeguard him. A few days later, I thinlc
probably at the time of the election, he toolc refuge. He left the place where
he was safeguarded — we did not interfere with his movements at all — ^he left
his place and went to th^ British Legation. The British charge d'affaires, Mr.
Cohn, came to me and begged me to dispose of Dr. Bobo; that he did not
want him; and I told Dr. Bobo that we absolutely would protect him; that
there was no danger to his life, and I think the arrangement was that he went
on board a steamer leaving for some other port in the West Indies and went to
Jamaica that day or the next day. At no t me, so far as I have any knowledge
whatsoever, was there any attempt on our part to do bodily harm to any of
them. We tried to handle the thing without bloodshed and without interference
with personal lU)erty. We stopped license.
Mr. Howe. When was the election called?
Gen. Cole. The election was called on the 12th of August
Mr. Howe. When was notice of the election given? .
Gen. Cole. Notice was given on the 11th of August, and on that day a revo-
lutionary committee issued instructions dissolving the national assembly, and
they were informed, I believe, by Admiral Caperton, that such action was not
permissible, and they were rather obstrei)erous, as I remember it, or some of
them were, and they were ordered dissolved.
Mr. Howe. The revolutionary committee?
Gen. Cole. The revolutionary committee. I think that was on the 12th.
Mr. Howe. Dartlnguenave was elected on the 12th, was he not?
Gen. Cole. Prirtlnguennvr wnH_rh^'tt^ on the 12th.
Mr. Howe. Was there any military acfTvITy?
Gen. Cole. In connection with the election?
Mr. HowK Jes. No; I did not mean that. Was there any military activity
at tlie time of the election, in town or out?
Gen. Cole. The only military activity on the da;r of the election was this:
There had been repeated reports of attenjpted disorders in case of an election,
and as military commander I was responsible for the i)eaceful holding of the
election, so I made arrangenjents with the president of the Senate and the
speaker of the Chaniljer of Deputies that admission to the assembly place of
the National Assembly .shouhl be by card, signed cards. lie gave me the list
of people that wanted to come, including the deputies, and the number that
were allowefl to attend as 8!)ectators. as I remenjber it, vvns limited, and we
required the people who tmteretl the Inclosure where the National Assembly
met to have these signetl cards.
Mr. Howe. Who slgnetl the cards?
Gen. Cole. The cards were, to the best of my recollection, signed by either
the president of tlu^ Senate or sjieaker of the (Muimber of I^inities and counter-
signeiLby me. That is niy recollei'tion of it.
•Mr. Howe. Were they issued to all njembers of the Senate and the Assembly?
(ien. Cole. They were given, to my recollection, to the Haitian otflclals of the
Senate and the Chamber for delivery. They had to sign these cards, and I
<'ountersigned them and kept the list of the people that went in. That is my
recollection of it now. All of the area for one square around the i)lace of
assembly was held by troops In order that there couhi be no overt act against
the Assembly.
Mr. Howe. Which was during the election?
Gen. Cole. Which was during the elec?tion. There were no American soldiers
inside of the Cliamber at the time, to the best of my knowledge and belief. I
was at the front gate myself all the time to see that the people who entered
had the proper cards, and In the case of any dispute the highest military au-
thority wouhl be there to settle it; but there was no attempt to prevent those
people who had any right to get In from going In. The only thing was to pre-
vent any disorder.
Mr. Howe. Then, after the election?
Gen. Cole. After the election Mr. Dartiguenave held a reception and Insisted
on be:ng accompanied by (me (Gunner Sergt. Miller, who was afterwards called
the Vice President of Haiti. The President could not go anywliere without Mr.
Miller.
Mr. Howe. Did Miller stay with him?
Gen. Cole. He staye<l with him until almost before I left. Shortly before I
left, Miller wanted to get back to straight duty, and he went back to duty as
lieutenant of the gendarmerie. Dr. Bobo left about that day — the day of the
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676 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
election — or the next day. I think it was the next day. Bobo, when he arrived,
was allowed to parade throuf^h the streets with his followers, about 50 or 60.
I took precautions to see that there was no trouble or interference \i1th him.
He was told that he could not start any revolutionary propaganda, or anything
of that sort, but so far as his ability to see his friends, or anything of that sort.
was concemeti he was free.
Mr. Howe. Was there any firing on patrols outside after the election?
Gen. Cole. Yes; once or twice, as I remember it. I have a note of once: "On
August 14 a patrol was fired on."
Mr. Howe. But otherwise?
Gen. Cole. Quiet.
Mr. Howe. Col. Waller arrived on the 15th and you left the next day; istliat
correct ?
(Jen. Cole. I left th^ next day for Cape Haitien.
Mr. Howe. What was your position at Cape Haitien?
Gen. Cole. In cummand of all military forces in the north and militarj-
governor.
Mr. Howe. When did you arrive at Cape Haitien?
Gen. C^OLE. The 17th.
Mr. Howe. What was the situation when you got there?
(ien. Cole. The landing forces from the Connecticut and from the XashvUle.
as I remember it, were occupying the town of Cape Haitien. The cacos were
outside of the town. There are two roads into Cape Haitien only, one by way
of Haut de Cap and one by way of Petite Anse. There are two niads entering
Cape Haitien, one by way of Haut de Cap from the south, and the other fnnu
the Dominican border, and they go oft like that [indicating]. The approacli to
the town is quite limited, and those approaches were held by Cacos.
Mr. Howe. How near in?
(Jen. Cole. Their outpost toward Petite Anse was al>out a mile and a half, ami
the other way it was three-quarters of a mile. The other entrance was farther
out of the town, and at Haut de Cape it was about 3 miles out
Mr. Howe. How long had the American forces been in occupation there?
(Jen. Cole. I think they had been there for a little over two weeks.
Mr. Howe. What was the situation in town as to food?
Gen. Cole. Very scarce. Nothing couUl come in. The Cacos did not allow it
to come in.
Mr. Howe. What disposition did you make when you got there? Did you take
troops there with you?
(fcn. (.V)LK Yes; I went right on board the Tennessee and went up with a
battalion and came down toward the station on the Tennessee,
Mr. Howe. With ab(»nt 500 mcMi?
Gen. Cole. Four hundred or five hundred. My orders were to presene peace
and order in ('aiK» Haitien for the time being, and not to start any conflicts
with the Cacos. and I simply took the necessary steps to protect Cai>e Haitien.
estnbUshoil outposts at the entrances to the town, and patrolle<l the immediate
vicinity within the outposts.
Mr. Howe. What did you do about the food situation?
Gen. (*oij<:. Well, that kept getting worse and worse, but some little stuff
came in, but very little, and there was a very decided shortage of foodstuff".
and we could do nothing in regard to it, except to bring it in by sea, .so long a?
tliat condition was allowed to exist.
Mr. Howe. Was that condition allowed to exist?
(Jen. Cotj:. That condition was allowed to exist until alwut the end of
September.
Mr. Howe. The end of September?
(Jen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Then what happened?
(Jen. Cole. 'Now. wait a second. About the middle of September, from tlic
middle to the end. The thing was not opened up until after the 1st of OctobeL
as a matter of fact, but s(»me things did come in, some little amount, but nothinp
like the amount that was neecled. There was a sort of truce, you might say,
un<lerstood, and some little stuff d!d come in, but it was very little.
Mr. Howe. Was there any Haitien Government in Caiie Haitien?
(Jen. Cole. No; there was no communal government. They had resifoied.
There were some representatives of the (Jovernment but there was no govern-
ment.
Mr. Howe. Were any courts there functioning?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 677
Oen. Cole. No courts were functioning.
Mr. Howe. Col. Waller told us that an agreement was signed with the Cacos
in September there, or about that time. Will you tell us what you know about
that. General? ,
Gen. CoT^. Col. Waller came up about the middle of September — the 18th, I
think it was — and he and I, and I think one or two orderlies, met the Caco chiefs
at a place called Carrefour, a mile and a half or 2 miles outside of Cape Haltien.
Gen. Zamor, I think, was instrumental in bringing about that meeting. At
that time my recollection Is that Col. W^eller stated it was necessary that the
orders of Bobo and the other people that had been given prior to the election be
honestly carrle<l out, Bobo having given instructions that his followers in the
north should turn in their arms, disband, and go to the their homes. They had
not done that, and Col. Waller informed them that that would have to be done,
and that he proposed to start patrolling ; that it was necessary for foodstuff to
come into Cape Haitien. After that conference he decided to open up the rail-
road, at least to go to Grande Riviere, which, as I remember it, was about 18
miles from Cape Haitien. We started out with some three squads of men, I think,
and got to the cross-roads at Carrefour, near Quartier Morin, where we were
halted by an obstruction placeil on the track, and we w^re met by the Caco
letiders and told that we could not go on. Col. Waller said we were going on,
and we went on, and they promptly derailed us, they having drawn the spikes of
some of the rails. I put the men out at once alongside of the track, and these
Cacos were across the road at Carrefour, behind the hedges, etc., but there
was no shooting, and we got our train back on the track after a while, and they
were informed that we were going to Grande Riviere. But we went back to
Cape Haitien, and it was deeidetl that the situation was sufficinetly charged
with dynamite that we better have more than three squads, so we took about
GO men, with a machine gun, put sand bags on a flat car and built up a parapet,
etc., and started out, and we went to Grande Riviere that night. It was one
of the wildest rides I ever took.
The road had not been used for a period of five or six months, and it was
simply a line going through a young forest. We never knew what was going
to happen. One time the engineer let her go llckity-split down grade, and we
were going 35 miles an hour on this road where you c<mld not see the track in
front of you. W^e got up to Grande Riviere at about 9 o'clock in the evening,
and there was a lot of obstructions on the track there. We were halted right
under a bluff which we found out later the Cacos had occupied with some can-
non, and had them trained on us, but fortunately Col. Waller Induced the Caco
general not to oppose our entrj', and we went on into Grande Riviere. We si)ent
the night there and a part of the next day, loaded up all the produce that was
in the station awaiting shipment, and took that back to the cape, mostly coffee.
Then Col. W^aller went back to Port au Prince and I had instructions not to
start patrolling until I got orders; along abcuit the 23d, I think, or the 24th, I
got instructions to start patrolling, and to notify the Caco leaders that we were
going to start this patrolling; that we did not Intend any harm to them, but
that we were going to patrol ; that we must have the food coming in, and that
while we were making these patrols we did not intend to oi^en tire on them,
but that they must not open fire on us; that if they did we would then certainly
take forceful action.
On the 2,')th of September I sent two patrols out, one to Haut de Cap about
3 miles outside of the town, in the morning. They went through some of the
('aco patrols and they did not stop u.s. Our patrol went to Haut de Cap. On
the way back there was considerable shouting at one point,* and apparently they
were about to fire upon our men, so our troops just put their machine gun in
iwsition, the Cacos quieted down, and we came on in.
The siime afternoon I took a patrol out to Petite Anse, and we rode by their
outi)ost. As a matter of fact, their outpost was at the crossroads, Petite Anse
being off the main road. I toolc one company past their outpost, and the other
company went on through Petite Anse and came back. This day they had evi-
dently been surprised and their outpost commanders evidently did not know
what to do about these patrols.
The second day I sent out two patrols of i\J[)out 40 men with a machine gun
in both cases. One, I rememl>er. was to go to Haut de Cap, and then on to the
town of Plain du Nord. The other patrol was to go past Petite Anse and then
across the Plain, and eventually join with the other colunm at Haut de Cap
on its return from Plain du Nord. They had the same instructions as the
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678 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
others, and we sent interpreters with them so that there could be no question
as to the thing being understood, that we were going to make this patrol;
that we did not intend to start offensive operations against them but that wc
must make the patrol ; that if they attempted to stop us by force or opened fire
on us, we, of course, would return the fire.
About 9 o'clock I got word from Haut de Cap that the Cacos had said that
if we advanced they would fire on us, and was asked for instructions. I said
the instructions were plain, to go ahead. And our men went ahead and they
were fired on. Our men dropped alongside of the road, and opened fire with
their machine gun. The Cacos scattered through the town of Haut de Cap.
There was considerable firing going on there. I sent out three squads as a
reinforcement, and shortly after that went out myself. There was firing
going on all along out there, and up to three o'clock in the afternoon desultory
firing was kept up, principally from across the river at Haut de Cap, and
considerable firing had been heard in the distance, from Capt. Campbeirs
column. The Cacos had attacked him, and had caught him in a rather nasty
place, and he had a number of his men wounded, but he had successfully ex-
tricated them. We do not know how much loss he inflicted on the Cacos.
He inflicted some, without any question, because they gave it up and left him.
As soon as they got back to the Cape I had a conference with the senior naval
officer present, Capt. Durell, and said that my proposition was that I was going
to Quartler Morln the next morning with all our troops, with the exception of
just a few to hold Cape Haitien ; that I would like him to land a couple of
companies to hold the Cape, my Idea being that if the troops at Quartier Morin.
which was their headquarters, would stand, we would have the Issue decided
then and there ; that if they would not stand, we would ride over the town to
show them we would go anywhere we wanted to.
We started out the next morning. Quartier Morln was 8 or 9 miles away.
We went out there, and there was only one shot fired by us that day. At
Carrefour, about half or three-quarters of a mile from Quartier Morin, we
were met by a Gen. Fouche, a Haitien, who was surgeon general, and he said
that the war was over; that they wanted to be good, and welcomed us to
Quartier Morln. As we were going up toward Quartier Morin there was one
shot fired by a Caco at our column and one of our men took a shot at the man
who had fired and killed him.
We went to the town of Quartier Morin, and I asked for Gen. Moranoy, and
was told that he had business elsewhere and had left the town a few minutes
before, so there were none of their soldiers there. The population of the
town, such as it was, largely women, turned out to greet us, and was very
pleasant, and so on, and Dr. Fouche, the only oflficer who was present, said
that the war was over without any question ; that they had had enough ; that
the day before had been a very severe lesson to them, and that they realized
it would not pay to attack us again.
Gen. Waller, I think . came up about the 28th. I am not certain Just as to
the sequence of events there. I am inclined to think that Gen. Petlon came in
to Cap Haitien, and a few days later Gen. Waller and I, with some others,
went to Quartfer Morin, and Gen. Waller signed the copvention with the Caco
chiefs for them to carry out their Instructions to turn In their arms and dis-
band and go to their homes and take up peaceful pursuits. That Is my general
recollection of it.
Mr. Howe. That, by the way, went into our record here. It was read in as
Gen. Waller was testifying. Did you have any negotiations yourself with these
Cacos at or about that time?
Gen. Cole. I do not think you could call them negotiations. They would
not come into Ciipe Haitien for preliminary negotiations unless I agreed
to go out to their outi>ost wltli one orderly to meet them, and I went out there
to meet thera, but Gen. Morancy would not come in. He evidently was afraid.
Mr. Howe. Who did?
Gen. Cole. Gen. Petlon, with a considerable number of his followers, I think,
came into town, and they insisted that I should accompany them everywhere.
Mr. Howe. You mean back into their own country ; back of their own out-
posts?
Gen. Coi^. Not only through the town, but back Into their own country ; back
to their outpost. As a matter of fact, I accompanied them out to their head-
quarters at Quartier Morin, which was about 8 or 9 miles out, with an orderly.
Mr. HowEi What happened there?
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 679
Gen. Cole. Well, they brought oat some champagne, and had a band and a
few other things, and I distributed some gourdes among the band, and they
cheered me, and then they escorted me back to their outpost.
Mn HowK. It was a friendly visit?
Gen. Cole. It was a friendly visll. Gen Pet ion said that if I would go out —
I had no idea of doing it-— he said that if I would go out with them that it
would do more to bring about peace in the north of Haiti than anything else.
Mr. Howe. Did it have a good effect?
Gen. Cole. It had a splendid effect. It gave me u very big influence with the
chiefs in the north of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. I fancy you must have been more comfortable after the receipt
of this hospitality than on the way out to it.
Gen: Cole. Yes; I was. I was not particularly anxious to go, but it was
one of the things you had to decide like that. They evidently saw that I was
hesitating, and I suppose that tliey thought thai I thought of treachery, which
I did, and I thought, " Well, the best thing to do is to go."
Mr. Howe. In general, what were your relations thereafter with the Caco
chiefs?
Gen. Cole. Very friendly ; very friendly. Gen. Morancy, who was supposed
to be the big chief, used to come into my office and prink himself before the
glass — we alwayr. had one of these big mirrors in the office, one of the signs
of Haiti, and he would step up there before that and prink himself. And
sometimes he would come in crying. They arrested him time and again, and
he would come in cry lug like a child, and look up in the mirror and. see
himself crying, and would straighten up and get along very well. He was a
go(id deal of a buoco, but he had a good deal of force withal. He was a child
in certain ways, but I got along splendidly with Morancy, and exceptionally
well with Petion, who really had the brains of that outfit.
Mr. Howe. Did those two keep the terms of that agreement fairly well?
Gen. Coij:. To the best of my knowledge and belief, absolutely. I had more sup-
port from Petlon than I did from Morancy. Morancy was an entirely different
type of man from Petion. Gen. Petion was a mnn of a great deal of Intelliseuce.
and we discus-SK^l thincs vei*>' frequently, ami he becauu^ convinced after I was
there, at least I though he did, that there was a great deal more for him and
for his country throufjh i)eace than there was through disorder, and at that
time there was a big boom in logwood. German dyes were kept out of our
country, and logwood was selling uway up to the skies, and Petion had large
properties, so he started in cutting log^vood, and I think he cleareil a good
many thousands of dollars.
Mr. Howe. Then, we are now up to the point, after the attacks on those
patrols, where you took Quartier Morin, and where the agreement with the
Cacos had l)e<*n *signe<l. Now, will you outline the developments after that?
Gen. Pole. During October and November there were a considerable number
of arms turneil in. They came in slower than we thought they should come
in, but they came in. The arrangement was that they should be paid for their
arms after they were turned In, and possibly, in part, for the reason that they
were not paid for as turned in, some of the minor chiefs thought that their head
chiefs were taking the money, and as they were not getting anything, they did
not turn Hi their arms. Some of them were opposed to the Americans. You see,
there hpd been revolution after revolution in Haiti, and tliey had lost the habit
of worlf. They did not want to work, they did not want peace, and some of the
bad men. I think I could call them, took to the hills, more or less. They went
up in that area \^bich lay between the Grande Riviere and the Dominican bor-
der, and more particularly up in and around what was called the Capois
district. I trie^' to meet them. I went up in that vicinity two or three times,
and they would promise, but tJbey would not meet us ; they attacked our forces
in one or two places; there was robbery going on all the time, and conditions
gradually got worse In that area; so it became necessary to clean it up, and
we started a systematic campaign of running down these bands.
Mr. Howe. I^et me interrupt right there. IIow would you characterize the
IieopI^ with whom you came Into conflict at first there on the 20th of September?
Were they Cacos or bandits?
Gen. Cole. They were i'acos. Thoy were what I would call mercenaries. I
think that is about as g<»od a definition of what a Caco is as anything I know
of. They were people who sold their arms, that is the use of their arms, mili-
U\ry arms, to any revolutionary candidate. They were, generically, people
who lived in the north of Haiti, and a certain type of peasant aiuj^ ids chief.
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680 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Later on, up near the border, at the time when you said it was
necessary to clear that country up on account of the bafidita, those were not
Cacos any more that you were opposed to?
Gen. Cole. They had been Cacos, and they were Cacos in the sense of the
word that tliey t>elonged to that illt. There were good Cacos and there were
bad Cacos. Most of tlie Cacos that I ran across I rather liked. I liked them
better than the other Haitians. They were more sincere. The Haitian
politician I never had much use for, but I did have a good deal of liking for
the Caco chiefs.
Mr. Howe. Then, were these i)eoi)le that you did liave to proceed against
good ex-CacoB or bad ex-Cacos?
Gen. Cole. I would say they were bad ex-Cacos, most of them. There may
have been some of them who were actuated by patriotic motives. One of their
principal leaders, Joseph, was very bitterly antiwhite, and said that the
Americans had come there to enslave the country. He inflamed a g6od many
people, and got a good many together, a considerable number. He was in
command of For Riviere. The day before our final attack on Port Ri>iere
he took some of his j)rincipal followers and certain minor followers Into the
fort with orders to defend it, and he went off to save his own skin. That was
the sort of patriot he was. He left them there with owlers to fight, and defend
it to the last, and they did. They were not in the habit of giving mercy, and
they had no idea that mercy would be given them. That was their systeui of
warfare, and they fought to the very end in the fbrt
Mr. Howe. General, will you give us an outline of the campaign begimiin?
up at the border there and ending in the capture of Port Riviere?
Gen. Cole. Well, we sent troops up to Grande Riviere, and then we sent them
on to Bahon, which was 10 or 12 miles beyond Grande Riviere. We sent two or
three squads — three squads, I think. They were fired on from across the river.
They were at the railroad station there. Our troops returned the fire and
evidently did some damage, although they never knew how much, because the
next morning they exandned the place and they found trails of blood. They
were withdrawn to Grande Riviere, and the report was received that Grande
Riviere was to be attacked, and there were only about 20 men there. I took a
company to Grande Riviere, I think, that night. Along the border somewhat
the same conditions prevaile<l, and there was a good deal of bandit activity, but
that was cleared up, and Capt. Campbell at (Jrande Riviere was directed to
operate through that countiT and find out what he could about the country,
and Gen. Butler, then Maj. Butler, was directed to make a reconnaissance
from Fort Liber te, by way of Terrier Rouge, Le Trou, St. Suzanne, Grande
Riviere, Bahon, to a place called Valliere, thence back to Ounanaminthe.
There was some trouble around Terrier Rouge, as I remember it, and we seized
some 50 rifles there. Butler's detachment was mounted, but they found the
trails so bad that they could not get through, so the horses were left at Grande
Riviere. I had infornmtion that the principal stronghold was at a place called
Fort Capois, but we could get no Information as to its exact locality. Gen.
Butler, at St. Suzanne, was given information that he believed its location
could be determined from the northern trail from Bahon to Valliere.
The informant said that there were probably three people who could lend ns
to Fort Capois. He was one, and he could not do it, and the other two would
not, without any question. I changed Gen. Butler's route to go by Fort
Dipiti, with the idea of locating Capois. He was attacked when near Dipiti
in the night by what was estimated to be about 400 Cacos but drove them
off; held them off. I think we had a couple of wounded, and continued to
Gros Roches. In the meantime Col. Waller had come north and he Joined
Col. Waller and me at Cape Haitien, and as the result of this reconnaissance a
plan of action was drawn up to attack Fort Capois. The operations were to be
divided into two parts, (a) cleaning up the country east of the Grande RIvIctc,
and (b) the cleaning up of the Fort Riviere district to the west of the Grande
Riviere. The country east of the Grande Riviere was cleaned up, but owing
to the failure of a part of the troops to get to the fort at the proper time most
of its garrison escaped.
Mr. Howe. The fort was occupied?
Gen. Cole. The fort was occupied. It was very well defended. It could
have been held if they had gone about it properly, without any qu^tion.
Some of those people fled across the Grande Riv!ere. We tried to stop them,
but the advance was very slow through that section, and it had to cover a very
wide area, and a ^considerable number got across and took station in Fort
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INQUTRY INTO OCCUPATION OP HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 681
Riviere; after tliat area was cleaned op of the bandits our troops refitted
at (vrande Riviere. I, in the meantime, had been getting a good deal of
information about Fort Riviere; a plan was drawn op and the place was
attacked by four columns coming from widely different directions, but the
time was fixed -so that each column got to the place at the right time, and
the attac); was made at daylight on a certain morning; the fort was occupied
after considerable firing, and some of the people escaped but I do not know
how many. There were about 50 dead counted in the fort and in tlie vicinity of
the fort. There was only one entrance. It was on a high mountain, and it
was a masonry fort with embrasures and a moat, and places inside, cells
inside where they could shoot in every direction, and they simply fought to the
end. They would not surrender.
Mr. Howe. What was the character of the fighting there?
(Jen. ('OLE. Hand to hand, cons'derable.
Mr. Howe. How was entrauce gained?
Gen. Cole. The report was — and I presume it is correct, there was no reason
to doubt it — that our assaulting troops got under the cover of the wall of this
fort at the entrance and they had difficulty in getting in, so Pvt. Gross and
Sergt. lams climbed in through a small sally port and held the entrance, fol-
lowed by Butler and the rest of his men.
Mr. Howe. Gen. Butler got a medal of honor for that, did he not?
Gen. ('OLE. I do not think so. lams did, and Gross.
MnJ. Mc(-LErxAN. Yes; he did.
Mr. Howe. There was n brief resistance then by the Haitians Inside the fort?
Gen. (^OLE. Apparently, and then we blew up the fort, got dynam'te from the
Cape and blew up the fort.
Mr. Howe. That was on November 17?
(ien. Cole. November 17.
Mr. Howe. Did that mark tlie end of the campaign?
(ien. Cote. Yes: :t ended the campaign, but my plan had been, just as soon
as troops could l>e refitted, to start a detachment to Hinche. That was Gen.
Waller's orders, and my plan was to send out other troops and to go all through
the area between the Grande Riviere and the Dominican border, not with the
idea of any offensive action, but with the idea that if any wandering bands
were in that area they would be dlsposetl of. captured, dispersed or killed,
whatever had to be done, and to show the Haitians In that area, in the first
place, that the Americans would go anywhere.
The Haitian Government troops had never been in the Fort Riviere and Fort
Capois districts. It was absolutely an unknown land to them. It was the Caco*s
stronghold jrll through there, and my idea was that by sending troops all
through that country they would .see, in the first place, that .^o long as there
was no resistance we would treat them kindly, and in the second place, that we
went anywhere we wanted to go. I do not think they had any doubt about it,
l>e<*ause we had gone all through that country, but I thought a second going
through it in a peaceable sort of way would be a very good thing; but the de-
partment deeded that there had been enough lesson given to theni and that
probably they would be goo<i.
]Slr. Howe. So you abandoned that reconnaissance?
Gen. Cole. We sent troor>s to Hinche, but in very much smaller numbers, to
get arms down th€»re which were to be turned in. They were n«>t turned In,
nil of them, by any manner or means. They kept a lot of them at Hinche. If
we had sent right away a column in there, I think we would have gotten more
arms.
Mr. Howe. How .soon after was absolute quiet restored?
Gen. Cole. There was quiet from then on. except for bands of robbers, small
bands of four, five, or six, just here and there and anywhere between St.
Suzanne, Le Trou, Limonade, and the border. They usually robbed the market
women. That was their best bet. They always avoided our patrols if they
could ; sometimes they did not.
Mr. Howe. And to that extent there was unrest and trouble there?
Gen. Cole. To that extent there was unrest, but it grew smaller and smaller,
and I adopted the policy wherever a man who had been out would come in and
present himseJf and state that he would be goo<l and would go to his place
to live and keep in touch with us, that unless there was some crime alleged
against him, an actual crime, he would not be confined but given his liberty and
the opportunity to make a good citizen of himself. That was the general
principle. There were practically no punishments, practically mr imprison-
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682 ENQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
ments, on account of that Joseph some time later was captured, and I think
myself, in view of the cowardly way in which he left his followers in Fort
Riviere, he ought to have heen hanged. He was given 10 years.
Mr. Howe. By the provost court?
Gen. Cole. By the provost court.
Mr. Howe. That brings you up to March, 1916?
Gen. Cole. That brings us up to March, 1916. There were a considerable
number of small outbreaks dire<*ted against the gendarmerie. The gendannerie
had, in the meantime, been established, and had been sent out for some politic&l
reason from Port au Prince — that is, for some political reason in Port au
Prince had been sent out to take over the policing of the interior to as
great an extent as possible. They were not fit for it, they had not had snffi
cient training to do it, and it was not a good thing to do, except as it may
have affected the political situation, of which I have no knowledge. So &r
as the military proposition of this order was concerned, it was not the best
thing to do, but it was done, and soon there was trouble. I sent white
troops, a couple of white soldiers to each detachment, or something of that
sort, and with the white man they were stiff — ^they would stand. Withont
the white man they were not apt to do it. I was afraid to send one white
man, and I sent from two to four to six to eight, depending upon the isolation
of the post, but during the month of December, 1916, there were three or four
skirmishes. On December 6, at Gros Roches, there were several captures,
and on December 12, at Perche and Terrier Rouge, several were killed, and
on December 21 one was killed at Perche in an attack there.
Mr. Howe. General, as you look over your notes there, can you summarise
the number of engagements there then, in the first months of 1916?
Gen. Cole. Well, that was the end of 1916. During December there were four.
Mr. Howe. In the first months of 1916?
Gen. Cole. In 1916 I have notes showing 17 little attacks on the gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. Between what dates?
Gen. Cole. Between March 6 and April 11 St. Michel was attacked and the
gendarmes fled.
Mr. Howe. Did that end the disturbances?
Gen. Cole. On May 1 there was a serious attack on Hinche. That ended It
All of these things, exc^t St. Michel, amounted to very little. At St Michel
there was quite a serious repulse. I had this policy in regard to conditions of
that sort: I believed that prevention was very much more valuable than
cure; we could not keep troops In all parts of the country, and, as a matter
of fact, they did not want it done, but I did have white troops in what I con-
sidered strategic points, and whenever trouble showed its head" in any one
section, I immediately sent military detachments of white troops, and at every
place they surrounded them and went right in.
Mr. Howe. In order, if possible, to prevent the trouble from becoming active?
Gen. Cole. Always before it did, because it did not become active ; we always
stopped it. There were seven attacks In 10 days on different places, and we
sent troops in from along the border towns and in from the other places.
Mr. Howe. But the attack on Ouanaminthe ended things, and that was in
May?
Gen. Coi^. Yes ; that was in May.
Mr. Howe. Had you by that time been able to begin building public works?
Gen. Cole. Oh, yes ; it had been going on.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Thursday, November 10, 1921, at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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INQUIRY miO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
THT7BSDAY, NOVEMBEB 10» 1021.
United States Senate,
Select Ck>MMiTT£E on Haiti and Santo Domingo.
Washington, D, C.
The committee met pursuant to adjournment. In room 131, Senate Office
Building, at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Senator Tasker L. Oddie, presiding.
Present: Senator Oddie.
Also present : Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and Maj. Edwin N.
McClellan.
STATBMEHT OF BBIG. GEN. ELI K. COLE, UNITED STATES MABINE
OOBPS— Besumed.
Mr. Howe. General, yesterday, when the hearing closed I had just asked
yon a question about what you were able to do in the way of internal im-
provements and restoring the various undertakings of government, such as
hospitals.
Gen. Cole. In the North?
Mr. Howe. Yea
Gen. Cole. I think probably I can do that more quickly with my notes. You
might try that, if you feel disposed to do so.
Mr. Howe. Will you go ahead, and let us have the heads of what you under-
took there.
Gen. Couc. There was no civilian administration whatsoever in Cape Haitien,
and the various things pertaining to a town administration were taken up and
carried on by us. The Hospice, in charge of the French Sisters, was in a very
dilapidated state, and without supplies or proper appliances, and even shelter
for people who were there for care. In the course of our stay in the north of
Haiti this building was thoroughly overhauled, supplies were obtained from the
United States, the question of proper food was taken up and solved, and gen-
erally it was placed in a very satisfactory and efficient condition.
Along the same lines, the people of the rural districts of Haiti had absolutely
no medical attention whatsoever, and in order to eliminate as much of this
as possible. I had established, wherever we had American troops, small dis-
pensaries, furnishing the medicines for a long time from the United States sup-
plies, and later purchasing them in the United States, and had either medical
officers or Hospital Corps men detailed in charge of those dispensaries, where
people who had physical troubles could receive such examinations and treat-
ment as the limited facilities would allow, medicines being dispensed, and In
serious cases the people being sent to one of the large ports where they re-
ceived as good hospitalization care as we could give them. This was without
question of great value to the people, and it did much to establish our influence
for good with the people of Haiti.
The prison at Cape Haitien was a national aflCair, and was about as dis-
reputable an institution as it would be possible to And. The place was thor-
oughly gone over, rebuilt in many places, repaired, put in sanitary condition,
exercise grounds were prepared, the men incarcerated therein were taught
trades, and they were fed, the former proceilure being that if the prisoner had
no friends "or relatives to feed him, he was apt to die of starvation, and gen-
erally the place was placed in a condition where one could see that it was
as dean and sanitary a place as one could find anywhere.
683
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684 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The water works had be«i allowed to go entirely to pieces. Fresh water
possibly was available in some houses for a period of from one to two hours
a day. This water system was thoroughly overhauled, and while there never
was a sufficient amount of water to meet all the requirements, tliere was ample
water for the immediate purposes of human life.
The streets had not been cleaned for years, and no street repairs had beeo
made. First the main streets, and then the secondary streets in the town of
Cape Haitien were overhauled and put into a good state of repair.
The roads outside of Cape Haitien, and, as a matter of fact, outside of all
towns, had been allowed to go utterly to ruin. In the dry season passable for
donkeys, but not for vehicles, and in the wet season the donkeys would frequently
be drowned in mud holes. For mile after mile of road in the wet season, if
you rode over it, you would have to pull your feet up to keep them out of the
mud, the mud rising up practically to the horses' belly. We employed a large
number of ex-Cacos and farm laborers on these roads, paying them at the rate
of a gourde a day, the idea being that they would get money in that way to
purchase seed, etc., to start planting, and that the men who were working would
not engage in revolutions. Up to that time the Haitian officials or Haitian
laborers had practically never been paid, and we made it the absolute rule,
of course, that they should be paid not only the full amount but actually on
time every week. At first the people did not want to work, because they feared
they would not be paid, but when they found they were being paid we had
many more applicants than we had funds to employ.
The road between CJape Haitien and the border was put in a state, within
a few months after we arrived there, when an automobile could go over it,
and eventually it was made into a well-graded and maintained highway.
The national schools hardly existed. There were some in the Cape, and there
were so-called schools in a good many different places, but they were not
functioning as schools. The school system was a political one. The school
teachers were very Inadequately paid. They were generally appointed as the
result of some friend being in power, and they were actually not expected
normally to do any work in regard to teaching school. The state did not own
these buildings but rented them. I inspected a school in a little settlenient
outside of Llmbe, on a tour of Inspection I was making, and it was built of
wattle, and when I went inside I found that it was a hog wallow. There
were no windows, Just one door, and a sow with a litter of pigs was inside of
Ihe building, and it never could have been occupied in any way, shape, or fonn
as a school building, yet the government was paying for it. That is an
extreme case, but it is a sample of the conditions existing in the schools of
rural Haiti.
One schoolhouse where there were supposed to be two school rooms was
probably 12 by 8 feet. It had two rooms, tl\e second room being a closet without
windows about 3 by 8 feet. The reports of that school showed about 45 or 50
pupils in daily attendance. I asked the teachers where they could get anything
like that number in the school, and they said they could not. As a matter of
fact, at the time I arrived there the school was not open and the school-teacher
was not present until tlie following day. There had been no regular school
held there, at least for some time, the place being used as a coffee broker's
office.
Mr. Howe. What were you able to do about the schools. If anything?
Gen. Cole. The only real schools, outside of some in Cape Haitien, were the
church schools, run either by the Catholic priests or by the sisters. They had
fairly good schools in Cape Haitien and in nearly all the communes. In all
tho connnunes where there were priests they had schools which were quite
good. Tliey wore far better than anything else in Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Who were those priests? Were they Frenchmen?
Gen. Coij:. They wore Frenchmen, and the sisters? were French women
almost entirely. There were a few of other nationalities. If It had not
been for the church schools, in my opinion, Haiti would have relapsed absolutely
into barbarism. It was tlie one source, the one ray of educational light in
the wliole country There can be no question about that, because outside of a
few of the larger towns, the public schools were absolutely of no use whatever.
There might be one here and there. We did find people here and there who
were trying to do with the things they had as best they could, but It was little.
We gave assistance to the church schools wherever we could. We assisted them
in making repairs. They were supposed to receive a subsidy from the
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 685
Govemnieut, and we investigated those as far as we could, and paid them,
and where possible paid the arrears, in order that the work of repair might
go on. And generally, during my stay In Haiti, I had the utmost support of
the church, from the priests and from the si?»ter8, because wherever we went,
realizing the fact that they had done so much, and that they were the points
from which we could do something in regard to education, we gave them such
support as we could, and they were very grateful. The bishop of northern
Haiti, an old man by the name of Kerquzan. made two extensive trips on
horseback through the north of Haiti, in order to preach cooperation with the
American occupation in Haiti.
In the latter part of my stay an expert from the United States has been
obtained to give advice and assistance in regard to building up the school
system. The archbishop of Port au Prince rather opposed that proposition.
He was in favor of national schools, but entirely under the Catholic Church,
and that caused a little antagonism on the part of some toward the Anterican
occupati<Mi, and pressure may have been brought to bear on officials to interfere
with the work of the expert we brought down to help build up the national
jschool system.
Sanitation in all the towns was entirely neglected. Refuse of every descrip-
tion was thrown on vacant lots. There were no sewers and no toilets. The
result was that the town stunk to heaven. The yards were cleaned up, public
toilets were built, drainage was instituted ; areas where mosquitoes had been
breeding were drained or filled, as we could do it, and generally the place was
pot into a state of good sanitation.
We did everj'thing we could to get the peasant to return to the farm and
go to work cultivating, and with the exception of a few, a very few of the
chiefs of the rebellion against us during October and November, they were
allowed when they came in to go to their farms and f^o to work. We told
them that we did not care for anything except their being good, honest citizens,
and that so long as they behaved themselves we would not interfere with them,
but that they must keep absolutely clear from any robberies or banditry, or
anything of that sort.
The sugar mills we did nothing about, but, as a matter of curiosity, the same
type of sugar mill which you see in picture books as being in use in ancient
Egypt were in use In Haiti at that time, and I presume are generally In use
to-day. the long pole, with the oxen tramping around the grinders.
We took up, under orders from Admiral Caperton, the payment of Haitian
officials, and our officers personally paid the officials the amounts due them,
something that had never been done before.
Practically nothing was done In regard to the postal system at that time.
The telegraph and telephone lines were practically down and out of existence,
the telegraph entirely. Here and there there were some single wires. We
reconstructed the lines in the north of Haiti, extending them into the interior
and along the border, very frequently without proper material. For many
miles on the telegraph poles we used beer bottles and other bottles for the
purpose of insulation.
The judiciary did not exist at the time we lauded, and did not function for a
considerable period thereafter. I had no authority over that, except under
the'power of military rule. There were no judges, and practically nothing was
done in regard to that, though after a few months one of the higher courts
was opened. As soon as we could we had a judge de palx appomted, but
until that time offenses against sanitation were punished in the provost
courts, usually by a fine or a certain number of days work, and generally the
people were not taken before the provost court for first offenses. For a
repetition of offenses after warning they were sometimes fined 2, B, or 5
gourdes, and sometimes the fine was waived. The military court was func-
tioning, and where robbers were captured they were brought before the military
court, but it never weighed heavily on any honest citizen in Haiti, and it did
not weigh heavily enough very frequently on the dishonest citizen, because we
were trying to get the good will of the people of Haiti in the north, because, in
my opinion, such good will was absolutely necessary, if we were going to
successfully accomplish our mission.
Those same things were done to a greater or lesser extent in the towns of
Port Liberte, Ouanamlnthe. Le Trou, Limonade, Grande Riviere, Port de Paix,
Leborgne, and other towns.
Mr. Howe. AVere similar undertakings begun and carried on in the other
parts of the island in the south of Haiti?
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686 INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION' OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
G€sn. Cole. In the larger towns, to the best of my knowledge and belief. I
know they were.
Mr. Howe. And when you became brigade commander down there, you fmiml
similar undertakings In operation?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Under your command were these undertakings, such as the
schools, hospitals, prisons, etc., continued and maintained?
Cten. Cole. Yes ; there was considerable done. You are speaking of the time
after I got to Port au Prince?
Mr. Howe. Yes; in other words, was this general work carried on durng
that year during which you were brigade commander?
Gen. Cole. Yes; and in addition there were a good many other things done
in addition to what I have mentioned here.
Mr. Howe. I would like to get to those, but let me ask you did you en-
counter, as brigade commander, any difficulties In carrying on this work?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; some, but the difficulties were hidden to a great extent. For
Instance, take the school proposition: The president, I think, was really in
favor of good schools. The minister of public instruction was an educator— was
not a politician; that is, except incidentally, as every educated Haitian is,
and he promised to " beat the band " to do things to help build up the school
system. I might preface this a little bit I had caused a comprehensive sur-
vey to be made of the actual conditions in the schools In Haiti, the number of
children that were attending them, the size of the schools, the condition of the
buildings, the teachers, whether they went to the places or not, and we found
that conditions were simply intolerable.
As I said, there was no public-school system outside of the large towns.
In conversation with the president, on a number of occasions, the question of
the school system was taken up, and. eventually, I was requested by the pcesi*
dent to procure the services of a school expert, and I set the requirements
that he was to be a man who could speak French, and, if possible, have some
knowledge of Creole, should be a Catholic, should have dealt with colored
people, should be a man of tact, and one who had handled a reasonably lanse
school system. We found a man by the name of Bourgeois, from Louisiana, who
had been county superintendent of schools, and spoke Creole and French, etc.
Mr. Bourgeois came to Haiti. Considerable difficulty was experienced in re-
gard to the contract. It was finally agreed that he should receive a compensa-
tion of $3,000 a year, and should be employed for a period of thi*ee years, as I
remember it. They had wanted to employ him for a year. I said, *' No," be-
cause conditions were such that in one year the man can do nothing ; he will
simply have started. It will take him six months to get familiar with th* propo-
sition, and at the end of the year. If conditions are such that you want to get
rid of him, he has no contract, and It is not fair to that man to have him come
down here for one year with the expense of moving at that salary, so it was
agreed to give him a contract for three years.
Mr. Howe. Did Mr. Bourgeois run into any difficulties there?
Gen. Cole. Mr. Bourgeois had them all the time.
Mr. Howe. Just in general, describe what kind of difficulties those were.
Gen. Cole. Well, Mr. Bourgeois did not get there very long before I left.
He found Inertia and objection to a white man working In their bureau.
While I was there he was able to make some headway in his preliminary work,
because he came to me when he had trouble, and I went to the president, and
the president usually straightened It out.
Mr. Howk. Who caused the trouble?
Gen. Cole. Subordinates In the office of the minister of public instruction
and assistants to him. I think he (the minister) did himself at times, and it
is possible that the church may have had something to do with it.
Mr. Howe. In other undertakings other than schools, like sanitation, prisons,
or hospitals, were you hindered In your efforts?
Gen. Cole. No; I can not say we were hindered, because we went ahead
and did the things. Generally they wanted the things done, but Just as soon
as anything was done they wanted Haitians to take it over. All we could do
In most of these cases was to have, as, say at the hospital In Port au Prince,
which was built up Into a really exceptionally good Institution — ^\*^e had one
or two American surgeons and one or two Hospital Corps men or something
of that sort, but they wanted to put the Haitian in charge of It. The Haitian
can work under the American and can do good work, and they had some ex-
ceptionally gooil medical people down there along certain lines, but just the
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 687
minate the Haitian takes hold of anything that I ever saw in the way of execu-
tive work and keeping an organization together and keeping it in shape, it goes
to pieces.
Mr. Howe. When you were in the north did you find that you had a freer
tuind than when you were later on in Port au Prince? In other words, I would
like to know whether your remoteness from Port au Prince in the center of
government there made it easier for you or not to carry on these works of
internal improvement.
Gen. Cole. No; I can not say it did make any difference. In the north of
Haiti I was very fortunate in having, apparently, the confidence of the people
who were in Port au Prince, my recommendations were generally accepted
and I was never interfered with ; and in Port au Prince I was in charge of
the brigade — I was chief of the occupation, as they called it, and I had no
interference. The only time in which I did have interference was when the
t^ips of the convention were put into effect in regard to the civil engineer and
the sanitary engineer and when the distribution of funds was placed entirely in
Uie hands of the financial advisor. We had used the gendarmerie officers as
our agents through the country. They were people that we could rely on ; we
could not rely on a Haitian. That was absolutely out of the question. Occa-
sionally we could rely upon one, but he is apt to go off at a tangent without
any warning. He may be honest, but we had in the white officers of the gen-
darmerie people who were honest, people who would do what they were told,
people who iSelieved that they were doing a big piece of constructive work,
people who put their heart and soul and everything else into the work they
were doing and who were trying to build a fine system in Haiti, trying to ^^ne-
fit the people of the country. There is no question about it. And they were
making every dollar they were allowed for repairs and improvements do the
work of two or three, because they were eternally on the job all of the time
themselves, out day and night. There can be no question but what the subordi-
nate as well as the higher officers of the gendarmerie in Haiti performed a
magnificent piece of work under exceptionally trying conditions.
Mr. Howe. General, you mentioned that when you went down to Port au
Prince later on you observed other undertakings in addition to those you de-
scribed as having been put into effect In the north.
Gen. Cole. We will take agriculture. We did something in the North to aid
agriculture, everything we could do. In 1917, the United States having declared
war, the submarine campaign being extremely effective, all the French ships
which ran to Haiti having been sunk to the bottom, the question of foodstuffs in
Haiti, in my opinion, became very Important. This came up possibly before our
declaration of war, but it was just about — well, the sinking of the three French
ships, the Quebec, the Montreal, and the other one were sunk just about the time
we declared war, but the shipping conditions had been growing steadily worse
from early In 1917, and It was early In 1917, though I do not remember the
exact date, that I had a survey made to find out what I could about agricultural
conditions, and what had been imported In the way of foodstuffs Into Haiti,
and I found that Haiti had been getting somewhere In the neighborhood of
from 1,800 to 2,000 tons of foodstuffs.
Mr. Howe. A year?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; and that if steps were not taken to provide this, to take the
place of this foodstuff, that we might have serious difficulty In feeding the people
of the country. Through the assistance of some Haitian societies, the President,
the minister of agriculture, and the gendarmerie, we got started a campaign on
agriculture, with the idea of not only providing food for the people but also
possibly providing a reservoir for ourselves and for the Allies. This campaign
was remarkably successful. In connection with it we established experimental
farms, and had them in different parts of the country. We established an agri-
cultural school outside of Port au Prince, and the result of this campaign was
extraordinarily successful, and the question came up, " What are we going to
do with the food after it Is raised? How are we going to get all of this food
from the interior to the coast?" And that started the intensive campaign to
build up the roads, because I felt that if these people, at our instigation, had
started in and cultivated a large quantity of land and obtained a large crop, and
then their crops had to rot, because there was no transportation, or any way of
getting it into the towns, and there was nothing to be done with the stuff, that
we would be In a worse condition than before, because they would say, " Here
is what the Americans have promised, and see wlial they have done to us."
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688 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Panama Canal Zone sent ajfents to look Into the question, and they started
tn buying very heavily.
Mr. Howe. Food?
Gen. Cole. Food. We were raising foo<l and getting It Into the ports, and
Haiti was exporting large quantities of foodstuffs by the spring of 1918 and tlte
end of 1917. The Panama Canal Zone along In the summer of 1917 was speed-
ing over $10,000 a month for food supplies in Haiti, and we were asslstiiig ow
allies and our own country in that way, and by shipping that foodstuff to tl»
Canal Zone it enabled a full ship to be brought to Port au Prince or to St. Marc,
and this stuff would be put in the place of gmnls that were assigned to Haiti:
otherwise they couhl not have gotten the stuff down there. The department al
home wns asked to get agricultural experts. This was at the request of the
President, as the result of conferences. The President was apparently ex-
tremely anxious to do everything he could do to benefit his country In the way
of building things up. and I do not know whether I suggested it, or whether he
suggested it — ^probably I did — but he accepted the suggestion and requested
that we get agricultural experts from our Department of Agriculture, and we
went into the question of preventing the importation of diseased seed, etc.
We arranged with the Department of Agriculture for inspections here and
certificates and things of that sort in the United States.
Mr. Howe. How about irrigation; General? Have you mentioned that?
Oen. ('oLE. I have not nvntiont^d that. There wns very little irrigati«>n.
There had been irrigation in the north, but it had completely gone to pieces.
The plains of the cul-\le-»ic had quite an extensive irrigation system In the
time of the French, called the Grande Bassiu, and that did at one time protwbl.v
give* water to the entire plains of the cul-de-sac. I made a personal Inspection
of the place and went over it veo* carefully, and in order to increase the supply
of water so fai* as I could we started the system, under the law, of keeping the
existing canals open, of preventing the big landowner from opening up the
gates and taking all the water himself, simply because he happened to be nearer,
and we started plans for the repair of the dam at the Grande Bassin, which
was. in* my opinion, in danger of being carried away, and we were about to start
work on that project when the orders were received to turn over public works
to the civil engineer.
Mr. Howe. One of the treaty officials?
(ien. Cole. Yes; and I thought that was one of the works which should be
taken over, but when I left nothing had been done, and I was told that nothing
has l)een done since. Hut the thing had bc»en very thoroughly gone into, and a
comprehensive plan had been drawn up to repair and rehabilitate this system of
irrigation there, and to finish the urgent repairs in a month or six weeks.
Mr. Howe. General, did the work imdertaken there tend to encourage the
men to work generally, instead of making the women do all tJie work, as there-
tofore?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
There is one thing I wouhl like to add in regard to Mr. Bourgeois. I under-
stan<l that Mr. Bourgeois. uiK)n leaving Haiti, made a very compr^ensive
report in regard to the school condition and the dlfl[iculties encountered by him.
I have never seen it, but I believe It will probably contain very valuable In-
formation for the committee, as, in my opinion, It Is very essential that the
Unite<l Stntes take some active predominating part in establishing proper
schools in the Republic of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Where do you think we could find Mr. Bourgeoises report, at a
guess?
Gen. Cole. At a gness, the headquarters of the Marine Corps. Maj. McOlellan
could possibly tell about that.
Maj. McClellan. There are some papers in the papers here with reference
to thnt report made by Mr. Bourgeois, and they are certainly available to the
committee, if they desire them.
]ilr. Howe. Will you be good enough to find out what Is there and let us
kuow, please?
Maj. McCLEiiAN. Yes.
(ien. ('^>TJ':. There is one thing I would like to bring in in regard to the school
propo.sitlon. I had plans drawn up. Gen. Butler and myself bet\*'een us, of
model schoolhouses for a climate like Haiti, with its particularly peculiar re-
sources, an<l I allot.ted funds to build four of these model schoolhouses, the
sitjes selc»cted being in locations where the largest possible number of people
from all parts of the country would pass by these schoolhouses and see what
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INQUIRY IKTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 689
they were. For instance, one was placed at Croix des Missions. This place
was selected because it was at a crossroads outside of Port an Prince, over
which every one entering Port an Prince from the major part of the plains of
the cul-desac and from the Artlbonite district and Laguna district passed by
in entering Port au Prince. When we landed in Port au Prince no market
women were coming in. On the big market day before I left there anywhere
from five to eight thousand donkeys loaded with produce would be brought in
over that one road.
Mr. Howe. And then all hands passing there saw the schoolhouse?
Oen. C01.E. All hands passing there saw that schoolhouse.
Mr. Howe. Gen. Butler, as I recollect it, told us that the people In the imme-
diate neighborhood were much Interested in the construction of these school-
houses?
Oen. Coi>E. They were ; and then I had minor plans drawn up for very exten-
sive schoolhouses, and through the gendarmerie had the Information sent out
that we would provide the plans, some one to supervise the work, and such
material as could not be obtained locally to any commune that would do the
rest of it themselves.
Mr. Howe. Was that offer taken up?
Gen. Cole. That offer was taken up, and Gen. Butler told me that approxi-
mately 40 communes had accepted that proposition. My recollection was that
there had been some 36 or 38 started before I left
Mr. H»WE. Do the peasants down there want education for their children?
Gen. Cole. I believe they do. You would have difficulty in enforcing at-
tendance for some time, but I do believe that the peasant does want education
for his children. It may be because th^y want to go to the " patent-leather
stage," but I do believe they want the education.
Mr. Howe. Is there any other feature of your time of command in the north
that you think the committee should hear about?
Gen. Cole. I do not know of anything ; I do not remember anything.
Mr. Howe. Then, General, what was the date again, please, of your going
down to Port au Prince and becoming brigade commander?
Gen. Cole. I think it was the 22d of November Is my recollection of it
Mr. Howe. In 1916?
Gen. Cole. 1916. Now, of course, this latter discussion has gone a good deal
into Port au Prince, you remember.
Mr. Howe. Yes ; the latter part of It especially.
Gen. Cole. All of that latter part.
Mr. Howe. After you became brigade commander, what was the first event
of importance that came up?
€Jen. Cole. The question of elections.
Mr. Howe. Let me ask you on that, the elections for what offices?
Oen. CoLR For the Chamber of Deputies.
Mr. Howe. And those elections were conducted under the supervision of the
gendarmerie; is that correct?
Gen. Cole. Under the supervision of the gendarmerie and of the Haitian
Government The plans had been worked out to a considerable extent — almost
entirely, as a matter of fact — by Gen. Waller, in connection with, presumably,
the Haitian Government; and Immediately after Gen. Waller left I was asked
to come to the palace and they wanted to make some changes.
Mr. Howe. In the arrangements?
Gen. Cole. In the arrangements.
Mr. Howe. Let us have that, will you, please?
Gen. Cole. I do not remember the details. They wanted to make arrange-
ments, different arrangements, and it was a succession of desires to make dif-
ferent arrangements, apparently with the idea of having the Government able
to exercise Its former activities in connection with the results of the election.
As a matter of fact, on a number of occasions afterwards the President said
that we had forced them to have a fair election and that we could handle the
national assembly ourselves; that the President formerly would have been in
a position to have expended money, but we would not allow that, and conse-
quently his hol(f over the national assembly was gone. As a matter of fact,
the legislative bodies In Haiti prior to the occupation had been absolutely,
completely subservient to the person who was In power, who held the power.
Mr. Howe. These changes which they suggested. General, did you agree
with them?
Gen. Cole. Generally not.
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690 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Why not?
Gen. Cole. Because I was using my best Judgment in trying to get as close
to a fair, honest election as it was possible to get.
Mr. Howe. And these suggested changes would, In your opinion, have made
that more difficult?
Gen. CJoLE. Yes. I do not say there were many of those changes. There were
frequent requests, probably for local conditions, in regard to the instmctions
that had been issued. There was constant calling on me for investigatione, oiie
way or another, or reports of interference or of noninterference or things of
that sort. We had to look after the registration to see that that was honestly
conducted, and they tried to put over all sorts of things, but our people 8tOM>ed
them so far as they could. Sometimes they made mistakes, but when they were
made they were rectified. Where they were not made, they were told that their
actions were perfectly correct We actually tried, to the best of my knowledge
and belief — I know it, as far as I am concerned and as far as the people who
were working under my immediate control were concerned — I can not, of
course, answer for every man who was in the Republic of Haiti, but as far m
those people were concerned, we were trying to have as honest and fair an
election as we could possibly have, and I think tliat I can state that tliat was
the attitude in every other activity that the Americans had during the years
1915, 1916, and 1917, and I presume since.
Mr. Howe. The election, then, took place?
Gen. Cole. The election then took place.
Mr. Howe. Did it pass off quietly?
Gen. Cole. It passed off quietly, without any disorders.
Mr. Howe. How soon after that di4 the assembly meet — or it would be the
legislature, would it not — that you were electing?
Gen. Cole. The Chamber of Deputies.
Mr. Howe. About how long? What date did the assembly meet?
Gen. Cole. The Chamber of Deputies met on April 2, and for the information
of the committee I will state that the Senators were elected by the Chamber of
Deputies from certain lists of candidates, and that consequently the complete
National Assembly was not formed until after the election and the organization
of the Senate, and then the organization of the National Assembly and the two
chambers, and that took place on April 19.
Mr. Howe. Between the election and the organization of the assembly there
were more than two months?
Gen. Coi>e. Yes; it was three months: February, March, and April.
Mr. Howe. Now, in those three months what was the next important matter
that came up after the election?
Gen. Cole. The question of the cabinet came up in February, and it came up
at the same time as the extension of the terms of the treaty from 10 to 20
years, the terms of the convention.
Mr. Howe. Will you give us a descriptive outline of what you know in con-
nection with the selection of the cabinet and with the extension of the time of
the treaty?
Gen. Cole. As the result of the elections, I recommended to the department,
and also to the President, that it would be well to have a cabinet which would
be in accord with the different chambers and the National Assembly, somewhat
along the same political lines as the National Assembly was. I also felt, some-
what later, in particular, that Dr. Herraux, the minister of finance, should re-
main in any cabinet formed. Herraux had been a strong supporter of the Ameri-
can occupation, and was known as probably the only minister who really was
in favor of American intervention and American management of Haitian affairs.
He had married a Cuban, and their only son had been killed in one of the rec«it
revolutions, and she was probably the stronger member of the family, and very
bitter against the revolutionary idea in Haiti. In add tion to hi?? having been
a constant supporter of the American occupation, he also, as head of the<lepact-
ment of finance, was the one Haitian who was familiar with the work that was
being done to carry out the investigation of Haitian financial affairs and a^
counting affairs of the Haitians, and to have hlni removed frcgn the cabinet in
the midst of this work going on would have resulted, without any question, in
a decided hindrance to the work that was being undertaken. At the request of
the President of Haiti, I saw Gen. Legitime, probably the finest specimen of
the best type of Haitian that I met in my sojourn in Haiti, with the idea that
he might be able to form a cabinet of a more or less non^wlitical type, composed
of the best men in the country that would serve with the President. He had a
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND. SANTO DOMINGO. 691
good many difficulties. People distrusted the President, but the main thing
was that Dr. Herraux had to remain as a member of the cabinet
Mr. Howe. Do I understand you to mean that that made I-.egitime's tusk in
forming such a cabinet difficult?
Gen. OoLE. Very difficult. He said he had no objection to Herraux personally ;
that he believed that he was honest* but that Herraux had the antagonism of
all the political element of Haiti, and that he did not think that any cabinet that
included him could be formed, of the type that had been suggesteil between the
President and myself, or suggested to him. The antagonism to Dr. Herraux
grew on the part of the politicians stronger and stronger, until he became, as
you might say, the storm center, and with their vicious attacks on Dr. Herraux,
if we had acquiesced in his being thrown aside, it would have destroyed, in my
opinion, a great deal of the influence that we had there, in that we would have
been unable to get anyone to work with us oi)enly, because they would say,
" There is the case of Dr. Herraux. He worked with the occupation, and the
time came when he stood in their way, and they calmly threw him aside." And
I felt, for that reason, in addition to the other ones, that Dr. Herraux would
have to remain as secretary of finance, and that the deimrtment also agreed to.
About that time the question of the extension of the terms of the treaty from
10 to 20 years came up, and there was a good deal of discussion back and forth.
The Haitian Secretary' of State for foreign affairs in particular, Mr. Borno,
who was really the dominating member of the cabinet, tr.ed to use it as a lever
to get concessions toward the appointment of Haitians in the customshouses,
and after it was agreed to there was constant delay, and the terms they made
were not lived up to when they were put in writing, and the correspondence
went back and forth, and Mr. Borno, Dr. Herraux, and one other man, as I
remember it, were in favor of it. The President was in favor of it, and three
other members of the cabinet were opposed to it.
Mr. Howe. To the extensitm of the treaty for 20 years?
Gen. Cole. To the extension of the treaty; and while it was passe<l on his
majority, the President having voted in case of a tie, that, among other things,
in the main, caused the resignation of the cabinet. Vincent left the cabinet
absolutely. The other five remained, and my recollection is tliat Dr. Herraux,
or Mr. Borno, carried on the duties of two departments during the time when
his vacancy had not been filled. The whole cabinet resigned but continued to
function, upon the request of the President, until the new cabinet was formed,
about the time that the National Assembly met, or just before.
Mr. Howe. I understand, then, that the treaty was exti^nded?
Gen. Cole. The terms of the convention were extended to 20 years. The
object I had in all the discussion in regard to the cabinet was to try to get
people together who would work with us and with the Haitian Government to
build up a government, and a proper government, in that Rt^public.
Mr. Howe. General, would you say that in this work you acte<l primarllv as
assistant to the President in the formation of his cabinet?
Gen. Cole. I considered I had two masters, as it were, or, at least, I had two
sides to serve — I had to serve the ITnlte<l States and I had to serve Haiti — and
anything I could do to serve the interests of those two I did.
Mr. Howe. And did .vou work in cooperation with the President of Haiti?
Gen. Cole. I did.
Mr. Howe. Close cooperation?
Gen. Cole. Close, very close.
Mr. Howe. General, you spoke of having two objects ; that is, the Interests of
the United States and the Interests of Haiti. Did those interests coincide or
conflict?
Gen. Cole. In my opinion, they coincided absolutely.
Mr. Howe. What was the object of both of those interests?
Gen. Cole. The object of both of those interests was to establish peace and
order and a proper government In the Republic of Haiti In order that there
could be no cause by Irresponsible r)eople for foreign complications to arise. I
believed that by l)uilding up the Republic of Haiti and Improving the condi-
tions of the people In the Republic of Haiti It was working for the benefit of
the United States.
Mr. Howe. And your conception, then, of the interests of the United States
and of the Interests of Haiti
Gen. Cole. Were absolutely coincident.
Mr. Howe. They coincided for that purpose?
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692 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Geii. (^OLE. Yes. I told the President from time to time that that was my
Idea. I also told him on one or two occasions, when there were ^rious discus-
sions between us, or something arising between us, that I would have to con-
sider primarily the point of view of the United States, but the whole thing was
that the United States needed a proper government in the Republic, and that i»
what we were after.
Mr. Howe. Why did the United States need a proper government in Haiti?
Gen. Coi^ Well, in the ilrst place, it is at our front door. The Oarribean
Sea is the entrance; that is, the islands of the Carribean guard the entrance
to a considerable part of tlie United States and the Panama Canal, absolutely.
We can not afford to have any foreign country obtain additional power and
influence in that part of the world. Our policy is, and I thinlc has been, that we
do not interfere with the status quo, but that we do not propose to allow Euro-
pean powers to gain any further influence in that part of the world.
Mr. Howe. Well, was there danger of that?
Gen. Cole. I think there was danger of that We can not allow intolerable
conditions to exist, or to grow, and say ** Hands of " to everybody else, and let
them stew in their own juice indefinitely. France had $150,000,000 worth of
fran<rs invested in Haiti in the loans, and she had other sums there. Germany
had large sums invested in Haiti, and, as I have said yesterday in my testi-
mony, I believed that the European situation was the one thing that prevented
active operations in Haiti by either one or two European nations.
Mr. Howe. Now, besides the United States policy, which you might describe
as its following of the Monroe Doctrine down in Haiti, what other objects 61^
the United States have?
Gen. CJoLE. Well, my own opinion is that its objects or object was to eliminate
a state of chaos, aiid replace it by a condition wherein the Negro Republic of
Haiti could continue to exist as an independent State and exercise its own
functions of government. In other words, I believe it had a moral duty to
clean that place up and establish decency dow^n there, because it did not exist
You have no idea of the conditions, if you have not been there, that did exist
when we landed in Haiti. The Aegean stables were Paradise compared to it
Mr. Howe. It would sound as it' you believed that one of the objects of the
United States going down there was to save Haiti?
Gen. Cole. I think it was. I think that we were compelled to land in July
of 191.5. and having landed and found the conditions that did exist, there
was not anything else to be done but to say there and save Haiti. Always did
I say to everybody that I talked to that, to the very best of my knowledge and
belief, the United States had no tlesign whatsoever against the indei)endence of
Haiti, but on the contrary, it liad every design to maintain it
Mr. Howe. And you were closely in touch, as brigade commander, with the
policies of our countrj'?
Gen. Cole. I know that is the policy of our country ; I got it in black and
white, to maintain it and establish a proper government down there. There
was no idea of taking away the independence of Haiti. I am certain of that.
Establishing an influence ; yes.
Mr. Howe. And you have already told us as to what you believed your
mission to be In establishing good material conditions down there. That was a
part of the whole task?
Gen. (^ole. Yes; by task, particularly after the national assembly was dis-
solved was to do everything I possibly could to aid — not that I had not been
doing it before, but that became almost the sole task — to aid the Haitians in
building up a proper government. It was difficult and required a long time to
do. I do not know how much of an impression I even made.
Mr. Howe. What was the next matter that came up? Was it the question
of the declaration of war against Germany?
Gen. ('oLi-:. The question of the declaration of war against Germany, and
that was made the object of the wrath of the national assembly against the
United States.
Mr. Howe. Was it desirable or even consldereil necessary that Haiti should
declare war against Germany ? That was in the spring of 1917, after we had
gone in, was it not?
Gen. Ca)tjr. It was considered desirable. The President of Haiti consida^d it
desirable, though they wanted certain guaranties. When I say he considtt^
it desirable, I mean that he said he considered it desirable. We were a beU^«e^
ent nation occupying a neutral country in an area where enemy operations wa'c
being conducted.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 693
Mr. Howe. You refer to the submarine operations?
Gen. Cole. I refer to the submarine proposition. I do not believe the stories
we heard In all cases were true, but Haiti might very well have become a base
for German submarines. If German ships had been able to put to sea, Haiti
miglit very well have been a place where they would have tried to base. An
enemy country — Germany — ^had large material interests in Haiti, a neutral
<x>untry which we, a belligerent, were occupying, and it was thought best to have
Halt! become our aUy. There were good reasons for it. For instance, Haitian
lives had been lost through the sinking of French ships which plied between
Haiti and France; numerous Haitians were in the French Army as volun-
teers, and when they came back to Haiti they were received as heroes; the
Haitian civilisation was entirely French; their names were French; their
education was French ; the educated Haitian who could go to Paris to live was
going to Paradise, and he had every sympathy with the French; and yet, in
order to swat the United States, they voted absolutely against war with Germany.
Mr. Hows. The assembly?
Gen Coij:. Yes. There can be no question about it that that was the case.
Mr. HowK. And that declaration of war was killed In the assembly?
Gen. Cole. They recommended the severance of diplomatic relations, and tliey
wanted the President of Haiti to make claim for indemnity and so on.
Mr. HowE. Did the question of the declaration of war come up later?
Gen. Cole. In September I had a very long letter from the President, In which
he made that proposition.
Mr. Howe. What did lie propose at that time — tliat the assembly be asked
again to declare war?
Qen, Cole. He proposed that the cabinet and the council of state should draw
up a declaration of war, and then it should be submitted to a plebiscite, and
they wanted a loan and everything else ; and I replied to it, or advised In regard
to it, that, in my opinion, it was entirely undesirable; that It was not neces-
sary at that time; that if Haiti had done it in the beginning It would have had
a good effect and would have probably aided Haiti very materially in her
desire to get the loan. She needed financing, and I was very much in favor of
il in the spring, because I felt it would have assisted Haiti in that line at that
time, but in September, no. I have a long correspondence here about it.
Mr. Howe. You must have considered, then, the conditions to be very radi-
cally changed between April and September?
Gen. Cole. I considered they had changed. I think the United States policy
was to have as many countries declare war against the Central Empire as pos-
sible, as a matter of morale, as a matter of showing that the world was in
league against the C'entral Empires. It was the desire of the United States,
without any question, that as many American States as possible join in this
alliance. Cuba joined in. Of course, San Domingo was under our occupation.
Some of thp other countries took a stand, but Haiti wanted to swat us.
Mr. Howe. Then, that condition had changed by September?
Gen. Cole. I considered it had changed, and that there would be no moral
effect In aid of tlie l^nlted Stiitos in the war with Germany, and I did not see
that Haiti would get any benefit from it. She was coming in with the idea
that having made this declaration of war she could get a loan, and I did not
think the financial conditions warranted her in that belief. I believed she
would have obtained the loan if she had gone in at the start, but when she
was coming in, apparently with the idea of simply getting something out of it,
I thought It was not good form for her to do It. As I say, I have a long corre-
spondence here about it, if you care to have me read it.
Mr. Howe. Had the military situation changed by September? It is so, is
it not, that the military situation required caution on the part of the United
States in April?
Gen. Cole. In September of 1917 the conditions were pretty well drawn at
that time. Cambrai, as I remember it, occurred about the 1st of December,
when the British made the assault and were so badly broken up.
Mr. Howe. Cambrai was in
Gen. Cole. November, 1917, was it not? That was the time the British made
the advance and got caught there, and they were not prepared for an open
movement at all, and got smashed back.
Mr. Howe. They got pretty well pushed back by a counter attack?
iicn. (loLE. I will give you my resume, if you wish, m a tew woras.
Mr. Howe. I wish you would, please.
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694 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOIONGO.
Gen. Cole. My opinion is that the motives were: (a) Desire to obtain ironi
the United States a loan on the ground that the country Is one of the AUIes;
(b) desire to be placed in a favorable position, so that she may properly obtain
the needed merchandise from the United States; (c) a market for her coffee,
or, at least, to gain favorable consideration from France; (d) the qnestioD
of gaining prestige and of getting an indemnity for the destruction of Haititn
armed vessels by the Germans on December 6, 1897, and for various other ar-
bitrary acts of Germany, including the loss of Haitian lives and property doring
the present war.
Mr. Howe. That 1897 is the correct date?
Gen. Cole. Eighteen hundred and ninety-sev^i. With this goes the expecta-
tion that they will be represented on the council when peace negotiations are
started at the end of the war. I also hear they are talking of a commission
to take charge of German sequestered property, if such a declaration of a
state of war is made, but in that I can see absolutely no advantage for Haiti
from the proposed move, but, on the other hand, I see some disadvantages for
the United States. If the declaration is made, they will expect us to do many
things for them, and if we do not do them as they expect, our position with
the present Government will be made less satisfactory ; they certainly can give
no aid commensurate with the expenditures that would be involved.
It is also said that we are using our influence to press this matter, and, in
general, it would be one more thing to distract the people from following peace-
ful pursuits, and would be a source of or cause for agitation. At present there
Is no real excuse for such a step on the part of Haiti, and, if taken, it would
l>e considered as the result of pressure by us — if in the future more Haitians
are lost through submarine activity, then there may be reason for such a step
but at present, in my opinion, emphatically no.
Mr. Howe. Did the fact that the declaration of war had once been rejected
have anything to do with your determination in September?
Gen. Cole. I think it had something to do with it; yes.
Mr. HowK. Was the next inirK)rtant event the revision, or the attempt to
revise the Haitian constitution?
Gen. Cole. That was one of the outstanding features of that part of it
Mr. Howe. Then. General, can you indicate in what respects this constitution
needed change, and what was done about it, or what was attempted? Give us
another narrative outline, please.
Gen. Cole. My re<MiUection is that the thing was practically an outct>me of
the convention, necessary in order for the United States to carry out the duties
it was to undertake under its terms — as the constitution then stotnl it woul<l
be ver>' difficult, if not impossible, to get flnancial interests to loan money to
Haiti, at least without our guarantee and we could not well give that without
changes in the fundamental law of Haiti — a revision of the cimstitution was, at •
least, implied by the terms of the convention of August, 1916. This would be
indicated by the fact that there had apparently been two or three commissions
sent from tlie TTnittnl States to take up formally and Informally with the
Haitian Government the question of a convention between the two Governments
which would contain features that would require a modification of the constitu-
tion. Under the constitution of Haiti, as then existing, a foreigner could not
own land. Through subterfuge, through marrying with Haitians, German
subjects had t)ecome possessed of a good deal of land in Haiti. Our iieople did
not intermarry with the Haitians, and the lOnglish did not intermarry with the
Haitians. As a matter of fact, tlie only i)eople who did were the Germans and
the French. So, under the constitution as it existed then, there was no way
for a foreigner legally to own real estate in Haiti, and that was one of the
things that the Ignited States Government desired to have mo<lified. Do yon
want to go into the exact details?
Mr. Howe. On this land tenure?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; compare the two constitutions. You have them before yon,
have you not?
Mr. Howe. We have not got those in the record, have we?
Mr. Angell. Yes ; at least the article of the old constitution is In the record.
I read it one time in the hearings.
Gen. CoT^. I ban take up the comparison of the two later, if you want It
Mr. Howe. Yes; I think now, if you will go ahead and indicate any other
changes, besides the land-tenure one, it would be well ; changes of Importance. I
mean.
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INQUIRY IKTO OCCUPATION Ot HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 695
Gen. OoLE. Article 4. We desired that foregners should have the same protec-
tion granted to Haitians, without exception, the difference in the preceding
constitution being that foreigners were granted the protection accorded by law,
and also denying the right of diplomatic intervention or discussion in case of
damage to foreign property. It was desired that the condition of five years*
residence be set aside. The intention to engage in business and to reside in the
country should be added to the list of enterprises for which the right to hold
property may be acquired, the exception concerning diplomatic intervention to
be taken out.
Mr. Howe. In other words, did you favor a clause In the new constitution by
which an absentee foreign landowner would, after a certain time, lose his right
to hold land?
Gen. Cole. That does not concern what I was talking to you about over here,
this particular thing. These were made by the American minister. I had
nothing to do with that, this thing I am giving you. I am quoting this corre-
spondence simply to show what the United States desired the Haitian Govern-
ment to do in connection with this change in the constitution.
Tlie ctmstitution provided that secretaries of state should receive fees in
addition to their pay. Our country desired that cut out, our Department of
State. 1 desired to do away with the council of state, as it did not consider
it was necessary, being an additional expense and, as a matter of fact, an-
other cause of friction in the country. It desired that provision should be made
for the prosecution of judges of the court of cassation and the judges of the
courts of appeal. This had been made for the prosecution of the secretaries
of state, In other words a procedure whereby the judiciary could be held to
account for malfeasance In office. It desired that article 131 should read:
** The examination and the liquidation of the accounts and of the general ad-
ministration of all officers responsible to the public treasury should be deter-
mined by law," in the place of having it in the constitution, ** On confirma-
tion of a chaml)er of accounts," which was the prior constitutional provision.
Then there were three articles — 132. 133, and 134 — that it desired to be
eliminated.
Article 133 refers to Justices of the peace being named by the President of
the Republic, under certain conditions.
Article 134 concerned judges also, judges of the court of cassation, the re-
movability of the judges and the fact that they could not be removed from
office other than by legal forfeiture, a judgment, or suspended only by an
admitted accusation. They could not be retired.
And the next one, 135, provided that the appointment of judges of the peace
be open to ratification.
Those things were apparently not considered proper In there, and- the gov-
ernment wanted them eliminated.
Article 140. They desired that fbreigners should enjoy the same protection
granted to Haitians, without exception, and besides that the right i^all not
be denied them to claim indemnities for wrongs or losses sustained by them.
Mr. Howe. I have not got that quite clearly. The proposed change was to
permit foreigners to claim Indemnities?
Gen. Cole. Yes; the proposed change to the article followed substantially
article 4 and we wanted Inserted In the constitution an article similar to the
appendix to the Cuban constitution, ratifying the acts of the United States in
Haiti during the military occupation — a very Important provision.
Mr. Howe. Affecting property rights and everything else vitally?
Gen. Oole. Affecting everything. Practically everything that had been done
by the American military forces in Cuba could be set aside.
Mr. Howe. If it were not
Gen. Cole. If it were not
Mr. Howe. For such a provision In the constitution?
Gen. Cole. For such a provision In the constitution, an absolutely essential
provision, the same as was made In the case of the Republic of Cuba.
Mr. Howe. Was not that essentially for the good of Haiti?
Gen. Cole. Essentially for the good of everybody — Haiti and the United
States. No one could know where he stood.
Mr. Howe. Did you find more objection to some of these proposed changes
than to others?
Gen. CoijR. Yes; but I did not have anything to do with them other than
advise them. I do not think I did very much in that, as a matter of fact,
6226»— 21— pt2 38 • r"r-inrrlf>
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696 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO POMINGO.
the revision of the constitution, so far as that was concerned. In discuasioos
with the President and in discussions with the different members of the Senate
and of the cabinet and the Chamber of Deputies, I advised them to give
very careful consideration to the wishes of the United States, but I did not
take any particular part in that particular feature of it Tiiat was a question
between the State Department and the Haitian Government.
Mr. Howe. Now, let me just ask you this question. What was the attitude
of the Assembly toward these changes?
Gen. Cole. The attitude of the Assembly was very hostile.
Mr. Howe. To the United States?
Gen. Cole. To the changes and to the United States. They were particu-
larly hostile, and this, I think, was something that they believed thoroughly—
the question of land tenure they were afraid of; there is no doubt about it
The question of ratifying the acts of the occupation, the American military
forces, martial law, the decisions of the military commander or the military
courts
Mr. Howe. They were very reluctant on
Gen. Cole. They would not do it. They did not want to do it. They wanted
that set aside, and it was absolutely essential.
Mr. Howe. For the best Interests of Haiti?
Gen. Cole. I think for the best interests of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. How about foreign land tenure? Was that for the best interests
of Haiti?
Gen. Coi^. I think so, with certain reservations to bind the rights of
HaiU.
Mr. Howe. You mean for the protection of tlie rights of Haiti?
Gen. Cole. For the protection of Haiti. That was a question that was very
carefully consid^ed by Admiral Knapp, Mr. Myer, and myself in the prepara-
tion of the form in which the constitution was finally passed.
Mr. Howe. Of what we might say was the new constitution?
Gen. Cole. Of the new constitution.
Mr. Howe. As distinguished from this attempt to revise the existing con-
sUtution?
Gen. Cole. As distinguished from this attempt to revise the existing con-
stitution.
Mr. Howe. Now, General, some little time after that the assembly was pro-
rogued, or dissolved?
Gen. Cole, I think if I gave a short rtoum^ of the constitutional proposi-
tion it would be well. The council of state prepared a project for the con-
stitution. That project was presented to the national assembly. It was also
presented to the American minister, who also took it up with the United States,
presumably. The American minister, after having the matter considered in
the United States, I presume, communicated with the Haitian Government,
and there was considerable correspondence with the executive branch of the
Haitian Government The Haitian Government, I always thought, to use a slang
expression, deliberately spilled the beans. They took this whole correfqwndence
and sent it, without comment, practically, to the national assembly. In other
words, saying, " Here Is not our recommendation, but here is what practically
amounts to dictation from the United States. Now, see what you can do with
it." There is not any question in my mind but what that was done with absolute
malice aforethought, and it certainly did raise a rumpus, and the chambers
naturally got angry, because it was inexcusable to do. anything of that sort
They just simply shot this thing over to the national assembly, and that natu-
rally made them all the madder.
Mr. Howe. That result is easUy understood?
Gen. CouE. I think so. They Just simply would not pay attention to what
the United States considered necessary. The United States felt that certain
things had to be done to carry on the work it had set itself in Haiti, and one
of them was that a constitution which was absolutely at variance with every
expressed wish of the United States should not be put into efft»ct.
(Whereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)
AFTER BECESS.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, I will present certain testimony of Admiral Cape^
n written form, in the shape of a continuation of hte former testhnony,
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INQUIRY INTO OOCRJPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 697
as was the understanding, I brieve, when he was last here as a witness. This
is received with the understanding that later on, if cross-examination is de-
sirable, or furth^ examination, Admiral Caperton will be recalled. This is a
document of some 75 tjrpewritten pages.
(The matter referred to was printed as a part of Admiral Caperton's original
testimony.)
Mr. Howe. Oeneral, I tliink at the end of the morning session we had arrived
ftt the point where you were going to describe the prorogation or dissolution of
the assembly. Will you give us an outline of that?
Qen, Cole. There were a number of confer^ices with the President. The
President had conferences with the leaders of the national assembly, the Senate
and House, in an endeavor to come to some amicable arrangement, but appar-
ently without avail. The President had from time to time intimated or stated
that he thought it would be necessary to dissolve the nntional assembly sooner
or later, and he had asked me what attitude we would take, and I told him that
It would depend on what developed ; that at the times he had spoken before, in
my opinion, the time was not yet ripe for any such action.
I notice here I have a comment on that question which I wrote at the time,
which would probably express my opinion better about the thing than I could
say now.
Mr. Howe. Will you read that? Is that your idea?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; I thought I might do that, if It is agreeable.
On June 5, 1917, the President asked me to come and see him at 10.30 a. m. I
found him with Dr. Herraux. He stated that the national assembly did not seem
disposed to act in accordance with the desire of the United States in regard to
certain changes in the constitution, and that the opponents to the Government
and to the United States are apparently endeavoring to prevent, by means of a
claque, the expression of opinion of those favorable to the Government, and
consequently to prevent a free discussion ; that while he was trying, he did not
appear to be able to get very much done, and wanted to know what attitude the
United States would take in the matter of the national assembly failing to
comply with the wishes of the United States. I told him that I was keeping
the United States Government Informed as to the conditions here; as to the
attitude of the national assembly, and as to the various happenings; that
I have made a long and fairly detailed report as to the general condi-
tions in this country, and particularly as to the present situation, and
that this report must now be in the hands of the State Department, I also
told him that I ftelt that my Government felt that Haiti should have every
chance to show her capacity for self-government, and to actually govern herself ;
that I believed that it considered that the national assembly should be given
every opJJortnnity to show that it was capable of relieving the actual state of
affairs and capable or incapable of performing its duties in such a way as to aid
in establishing a proper Government in this country ; that there were a number
of projects or agreements which required the approval of the national assembly,
and that until this assembly showed that it actually was not going to approve
such agreements, it would not be wise to have recourse to drastic action, par-
ticularly as there would be no assurance that another body would be any more
amenable to reason, and in the meantime things most necessary for the develop-
ment of this country would be held up.
In regard to the interference of which he spoke, I suggested that he endeavor
to get his supporters to stop playing politics and come out in the open in favor
of the various things he was supporting, and to demand their rights to be heard ;
that the balance of power had apparently been in his hands, and that if they
really wanted to be heard they could force the opposition to act In a reasonable
manner; I also told him that when disorder was feared before, the presiding
officer had asked for gendarmes to preserve order and that as soon as addi-
tional gendarmes were asked for they would be furnished, and in sufficient
numbers to clear the chambers of spectators if necessary.
That is all in regard to that.
Mr. Howe. That conversation which you have Just spoken of took place about
how long before the actual time of the dissolution of the assembly?
Gen. Cole. Fourteen days, two weeks.
Mr. Howe. Then what developed?
Gen. Cole. The reprt of the committee to the national assembly to prepare the
new constitution provided that only Haitians could be landed proprietors or
acquire real estate. They stuck to their safeguard that foreigners could enjoy
the protection provided by law, etc.
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698 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SAJ^TO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. They stuck to that — continued it?
Gen. Cole. Yes ;• they stuck to that.
Mr. Howe. Just what was that you referred to ; they stuck to theh: safeguanl
that foreigners
Gen. Cole. Should have the protection accorded them by law. The United
States' demand was that foreigners should have the same protection accorded
to Haitians, and they stuck to the provision that they should have the protec-
tion provided by law.
Mr. Howe. What was the difference there?
Gen. Cole. What was the difference?
Mr. Howe. Yes; between the two classes of protection?
Gen. Cole. Well, the one class of protection to foreigners gave a foreigner
the same rights and the same protection under Haitian law that the Haitian
law gave the Haitians, while under the proviedons of the constitution of Haiti
it gave them such rights only as the national assembly in the course of its law-
making might see fit to grant them.
Mr. Howe. As a matter of fact, was there a different degree of protection
provided by law?
Gen. Cole. There was. It was practically impossible for foreigners to get
justice in the Haitian courts.
Mr. Howe. That word " protection " applied to more than physical safety of
their lives?
Gen. Coi-E. I mean in litigation and things of that sort a foreigner had no
chance in a Haitian court unless he was able to buy it.
Mr. Howe. Was he discriminated against in the constitution?
Gen. Cole. Oflfhand I would say yes; decidedly.
Mr. Howe. So there was more than a distinction in language in the two Idnda
of protection?
Gen. Cole. Oh, yes ; it was considered very vital, and I considered it very
vital myself.
Mr. Howe. And the assembly stood by the existing provision of the consti-
tution?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And would not change it?
Gen. Cole. And would not change it ; and they would not consider the ques-
tion of ratifying the acts of the occupation and the military government and
martial law. I had reported the final project that the national assembly had
proposed to put through and I received instructions to exert every endeavor to
prevent the passage of such a project.
Mr. Howe. You have given us an outline of that project?
Gen. Cole. Yes. Now, here is a report that I made on the 15th of June:
"Antagonism national assembly to foreign ownership land and to all Ameri-
can influence such that no endeavor I can make short of dissolution assembly
will prevent passage constitution along lines reported my 13107. Have dis-
cussed matters fully with minister and Gen. Butler. Suggest minister notify
Haitian Grovemment that, in opinion our Government, constitution prepared
assembly will make impossible to bring about results contemplated under
articles 1 and 14 of treaty, and consequently our Government can not accept
such constitution. If national assembly refuses heed such warning, it will be
necessary to dissolve assembly to prevent passage. The number marines in
Haiti should be Increased by at least eight full companies to prevent disorders
that may follow dissolution assembly. See paragraph 16 my report May 17.*'
Mr. Howe. Did you anticipate trouble when you were considering dissolving
the assembly?
Gen. Cole. I did not anticipate It. but I was prepared for it I did not think
It would create trouble. I did believe this: That it would create more trouble
than the dissolution of the entire Haitian Government and the establishment
of a military government there, because, on account of the antagonism between
the twp elements. If both were siippresse<l each would be pleased at the down-
fall of the other, but If one went down, one would be sore about the other.
Mr. Howe. For surviving?
Gen. Cole. For surviving.
Mr. Howe. You refer to the executive and the legislative branches?
Gen. Cole. Yes. The President had sent me a memorandum on the 16tb.
and I went to see him in regard to this memorandum, concerning a proposal
he made in connection with the constitution. I went to see the President in
regard to his memorandum and discussed matters with him very thoroughly.
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INQUIBY INTO OOOUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 699
and in the course of the conversation X learned a number of interesting things.
Id regard to his memorandum I told him that It was necessary, before it
could receive further consideration, to follow out its results to an ultimate
conclusion. He admitted that if the people decided, in the election proposed by
him, to sustain the constitution prepared by the national assembly that
unless the United States were willing to accept such a constitution and wa»
willing that Haiti should remain in its present primitive and disorganized
state that it would be necessary to suppress the national assembly. He also
finally admitted that if the result of the elections was to reject the constitution
prepared by the national assembly the fact that the national assembly would
not change its attitude and that it would still, in his opinion, stick to its
original scheme, and that if his suggestion that other representatives be
elected were followed the consequence would be either two assemblies, each
claiming to be legally elected or that the present national assembly would
have to be dissolved.
He further stated that he could do nothing without the complete support of
the United States and that his real belief was and is that the national
assembly will have to be supprt^ssed. As I have reported on a number of occa-
sions, there is little doubt in my mind but what the President has consistently
worked toward that end. He stated that, In his opinion, the dissolution of the
national assembly was absolutely the only method that could be followed,
but that he must have the approval of the United States before he could take
that step. He also stated that at no time, as he believed, has this country
been in condition to elect a proper national assembly, that the elections were
engineered by a few politicians, and that the vast majority of the voters had
no idea as to what they were voting for, but were simply brought in and
voted by the candidate or his friends, having received money for such votes.
He stated that in his opinion the only government by Haitians that would be
satisfactory would be one of a President, with a council of cabinet ministers
and a further council of state with legislative powers; that such government
should prepare a constitution in accordance with the ideas of the United States,
promulgate same to the country and carry on the government under such con-
stitution until such time as the country had gotten out some of the influence
of the politicians and had been able to realize by actual experience the benefits
resulting from the various changes in the constitution that were suggested
by the United States. He stated that sucli a government had been carrie<l on
in 1846. I stated to him that if the experience with the last and the present
national assembly was a criterion of the capacity of a Haitian national
assembly that I quite agreed with him as to the undesirability of such an
assembly.
I also stated to him that while the present system seemed to be demonstrat-
ing its inefficiency, that for a year the system propose<l by him had been
tried and had not been a success ; that if such system were continued, in order
for it to succeed it would be absolutely necessary that the political element
be practically discarded and a cabinet and council of state formed of people
of education and ability who had not been active politicians, and, above all,
by people who had the reputation of being thoroughly honest, so that the e<lucate<I
people of the country would realize that the Government was comixised of
people who were working to benefit the country and not to fill their own
pockets at the expense of the country. I stated that the council of state had
been almost entirely all politicians, and that they had not been able to (Com-
mand the respect of the country, and further, that if such experiments were
again tried and found lacking there could be but one result, the administration
of affairs of Haiti by Americans until such time as the younger generation
could be trained in public afTairs. He state<l that he realized this fully ami
that if such government were permitted that he would make no appointments
to the council of state or to the cabinet without the express sanction of
the representative of the United States Government, and that, in his opinifm,
such a government would be successful. He further statnl that he would em-
ploy expert assistants in the various departments, particularly of agriculture
and of public instruction, as would be necessary to place these departments on
a modem basis.
The President stated that since he had become President many people who
had been former friends, became his enemies ; but that outside of the political
world he had numerous friends of high standing in all parts of the countrv,
and that he believed he could get good citizens to work with him. As to this
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700 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
I am somewhat uncertain, as the President has been in political life for many
years, and I do not think he is particularly well or favorably Icnown in aii>*
other parts of the country than Port au Prince and his home.
In discussing politicians he stated that the reason why the occupation and
the United States influence was so bitterly hated by the politicians was that
they were prevented from getting their livelihood from the public funds, add-
ing that in former days all of the principal politicians expected to get
enough money out of the public funds to enable them to live well and to take
their families to Paris each year.
In discussing article 6 I stated that from the instructions I had received,
I had no doubt whatever but what my Government would refuse to recognize
or to accept a constitution similar to the one now being considered in the
national assembly, and I referred to the fact that his brother had voted against
the right of foreigners to own land, and the President explained it hi this way :
Prior to the first meeting of the national assembly to vote upon the constlto-
tion he had had a meeting of his friends and that one-half had been in favor
and one-half had been opposed to the right of foreigners to own land ; that he
had information that payment was being made by those opposed to the change
to have people in the chambers to howl down any attempt to speak in favor
of the ownership of land by foreigners, and, consequently, not being able to
keep his supporters lined up, he had suggested or stated that they could vote
as they pleased, and consequently his brother, among others, had voted in
favor of denying foreigners the right to own land. I reminded him of my sug-
gestion, when he had referred to . paid people being present in the national
assembly chamber while voting was going on to intimidate voters, that that
was a game at which two could play; that we would provide the necessary
force to maintain order in the chambers, and that aggressive action on the
part of government supporters would have resulted in a hearing for all con-
cerned.
I think, possibly, it would be well to explain what that particular thing
means. On one or two occasions, when they had feared disorder, the President
of the chambers had asked for additional gendarmes to guard the chambers,
and we had furnished them, and that was what was intended in that par-
ticular case, and if they asked for additional protection, or if they feared
disorder or asked for protection, that we would furnish it
Mr. Howe. Was that request made in this case by Vincent?
Gren. Cole. Certainly not If it was, they were provided ; but they were not
This was something the President was stating. I further stated that the whole
trouble lay in the fact that most of the Government supporters were not acting
in an aggressive manner; that they were all afraid of the political world in
Port au Prince and that they would do nothing to oppose the things that were
antagonistic both to our Government and to their government He also stated
that when the convention was passed he had adopted the same tactics that he
claimed had been recently adopted by the opposition, but that now, liaving no
money to spend, he was unable to follow that practice.
This Is one of my reports.
Mr. Howe. On that situation?
Gen. Cole. Do you want that?
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Gen. Cole. I had an interview with the President
Mr. Howe. Dated?
Gen. Cole. The 16th.
Mr. Howe. June 16?
Gen. Cole. June 16.
" Had interview, President, who stated his suggestion, present constitntioa
to people reported my 16014 Marcorps would only result in delay and eventual
dissolution national assembly, as it will not grant foreigners right own land.
He stated Government supporters in assembly were evenly divided regarding
foreign ownership and feeling certain of defeat, and to avoid possible hostile
demonstration, meeting assembly, his brother and others voted to deny foreign
ownership lands, this apparently with his consent. He desires suppression
assembly and Government by cabinet, with council of State with legislative
powers, the latter to prepare and Government to promulgate a constitution to
meet our views, such form government to continue until country realizes benefit*
an<l ready for self-government. He will promise anything. I believe con-
ditions as stated, paragraph 16, my report May 17. Assembly about one-thinl
through constitution.*'
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Mr. Howe. What developed after that?
Gen. Cole. On June 18 I notified Washington, " Unless contrary Instructions
received, if necessary to prevent passage proposed constitution, I intend dis-
solve national assembly, through President, if possible ; otherwise direct."
Mr. Howe. Was that proposal of yours approved?
Gen. Cole. It was approved and it was disapproved.
Mr. Howe. Explain that, will you please?
Gen. Cole. " State Department is dispatching a message to Hatian Govern-
ment in regard to this matter, which also refers to the changed aspect of the
question due to the break in diplomatic relations wiUi Grermany."
Mr. Howe. What is the date of that?
Gen. Cole. That is the 16th of June.
Mr. HowB. From the State Department?
Gen. Cole. From the Navy Department. **The department vests you wltli
full discretionary power. Endeavor to accomplish end desired without the use
of military force."
I will read the whole of that message :
** Following message received evidently intended for Port au Prince." Brigade's
15318. State Department is dispatching a message to Haitian Government in
regard to this matter, which also refers to the changed aspect of the question,
due to the break in diplomatic relations with Germany." (Haiti had broken her
diplomatic relations with Germany. ) " The department vest you with full dis-
cretionary power. Endeavor to accomplish end desired without the use of mili-
tary force. Acknowledge."
On the 18th it had been concluded that the assembly would have to be dis-
«olve<l — it may have been on the 17th — and the President was to draw up and
did draw up a decree dissolving the national assembly. He was to give me a
copy of it to examine. I did not fjet it. I got it on the morning of the 19th,
having sent to him or having gone to him, I do not remember which, personally
and got it. I was informed that It had been sgned, the original, or was being
signed. I had iu the meantime drawn up a proclamation of my own, which I
intende<l to put into eifect in case the President did not exercise his powers as
President. I did not want to use our military force, as it was contrary to the
desire of the Ignited States, but it was ready to use in case it became necessary.
Mr. Howe. That was a proclamation to dissolve the assembly?
Gen. Cole. To dissolve the assembly.
Mr. Howe. That you had prepared?
Gen. CoT^« That I had prepared myself. That was prepared and in my pos-
session, ready to use in case it became necessary.
Mr. Howe. That is to say, in case the President d:d not dissolve it?
Gen. Cole. In case the President absolutely refused to do it. Suppose I read
my report of June 19.
Mr. Howe. I think that is very important.
Gen. Cole. " June 19, 1917. Early this morning the President sent a message
to me that he proposed to go to the national assembly and. In a secret session,
inform them that it was absolutely essential that they pass a constitution which
conformed to the recommendations made by the Government of the United
States ; that he proposed to make this visit about 10.30, after he had received
the American minister and Capt. Anderson, commanding the patrol force. I
stated that I saw no objection to his endeavoring to get the asseml)ly to change
its stand but that I would communicate with him later,
*' Saw the miniser and discussed matters with him, and then went to the
pahu-e and saw the President. I inforuiod him that some time ago he had re-
queste<l that I consider the question of dissolving the national assembly, but
that I bad Informed him that. In my opnlon. the time was not quite ripe. Yes-
terday I had informed him the time had come to dissolve the national assembly
and that he had agreed and Inftmnod me that he would furnish me, either last
night or this morning, with copies of the decree for my consideration. Prior
to its being promulgated he immediately gave me the decree; copy appended."
That does not seem to be particularly good sense.
*• I asked the President what he expected to gain by seeing the chambers, and
he stated that he had hopes that all the suggestions of the United States would
be accepted by the national assembly with the possible exception of the one
ratifying the acts of the occupation. I told him that the constitution of 1889, in
the third paragraph of its one hundred and ninety-second article, had provided
that certain decrees and acts made by revolutionary committees were ratified,
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702 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
and that I considered that the new constitution of Haiti should have similar
ratification of his decrees and of the acts of the occupation. His proposal was
that the end desired could be accomplished by agreement between the two coun-
tries formally ratified by the national assembly. I Informed him that, hi my
opinion, no constitution could possibly be accepted which did not conform gener-
ally to the one prepared by the council of state and which was submitted to onr
State Department for cohslderatlon, with modifications In accordance with the
suggestions of our State Department In the meantime he had informed me
that, fearing he might be insulted, he decided to send for presiding officers and
assistants of the two chambers in place of going to the national assembly him-
self. I informed him that the decree should be in readiness for Immediate de-
livery, so that in case any tricks were tried by the national assembly they could
be met by an immediate delivery of the notice of dissolution. I then left, as the
American minister, with Capt. Anderson, was entering the palace. Capt Ander-
son was received with honors of a vice admiral.
** Immediately after the American minister had left the palace the President
saw the bureaus of the national assembly, after which they returned to the
meeting place of the national assembly, when the national assembly went into
secret session on the second floor of the building, the meeting lasting about
one-half hour. After this they came downstairs and resumed their regular
session, starting in at article 104, where they had left off tlie preceding day.
Gen. Zamor then attempted to speak, starting his speech with a statement that,
while he could not divulge what had taken place in the secret meeting, he con-
sidered that people should know what the situation was, and that it was useless -
for the national assembly to attempt to pass a constitution which they all knew
could not possibly be accepted or put Into efTect. At this stage of proceedings
various members interposed to«such an extent that he resumed his seat Shortly
afterwards it became apparent that the chambers were endeavoring to rush the
constitution through. I sent Gen. Butler to the palace to get the decree, and
after his arrival there he reported that It had not been signed, and that one of
the cabinet members could not be found, but that he had sent an automobile to
search for him. I had told Gen. Butler that, In case the President did not sign
the decree, he was to be informed, as coming from me, that I would suppress
the national assembly myself and would recommend the establishment of a mili-
tary government. The President then signed the decree. A short time after
wards It was reported to me that the national assembly was endeavoring to i^aas
the whole constitution by skipping articles, so I sent Immediately orders to the
gendarmerie officer at the meeting place of the national assembly to prevent
by force If necessary, any further proceedings. The assembly had skipped
various articles and endeavored to declare that the constitution had been passed.
I directed that the doors be closed with the members and si)ectators being in-
side. The missing secretary of state was found; he signed the decree. I
directed Gen. Butler to proceed Immediately to the national assembly and de-
liver the decree to the President of the assembly.
" The president of the assembly refused to accept the message or to announce
it to the assembly as it was not delivered to him by the cabinet or by a mem-
ber thereof, announcing that he had a message from the President, but he did
not know what It contained. Gen. Butler then took the decree, promulgated it to
the national assembly, and directed. In accordance with my orders, that the
chambers be cleared and members and spectators be released. The guards had
been placed at the entrances to the chamber, and no further meetings of the
deputies or senators will be recognized nor. If practicable, permitted. In any
event they stand dissolved and no meeting of any considerable number can
take place and then only In some private place."
Just prior, I think a couple of hours prior, to the dissolution of the assembly
I was at the legation with the American minister and the commander of the
patrol forces, and Just about that time, after we had decided that the dissolu-
tion was necessary and must be done at once, a message was delivered, which
stated: "Take no action until arrival of State Department's message. Ac-
knowledge.*' There was nothing else to be done but dissolve the national
assembly, and it was done.
Mr. Howe. Did Gen. Butler clear the hall, the legislative meeting room, or
did he strike any difficulty In that; do you know?
Gen. 0)LE. As far as I know there was no clash whatsoever.
Mr. Howe. This report which you have Just read was prepared after yoo had
seen Gen. Butler, after the dissolution was accomplished; is that right?
Gen. OoLE. Yes.
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INQXJIBY INTO 0C0X7PATI0N OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 703
Mr. HowB. Do you know whether or not Gen. Butler was personally armed
when he went down there?
Gen. CoiE. I do not know ; I would presume that he probably was.
Mr. Howe. But do you know?
Qen. GouE. I do not know. He may or he may not have been.
Mr. Howx. Do you know whether there were gendarmes inside there?
Gen. Cole. I think there were. ,
Mr. Hows. Do you know why they were there?
Gen. Ck>LB. To preserve order.
Mr. Hows. Do you know if they had been requested by the presiding officer?
Gen. Cols. My recollection is that they were invariably there.
Mr. Hows. Do you know whether they had been requested?
Gen. GouB. On that specific occasion I do not remember.
Mr. Howx. Had they been on previous occasions requested by the presiding
officer or officers to keep order?
Gen. Cole. There had been requests made on previous occasions for extra
numbers to preserve order.
Mr. Howe. A request made by the presiding officer?
Gen. Cob. Tes. I think, as a matter of fact, there was probably a request made
by the cabinet that there be extra men there to preserve order.
Mr. Howe. Well, then, General, to sum this up, the assembly was dissolved?
Gen. Coix. The assembly was dissolved?
Mr. Howe. By the President?
Gen. Coix. By the President
Mr. Howe. But you were prepare«l, in case the President did not take that
Hctlon. to have it dissolved on your own orders, and In that you had the approval
of the Navy I>ei)artnient, with the exception, perhaps, of that last dispatch
which you read, and do I understand that that was received so late in the day
that plans c<ml<l not be chauge<l?
Gen. Cole. It was receive*! so late that wc could not change our plans. If
we had stopi)*^!. our usefulness there would have ended then and there.
Mr. Howe. Was that received before or after the President signed his
proclamation?
Gen. Cole. I would say it was received after he had signed his proclamation,
liecause It came in after it had been decided that the dissolution was to take
place, that it must take place. *It was received just a few minutes before the
dissolution actually took pla<*e in the chambers. If I had gone to the telephone,
or sent a mountetl messenger, or automobile, I could have stopped it.
Mr. Howe. You could have stopped Gen. Butler?
Gen. Cole. I could have stopped Gen. Butler.
Mr. Howe. From delivering the President's proclamation?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Howe. But you could not have done that unless you had acted quickly?
Gen. Cole. It was not a case that could be done. I had to take the re-
sponsibility of carrying out what I considered the best thing to do, being on
the spot.
Mr. Howe. Were there attempts after that, on the part of the assembly, to
meet?
Gen. Cole. No ; it passed off as quietly as you please.
Mr. Howe. They did not gather in other places and attempt to function?
Gen. Cole. No.
Mr. Howe. From that time on until the end of your tour there were there
any more political crises?
Gen. Cole. No ; no more. That ended it.
Mr. Howe. Then how would you characterize the remaining months of your
tour there? Were they tranquil?
Gen. Cole. Yes; very tranquil.
Mr. Howe. And how was the time used?
Gen. Cole. The time was used In building up, to the best of our ability,
the Haitian Government, and improving conditions?
Mr. Howe. During all j'our tour there did you hear of any Haitian prisoners
being killed by gendarmes or marines?
Gen. Cole. No.
Mr. Howe. And, to the best of your belief, during your tour were there any
such occurrences?
Gen. Cole. There were no such occurrences, to the best of my knowledge ami
belief. There was a prisoner who escaped at Fort Liberte, or at Ouanaminthe.
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704 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
sometime in 1916, and a considerable number of prisoners got away before the
escape was discovered, and I am of the opinion that one man was killed &t
the time of that escape, by a ^ard who saw him getting away.
Mr. Howe. He was in the act of escaping?
Gen. Cole. He was in the act of escaping, one of a considerable number wnu
had broken Jail. They had started to tunnel and gotten under the walls of
the prison, without being seen, but some were seen just as they were going,
and my recollection is that one may have been killed at that time, though I
would not state for certain.
Mr. Howe. General, during your time down there were the relations between
the American occupation and its forces, and the people in general in the
country, happy?
Gen. Cole. They were all given to understand that It was their business to
make themselves so persona grata to the Haitians and the Haitian Govern-
ment, that they were on their toes to do it, and they did a very great deal for
the country, and they made their influence throughout the country very strong.
Mr. Howe. Now, in addition to this influence of the occupation over the
people of the country, in addition to the steps taken to preserve law and order
and to internally upbuild the country, could you say that the occupation has
resulted in the increase of the wealth of the country in that strictly material
sense?
Gen. Cole. Taking the end of 1917, when I left there ; yes. The country, I do
not believe, had been as prosperous as it was in the fall of 1917 for gcsieratlons.
The country people, the peasantry, were far ahead of any wealth thej had
ever had before. However, that did not. apply so much to the merchant class,
nor did it apply to the political class, for the reason on the jwrt of the political
class that they did not have the pickings, and on the part of the mercantile
class that the war and the suspension of water transportation had materially
affected their business, and they could not get material, so there was a con-
siderable diflficulty in regard to that. But we had absolutely the respect and
confidence, I will venture to say, of 95 per cent of the country people of Haiti.
On a number of occasions it was reported to me by priests and others that they
had seen country women kneeling down beside the wayside shrines thanking
God that the Americans were in Haiti.
Gen. Butler and I took the President and a number of the members of hiS
cabinet out to a place called Mome a Cabrlt, 2(T miles outside of Port au Prince,
on the top of a mountain on the road to Mirebalals, to see some road work
that was going on, and while we were there a number of parties of country
women with their produce came by, and I said to the President, " Suppose yon
and your minister of public works go off there by yourselves and stop some
of those women and talk to them about what they think of conditions, and the
American occupation, and the work they are doing." And he did, and he said
that they all thanked God that we were there.
That was the attitude of the country people almost entirely.
There is one phase of the work that was done that I think may be worth while
bringing up, and that is the improvement of the communes in the interior. We
found from time to time that probably one- tenth of the funds that should be
collected by the communes were being accounted for ; that taxes were apparently
being collected still, but that there were never any such sums as should have
been collected accounted for by the communal books, and on one or two occa-
sions, owing to the absence, the enforced absence or long absence of the magis-
trate of a commime, we had placed officers of the gendarmerie in charge of
affairs of the communes, upon the request of the President, and on two of those
occasions it developed that, under the law, collecting himself the things that
the magistrate was supposed to collect, approximately 1,000 per cent more
was Oftllected. sometimes at letist 1.500 per cent more, and so when a par-
ticularity good case came up, the matter was taken up with the President
and he eventually signed a decree making the gendarmerie officers Inspectors
of the finances of the communes, each district commander. He had supervision
and represented the central government in the commune, and saw how the
funds were collected, etc.
Mr. Howe. Did that work well?
Gen. Cole. It worked splendidly.
Mr. Howe. Did it cause any friction?
Gen. Cole. It caused the resignation of the magistrate at the cape. Mr.
Adehemar Auguste, but generally no friction. There were rubbings at times,
but It straightened out, and the funds were properly accounted for, and- the Ino-
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 706
proyement In the communes was simply beyond belief. It was not accepted in
good spirit by some people. The^ found that the President stuck to It In
Haiti, so some one took it up with M. Menos, who was the Haitian min-
ister to Washington, and he made complaints to the State Department, and
the State Department took it up with us, and I took it up with the President,
and the President said M. Menos had acted entirely without his authority;
that he had acted on his own initiative entirely, without any authority from
the Government, and the Government was thoroughly satisfied with the way
In which the thing was working. There were one or two complaints from the
Government, and the question was gone Into, and it was satisfactorily arranged,
I think, in both cases, it being shown to tlie President, to his entire satisfac-
tion and to the satisfaction of the minister of the interior, that the reports that
had come to him were misleading reports, and not correct.
Mr. Howe. Was there anything, else down there that you think we should
know about. General, that you have not covered In your testimony?
Gen. CoLB. There is that question of martial law that has not been spoken of
at all, or at least very little.
Mr. Howb. Will you make comment on that, please?
Gen. Cot J. In my opinion, until the Haitian courts have been entirely
reformed, and until an entirely improved government exists in the Republic
of Haiti, martial law must continue. It certainly must continue so long as
American troops are there under anyth'ng like the present conditions. It has
not weighed heavily on the innocent; it has not weighe-l heavily on the poor;
It has not weighed heavily on anybody, except on their fears. There were
very few cases where provost courts were resorted to. There was one occasion
when I took action in a purely Haitian case.
Mr. Howe. Will you describe that?
Gen. Cous. A man died, leaving two sons, and also leaving some property.
There was a dispute between the two sons as to a division of the property,
and they were not friends. One brother sent to the other brother and said
that he was ready to settle up, so the other brother went to him, and he was
bound by hs brother and the brother's son. and then his wife and child were
sent for, and they came, and for a period of approximately 12 hours, in the
sight of the wife and the child, the man was gradually tortured to death by
slow means — cuttings and bleedings, and ligatures — tied to a tree. It was
a particularly atrocious, deliberate killng of a brother. The matter was
reported by the gendarme officer to the local judicial authorities, and the man
was arrested and released. The gendarme officer took it up with the next
higher judicial authority, and was informed that nothing rould be done in
regard to it; that the case was ende<l, he having been released by order of
this judge de paix. The matter was reported to the chief of the gendarmerie,
who brought it to my attention, and I took it up with the minister of justice
and with the Presdent. I said jthat a condition of that sort could not he-
allowed to exist, and they took it up with the commissary of the Government.
In the meantime I directed that the man be arrested. They sad that there
was nothing that could be done. I said, "Very well, then, this is a case I
am going to put before a military court," and the man was trie<l before a
provost court and sentenced to confinement. After that was done, a short
time afterwards, the minister for justice said he thought they could deal with
the case; that they had made a mistake; they ^id they could not deal with
it before, and after some discussion between the minister, the President, and
myself, they having asked for jurisdiction of the man, I told them that I
preferred to have the man serve under the sentence of the Haitian court
than serve under the sentence of a military court; that it was a Haitian
offense, between Haitians, but I did not propose to allow- the man to escape
punishment; that if they would prepare the proper legal papers in his case
ant^ would bring him to trial before the proper Haitian tribunal, that in case
that tribunal acted in accordance with the evidence, the man would then
be considered as a Haitian prisoner, but, so long as I remained in Haiti, and
BO long, in my opinion, as the Amercan military authorities remained In
Haiti, that man would have to remain in jail for the length of his sentence;
in other words, he could not, having become a Haitian prisoner, b6 imme<r-
ately released.
Martial law was something that they feared, but it was something that did
not touch them very often; very, very seldom. The newspni)ers generally be-
haved themselves pretty well. The only case in which I remember of having
put a newspaper editor before the provost court was immediately after the
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706 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
dissolution of tl)e National Assembly. Tbe same day that the National As-
sembly was dissolved I gave Gen. Butler a notice to deliver to all the news-
papers that there should be no comment on this particular thing, to inflame
public opinion, and all the newspapers carried out those instructions.
Some two or three days later a Goyemment new^mper came out with a
vicious attack on the National Assembly, and I had the editor taken before the
provost court, and he was tried and placed under a bond of $100 not to repeat
his offense. Incidentally, it looked very much as though the article had been
written by Dr. Heraux.
Mr. Howe. What was the attitude of the Haitian courts toward the occupa-
tion?
Oen. Cole. They were opposed to it ; they did not want to recognize it
Mr. Howe. Do you know about the case which has been mentioned here of the
presentation of a check for gourdes?
Gen. Cole. Well, I know something about it.
Mr. Howe. It was testified here, General, that a Haitian jHresented a check
calling for the payment of gourdes at the bank, and he was offered payment in
dollars, but refused payment, whereupon he brought suit against the bank
for the amount of his check in gourdes and punitive damages, and that the
plea of the bank was that it was forced to take that action — forced by the officials
of the occupation — !ind thereafter the court of cassation refused to recogni»>
that plea and upheld tlte action of the lower court in finding for the plaintiil
Do you know who of the American ofiicers ordered the bank to pay in gourdes?
Gen. Cole. I think Admiral Caperton. My note states the foundation of the
case; that acting under an order of Admiral Caperton, with the end in view of
preventing speculation in gold and gourdes, and the corresponding fluctuation
in the rate of exchange, the bank made payment in gourdes at the rate of
five for one for a check drawn in gold. This was a check drawn in gold.
Mr. Howe. Draw^n in gold means in dollars?
Gen. Cole. Yes. Mr. Francis — ^his name is Francois — brought suit against the
bank and attempted to execute the Judgment. I issued instructions that the
.ludjrment could not be executed and that no interfcTence with the oi)eration8 of
the bank on account of this case would be permitted.
Mr. Howe. Then I got my question hind part before as to what the check
was for.
Gen. Cole. Mr. Francois made decidedly objectionable statements, acconling
to this, against the occupation ; and I was very much inclined to take action
against him. but finally decided 1 would not, as he was an old man and had the
reputation of being quite iruHoible and was apparently trying to get himself
made a martyr, and I thought the best thing was simply to prevent any action
being taken to put into effect the decrees. I took it up with the President, and
he could not do anything, of course ; it was beyond his power. And the minister
of Justice said it was beyond his iH»wer; but as it was done under an absolutely
direct, positive order of Admiral Caperton, as far as I could tell, I had nothing
to do but protect the bank, I have considerable paj^ers about this proposition.
I can give my instructions, if you would care to have them, in regard to that.
Mr. Howe. Let us have those.
Oen. Cole. This is to the financial adviser, dated April 28, 1917:
"Referring to your letter of April 20, 1917, with inclosures, whereby I am
infornuHl that oiw J. B. W. Francis has caused a summons to be issued for
the ' National Bamiue de la Uepublique d'Haiti ' through Its representative, to
api>ear before the tribunal civile of Port au Prince, to produce certain papers,
or cor>ies thereof, and to show cause why certain fines or penalties should not
he imposed against the fuM banque, you* are informed that, as the original
action on which this complaint is based was performed by the banque as an
agent of Admiral Caperton (in whose name the ac(»ount was carried and by
whose orders the funds concerned were disbursed) and in compliance with
his orders, this case does not fall within the Jurisdiction of the civil conit>«.
and consefiuently that no judgment of the civil courts against the banque in this
case can be pennitt(»d to be executed, nor will any interference with the biisi
ness of the han(iue on accnunt of this case be tolerated. Please notify the
banque accordingly and instruct it to inform this ofiice immediately if an.^
attempt is made to effectuate any Judgment or execution against the banque or
to interfere in any way with its oi^erations on account of the action of tht'
plaintiff in this case- Al.so instruct the banque to keep the military ct>n»-
mander informed of the further acti(ms of the plaintiff and of the civif courts
in this case.**
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INQUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 707
Mr. Howe. I think that probably is all that is really necessary about the facts
in that case.
Gen. Cole. The court withdrew a part of its decision against the occupa-
tion, and a part of the fines against the bank, but they stuck to something else,
but it was not put into effect.
Mr. Howe. In other words, the effect of that direction of yours was to disre-
gard the order and decree of the court?
Gen. Cole. To set aside the decree in the civil court. That would be an
example of a case where it was necessary to have ratified the acts of the occu-
pation in the Republic of Haiti by the constitution before we could withdraw.
That is simply a case in point
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, I understand that Mr. Angell would like to sug-
gest the names of some witnesses to the committee. I told him that I hoped
that the witnesses to lye called by the committee at its own instance will prob-
ably have l>een examined by the end of Tuesday morning*s session of the com-
mittee next week — that is to say. on the 15th of the month — and he, I think,
will now suggest to the committee the names and addresses of some witnesses
that he would like to have called.
Mr. Angell. All of these names, I believe, have been already given by me in-
formally to Senator McCormick, at his rt^quest, as far back as August, the time
when he called me <lown here from New York to go over with me the names of
the witnesses and the general procedure, and these were the names that I
suggested at that time.
Senator Oddie. Do you think that he had better give a list of theip for the
record?
Mr. Howe. Here is the point. You will probably not have time in the two
or three days before we start down to Haiti to examine all of these witnesses.
Mr. Angell. I suggest, in view of the limited time at the disposal of the com-
mittee before we sail, that only two or three or possibly four of those be heard
next week. I. am particularly anxious to have the committee hear the testi-
mony of a Mr. H. R. Pilkington. whose address is care P. W. Chapman &
Co., 115 Broadway, New York City, or, if he happens to be away from New
York at this moment, he can be reached in care of P. W. Chapman & Co., Chi-
cago.
I would also like very much to have the committee hear the testimony of one
Max Zurckerman, at 110 Crawford Street. Roxburj'. Mass., care E. Levy, and
the testimony either of Charles A. Burrows, 253 Belgrade Avenue, Roslyndale,
Mass., or James W. Johnson, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York.
Mr. Pilkington and Mr. Johnson would come simply on any informal request
from the committee (»r its counsel, Mr. How^e. Zurckerman is a young man
who is in business, and he told me he could not get away without serious preju-
dice to his own position with his employer unless he had some kind of semi-
official notice from the committee.
Mr. Howe. I would suggest a telegram from the Sergeant at Arms.
Mr. Angell. Yes; some such form in his case. I do not think that will be
necessary in the case of Mr. Pilkington and I am sure it would not be neces-
sary in the case of Johnson, but I would suggest that a similar telegram be
sent by the Sergeant at Arms to Burrows.
Mr. Howe. Which would you rather have, Johnson or Burrows?
Mr. Angell. I can tell that better when I get back to New York to-morrow.
I know what Johnson has to say, in substance, but I do not know what Bur-
rows has to say, although he has promised to write me and give me an outline
of what his testimony will be.
Senator Oddie. You take that up with Capt. Angell, Mr. Howe?
Mr. Howe. Yes ; I will take that up.
Mr. Anoeix. If in the meantime I may have Pilkington and Zurckerman
notified definitely, when I get back to New York to-morrow morning I will be
able to say whether I would prefer to have Johnson or Burrows, as the case
may be.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Monday, November 14, 1921. at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
Digitized by VjOOQIC
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY LNTO OCCUPATIOiX AJJD ADMLMSTRATION OF HAITI
AND SAMO DOMINGO.
MONDAY, NOVEMBEB 14, 1921.
UNma> States Senate,
Sklect Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington. D. C.
The eonmilttee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment, Senator
Tasker L. Oddle presiding.
Present : Senator Oddie.
Also present : Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and Maj. EJdwin N.
McOlellan in their respective representative capacities as hereinbefore indicated.
STATEMENT OF ^BIQ. QEN. ELI K. COLE, UNITED STATES MABINE
COBPS— Besumed.
Mr. Angell. You si)oke in the early part of your direct testimony, General,
concerning conditions relative to Cape Hatien and -the Cacos of the nortli, and
of good and bad Cacos. What was the distinction in your mind in using that
term?
Col. Cole. The good Caco was by force of circumstances a member of the,
from time to time, revolutionary forces, and between times was engaged in his
occupation, generally that of small farmer, while the bad Caco was intended to
designate those people who, from one cause or another, had become objectors £o
work and who when not engaged in revolutionary activities prefer living on the
work of others to work performed by themselves; and in general It included
those who lived by arine<l robbery.
Mr. Angell. Were the Cacos who refused to surrender their arms and accept
the occupation in the fall of 1915 thereafter regarde<l as bandits by virtue of the
fact of such refusal?
On. Cole. Only during the peritMl when they remained under arms. After
the campaign at Fort Riviere was finished we did what we could to get people
to come into their homes and reestablish their farms; and it was our general
policy to take no action against other than a few of the higher leaders, except
in the case of people who still continued in bands under arms and were scouring
the country robbing, in particular market women, their best prey.
Mr. Angell. Well, up to the time of the capture of Fort Riviere were those
who in any way remained under arms regarded as ipso facto bandits and
enemies of the occupation?
Gen. Cole. They were. They were regarded as bandits, because their leaders
had entered into a formal convention for the delivery of arms and the return to
their homes of their followers; and these people had disobeyed not only the
orders of their leaders, up to and including the very highest, but they had taken
to the woods with the announced detennination of carrying on a war to drive us
out of Haiti. A subordinate must in civilized warfare follow the instructions of
those placed over him In the military hierarchy.
Mr. Angell, Were those operations — I am speaking now of the operations in
the fall of 1915, which concluded with the cjipture of Fort Riviere — regarded by
the occupation as practically warfare being conducted by our trm>ps against the
Cacos?
Gen. Cole, Yes; absolutely.
Mr. Angell. You .spoke in considerable detail of the conditions at Cape
Haitien in the summer and early fall of 1915 and of the work that was under-
taken by our military forces under your direction, such as cleaning up hospitals,
waterworks, sanitation, and public utilities generally. From what sources were
the funds used in those works derived?
709
Digitized by VjOOQIC
710 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Cole. Almost entirely from funds allotted me by Admiral Caperton. as
the senior naval officer present, through Col. Waller, the brigade commander and
senior military officer on shore, although some small sums collected or on hand
in the treasury of the commune were used to make payments for purely com-
munal purposes and to make payments, as I remember it, for the rent of the
communal building or buildings. But the amount involved in the latter class
was very small, the funds being turned back as soon as a Haitian communal
administration was formed at the Cape.
Mr. Anoell. Were those communal funds seized by you or by Col. Waller or
others under his direction or your direction? In other words, how were they
made available for expenditures by the military forces?
Gen. Cole. There was no Haitian official <»f any authority remaining, and I
found that there were fimds belonging to the commune In what I considered
a very precarious position, and
Mr. Angeli. (interposing). Were those funds on deposit In the bank?
Gen. Cole. No ; they were not.
Mr. Anoell. They were in specie?
Gien. Cole. They were in specie, in a very ini^ecure safe. In a very insecure
building, and In charge of a man of whom I was somewhat suspicious; and
those funds were placed In the bank at (^ape Haltien, and receipt was given
for them, and an account was kept of all funds that were received, and a
receipt was receivetl from the communal administration when these funds
were turned back.
Mr. Angell. Were the funds In questhm deposlte<l by you or under your
orders and In your name?
Gen. Cole. They were, as I remember It, deposited by me personally and In
my name, as representing the commune of Cape Haltien.
Mr. Angell. Do jpou remember the approximate amount of those funds?
Gen. Cole. I do not. And I have not got the data ; I looked to see if t
could find It. I have it somewhere, but I do not know where it Is.
Mr. Angell. Was It a few hundred gourdes, or several thousand dollars,
roughly speaking?
Gen. Cole. As I remember It, It was some hundreds of dollars at the start.
Now, the time approached — or the time had arrived — when it was necessarj*
to make up the tax list for the commune for the coming year. I knew nothing
of this until very near the time to have the thing completed, and I ascertained
from. I believe, the former mayor, Mr. Auguste, who had drawn up these
papers before, and the same people were employe<l to draw up the tax notices
for the ensuing year. And my recollection Is that funds were not collected
from those taxes during my administration. They may have been, however,
like a good many other things, and I had placed an officer In direct charge
Dt that work, carrying that rm under my general directions. But the funds
were, I am quite certain, absolutely secure without my signature. My records
show funds of Coranmne of Cape Haltien were deposltecl in the Banque Na-
tionale de la Hepubllque d'Haiti in the name of Col. Ell K. Cole, jwur corapte
de la Connnune de Cap Haltien, as follows:
Goufdei.
19 Oct., 19ir> 452.32
28 Oct., 1915 496.49
22 Nov., 1915 3,543.59
23 Nov., 1915 1,462.54
Total 5,954.94
The above total was turned over to and receipted for by the Receveur Com-
munal of Cape Haltien on December 4, 1915.
Mr. Angell. The funds were secure without your signature?
Gen. CoT^. They were absolutely secure — unleas I put my signature on some-
thing ordering them to be taken out of the bank.
Mr. Angell. Oh, they could not be disbursed except with your signature?
Gen. Cole. They could not be disbursed without my signature.
Mr. Angell. In the name of the commune?
Gen. (^OLE. I really do not remember, but I have no reason to doubt that It
was in the name of the commune. It was a separate accoimt; It was not an
account lumped with anything else; but as to the exact name In which It
was carried I do not know, though I did have a number of different accounts
in the bank from time to time, though never a personal account there.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 711
Mr. Anoell. Who was responsible for determining the purposes for which
these funds were expended In and around Cape Haitlen?
Gen. Cole. The military governor himself.
Mr. Anoell. Do you know the sources from which the funds turned over to
you by Admiral Caperton were derived?
Gen. Cole. I always understood they were derived from the customs revenues.
Mr. Angell. Was martial law in effect in Cape Haitlen in the fall of 1915?
Gen. Cole. It was.
Mr. Anoell. By formal proclamation?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Anoell. Was that made substantially at the same time as the procla-
mation of martial law In Port au Prince?
Gen. Cole. Immediately following, o^: at the same time.
Mr. Anoell. You spoke of the agricultural stations, experimental farms, and
experiments conducted. Do you remember how many of those stations there
were and where they were located?
Gen. Cole. The school was located outside of Port au Prince, beyond a place
called Bizoton.
Mr. Anoell. And when was that begun — that school — approximately, if you
remember?
Gen. Cole. It was some time prior to the end of June, 1917.
Mr. Anoell. Was that established and run by the marine forces of the occu-
pation—by the military occupation?
Gen. Cole. It was run by the military occupation, and my recollection Is that
it was handled by officers of the gendarmerie. Now, there was an experimental
farm at the same place ; there was a farm started at Furcy, and there was a
farm started, my recollection is, in the vicinity of the gendarmerie station near
Le Trou; and a number, or practically a large proportion, I think, of the
gendarmerie posts had been directed to start small farms with as up-to-date
methods of operation as the officer concerned was capable of putting into
effect.
I had the scheme of having a model cabin or farm buildings put up, but It
never was done.
Mr. Anoell. All of this work that you are Just speaking of — ^thls agricultural
worlj— was undertaken upon the Initiative of the military occupation?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Anoell. Rather than upon a suggestion from Washington?
Gen. Cole. Oh, yes. Washington never made any suggestions. All of this
was being done — we had a certain mission to perform, to do the best we could
to build up that country ; to build up a stable government ; to preserve peace and
order ; and to bring prosperity to the people ; and we were all trying our best
to do that ; and anything that we could put our hands to that would help toward
that result we tried to put over.
Mr. Angki.u So far as you know, were agricultural experts ever sent down
from this country?
Gen. Cole. Oh, yes.
Mr. Anoell. When was that? Was that during your time in Haiti?
Gen. Cole. Yes. I find this under date of July 13
Mr. Anoell. 1917?
Gen. Cole. 1917.
" The delay in the arrival of the agricultural experts from the United States
is unfortunate, as it was hoped through their advice to be able to secure a
considerable quantity of nonperlshable foodstuffs for export to the United
States or to Cuba."
You see, we were up against the, proposition there of lack of transportation
from the United States, and consequently we had to provide food in Haiti, not
only for Haitians, but we wanted to go beyond that If we could and provide food
for export, which would be to oiir benefit and to the benefit of the Hatlans
also.
Mr. Anoell. What was the source of the funds that supported these little
farms and stations?
(len. Coi-E. Haitian funds; presumably collected, as I said, from the customs.
Mr. Anoell. Have you any idea. General, of the attendance at the agri-
cultural school? How widely did the Idea spread? How much was It taken up
by the Haitians?
62269— 21— PT 2 39
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712 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Cole. It was an idea that grew. At first we paid them a little, I
think
Mr. Angell (interposing). During attendance?
Gen. Coi^ During attendance ; I think 10 gourdes a month, and we provided
them with their food, such food as they could not raise on the farm. Later
that was withdrawn — that is, the 10 gourdes — and my recollection is that they
were required to pay small fees. But it was a thing that started out and
increased. I have somewhere among these papers — I may be able to find it—
an account of the visit of the President there, if you care to have it.
Mr.' Angell. You might put it in afterwards if you think it of Inta'est.
Gen. Cole. Well, I would have to hunt for it. I may not have it here.
Mr. Anoelu Did the numbers in attendance at the schools run into tlie
scores or the hundreds or
Gen. CoLK. No ; my recollection Is that there may have been 40 or 50 there.
But unless I Iiad something in my records to show I would not be able to
answer that question very satisfactorily.
Mr. Angell. Did that school continue to exist so long as you were in Haiti?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Do you know if it was continued after that, or was it given np?
Gen. Cole. I understand that it is still in existence, though I am not positive
in regard to it.
Mr. Angell. Beferring to irrigation and the cul de sac region around Port aa
Prince. I understood you to say that nothing had been done by the engineer ap-
pointed under theHreaty prior to the time when you left Haiti in 1917?
Gen. Cole. Nothing had been done by him. We had the plan dra>^'n up to
repair the dam, I being afraid that in the winter freshets it might give way, and
I believed then that we would have completed the work inside of a month or
six weeks ; but as I had orders to turn over the engineering work to the engineer
of Haiti, and as I believed that the irrigation systems came clearly under his
Jurisdiction as a treaty official, I turned It over and said, " There is a job that
you can go at."
Mr. Angell. Do you remember aljout when it was that you turned over those
plans to him?
Gen. Cole. I think it was probably In September or October.
Mr. ANGELL. Of 1917?
Gen. Cole. Of 1917.
Mr. Angell. These plans were drawn up by you, or under your direction, and
upon your Initiative?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. ANGELL. Rather than by direction from Wasliington?
• Gen. Cole. Yes ; all of these things. I do not remember of anything of that
sort that we ever got from Washington.
Mr. Angell. Did you make recommendations along that general line to
Washington — that is, recommendations for irrigation, or agriculture, or educa-
tion, or such matters — to Washington?
Gen. Cole. I kept -a diary, and copies of that diary were sent to Adnihral
Kuapp in San Domingo, to the Navy Department, to the State Department,
and to headquarters of the Marine Corps ; and I took up everything, day by day,
that came up that was of any Importance. In that diary there were numerons
discussions in regard to what we were trying to do; what we wanted done; that
I had gotten tlie President to ask for agricultural experts, school experts, or
postal experts, or whatever It might be. So Washington was always informed
during the vear 1917 as to what was actually being done in the Republic of
Haiti.
Mr. Angfxl. Did your diary also contain general notes which to a reader
would set forth clearly conditions In Haiti as you have testified to them on
direct examination here?
Gen. Cole. I tliink so, without any question-; because my memory in giving my
testimony liere has been refreshed by going over this mass of diaries.
Mr. Angell. Did you keep such a diary during the year 1915?
Gen. Cole. No.
Mr. Angell. Or 1916?
Gen. Cole. No.
Mr. Angell. In addition to this diary, copies of which were forwarded, as
you have just said, did you make specific recommendations and reports to
Admiral Knapp, tlie State Department, the marine headquarters, or the Navy
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iNQuiBY nrro oocttpation of haiti aitd santo domingo. 713
Department on such aspects of the whole situation as education, public works,
the Judiciary, Government administration, and the like?
Gen. GoLJE. Yes ; but not extensively. The only way to get things done is to
do them yourself. And tlie United States was pretty busy, with probably more
important things for Its Government than the administration of an experimental
farm, or something of that sort, though they did send the agricultural experts ;
they sent one of their postal experts. I got the expert for the schools. They sent
down some geologists ; the Smithsonian Institution sent down some people. And
generally those things that they were asked to do they did. But I did not ask
them to do things that it was our business to do, or that it was the business of
other treaty officials to do. I made comment from time to time in regard to
what was being done, or as to what was not being done, by other treaty officials.
Mr. Angeix. Are those comments contained in this file?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; generally. Of course, there were brief, more or less dally, or,
nt least, frequent radio reports made, and impotant tilings were handled that
way, or by cable very frequently.
Mr. Angell. Why did the people of Haiti disapprove of President Dartigue-
nave? ,
Geii. Cole. I imagine because he was a politician, had been in political life
all of his life — that is, most of his life. And there are very few men in Haiti
who could rise to prominence in iK)lltical life and retain their integrity. You
see, d'Artiguenave was well educated— quite polished ; and I must say, In my
opinion, a consummate politician. I have a great deal of respect for Mr.
d*Artiguenave, and a great deal of i)ersonal liking for him. And he had the
courage to accept a difficult position, when apparently very few others would.
So you must give him the cre<1it of being a man of considerable moral and
physical courage.
Mr. Angell. When you say " to accept a difficult situation," do *you mean
accepting the American Intervention as a fait accompli, as a nece.ssary step
in the development of Haiti?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; I think that would be a correct way of putting it. The term
" anarchy " best describes the condition of affairs in Haiti ; our troops had been
compelled to land ; the President had been a8sassinnte<1, murdered ; revolutionary
troops were at large throughout the extent of the Uepublic ; generally the courts
were in a very low state of morale, if any exlsteii at all ; a foreign government
had landed troops in Haiti ; and the Haitians had lind no reason to think that
European powers, that is, white powers, were particularly anxious to regard
their rights. So any man that accepted and worked with a white occupation
must have known that he would be a very decided object of suspicion and of
hatred. Because there Is no question that they were jealous of tlielr independ-
ence. We were anxious to preserve their indei>endence, but they did not idealize
that; they had the idea that were were going in there, for instance, as the
Germans had gone In there, and were going to swat the deuce out of them.
Mr. Angell. Was the President's acceptance of the American intervention
generally known among the people?
Gen. Cole. Oh, I think so, without any question.
Mr. Angell. Did the knowledge of Uiat acceptance of such Intervention have
any part, in your judgment, in the distrust in which he was hold by the jieople?
Gen. Cole. Now, do not go too far in regard to that, because Mr. Partigueuave
(lid not have the distrust of all the people, by any manner of means. Mr.
Dartiguenave had the distrust and the dislike of a considerable part of the
Haitian politicians, the Haitinn iwUtical classes, but Mr. Dartiguenave did
not have the animosity of the people of Haiti. Mr. Dartiguenave went through
the Republic of Haiti ; and he went at times almost unattended, and he did
not have their animosity; he had their liking, to a great extent.
Mr. Angell. Did he have the general support of the [jopulatlon?
Gen. Cole. I think Mr. Dartiguenave had as much of the support of the
population as a population like that of Haiti was able to give anybody ; as a
matter of fact, the population of Haiti are like so many sheep In the hands of
a few of their leaders ; a few educated people, possibly 2 per cent of the total
population, are the people who handle the affairs of Haiti, and who have
manipulated the affairs of Haiti for the purpose of lining their pockets and
maintaining their own standards.
Mr. Angell. Did the population of Haiti generally know, in your judgment,
of the detailed facts leading up to our intervention and the signing of the
treaty and its ratification and the subsequent steps?
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714 INQUIRY INTO OCCTUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Cole. No; only a comparatively small part of them did. Their idea
was based on the fact that they were getting better treatment than they had
ever gotten before: that their life and property were more secure; that they
had much more consideration shown them ; that they were not subject to belni
arbtrarily led oflf in droves to form part of a revolutionary band or the army
of the Government. They had rights, and their rights were respectel, and
they were given a chance to enjoy the benefits of their own labor, which they
had never had before.
Mr. Angell. What was the general attitude of the Haitian population toward
the United States and the military occupation at the end of 1916 and dur ng
the year 1917?
Gen. Cole. Fine. They used to kneel down by their wayside shrines and
thank God that we were there. I have told about the President and Gen.
Butler and I, as well as the cabinet, going up the mountains and seeing the
people.
Mr. Anoeij.. You remember the report which you made to the Secretary of
the Navy, in an offlc'al letter dated September 28, 1920, In which, speaking of
the peaceful conditions In Haiti at tha time you relieved Col. Waller In Novem-
ber, 1916, you went on to say : *' I will venture to say that during the time in
question" (that Is, wh'le you were In command) "life and property in Haiti
were as secure as In the United States, If not more secure? "
Gen. Cole. Yes. You take the little State of Georgia, and there are more
murders, or more killings In a day, or in an average of 10 days in that State,
than there were in a month In the Republic of Hatl at that period of time. 1
mentioned Georgia because I read the Savannah News; and that Is a com-
mentary on American civilization.
Mr. Aj^ell. Did they ever have to use the marines in Haiti to guard the
malls? [Laughter.]
Gen. Cole. No. But In order to prevent rifling of the malls we Inaugurated
a system whereby a gendarmerie noncommissioned officer or ofltt»er should go
to the post office and seal sacks of mall and deliver those sacks sealed to an-
other part of the Republc. getting the receipts therefor. I Initiated that sys-
tem of having gendarmerie messengers responsible for the carrying of the mall
And we shortened the delivery of the mail very materially, and at the same
time mall that was Intrusted to the charge of the gendarmerie was delivered
Invariably.
Mr. Angell. WHl you tell us briefly. General, what you did to support Dr.
Heraux. the pro-American leader in the assembly?
Gen. Cole. Well, I gave you my reasons for the support of Dr. Heraux. In
acting for the President In regard to getting together people who would serve
in his cabinet, I invariably made the statement that It was necessary for Dr.
Heraux to remain as a member of the cabinet, giving my reasons. I presume
that is about the extent of my discussions In regard to Heraux ; there were
many of them, but they were along that same line. Heraux was the one
Haitian who had consistently endeavored to aid us In building up a proper
natonal government In Haiti, and he was the one Haitian who was familiar
with the financial Investigation and revision of system of accounts that was
going on. The President, without any question, wanted at times to get rid of
Dr. Heraux. As a matter of fact, I felt quite certain at times that the agitation
against Dr. Heraux was traceable directly to the room occupied by Ms
excellency.
We felt that in order to carry out our work In Haiti we had to have tlie
cooperation of Haitians ; unless we had the cooperation of Haitians, there would
be no Haitians to occupy Government positions of Haiti under the education
that we hoped they would get from an honest administration of affairs. If
we had calmly thrown Dr. Heraux aside, because he was considered honest and
a firm supporter of the United States, desiring to Improve conditions In Haiti,
we never would have been able to get anybody to stand up for us, because they
would have said : ** You use him, and when it seems better to you for yoar
own purposes you cast him aside." And I would not do it.
Mr. Angell. Was the treaty of September, 1915, extended for a further
period of 10 years upon the request of the United States?
Gen. Cole. Upon the request of Haiti, but presumably after conversations be^
tween the representatives. The United States had bound Itself under that
invention to do certain things. Among other things, was the rehabilitation of
the finances ; the procurement of a loan.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 715
Now, the United States, or the fiscal agent nominated by the United States
as financial adviser, had. I thlnls, without any question, tried to get a loan
for Haiti under the terms of the old convention. It was absolutely essential
that such a loan be procured if the worli was to be initiated that we wanted
to have done there and the country built up. And the United States, I believe,
notified the Haitian Government that such loan could not be obtained from
the financial interests of the United States under the lO-year tenure in Haiti;
and the Hatian Government then tools up the question of asliing the extension
of the treaty ; and it was passed by a divided cabinet. ,
Mr. Angell. The request, then, came from the Haitian Government, rather
tlian from the United States Government, in the first Instance?
(Jen. Cole. The oflicial request came from the Haitian Government Now,
as to whether or not the United States or the Haitian Government first started
It I do not know, because I had nothing to do with that particular feature,
as the matter was handled between the representatives of the State 1!)epart*
ment and of the secretary of state for foreign affairs of Haiti.
Mr. Anoell. Do you Imow the period from which the treaty was extended for
a fm-ther period of 10 years?
(Jen. Cole. Nineteen hundred and seventeen. The school system and every
other thing that we wanted to get built up in Haiti required financing, and to
do the work that we had to do we had to have the funds, and we could not get
the funds under the then existing conditions. In my opinion, if the Haitians
had acted decently and aided us as we were trying to aid them, the funds
could have been obtained long ago, and the affairs of Haiti could haye been
in a very much better state than they are to-day. And I lay the blame, to a
Rreat extent, on the Haitian people's or the Haitian Grovernment's, or the
Haitiaii politician's inability to do anything that seemed to aid in this particular
work.
Mr. Anoell. You say the funds might have l)een obtained if it had not been
for this condition. What do you mean by saying the funds might have been
obtained? Do you refer to a loan?
(ten. Cole. Yes. I think that if the Haitian Government, its representatives,
the nat'onal assembly, and so on, had acted as honestly toward us as we were
tryng to act toward them, or as fairly as we were trying to act toward them, they
would have done a great deal better for themselves ; they would have retained
the good will of the United States and they would have caused, through showing
their desire to cooperate with the United States, such an attitude as would have
enabled the Government at home to put over a loan to the Republic of Haiti
to refund Its debts, and to give it sufilcient funds to enable the work that was
to be carried on to be started, at least.
Mr. Angell. And you feel that the fact that no loan was made is due in large
part to the political conditions in Haiti?
Gen. Cole. I think It was absolutely due to that. If, f(>r Instance. Haiti at
the start had cooperated with us ; if they had displayed a desire to cooperate,
I have no doubt in my own mind but that in 1916, or the spring of 1917 at
the latest, the Haitian loan could have been floated in the Unite<l States. But
the people who had funds just simply would not advance funds, on the lack
of knowledge as to what was going to be done in the Republic of Haiti. Then,
of course, there was the war financing ; loans to countries whe were to become
our allies, etc. But largely, the thing is due to the attitude of the Haitian
politicians.
Mr. ANGELL. Speaking of the United States interests in Haiti, you referred to
the fact that the French had 150,000,000 francs
Gen. CJoLE (interposing). In round numbers.
Mr. Angell. Yes; invested in Haiti. That was largely the sum investe<l in
the Haitian foreign loan, was it not?
Gren. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Angell. And on that loan the Interest had been paid regularly during
all recent years, up to the time of the intervention, had it not.
Gen. Cole. Up to the time of the intervention.
Mr. Angell. And for five years following the intervention the interest was
not paid, was it?
Gen. C!oLE. I am not able to answer as to five years. I can say it was not
paid for two years and a half. But as an explanation, I think that you will
find, if the matter is investigated, that the payments of the Interest would not
have been continued by Haiti any longer. I think that she had reached the
limit of her paying or borrowing capacity. ^ ,
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716 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
I was very anxious to have the finances of the country put In order. I was
very particularly anxious to have the internal deht, particularly the honds h^
by the people of Haiti, put in the course of settlement at least, so that the In-
come therefrom could be paid. These bonds had been taken, I suspect very
frequently forcibly, by the middle and upper middle classes of Haitians, and
by some politicians as provision for their families when they died. And I felt
that 'if those bonds could be settled, or if the interest on those bonds could be
paid, it would relieve a very pressing necessity. Because the people who owned
those bonds were generally the people that we were unable to help. We could
help the countryman, the farmer, and so on; we could help the laborers.
But with the war going on, with steamers not running, with goods difficult
to secure, the commercial class, the city dweller who was living on what had
been saved in one way or another before — ^we had no way of giving any par-
ticular financial l)enefit to those people.
Now, I said and reimrted that if the interest on these loans could be paid,
we were at least going to get away from the antagonism and animosity of those
people; and that that antagonism and animosity must grow the longer they
were unable to get their interest with which to purchase the necessities of life
I wanted that paid, and I wanted It paid badly, because I .wanted the support of
those people; and I believe that If we had gone ahead and made an arrange-
ment to pay the Interest on the Internal loans In particular, and paid all of
them, it would have given us a great many more friends In Haiti than we
had, and among a class of people who were able to influence public opinion.
Mr. AjvGKT.L. Was the interest paid on the so-called interior bonds during the
first two and one-half years of occupation ?
Oen. Cole. No ; it was not paid at all.
Mr. Angell. The question as to whether or not interest on that loan should
be paid depended ultimately on Washington?
Gen. Cole. Possibly. There was the financial adviser. I had nothing to do
with those things ; bnl I observed those things only as they had to do with what
I had in mind, which was to build up a Government In Haiti which they could
work themselves.
Mr. Angeix. You made an investigation and report?
Gen. Cole. I did, a number of times.
Mr. Angell. You made reports to Admiral Knapp and to the Navy Depart-
ment?
Gen. Coi^. Yes ; I think that was In a long report that I made In May, 1917.
Mr. Angell. You said a moment ago that In your opinion Haiti would have
been unable to c!ontlnue to pay the Interest on the foreign loan. Is such opinion
based upon the feeling by you that the national funds would not have been
sufficient to meet these obligations.
Gen. Cole. Yes; for, as I understand It, the national funds had practically
disappeared. Interest on the loans would become due within a short time, and
there was nothing on hand or In sight sufficient to pay that Interest.
Mr. Angell. After our Intervention In July, 1915, and the seizure of the collec-
tion of the customs by us, were there, to your knowledge, or were there not
fnnds that actually would have been sufficient to meet the Interest on these
foreign-loan obligations?
Gen. Cole. I really do not know, but I rather doubt it.
Mr. Angell. Do you mean when you say you doubt it that you think the sur-
plus above and beyond the expenditures actually made for public improvements,
constnbular>% road building, etc., would have been insufficient?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Or that the total receipts l)efore any such expenditures would
have been insufficient?
Gen Cole. I do not know whether or not the total receipts would have enabled
the interest to be paid. I presume they would, but government had to be
reestablished ; much starvation had to be warded off"; the expenses of admIniste^
ing the government had to be met. And as the Haitian employee, dependent
upon his stipend for his dally bread, had not been paid for months and months, It
was necessary to provide these people with some means under the conditions
existing of meeting their obligations and of reestablishing credit In the country.
I think those are the things that must have been considered as necessary to
place ahead of the payment of the interest on the loan.
Mr. Angell. You had no hand yourself In the determination of whether or
not to pay the Interest on the loan?
Gen. Cole. I had nothing to do with it at any time.
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INQUIBY nSTTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 717
Mr. Anqell. Do you think that the declaration of war on GJermany by Haiti in
the spring or early in the summer of 1915 would have been beneficial to Haiti?
Gen. Cole. I think it would have be«i very beneficial to Haiti. It would have
made no difference in her expenditures; and it would have brought about, I
b^eve» a feeling in the United States — that is, in the Government at Washing-
ton—tliat at last Haiti was willing to work with us. They were Informed that
we had no idea of calling upon them for assistance. All the arguments that I
made in regard to Haiti entering the war with the President and members of
the National Assembly were based on what, in my. mind, were the best interests
of Haiti ; because, so far as the United States was concerned, we did not need
Haiti in the war; it would have been much more expensive to arm her people
than to arm ourselves, and we would not have made good soldiers out of them.
The advice was absolutely given, I repeat, with the idea that it was to im-
prove conditions in the Republic of Haiti, and incidentally It would have im-
proved our relationship with Haiti.
Mr. .4NGELL. When you say .it would have improved tlie conditions in Haiti,
do you mean by virtue of the
Gen. Cole (interposlog). I believe that they would have gotten their loan;
I believe that that had something to do with it.
Mr. Anqell. That it would have established a psychological rapproachement
between Haiti and the United States?
Gen. Cole. A rapproachement, yes ; but they Just could not do it.
Mr. Angell. At the very beginning of your testimony the other day, in giving
the dates of your tour of duty in Haiti, you said that you left there late in
1917 and came up to Washington, where you had conferences at the State De-
partment regarding the new constitution. With whom did you hold such con-
ferences? Will you tell us briefly about that?
Gen. Cole. Mr. Stabler, as I remember it.
Mr. Anqell. Mr. Stabler was chief of the Latin-American Division of the
State Department?
Gen. Cole. Yes, sir. My interviews with him were brief and far apart I
got here early in Deceml)er, and the business was finished up by the end of
January, when I thought that it would have been finished up long before.
However, Haiti, as I say, was probably a small part of the large whole that
bad to be considered.
Mr. Angell. Were your interviews at the State Department with Mr. Stabler
alone or with other oflflcials?
Gen. Cole. With other officials. I think there was a Mr. Glen Stewart ; there
was another man there most of the time. I had interviews alone with him.
Mr. Angell. Did you acquaint the State Department through these gentle-
men in these interviews with the general state of affairs in Haiti?
Gen. Cole. As much as was necessary. I think the State Department had a
pretty fair idea — that is, the Latin-American Division head had a pretty fair
idea.
Mr. Angell. Had a pretty fair idea of the conditions there?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Angell. And of what was needed and what the occupation had been
trying to do?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Do you know who drafted or was in the main responsible for
the principal changes desired by the United States In the then existing con-
stitution of Haiti?
Gen. Cole. I had nothing to do with the projects of the constitution until
the early summer of 1917, and I presumed the questions as to what changes
were necessary had been discussed between representatives of the State De-
partment of the United States and the Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Haiti.
Mr. Angelu Of those preliminary discussions and projects you have no per-
sonal knowledge?
Gen. Cole. I have no personal knowledge. I know that there was correspond-
ence on the subject; that the correspondence went to the Department of For-
eign Affairs; that the Haitian Government — I have always felt with an idea
of creating difficulties — sent the correspondence direct to the bureau of the
National Assembly without comment, or with other than little comment.
Mr. Angell. That was the act which you referred to the other day as a
faux pas?
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718 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. CoLK. I do not know that that act on the part of the President, or of
his cabinet, really had any actual effect on what took place, because I beUeve
that the members of the National Assembly were so antagonistic to the United
States in every way, shape, and form, reasonable or unreasonable — if there
were any reasons for it — that they would not have acceded to the slightest re-
quest of the United States Government in regard to the change in the consti-
tution, although, through the convention, such changes had been clearly indi-
cated as contemplated, as necessary, and as agreed to by the representatives of
the Haitian nation.
Mr. Anoexl. Agreed to in so far as they were implied in the terms and the
fact of the execution of the convention of 1915?
You referred to different articles which the United States desired to have
modified in the old constitution, such as the land-holding question, and other
articles which you named. Is it your understanding of the negotiations that
the suggested changes initiated with the United. States rather than with the
Haitian Government?
Gen. Cole. I can not say. It was probably as the result of negotiations be-
tween the two departments of state, or discussions between them. In all
probability, the United States took the lead ; but I have no knowledge of it.
The Council of State drew up the projet de constitution. That was the basis of
the preliminary discussions. After the assembly had thrown aside the consti-
tution recommended by the Council of State and prepared one of their own.
which they were trying to put into effect, they were dissolved, and then the
Council of State prepared another project.
And my first real connection with the constitution as a constitution, dated
from immediately after the dissolution of the National Assembly, when the
President asked me to come to the palace and discuss with him the ques-
tion of a constitution which would meet the objections of the United
States to the ones that had already been prepared. I told him that I had
made full r^)ort to our Government, and that I could not do more than act in
a friendly way with him in discussing the matter; and that I could in do
way bind myself or the Government in any way without referring a question of
this sort to the United States. . And we had considerable discussion, and I
made certain suggestions.
The thing, with my suggestions, as I remember it, did go to our legation.
As a matter of fact, I think I took them there; became an intermediary be-
tween the President direct and the legation, and cut out the Department of
State for the time being. I think that I was simply trying to get something in
each Instance which stood a reasonably good chance of meeting the approval of
everybody concerned.
There was after that, to my knowledge, considerable correspondence, and
the department sent back a project of constitution: and Admiral Knapp and
the charge and myself thought we probably were better informed as to the
needs of Haiti than anyone else ; and we decided to go into executive session
and to take everything bearing on the constitution that we could, go over it
and consider it from every point of view, and possibly finally arrive at a con-
stitution which we hoped would be a satisfactory one to the United States
and at the same time conserve the interests of the Republic of Haiti. We
spent, as I remember it, some three weeks on it. We realized that there were
various things
Mr. Angell (interposing). This was In the fall of 1917?
Gen. Cole. This was in the fall of 1917.
Mr. Angell. After the dissolution of the assembly?
Gen. Cole. After the dissolution of the assembly ; some months afterwards.
This was in November. We felt that there were certain things wherein.
Haiti had a right to feel disquiet, and we tried to fix it so that the rights of
the Haitians would be safeguarded just as much as it was reasonable for them to
be safeguarded.
Mr. Angell. In what particular did you feel that the Haitians had a rl^it
to feel disquiet?
Gen. Cole. I felt that there was in Haiti the idea that foreigners should not
be given the right to own land. That was one thing.
Mr. Angell. Was that idea widespread and intensely felt?
Gen. Cole. I do not think that it was widespread or intensely felt except
among the political classes, and to a certain extent among the educated classes.
The better they were informed, of course, the more they could think for them-
Belves. And I really believe that they had an honest fear of
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INiJUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 719
Mr. Angeex ( Interposing). Economic exploitation?
Gen. Cols. Economic exploitation, yesf; that is a very good term for It. I
think they did have a real, honest fear: and we tried our best to give at least
safeguard so that that fear could not materialize.
Mr. Anoell. In what other particulars, if any, did the Haitians feel dis-
quiet?
Gen. Ck)LE. I think this Is about the only one that they really had disquiet
about. There was the question of so-called diplomatic Intervention. Under
the constitution of Haiti, carried to its logical conclusion, no Haitian official
could allow or consider a question raised by a foreign government through its
diplomatic representative concerning an indemnity for damages done in the
Republic of Haiti to the foreigner or to his property. In other words, their
constitution absolutely prohibited any such diplomatic representation or
intervention. And I think that that was one of the things that they had in
mind.
Mr. Anoell. Was that provision finally done away with in the new consti-
tution, do you remember?
Gen. Cole. That provision was done away with, yes. Our Government con-
tended that the foreigner doing business in Haiti should have the same legal
protection as was accorded a Haitian. A Haitian comes to the United States
and he has the same legal protection that our people have. In addition, he
has the protection due to diplomatic representations, which would without
any question be made. And you can not expect the country of Haiti to be
built up without funds and without security for proi)erty. And I know per-
fectly well that I would not put a cent, if I had a million dollars, Into Haiti
under the conditions that existed there.
Mr. Anoell. You have referred several times rec'ently to the council of
state. That body was appointed exclusively by the President of Haiti, was it
not?
(ien. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Anoell. It was not elective?
Gen. Cole. It was not elective.
Mr. Anoell. And since the dissolution of the national assembly in 1917,
there has been no meeting of any legislative body in Haiti?
Gen. Cole. No ; the only legislative body is the council of state, which, under
the transitory provisions of the constitution which was adopted, exercises all
the functions of the legislative branch of the Government of the Republic
of Haiti.
Mr. Anoell. It frames and passes laws?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Angell. To use the inaccurate word " passes " ?
Gen. Cole. Yes; as a matter of fact, I believe it would elect a President,
if a vacany existed.
Mr. Anoell. Do you know whether, under the constitution of 1880, which was
.still in force up to the adoption of the new constitution in 1918, there was any
provision for a council of state which has functioned as you have just de-
scribe<l?
Gen. Cole. I can not answer that directly. I vnW examine the book. It
says, article 199. "The council of state Is dissolved," under "Transitory dis-
X)08itions " in. the constitution of 1889. That seems to settle that ; there was
no council of state.
Mr. Angell. So that, under your understanding of the constitution of 1889,
there was no constitutional provision for the existence or functions of such a
body?
Gen. CoiJ«:. To the best of my knowledge I believe there was not; though a
council of state did exist in 1917 — though it was very quiet, and I do not
think It was getting any pay ; it very likely was an unofficial body.
Mr. Angetx. That was the body presumably existing under the President's
decree of April 5, 1916?
Gen. Cole. Yes. And I guess that must have been the time when they were
dissolved; it was by presidential decree, to tnke the place of the legislative
power though only in nn advisory capacity. I was not in Port au Prince at
that time and incidentally neither one of those dissolutions made the slightest
ripple in Haitian affairs.
Mr. Angell. What instructions did you get, and from whom, and what was
the approximate date, so far as you can remember, approving the adoption
of a constitution adverse to the wishes of the United States? ^'ere thos&
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720 INQUIRY 'INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
instructions, in other words, that came from the Navy Department or the State
Department?
Gen. Cole. The Navy Department. I read them all into the record.
Mr. Angell. All right, if those Instructions are In the record. Did you give
us, in your direct testimony, the date of your cahle showing that no stei)s
short of dissolution by force would prevent the adopt 'on of a constitution
adverse to what was desired by the United States?
Gen. Cole. I think so, but I can very easily give It to you [examining papers].
That was the 15th of June.
Mr. Anoell. June 15, 1917?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Were you, as brigade commander of the United States Marines
in Haiti at that time, prepared for the eventuality of the substitution of a
military government for the then Haitian Government?
Gen. Cole. No, and yes. I had stated In the first long report (May 17, 1917)
that I had made that I believed the results desired could be accomplished quicker
through a military government, and more economically and more satisfactorily
than in any other way. I had given four different methods which, in my
opinion, could be followed by the United States Government.
Mr. Angell. In those suggestions of the method of accomplishing the desires
of the United States, did you specifically recommend the substitution of an
out-and-out military government for the Haitian Government?
Gen. Cole. I stated that, in my opinion, that was decidedly the best thing
to do. We could not get cooperation from them ; the minute we took our eyes
off of them they were off doing something that was a waste of money, or a
waste of time, or a grain of sand or two In the bearings.
Mr. Angell. Did you make actual preparations for a military government
for the Haitian Government?
Gen. Coijc. No ; not at all. I had been told by members of the cabinet that
they thought that the only way in which the matter was going to be straipht-
ened out in Haiti was through the exercise of the military government; and I
believed it myself.
Mr. Angell. General. I do not want to put to you a question which by virtue
of its legal and constitutional implications seems unfair, but, knowing your
familiarity with condit'ons In Haiti, I would like to ask you whether, accord-
ing to yoifr understanding of the constitution of Haiti, the President's decree
of dissolution in 1917 was constitutional or was provided for by the constitution?
Mr. Howe. It .*<eenis to me, Mr. Chairman — Mr. Angell and I have just been
talking about it — that perhaps it would be just as well not to ask the general
those questions of Haitian constitutional law here — merely confining himself to
the understanding of that law on which he was acting at the time.
Senator Oddie. Yes ; I approve of that point. I think that Is going too far.
Mr. Angkll. I think it is an intricate question of constitutional law. The
practical question is, we have this constitution here, but it is in French and
it consists of some two hundred and odd articles. Now, for any of us who are
not familiar \vith it to go through with it and pick out the right article that
bears or does not bear on a particular question is a difficult thing.
Gen. Cole. I can do it, but it wHl take some time, because jou never can tell
where a thing is stuck in that constitution.
Mr. Howe. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, however, that I think the question
asked by Mr. Angell is one of some importance and intere.<«t to this committee.
Senator Oddie. Yes.
Mr. Howe. But we are starting down to Haiti at the end of this week, and
our time is very limited. I know that Gen. Cole has a mass of material, much
of which may be of importance — I mean documents and copies, and his diaries
that he mentioned this morning. The conunlttee Is- going to hold sessions on
its return from Haiti, as I understand it. Gen. Cole was in command In Haiti
during a most inirportant period. And it may very well be that the committee
will need to have the general's knowle<lge put at its disposal on another occa-
sion by having him here as a witness, or by having him give the committee the
benefit of tills collection of memoranda and papers of his, which could only be
taken up on our return on account of the shortness of our time.
Senator Oddie. Yes; I agree with you about that.
Mr. Howe. And I believe that an arrangement can be made with Gen. Cole
by which we can inform ourselves more at leisure as to what material he has
got there, and if necessary we can have him as a witness again or at least have
him furnish us with copies of these papers for our information.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 721
Senator Oddie. Ye^.
Mr. Howe. I would like to make that statement at this time, l>e<'ause I think
It would be unfortunate to have_ the impression go out that the committee was
hurrying through with Gen. Cole's testimony.
Senator Oddie. Yes. I think unquestionably we must have it understoo<l that
Gen. Cole will have time to give us the material facts, and that ('apt. Angell
can question him on these matters, so that none of us will be unduly hurried.
Gen. Cole. To the best of my knowledge and belief I am entirely at the dis-
position of the eonirmittee, and I have nothing to hide that I know of.
Mr. Angell. Then would you make as an answer to that question which I put
to you before, the question which started this last discussion, the answer that
you are not prepared to answer the question si>eciflcaily at this time, or words
to that eflfect?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; that will serve my purpose ver>' well. I can add to it if it is
wanted, if It is necessary.
Mr. Angell. You said in connection with martial law, General, if my recol-
lection is correct, that it is and will be necessary in Hajti so long as American
troops remain there. Why do you think it is and will be necessary? .
Gen. Cole. Fn»m the attitude of the Haitian politicians and from the condi-
tion of the Haitian judiciary.
Mr. Angeli* Do you think that the raising of martial law while American
troops are there would result in an outbreak of crime, or rather in what the
military occupation might regard as undue liberties or excesses on the part
of the press?
Gen. Cole. I have never worried much about the press — never did myself while
I was there. I would not tolerate the things that appeared in the press subse-
quent to my leaving there — absolutely. But I had no particular trouble with the
press; occasionally they would slop over a bit and maybe be cautioned to be
carefuL
Mr. Angell. That, then, is your belief, is the actual practical function of
martial law in Haiti?
Gen. Cole. A military force occupying another country has got to have a
law of its own, and it can not get along without it, particularly under the con-
dition where there Is a venal judiciary system, and one that is absolutely', in my
opinion, unreliable ; no white man can get justice before a Haitian ct>urt, in my
opinion.
Mr. Angell. Martial law, then, in Haiti enables a white man to obtain justice
through the me<lium of our own military provost courts?
Gen. Cole. Our martial law in Haiti is more of a moral force than it is a
physical force, but it Is a physical force standing back of the shadow of the
moral force.
Mr. Angell, The moral force being exerted
Gen. Cole (interposing). Through the belief that, in case of necessity, the
power back of that moral force would be exercised.
Mr. Angell. To the end that the white man may obtain justice in Haitian
courts?
Gen. Cole. No ; we have never interfered in the Haitian courts to amount to
anything; we have prevented, tm one or two oc'casions, through the i>ower of
military force, the Haitian courts from putting into effect judgments against
institutions where the institutions were acting as agents of the occupying forces.
Mr. Angell. For example, the bank case?
Gen. Cole. The bank case. But if martial law were lifted. Tom, Dick, or
Harry could go out and shoot at a white man, or at a member of the ocinipation,
and unless the member of the occupation took the law into his own hands there
would be no punishment for the Haitian. In other words, I believe that martial
law is absolutely necessary, under the conditions existing Haiti, to enable peace
to be maintained throughout that country.
Mr. Angell. Martial law oT>erates, then, as a protec»tion to the white man?
Gen. CoiJ2. I believe that it oi)erates as a protection to the white man and the
black man, becau.se the black man knows that, under the pains and i>enalties
that martial law may invoke, he is l)eing protecte<l from his own people, in
many cases. It is just as important for the black man as it is for the white
man ; it is a moral force which makes people behave themselves, a blesse<l
sight more that the Haitian law. If there w^ere no martial law, it would be
possible for any man that wanted to start in and raise trouble, to do so, and
thwe would be nothing for us to do but to go after them with military force
to kill them; we could not deal with them umler martial law, unless we put It
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722 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
back; and in the nieautinie, if we had raised it, something might come up,
and our people nii;;ht be shot and ivilled, and white iieople might \ie shot or
Ikilled. I do not think tliat it is really an important danger, but you have got
to consider eventualities and iK)ssibiIities, whenever you take any particular
step, and particularly when you take any stv\} to destroy a system which lias
l)een in existence. And if you had your martial law raised for even a period
of 24 hours, you would really have no right to act or function as a military
force, even if it was 24 hours later, <m anything that had happened in between.
Mr. Ancjeix. Except as to offenses by the military.
Gen. ('OLE. Offenses by the military are not tried by those courts.
Mr. Angell. Jiy those — y<m mean the provost courts?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; the provost c<mrts. Our own courts functi(m right straight
along, and would function.
Mr. Howe. The military is taken care of by the military courts?
Gen. Cole. The military is taken care of by the military coui*ts, and tlie
provost courts are different, though they are military courts; for instance, in
the two cases of murder or killing by our men, in cases where it was a civil
crime ; that is, in one case a man got drunk in Port an Prince and started shinn-
ing, and kflled somelM)dy ; I had him tried and charged with murder, by a mili-
tary ccuirt-martlal, not by a jirovost court.
Mr. Angell. Killwl by a Haitian?
(»en. <V)iJE. No; he killed a Haitian.
Mr. Angell. I niean the man that got drunk?
Gen. Cole. The man that got drunk was a sergeant of marines; he was trm\
by c*ourt-martial and got 10 years at hard lalwr.
Mr. Howe. Hefore a general court-martial?
(icn. Cole. Yes. Another case came up at Ca|>e Ilaitien, where a man wa<
tried by general court-martial.
Mr. Angell. And not by the provost court?
Gen. Cole. Not by the i>rovost court. Now, a man was kllleil In Cape HaitieiL
If I had gotten that man, he would probably have l»een tried by a military coiii-
missicm, and probably hanged, because it was cold-blooded murder, not imder
the influence of liquor, or anything of the sort, but just murder. In the sjune
way, the man that kille<l Lieut. McNab would have b<H*n trieil l)y a military
commission, and not by a naval general court.
Mr. Howe. Let me straighten that out : The members of our military fonv<?
are always subject to the military courts?
Gen. ('oLE. Are always subject to the militiiry courts.
Mr. Howe. lUit it takes the operati<m of martial law to subject the civil .
poi»ulation to a military court?
(ien. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Howe. That is. under the control of our forces?
(Jen. ('OLE. Yes.
Mr. Howe. An<l they are subject t(» the Jurisdiction of certain other uiiUtary
tribunals, the provost courts?
(ien. (.^oLE. Yes; and the military commission.
Mr. Howe. And the military c<munissl(m, for more serious olTenses?
GeiL (Jou-:. All offenses between members of the military organization an*
tried before the naval or military court, pure and simple.
Mr. Howe. That is no in this <*ountry?
Gen. Cole. That is true everywhere; wherever the forces go there goes the
right to use the military or navnl court.s. Now, when you are in <'onflict with
the law in the riiitwi States, a civilian would be tried in the civil courts; n
military man woiUd be tried in the military courts or the civil courts, depend-
ing on which had taken jurisdicticm first. Formerly the proposition was that
a nmn in the military si'rvice who had committed an offense under the civil
law was amenable to trial not only by the military courts but by the civil
courts as well ; and he might get one sentence by the military courts and then
come out and have to take another trial by the civil ccmrt.s. Now, in a foreign
country, where the crimes are between members of the occupying forces ami
the members of the civil population, there is the provost court, and the military
commission, and under certain conditions the provost court and tlie military
commis.sion can exercise jurisdiction over peoi)le who are exclusively civilians.
Mr. Howe. Who are exclusively civilians?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; it does not necessarily limit its authority to people who are
in conflict with the military forces; they may be in conflict simply with the
mission or with the pronmlgated decret^s of the military force.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 728
Mr. Howe. Thank you; that !s all.
Mr. Anqell. General* would you care to make any comment upon the degree
of fulfillment hy the United States, particularly through its civilian treaty
officials, of the obligations assumed by the United States under the convention
of 1015?
Gen. Cole. Well. I have made a considerable number of comments already in
regard to it. I think that the financial situation could have been bettered;
more could have been done, possibly, than has been done. But I also believe
that you would have to go back to the fact that there were always difficulties,
most serious difficulties, put in the way of the financial adviser In carrying out
his part of the work, in endeavoring to get the finances straightened cmt,
through the obstruction of tlie Haitians, and of the legislative branch of the
Government in particular.
Mr. Anoell. Referring particularly to article 1 of this convention of 1915,
do you believe, from your understanding of the facts, that the United States
has aided the Haitian Government In the proper and efficient development of
its agricultural, mineral, and commercial resources?
Gen. Ooi£. It has, without any question, done a great deal ; it has not done
as much as it should have done had there been sufficient funds available. As
I have stated, a country which was on the verge of starvation in 1915. for the
country as a whole was absolutely undernourished, inside of two years, or two
years and a half, had been developed into a country where the country people
were richer than they had ever been before, and were not only producing enough
food for the Haitians but were exporting food. I say it did a good dejil to help
develop agriculture. It did not do all it might have done had funds been avail-
able, but it did do a great deal. I say this, that without funds — and consid-
erable funds — it was a mistake to create an engineering organization which
was going to require for overhead practically all of the funds that could be
allotted, and consequently that fimds that had been theretofore actually avall-
.-ible for improving conditions wore going to get up here (in ** overhencr*) .
That was my objection.
Mr. Anoell. To the overhead?
Gen. Cole. To the engineers going in at that time. I wanto<l to use the engi-
neers; I offered to put them In a position where they could handle the work
through other j^eople, and where they could have gotten something done. But
they wanted to have their organization. Each man naturally, I suppose, is
working for his own iwsition: he fights for his own position. And, under the
treaty, they were lndei)enOent branches, independent of the military, and
they wanted to be Independent. It did not matter to me whether they were
independent or anything else. What I wanted was to get the results; and
I did not believe they would get the results — and they did not. And they will
not until funds are available and they get a different system. I do not know
what they can depend on in the way of Haitian assistance under the present
conditions.
Mr. ANGELL. Do you believe that the unification of the responsibility and
direction of all American administration, civil and military, in Haiti wcmld
make for a greater accomplishment by the Unted States in the island?
Gen. Cole. I do. I think there Is no question but what that is true. I would
put selected Americans in positions where they could be resiwnsible for what
was being done, and I would put with them just as many Haitians as have
shown by their attitude and by their work that they were the kind of men
needed for that particular kind of work. In other words, I would start in
with such American forces as were necessary to direct the work, suppleniente<1
by such Haitian forces as could be use<l to perform such details as couhl be
entrusted to them; and I would gradually increase the number of Haitians
employed, and gradually reduce the number of Americans employed.
Mr. Anoell. Do you think the responsibility and direction of the Americans
under the several different branches, militar}' and civil, such as military com-
mander, financial adviser, receiver general of customs, engineer, and the like,
has militated against the effec'tiveness of the aid which the Unite<l States
might have rendered Haiti?
Gen. Cole. I think so. Now, I do not know what has been done in Haiti
in nearly four years beyond casual hearsay.
Mr. Anoell. You have not been back to the island since 1917?
Gen. Cole. I have not been back to the island since the end of 1917. But I
do know that when I lost control — just l>efore leaving — over the sanitary en-
gineer and the civil engineer, or at least when my ctmtrol over them was re-
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724 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
duced, the efficiency began to go straight down ; and the funds, which thereto-
fore had been put into actual work In improving conditions, a considerable
part of them went up here — considerable number of engineers.
Mr. Howe. Went up to overhead?
Gen. Cole. Went up to overhead. They brought down their engineers from
here, and there was not anything to be done with them; they did not want
to go out into the country with them. I wanted the chief engineer to go oat
and make a comprehensive survey in the country.
Mr. Angell. When you say " the chief engineer," to whom do you refer?
Gen. Cole. I am referring to the civil engineer, who was a treaty official.
I fought it just as hard as I could.
Mr. Angell. As a matter of fact, the civil engineer and the sanitary engi-
neer were not responsible to the chief of the military occupation, were tbey?
Gen. Cole. They were only responsible to the military occupation in this
sense : That I was the senior officer on the spot, and they had to be responsible
up to a certain point. But instead of my having the final say in regard to
the details of their work, in regard to the policy, etc., that they were to woric
out, that was practically taken away from me. Thai was the point But
so far as their not being under my control is concerned, they were under my
control ; but I had lost my iK)wer of saying : ** This is what you have to do,**
or ** this is what must be done." I could advise them, but they could do it
or not.
Mr. Angell. The determination of questions was not under your control?
Gen. Cole. It had passed from my control.
Mr. Angell. I want to read article 5 of the convention of 1915, as follows:
"All sums collected and v received by the general receiver shall be applied,
first, to the payment of the salaries and allowances of the general receiver, Us
assistants, and employees, and expenses of the receivership, including the
salary and expenses of the financial adviser, which salaries will be determined
by previous agreement; second, to the interest and sinking fund of the public
debt of the Republic of Haiti; and, third, to the maintenance of the constab-
ulary referred to in Article X, and then the remainder to the Haitian Govern-
ment for the purposes of current expenses.
" In making these applications the general receiver will proceed to pay sal-
aries and allowances monthly and expenses as they arise, and on the 1st of each
calendar month, will set aside in a separate fund the quantum of the collectioo
and receipts of the previous month."
I want to ask you whether it is your belief that Uie first paragraph of artide
5, which I have just read, giving the order of the disbursement of funds by
the general receiver, has been carried out?
Gen. Cole. I will say that that is a question that should be answered by the
people who have to do with it, because I did not know what the conditions
were. I had nothing to do with that at all, absolutely nothing; and I had
enough things to do with to make it undesirable for me to mix into the affairs
of somebody else.
Mr. Angell. I think we understand that you had no direction in the spend-
ing of money.
Gen. Cole. Absolutely nothing in regard to that particular part I did have
direction for a long time in regard to the expenditure of such funds as were
allotted to the Government of Haiti ; that is, which were expended through
the military occupation of Haiti ; all of that I allotted. I was informed that
there was a certain sum which I could employ for certain purposes of
the Republic of Haiti ; and reports were coming In all over the country of
things that were needed, and I made up every month a budget of an allotment
of funds for different purposes, roads, repair of hospitals, schools, irrigation,
or whatever it might be ; and that budget, signetl by me, was sent to the financial
adviser and he paid that. Now, that sum was not a sum which I fixed ; it was
simply a sum which I was authorized to expend, and I never went beyond that
Mr. Angell. Well, upon the understanding that you had no control of the
disbursement of funds, except such as were S5)ecifically allotted to you in the
manner you have just described, is it your understanding that the sequence
of disbursement- and appropriation of funds provided for by paragraph 5 of
the treaty was carried out?
Gen. (^oLE. Well, I would have to make my answer a qualified one. It is
a question in my mind whether it has been carried out, but I do not know of
my own personal knowledge.
Mr. Angell. All right ; that is all.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 725
Mr. Howe. You referred to those funds which were allotted to you. From
those funds, were there any funds available for the necessary upkeep and
building up of public works?
Gen. Cole. No ; except that in
Mr. Howe (interposing). Except for the communal funds which you have
ah-eady mentioned?
Gen. CoLB. Yes ; that is correct.
Mr. Howe. But beyond the communal funds and the allotment there was no
money available?
Gen. Cole. No money available.
Mr. Howe. The United States was not supplying funds for those purposes
from its own Treasury?
Gen. Cole. No; nor was the Haitian Government, as reported, making any
payment whatsoever to the support of the United States occupation.
Mr. Howe. In other words, the sustenance and the pay and the equipment of
the marines who were in Haiti was borne solely by the United States?
Gen. Cole. Solely by the United States, except in so far as those people who
were appointed to the gendarmerie of Haiti received the additional compensa-
tion allowed by law — ^and the sanitary engineers, etc. They got their compen-
sation
Mr. Howe (interposing). To what extent was agriculture down there de-
pendent upon irrigation? Were there lands down there which could be culti-
vated without irrigation?
(xen. Cole. Yes ; there were two or three irrigating systems ; there were two
irrigation systems, I think, that were in existence when I was there, one at
the Plain of the Cul-de-Sac and the other one down near Mommance.
Mr. Howe. In those regions was irrigation necessary?
Gen. Cole. Irrigation was necessary for the raising of sugar cane ; irrigation
systems were formerly in quite a number of the plains.
Mr. Howe. Here is what I want to get at : The repair of these Irrigation sys-
tems which you have spoken of —would the tendency of that be to put more
lands under cultivation?
Gen. Cole. Yes; much more land. The work that was done In fixing up
the existing system In the Plain of tlie Cul-de-Sac Increased materially the
acres of land that were under cultivation.
Mr. Howe. Now, was It necessary to Increase the acreage at that time, or
was there enough land susceptible of cultivation available without repair of
the irrigation systems?
Gen. Cole. The people own the land, and they had their homes on this land.
Now, in a country like Haiti, which Is thickly populated, and where all the
good lands are taken up, you do not want to make the people go out and move *
to another part of the country If you can avoid It — If, by repairing the irriga-
tion systems, those people can grow their produce In the vicinity of the market. ^
Mr. Howe. Then, I take it that these Irrigation systems which were repaired '
had been Impaired comparatively recently?
(Jen. Cole. There was only one that we did anything to, so far as I know,
and that was the one In the Plain of the Cul-de-Sac.
Mr- Howe. Which had fallen recently Into disrepair?
Gen. Cole. It was in a very bad state of repair. And the large landowner,
near the source, had simply taken all the water, so that the people who were
farther down, and who were generally the small landowners, did not get any.
And we stopped that, and we opened up the ditches.
Mr. Howe. You made a comparison, for the purpose of illustration, between
safety of life In Georgia and safety of life in Haiti. Did you mean that com-
parison, which was somewhat to the disadvantage of the Georgian, to apply to
those times when the Cacos occupied Fort Reviere?
Gen. Cole. No; I did not.
Mr. Howe. And excluded food from the towns and robbed the market women?
(Jen. Cole. No; I meant that during the major part of the year 1917.
Mr. How e. Yes.
Gen. Cole. Now, I do not want to make any disparaging remarks about
Creorgia. Because I simply read the Savannah News
Mr. Howe (Interposing). Excuse me. I just want to say, Mr. Chairman,
that I am asking this question, of course, as the question was asked the general
and answered by him, and the time to which he meant it to apply was not
made definite; and It might be construed as meaning that at the time of our
occupation there
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726 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Gen. Cole (interposing). No.
Mr. Howe (continuing). Conditions as to peace and quiet in Haiti comiiared
favorably with those of enlightened communities in our own country.
Gen. Cole. Oh, this was in 1917.
Mr. Howe. After the suppression of the Cacos?
Gen. Cole. Yes, absolutely ; and after we had been functioning there for a
year and a half.
Mr. Howe. I tliink that clears that up, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Oddib. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Now, as to the interest on these different classes of loans, ex-
ternal and internal, do you know whether Haiti could have paid the interest on
her foreign loans and maintained the necessary current expenses of her Ciov-
ernment at the time of o"r occupation?
Gen. Coufi. I do not believe so. I do not know from actual experience, but
I do not believe so. She could not have paid, in my opinion, the interest on
her loans at any time subsetiuent to the 3()th of June, 1915.
Mr. Howe. Let me ask you this question for the record : Do you know, if
the treasury was practically empty at the time of our occupation, how to ac-
count for the fact that ui> to that time Haiti had met the interest on her
foreign loans?
(Sen. (^.oLE. I un(lerRtoo<l that It had been through borrowing from others,
or forceil loans from its own people. ,
Mr. Howe. Which practices were not continued during the occupation?
Gen. (?OLE. Which practices were absolutely dlscontinue<l during the occupa-
tion.
Mr. Howe. Do you know why no interest was paid dui;ing the two and one
half years with which you were familiar?
Gen. Cole. I think they were trying to get the thing straightened out. an
agreement reached between the parties, trying to ftnd out what the bonds
actually represented, and trying to get a loan to refund the whole business.
It was not my business; but that was my understanding of what was going on.
Mr. Howe. I understand. But was it your recommendation that the in-
terest on the internal loan should be paid by funds furnished by the Unital
States?
Gen. ('OLE. I did not recommend how it should be done. I simply pointed out
the political effect, or the social effect, that the nonpayment of these things
would have, and why. in my opinion, the people who were in charge of the
finances should, as soon as ixissible, make some arrangement whereby those
things could be i)aid.
Mr. Howe. If you had been in charge of those matters yourself, and there
had been money enough, then you would have done it ; but you do not know-
why it was not done?
Gen. Cous. That I can not say, because no man in a position of high
responsibility can siiy what would be done until he knew all the conditions that
surrounded that thing.
Now. I picked out, as a person who was not materially active in the thing—
I picked out a certain salient point which could be improved, and which, if
certain action was taken, would cause good results to follow over a much larger
place than that particular point. But I can not say that the i)eople who had
charge of that particular thing could have done what apiieared to me the l>est
thing to do; for instance, I could not say that if they had paid one creditor there
would not have been such a howl from the other creditors whom. ix>ssihly, they
would not have paid, that It would not have been wise to do that to incur the
g(MMl will of one at the exi)ense of the antagonism of many.
Mr. Howe. Did you see any rise in the revenues, and any benefits from the
Internal Improvements on which you expended the allotment?
Gen. Cole. Oh, yes; materially. The exports for a time from Haiti wen*
very large. And they were just as large as the transportation could handle,
up to the time I left, though at one time the bottom dropped out of the lop-
wood market.
Mr. Howe. Did you see any connection between the changes in the Haitian
constitution and the possibility of commercial development and financial re-
habilitation?
Gen. Cole. The changes, as I have said, were, in my opinion, absolutely net'-
essary ; nobody is going to go into a country like Haiti and be at the mercj- of n
constitution which says that he shall not have even the safeguards given their
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INQUIBY nsrrO occupation of HAITI AKD SANTO DOMINGO. 727
own citizens, but that he must have a safeguard which is whatever they may
want to make it and never equal to that of their own citizens. He is not
getting any. He can not get land; the land tenure is uncertain. The courts
were venal, and the man who went in there and put a sugar mill on land leased
from a Haitian, the Lord only knows whether he would ever be in a posi-
tion to make anything out of it. All the provisions in the proposed consti-
tution, to the best of my knowledge, were as much to the interest of Haiti as to
that of the United States and were such that the terms of the convention
could be carried out. I believe those terms were in such shape that proper
safeguards were given to the Republic of Haiti and to its people.
Mr. HowE. You have spoken of certain difficulties put in the way of improve-
ments by certain Haitians, and to distinct opposition to changes in this constl-
tuition by members of the assembly. It must follow, then, that those who
made those changes difficult did not look on them in the same way as you do,
for the benefit of HaiU?
Gen. CJoLE. I am not going to give them that much credit, because I think
that, in many cases, they were so obsessed with the idea that if they could get
the Americans out they could get back to their old system of graft, and their
old system of handling all the Government funds between the pockets of those
who paid them into the Government and their own pockets, that they would do
anything to get rid of us, and that they lost all sense of proportion in that
regard.
Mr. Howe. Then do you mean to say that you had the interest of the Haitians
more at heart than the members of the Haitian Assembly?
Gen. Cole. Unquestionably; there is no question about it at all; it Is un-
questionable that I had.
Mr. Howe. Let me ask you this: Do you think you imderstood better than
they did the relation between these steps proposed by the United States and
the rehabilitation of their country?
Gen. Cole. I think probably I did, though I also believe that many of them
realized that many of the things that we asked them were for the best Interests
of their coimtry; but they did not think they were for the best interests of
themselves, or of their own individual and political life.
Now, understand this: In Haiti politics was a profession — almost a pro-
fession; that the politician was largely a class by itself; people came into
it and people went out of it; but it was a class which had its own morals,
its private morals and its public morals. Its public morals were absolutely
lacking. There were some people who were all right Legetime, I believe, was
a very fine man ; he was a politician ; he had had the executive power ; he had
not enriched himself, and would not enrich himself at the expense of the coun-
try. I think Poly nice was a very fine man. And there were some others who
belonged In the political class. But, generally, the class of political parasite
in Haiti — you can not describe them.
Mr. Howe. Well, do you think the peasant — the country people, by and large —
had an conception of the effect of these proposed changes?
Gen. Cole. No; I do not think so. The peasant was fed up, I believe, with
talk to the effect that the Americans were trying to enslave them and trying to
get possession of their lands, and that if the changes were made, Americans
would get possession of their lands. But, as a matter of fact, we never believed
that the country people were against us in any way, after, I will say, the mid-
dle of 1916.
Mr. Howe. Now, as to martial law, on cross-examination you used some ex-
pressions, as I remember it, to the general effect that martial law there is neces-
sary to obtain justice to Uie white man?
Gen. Cole. Safety and justice.
Mr. Howe. Safety and justice to white men?
Gen. Cole. White military men.
Mr. Howe. Yes; white military men. Now, does the martial law which we
Imposed have anything to do with what we call in this country civil cases, as
opposed to criminal cases?
Gen. Cole. No. The biggest fine I ever had given in a provost court in Haiti
was against a white American who occupied the position of general manager of
the railroad.
Mr. Howe. That was analogous to a criminal case?
Gen. Cole. Yes ; a case of disorder and of defiance ; he got drunk.
62209— 21— FT 2 40
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728 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Now, the provost courts do not undertake to decide lawsuits be-
tween private plaintiff and defendant?
Gen. Cole. No ; it deals entirely with public order.
Mr. Howe. Yes. While martial law is In effect there through the operation
of the provost courts, is there any room there for the administration of crim-
inal justice affecting natives or whites or anybody? Do the native courts still
Impose fines? Do they still sentence a person?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What classes of cases, then, do they handle?
Gren. Cole. The provost courts?
Mr. Howe. No; the native courts.
Gen. Cole. The native courts handle all cases between Haitians.
Mr. Howe. Criminal cases?
Gen. Cole. Criminal cases; practically every criminal case.
Mr. Howe. Excepting the ones which are before the provost courts?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Now, where is the line drawn?
Gen. Cole. The line is drawn that the provost court deals ordinarily witli
those things which directly affect the armed forces in the United States in its
occupation ; they do not ordinarily concern the gendarmerie. I do not thinlj we *
would ordinarily put up cases before the provost courts against the gendarmerie
unless it were in connection with the maintenance of peace and order in the
country.
As I have said, the martial law is a moral force a great deal more than it is
a physical force ; but it is a very potent moral force on account of the physical
force that stands behind and casts its shadow on the moral forced
Mr. Howe. You say it is necessary for the safety of our marines down there?
Gen. Cole. Yes. It is necessary for Haiti, in order that peace and security
may not be flouted.
Mr. Howe. Are there any more questions, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Oddib. I have none.
Mr. Angell. I have one question, based upon your's. You said, General, that
martial law did not operate to interfere in cases between Haitian civilians?
Gen. Cole. Yes,
Mr. Angell. There was the bank case?
Gen. Cole. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Martial law did in effect there operate to interfere to prevent
the carrying out of the decree of the court of cassation, did it not?
Gen. Cole. The military commandant — not martial law. The officer com-
manding the military forces in Haiti said to the Haitian courts and to the
president of the bank, " The actions of the bank in this particular case are
done under direct orders and under duress of the naval commander, and conse-
quently I, as military commander, can not permit the courts of Haiti, which arc
not my superiors, to interfere and prevent something which the naval com-
mander has ordered done."
Mr. Howe. The justification of the act, or of the failure of the bank to act
as the case may be, would be in the existence of martial law?
Gen. Cole. Would be found in the facts that the bank, as the agent of the
military or naval commander in supreme control, had done certain acts, and
that as it had to do those acts it could not be held responsible for such acts by
the Haitian courts.
Senator Oddie. Is that all?
Gen. Cole. I think so.
Mr. Angell. There is a practical arrangement for going over such portions
of the general's data as are not personal and private to him, but are copies of
reDorts etc
Mr. Howe. It was my suggestion that on our return from Haiti, the commit-
tee authorize me to take up with the general the consideration of what parts
of his files should be available for the further consideration of the connnittee.
The time at our disposal has not permitted us to learn from the general what
those records are.
Senator Oddie. I think that can be done after we get back.
Mr. Howe. These are part of the records of the Navy Department ; they are
available to the committee ; but it would be in the nature of asking the general
a favor and assistance In guiding us through those reports to see what we need
in them.
Gen. Cole. I make this suggestion : That through your investigation in Haiti
you make record of such things as you feel I could possibly give you informa-
oogle
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 729
tion about during the time I was there, and inform me as to those things and
give me a chance to refresh my memory in regard to the particular things that
you have in mind, because there is a whole mass of that in there, and it stands
to reason that I can not remember everything that is in there.
Mr. Hows. Are these your own private papers?
Gen. Cole. These are private papers, kept for my own personal gratification
and protection in case any such question as this ever did come up.
Mr. Howe. I feel a delicacy in asking the general to send those iftipers up
to me en masse to look through them, but I am sure we can between us cut
out everything there that we think would be useful to the committee. My feel-
ing is that there is much valuable material there that the committee ought to
know.
Gen. Cole. I will turn over that material to you as counsel for the committee
during tiie rest of the time that you remain here, ^nd I am not certain but that
I will let you have them to take with you, but it will have to be on the under-
standing that they are not available as testimony before the committee unless
I have something to say in regard to them.
Mr. Howe. Yes.
Gen. Cole. Because conditions might come up that you might find conditions
in Haiti that I might have to take what was said here and there, and all through
the papers, in order to give proper answers and to have proper interpretations
placed upon them. You can take almost any bald statement and cut out cer-
tain parts and make a man out a liar, or anything else; and I do not want
anything of that sort. But my understanding is that headquarters of the Marine
Corps expects me to make available everything that I have. Is that true, MaJ.
McCleUan?
Maj. McClellan. Yes ; but with regard to most of these papers that Gen. Cole
hjis with him, the originals are either In the Navy Department records, or the
Marine Corps headquarters records; and Gen. Lejeune and the Secretary of
the Navy have both already stated that everything in those records is available
to the committee; nnd there are tons of such material. I merely want to make
this statement so that the committee will know that all these papers and many
others are officially available If the committee desire them. But the general
is right in saying that he has been Instructed to give the committee every
assistance possible with reference to books and papers.
Gen. Cole. My papers there are generally arranged in chronological order;
sometimes they are not, but generally they are. And in addition to that, I
til ink there are certain things there that headquarters do not have.
Mr. Howe. It is my Intention to get in touch with you on the return of the
committee, to find out to what further extent you can add to the very valuable
information you have already given.
Gen. Cole. I do not know what I can do, unless you want certain definite
information.
(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., the committee took a recess until 2.30 o'clock
p.m.)
AFTER BECESS.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
recess. Senator Oddle presiding.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. JESSE F. DYEB, TTNITED STATES MABIKE
COBPS, HEADQTJABTEBS MABINE COBPS, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Mr. Howe, Major, will you give your name, rank, and present station,
please?
Maj. Dyer. Jesse F. Dyer, major, United States Marine Corps, attached to
and stationed at headquarters. Marine Corps, Washington.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of calling Maj. Dyer as a witness is
for him to give the committee an Idea as to the scope and methods of the in-
vestigation conducted by him as judge advocate for the so-called Mayo court
of inquiry in Haiti.
Major, I see by the record of the Mayo court of inquiry here that the first
day was Tuesday, October 19, 1920. You had been appointed judge advocate
of that court of inquiry, had you not?
Maj. Dyeb. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Some of the meetings of the court were in this ^untry„ and
others in Haiti? Digitized by GOOglC
730 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Maj. Dyer. Yes.
Mr. Howe. And there is already in the record the precept of that court of
inquiry. I gather from reading the proceedings of the court that it was your
idea, as judge advocate, that the investigation and duties of that court were
prescribed in the precept?
Maj. Dyer. That is correct. That was not only my idea, but that is the only
authority a court of inquiry has to act, the precept
Mr. Howe. Therefore within the authority of the precept it was your duty, as
Judge advocate, was it not, to assist the court to bring before Uie court the
materials for an Investigation?
Maj. Dyer. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Now, may I. for the sake of brevity, ask you a leading question to
this extent : The record shows that some investigation was made by that court
of the cases in Haiti which involved the names of Lieut Brokaw, Capt La vole,
Lieut. Lang, Lieut. Doras Williams, and an officer named Rogoski, the latter be-
ing one whose name was mentioned by the witness Lifshitz. I believe I am
correct In saying that the cases where these officers were accused, by rumor or
in testimony, were the only specific cases which you came across in your investi-
gation. Am I correct in that, that these are all the cases of improper treatment
of Haitians that came within the scope of the precept?
Maj. Dyer. No ; there were a number of other cases mentioned, by rumor or
otherwise, which I attempted to run down. In the case of men who had been
accused of offenses and tried by court-martial, I got the records from the Judge
Advocate General's office and introduced them in evidence before the court of
inquiry. In numerous other cases I spent considerable time trying to obtain
some testimony to present to the court, but was unable to find it.
Mr. Howe. The record itself speaks of the cases of Brokaw, Lavoie, and the
others whose names I mentioned, and of these court-martial records, but I under-
stand from your last answer that there were a number of other reports which
came to you in the course of the investigation, no mention of which is made In
the record, and that you undertook to run those down, so far as you could?
Maj. Dyer. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What I want you to do now. Major, is to tell us the extent of
such investigations which you were unable to run down, how many interviews
they involved, to what extent there was correspondence on the subject, and to
what extent you traveled around the country.
Maj. Dyer. While I was In Haiti I Interviewed scores of people who had
related what they had heard. I corresponded with scores of other people and
traveled up into the interior somewhat to try to run to their sources indefinite
rumors which I had heard. I found a number of people who claimed to have
personal knowledge of alleged misconduct, but many of these were cases which
had already been tried by general court-martial; or, I would say, several. In
place of many. In other places the witnesses related facts which, under no
Interpretation could be construed as offenses, since they related to legitimate
acts, for instance, the case of Haitians who had been killed while resisting
arrest, and in one particular I recall there were five or six witnesses who came
to tell me, or who wrote to me, about such a killing, and they admitted to mo
themselves that they had no charges to bring of Illegal acts, but simply wanted
to tell about the case as they knew It. In most Instances the people who wrote
to me or who came to see me had no personal knowledge* of the cases of whidi
they talked. I tried to get them to give me the names of their Informants so
as to run the thing back to the original relator, but they claimed that they got
their information from general rumor, or that the thing was well known, etc
In a few cases I was given the names of people from whom they had heard the
stories, and on communication with those people I found they, too, vrere de-
pendant upon hearsay. Of course, I did not bring people before the court to
relate hearsay, but wherever any person claimed to have any personal know^
edge of any acts that could be construed as coming within the scope of our
precept. I brought such a person before the court as a witness, so that the
court could judge and weigh the testimony, which I never attempted to do.
Mr. Howe. I want to ask you also If you traced all such rumors, as far as
possible, so that you could determine whether you could find a witness who
could speak of his own knowledge or not? ^ „ ,^ t
Maj. Dyer. I did the best I could in that respect and before I left Haiti i
was convinced that I could get not further testimony to bring before the court
in relation to the matters mentioned in the precept
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 731
Mr. Howe. Now, as to these cases of Brokaw, Lavole, Lang, Williams and
Rogoski, in all but the case of Rogoskl yon had some reports on them as the
result of previous investigattion, did you not?
MaJ. Dteb. Yes; there were possible witnesses mentioned in those cases.
Mr. Howe. What efforts did you make to extend the scope of the previous
investigation with relation to those men?
Maj. Dteb. I went to the same source of information as the previous investi-
gators did, and endeavored to get further information. Also, I made inquiries
among the people mentioned as witnesses, and those people were brought before
the court wherever they could be obtained. In order to make one thing clear,
I wish to explain that a court of inquiry is purely a creature of statute, and has
no power not granted to it by statute. It is empowered to subpoena witnesses,
that is, the Judge advocate is, provided such witnesses be situated within the
same State or Territory or District as that in which the court is sitting. There
was one witness who came before the Senate Committee that I tried to get
before the court of inquiry. The court was then sitting in the District of
Columbia, and the witness was, I think. In Kansas City. I wrote to him, as
judge advocate, and requested his appearance, but we were unable to sub-
poena him, and he did not appear before the court
Mr. Howe. Do you refer to Lieut. Spear?
Maj. Dyer. Yes.
Mr. Howe. In other words, the Senate committee had the power to subpoena
him?
Maj. Dteb. I understand the Senate committee can subpoena anywhere within
the United States.
Mr. Howe. But It was not within your power to subpoena him unless he was
within the radius within which the law allowed your subpoenas to operate?
Maj. Dteb. Yes. '
Mr. Howe. Did you make any efforts to find Capt Lavoie?
Maj. Dteb. Yes; but I was unable to find out where he was located. Just
on a chance I wrote to him at his last known address, but the letter was re-
turned "Address not known."
Mr. Howe. What did you ascertain as to Lieut Brokaw?
Maj. Dteb. Lieut Brokaw was at the time insane and was not competent to
appear as a witness. In connection with the allegations against him, it was not
possible to complete an investigation, due to his insanity and to his inability to
defend himself or explain the circumstances as far as he was concerned.
Mr. Howe. I have here a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Senator
McCormick, dated October 29, in reply to an inquiry from this committee con-
cerning the sanity or insanity of Lieut. Brokaw, and also replying to a question
from this committee as to whether or not charges liad been brought against
Maj. Clark H. Wells; and if so, why the charges had been dropped. The
letter of the Secretary of the Navy carries with it inclosures in explanation of
the questions asked, and, in the case of Lieut. Brokaw, shows reports by medical
boards as to the insanity of Lieut. Brokaw. I offer in evidence the letter of
the Secretary and its inclosures. I think they should go in tliis record.
Senator Oddie. If there is no objection, they will be admitted.
(The letter and inclosures referred to are here printed in full, as follows:)
The Secketaby of the Navy,
Washington, October 29, 1921,
Mt Deab Senatob: In compliance with the requests contained in your two
letters of the 25th instant I inclose herewith the following papers concerning
the charges preferred against Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine
Corps:
(A) Letter Major General Commandant to Secretary of the Navy, No. 53086,
AQ-17-hdh, November 1, 1920.
(B) Letter Judge Advocate General of Navy to Major General Commandant,
No. 5526-321, November 5, 1920.
(C) Letter Secretary of Navy to Major General Commandant, No. 5526-321,
November 5. 1920.
(D) Letter Major General Commandant to Secretary of Navy, No. 53086,
November 8, 1920.
(E) Letter Major General Commandant to Secretary of Navy, No. 53086,
AQ-17-hdh, December 29, 1920.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
732 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
(F) Letter Secretary of Navy to Major General Commandant, No. 2G283-
8725:4, January 7, 1921.
(G) Letter Secretary of Navy to Judge Advocate General No. 26251-26072:
RHsn, January 7, 1921.
(K) Charge and specification against Maj. Clarke H. Wells as preferred
on November 1, 1920.
These Inclosures will show that one charge was preferred against Maj.
Wells and that It was withdrawn before trial Inclosure (C) will show that
Maj. Wells was first temporarily released from arrest in order that " be may
not be unduly prejudiced before the court of inquiry " convened " to investi-
gate conditions in Haiti/' while inclosure (G) revoked the order for Maj.
Wells's trial in view of the fact " that the exhaustive evidence adduced by
the said court of inquiry fails to contain evidence upon which court-martial
proceedings could be held in the case of Maj. Wells."
The questions regarding the mental condition of I^u's H. Brokaw, formerly
private, United States Marine Torps, and lieutenant. Gendarmerie d'Haiti, are
fully answered In the following inclosed papers marked.
(H) Report of Board of Me<l!cal survey. Naval Hospital, Washington, D. C,
(October 17, 1919.
(I) Report of Board of Medical Survey, Naval Hospital, Charleston, S. C.
September 15, 1919.
(J.) Report of Board of Medical Survey, I'ort au Prince, Halt'., .luly 9, 1919.
The last addreas of Mr. Brokaw, as given by him on April 22, 1921, in a com-
munication to the oflice of the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps,
was " Route No. 1, Fairview, Fulton County, IlL"
The following records requested in your letters have already been forwarded
to the committee.
1. The record of testimony, taken by Lieut. Col. Lay and Maj. Turner, etc.
2. The record of proceedings of the court of inquiry of which Rear Admiral
Mayo was president.
3. The record of proceedings of the general court-martial in the cases of Pvts.
Johnson and McQullkin and Capt. Hamilton.
Trusting that I have furnished you with the desired infornmtion and papers,
I am,
Very sincerely, yours,
Edwin Denbt.
Hon. Medill McCormick,
United State^i Senate, Washington^ D. C.
(A)
Heauquartebs United States Marine Corps,
Washington, D, C, November 1, 19tO.
From : The major general commandant.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Investigation of affairs in Haiti.
Inclosures: 22.
1. In September, 1919, the record of the proceedings of a general court-
martial at Port au Prince, Haiti, in the cases of Pvts. Walter B. Johnson and
John J. McQullkin, jr.. United States Marine Corps, were receiced In this office
and were found to contain references by counsel to a practice of executing
Haitian prisoners without trial. The Major General Commandant immediately
referred the matter to the brigade commander In Haiti for a full investlgatioii,
with the object of bringing such practice. If it existed, to a stop, and of bring-
ing all persons found to be guilty of such practice to punishment
2. On December 9, 1919, the brigade commander. Col. John H. Russell, United
States Marine Corps, forwarded the record of investigation, conducted by the
a&slstant adjutant and Inspector attached to brigade headquarters, with recom-
mendation that the statements of officers and men in the United States be
obtained. This was accomplished and all papers were returned to Haiti on
January 12, 1920, with instructions that the investigation be completed as sood
as practicable and the full report, together with recommendations of the
brigade commander, submitted to these headquarters.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIBY IKTO OCCUPATION O^ HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 788
3. On March 20, 1920, the brigade commander mailed the complete report,
but it was never received, being apparently lost in the mail. The fact that
the report had not been received was not discovered until August last, and
it was not until the return last months of Gens. Lejeune and Butler from a
trip of inspection in Haiti and Santo Domingo that all of the report was
available at these headquarters.
4. There are inclosed herewith copies of the first report of MaJ. Thomas O.
Turner, A. A. & I., November 3, 1919; of the forwarding letter from the
brigade commander. Col. John H. Russell, December 7, 1919 ; statements taken
by Lieut Ck)l. Harry R. Lay, A. A. & I., and submitted by letter of January 12,
1920; letter of Maj. Gen. Commandant Barnett to Secretary of the Navy Jan-
uary 12, 1920, stating that partial investigation had been made and that report
was being returned to Haiti for completion of investigation and submission of
report and recommendations (original) ; approval of action reported by Sec-
retary of the Navy in own handwriting on above-mentioned letter (original) ;
letter January 11, 1020^ brigade conmiander directing Lieut. Col. R. S. Hooker
to cooperate with Maj. Turner in conduct of investigation; letter February
12, 1920, from brigade commander directing Lieut Col. Hooker to expedite
Investigation; joint report of investigation, February 28, 1920, Lieut Col.
Hooker and Maj. Turner; indorsement, brigade commander, CoL Russell,
March 13, 1920, forwarding report of investigation ; rteum^ of testimony taken,
by Gens. Lejeune and Butler in Haiti, including 12 statements of gendarmes,
taken by Lieut Bertol, Gendarmerie d'Haiti ; and report of investigation made
by Gens. Lejeune and Butler.
5. On or about August 25, 1918, the commandant of the gendarmerie Issued an
order abolishing the system of corvee (enforced labor) on the public roads.
This was extended by another order, October 18, 1918, to include the Hinche-
Maissade districts, which had been interpreted as being outside of the limits of
the first order. The system was continued in those districts notwithstanding
the said orders and caused a great deal of unrest and disturbance. The continu-
ance of the cor\'^ was rei)eatedly denied by Maj. Clarke H. Wells, the com-
mander of the gendarmerie in the Department of the North, Haiti. Finally the
brigade commander personally investigated the matter and found the corvee
still in existence at Hinche and Malssade.
6. Lieut. Col. Alexander S. Williams was chief of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti,
and from the evidence available it does not appear that he kept himself suf-
ficiently informed of conditions. Moreover, it appears from the statement of
Edward J. Seiger, formerly an enlisted man in the Marine Corps and a lieuten-
ant in the Gendarmerie d*Haiti, that Lieut Col. Williams, on November 1, 1918,
told Capt. Lavoie, of the gendarmerie, that no provost prisoners were wanted ;
that if Lavoie found that any of the prisoners were " Cacos " and actually had
arms In their possession to do away with them. These statements, if made,
would show at least that the chief of the gendarmerie approved of the unlawful
kUIlngs of prisoners, and such approval would have had a baleful effect in the
Indoctrination of his subordinates. There appears, however, to be insuflicient
evidence for bringing Lieut. Col. Williams to trial at this time, and it is recom-
mended that action on his case be deferred until after receipt of the record of
proceedings of the court of inquiry now in session.
7. There is evidence that Maj. Clarke H. Wells had knowledge of the continu-
ance of the system of corv^ In the Hinche-Maissade districts during the period
November 1, 1918, to March 31, 1919, in the department under his command, and
failed to suppress It, well knowing that the order of the chief of the Gendarmerie
d'Haiti of August 25, 1918, and October 18, 1918, prohibited corv^; that on or
about November 2, 1918, he gave orders over the telephone from Cape Haitieii
to Frederick C. Baker, at that time a private in the Marine Corps and a captain
in the Gendarmerie d*Haiti, to " bump off," meaning to kill, prisoners ; that on
or about March 19. 1919, he gave Capt. George D. Hamilton orders to kill any
man whom Capt. Hamilton thought to be a caco and not to bring him to prison ;
that at divers times during the period November 1, 1918. to March 31, 1919,
he gave orders to his juniors to suppress reports of any unfavorable conditions
in regards to the state of pence in the Department of the North, of which he
was in command. In view of the foregoing I recommend that Maj. Clarke H.
Wells, United States Marine Corps, be brought to trial by general court-martial
for these offenses, and for such other offenses as may be warranted by the
evidence.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
734 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
8. From the statements In the attached papers it would appear that Doras
L. Williams, now a sergeant in the Marine Corps at Qnantico, Va., and then
a lieutenant in the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, beat to death with a stick one Gamier
Jean during the month of March, 1919, in the town of Maissade ; that he had
three prisoners, names unknown, shot to death during the month of March,
1919, at the same place ; that during the period November 1, 1919, to March 81,
1919, he permitted work under the corvee system on the roads in the Maissade
district In violation of the orders of the commandant of the gendarmerie.
It Is recommended that he be brought to trial for these offenses, and for snch
others as may in the opinion of the Judge Advocate General be warranted by
the evidence.
9. From the statements available it appears that former Pvt Ernest Lavoie,
formerly a captain in the Gendarmerie d*Haiti, was guilty of numerous ofEenses.
He was discharged on July 80, 1919, upon expiration of enlistment, and his
present address is not known. In case it is possible to bring him within the
Jurisdiction of a naval court-martial, it is recommended that he be bron^t
to trial. While his present whereabout are unknown he could probably be
locatcNi in case of necessity.
10. From the statements of certain native gendarmes It appears that former
Sergt Freeman Lang, while a lieutenant in the Grendarmerle d'Haitl, committed
certain alleged ofPensea He was discharged in January, 1919, and is now Hying
in Haiti. In case it is possible to bring him within the Jurisdiction of a naval
court-martial, his trial is recommended.
John A. Lejeitns.
(B)
Depabtment of the Navy,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington, November 5, 1920.
From: The Judge Advocate GeneraL
To: The Major General Commandant.
Subject : Investigation of conditions in Haiti and the trial by court-martial of
certain officers of the Marine Corps.
Reference : Your letter of November 1, 1920, and Inclosures.
1. Referring to the subject matter of above-mentioned reference, you are
informed that one charge and specification of a charge were prepared against
MaJ. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, and orders issued for the
trial of said officer on November 1, 1920. This action was necessary to prevent
the statute of limitations from preventing the prosecution of said case, as
the offense upon which ttie charge and specification were based was alleged to
have been committed on November 1, 1918. The two-year limitation prescribed
by article 61, A. G. N., expired November 1, 1920, and would have barred the
prosecution had not orders been issued for trial before the expiration of two
years from the date of the offense.
2. In view, however, of the fact that a court of inquiry has been convened
by order of the Secretary of the Navy to investigate certain alleged irrega-
larities in Haiti, among which matters to be investigated are those contained
in the above-mentioned reference, the Secretary of the Navy has directed that
the trial of Maj. Wells be deferred until after tlie court of inquiry, which Is
now in session, has completed its work and rendered its report The Secretary
has also directed that no further charge and specifications be prepared against
persons in the Marine Corps based upon the irregularities reported in the
above-mentioned reference until after the court of inquiry has submitted its
report.
The Secretary of the Navy has directed that the charge and specification
prepared against Maj. Wells on November 1, 1920, be re.turned to the depart-
ment, where they will be held pending further developments.
4. With reference to the case of Doras L. Williams, United States Marine
Corps, yon are informed that unless arrest is considered necessary to prevent
escape he need not be placed under arrest until after the completion of the
investigation now being conducted by the court of inquiry, unless otherwise
ordered by the Secretary of the Navy.
Geo. R. Clabk.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 73&
(C)
Depabtment of the Navy,
• Washington, November 5, 1920'..
Prom : Tlie Secretary of the Navy.
To: The Major General Oommandant
Subject : Investigation of conditions In Haiti and the trial by court-martial ot
certain officers of the Marine Ck)rp8.
References: (a) Your letter November 1, 1920.
(&) Letter of Judge Advocate General to the Major General Com-
mandant, dated November 5, 1920.
1. The charge and specification preferred by the department against Maj..
Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, on November 1, 1920, have been
temporarily withdrawn from the court and ordered returned to the depart-
ment pending the completion of the Investigation of other charges against said
officer and other alleged Irregularities In Haiti by the court of inquiry of which
Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo Is president. The diarge and specification are
not to be regarded as having been quashed or abandoned by the department
but merely as held In temporary abeyance.
2. It Is directed that Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, be
temporarily released from arrest and restored to duty pursuant to section 52.
Naval Courts and Boards. The order temporarily releasing him from arrest
should be In writing and should Inform of the reasons for his release; also
that his temporary release from arrest and restoration to duty will not be a
bar to any subsequent investigation or trial of the case that the Secretary
of the Navy may think proper to order on the charge already preferred or
other charges now being Investigated.
3.»The reasons for the temporary release froni arrest of Maj. Wells are that
he may not be unduly prejudiced before the court of Inquiry convened by order
of the department to Investigate conditions In Haiti ; that he may have every^
opportunity to defend himself as an Interested party before said court; that
the department may have opportunity to investigate other charges against him ;
and in order that he may not be held an unresonable length of time under
arrest awaiting trial by court-martial.
JosBPHUs Daniels.
(D)
Headquarters United States Marine Corps,
Washington, November 8, 1920,
From: The Major General Commandant.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Temporar>' withdrawal of charge and specifications against Major
Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps.
References : (a) Letter of Secretary of the Navy to Major General Commandant,
forwarding charge and specifications, of date November 1, 1920. (&) Letter
Major General Commandant to Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine
Corps, of date November 6, 1920, placing him under arrest, (c) Letter
of Secretary of the Navy to Major General Commandant, No. 5526-821, of date
November 5, 1920, directing temporary withdrawal of charge and specifica-
tions preferred by the department against Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United
States Marine Corps, on November 5, 1920, and release from arrest.
1. In compliance with reference (c), Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States
Marine Corps, has this date been released from arrest and restored to duty,
pending completion of the Investigations of the court of inquiry, of which Rear
Admiral Henry T. Mayo, United States Navy, Is president.
2. Maj. Wells has been informed that his temporary release from arrest and
restoration to duty Is not a bar to subsequent Investigation of, or trial upon, the
charge and specifications preferred against him by the department under date
of November 1, 1912, or upon any other charges and specifications that may
hereafter be preferred against him in connection with the case.
3. The receipt for the court, of which Brig. Gen. Ell K. Cole, United States
Marine Corps, Is president, bearing date of November 1, 1920, Is returned here-
with. Maj. Wells has been allowed to retain the copy of the charge and speci-
fications furnished him at the time of his arrest.
John A. Xejeune.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
736 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
(E)
Headquartkrs United States Marine Corps,
Washington, December 29, 1920,
From : The Major General Commandant
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Investigation of affairs in Haiti.
References: (a) Major General Commandant's letter November 1, 1920, same
subject. (6) Record of proceedings of court inquiry.
1. The court of inquiry convened October 19, 1920, to Inquire into the conduct
of the personnel of the naval service that has served in the Republic of Haiti
since July 22, 1915, of which Rear Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States Navy,
was president, included in its findings of facts a paragraph as follows :
•* 4. In view of the fact that the only unjustifiable acts found by the court
to have been committed are those wherein disciplinary action has already been
taken, and where no further proceedings could be had in the matter, the court
has not deemed it necessary to report further upon the question of responsi-
bility.'^
The court had before it all of the reports and evidence upon which my recom-
mendations, contained in reference (a), were based. It is quite apparent that
the court tninsidered all charges and found them, except those already sub-
ject e<l to disciplinary action, to be unsupported by sufficient evidence. The
court did not recommend any further action.
2. In view of the finding of the court after an exhaustive Investigation, I
desire to withdraw the recommendation for trials of officers and enlisted men,
as contained in paragraphs 6, 7, 8. 9, and 10 of my letter of November 1. 1920.
reference (a), in respect to Lieut. Col. Alexander S. Williams, Maj. Clarke .H.
Wells, Sergt. Dorcas L. Williams, former Pvt Ernest La vole, and former Sergt
Freeman Lang, and to recommend that no further action be taken.
John A. Lejeuxe.
(F)
Department of the Navy,
January 7, 1921.
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To : The Major General Commandant.
Subject : Investigation of affairs In Haiti.
References: (a) Your letter December 29, 1920, 53086 AQ-17 hdh. (b) Letter
from tlie Secretary of the Navy to the Judge Advocate General, January 7,
1921, 26251-26072.
1. A court of inquiry, of which Rear Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States
Navy, was president and consisting of high ranking officers of the Navy and
Marine Corps, was specially convened for the purpose of inquiring into the
conduct of the personnel of the naval service that has served in the Republic
of Haiti since July 22, 1915. In view of the finding of the court that the only
unjustifiable acts committed were those wherein disciplinary action has already
been taken, and that further fact that the exhaustive evidence adduced by the
said court of inquiry fails to contain evidence upon which court-martial pro-
ceedings could be held in the cases of Lieut. Col. Alexander S. Williams.
Maj. Clarke H. Wells, Sergt. Dorcas L. Williams, former Pvt Ernest Lavoie,
and former Sergt. Freeman Lang, United States Marine Corps, the department
considers that no further action is warranted in their cases.
2. The department, on November 1, 1920. directed the trial by general court-
martial of Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, based upon cer-
tain alleged offenses, the facts of which were meager and questionable. The
trial, however, was directed in order that, if the offenses had been committal,
the statute of limitations would not bar subsequent trial. The d^)artment
on November 5, 1920. directed the delay of Maj. Wells's trial pending the find-
ings of the court of inquiry convened as above. The order of the department
tliat Maj. Wells be brought to trial has been revoked, under date of January 7,
1921, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 1 of this letter.
JOSEPHUS Dan DELS.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
IKQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 737
(G)
Department or the Navy,
Washington, January 7, 1921.
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To: The Judge Advocate General.
Subject : Revoking order for trial of Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine
Corps, by general court-martial.
Reference: (a) letter from Major General romnmndant to Secretary of tbe»
Navy, December 29. 1920, 2628^-3725 : 4.
1. A court of inquiry, of which Rear Admiral H. T. Mayo, United States Navy,
was president, and cons'sting of high rank'ng officers of the Navy and Marine
Corps, was specially convened for the purpose of inquiring into the conduct of
the personnel of the naval service that has served in the Republic of Haiti s'nce
July 22, 1915. In view of the finding of the court that the only unjustifiable
acts committed were those wherein disciplinary action has already been taken
and that no further proceedings could be had in the matter, and the further
fact that the exhaustive evidence adduced by the said court of inquiry falls to
contain evidence upon which court-martial proceedings could be held in the
ca«e of Maj. Wells, the department considers that no further action is war-
ranted in his case. The previous order of the department dated November 1.
1920, that Maj. Clarke H. Wells, United States Marine Corps, be brought to
trial by general court-martial is therefore hereby revoked.
JosEPHUS Daniels.
(H)
disability under 10 PER CENT.
From : Board of Medical Survey.
To : Commandant navy yard, Washington, D. C, for transmission to the Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery.
Subject : R^)ort of medical survey.
Place, United States Naval Hospital, Washington, D. O. Date, October 17,
1919.
Name, Brokaw, Louis Abraham. Grade or rate, private, United States Marine
Corps.
Attached to United States Naval Hospital, Washington, D. C. How long at
this place? Sixteen days.
Admitted from naval hospital, Charleston, S. C. Date, October 1, 1919.
Bom : Place, Fulton County, 111. Date, December 21, 1889.
Enlisted: Place, Marine Barracks, Port Royal, S. C. Date, October 4, 1916.
Copy of db8tract of health record,
[During present enlistment and subsequent to any prior surv ey.l
Name of ship or station.
Date of trans-
fer.
Disease or Injury.
Days on
sick list.
Marine barracks, Port Royal
NaTT yard, Charleston
Maruie barracks. Port au Prhice
Field hospital. Port an Prince
Marine barracks. Port au Prince, Haiti —
Constabulary
Territorial hospital, Port au Prince, Haiti. . .
U. S. 8. Kittery
United States Naval Hospital, Charieston . .
Dec. 27,1916 None
Jan. 14,1917 do
Sept. 17, 1917 Poisoning by alcohol .
Sept. 21,1917 ....do
Apr. 4,1918 None
May 29,1919 do
July 30,1919 I Dementia precox
Aug. 14,1919 I do
Sept. 30,1919 do
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
47
PBE8ENT HI8T0BY OF CASE.
Diagnosis: Dementia precox.
Origin not In the line of duty. Disability is not the result of his own mis-
conduct.
Facts are as follows: Predisposition existed prior to enlistment. Article
29L2, Navy Regulations, compiled with. No statement.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
738 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Upon admission to this hospital patient was somewhat tense, nervous, and
physical examination showed tremor of eyelids and vasomotor disturbance of
the hands. However, he was oriented and in tonch with his environment.
Stated that he thought he had been poisoned wliile on duty in the Tropics. He
admits having been a heavy drinlcer, which was probably respcmsible for his
condition at this time. All symptoms have now disappeared and he is ap-
parently reacting on his normal mental leveL
W. M.M.
Pres^it condition: Unfit for service.
Probable future duration: Permanent
Rec'ommendation : That he be discharged from the United States Marine
Ck)rps. No menace.
[seal.] Dallas G. Sutton,
Lieutenant Commander, Marine Corpi, United States Navy,
[seal.] V. E. Habmon,
Lieutenant, Marine Corps, United States Navy,
[SEAL.] ALAM ChSNEST,
Lieutenant, Marine Corps, United States Navy.
[First indorsemeDt.]
October 17, 1919.
From: Commanding officer.
To: Commandant navy yard, Washington, D, C.
Forwarded.
Phillip Leach,
Captain, Marine Corps, United States Navy,
[Second indorsemefit.]
October 20, 1919.
From : Commandant navy yard, Washington, D. 0.
To : Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Forwarded. Approved.
A. W. Grant,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Commandant,
and Superintendent Naval Oun Factory,
[Third indorsement.]
October 23, 1919.
From : Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
To : Major General, Commandant, United States Marine Corps.
Forwarded : Recommendation of board approved.
W. C. Braistkd.
(I)
From : Board of Medical Survey.
To: Commandant sixth naval district. For transmission to the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery.
Subject : Report of medical survey.
Place, United States naval hospital, Charleston, S. C. Date, September 15
1919.
Name, Brokaw, Louis Abraham. Grade or rate, private, United States Marine
Corps.
Attached to naval hospital. How long at this place? One month.
Admitted from U. S. S. KUtery. Date, August 14, 1919,
Bom : Place, Fulton County, 111. Date, December 21, 1889.
Enlisted : Place, MB Port Royal, S. C. Date, October 4, 1916.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AlH) SANTO DOMINGO. 739
Copy of abstract of health record,
[Daring present enlistment and subseqaent to any prior surrey.]
Name of ship or station.
Date of trans-
fer.
Disease or injury.
Days on
sick list.
Field hospital, Port au Prince ...
Field hospital, Port au Prince ...
U. S.S.KIttery
Naval hospital, Charleston, 8. C.
Sept. 21, 1917
July 30,1919
Aug. 14, 1919
Poisoning by alcohol .
Dementia praecox
Dementia praecox
Dementia praecox
4
62
15
PRESENT HISTORY OF CASE.
Diagnosis, dementia praecox (217).
Origin, not in the line of duty. Disability is not the result of his own mis-
conduct
Facts are as follows : Article 2902, United States Navy Regulations, complied
"With. Patient has systematized delusions. He says that while on duty in Haiti
be became unconscious, and when he regained consciousness he found himself in
tbe brig. He says that he was poisoned by the natives In the highlands of
Haiti. Patient seems to be normal otherwise, excepting that he is nervous ; more
marlced at times, and while talidng shows lack of concentration of thought on
different occasions. It is recommended that he be transferred to United States
naval hospital, Washington, D. C, for further observation and treatment. Sero-
logical test on blood, negative. Patient refused to have spinal puncture made.
Present condition: Unfit for service.
Probable future duration: Indefinite.
Recommendation: That he be transferred to United States naval hospital.
'Washington, D. C, for further observation and treatment, in care of medical
officer and under guard.
[SEAL.] S. M. Taylor, Lieutenant Commander (M. C).
[seal.] Jj. Jj. Adamkiewicz, Lieutenant (if. C),
[SEAL.] A. D. Burnett, Lieutenant (M. C).
[First indorsement.]
From: Medical officer.
To: Commandant.
Forwarded.
[Second Indorsement.]
September 15, 1919.
Geo. W. Galver.
September 15, 1919.
From: Commandant.
To : Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Forwarded.
E. Thompson, Commander (M. C), U. 8. N,
Medical Aid, Sixth Naval Distticty hy Direction.
[Third indorsoment.l
September 19, 1919
From : Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
To: Major General, Commandant, United States Marine Corps.
Forwarded : Recommendation of board approved.
W. C. Braisted.
Digitized by VjOOQIC
740 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
(J)
From : Board of Medical Survey.
To: Brigade commander, First Provisional Brigade, U. S. M. C, for transmis-
sion to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Subject : Report of Medical Survey.
Place, Port au Prince, Haiti. Date, July 9, 1919.
Name, Brokaw, Louis Abraham. Grade or rate, private. United States
Marine Cbrps.
Attached to iield hospital. How long at this place? One year, 11 montlis.
Admitted from gendarmerie D'Uaiti. Date, May 29, 1919.
Born : Place, Fulton County, 111. Date, December 21, 1889.
Enlisted: Place, Port Royal, S. O. Date, October 4, 1916.
Copy of abstract of healtfi record.
Name of ship or station.
Date or trans-
fer.
Disease or injury.
DtTXOD
sick list.
Marine barracks, Port Royal. S.C I Dec. 27,1916
Navy yard dispensary, CHarleston, S. C Jan. 14, 1917
Marine barracks, Port au Prince. Haiti Sept. 17, 1917
Field hospital. Portau Prince, HaiU Jan. 21,1917
Marine barracks, Port au Prince, Haiti Apr. 4,1918
None
.....do
Poisoning by alcohol .
do
None
I
PBE8ENT HISTORY OF CASE.
Diagnosis, dementia precox (217). Origin in the line of duty. Disability
is not the result of his own misconduct.
Facts are as follows : Patient was admitted to hospital on May 29, 1919, for
observation as to his mental condition, having been accused of an unlawful
execution of two natives. Hearsay evidence is to the effect that he has been
a heavy drinker for some time, and his health record shows one admission for
poisoning by alcohol. Upon admission, he answered some questions in a very
hesitating manner, but since then he has not answered questions or spoken a
word. Patient is not oriented to his surroundings, and apparently sleeps or
keeps his eyes closed all of the time. When aroused by sitting him up hi bed
he will pick at the bed clothes, look under the bed, and assumes facial ex-
pressions which would indicate to the onlooker that he Is having very disagree-
able hallucinations. Patient Is unable to care for himself.
Present condition, unfit for service. Probable future duration, indefinite.
Recommendation, that he be transferred to a United States naval hospital
via the first available Government transportation for further disposition.
[SEAL.] G. P. SHIKLDe,
Lieutenant, Marine Corps, United States Navy.
[SEAL.] W. E. Beatty,
Lieutenant, Marine Corps, United States Navy,
[First indorsement]
From : Brigade surgeon.
To : Brigade commander.
Forwarded.
July 9, 1919.
A. J. Geiges.
I Second Indorsement.]
Headquartebs First Provisional Brigade, U. S. Mabine Corps,
Port au Prinm, Republic of Haiti, July 10, 19$1.
From : Brigade commander.
To : Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
Forwarded.
A. W. Catur.
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INQUIRY INTO OOOXJPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 741
[Third iDdorsement. ]
July 28. 1919.
From : Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
To: Major General Commandant, United States Marine Ck)rp8.
Forwarded. Recommendation of board approved.
W. C. Braisted.
(K)
Navy Depabtment,
Washington, November i, 1920.
To: MaJ. Edwin N. McCIellan, United States Marine Ck)rps, Judge Advocate,
General CJourt-Martial, Marine Barracljs, Port au Prince, Haiti.
Subject: Charge and specification in case of Clarke H. Wells, major, United
States Marine Corps.
1. The above-named officer will be tried before the general court-martial of
which you are judge advocate upon the following charge and specification.
You will notify the president of the court accordingly, inform the accused of
the date set for his trial, and summon all witnesses, both for the prosecution
and the defense.
Charge : Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline.
Specification: In that Clarke H. Wells, then a major in the United States
Marine Corps, while serving as an officer of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti in com-
mand of the department of the north of the Republic of Haiti, did, on Novem-
ber 2, 1918, at Cape Haltlen, Haiti, by telephone to Frederick C. Baker, then
a private. United States Marine Corps, while serving as a captain in the Gen-
darmerie d*Haiti at Gonalves, Haiti, willfully, maliciously, and without proper
authority or justification, deliver and cause to be delivered to the said Capt.
Baker an order to "bump off" any undesirable or useless Haitien prisoners
which he, the said Baker, might have captured or might capture in the opera-
tions at that time being conducted by the Gendarmerie d'Haiti against the
Cacos In the vicinity of Maissade, Haiti, by the words "bump ofF," used as
aforesaid, meaning and Intending to kill such aforesaid prisoners ; the United
States then being in a state of war.
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. HowE. Did the court of inquiry come to any conclusion in the cases of
Lleuts. Lang and Williams?
Maj. Dyer. Yes, sir. I think you have the record. The court found the alle-
gations against them not sustained.
Mr. Howe. And as to the officer named Rogoski?
Maj. Dyer. I believe the same findings in his case. As a matter of fact, I
think you will find that the court did not find any acts such as set forth in the
precept had been established.
Mr. Howe. How many Individuals do you suppose you interviewed or listened
to in connection with this inquiry while you were in Haiti?
Maj. Dyer, ^t a guess, I should say probably between 250 and 300.
Mr. Howe. What, if any, steps did you or the court take to let it be known
in Haiti that the investigation was on and that you were the proper person to
receive accusations or reports?
Maj. Dyer. Shortly after we arrived in Port au Prince T drafted a notice,
under the instructions of the court, to be sent to the local newspapers, announc-
ing the arrival of the court and the purpose for which It had come. That notice
was published. The fact of the court's coming was also pretty well known In
Haiti and had been a matter of discussion there for some weeks at least.
While we were holding sessions in Haiti a number of Haitians came to me and
said that some people thought they would have to wait until they should be
summoned and that I might not get In touch with them. I explained to them
that such was an erroneous idea, and that not only were they allowed to come
and give information to the court, but that I would consider it a favor if they
Digitized by VjOOQIC
742 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
would come to me and let me know what they had to say in regard to our
investigation. Some of the Haitian newspaper men asked me if they could pub-
lish a statement to that effect, and I told them that they not only had permis-
sion to do so, but I would be very glad to have them do so. As I recall it, how-
ever, they refrained from publishing that interview with me. In addition to
wliat I have stated, word was transmitted through the occupation to notify nny
person w^ho wished to testify to communicate with the judge advocate of the
court at Port au Prince.
Mr. Howe. There was no inquiry into the corvee by that court, was there.
Major?
Maj. Dyer. Not into the corvee as such, because the subject of (*or\'ee w^as
covered by Haitian law, and corvee, which means public work, was carried on
under the Haitian Government. The principal connection with that work on
the part of any of the forces of the occupation was through the gendarmerie,
who had charge of the actual work going on. I looked into the matter as far as
I could, and tried to find out if in connection wltli the corvee any of the Ameri-
can forces had committed any of the alleged acts, but could find no evidence to
that effect to bring before the court. We were not there to Investigate into the
question of the oi)eration of the Haitian Government or any outrages that
Haitian oificials may have perpetrated upon their own people. As a matter of
fact, numerous persons came to me offering to testify in regard to the fact
that illegal acts had been perpetrated upon them by Haitians, but in tliose cases
I had to tell them that that matter was not being investigated by the court of
inquiry.
Mr. Howe. Could you ascertain whether in those cases where the accusation
was against Haitian oiticials there was more or less than the usual amount of
hearsay?
Maj. Dyer. Well, I can only judge from my experience with tliose people that
practically none of them know the difference between real testimony and
hearsay.
Mr. Howe. So from what they told you
Maj. Dyer. They did not recognize the difference in their own courts.
Mr. Howe. So from what they told you, you really gained no idea as to the
extent to which Haitian officials abused the law; is that correct?
Maj. Dyer. I never made any attempt to form an idea on that subject
Mr. Howe. Did you at any time discourage any witnesses from coming before
you or from testifying?
Maj. Dyer. No; I did not; although I understand I have been accused of
discouraging them, based upon an incident which occurred while I was acting *as
judge advocate. I explained to a number of Haitians who were present for
the purpose of giving me information that as a preliminary matter I was glad
to hear even rumors, which I would try to trace down, but that when it came
to testifying under oath that a witness should confine himself to facts within
his knowledge, and that for any man to take the stand and swear that such a
thing had been committed, that he knew it had been committed of his own
personal knowledge, when, as a matter of fact, he was not present and only
knew of the occurrence by tlie I'nct that some person had told him of It, would
be perjury, and that I wanteil tliem to understand what was required in our
courts ; that, as far as the court of inquiry was concerned, it followed the same
rules as all the Federal courts of the United States, and only acc^ted sworn
testimony as to facts or circumstances within the knowledge of tlie witness
himself. I might say that several people who had come with the idea of being
witnesses left after that explanation. If that was discouragement, then I may
have discouraged some of them.
Mr. Howe. Is that tlie only basis you can think of for any reports as to your
discouragement of witnesses to ai>pear?
Maj. Dyer. I can not think of anything else, because my whole conversation
and attitude was to dispel any such idea, if it existed. I do not believe that
any such idea did exist, on account of the fact that people from different parts
of the country-, and widely scattered, connnunicated with me with the utmost
freedom volunteering to testify. They seemed to have no fear of it at all. As
a matter of fact, people came to me with complaints about civil suits being
carried on in tlie Haitian courts and wanted our court of inquiry to take juris-
diction. One woman had a suit over a grocery bill, and she wanted our court to
have a hearing on it and adjust it. Tliey seemed to think they could get justice
from the court of Inquiry, and had confidence in It. I believe there were certain
people there who pretended to believe and tried to create the atmosphere that
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 743
witnesses were not wanted, but I think that was confined to a few people for
a certa n special interest. The people at large, I feel sure, felt confident that
they could come before the court, and they did.
Mr. Howe. What action, if any, do you recollect that the court took in tjie
case of Maj. Clark Wells?
Maj. Dyer. The court took no action in h's case at all. There was no evV
(lence to bring before the court, none which 1 could find, to show that any of
the offenses named in the precept had been committed, with which he could
be connected. It was necessary, of course, before you could bring Maj. Wells in,
to show that some act had been committed, and then connect him up with it in
some way. There were rumors in regard to him, but we w^ere unable to verify
the acts having l>een committed. In other words, there was no corpus delicti
that we could start on.
Mr. Howe. You did, however, Investigate such rumors or reports as you did
hear about Maj. Wells?
Maj. Dyer. I traced them down fys far as I could, trying to get something to
start on, but was unable to get it.
Mr. Howe. How long have you been in the Marine Corps, Major?
Maj. Dyer. Eighteen years in the Marine Corps and about a year and a half
in the Army before that.
Senator Oddie. As a matter of curiosity, I would like to ask where you
got your medal of honor?
Maj. Dyer, Down in Vera Cruz, sir.
Mr. Angell. Major, have you the terms of the notice which you caused to be
given out of the arrival of the court of inquiry in Haiti, and its mission?
Maj. Dyer. No ; I have not.
Mr. Angeix. Was that notice published in full, as you remember, in the
papers?
Maj. Dyer. Yes ; I know it was. It was translated into French and published
in French in the newspapers. I read it myself.
Mr. Angell. Was it published anywhere, to your knowledge, except in Port
au Prince?
Maj. Dyer. Not to my personal knowledge ; I do not know.
Mr. Angell. Were any steps taken, so far as you know, to have it published
'n other places in Haiti, or give out an official announcement?
Maj. Dyer. I do not know whether there were or not, but the purpose of the
court being there was well known in other places in Haiti, be<'ause I had
letters from various parts of the country, for instance, from up in Cape Haitien,
Gonaives, and several other places.
Mr. Angell. Was that notice the only public announcement made by the
court or by the judge advocate of the court, concerning the function, purpose
of the court, procedure, methotl of hearing witnes.ses, and the like, during its
stay in the Island?
Maj. Dyer. Yes; that was the only official notice sent out. That court, the
same as any other court in the United States, did not advertise itself. It was
just like the Supreme Court of the United States, or any inferior court. They
do not send out notices about what their purpose is, or their status, or anything
else.
Mr. Angell. Was any announcement made, in your notice or otherwise, of
the t'me and place where the court would hold its sessions?
Maj. Dyer. Not in that notice, but It would have been impossible, because we
held our sessions as we were able to get testimony to bring before it.
Mr. Angell. Are we to understand, then, that there was no public announce-
ment of the times and places of holding the sessions?
Maj. Dyer. No; there was no public announcement. There was no purpose
in announcing it that I know of. The sessions of the court were open, but If
any person wanted to know when he could appear before the court, he would
have to come around and inquire.
Mr. Angell. He would have to know where to inquire, to find out when
and where the court was going to sit?
Maj. Dyer. They knew that. It sat in the same place, the barracks, every
(lay, and arrangements were made for the public to have access. I personally
saw that those instructions were given, because I knew there would be charges
made that it was not open to the public, so I know orders were given, and I-
know they were carried out, that any person who came there to the barracks and
wanted to attend the court was told where the room was and shown how to
62269— 21— PT 2 41
Digitized by VjOOQIC
744 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
get up there and told he could come in, because, as I say, I anticipated there
would be charges made about secret hearings, and all that sort of thing.
Mr. Angell. The sessions were, in fact, then, open to the public and attended
by the public?
Maj. Dyeb. Yes. There were, of course, certain times when the court was
closed.
Mr. Angell. Under the technical rules of procedure of military courts?
Maj. Dyer. Yes ; but not to talce testimony.
Mr. Angell. Was there any official statement gotten out by the court or in
its behalf, inviting persons who had complaints to malice to present themselTes
either to the court or to the Judge advocate?
Maj. Dyeb. No there was no advertisement other than what I have spoken
about already. We did not advertise in the newspapers for possible witnesses
to come or ofter them any rewards for coming or anything like that, or hold
out any inducements for them. They were all giv^i the opportunity.
Mr. Anoell. Where did the court hold sessions in Haiti?
Maj. Dteb. In the library room in the barracks in Port au Prince. They also
held, as I remember, one or two sessions on board ship, but not for the purpose
of taking testimony. That was only to consider matters of procedure.
Mr. Angell. There were no sessions, then, held in any other place in Haiti
besides Port au Prince?
Maj. Dyee. No.
Mr. Angell. You said you went up into the interior?
Maj. Dyeb. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Where did you go? How many trliw did you make? Can yon
give us some idea of the extent of the investigation you conducted on this trip
or trips into the interior?
Maj. Dyeb. I made one trip, going to Hinche and St Michael, and spent most
of the time at Hinche, endeavoring to obtain some witnesses from that place,
because that had been the center of rumors of numerous charges, and on the
statements of one of the inhabitants of that town prior investigators had re-
ported the possible occurrence of a number of outrages. I interviewed that
man and endeavored to obtain from him the names of all possible witnesses. I
also got into communication^ with Mr. Langjon that trip. I had intended to P>
Cape Hatien, and the court liad originally Intended to go there to hold sessions,
but in view of the fact that it was impossible to obtain any testimony from
people up there other than those who were brought down to Port au Prince to
testify, I never proceeded there. I was gone on that trip, I think, about three
days.
Mr. Angell. Did you go to Cape Haitien?
Maj. Dyer. No; I just said I did not.
Mr. Angell. Admiral Knapp made a trip to Cape Haitien about this time,
did he not?
Maj. Dyeb. Yes; he did. .
Mr. Angell. Did he go officially or unofticially for the court of inquiry?
Maj. Dyer. No ; he had nothing to do with the court of inquiry.
Mr. Angell. Any investigations he may have made at that time was, then,
entirely disconnected with the work of the court of inquiry?
Maj. Dyeb. So far as the court was concerned. He may have endeavored,
and, as a matter of fact, I know he did give us several possible leads which we
followed up, but he was not connected with the court of inquiry investigation
any more than any other official down there.
Mr. Anoelu You felt, then, that there was no necessity for the court itself to
go to any other point, in Haiti to hetir possible evidence?
Maj. Dyer. No ; there was no object In the court going to a place unless they
knew they were going to get some testimony there.
Mr. Angetx. And you felt that your trip or trips had covered the ground?
Maj. Dyeb. That, and in connection with the correspondence that I had and
the interviews. In other words, we could not spend a couple of years down
there going from one town to another and putting out advertisements for peo-
ple to come and testify before this court. We could have spent months doing
that, hoping that something might occur, or fearing that something might occur,
but the court stayed there as long as they thought there was any possibility of
getting any testimony in connection with their precept. It might make it a
little more understandable to you if I would state that the Investigation— the
preliminary investigation preceding the hearings before the court and the action
of the court — followed the same lines that would be followed in any United
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INQUntY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 745
States court which had a United States attorney to prepare the cases for the
cpurt.
Mr. Angell. That is as you conceived your function as judge advocate?
MaJ. Dyer. Not only conceived it ; I knew it
Mr. Anoell. In this large volume I have before me, which is or purports to
be the record of the Mayo court of inquiry and in evidence as such, I find on
pages 2 and 3 a list of the names of witnesses. Glancing that over, can you
by refreshing your recollection tell us whether those names Include all the wit-
nesses who appeared before the court?
Maj. Dyeb. No; I can not tell you from recollection. The record will have
to speak for itself.
Mr. Angeix. I will change the form of the question. This, then, is a com-
plete record of the proceedings of the court, so far as you know?
MaJ. Dyeb. The proceedings of the court, not of any of my preliminary Inves-
tigations.
Mr. Angell. The court did not hear as a witness Gen. CatUn, did it?
MaJ. Dyeb. No; Gen. Catlin never claimed to have any knowledge which
would enable him to testify as to any of the acts mentioned In the precept
having been conunltted upon any Haitians.
Mr. Angell. Did you Interview Gen. Gatlln or have any correspondence with
him?
MaJ. Dyeb. No ; I read his reports and his prior statements, and he was not
present on any occasion when any alleged offense was committed.
Mr. Angell. Was it for that reason that others of the higher Marine officers
who had served in Haiti did not appear before the court, such as Gen. Cole,
Gen. Waller, and Col. Williams?
Maj. Dyeb. I do not understand what you mean by that. Appear before the
court for what purpose?
Mr. Angell. In other words, did you make any attempt, and If so, what at-
tempt, to learn from these other Marine officers what knowledge they had, if
any, of acts which would come within the scope of the precept of the court?
Maj. Dyeb. I did.
Mr. Angell. What attempts?
MaJ. Dyeb. I read all the reports and other data on file in the Navy Depart-
ment and headquarters of the Marine Corps before taking up the Investigation —
prior investigations which had been made — and interviewed some of the people
personally.
Mr. Angell. You did not conceive or feel that under the precept of the court
any possible irregularities or abuses of the corvee law came within the scope
of the precept?
Maj. Dyeb. Oh, yes ; If they Involved any one of the acts alleged, any unjusti-
fiable homicide or other serious acts against any of the natives of Haiti or their
property; yes.
Mr. Angell. Did you Interpret the precept of the court, then, to apply only
to specific acts — unlawful acts — on the part of the personnel of the United
States Navy or Marine Corps?
Maj. Dyeb. Yes; It was confined entirely to their acts, not to the acts of
other people — foreigners.
Mr. Angell. And did not involve, under the precept, the question of responsi-
bility, if any, for such acts committed by any persons other than the personnel
of the Navy and Marine Corps?
Maj. Dyeb. It involved inquiry and finding the responsibility in case any^
person of the Navy or Marine Corps was involved, mediately or immediately.
For instance, to Illustrate, if a Haitian committed one of the acts under the
directions of a marine, then the marine would be In part responsible, and we
attempted to fix the responsibility In a case like that, but If It was a case of a
Haitian acting not^under the directions or orders of an American, we did not
attempt to Investigate all those cases ; in other words, the court did not attempt
to substitute Itself for the Haitian courts.
Mr. Anget.l. You did not feel that It came within the purview of the court of
Inquiry to Inquire into the possible question of responsibility of naval or
marine personnel for the Institution, conduct, or a possible general abuse of
the corv6e law?
Maj. Dyeb. Yes ; we did as I explained before.
Mr. Angkli.. Did you hear any stories or rumors of forced labor under the
corv^ law?
Maj. Dyer. All corvee Is forced labor. I heard lots of rumors of It.
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746 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Angell. Did you understand from sources of information which came to
you during your Investigation 'there in Haiti that the corv4e law, as applied
since the occupancy, had been in accordance with the Haitian law, irrespective
of any case of individual abuses?
aiaj. Dyee. I can not answer that question as put, because I thinic it is in-
consistent. The corvte was administered illegally, according to what I heard,
but the illegality consisted of specific instances of not following out the laws.
Mr. Angell. And the specific instances of illegality were cases, were they, of
alleged killings, or particular crimes?
Maj. Dyer. No. They were not alleged killings or particular crimes so much
as they were the abuse of putting people under the corv6e who were not sub-
ject to it at that particular time or place.
Mr. Angell. Did you make any attempt, then, to find who. If any, of the
Navy or marine personnel were responsible for such a state of facts?
Maj. Dyer. Yes. And I found It was the Haitians that were responsible
for it, the Haitian officials.
Mr. Angell. It was the Haitian officials, and not the Navy or marine per-
sonnel ?
Maj. Dyer. Exactly. I am stating now that that was not a judicial deter-
mination, but I could find no evidence that the marines were responsible for
that, and my personal opinion was that other people were responsible for it
and they were the people who administered that law.
Mr. Angell. Could you find any reliable or satisfactory evidence that marine
officers or marines who were officers of the gendarmerie, had knowledge of
such alleged Illegal conditions in their own districts?
Maj. Dyer. Yes. They must have, because they issued orders to correct those
abuses. I know that the chief of the gendarmerie issued orders to try to
correct it, and they employed the method of having colored identification
tickets issued to the men to show that they had performed their work and
were not liable to it again, and so I take it from that that they must have
known there were abuses under it, and were trying to correct them.
Mr. Angell. You say that you could not get ex-Lieut. Spear to appear volun-
tarily before the court?
Maj. Dyer. I wrote and asked him to come, as Judge advocate, but got no
reply, as I recall It, to the letter. I know he did not come.
Mr. Angell. Was that just one letter you sent to him? Was that followed
up at all?
Maj. Dyer. No. It was not followed up at all, because, as I say I had no
authority to compel him to come.
Mr. Angell. Did you make any investigation into the case of Gapt. George
D. Hamilton, who was court-martialed in Haiti?
Maj. Dyer. The records of his court was introduced in evidence before the
court of inquiry.
Mr. Angell. Was there any attempt to get him as a witness before the court,
or any persons who testified at that trial?
Maj. Dyer. You mean to retry that case?
Mr. Angell. No; not to retry the case.
Maj. Dyer. For what purpose?
Mr. Angetx. I am just asking you the question, whether any attempt was
made to get him or any of the witnesses who testified at his trial before the
court?
Maj. Dyer. I do not recall as to any of the other witnesses, but so far as he
was concerned, I made no attempt to get him.
Mr. Angell. What attempt, If any, was made to look Into the case of Lieut
Ryan, who was court-martialed?
Maj. Dyer. There was no attempt made to reopen any case which had been
settled by a court-martial. Our court could have liad no Jurisdiction over a
subject of that kind. The case was closed. We could not retry the man a
second time. We accepted the finding of the court. When it said a man was
guilty, we accepted that as evidence of the fact that the crime had been com-
mitted and that the man had committed It ; and where the man had been ac-
quitted, we accepted the finding of the court that he was not guilty of IL
Mr. Angela It was not within the scope of the Inquiry of this court, was It.
to Inquire Into the general question of the American armed intervention Id
Haiti or the conduct of the occupation, except for specific unlawful acts?
Maj. Dyer. The court, as you will notice from the precept had nothing to do
h the policy there and could not call upon the President to explain why the
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 747
Government adopted any such policy, or the Secretary of State, or the Secre-
tary of the Navy, or any of those people. The precept was not broad enough
to go into that subject.
Mr. Angell. It would not include, for example, the question of the original
intervention in July, 1915, apart always from individual cases of specific abuse
or alleged acts?
Maj. Dyeb. No ; it had nothing to do with the question of policy or the inter-
vention at all.
Mr. Anoell. Or the seizure of the customs, or the new constitution, or any
of those matters?
Maj. Dyeb. No. The precept will speak for itself.
Mr. Angell. I know; but I want to get it in the record, that is all Major,
the scope of the thing.
Did you speak French or Creole, Major, at that time?
Maj. Dyeb. I do not speak Creole at all, and I do not claim to speak French.
Mr. Angell. Did you have to converse with your witnesses who spoke
French through an interpreter?
Maj. Dyer. I used an interpreter, and used several of them. The majority
of the people in Haiti do not speak French, and their dialects are so different
that, for instance, a man can interpret for a native living in Port an Prince
is not necessarily an accurate Interpreter for one living 100 miles away. At
any rate, we had four people interi>reting before the court, to try to find out
what the witnesses really wanted to say. We had one interpreter who was
witli the court all the time, who spoke, read, and wrote French excellently, and
we had several, or one other, who attended all sessions of the court, as a
Creole interpreter. I believe that all the members of the court read, write, and
speak French with some fiuency — I know that Admiral Oliver is an espe-
cially excellent French scholar — so that they were able to follow the witnesses
who used French, with no difficulty, although everything was interpreted.
Mr. Angell. Had you served in Haiti before you were appointed judge advo-
cate of this court?
Maj. Dyeb. No ; I had never been there before.
Mr. Angell. Had you made any special study of Haitian affairs before being
appointed to the court?
Maj. Dyeb. Not any special study. I had been familiar with the general situ-
at on down there, as I followed it, but not what you would call a special study
of Haiti in particular.
Mr. Howe. Is there any further statement that you think you should make,
Major, in order that the committee may have any information that you have
about your investigation and about your conduct of this court?
Maj. Dyeb. No; I have nothing to say, except I believe that a reference to
the record of the court will show that it proceeded intelligently and thoroughly,
and within the scope of its precept.
Mr. Howe. The record of the court is In evidence before this committee, and
it will, of course, with its appendices and exhibits, sx)eak for itself. We were
more particularly interested in hearing from you the practical methods you
pursued in getting that record up.
Maj. Dyeb. I simply want to state that while I do not claim to anything near
perfection as a judge advocate of a court, I have had a good many years' ex-
perience in that kind of work, and I have a legal education and I understand
the duties of a prosecuting officer before a court, and where dissatisfaction was
expressed in regard to our court it was largely through ignorance of the Ameri-
can judicial system. The criticism that was most frequently made was that
the court would not accept hearsay testimony, and I explained to the people,
among others being one or two Americans down there, that that was a rule
followed in all United States courts, and that we had exactly the same rules
that the Federal courts of the United States follow, and we only accepted hear-
say when it fell under one of the regular exceptions to the genral rule.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned until Tuesday, November 15, 1921, at
10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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Digitized by VjOOQIC
INQUIRY LNTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
TUESDAY, NOVEMBEB 15, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D, C,
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment, Senator
Tasker L. Oddie presiding.
Present: Senators McCormick (chairman) and Oddie.
Also present: Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and Maj. Edwin
N. McClellan, United States Marine Corps.
STATEMENT OF MB. BICHABD E. FOBBEST, BYE, K. Y.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Forrest, will you give your name and present address to the
reporter?
Mr. Forrest. Richard E. Forrest, Rye, N. Y.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Forrest, you are a graduate of Yale, are you not, of the class
of 18d9?
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
Mr. Howe. You have had experience In the Philippines and Haiti. Before
you went to the Philippines, what was your occupation?
Mr. Forrest. I was in financial work, in what is known as Wall Street, first
with a large bond house there, and then with my own firm, and from that work
I went into the financing of a very large company in the Philippines, which
to-day is the largest producer of coconut oil under the American fiag. We
developed a very large industry there, and during the war were practically,
or pretty nearly, the largest shippers of coconut oil into the United States.
Mr. Howe. In addition to the financing of that company in the Philippines,
did you take an active hand in the development work there, and in the direction
of its affairs in the Philippines?
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Did you go to the Philippines?
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
Mr. Howe. How long were you In the Philippines ; I mean from the time you
went until the time you came away?
Mr. Forrest. About three months. That was in 1915, after this company had
gotten under way, and then, after that, I was in charge of certain branches
of the company's work, as its vice president, in New York.
Mr. Howe. When did you cease to be the vice president of that company?
Mr. Forrest. In January, 1918.
Mr. Howe. That company Is still doing business?
Mr. Forrest. Yes'; a very large business.
Mr. Howe. Did you have anything to do with the Philippine Society?
Mr. Forrest. Yes ; in 1912 the questions which arose in regard to the political
situation in the Philippines were of considerable moment, and those who were
commercially interested in the Philippines banded together to endeavor to
work out condittions which might help their interests in the Philippines, Into
the Philippine Society. I had talked with Mr. Taft and Gen. Wood, and Mr.
Cameron Forbes, and others who had had to do with the development, politically
and industrially, and so on, in the Philippines, and under their advice we
organized the Philippine Society with myself as secretary, and I was the
moving factor in the work of that society for upward of three years.
Mr. Howe. So it is fair to infer that you made a study of conditions in the
Philippines, and the relations between our country and the Philippines?
749
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750 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. FoBBEST. Yes.
Mr. Howe. When you left the company in the Philippines, with whidi you
were connected, did some of your associates leave at the same time with you?
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
Mr. Howe. That Is in stock ownership?
Mr. Forrest. Those who had been interested in the company by me retired
at the same time I did.
Mr. Howe. Then there was a prompt transition, was there not, from there
to Haiti in association with the same people?
Mr. Forrest. Yes; in association with the same people.
Mr. Howe. What was your project in Haiti?
Mr. Forrest. It started by taking a contract from the Aircraft Bureau to
produce castor beans in Haiti, from which castor oil would be made for avia-
tion. We were given a contract which was in the nature of an exclusive con-
tract for the production of castor beans, and subsequently, by the fact that
we were asked to enlarge our contract, our production, we were* led to believe
that we would have the exclusive right for the imi)ortation of castor beans
from Haiti.
Mr. Howe. About when was that?
Mr. Forrest The first contract was taken in February, 1918r and the second
contract was takwi in September, 1918.
Mr Howe. Will you go ahead now, Mr. Forrest, and outline your business
and development experience in Haiti, giving us an idea as to how much time
you spent there, whether or not you were interested in other projects when
you were not actually in Haiti, and, in general, give the committee an idea
as to what your opportunities for observation were?
Mr. Forrest. We organized our company, which was known as the United
West Indies Corporation, with myself as president, in Februarj', 1918. In
March I went to Haiti and spent about two months. We devoted ourselves to
the production of castor beans and the production of castor beans for the Gov-
ernment until December, 1918, about a month after the armistice was declared.
I Vkrent again to Haiti in January, 1919, and spent about three and a haUi
months in order to develop plans for the production of long-staple cotton.
Then we devoted ourselves to this cotton industry until Nvember. 1920, during?
which time I spent, I suppose, an average of from four to five months a year
in Haiti.
That is condensing the whole thing. I do not think it Is necessary to give
the details.
Mr. Howe. No ; it is not. We just want an idea as to what your general
experience was.
Mr. Forrest. And during all of that time, until May, 1921 » I devoted myself
entirely to the work of the company in Haiti, whether I was in Haiti, or New
York. I did nothing else.
Mr. Howe. What results came from the long-staple cotton project?
Mr. Forrest. We had developed a very large plant on the plain of St MlcbeL
Mr. Howe. About how many acres did you have there?
Mr. Forrest. We had under cultivation there about 2,500 acres, and there
was cotton tJiere on the 10th of November which looked extremely good, and
on the 20th of November we found that practically the whole of that crop had
been attacked by an Infection which apparently is a very unusual thing. I5
fact, there has been no record of that Infection happening at any other place,
except in the Island of St. Vincent some years before. The calamity we met
with in the destruction of that cottion, of course, meant that we were set back
to an experimental stage, and our position now Is that we are experlmentinJj
with sugar and cotton to see what furtJier plans we should adopt
Mr. Howe. Has the company holdings of land outside of the St. Michel dis-
trict?
Mr. Forrest. Yes ; we own, altogether — perhaps It would not be well to pnt
that In the record.
Mr. Howe. I do not think that is necessary on the record.
Mr. Forrest. I will simply say that we have large tracts of land hi other
parts of the country besides St Michel.
Mr. Howe. You forme<l the acquaintance of many Haitians. I take it?
Mr. Forrest. I have been down there very frequently and met them not only
in Haiti but also in New York, and I feel that I have a great many friends
among the Haitian people.
Mr. HowB. Have you also met our treaty officials and marine officers in Haiti?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 751
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
Mr. Howe. What were j'our relations with them? ,
Mr. Forrest. Complete cooi^eration. I have always been treated by the Hai-
tians as if they were glad to have our company there, as if they looked toward
us to help in the agricultural development of Hati, and we have endeavored
on our side to help them in giving them the benefit of our exi)erts which we
sent down there, and further in actually taking up to our plantation certain
members of the agricultural schools to instruct them in the work that we were
doing, which of course was done without any cost.
Mr. Howe. You expect to be in the United States for the next few mouths,
do you not?
Mr. Forrest. I do.
Mr. Howe. The committee expects to go to Haiti, Mr. Forrest, starting In
about a week and coming back in about a month after that. Its time for hear-
ings is at present limited, although the committee wants all the Information it
can get. Do you believe that we could have the benefit of your information
again on the committee's return to this country?
Mr. Forrest. I should be very glad indeed to do anything I can to assist in
this very important question, either now or when the committee comes back.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Forrest has had great oppoitunlt es for ob-
servation down there, I learn, and it would be impossible in the time at our
disposal now to go into these matters in any great detail, but there are a few
matters that I think he could touch on at the present t me, and with your per-
mission I am going to lead him up to those matters and then get his free com-
ment on them, but I am not going into an exhaustive examination.
Senator Oddie. That can be Uiken up later.
Mr. Howe. Is agriculture an easy matter down there In Hat', or do you
always have to be on the lookout for plant blights in cotton or in other crops?
Mr. Forrest. Tlie conditions which make for tlie prospect of agricultural suc-
cess in a country like Haiti also make for very dec ded dangers as to crop de-
struction. Where you have conditions which favor very rapid growth of plants
you also have conditions which favor the rapid growth of things whch will
destroy the plants. If we were ever to have the boll weevil in Haiti, it would
be very difficult to ever get any cotton (mt of Halt!, bei'ause there would be
nothing in Haiti to destroy the boll weevil as there is in this country where
the winters come along and retard their production. If you have army worms
to destroy the plants, you are going to have a tremendous number of them de-
veloping in a very short time. In agricultural production in Haiti, or in fact
anywhere in the Tropics, the risks that are taken are not only on account of
the rapid development of destructive influences but also the risks of transporta-
tion and all the difficulties of organizaticm on the ground. To sum that up, I
should consider that the profits fronr agriculture In Haaiti would be very large
and the r'sks also very great.
Mr. RowE. You have had an opportunity since you went to Haiti early in
1918 to observe the results or accomplishments of the American occupation
there. Will you please compare those results, not with what the conditions
were before the American occupation began, because, as I understand it, you
would have no direct knowledge of them; but compare them, please, with the
obligations assumed by the United States in its treaty with Haiti, the treaty
of 1915?
Mr. Forrest. I have the treaty, what is called the convention, here with me,
and }f I may be permitted to just read the first article of that treaty, it says :
"The Government of the United States will, by its good offices, aid the
Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of its agricultural,
mineral, and commercial resources, and in the establishment of the finances of
Haiti on a firm and solid basis."
That is a point of the convention which, it seems to me, is the most impor-
tant point to be considered in regard to the questions which this commit ee has
to consider. It si)eaks of the efficient development of agricultural, mineral,
and commercial resources, and the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a
firm and solid basis. If we look back to the time when we made this conven-
tion in 1915, and consider the progress which has been made during four years
and a half, we have to admit that the progress has not been at all satisfactory.
In my opinion, to-day the agricultural and commercial resources of the
country, while somewhat improved on account of the establishment of law and
order, still have not been at all commensurate with what both the Haitians
and the American business men who are interested in Haiti had a right to
expect from the words of this convention. ^^.^.^^^ ^^ GoOglc
752 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Of course, the European war bas had to do with the retarding of this pro-
gram, but, nevertheless, it seems to me that the chances are that when this con-
vention was made the people of Haiti had a right to believe that they were
going to be lifted up into prosperity, and looked to the United States to belp
them in that. I regret to say that, in my opinion, the United States has not
lived up to that faith which they gave the Haitians. And I consider that the
feeling of disappointment and the indefinite policy on the part of the United
States, and also on the part of the Haitian Government, has caused a great
deal of friction, and has brought about a weakening of confidence on both
sides. I think, if we look at that, as the basic situation with regard to the
condition of Haiti to-day, we have got the main cause of the difficulties which
exist
Mr. Howe. Tou stress what you term the disappointing results of the Ameri-
can occupation in bringing about financial stability. What is needed?
Mr. Forrest. First, I should say that there was needed a definite policy on
the part of the United States Government as to how the Government of Haiti
can be established on such a basis that 'friction between the Haitians and the
representatives of the United States Government can be entirely done away
with, to the end that the words of this article may be adhered to, and after a
firm policy of government has been established, capital will be encouraged to
go into Haiti. We all know that capital is extremely timid, and we also know
that if there are indications of governmental friction capital will not allow
itself to beconte subject to the exigencies of a continual series of political
misunderstandings. ^
Mr. Howe. To go back a minute to the material evidence of our occupation,
what about the establishment of law and order? Has that been well done,
or not?
Mr. Forrest. I consider that the work which has been done In establishing
law and order in Haiti has been truly remarkable. The geographical formation
of the country is Rich that to the person who sees these mountains and Im-
passable districts It would seem quite impossible to ever preserve law and
order throughout the country. The efficiency with which the marines hare
handled that is, I think, truly remarkable and very much to their credit
Mr. Howe. What have you to say, Mr. Forrest, as to the development of
roads and communications?
Mr. Forrest. I can not give the details. It is not perhaps, expected by the
committee that I, a layman, would give the details as to what the roads were
and how much had been constructed and what the expense had been.
Mr. Howe. Well, we knew from testimony which has been given to us here
that between 400 and 500 miles of roads of various classes were reconstrocted
or constructed under the supervision of our military or naval authorities— our
marines — down in Haiti. How good has that work been, how useful, and what
purposes has It served? Let me ask you a question suggested by the testimony
which the committee alrea<ly has. In your opinion, were these roads located
on a plan which would do the most for the commercial development of the
country or, in your opinion, does the plan of reconstructed roads indicate
military ctmslderations as being better wrved by the roads as they were
laid out?
Mr. Forrest. It is very difficult to discriminate between the value of a road
for commercial purposes and for military purposes, except where the location
of a road would be such that there would be no economic value whatever.
The road from Ennery to Linihe Is purely a military road, for the reason that
the agricultural products of the Gonaives Valley and of the Ennery Valley
would naturally go to Gonaives for export, and on the north side the agri-
cultural products of the Plain du Nord would naturally go to the seaports
of the north coast ; therefore the most expensive, you might say the spectacular
part, of that road is purely a military road, because it leads over the moun-
tains, where there are no agricultural developments whatever and probaWy
never could be.
Mr. Howe. Is there on either end of that road a district which could be
economically served to other outlets, to outlets on the sea?
Mr. Forrest. Yes; but the building of the roads across the country can not
have anything to do with the handling of the economic products of the country,
because they would not go over the mountains.
Mr. Howe. They would not go to the sea?
Mr. Forrest. They would not go to the sea, but entirely in this direction
Instead of over the mountains the other way. I speak of that particular road
because I think that is the most spectacular road in Haiti. GooqIp
INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 753
0
Another road on which I came to the same conclusion is the road from Pont
Bed to Mirebelals, which has no economic value whatever, and must have
been built in order to allow good access Into the heart of the country, w^here
the so-called Cacos were operating.
A third road is the road from Ennery to the St. Michel plain. In the
building of this road it must be remembered that the headquarters of the
Charlemagne Insurrection were in the mountains surrounding the plains of
St. Michel, and the construction of that road into the St. Michel plain was
undoubteiUy one of the moans of eliminiiting the Charlemagne rebellion, for
the reason that it could be approached from the south and also from the north.
The road from Miragoane to Jacmel is also purely a military road, for the
reason that the products of Miragoane are on the shore, and the products of
Jacmel are also on the shore, but those three roads are very spectacularly
built, and, in my oipnion, are purely military roads.
Now, in order to facilitate military operations, It was really necessary to
improve the condition of the roads which were already in Haiti. Whether you
would say that the improvement of the road to Croix Des Boquets and to
Leogane, and into the Gonalves district would be due to economic developement is
also doubtful, because it must be remembered that the products of Haiti are
carried by burro and oxcart, and can be carried over a road which is not what is
known as an automobile road. It Is perfectly true that the economic adx'antages
of good roads have been very remarkable In Haiti, and I believe that the market
people of Haiti recognize the fact that to-day they can transport their products
three times as far with the same effort as they could before these good roads
were built.
Mr. Howe. Let me Interrupt there to ask if you think there was any benefit
in building that road you mentioned over the mountains, in making it possible
for the people of one part of the country to mingle with and meet the people of
another part of the country?
Mr. Forrest. I believe that political stability and the progress of the
intelligence of the country people is dependent upon communication, Just as
we know in China, or any other country, that you can not have a civilized,
intelligent people who are separated from each other by Impassable conditions
of the country.
Mr. Howe. So that might be an incidental good from that piece of road
building?
Mr. Forrest. Absolutely. The comnmnication has been tremendously im-
proved during the American occupation.
Mr. Howe. And that has brought forth greatly bettered conditions?
Mr. Forrest. A great deal better living conditions, and a decided advancement
in the people of the outlying districts.
Mr. Howe. In other words, you would not call that work wasted work?
Mr. Forrest. No, I should not.
Mr. Howe. But If the plan had been purely for the economic development of
the country at the earliest possible date, would you have devised a different
road system?
Mr. Forrest. Entirely — I do not mean entirely, but I would have supplemented
the construction of these Important military roads over the mountains, which
presumably were the most expensive part of the program.
Mr. Howe. What would be the central theory of a system of roads for the
economic development of the country?.
Mr. Forrest. The proper construction of roads in the three large agricultural
plains of Haiti ; first, the Cul de Sac ; second, the Plaine du Nord ; and third ;
the plain of St Michel.
Mr. Howe. And an outlet from those regions to what point?
Mr. Forrest. To the sea coast.
Mr. Howe. And then, after that, I take it you would be ready to link up these
different plains, but your first avenue of tran.sportation would l)e to the sea,
is that correct?
Mr. Forrest. Correct.
Mr. Howe. How much of that has been done, giving these regions direct ac-
cess to the sea over roads?
Mr. Forrest. That is a difiicult question to answer, because it involves a
knowledge of all of the little roadways that go through those districts.
Mr. Howe. I do not think It is going to be beneficial at this time to have a
detailed answer to that, Mr. Forrest?
Mr. Forrest. I should say there has been considerable improvement in the
facilities for transporting products to the markets and to the seacoast. _
754 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Would you say that consldernble improvement remains yet to tie
done? •
Mr. FoBKEST. A preat deal remains yet to be done; yes.
Mr. Howe. What about sanitary conditions?
Mr. FoBREST. Sanitary conditions In the towns have shown remarkable prog-
ress. It used to be such that when ships passed by Port au Prince without even
stopping there, they knew^ that the sanitary conditions of Port au Prince were
bad, because of the wind, which would carry the odors to them. To-day the
towns, the large towns of Haiti are in an excellent sanitary condition, tuul this
has been brought about by the expenditure of comparatively little funds.
Mr. Howe. By what agency?
Mr. Forrest. By the sanitary engineer of Haiti, assisted by the loc*al Haitian
magistrats and chefs de section, through the old rural police.
Mr. Howe. Have the gendarmerie or the marine connnanders had any hand
in that improvement?
Mr. Forrest. Yes; where the towns were under the conmuind of the ?en-
darmerie and the marines, the sanitary conditions were entirely in the control
of those officers, and they are directly responsible for the Improvement that has
taken place in those towns.
Mr. Howe. Has progress in sanitation, then, been worth while?
Mr. Forrest. Not only worth while, but truly remarkable.
Mr. Howe. I suppo.se there Is still more to be done along those lines?
Mr. Forrest. Ye^s; I should say that there was In a great many instatn-es,
but to-day 1 consider that Haiti is a very healthy place to live.
Mr. Howe. What changes has the occupation brought alH)Ut in education in
Haiti?
Mr. Forrest. The education has been improved by the Improvement, of ttmrse,
in the conditions of law and order. There are more children g(»lng to scluwl
now than there were when we first went Into Haiti, but the progress could not
l)e called satisfactory, in my opinicm. Whether this Is due to the fact that when
we went Into Haiti there was no school organization of a .satisfactory character
from which to build up, or whether It is due to the lack of finances or funds
to carry on a proper organization of an educational development, is the ques-
tion. My own idea is that the pro8i)ects for educat:onal development in Haiti
would not be bad if funds could be provided and a projjer educational bureau,
with funds at Its command, established.
Mr. Howe. How long would it be before you could have teachers In .sufficient
numbers?
Mr. Forrest. I believe It would be a long time.
Mr. How}. Would you have to train your ow^n?
Mr. Forrest. You would.
Mr. Howe. What, then, is necessary for the carrying out of any educational
system there, would be sufficient funds and sufficient time?
Mr. Forrest. Sufficient time to provide an organization. I can not give you
the details of the number of (rhildren that are at school, but I would say it is
really very small compare<l to the size and iK)pulatlon of the country.
Mr. Howe. What has been effected in the way of Improvement of ajrri-
culture?
Mr. Forrest. I feel that the improvement in agriculture has l)een develojied
by the work of companies which have starte<l there in the last three or four
years, but that the results, as far as econondc progress of the country is con-
cerned, s to-day not of any consideration.
Mr. Howe. What is needed in order to make progress In agriculture?
Mr. Forrest. The first thing that is needed is the clearing u\i of the land
situation In Haiti. It is not feas ble for i)eople to start to develop lands
when they do not know who owns the land, and that Is a subject which the
committee will probably go into at length.
The second thing is intelligence of management and organization, and the
third thing Is the providing of equipment, and the fourth thing, of course, is a
market for the products.
The land situation is a very difficult one to solve in Haiti. The organizations
to-day down tliere who are in agriculture are comparatively few, and I think
it will take a considerable time before Haiti really starts to get on a good
footing In agriculture unless the finances of the country encourage tlie invest-
ment of proper capital down there.
Mr. Howe. Here again is a feature of development requiring capital?
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 755
Mr. Howe. So far you have made that comment on education, that It requres
money, and on roads or transiK)rtation, that that requires money and capital,
and now on agriculture. Would you deem irrigation projects as another matter
which requires capital and which i)r()jects themselves are necessary to a better-
ment of conditions in Haiti?
Mr. Forrest. I should say irrigation was a part of the equipment o'f a plan-
tation, and therefore comes under the heading that I spoke of. It is just as
much equipment as buildings or anything else which has to do with the im-
provement of soil conditions. I consider that in any agricultural operation
in Haiti a large Investment of capital would absolutely require irrigation.
Mr. Howe. The reclamation of land would also require irrigation, is that
correct?
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
Mr. Howe. So an rrlgatlon system would be an indispensable prerequisite to
new agricultural projects In Haiti?
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
Mr. Howe. The development of new lands?
Mr. Forrest. You say new? I should say large agricultural developments
in Haiti. There are a great many things that are produced that require no
irrigation, but the important things in Haiti, such as sugar and cotton, should
have Irrigation. Of course, we deal with coffee and cocoa, and things of that
kind. They do not require irrigation, but the important development In Haiti ie
in sugar, and Irrigation Is necessary for that, but not for cotton, because there
are districts in Haiti where cotton could be grown without Irrigation.
Mr. Howe. What has been done toward the restoration of irrigation systems
and the development of new irrigation systems by the forces of our occupation?
Mr. Forrest. In 1919 an irrigation expert was employed by the engineer of
Haiti to come down there and report on a complete system for the Irrigation
work of the Cul de Sac. He made a full and complete report, whichi is on
file. As I understand it, nothing has been done further with regard to that
plan, on account of the lack of funds, but it has been seriously considered In
Haiti ever since we have been down there that a proper Irrigation development
was necessar>\
I may say in this connection that there have been plenty of revisions of the
irrigation faws of Haiti for some time past, and that the difficulties in th«^
revision are very great, due to the uncertainty again of land ownership. It
all comes down to the same thing. If a man is not sure as to who owns the
land, he is not so much interested in how he Is gong to put water on the
land. Whereas In a great many Instances of Irrigation that has been carried
on for a good many years the ownership of the water Is established, still,
with the situation In Haiti with regard to land titles as It is to-<lay. the land
title situation is linked up with an irrigation system. For instance, if you
are going to put in an irr'gaton system, and then put a tax on the lands which
are benefited by the irrigation, the question is who is going to pay the tax —
who owns the land?
Mr. Howe. And that is a question on which there is uncertainty In Haiti?
Mr. Forrest. On which there is and always has been and will be until some
system of land surveys can be put In, and the owTiershlp of land established.
The irrigation projects and the land title situation are linked up together, in
my opinion.
Mr. Howe. In your opinion, what should be the main channels of exi)endi-
ture of the funds of the Haitian Government?
Mr. Forrest. The object of Investing any money In Haiti would be to get
back as quickly as possible a return on the Investment
With the land situation as It Is to-day. It Is Impractical to place a land tax
In Haiti, therefore I think that the thing that would yield the quickest rev-
enue to the country, and also clear up all of these other Indefinite projects
which are so necessary, would be the establishment of a proper system of lan<l
titles, which means of course, a Government survey, and, after that, the estab-
lishment of land titles; In other words, the establishment of a proper bureau
of lands, as we had In the Philippines. The Torrens system has worked out
extremely well In the Philippines, and I think it might work well In Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Then you think that the existence of land surveys and Govern-
ment machinery and the bureaus for the administration of land titles would
be an appropriate expenditure of Government funds?
Mr. Forrest. I believe so, and not only appropriate, but would tend also to
clear up a great many of the difficulties which have to be met now.
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756 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. What else would you spend Government money on?
Mr. Forrest. I should say that the second thing would be the proper educa-
tional progress of the country. I do not believe the country can progress as
rapidly as it should, without having the educational system very much im-
proved.
Mr. Howe. WTiat visible results would you expect from a better education
of the Haitians?
Mr. Forrest. The whole welfare of the people would be greatly benefited.
It would result in the development of a middle class in Haiti, which 1 think
we can not say we have at the present time. It would tend to harmonize the
political situation. I thlnls the beneflts of education, of course, could be dis-
cussed at quite a length but not necessarily here.
Mr. Howe. But it would be a direct and importnnt benefit to Haiti?
Mr. Forrest. It would l)e a direct and important benefit to the situation.
Mr. Howe. What else would you si)end Government funds on?
Mr. Forrest. Haiti is decidelly an agricultural country, and the most im-
jiortant factor in the development of agriculture is the handling on an economic
basis of the products of the country. Wherever you are going into an Industry
which deals with things in bullf. the cost of transportation is a very important
item in the proper conduct of the business. It applies esi>ecially to sugar and
to cotton, and I think practically everything Haiti would produce, I shonld,
therefore, say that the ability to get the protiucts to a market at the lowest cost
would be the next thing to handle anvi consider, and therefore, that the proper
development of the road system which would go through all of the agricultural
districts of Haiti, would be the next most important thing, by opening up those
districts and also increasing the security of those who are going into agriculture,
and also improving the intelligence of the farmers of Haiti.
Mr. Howe. Then, from what you say, I would gather that not only private
enterprise but the Government of Haiti now needs capital and financing; is that
correct ?
Mr. Forrest. That I consider to be most important.
Mr. Howe. And if that should be accomplished would you look for satisfacioiy
progress and would you expect satisfactory progress along the lines of the de-
velopment of the country and the proper development of Government institu-
tions?
Mr. Forrest. I think it would be the first step in the satisfactory progress of
both the Government and ec^ononiic development.
Mr. Howe. Would you consider that the negotiation of a loan was one of the
duties and obligations which the United States Government assumed when it
entered into that treaty?
Mr. Forrest. I think that is implied in this convention without any doubt, and
I know that the sentiment in Haiti, or the feeling in Haiti, was one of absolute
confidence that as soon as this conventi<m was signed they would be provided
with the funds, because it says here, " The Republic of Haiti, desiring to remedy
the present conditions of its revenues nnd finances."
The Chairman. Do you think that the American Government has been delin-
quent by reason of its delay in making this loan?
Mr. Forrest. I consider that the American Government has not lived up to
the terms of this convention, as generally interpreted by the Haitian people.
The Chairman. Apart from the interpretation of the Haitian people, in your
own judgment, do you think our Government, as a matter of policy, has erred hi
I)Ostponing until this time the negotiation of a loan?
Mr. Forrest. I think so. ^^/w^nnn
The Chairman. Let me ask you further: The authorized issue is $40,000,000.
It will take some $14,000,000, in round numbers, to pay the French debt, and that
on very advantageous terms, I think, to satisfy the local claims and refund the
internal debt. That will leave somewhere between $1,000,000 and $2,000000
free for expenditure on public work in Haiti. Do you think that sum is adequate
at this time?
Mr. Forrest. I should say it was pitiably inadequate.
The Chairman. Do you believe that even at the high cost of money the Gov-
ernment would have done better to borrow $5,000,000 more?
Mr. Forrest. I am confident that it would ; yes.
The (^HAiRMAN. I ask that because, at 6 per cent, which Is the rate borne by
the loan ultimately and permanently, apparently the market for the bonds stays
around 85, iind naturally the conservators of Haitian credit are indisposed to
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 757
make^ great borrowings at this discount. Nevertheless, you believe that, despite
the discount, it would have been better to haw borrowed $6,000,000 mere, let us
say, now% in order to carry out energetically the program of public works?
Mr. Forrest. Senator, I feel that anyone who would think that they should
delay in the borrowing of $5,000,000 at the present time, even if they paid such
a high rate as you say, could not have the proper confidence as to what that in-
vestment means in Haiti. In other words, if we consider that this loan means an
investment in Haiti for the improvement of Haiti, the more money that is put
in there up to a certain limit will bring back more return, because those of us
who believe in Haiti
The Chairman. Well, more money put in, and the sooner the better?
Mr. Forrest. The sooner the lietter, because those of us who believe in the
future of Haiti believe that we would not invest capital in Haiti if we would
only get 9 or 10 per cent out of it We believe that the prospects for invest-
ment of capital in Haiti are far in excess of 10 per cent, and what applies to
♦he investment of private capital in Haiti would also apply directly to the
investment of public funds in Haiti.
Now, as I have just explaiue<l, the most imiwrtant thing in Haiti at the
present time is the settling of the land situation, and until that is done
The Chairman. By that you mean the clarification of titles?
Mr. Forrest. Yes; and until that is done I do not think you can start any
proper economic development of Haiti, and that will take a great deal more
money than the Senator has said would be available right there, in my estima-
tion.
Mr. Howe. W^ell, how about the negotiation of a loan, or the settlement of
land titles when the relations of this country in Haiti are, as you have called
them, indefinite? Can you obtain that loan or settle your land titles as long
as those relations are indefinite?
Mr. Forrest. I think that capital, ordinarily being extremely timid, would
hestitate to invest in a country where the political program or policy, we will
say, was in any way indefinite, and that it would be essential to obtaining the
proi)er confidence of the peoi)le who have the capital that they should know
what the political conditions are in the country in which that capital is investe<i.
Mr. Howe. And what they are likely to be?
Mr. Forrest. And what they are likely to be.
Mr. Howe. How far can you go in the development of the country by private
capital, or in assisting the Haitian Government along progressive lines, or lines
of x^rogress, without the confidence of the Haitian people?
Mr. Forrest. I do not believe that any project can succeed in a country which
has not the sympathy of the iKn)ple of the country. I think that the sympathy
which I have gotten myself from friends in Haiti can be easily obtained by
the representatives of the United States, once the program of a political policy
has been determined. I believe the Haitians will cooperate. I think that it is
essential in any agricultural development of a country to have, further, more
than cooperation, almost a partnership with tiie people of that country. I
think that is essential, and I believe that can be done in Haiti. ,
Mr. Howe. In other words, the agricultural development of Haiti would
carry with it necessarily benefits to the Haitians?
Mr. Forrest. Yes; and I think that the Haitians, who are extremely sensi-
tive now on account of what has happened since this convention was made —
I think that their confidence could be obtained.
Mr. Howe. By what steps?
Mr. Forrest. First, by a development of policy which would show that their
interests are properly safeguarded, and by a general cooperation between those
who go down into Haiti to invest their money and those
The Chairman. Has our (Tovernment had any policy in Haiti since it went
In there?
Mr. Forrest. I should say no; I think things have he(m allowed to drift.
The Chairman. Has there been any resj)onsible American ofticlal to whom
all Americans, either in the service of the Haitian Governnieut or in the service
of the Government of the Uniteil States, could be held responsible?
Mr. Forrest. No ; there has not l>een, because the authority has been undefined
as to the standing of treaty officials, and as to the:r standing in their relations
with the Haitian Government. There has been a confusion of authority which
has deprivwl those who are in Haiti of confidence as to just what the Govern-
ment of Haiti was, and where the resi)onsibility lay, a problem that we all know.
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758 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Chairman. Let me ask you, Mr. Forrest, to consider again for a moment
the problem of a loan. The treaty was proclaimed in May, 1915. and runs for
a period of 10 years, and may be extended for a perod of 10 years, so that it
will expire automatically, unless further renewed, in 1936. The period for
which the proposed loan of $40,000,000 is to be made is 30 years.
Mr. Forrest. So I understood ; yes.
The Chairman. Therefore, the treaty will expire at the end of 15 years,
although the loan runs for 30 years. Let me ask you If you find in the eightli
article of the protocol, and especially in the following language, adequate se-
curity for the loan :
"And It is further agreed that the control by an officer or officers duly ap-
pointed by the President of Haiti, upon denomination of the President of the
United States, for the collection and allocation of the hypothecated revenues
will be provided for during the life of this loan, after the expiration of the
aforesaid treaty, so as to make certain that adequate provision be made for the
amortization and interest on the loan."
I ask that question because I am disposed to believe that the rate of interest
borne by the loan and the ability of the underwriters to place the bonds turns
largely upon the interpretation of that provison of the protocol?
Mr. Forrest. Well, I think you have answerefl the question yourself, Senator.
I believe that if I was one of a syndicate which was going to take up this loan,
that I would try to make the loan as good as po.ssible.
The Chairman. Well, under that language, is it good enough? '
Mr. Forrest. Well, I could not answer that question, because I am not suffi-
ciently in touch with the investment market to know how the people would feel
in taking that loan, under those conditions.
The Chairman. Let me ask the question in another way : Does the languaj?e
imply to you that for the service of the external debt proposed to be created,
the receivership under control of officers appointed by the President of the
Tn'ted States will continue until the service of the debt is complete, and the
loan is paid?
Mr. Forrest. I should say that 15 years was too short a t'me.
The Chairman. That is not tlie question I am asking. I am asking if this
means that the receivership will continue for a subsequent 15 years?
Mr. Forrest. I should say yes.
The Chairman. After the expiration of the treaty?
Mr. Forrest. Yes; I do not believe that Haiti could recover into a proper
condition in 15 years.
The Chairman. Do you believe that she is bound by the terms of the protocol,
whether she recovers or not, to agree to the appointment of a rece'.ver by the
President of the United States?
Mr. Forrest. I should say that she was : yes.
Mr. Howe. How much progress can be made until the loan is a fact?
Mr. Forrest. Under the present world conditions, I should say almost no
progress.
Mr. Howe. Can the lean be a fact until the uncertainty of the relations of this
country and of Haiti is turned into as great a certainty as possible?
Mr. Forrest. Well, that depends on the conditions, the chances which those
who are subscribing to the loan are willing to take. It is not possible for me
to say whether people are going to buy those bonds under the present condi-
tions or not, but there is no doubt that there would be more chance of it
Mr. Howe. The greater the certainty, the greater the chances of a loan?
Mr. Forrest. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Is there anything more, Mr. Forrest, that you would like to add
which you think the committee should hear from you?
Mr. Forrest. No; I think that as the committee is going to Haiti, they will
perhaps absorb more information, or so much information that anything I
might say now further would be sui:)erfluous. but I would be very glad to hold
m.vself available for the c^ommittee on their return.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, I have now called the last witness which the com-
mittee has in mind to call before its departure for Haiti, unless the plan can be
materially changed, with the exception perhaps of a short time with Col
Williams to complete his cross-examination, and I therefore now propose to the
committee that Capt. Angell be permitted to call his witnesses and conduct the
examination of his own witnesses.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 769
STATEMENT OF MB. MAX ZUCKEBMAN, BOXBUBY, MASS.
Mr. Anqeix. Will you state your name and residence, Mr. Zuckerman?
Mr. ZucKCBMAN. Max Zuckerman, 110 Crawford Street, Roxbury, Mass.
Mr. Anoell. Have you served in tbe United States Marine Corps?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Will you give us the dates of your service?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. From July 6, 1915, up until, I believe, October, 1919.
Mr. Angell. In October, 1919, did you receive an honorable discharge from
tlie Marine Corps?
Bfr. ZuCKEBMAN. I did.
Mr. Angell. Did you serve in Haiti while a member of the Marine Corps?
Mr. ZiTCKEBMAN. Yes.
Mr. Anoei«l. Between what dates?
Mr. Zuckerman. From the 7th of November, 1915, up until the 22d of Oc-
tober. 1918.
BIr. Angell. Where were you on duty with the Marine Corps between the date
of your enlistment and the time you went to Haiti?
Mr. Zuckerman. What is the question?
Mr. Angell. Where did you serve in the Marine Corps between the time of
your enlistment and the time you went to Haiti?
Mr. Zuckerman. I served at Norfolk, and th^i went to Haiti, Cape Haitien,
Port Llberte, and Ouanamlnthe.
Mr. Angell. Where- were you on duty after your return from Haiti?
Mr. Zuckerman. Quantico, Philadelphia and Quantlco.
Mc. Angell. Did you go overseas?
Mr. Zuckerman. I did not.
Mr. Angell. With what units did you serve in Haiti?
Mr. Zuckerman. The Fifteenth Company, and then was transferred to the
headquarters detachment. Second Regiment as acting sergeant major to Col.
GuIIch.
Mr. Howe. Was that what you were during the rest of your time In Haiti?
Mr. Zuckerman. I left Haiti as sergeant major and came back to Phila-
delphia, and then went to Quantlco.
Mr. Howe. And did you ser\e as sergeant major in the headquarters of the
Second Regiment during that time?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes; I was acting sergeant major up until the time I was
made sergeant major at Cape Haltlen.
Mr. Angell. What other officers of the Marine Corps did you serve actively
with and under In Haiti?
Mr. Zuckerman. Capt. Upshur, Col. Gulich, Col. Hooker, Col. Wadlelgh, Col.
Bannon, Col. Bab — that is all I can remember.
Mr. Angell. Gen. Catlln, did you serve with?
Mr. Zuckerman. No, sir.
Mr. Angell. Where did you go when you first landed in Haiti?
Mr. Zuckerman. Fort Liberte.
Mr. Angell. What indications, if any, did you have on going to Fort Llberte
of the general attitude of the Marine forces In Haiti toward the natives?
Mr. Zuckerman. We came down on the Prairie and got aboard a motor boat,
and as we got on the motor boat there were two or three natives, as I remember,
and we got the Impression that these were the men we had to contend with on
the Island.
Mr. Angell. What Impression were you given?
Mr. Zuckerman. Well, ** these are the sons of bitches that you would have
to contend with while you are down here."
Mr. Angell. Who made that remark, if you can remember?
Mr. Zuckerman. The man In charge.
Mr. Angell. Was that an officer?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes ; he was an officer.
Mr. Angell. A Marine officer?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes.
Mr. Angell. You went to Fort Liberte first?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes.
Mr. Angell. What was the nature of your duties there?
Mr. Zuckerman. I was private, attached to the Fifteenth Company.
Mr. Angell. What was the nature of your duties?
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760 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr.. ZucKERif AN. Hiking details, guard duty, etc.
Mr. Anoell. How long were you on duty at Fort Liberte?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. About five months, I believe; four or five months.
Mr. Anoell. Then where did you go?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Then I was assigned to headquarters, and went to Ouana-
minthe as acting sergeant major for Col. Gulich.
Mr. Anoell. How long were you at Ouanaminthe?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. I was at Ouanaminthe for about a year, I guess.
Mr. Anoell. Then where were you transferred to?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Back to Cape Haitien.
Mr. Anoell. In what capacity were you there?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. As acting sergeant major of the regiment.
Mr. Anoell. Did you remain at Cape Haitien the rest of your time?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Until I was ordered back to the United States.
Mr. Anoell. Did you ever serve in the gendarmerie?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I did.
Mr. Anoell. Where?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Ouauamlnthe.
Mr. Anoell. In what capacity?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Just dctachcd from the Marine Corps to serve with tlie
gendarmerie.
Mr. Anoell. Were you an officer in the gendarmerie?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No ; I was riot.
Mr. Anoell. How long were you at Ouanaminthe in the gendarmerie?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. About seven months.
Mr. Anoell. Did you come in frequent contact with the natives in and
around Ouanaminthe?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I did.
Mr. Anoell. While you were serving in the gendarmerie at Ouanaminthe
were there native prisoners brought In from time to time?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. There was.
Mr. Anoell. What was the general attitude of our forces at Ouanaminthe
toward the natives and how were they treated?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Well, it was an individual attitude. As a unit they were
treated fair, but it was the individual attitude of the different men who were
bringing the prisoners in. They were generally grilled. There was a third
degree. We brought them into the gendarmerie headquarters. The g«idarmerle
would take their prisoners to the gendarmerie headquarters and the marines
would take theirs to the marine headquarters, and they were questioned there
by the captain in charge of the gendarmerie — ^put through a third degree— hi
order to derive answers from them. They had two different treatments there.
One was to gain Information from them by beating them with just — I can not
remember what It was. but it was a long thing filled with sand— and a
gendarmerie would stay there, and if he would not answer just so he wonld
let him have It. Another one was this : They had a stanchion there built ahont
6 feet over the ground, and they just stnmg a rope around him and tied him
there so that his toes would just touch the ground, and if he would not answer
the question he would pull the rope.
Mr. Anoell. Who were those pHsoners?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Brought In by the gendarmeries.
Mr. Anoeli^. Why were they brought in? Were they Cacos in active re-
bellion?
Mr. Ziv^KERMAN. They were brought In to get information as to where the
Cacos were.
Mr. Anoell. How often did you see these methods of treatment of prisoners
which you just described?
Mr. ZuCKERMAN. About twice a week.
Mr. Anoell. Over a period of what length of time?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Durlug my period of duty with the gendarmerie. I just do
not know how long It was. It was five, six, or seven months — something like
that.
Mr. Anoell. Was the information obtained from these men through an inter-
perter or through direct questioning by the offlcers?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Through an interpreter.
Mr. Anoell. Were you yourself actually present to see these methods <rf
treatment?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes.
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Mr. Angell. Did you ever see yourself or know of your own personal knowl-
edge of any Instances of shooting of prisoners?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No.
Mr. Angell. Did you go out on patrol duty or hikes in active operations
against the natives, the Cacos?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. I have often gone cut on h kes, but was ne\'er Jumped by
any of them.
Mr. Angell. On these hikes did your detachment take active operations
against the natives?
Mr. ZucKEBifAN. We did.
Mr. Anoell. What was the nature of those operations?
Mr. Zuckerman. Well, on several hikes out of Ouanaminthe we fired at sev-
eral parties out in the fields supposed to be Oacos.
:.lr. Angell. What were those parties you refer to doing?
Mr. Zuckerman. They were out in the fields there a distance of about a
thousand yards, I should say.
Mr. Angeli^ And doing what?
Mr. ZucKEBifAN. And apparently It was a large plantation there. On two
distinct occasions there was a party of three or four that were fired at, and on
another occasion, just coming over the top of Mount Capitan, we fired at a
IMirt>'.
Mr. Angell. What were these various parties doing at the time? Were they
engaged in operations against your detachment?
Mr. ZrCKEBMAN. Xo.
Mr. Angeix. Were they working on a plantation, or what were they doing?
Mr. Zuckerman. Well, they were quite a distance away. We could not tell
just what they were doing. They appeared to be w^orking on the plantation.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether your firing at them resulted in hitting
them?
Mr. Zuckerman. I really could not say.
Mr. Angell. You could not tell?
Mr. Zuckerman. No.
Mr. Angell. Was there or was there not common talk among the marines of
shooting prisoners, referred to as bumping them off?
Mr. Zuckerman. There was by a certain gendarme lieutenant.
Mr. Angell. Who was he?
Mr. Zuckerman. La vole.
Mr. Angell. Lavoie?
Mr. Zuckerman. Ernest Lavoie.
Mr. Angell. Did you know him personally?
Mr. Zuckerman. I did.
Mr. Angell. Where have you seen him, under what circumstances?
Mr. Zuckerman. Well, I used to see him at Cape Haitien quite often. He
used to come in there. I believe he was stationed at Le Trou, in charge of the
district at Le Trou.
Mr. Angell. Is Le Trou near Hinche?
Mr. Zuckerman. It is quite a distance from Hinche. They operated from
Le Trou up through Hinche. That was before they put a gendarme post at
Hinche.
Mr. Angell. What conversation did you have with Lavoie along those lines?
Mr. Zuckerman. We were all at the French Club one night, a party of five
or six.
Mr. Angell. This was at Cape Haitien?
Mr. Zuckerman. This was at Cape Haitien; and he came in and told us
about bumping off a magistrat, I believe ; that he finally caught him and bumped
him off.
Mr. Angell. Did he give any particulars of this incident?
Mr. Zuckerman. No ; he just happened to pass that remark.
Mr. Angelt* Can you fix the approximate date of this statement by Lavoie?
Mr. Zuckerman. It was either the latter part of A917 or in 1918 ; I just can
not remember ; but I remember distinctly his coming down to the French Club
on this night. He drove in there with his horse and told us this story.
Mr. Angeli.. Did you ever see the corvee in operation?
Mr. Zuckerman. I seen two corvee camps, and I saw them working on the
roads.
Mr. Angell. Where were these camps?
Mr. Zuckerman. One of the roads was from Cape Haitien to Ouanaminthe
and one of the roads from Cape Haitien to Port an Prince. C^r^r\rf]i:>
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Mr. Angeix. How far, approximately, from Cape Haltien were these two
camps?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. One of them was about 12 or 15 miles- and the other one
was about 7 or 8 miles. They worked on the roads, and while building those
roads they helped build the road from €ape Haltien to
Mr. Angell. Will you describe these camps as nearly as you can remember
them?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. In one camp on the road to Ouanamlnthe they hfd them
quartered In these ordinary Haitian huts, and in the other one they had a shed
about the length of this building, and barb wired off.
Mr. Angell. When you say " barb wired off," how do you mean — sorronnded
by barbed wire?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Just the front of It was barbed wired, not the back of It
The back of it was a wooden background and the front of it was barb wired.
Mr. Angell. Did you see the gangs actually at work on the roads?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I bclleve I did ; yes.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether or not you saw the gangs?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I bellcve they were corvee. I saw them working on the road
there building the road — oUt on the road to Port au Prince. They were build-
ing the road there to transport logwood from the interior, and I believe the
corvee system built that road coming out to the Plain du Nord, I believe it
was.
Mr. Angell. Who were In charge of these men you saw working on this
road?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Gendarmes.
Mr. Angell. Were they armed or not?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. They had a gendarme guard there.
Mr. Angell. W^ere they armed?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes.
Mr. Angeli^ How many were in these gangs?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I bclleve 30 or 40 ; sonrething like that
Mr. Angeix. Each gang?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No ; that is the crowd that I saw working, about 30 of
them.
Mr. Angell. What was the general attitude of the enlisted personnel and the
officers of the Marine Corps toward the Haitians?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Well, among the enlisted personnel it was an individnal
attitude. Some of them had no use for the natives and others got along fine
with them.
Mr. Angell. What was the attitude of the natives toward the marines and
the occupation?
. Mr. ZucKERMAN. It varied. When they first went down there it appeared to
be all right, but kind of went after we were there a while.
Mr. Angell. What did it become after you were there a while?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. They got so thoy did not like Cs.
Mr. Angell. Do you know why there was that change In feeling?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Well, as I say, it was individual. The marines would go
out and raise hell with them, and it got to be that they would take the other
side of the street when they would see a marine coming.
Mr. Angell. Will you specify a little more what you mean when you say
the marines would go out and raise hell with them?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. They would go out and break up their furniture In their
houses and beat them up.
Mr. Angell. Did you see such instances?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No ; but several of them were tried by court-martiaL That
is how I know that.
Mr. Angell. Where were these courts-martial held?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. At Cape Haltien.
Mr. Angelu How did you know about these courts-martial?
Mr. ZucKKRMAN. I was sergeant major, and drew the specifications.
Mr. Angefx. Were there convictions In some of these cases?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Tlicrc were.
Mr. Angell. Why did you get out of the gendarmerie?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Well, I requested a transfer to Cape Haltien, and I was
ordered to put a priest under arrest.
Mr. Angell. Where?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. At Ouanamlnthe.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 763
Mr. Angell. Ordered by whom?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. By a enptain of the Marine Corps in charge of the gen-
darmerie.
Mr. Angell. At Ouanaminthe?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. At Ouanaminthe. I was ordered to put this priest under
arrest and there was some stir coming up about it, and when this thing came
up I requested to be transferred baclt to the Marine Corps headquarters.
Mr. Angeix. Why did you request to be transferred baclc?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. I thought some investigation was coming out of it, and I
wanted to get back to duty in headquarters ; I did not want to be on duty with
the gendarmerie.
Mr. Angbix. Why?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Weil, I did not lilse the doings down there at Ouanaminthe;
I did not like the way things were carried out down there ; and I wanted to get
Imck to the Marine Corps.
Mr. Angell. When you say " doings," what do you mean by doings?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. I saw there was going to be some investigation of some sort
coming out of the arrest of this priest, and I did not want to get mixed in
with it.
Mr. Angell. Tell us about the arrest of that priest?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I was sent over to place a priest under arrest, with five
gendarmes.
Mr. Angell. That was at Ouanaminthe?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. That was at Ouanaminthe.
Mr. Angell. Can you fix the date approximately?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No ; I can not.
Mr. ANGELL. During what year?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. 1917.
Mr. ANGELL. In 1917?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes ; I was sent to place this priest under arrest.
Mr. ANGELL. On what ground, do you know?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Well, this priest came over to draw his monthly pay, or
weekly pay, which was disbursed out of the gendarmerie funds, or some sort
of funds, and he came over to get his money and had some kind of a row with
this captain, and the captain ordered him out of the office and sent me over to
place him under arrest.
Mr. Angell. Did you place him under arrest?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Just as I got to the door I was called back, and then I be-
lieve he sent two gendarmes over there to place him under arrest.
Mr. ANGELL. You were called back by whom, the captain?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes.
Mr. Angell. So you did not place the priest under arrest?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No.
Mr. Angell. Was the priest placed under arrest afterwards?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I belicve he was.
Mr. Angell. Do you know whether he was charged with any offense?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I really do not know. There was a radiogram that came
from Port au Prince to release him immediately.
Mr. Angell. Did you see the radiogram?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No ; I Just heard there was a radiogram came from Port au.
Prince to release him.
Mr. ANGELL. Was he released?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. He was.
Mr. Angelu It was shortly after that you requested a transfer?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir .
Mr. ANGELL. And you were transferred back to Cape Haitlen?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Cape Haitien.
Mr. Angell. When you went back to Cape Haitien what was the nature of
your duties as sergeant major?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. I was acting sergeant major to Gen. Gulich.
Mr. Angell. What did you do as sergeant major there?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Office duty.
Mr. Angell. Tell us a little about the nature of those duties?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I>rawing specifications for court-martials, taking care of
all morning reports, binding them, taking care of incoming radiograms, and I
was also acting sergeant of the headquarters detachment, sometimes par
rolls and muster rolls.
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764 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Anoeix. Did you have anything to do with provv«t courts?
Mr, ZucKERMAN. Later on I was made clerk to the provost court
Mr. Anoell. About what time?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. That was the latter part of 1917, I believe, that I was made
clerk to the provost court under Col. Hopkins and Capt. Price.
Mr. Angell. How long were you acting as clerk of the provost court?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. About three or four months.
Mr. Anoell. This was in the latter part of 1917 or in 1918?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. During the latter part of 1917 and Into 1918.
Mr. Anoell. Did you have anything to do with the Haitian funds at Cape
Haitien?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I was bookkeeper for the disbursement of public work
funds.
Mr. Angell. Where did these funds come from?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Port au Prince. They were cabled to us monthly-
allotted to us for certain purposes each month.
Mr. Anoell. For what purposes were th^ expended?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Public work — road work.
Mr. Angell. Anything else?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. That is all I can remember, just road work, I believe.
Mr. Angell. Did the personnel of the Marine Corps draw extra pay while
you were on duty at Cape Haitien?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Men assigned to road work, I believe, drew a dollar a day,
80 days a month.
Mr. Angell. Was that in addition to their regular pay as marines?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. That was in addition to their regular pay as marines.
Mr. Angell. From what source were those payments made, if you know?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I bclleve they were made from the public works office.
The public works officer disbursed those funds.
Mr. Angell. Did you have anything to do with the vouchers for such pay-
ments?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Not with the individual vouchers. We used to draw the
vouchers in bulk. I drew the vouchers, and they were signed by the com-
manding officer, and then they were taken down to the collector of customs and
were turned over to the public works officer — whoever was public works officer
of the town.
Mr. Angell. Did you yourself draw extra pay at any time?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. As clerk of the provost court.
Mr. Angell. How much?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I bclleve it was $^5 a month.
Mr. Angell. From what source was this $25 a month derived?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. From the fines.
Mr. Angell. From the fines paid?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Paid by the prisoners.
Mr. Angell. Were they native prisoners entirely?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Ycs. And I drew, I believe, $12.50 or $25 a month for
handling the books for the Haitian Oovernment
Mr. Angell. Do you know the purposes for which the funds derived from
fines paid to the provost court were used?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I believc there was some office furniture from time to
time bought from the funds, and stationery, etc.
Mr. Angell. What other purposes were these funds derived from fines used
for, if you know?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I bolieve they turned some over to the sisterhood there,
Mr. Angell. Will you tell us about the operation of the provost courts?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. In what respect?
Mr. Angell. Well, what Jurisdiction they exercised, what kinds of offenses
were tried before them?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Well, the offenses were mostly thefts.
Mr. Angell. Thefts by natives?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. By natives.
Mr. Angell. By natives of articles from themselves or the marines, or both?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Both from the marines and from themselves.
Mr. Angell. What were the sentences or fines imposed?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Well, the fines use<l to run from 25 gourdes on up, and the
sentences were from six months on up to about two years.
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Mr. Angell. Can you give ns specific instances of speoiflc fines imposed or
sentences imposed for specific offenses?
Mr. ZucKUBKAN. Well, I Just can not remember the names of any cases, but
there were — I can remember the instance of a native being sentenced to 18
months for the theft of some Marine Corps clothing from some marine attached
to one of the companies up there.
Mr. Anoell. Was it more common to impose fines or to impose sentences?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Well, just about evenly balanced. For theft, I believe they
were sentenced ; for such offenses as carrying arms they were fined.
Mr. Akoell. Did the average amount of the fines imposed vary from time to
time?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes; they did.
Mr. Angeix. Under what circumstances, if you know?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. That I can not say, but they varied from time to time.
Mr. Angeix. Who sat on the provost courts?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. An ofiicer appointed by the commanding officer at the post
was appointed provost Judge, and he decided the cases.
Mr. Anoell. The court, then, was composed of a single Judge?
Mr. ZxrcKERMAN. A single judge.
Mr. Angell. Tell us briefiy what the procedure in those cases was?
Mr. ZncKERMAN. They were brought in, and the witnesses were brought there
and then questioned through an interpreter.
Mr. Angell. Were there written charges?
Mr. ZucKERif AN. We had a blank form that we furnished the brigade com-
mander a copy of.
Mr. Angell. Were the charges on which a man was tried written out in
advance of the trial?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Oral.
Mr. Angell. The charges presented were oral?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Ycs.
Mr. Angell. You say the man was brought in before the Judge?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs.
Mr. Angell. How was the trial conducted?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Well, the prosecuting witness would tell his side of the
story, and then the interpreter would explain it to this native and ask him what
he had to say; and if the provost marshal thought he was guilty, he would
adjudge sentence.
Mr. Angell. Was there any review of these sentences?
Mr. ZUCKEBMA19. They were reviewed by the commanding officer and then
forwarded to the brigade commander.
Mr. Angell. Did the sentence go into effect immediately upon pronouncement
by the presiding judge?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I belleve they had to be' approved by the commanding officer.
Mr. Angell. The local commanding officer?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes ; either him or the brigade commander; I am not Just
sure.
Mr. Angeix. What happened to the man In the meantime, if he was sentenced?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN, He was held at the civil prison.
Mr. Angell. What was the condition of the prison?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Very good.
Mr. Angell. At that time?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. The prison was very, very good.
Mr. Angell. Was the condition sanitary?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Very sanitary.
Mr. Angell. Was the civil prison maintained by and kept in ordef by the
marines or gendarmerie?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. The gendarmerie.
Mr. Angell. Under the marine officers?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Under marines assigned from the Marine Cori>9 — gendarmerie
officers.
Mr. Angell. Would you care to make any comment, based on your experience,
on the relative qualifications of marine officers and men for duty in Haiti under
these conditions between 1015 and the latter part of your tour of duty In 3918?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Well, as I say, as a unit they done very good work (U)wn
-there, but it was the Individual feeling amongst the men. As a unit, they worked
together, but the men got out, and it was just the individual feeling that they
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766 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
had no use for the natives. It was not aU of them ; it was a few here and a few
there. • But, as a unit, the work was generally very good down there.
Mr. Anoell. Is there anything else you would care to say about the relations
of the military forces and the natives?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No.
Mr. Anoell. Did you see service in south Haiti at all?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No. sir.
Mr. Anoell. You were In the north during your entire three years?
Mr. ZrcKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. In the provost courts was there any disposition on the part of the
provost judge to fine the marines that were convicted before him less than the
natives?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. There were no marines convicted before the provost judge.
Mr. Howe. I thought your statement was that they tr'ed cases of thefts by
marines from marines?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No ; it was natives who were tried for thefts, for stealing
from the marines.
Mr. Howe. Were there no written charges against the defendants there in the
provost courts in any cases whatsoever?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. There was. We used to make a written report to the brigade
commander telling him that so and so was tried for so and so, that John Henry
was trle<l for carrying armp, and sentenced as stated, but during my tour as
clerk of the provost court we never had any written charges.
Mr. Howe. You mean there was no written charge presented to the provost
judge, or drawn up by the provost judge during the trial ?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Even in the cases which drew sentences of two years?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. We just had a blank form, and at the end of the trial we
would write the charge in on the typewriter, whatever the charge was, and then
the sentence, a regular blank form.
Mr. Howe. Was the defendant ever infonned before sentence what the charge
was against him?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. That was oral?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. But not in writing?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No, sir. As far as I can remember, we just had this blank
form, and the man's name was put on there, his age and occupation, and then
there was a space for the charge, and we just write the charge In on the t>T)e-
writer.
Mr. Howe. Did you ever know of any sentences by the provost court of more
than two years?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes ; I believe there was one of 5, 10, and 15.
Mr. Howe. You knew of tliose, did you?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs.
Mr. Howe. Were tliey imposed by the court of which you were clerk?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I belleve there was one of five imposed by the court of which
I was clerk, and those over five — there were conmiissloned officers at all of the
provost courts.
Mr. Howe. Then was it your understanding that the provost court which
had only one marine officer as Judge could not impose a sentence of more than
five years?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. That I could not say.
Mr. Howe. Were there some provost courts that had more tlian one officer
sitting as judge at the same time?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir; only at the time, I believe, they tried these men
down there for carrying arms there were three marine officers that sat on that
provost court, and they were sentenced for 15 years, If I remember.
Mr. Howe. Was that a provost .court or a military commission?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I bclieve it was a provost court It may have been a mill*
tary commission. That was after I was relieved as provost clerk.
Mr. Howe. So you do not know anything about that of your own knowledge?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. But just what you heard?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Senator Oddie. Do you know whether many or any of the prisoners brou^t
before the provost court could read or write?
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J^<^XJrRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 767
omf ^^^^^ERMAN. Nine-tenths of them could not. They did not know their
m/»" I have never yet seen any of them that could read or write.
Mr ^^^^ What books did you handle for the Haitian Government?
rpjjg ' f-^CKEBMAN. I handled the public-works books, disbursing the funds.
whom /k^*^^ so much funds for Port au Prince, and I kept the record as to
Mr Br ^^ ^^^^ *^-
Mr Zt^^*^^ ^^^ y^" ^^^ * regular payment for keeping those books?
Mr. ^ ^^EBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Zx^^'^^ Under whose directions did you keep those books?
^r* jj ^iCERMAN. The commanding officer.
Mr.' Zt?^*^- The colonel?
naving tK^^™^^N- Y^» ^^^- They had a Haitian keeping them, and we were
thpm fl^ti^ Haitian, I believe, $60 a month, and I was ordered to take care of
Mr' ^rv -*^ believe I got $12.50 or $25 a month for taking care of them.
viiv ^"^E. Did you get that in a different voucher than your regular pay
^t. Cajckebman. Yes, sir; I got that on a voucher, and that was taken down
to ^^ collector of customs; or to the bank, I think, and I then cashed it in
and made a voucher under my own name for it.
Mr. Howe. You drew that up?
Mr. Zuckebman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ho\^'E. Who signed it?
Mr. Zuckebman. The commanding officer had to sign it
Mr. Howe. Whence came your compensation as clerk of the provost court?
Did you get that on your pay roll?
Mr. Zuckebman. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Who signed the voucher there?
Mr. Zuckebman. There was no voucher; I just got that from the provost
marshal.
Mr. Howe. In cash?
Mr. Zuckebman. Yes.
Mr. Howe. As clerk of the provost court did you keep any account of lines?
Mr. Zuckebman. No, sir ; the provost marshal kept that himself. All I did
was to draw the records for the provost c^urt.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether or not the provost court itself kept a record
of fines imposed ?
Mr. Zuckebman. I do not.
Mr. Howe. Do you know what disposition was made of the fines which it
collected?
Mr. Zuckebman. Well, it purchased stationery and furniture and turned
some over to the sisterhood there.
Mr. Howe. Do you know if there was a bank account opened with the money
from fines?
Mr. Zuckebman. I believe there was ; yes, sir.
Mr. HowEw Do you know whether or not that was the disposition made of
the money collected in fines? When the money was collected by the provost
conrt, what was done with it — the money?
Mr. Zuckebman. Well, they bought furniture, and turned some over to the
sisterhood, and I drew a salary from it.
Mr. Howe. Yes; but where was the money kept?
Mr. Zuckebman. I believe it was kept at the Haitian National Bank there,
and then they turned some over
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether or not in connection with the account in
the Haitian National Bank books were kept?
Mr. Zuckebman. I believe there was ; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you know who kept them?
Mr. Zuckebman. The provost marshal.
Mr. Howe. Himself?
Mr. Zuckebman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howa Then, your $25 a month came to you in the form of a check drawn
against that bank account?
Mr. Zuckebman. No; I believe the provost marshal used to pay me per-
sonally $25 a month, and I would sign a receipt and attach it to the records in
the files.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether he, first of all, cashed a check and made an
entry of that in his books?
Mr. Zuckebman. Yes; that was done; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. What was done? r^^^^T^
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768 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. ZucKEBifAN. There was a check drawn for iny salary, and was cashed,
and it was turned over to me.
Mr. Howe. But you did not cash the check yourself?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you know who signed tliat check? •
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. The provost marshal.
Mr. Howe. Do you know that he did have, in fact, a check l)ook?
Mr. ZucKKRMAN. I t)elieve it was a check book. They had an account with
the Haitian National Bank, and every month they drew Just so much money,
and at the end of the montli I drew mine — every two weeks — $12.50 every two
weeks.
Mr. Howe. Were the only funds in that bank account fines imposed by the
provost court?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And the provost judge had the right to expend the money, did he,
through checks?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. That I could not say, but he did expend it.
Mr. Howe. That Is what I mean — the same |)er8on that deposited the money
in the bank took it out?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Ye«, sir.
Mr. Howe. And the person who deposited the money in the bank was the
provost judge himself?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yos, sir,
Mr. Howe. Were these marines who were doing road work on the public roads
paid a dollar a day extra there?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. By the public- works officer.
Mr. Howe. By the public works officer?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs.
Mr. Howe. How often were they paid — once a month or once a day?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN, I l)elieve once a month.
Mr. Howe. In what form?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. That I could not say.
Mr. Howe. How do you know they were paid a dollar a day?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. By what they told me.
Mr. Howe. Did you ever see them paid?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir ; we had nothing to do with that.
Mr. Howe. You do not know. Were they in the gendarmerie?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, slr ; they were just paid from the Marine Corps — doing
duty with the public- works officer.
Mr. Howe. Do you know the name of anyone who received a dollar a day?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Well, I believe there was a Sergt. Baker who was in charge
of the public-works force.
Mr. Howe. Did Sergt. Baker ever tell you he received a dollar a day?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did he tell you from whom he received It?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Howe. Whom did he say he received it from?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. From the public works officer.
Mr. Howe. And in what form did he receive it. by check or cash?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. That I can not say. He said he was paid monthly. I believe
he was paid more than a dollar a day ; I can not remember the exact amount.
He Bid he was drawing extra pay from the public works officer.
Mr. Howe. How much extra pay?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. That I could not say ; I do not remember exactly.
Mr. Howe. You had nothing to do with the payment on these public works?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No, sir. All we done, we drew a voucher on this and turned
the voucher over to the public works officer.
Mr. HowK. Do you know how that voucher was made up? Was there any
part of that money intended for wages?
Mr. Zi'CKERMAN. The voucher was made In this way: I believe there was
class A. B, and C, and A was public works, B was sanitation, etc., and a
voucher was drawn under class C, so much money was drawn under class A, and
rhe voucher and all was turned over to the public works officer. That was the
last we had to do with It.
Mr. HowE. Did the public works officer account for that money?
Mr. ZiTCKERMAN. Not to us; no, sir.
Mr. Howe. To whom did he account?
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 769
Mr. ZucKEEMAN. I do not know anything about it. sir. We used to send a
rad.ograin to Port au Prince each month, requesting so much money to be
allotted to us, and it was allotted to us by radiogram.
Mr. Howe, How did you fix the amount?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. By estimates sent in from the different posts.
Mr. Howe. Did they itemize their estimates?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes.
Mr. Howe. In those items was any amount estimated as wages for the marine
corps?
Mr. ZucKEEMAN. They itemized them in this way, sir: Sanitation, $500; road
work, $1,000; etc.
Mr. HowE. And it did not state there that $1,000 was for material or wages?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. In some instances when they wanted some extra material
they quoted " extra material," whatever the material was they needed, but no
wages were paid, I do not believe.
Mr. Howe. Sergt. Baker never told you whether or not he signed a receipt
for that, did he?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir; he never did.
Mr. Howe. Do you know where Sergt. Baker is now?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you know Sergt. Baker's first name?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No ; I just can not think of it
Mr. Howe. Now, did any other marine tell you that he was being paid extra
for road work?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Not for road work, but there were marines there
Mr. Howe. I mean on road work. Is Sergt. Baker the only one?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes ; I believe that is the only one I came in contact with at
Cape Haitien.
Mr. HowE. How do you know that the funds, the amount of the fimds in
the provost court were expended for furniture and stationery?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I was there at the time they bought them. I went out and
bought stationery and charged it to the p'-ovost marshal, by direction of the
provost marshal. I went out and purchased stationery and charged it to the
provost marshal.
Mr. HowB. But how do you know he paid for that stationery and furniture
from funds derived from fines?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. That I do not know, though I went out and charged them.
I would go out and buy stuff and charge It to the provost marshal.
Mr. Howe. But you do not know how he paid for it?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. You did not have anything to do with keeping his books?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Then do you know, or do you not know, whether or not furniture
and stationery was paid for by him from the fines?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. That was just from what I heard and what I seen done;
from what I seen bought. I never .seen any bills paid.
Mr. Howe. Is it not so that you just assumed, that that was your guess, that
furniture ciiarged to the provost court, the provost court paid for from fines?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. It was not exactly a guess; I was sent out by the provost
marshal, who told me to charge the furniture to the provost marshal, and I
assumed that it was paid for from the provost marshal's funds.
Mr. Howe. From the fines?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And that was just your guess?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Ycs, sir. That was what I knew from the provost marshal,
that he used to pay it from the provost marshal's funds.
Mr. Howe. Who told you that?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. He would say, " Charge it to the provost marshal." I have
gone out and bought stationery, and he would say, " Go out and charge It to
the provost marshal's account."
Mr. Howe. Did you, before doing that, make some investigation to find out
how much of a balance the provost court had at the bank?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Ycs, sir ; he would say occasionally to look up and see what
the balance was, and I would say, " Y'^ou have got so much."
Mr. Howe. Where would he look to find out how much balance there was?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. He had an account; he kept an account of his own.
Mr. Howe. Did you see those books, then?
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770 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes ; he kept a regular account of his own.
Mr. Howe. As provost Judge?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. As provost Judge.
Mr. Howe. You have seen those books?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. You saw those books?
Mr. ZrcKERMAN. Yes, sir ; he kept a regular account.
Mr. Howe. You saw them?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did you help him to keep those books?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No, slr ; I did not ; I had charge of the records of the cases
tried.
Mr. Howe. Do you know how he paid for the stationery and furniture?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No, sir ; I do not. The bills were sent to him, and 1 never
had anything to do with the bills.
Mr. Howe. You do not know whether they were paid or not?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I do not know anything about It ; no, sir.
Mr. Howe. You do not know whether he got receipts when he made paymenti
for furniture?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. All I would do would be to go out and purchase the furni-
ture. I never had anything to do with that, but I have gone out and bought
stationery and charged it to the provost marshal.
Mr. Howe. Who told you about furniture?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I think It was the party they bought it from who came in
there, and he would have it charged to the provost marshal, office furniture.
Mr. Howe. How would you know that?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I was there at the time he purchased this furniture— one
desk in particular that I use<l to take the records of the cases there. I bought
that desk, and he told me to send the bill in to the provost marshal.
Mr. Howe. He bought that desk from whom?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Froui n native there.
Mr. Howe. Where was the desk when It was bought?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. On Twenty-second Street; a native owned it there. I be-
lieve he had the desk made — a mahogany desk.
Mr. Howe. Did you go with the captain at the time you bought that
desk?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I Walked down and picked out the desk and then came back
and told him about it — how much it would be — and he said. ** You charge it to
the provost marshal."
Mr. Howe. He was provost marshal himself, was he not?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. You do not know how it was paid for?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No, sir.
Mr. HowE. Do you know of any other Instances of marines raising hell-
breaking furniture and beating the natives up — than what you learned about
through reading the court-martial proceedings?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No ; it was Just through drawing the court-martial papers.
Mr. Howe. You never personally had such information yourself?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. On one occasion one marine got into a row with the secret-
service men of the gendarmerie or something, and he was tried by general
court-martial.
Mr. Howe. You were present at that time?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I was Just coming out of the quarters when they were tak-
ing this marine down to headquarters.
Mr. Howe. Do you know how many court-martials there were of marines for
raising hell or breaking up furniture or beating up natives?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I believe I drew up 10 court-martials in about six weeks
under Col. Hooker for marines raising hell, etc.
Mr. Howe. But in the course of all your time you saw these records when
you were acting sergeant major and sergeant major; is that correct?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And you were acting sergeant major and sergeant major how
long — two years?
Mr. ZiTCKERMAN. A little better than that.
Mr. Howe. In those two years how many court-martial records did you learn
of where the accused was breaking furniture or beating up natives?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. That I can not say.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND* SANTO DOMINGO. 771
Mr. Howe. Well, more than 10?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes ; there were more than 10.
Mr. Howe. As many as 100?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Well, I should say about 20.
Mr. Howe. Of those 20, how many resulted in convictions?
Mr. ZucKERUAN. All of them ; practically all of them.
Mr. Howe. You said in your direct testimony that the attitude of the natives
toward the marines changed because the marines were raising hell with the
natives?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you mean to be understood that the attitude of all of these
natives you saw there in Haiti was changed by these 20 cases of court-martial
proceedings of marines for raising hell?
Mr. ZuckEBMAN. I would not say that. There were probably 100 cases that
never were brought to the attention of the commanding officer.
Mr. Howe. How did you gain knowledge of those?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Just from hearsay.
Mr. Howe. Were there any other reasons that you could think of for the
change in the attitude on the part of the natives besides the conduct of the
marines?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. That was all?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Howe. You mentioned road gangs working on the road from the cape to
Ouanaminthe, and from the cape to Port an Prince. How do you know that
was forced labor and not paid?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I Went up to see Lieut. Seeger with the gendarmerie, and he
told me those were corvee men working there.
Mr. Howe. Did he use that term " corvee? "
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether or not those men were paid?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I do not ; no, sir.
Mr. Howe. They might have been paid?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs, sir. I understand they were paid something like half
a gourde, or something, just from what I heard, but whether or not they were
paid I can not say.
Mr. Howe. When you saw people working on the road, In this working on the
road did you speak of them as doing corvee In all cases?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. How would you speak of them when they were not doing corvee?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. The road gangs — they were paid a gourde a day.
Mr. Howe. A road gang?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes.
Mr. Howe. So when you say paid labor you would call It a road gang, and
when you say forced labor you would call It corvee?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I think I have seen one of the corvee. That was up with
Lieut. Seeger, one case of them being pointed out as a corvee gang.
Mr. Howe. Which road was that on?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. On the road going to Port au Prince.
Mr. Howe. What was the gang you mentioned being on the road between the
cape and Ouanaminthe?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. I uodcrstood that was a corvee camp there. I never seen
them working. We were going over to Santo Domingo.
Mr. Howe. And you passed the camp?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. We passed the camp.
Mr. Howe. How did you know that was a corvee camp?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. A man in charge there, I think a detailed lieutenant with the
gendarmerie, was going into Ouanaminthe from this camp, and he left gen-
darmes in charge out there, and he says, " I have got some corvee men at work
there,- and I will leave a guard with them overnight"
Mr. Howe. Did you see the men in that camp?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Quitc a few, sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you know whether they were being paid or not?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I do not ; no, sir.
Mr. Howe. What was the date when you passed that camp and you heard
that?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. That was In 1917 sometime, sir.
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772 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. You can not give us the month?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. What was the date when you saw this gang working on tlie road
to Port au Prince?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. That, I rem^nber distinctly, was about Christmas, 1917.
Mr. Howe. You were in the Marine Corps under the name of Max Zuckerxnaiu
your own name?
Mr. Zuckebi£an. No, sir; Joseph Rosentlial.
Mr. Howe. What residence did you give when you enlisted as Joseph Rosen-
thal.
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. New York City.
Mr. Howe. New York City?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Howe. What did you give as the place of your birth when you enlistml
AS Rosenthal?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. New York City.
Mr. Howe. What did you give as your age?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Tweuty-oue.
Mr. Howe. And which is your real name?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Zuckenuau.
Mr. Howe. And why did you enlist as Rosenthal instead of Zuckerman?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Well, I Ju§t left home and enlisted, and did not want tb^
folks to know where I was.
Mr. Howe. Were you discharged under the same name?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Of Rosenthal?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
(Whereupon a recess was taken until 2^30 o'clock p. m.)
^FTEB BECESS.
The committee reassembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of
recess, Senator Oddie presiding.
Mr. Howe. As a matter of fact, all you know about these corvee gan^ which
you have mentioned on the road between Cape Haitlen and Ouanaminthe, and
Cape Haltien and Port au Prince, is that they were said to be corvee gangs,
and you do not know whether they were paid or not?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. They were, however, guards there in both cases, and you saw
them, is not that right?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. There were guards there. They also had prisoners worlc-
ing, mixed In amongst those, prisoners that they had taken, that the gen-
darmes had taken.
Mr. Howe. How could you distinguish them from the others?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. They had them in uniform.
Mr. Howe. What uniform?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. The prison uniform ; red and white stripe.
Mr. Howe. Were all prisoners down there in uniform?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No. sir; not all of them.
Mr. Howe. Well, the rest of the gang outside of those that were in red and
white stripes — do you know whether those were prisoners or not?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I could not say; no, sir.
Mr. Howe. How many times did you go out on hikes there after you became
sergeant major?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Ncver.
Mr. Howe. So these occurrences where you spoke of- firing on natives were
before you were sergeant major?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sr.
Mr. Howe. And your rank at that time was private?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sr.
Mr. Howe. With the Fifteenth Company?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Not doing duty with the gendarmerie.
Mr. Howe. That was when you were in the gendarmerie?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes, s'.r.
Mr. Howe. What was your rank in the gendarmerie?
Mr ZUCKEBMAN. Private on detached duty with the Haitien gendarmerie.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 77S
Mr. Howe. And under whose orders were you at the time you fired on these
natives in the fields?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Capt. Torrey.
Mr. Hows. Of the gendarmerie?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Captain of marines and major of gendarmerie?
Mr. Howe. About what date was that, then?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. That was in 1917 some time, sir.
Mr. Howe. Late In 1917?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No ; I believe it was about the middle of July, somewhere
along there.
Mr. Howe. Did you fire at the orders of Maj. Torrey?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. We did not fire ; the gendarmes fired. Our orders on hikes
were not to fire until fired upon; on all hikes on every detachment that left
the post.
Mr. Howe. How near were you to the gendarmes that actually did the firing?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Capt. Torrey and I had a detail of two gendarmes, and we
were about 100 yards from ths detachment of gendarmes that fired on those
natives.
Mr. Howe. The natives had fired on the gendarmes?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No ; the gendarmes had fired at the natives.
Mr. Howe. First?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. How far away were you from the party which fired on the
natives?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. We were about 100 yards.
Mr. Howe. Was the party which fired on the natives under direct Command
of any gendarmerie officer?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. No, sir; Capt. Torrey and I were going around Mount
Capitiin and we could just barely see this other detachment of gendarmes com-
ing up over the mountain. We were looking for Gentil Sevier.
Mr. Howe. This detachment of gendarmes that you saw firing were not in
your detachment; is that right?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes ; they were with us, but we had left them to go over
there. We took a detachment of gendarmes to go up on the top of the moun-
tain, and we left this detachment to guard the bottom of the mountain.
Mr. Howe. How did you know they were firing in the direction of these
natives?
Mr. Zucke;rman. These natives were out in the field there.
Mr. Howe. How did you know this detachment 200 yards away were firing
at these natives In the field?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. That I could not say, but they fired in that direction.
Mr. Howe. And at the range of a thousand yards?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. They were about a thousand yards ; yes, sir.
Mr. Howb. What did MaJ. Torrey do when that firing took place?
Mr. ZucKEBKAN. He sent me down to find out what they were firing at^
and I went down there, and they said they fired at a bunch of men that came
out of the brush, and as I went* down I saw three or four men across the plain
there.
Mr. Howe. Where was that?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. That was right at the bottom of Mount Capltan.
Mr. Howe. You mentioned another Incident of firing on natives?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. We were going up to Cul de Nord, I believe the name of
the town was, and we also had a detachment of gendarmes, and I was In charge
of the gendarmes, and we came across about nine shacks, and a gendarme
claimeil that somebody had one of these — I forget what they called them — a
machete, and he took a shot at him, but did not hit him. We did not get any
prisoners there or anything else. But that firing was without the orders from
anybody that was In charge.
Mr. Howe. Those people In the place near the shacks were under your orders
at that time?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Howe. You had no instructions from your superior officers to fire on
any natives, did you?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Not until we were fired on first. That was the standing
order in the regiment.
Mr. Howe. Now, how many times did you yourself see Haitians subjected
to beatings with this sand club which you have described?
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774 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. While I was on duty with the gendarmerie, abont once or
twice a week.
Mr. Howe. For about six months?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. About that time ; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. That was a usual occurrence?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe Where did It take place?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. In the gendarme headquarters at Ouanaminthe.
Mr. Howe. At Ouanaminthe?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Were you present during those beatings?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Some of them.
Mr. Howe. You were present about twice a week, on the average?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. For six months?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Now, what time was that — what year?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I belleve In 1916 somewhere, the latter part of 1916.
Mr. Howe. What duty were you performing at the time?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. On detached duty with the gendarmes.
Mr. Howe. As private of marines?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. At the times when you were present, was any other white man
present?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. You mean a white officer?
Mr. Howe Was there a white officer present?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Was there any other white man than yourself present?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Capt. Torrey was there on a few of the occasions; he ques-
tloneil the natives.
Mr. Howe. Was Capt. Torrey present at the time these natives were beaten
with the gand club?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Howe. Who actually did the beating?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. The gendarmes.
Mr. Howe. And did he do it at the direction of Capt. Torrey?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I bclleve he did; yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Now, how often did you see natives strung up on this beam?
The Chaibman. Let me Interrupt. Do you know who devised or Invented tills
sand club and Initiated the practice of beating people with it?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
The Chaibman. Was It invented durlhg your service, or did it exist in the
Island before?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. I do not think it ever existed l)efore; no, sir.
Mr. Howe. Would the man be strung up on the beam Just as a rack?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes. •
Mr. Howe. At the time he was being beaten?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No ; they would just tie him up there and question him.
Mr. Howe. Who would tie him up?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. The gendarmes.
Mr. Howe. Those were native Haitians?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs, slr.
Mr. Howe. Did you see Capt. Torrey or Maj. Torrey questioning one of these
men while he was strung up?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No, sir ; he was never there at any of the questioning.
Mr. Howe. Do you know what the name of Maj. Torrey was?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. I think it was Philip H.
Mr. Howe. Is that the one you are talking about?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Ycs, sir; Philip H.
Mr. Howe. Were thejse natives strung up?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Or H. P. There are two marine officers. I mean the
younger of the two.
The Chaibman. The younger of the two Is the one you mean?
Mr. Zuckebman. Yes, sir.
Maj. McClellan. Philip happens to be the older.
Mr. Zuckebman. It is the younger of the two that I mean — Henrj' P. Torrey.
Mr. Howe. Did they both have the same rank?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 775
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I bcHeve they did, sir.
Mr. Howe. This one was commanding officer at Ouanaralnthe at this time;
is that the one?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Commanding tlie gendarme detachment.
Mr. Howe. Did he order these natives strung up?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. As far as I know he did not ; no, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did you ever see him present in the room while a native was
strung up?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. But he was present when tlie native was being l>eaten by the
sand club?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. More than once?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Did you ever see a native being beaten with a sand club when he
was not present?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Auiougst the gendarmes they used to beat them quite
frequently, chase prisoners with these sand clubs.
Mr. Howe. By chasing prisoners do you mean running after prisoners, or
guarding prisoners?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Guarding prisoners.
Mr. Howe. You say that Maj. Torrey was not present when these prisoners
were being questioned?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. As far as I recollect he was not ; no sir.
Mr. Howe. Do you know why he ordered them beaten?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Well, to gain information.
Mr. Howe. Who did the questioning?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Capt Torrey, through an interpreter.
Mr. Howe. Then was Capt. Torrey present when the witnesses were being
questioned, ^vhen the natives were being questioned?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. On several occasions he was.
Mr. Howe. I misunderstood you, then. I understood you to say that Capt.
Torrey was not present while these prisoners were being questioned.
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. While they were strung up.
The Chairman. If you will permit me, the witness I think, alludes to his
presence when the prisoners were being beaten with sand clubs for the
purpose of questioning, whereas he says that Capt. Torrey was not present
when they were strung up for the purpose of questioning.
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Who would do the questioning of these natives as they were
brought In?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Capt Torrey.
Mr. Howe. In all cases?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Howe. Were prisoners being brought In constantly during that time,
your six months?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir; practically every day we would get a detail of
prisoners, or every other day, or every time a gendarme detachment would bring
♦hem in.
Mr. Howe. Was every prisoner who was brought in clubbed or strung up?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Then it was only those who refused to answer questions, as
you understand It, who were clubbed or strung up?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howbl Were there any other white officers stationed there In the
gendarmerie?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Who else besides the major, his Interpreter, and yourself, were
hi the room at the time of the beatings?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. There were several gendarmes there, a gendarme sergeant,
and a gendarme first sergeant.
Mr. Howe. Were there any attempts made to keep these occurrences secret?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir.
Mr. HowK. Was Maj. Torrey tlie only white officer stationetl there?
Mr. ZUCKEBMAN. No, sir; Col. Hooker, the commander of the marine de-
tachment
6226^— 21— PT 2 43
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776 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANIX) DOMINGO.
Mr. Howe. Was he stationed at Ouanaminthe?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Was he ever present aU the time any of these natives were 1
beaten or strung up?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. No» sir.
Mr. HowK. Were you working under Col. Hoolcer at that time, directly, or
under Capt. Torrey, or Maj. Torrey?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Maj. Torrey.
Mr. Howe. He was Maj. Torrey in tlie gendarmerie and Capt Torrey in
tlie marines?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes. sir.
Mr. Howe. What questions were being asked of these prisoners, what kind of
questions?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. The prisoners, I understand, those they questioned so
severely, were caught with arms out in tiie country, and they were trying to
^ain information as to wliere the l)andits liad their anns. At that time they
were after tills (ientil Sevier.
The ('haiuman. He was a bandit chief?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir; of that section, through Circa la Source.
Mr. Howe. And throughout the whole six montlis, that was the information
that Capt. or Maj. Torrey was after?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. HowR To find out the location of the camps of the bandits?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Have you ever made any rei)ort of these l)ea tings before your
testimony to this committee?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Have I ever made a report? No, sir.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state for the record that Mr.
Zuckerman testifie<l that he was honorably discharged from the Marine Corps,
but did not have his <li.scharge pai)ers with him. In the recess Maj. McCl^an
has looked up his record, his reconl appearing under another name which he
gave to the conmdttee before recess, and finds out that the individual who was
enlisted under the name which the witness furnished us was honorably dis-
charged. What is your real name?
Mr. Zuckerman. Zurckerman.
The Chairman. You enlisted as Rosenthal?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And Ilosenthal was honorably discharged. I think that should
appear on the record.
You had only one enlistment, did you not?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And you were, nevertheless, in the Marine Corps for more than
ioiir years?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. By about three or four months?
Mr. Zuckerman. About four months.
Mr. Howe. What was the cause of your staying over those four months in
the Marine Cori>s?
Mr. ZicKERMAN. Waiting trial of a summary court for absence over leave.
Mr. Howe. Were you kept waiting trial those three months?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And you were fined?
Mr. ZtTCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. How much?
Mr. Zuckerman. I was finefl $30 at first, and then the court went to the com- "
manding officer, and he said it was inadequate for the offense committed, and I
was flne<l $90.
Mr. Howe. In addition to confinement?
Mr. Zuckerman. I was not confined at all, just waiting the result of the
trial.
Mr. Howe. Being held three months over your enlistment?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. And were ycm re<luced from rank?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. You had been a sergeant?
Mr. Zuckerman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Howe. Or a sergeant major?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 777
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I was sergeant, I believe, at that time.
Mr. Howe. What were you discharged as?
Mr. ZucKEBMAN. Oorporal.
Mr. Howe. You were reduced from sergeant to corporal?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir. The flne was remitted at the expiration of ray
enlistment
Mr. Howe. So you actually suffered no loss in money?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Howe. I have no further questions.
Mr. Angeli.. Oan you give us the names of any of the gendarmerie sergeants
tiiat served at Ouanaminthe during this period?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No, sir; I could not
Mr. Anoell. You do not remember the names?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No, sir; I could not.
Mr. Angell. You have no grievance against Capt Torrey?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Angell. No i)ersonal run in with him in any way?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No, sir.
Mr. Angeix. And you served the wliole i>eriod of four years and some
months in tlie Marine Corps under the name of Rosenthal?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Angell. Why did you enlist under that name?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I just wanted to get away. I had some scrap at home. I
did not write home for two years after I enlisted, until they found out where
I was.
Mr. Angell. You enlisted under that name to get away from the family, so
tliat the family would not know where you were?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Ycs, sir.
Mr. Angell. That is a fairly common practice in the Marine Corps and in
the Army, is it not?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I do not know. I guess it Ls. The cases I cited were just
Instances of abuse, but there are a lot of things that I ctmld tell on the bright
side of the occupation; that is, during the time I was with the gendarmerie.
Outside of that, I was in position to see exactly what was going on down
there, being sergeant-nmjor of the regiment and seeing the reiwrts and going
out on inspection tours with the commanding officers. I accompanied the com-
manding officer with every Inspection tour before the gendarmerie w^as organ-
ised. The commanding officer of the marines was In complete charge of roads,
sanitation, and everything else there.
The Chairman. I^t the witness go right along and tell the story in his own
way.
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Outslde of that instance I quoted, I could not think of any-
thing that could condemn the occupation down there.
The Chairman. What have you to say in justification of the occupation?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Well, sanitation down there has been very, very good, and
the waterworks system. I went through that with Mr. Bond, the ex-marine
who was in charge of that, and he done some very good work on the water-
works system — worked all through it
Mr. Angell. All of this is at Cai)e Haltien?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir; and the roads from Ouanaminthe to Cape Hnitien
Were pjjt up by the marines, and that was taken care of, and the city Itself
was i)ollced very well, all taken care of by marines. Outside of that one In-
stance at Ouanaminthe, I can not say anything.
The Chairman. I^t me ask the witness what were the general relations
between the gendarmerie and the population, other than the bandits or the
suspected bandits?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Well, they got along very well, just for the exception that
^ few marines would go <»ut and get drunk and the first thing they would
think of would l)e to go around and break up some kind of shack.
The Chairman. That is not peculiar to marines or to the Republic of Haiti?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Outslde of the few instances I can not think of anything
that I could say.
The Chairman. S^ormally, what was the relation, let us say, between the
xenclarmerle native and American officers at a point like Cape Haltien with
the Inhabitants of the city and the country around about?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Very good. They got along very well In Cape Haltien.
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778 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Chairman. At what point were you stationed, or to what point did yoa
travel in Haiti?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. To all northern Haiti, practically all of northern Haiti.
Tlie Chairman. As far west as Gonaives?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No ; I went to Fort Liberte, Ouanaminthe, Cai)e Haitien, and
lip as far as Hinche, and a town this side of Gonaives, just over the mountains,
l*ort nu Palx. This was on inspection trips.
The Chairman. You were on insiiection trips, and presumably had a reason-
able opportunity to observe?
Mr ZiTc'KKRMAN. Yes, sir. I was there at the time they calle<l the rifles to
from the natives, and we paid them — I thinly the Haitian Government paid
them — a dollar apiece for turning in all their rifles, and I took a trip with Gen.
Cole, I believe it was to Le Trou.
The (*HAiRMAN. Did the callinp: in of the rifles, the organization of the
gendarmerie, and its presence in various communities conduce to order and
l»eace?
Mr. ZrcKERMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Did the i)eople more freely come and go from tlieir lionies in
the country to the market places in the towns, because of the gandamierie?
Mr. ZrcKERMAN. Yes; and under Col. Hooker^s administration he had the
Marine ('orps band come down from Port au Prince, so as to get the natives
out on the street. He put the band in the band stand and let it play every
evening, so as to let the natives come out of their shacks. They used to stay
in and lock themselves up.
The Chairman. Weighing the incidents to which you alluded earlier in yonr
testimony, the stringing up and the beating with clubs and the firing at natives,
unprovokeil in some cases, against the pacification of the country and the main-
tenance of peace, did the faults of the gendarmerie outweigh the benefits to
the iM)pulation, or did the benefits to the i>opulatlon outweigh the faults of the
genclarmerie?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. I think the benefits to the population outweighed the faults
of the gemlarmerie.
The ('HAiRMAN. The country was better ofl* for the gendarmerie despite
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. They were better off with the gendannerie and the ma-
rines
The Chairman. Than if there had been none?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Ycs, slr. The marines patrolled the interior at all times,
and .^o did the gendarmerie, and the gendarmerie natives themselves caused a
lot of this trouble. As soon as a man was made a gendarme and wore the
uniform he was the big *' It," and he went out amongst the natives and raised
the devil himself. They started a lot of the trouble themselves.
The Chairman. Was a large center like Cape Haltien or Port au Prince oo
the whole well and orderly and i>eacabl^ policed by the gendarmes?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. They acted In lieu, of course, of city police?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. Angell. And on the whole they discharged their duties reasonably well?
Mr. ZircKERMAN. Yes, sir. We bail marines patrol the streets at the sanie time
as gendarmes.
The Chairman. Would that patrol walk a beat as a policeman would \>*alk a
beat, the marine or gendarme?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. I do not think either. There was a continual patrol of the
marines through the streets at all times.
The ('hairman. In groups of 4, 6, or 10 squads?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. No, sir ; singly.
The Chairman. Singly?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And the gendarmes patrolling also independently?
Mr. ZUCKERMAN. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Would you say, in so far as there were injuries done na-
tives, that they orlglnatjed with the native gendarmerie, or were Inspired by
Americans serving with the gendarmerie?
Mr. ZucKERMAN. A lot of It was inspired by the native gendarmerie.
The Chairman. Well, it is a loose question, and I only want to get your Im-
pression for the benefit of the committee. It is not testimony which would be
valid In any other sort of a hearing. On the whole, would you say that the
resDonsibllit.v for ill treatment rented with t^p 4 mprlrpn^fflopp whether an
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 779
enlisted man or officer of the marines, or an American serving with the gen-
darmerie, or with the gendarmerie themselves?
Mr. ZucKERifAN. Tlie gendarmes tiiemselves, the native gendarmes.
STATEMENT OF MB. JAMES WELDON JOHNSON, 70 FIFTH
AVENUE. NEW YOBK CITY.
The Chaibman. Will you give your full name and address?
Mr. Johnson. James Weldon Johnson, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York City.
Mr. Angell. What is your occupation?
Mr. Johnson. I am secretary of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of the Colored People.
Mr. Anoell. Have you ever been in the United States Consular Service?
Mr. Johnson. Yes; I was.
Mr. Anoell. Will you tell when and where, briefly?
Mr. Johnson. I was appointed consul at Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, in 1906,
and promoted to Corinto, Nicaragua, in 1909, and served there until — I can not
remember the month, but it was early in 1913, when I resigned — about seven
years and a half.
Mr, Angell. You have been in Haiti, have you not?
Mr. Johnson. I have.
Mr. Angell. When did you go there, and how long did you spend in Haiti?
Mr. Johnson. I went down to Haiti in March of 1920, last year, and I got
back — I went down on the 2l8t of March and I got back about the 21st or 22d
of May, but I was there eight weeks. I was there perhaps six weeks: and
a half.
Mr. Angell. Where, in tlie island, did you go in Haiti?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I made my headquarters at Port au Prince. I radiated
out from Port au Prince throu^ the country there, anything that could be
covered inside of a day, and then I made a trip in an automobile as far as
Cape Haitien, and returned back in about a week.
Mr. Angell. Did you stay at any place along the way?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I made the usual stop at St. Marc and Gonalves, and
then went on.
Mr. Angell. Did you go back into the interior of northern Haiti or central
Haiti?
Mr. Johnson. I went back largely for the purpose of paying a visit to
Chrostophe*s old palace and citadel up there. That took me a day's journey
into the Interior in the nortJi.
Mr. Angell What claas of population did you come in contact with?
Mr Johnson. Well, I guess I came in contact with all classes. I had letters
to what we might terra the best people of Haiti, and then I got in touch an
largely as I could with all other classes.
Mr. Angell. Did you meet officials of the Government?
Mr. Johnson. Yes. I met the President twice, and most of the Cabinet
ministers at various times, and other lesser officials.
Mr. Angell. Did you converse with the local officials in the comnmnes.
priests, and such people?
Mr. Johnson. I did not talk with any priests that I can remeinber, but I
talkeil with such peoi»le us I could draw out They are mostly suspicious of
strangers.
The Chairman. A little more clearly, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. I say I did not talk with any priests.
The Chairman. But with people such as were not suspicious of strangers?
Mr. Johnson. Yes; those competent to talk.
The Chairman. Did you have to speak through an interpreter, or do you
speak the vernacular, or French?
Mr. Johnson. I speak enough French to get along. I am not very familiar
with the Creole. Although I speak a word or two, I could not say I could talk
Creole.
Mr. Angell. Will you tell us what you found to be the attitude of the Haitian
population of tlie different classes, and its feeling toward the I'nited States,
toward the military occupation, and the reasons for its feelings and attitude?
Mr. Johnson. Well of course, that is a question that has to be varied a
little. If I gave Just a general impression, it would be that there was a gu(Ml
deal of bitterness and resentment in all classes. The reasons might have been
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780 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
varied, but the impression I gained was from the highest to the lowest— ami
by the lowest I do not mean what we call a peon, because I did not talk witli
tiiem to any large extent, and I do not know whether they had any very
serious thought on it one way or another, but the pec)ple I talkeil with of any
intelligence, of any thought at all — they were extremely bitter.
Mr. Angell. Was there bitterness toward the United States in general, or
toward the military occupation in particular, or both?
Mr. Johnson. If you will let me put it this way : There were a number of
people who seemed to have been disapi)ointe<l. They seemwl to have had the
hope, and I might say the faith that a good deal more was coming out of the
occupation than did come, and their resentment was basetl upon what they
considered to be the iiarshness of the military rule, and the fact that the oon-
vention was not being carried out in the spirit in which they had expected it
to be carried out.
The Ch.\irman. May I interrupt. Captain, at that point?
Mr. ANGEi>i^ Yes.
The Chairman. By that do you mean that the financial and economic reor-
ganization contemplated by the convention appeared to have been indefinitely
jmstponed?
Mr. Johnson. Yes. I think, Senator, that would be the cau.se of one dlsap-
l)Ointment.
The Chairman. They had been led to l)elieve from the text of the conven-
tion that tlie adjudication of long i)endlng claims, the refunding of the debt and
related matters would be taken in hand forthwith and carried through?
Mr. Johnson. Yes. I think that is true, but I think that this set of people
I am talking about — I will have to divide them into a group or two, because
one statement would not cover them all.
The Chairman. Precisely.
Mr. Johnson. There were a group of people who seeme<l to he expectant of
some good things coming out of the convention. Those people, it ."seemed, never
expected a strict military rule. They seeinetl to feel they were going in for a
civil oversight and they considered that the military domination was a thing
outside <»f the letter aud spirit of the convention.
Then, of course, there were groups that I talked with, and I talked with
various groups of different political sliades of opinion and different economic
sttitus, and some i)eople, of course, were bitterly opix>.sed to any sort of foreign
intervention. I found a very deep pride in their independence, and they
resenteil anything like foreign invasi(m, and they were irreconcilables.
Mr. Angell. What <lid you find the attitude of these various groups, answer-
ing the question according to tlie different groups. If you can, and their
expectations for the future as to treatment from the Unite<l States and their
relations with the United States?
Mr. Johnson. Let me get the gist of that question again.
Mr. Angeli« Perhaps that was not very well put. What were the expecU-
tions of these various groui)s of people with wliom you talked as to the rela-
tions with the United States in the future?
Mr. Johnson. The more intelligent pe<jple that I talked with felt that there
ought to be what we might call a new deal entirely. They said frankly that
that convention such as it was, was forced upon them. They felt that if there
could l>e any nuitual benefit in cooperation between the two countries that they
ought to have a fairer .start together. That expresses the opinion of one
group. When we get to the other group that I referred to Just now as the
irreconcilables. tliey want notiiing less than the independence of their country.
The Chairman. They want the abrogation of the convention?
Mr. .Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Angell. Are you ni)le to specify the particular incidents, not as testifying
to the truth or untruth of those incidents, but as to their being apparently the
reasons for the feeling which these different groups had about our presence
and the conduct of our administration of Haiti?
Mr. .ToiiNsoN. You mean the reasons for the fact?
Mr. Angell. The specific reasons for the particular feelings which they had.
Mr. .Johnson. They resent very much the military occupation, the militjiry
rule.
Mr. Angell. The fact of the occupation or the method in which it has been
cond u ctetl , wh i ch ?
Mr. Johnson. The fact in some degree, and the method in a greater degree,
I judge, and of course conditions in Haiti give rise to a phase of this question,
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 781
which might not artse in any other country, and that is the question between
white and black, and that has been brought to the fore very much in Haiti,
and the Haitians resent it very keenly; they feel it very deeply.
Mr, Angell. Just how did you gather that the question had been brought to
the fore there?
Mr. Johnson. Well, they talked with me, and I talked with what you might
call the better class of Haitians, the men who assembled in the clubs there
and who had nice homes, the educated class, and they said that before the
coming of the Americans there was no such thing as a well-defined color line
in Haiti; that there were foreigners there, both Americans and Europeans,
but the color line had never boen specifically and tightly drawn as it has been
since the occupation there — instances now in which it shows very plainly.
Mr. Anoell. By whom has the color line been drawn since the occupation,
without reference to any particular individual?
Mr. Johnson. I learned that It started with the Americans, but now the
thing is mutually dra\\ni.
The Chairman. You mean there are no 'relations, other than official, between
the Haitians and the Americans?
Mr. Johnson. That is wliat I am getting at. Of course, what I am repeat-
ing now is merely what I gathered in t*Uking, Senator.
The Chairman. Precisely.
Mr. Johnson. You might say that there is no personal relation between the
American official class and the upi)er class of Haitians, except where It is
officially necessary, and that heretofore those conditions never obtained even
among the white Europeans there in Haiti, and the American citizens in Haiti.
Mr. Anoell. You said a moment ago that this feeling originated, I believe,
after the military occupation?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Anoell. Was it your understanding that It was a feeling which origi-
nated— that the color line was brought forward by the Americans against
the Haitians or by the Haitians against the Americans?
Mr. Johnson. Dra>vn first by the Americans. I was informed that the
Haitians, those in what we would call the social set there, who would go into
society, when the Americans first landeil went very far to make it pleasant
for them, and It was all right until the number increased very largely, and
especially up until the time when the ladies of the occupation came down.
Then, I understand, that the American occupation or the officials of the occu-
pation, military and civil, organized a club to which no Haitian Is ever In-
vited, and now the Haitians. I believe, have returned the lack of compliment
by not inviting the Americans to their clubs. That is a side lasue, but I judge
that it was a point of friction which Impeded a good deal of motion that might
have gone along more easily.
Mr. Angell. Did you hear comment or discussion to any extent among
these groups of the institution or c*omUict of the management of the corv6e
law by the Americans under the American occupation?
Mr. Johnson. Yes; that was put down as one of the reasons for bitter re-
sentment
Mr. Angell. Was the feeling ai>parently strong on that point or not?
Mr. Johnson. Very strong with everybody I talked to, and I talked with a
great many people. I talked not only with the native Haitians but I talked
with Americans in business there and European business men.
The Chairman. Was It to the abuses incident to the corvee or to the actual
invoking of the law of the corvee that objection was made?
Mr. Johnson. I heard something of abuse, but, of course, I have no definite
knowledge. I have heard of things that are told everywhere, but I think as I
studied the situation there that there is something in the Haitian which objected
very deeply to the corvee itself — the invoking of It.
The Chairman. Although it was in his law?
Mr. Johnson. Well. I understand it was never enforced in that way.
The Chairman. Well, I think It was never enforceil at all ; It was a dead
letter, but it was a law.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I think we have the same laws in most all of our States ;
at least in some of the Southern States there is a road law, by w^hlch you can
be compelled to work on the road around your vicinity, but I think it went — if
you win allow me to <Ugress a little — I think it went pretty hard with the
Haitian, as I studied the questiiai, because I do not think there was ever any
such thing as peonage in Haiti. The Haitians jn the country, so far as I
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782 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
could learn, the great majority of them, were individual' cultivators, with a
little plot of ground ; and no matter whether he cultivated It well or ill, he
was an independent farmer, no matter on how small a scale, and when he was
taken off his little plot of ground and carried miles away into another part
of the country it was slavery to him, even though the treatment might not have
been abnormally crueL
The Chaibman. Well, if they were carried far from their plots of ground,
that might be characterized either as an abuse or maladministration of the
corvee.
Mr. Angell. Were there any specific reasons for the feeling which you hare
described toward the occupation?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I think that most of the Intelligent people felt that there
was really no Government, because there was a conflict between the military
authority and American civilian authority and Haitian national authority. I
got that not only from intelligent Haitians but from Americans and Europeans
there.
The Chaibman. Let me ask the witness the question I put to Mr. Forrest this
morning. Could you say that there was any American policy fii Haiti after
the pacification had been completed up to the present time?
Mr. Johnson. Any policy at all — any defined policy?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. I could not say that there was.
The Chairman. Were you able to see any evidence of a policy leading any-
where?
Mr. Johnson. I could not.
The Chairman. Did you hear any particular comment upon specific instances
of the relations in governmental administrative matters between the occupation
and the American minister and financial adviser, on the one hand, and the
Haitian Government on the other, such, for example, as the dissolution of the
Haitian Legislature and the National Assembly?
Mr. Johnson. Yes ; I talked with various men, and they told me about the dis-
solution of the Chamber of Deputies. They said that it was d<me by force,
virtually. Of course, that was another cause of resentment with the thinking
classes. Then, most of them told me that they did not feel, outside of the
country being policed, that they had gotten anything back; that all of the
obligations were on the part of Haiti, but there s^med to be no obligation on
the part of the United States — at least, they could not see any benefits.
The Chairman. But the United States had taken control and had failed to
discharge the responsibilities incident to control?
Mr. Johnson. That is what the intelligent classes felt and said.
The Chairman. Did the foreigners perhaps feel the same way, American and
European?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Would that be your own judgment?
Mr. Johnson. That was my own judgment after my short stay there. May
I limit it by that? I looked around, and I was trying to make an inipartial
survey of the whole situation. First, let us say that I went down there with
some misgivings that I was going to find that the entire propaganda which yoii
might call against Haiti was mere design. I found it. I was veiT much sur-
prised at the Haitian people. I found them a good deal l>etter sort of folk than
I had ever hoped or exi>ected to find them, and 1 wanted to make a fair report,
and I looked to see what the Americans had done. I could only find three things,
and that was the military' roads, the big highway from Port an Prince to Cape
Haitien, the improvement of the hospital there in Port au Prince, which it
seemed had been made quite efficient, and some minor sanitary regulations that
had been instituted in the larger town.s. I think they were all minor though.
I think they did not go any further than that you must sprinkle lime so many
times a week, you must have a cement gutter in which water can run off, ami
things of that sort.
As for the city of Port au Prince, I found it a very clean, well kept city, and
at first I thought that that was the work of the occupation, but I learned that
the paving of Port au Prince was the work of the Haitian Government; that
the contracts had been let before our occupation.
The Chairman. Had the work been completed before?
Mr. Johnson. Not entirely. Outside of those three things I could not find
any Improvement. I looked especially for some marked Improvement in the
school system and I talked to Mr. Belgard, who was Minister of Education, and
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I visited some of tiie schools in Port au Prince, and saw some of the schools
aronnd the country, but, as far as I could learn, the occupation and the Ameri-
can Government had not done anything to improve the school system, such afe
had taken place in some of the other possessions.
Mr. AnoelXw What feeling did you And among the population, if any, about
the ownership of land by foreigners, and the whole question of foreign capital
in Haiti, the economic exploitation, and kindre<l questions?
Mr. Johnson. Those I talked with seeine<l to be quite apprehensive about the
economic exploitation, and especially the buying of large tracts of land by
foreigners, and some of them seemed to l)e quite disturbed at the rumors preva-
lent while I was down there of large tracts being taken up. I do not know how
true they were, except in one case I talke<l with a man who said he was dicker-
ing for 5,000 acres.
Mr. Anoeuu What feeling, if any, was there regarding the article in the new
constitution of 1918. permitting the ownership of land, and regarding the adop-
tion of that constitution itself?
Mr. Johnson. The intelligent Haitians of all political parties that I talked
with felt that the constitution which they had now was unconstitutionally
adopted, and they felt that the old provision in the old constitution not allowing
aliens to own land was one of the bulwarks of their safety and security. All
that I talked to were very much opiwsed to that change in the constitution.
Mr. Anoell. They said they felt that the constitution was unconstitutionally
adopted in what respect and how?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I understand the fundamental law of Haiti calls for the
constitution to be adopted by the legislative body, and this was adopted by a
plebiscite, a popular vote.
Mr. Angeu*. Was It or was It not the feeling among the groups whom you
talked with that the methods of the adoption of this constitution and these
clauses in it regarding the ownership of land were to be laid to the occupation —
the American occupation?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir.
The Chaibman. We have now a record of nearly six years of the occupation,
and of four since the acknowledged establishment of general order. We have
a treaty, the life of which, assuming a renewal at the end of the first period, is
15 years. If there be established in Haiti a true and centralized responsibility
for the American agents there, whether in the employ of the Haitian Govern-
ment or the Government of the United States, if the American Government,
through these agents, assiduously and in good faith pursued a ' sympathetic
policy, seeking always, as you suggested early In your testimony, to put forward
the development of civil administration through civil advisers rather than mili-
tary officials, do you believe that we may secure the cooperation of the Haitian
people In the carrying out of such a policy?
Mr. JoHNS(»«. I think it would be very largely secured. Senator. I do not see
that any occupation of Haiti will secure 100 per cent cooperation, or maybe not
anywhere near perfect, but I think It would secure quite a large cooperation.
The Chairman. I mean can we secure that measure of cooperation which Is
necessary If we are to contribute substantially to the moral and material prog-
ress of the Haitian |)eople during the 15 years of the treaty?
Mr. Johnson. Will you let me answer It by making a statement?
The Chairman. Certainly.
Mr. Johnson. I think that if the right .sort of man took charge of the right
sort of a sympathetic and cooperative civil administration in Haiti, and the
man would have to be a man of big caliber — I think that has been one of the
mistakes of the present occupation there — and looking forward witli this thing
In view, to an absolute restoration of Haitian independence at the end of that
term, I believe you would get the cooperation of all the elements In Haiti that
would be worth while.
The Chairman. Do you believe that at the end of 15 years, the Haitians, un-
aided, could resume the administration of the public services of the country?
Mr. Johnson. That would depend, I think, on what took place in the 15 years.
Of course, if we went there and administere<l it for them, and got up and came
out in 15 j'ears, they might be so weakened in that time that they could not
administer it for themselves.
The Chairman. What you have in mind is that we should not administer for
them, but with them, during that period?
Mr. Johnson. With them, and their administrative powers should be con-
tinually strengthened until that wldrawal.
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784 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Chairman. What would hapi>en If the treaty were abrogated and the
occupation withdrawn on 90 days* notice?
Mr. Johnson. Well. I have heard opinions on that. I should Judge tlie
sanest opinions I have heard from natives would he that it would not be a very
wise thing to do on 90 days* notice. In fact, I do not think you could withdraw
froin Haiti until the native constabulary or a national army or some such force
is there to replace what you have. I do not think this gendarmerie would do it
entirely, l)ecause the intelligent Haitian has no place in it I understand that
they are the most ignorant, and although some of the intelligent Haitian youth
went in at first, they foun<l they had no chance and no place, and they simply
st<M>d aside. You would have to replace authority by Haitians of intelligence.
The Chairman. If ycm were laying 'down in the most general terms a course
for us to follow, w<mld it be one like that suggested by my first question?
Mr. Johnson. If I had a program to lay out for Haiti, I would lay out one
looking to the quickest pos-sible withclrawal of the United States, and almost
as immediate as iK>ssible the withdrawal of the military forces, and as prompt
as possible a withdrawal of even civilian rule or oversight. We will never be
able to do anything in Haiti unless we have the good will of the Haitians. We
know that. That is axiomatic, and I believe the best way to get it is to assure
Haiti that we have no ultimate aims against her independence.
The Chairman. Well, you say the withdrawal as socm as possible?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
The Chairman. Six months, (me year, five years, ten years, or the i^eriod of
the treaty?
Mr. Johnson. Military withdrawal?
The Chairman. No. I am talking now of comidete withdrawal. I think that
was the phrose which j'ou used.
Mr. Johnson. Yes. Well, I will put It Into two parts, military withdrawal
as soon as possible and as prompt a civilian withdrawal as can be worked out.
The Chairman. Could you Indicate a difference in time?
Mr. Johnson. This treaty now has five years to run, has it not?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. I should venture that we could get out of Haiti in a militar}*
way in a year and that we ought to be able to get out at the close of this term
of the treaty.
The Chairman. What would you do with the service of the debt?
Mr. Johnson. Of the debt?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I do not know that we have made It any easier for them.
The Chairman. Whether we have or not, we have undertaken to refund the
French debt, which, as you know, has not matured and must be paid.
Mr. Johnson. I did not really know we were assuming that as an obligation.
I knew we were to furnish a loan for Haiti.
The Chairman. The major part of the loan Is allocated to the payment of
the French debt.
Mr. Johnson. You mean the loan that was to have been made and that they
have l)een exi)ectlng?
The Chairman. Well, I think the negotiations are consummated.
Mr. Johnson. I did not know that. I had given that up. I thought that was
a lost hoi>e.
The Chairman. I think it has been consummated, but the major part of the
loan goes for the payment of the French debt and the liquidation of the internal
claims. I think it Is fair to say that nine-tenths of the fund to be realized
from the loan now aiiproaching consummation will go for that purpose. How
would j'ou assure the service of that loan?
Mr. Johnson. I do uot know that I am prepared to say that. I am not pre-
pared to answer that question. That involves a good deal more than I had at
hand.
Tlie Cii airman. That Is something which, of course
Mr. Johnson. I was coming back merely to this proposition, as to whether, in
my opinion, the Haitians were capable of self-government or not.
The Chairman. Well. I had In mind the service of the Nicaraguan debt, tlu*
service of the Dominican debt, the service of the Ottoman debt, and the Egyp-
tian debt, and all these debts which have been In default at one time or another.
Mr. .Johnson. May I ask now, Where are we with the Dominican debt?
The Chairman. The Dominican debt will be paid, I think, in 1926 or 1928: it
is almost extlnguisluMl. The revenues last year and the year before have in-
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INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 785
creased so in Santd Domingo thiat the debt is being paid off something like 20
years in advance of the expected time.
Article 8 of the protocol for a loan, in part, reads as follows :
"And it is further agreed that the control by an officer or officers duly ap-
pointed by the President of Haiti, upon nomination by the President of the
United States, for the collection and allocation of the hypothecated revenues,
will be provided for during the life of the loan after the expiration of the afore-
said treaty, so as to make certain that adequate provision be made for the
amortization and interest of the loan.**
That would imply that a contract between the bondholder and the debtor
would require that the revenues' control and the revenues be vested in the
appointee of the President of the Unitetl States, even after the withdrawal of
the other American agents. I think, roughly speaking, the amortization of the
debt runs over a period of 13 years, whereas the extended treaty has 15
years to run. There is not any such provision, I think, for the allocation of
revenues for this debt, as there was for the Dominican debt, where they took
half of all above a certain sum of the revenues.
Senator Oddie. There is one thing I would like to ask. You spoke of the
value of the roads. Did you look over the system of the roads yourself?
Mr. Johnson. I can not say. Senator — the system. I took the big highway
from Port au Prince to Cape Haitlen. That is a very good road.
Senator Oddie. Do you feel that criticism of the work that has been done by
the marines on the roads was made with full knowledge of the work that had
l»een done by the marines?
Mr. Johnson. Yes; I think »»,. You mean the value of the work to the
country?
Senator Oddie. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. I think so. As I looked at it, I think the value of that road
to Haiti can be overestimated.
Senator Oddie. Do you not think, in si)eaking of a military road as you do,
that it can have value from an economic and commercial standpoint as well?
Mr. Johnson. Oh, yes. I think it has some, but I say that value can l>e
overestimated, I think, for Haiti. I mean by that that a road would be of
greater ec<momic advantage in some other country than it is in Haiti. This
is a great highway, and you will find military trucks and automobiles travel-
ing over it without any speed limit. In fact, in some instances, the road is a
drawback to the Haitian farmer. I went over the road and I saw an auto-
mobile frighten a market woman. She was on one mule, and she had a horse
loaded down with all her produce going to market, and her child was on an-
other one, and the horse got frightened and ran and scattered all her produce
from one end of the road to the other. And when the farmers get their
donkeys killed, a donkey means a great deal to a Haitian farmer, and when
these automobiles come along, these poor people scramble up the sides of the
mountains, or do\\ii the <leclivitles, trying to get out of the way. The road, as
I say, is a great advantage to people who want to see Haiti, but I do not think
it is worth quite that much to the Haitian farmer who is trying to get hii*
produce to the town. He has got no automobile. He goes on foot, with his
little donkeys in a trail (me behiml the other, and a mountain path would be
far more /convenient to liim almost than a road.
3Ir. Howe, Wcmld the same remark apply to tlie railroads? Have the rail-
roads or>eneil up the country to any extent. In developing it?
Mr. Johnson. Well, tlie railroad, as far as it goes, I think serves quite the
purpose. The railroad runs north as far as St. Mare, and then they have got
another little one that shoots around the bay of Port au Prince down to the
south there.
Mr. Howe. Have they had any particular effect in opening up the country
for the transportation of prcnluce whigh otherwise would not have any way
of reaching a market.
Mr. Johnson. No; I do not think so. I think the traffic perhaps between
St. Marc and Port au Prince would be perhaps just about as nmch as It is.
Mr. Howe. Did you make any investigation as to the condition of the lower
Haitian courts there?
Mr. Johnson. I did not investigate the courts, but I talked with some of the
big lawyers there.
Mr. Howe. What was their opinion of the Haitian lower courts?
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786 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. Johnson. Well. I talke<I with one man there who is a Judge In one of
the courts, and he told me that the Haitians felt that the courts did not amount
to anything now, because they had no exclusive jurisdiction. He said that they
were interfered with always by the military authorities.
Mr. Howe. Did you gather from what they told you that the military conrts
interfered in the civil cases, that Is to say as distinguished from the criminal
cases ; I mean cases between plaintiff and defendant over money mattnv?
Mr. Johnson. Well, I do not think I have got a distinction as to that, but
I gathered that they Interfered with cases that were in the civil courts; that
a man would be exonerated by the civil courts, and the military would simply
arrest him on that same charge.
Mr. Howe. The thing I was more Interested in, perhaps, than that, was this:
That being an abnormal condition under the intervention of the provost courts,
are the lower courts competent courts to decide — I mean are the Judges there
able enough men to decide questions of proiwrty between plaintiff and de-
fendant?
Mr. Johnson. I think so. I ju.st throw that out. I have not investigated it.
Mr. Howe. What I want to know Is whether you had made any special in-
quiries about that branch. Did you have anj^ time to inform yourself on that?
Mr. Johnson. Not specifically, but I am Just giving a general impression. I
think they are capable to handle
Mr. Howe. Do you know what the salaries of those Judges de paix are?
Mr. Johnson. No ; I do not. I did find out the salaries of some of the school-
teachers. I did not look up the salaries of the Judges.
Mr. Howe. Would it be your opinion that if martial law were done away with
there, the Haitian lower courts could satisfactorily cooperate with the gen-
darmerie to the end of preserving law and order in the country?
Mr. Johnson. I should think so.
Mr. Howe. I mean after removing the element of divide<l authority, which is
a bad element for any court?
Mr. Johnson. I was going to qualify it by that ; yes.
Mr. Howe. Is the Haitian system of lower court«J capable of backing up the
Haitian system of gendarmerie and administering Justice fairly, to the end of
preserving law and order?
Mr. Johnson. I should .say that I think so.
Mr. Howe. I have heard that the salaries of the lower courts, the Judges de
paix. are very low indeed, and that a proper and properly qualified man would
not be induced by that salary to go on the bench of a Judge de paix?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Howe. Is it not your opinion that the Justices of the peace, or the Judges
de imix, ought to be well qualified men, as the Judges that the {hmt i)eople first
encounter?
Mr. Johnson. Well, he at least ought to be an honest man.
Mr. Howe. It is a very imi>ortant position, is it not?
Mr. Johnson. Yes ; it is from that point of view. I do not think it requires
any extraordinary* ability to be a Justice of the peace ; it does not in this country.
Mr. Howe. No ; but he has got to be honest ; he has got to know some law, has
he not?
Mr. Johnson. He has got to know some law and he has got to have common
sense.
Mr. Howe. And especially if he decides questions of the ownership of property
between poor people?
Mr. Johnson. Yes; but I do not know how far the Jurisdiction of a jiidse
de paix would go in property nmtt(*rs. I Judge it wouUl l>e limlteil acconliu?
to some amount, and that above a certain amount it would go up to some higher
court.
Mr. HowK. Would it not be a useful thing for anylwxly to know, liefore the
time of the withdrawal of the American occupation is de<*ide<l, as to whether the
Haitian (fovernnient can supply nn adwiuate judiciary?
Mr. Johnson. I think it would be a very good thing to inquire Into.
Mr. Anoelk Would you caiv to give us, without feeling that you are violat-
ing any confidence, the substance of a conversation that you had, I understand,
wltli I'resident Dartigueiuive regarding the relations between the occupation
and the Haitian Government?
Mr. Johnson. I saw President Dartiguenave twi<*e. The first time I saw
him, although I was well introduced to him, he was rather reticent. He talke<l
ahmg generally. We talkwl without any interpreter. And the second time I
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 787
saw him he \va? a little freer, and he confessed to me then that he had a very
difficult time in getting along in any direction at all with the American occupa-
tion. He said that they ignored him completely ; that they ignored his council
of state, I think then acting as a sort of cabinet ; that they paid no attention
to his recommendations, and that whatever they decided was to go through
they made him to understand that it was to go tlirough, and he talked in that
strain with me for half an hour.
Mr. Angell. When you say ** they " are we to understand that he referred
to the officers of the military occupation, or the American minister, or the
civilian treaty officials, or all of them?
Mr. Johnson. " They " was a comprehensive *' they." It takes them all in.
There seemed to be considerable dissatisfaction with our minister who was there
ait that time.
Mr. Angell. Mr. Bailly-Blanchard?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
(Whereupon the conmiittee adjourned until Wednesday, November 16, 1921,
:at 10.30 o'clock a. m.)
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INQUIRY IiNTO OCCUPATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF HAITI
AND SANTO DOMINGO.
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBEB 16, 1921.
United States Senate,
Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo,
Washington, D. C.
The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment, Senator
Tasker L. Oddie presiding.
Present; Senators McCormick (chairman) and Oddie.
Also present: Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Mr. Ernest Angell, and Maj. Edwin
N. McClellan, United States Marine Corps.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Chairman, Capt. Angell has here to-day a witness, Mr. Pilking-
ton, who he says has had exceptional opportunities to observe conditions in
Haiti, and my suggestion would be to have Capt. Angell, who has talked with
Mr. Pilkington, as I understand It, conduct the questioning at the outset.
Senator Oddie. If there is no objection, it is so ordered.
STATEMENT OF MB. H. M. PILKINGTON, TECHNICAL EXPEBT,
VICE PBESIDENT AND MANAGES AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
CO. OF HAITI, NEW TOBX, N. Y., AND POBT AU PBINCE, HAITI.
Mr. Angell. Mr. Pilkington, what is your occupation?
Mr. Pilkinoton. I am technical expert and vice president and manager of
the American Development Co. of Haiti.
Mr. Angell. You have been in Haiti?
Mr. Pilkington. Since 1918 practically up to the present.
Mr. Angell. What was the occasion which took you to Haiti, and what has
been your general business in Haiti?
Mr. Pilkington. I went there, originally, in an advisory capacity for the
banking interests who control the Haitian-American Corporation.
Mr. Angell. What was the Haitian-American Corporation?
Mr. Pilkington. That being a company organized to take over the public
utilities existing in Haiti, and to build a sugar mill and organize extensive
plantations in the plains of the Cul de Sac and Leogane, these being the only
two parts of Haiti in which sugar is naturally grown on the same lands as it
was In the days of the French occupation, and the only districts in which
the irrigation system is in practical operation, as originally engineered by the
French colonists.
Mr. Angell. What was the date of your going to Haiti?
Mr. Pilkington. That was early in 1918.
Mr. Angell. Have you been practically continuously in Haiti since that
time?
Mr. Pilkington. I have been practically continuously in Haiti since that
time, spending during that time easily a solid two years and a half of time
right in Haiti.
Mr. Angell. When did you come up from Haiti last?
Mr. Pilkington. I came up from Haiti last just l)efore Christmas.
Mr. Angell. Of 1920?
Mr. Pilkington. Yes. During that particular trip I made a complete and
intensive study of the physical properties of the corporation, and Inasmuch
as the success of any industrial project in any coutry is dei>endent upon the
mental attitude of the people of that country. It was equally improtant for
me to make a study of the psychology of all classes of the people.
My physical investigations and studies of the country and the lands natur-
ally brought me in contact with what we might call the lowest or the most prlmi-
789
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790 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
tive class, which is the laboring class or peasantry, this class of people being
entirely illiterate and living in the most primitive imaginable conditions. I
found that the thousands of people employed in field work and in this laboring
class on our many and various plantations extended over a very wide terri-
tory, were invariably and without exception a completely amiable, docile, tract-
able, and completely amenable people. They are naturally and inherently
cultivators of the ground 'and with a very slight outlay of patience and a
very slight exercise of friendly discipline, they became exceptionally good
plantation operators to the extent of planting, cultivating, and cutting the
cane, and it will be fair to say that a very large percentage of the vast number
of people of this class, who migrated from Haiti to Cuba as skilled cane cutters,
were educated in this line by the Haitian- American Sugar Co., and reiwrts
from Cuba were invariably to the purport that these people, the Haitians,
made the best cane cutters in Cuba.
I next made it my business to come in contact with what we might call the
ruling or political class of the country, because, at basis, every industrial or
other enterprise is fundamentally dependent upon the laws and the execution
of those laws In whatever country may be concerned. The original financing
of this Haitian-American Corporation was brought about and put to the
public directly and definitely upon assurance In Washington, by competent
people and competent officials, that the treaty between the United States and
Haiti was, in fact, to be a living thing. The large future in the floating of
the securities of this company, all of which floating came under my personal
observation at the time, was i)redlcated, one might say, wholly as to security,
upon the implied bona fides of the Unltetl States In carrying out this treaty—
the basing of which was security for foreign capital. This must be a self-
evident condition, because the development of a primitive country depends
upon one thing and one thing only without which it can not even l>egin— that
is, the bringing in of foreign capital. It is a manifest axiom that this capital
will not be risked in a country which does not ext«id a sufficient guaranty
for the security of that capital. I l)ecame acquainted on extremely Intimate
terms with what I have before called the ruling class, having had several very
confidential Interviews, which later ripened into an Intimate friendship on
the most agreeable basis, with President Dartiguenave, with practically all
of his cabinet, his consell d* etat, and practically all of tlie Intellectual class
of Haitians. I have been accorded what to me Is considered the high privilejje
of being invited to become a member of the Cercle Bellevue, the excluslTe
social club of Haiti, this Invitation l>eing extended by the president of that
club, one of the most cultured, educated, and enlightened gentlemen that one
might meet anywhere.
Mr. Anoell. Will you give the name of that gentleman, for the particular
reason that I rather expect to call him as a witness when we get down th^e?
Mr. Ptlkington. I would be glad to have aiH>ear on the record the name of
this gentleman, Mr. George de Lesplnasse, and In the same paragraph, an
apology for not mentioning, for want of space, the names of a multitude of
other Haitians, of whose acquaintance I am more than proud, and to all
of whom, or to any of whom, I am sure could Ik* intrusted the rein» of their
own Independent government, being fitted for this by a very high grade of
education, character, and political and diplomatic training, It being almost
an Invariable rule that the better class Haitian has had, In addition to a good
education In the higher schools of Haiti, a further education In European
conservatories.
There is not in Haiti what we would term a middle class, in the Europcta
or American acceptance of the term. What corresponds to this class might be
called the commercial class, the traders who biiy the products of the country
and export them to other countries, and those who maintain shops and storea.
This class Is, of course, literate, and to a greater or lesser extent well educated.
In all my two years or more intensive study In Haiti, I have not In any one
single Instance found an example of what we could rightly call a vicious type.
I say this broadly and in full knowledge of Its purport. I extend this ev^
to the members that I have seen and observed of the bandits or so-called
Cacos. I present for the Infonuation of the committee, on this line a photo-
graph of one of these bandits who openly confessed to have had a part hi the
torturing of Pvt. Lawrence, who was openly claimed to have been actually
eaten. It will be seen from this portrait that while the deeds of this roan
and of his like were unspeakable, that the type, ethnologlcally speaking. Is not a
vicious type.
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I also show the photograph of one of these Cacos who was concerned in
the mutilation and death of Lieut. Muth. The same observation will also apply
to the physiognomy of this man. Further evidence along this line of this
same clasH has l>een frequently told me by enlisted men of the marines, In
reference to treatment that they have had at the hands of this class of people.
I have been told by enlisted men who have been lost in the hills from their
detachments, and have wandered for days through the bandit territory in
their uniform, that they have been concealed away from other Oacos in
security and safety, and then forwarded on their way, that is in among this
same class of Cacos.
My impression gained at that time of the physical advantages of the country,
ns regarding the advantages of soil and light, and the prevalence of a large
amount of satisfactory field labor, were so favorable that in association with
the banking firm which controlled the majority of the stock of the Haitian-
American Corporation, I organized in Haiti, under the Haitian laws, a
genuine Haitian company, to comply in all respects with the existing laws
of Haiti, a development company, which was prepared with sufficient financial
backing to undertake and execute any form whatsoever, of development work
in the country, which would warrant a reasonable return upon the investment.
I was voluntarily elected under the law of Haiti to be the resident director
who ^ould be directly and personally responsible for the actions of this
company, as the law requires.
Immediately upon and before the formation of this company, I made an
extended study of all Haiti, its physical conditions, not only of soil but of
topography, the possibilities of transportation, the mineral possibilities, and the
existing conditions affecting in any way the practical development and ex-
ploitation of the country. The character of the country may l>e best described
in words which are accredited to Napoleon, whose brother-in-law, Le Clerc,
was the military governor of Haiti at the time that this country was France's
greatest possession, and one of the, if not the, finest colonies in all of the world.
This Gen. Le Clerc was making a report of conditions to his chief. Napoleon, and
was asked what Irind of a country is Haiti. He seized a large sheet of foolscap,
completely crumpled it up in one hand, and throwing it on the table, said,
" Sire, that is Haiti." In my opinion, no other description could so well
explain the topography of Haiti. With the exception of a few plains of rather
limited extent, the entire country is a mass of interlocking mountains, almost
totally without connecting valleys, many of which are so narrow that one may
stand with one foot on one mountain and the other foot on the other mountain —
these, of course, being the bases.
The general means of intercommunication is nothing but trails of loose stones,
the entire country being practically of limestone formation. Over these trails
the produce of the tiny farms with which the country is completely covered is
carried upon the heads of women, or on the backs of the burros, to some market
center. This means and method of transportation is entirely satisfactory to
these people in their present state of evolution. They, in fact, universally com-
plain of the crazy acts of the whites in destroying their nice, shady trails for
the purpose of making a wide, smooth road, on which their automobiles may
kill their burros and scare them to death.
It is manifest to even the casual observer who merely sees Haiti from a pass-
ing steamer that the country is only at the present time an agricultural possi-
bility, and it is manifest that hillside agriculture must be very largely con-
sidered in any general development of the country. This feature has been, one
might say, entirely overlooked and neglected by every tentative exploitation in
Haiti. Even from the colonial times the plains only have been really cultivated.
Haiti is characterized by their own writers as being a one-crop country — this
one crop being coffee — and it is fair to say that even in this narrow sense there
do not exist what can be rightly called coffee plantations, most of it being
grown in a desultory manner, wild and always at some considerable elevation,
and without irrigation. Cotton has also been an extensive article of export,
but its cultivation has never, up until the time of the United West Indies Cor-
poration, been scientifically pursued. The cotton, which has heretofore been
exported, having grown wild in various parts of the country, and being picked
by the natives and carried to the market in small quantities and exported in its
raw state.
The country may, therefore, from an industrial point of view, be considered
from an absolutely primitive basis, and whatever development is done there
62269— 21--PT 2 44 ^ i
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792 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
must start, in two senses of the word, from the gromid up. This naturally
brings us to the very vital, basic principles which must govern all such opera-
tions, first, the control of the lands, and second, the possibility of remaining in
peaceful and friendly possession and operation of these lands.
The first point — that is, the control of the lands-^nust necessarily mean
some form of exclusive ownership of these lands over a period necessarily
long to allow for complete development of these lands and the consequent
suflacient return for the money invested. At the present time there does not
exist in Haiti any general system whatever of determining the ownership of
these lands, there being a vast amount of territory which is claimed to be
Government land, but in any concession or lease involving these so-called Gov-
ernment lands there is always a requirement that they be surveyed under the
supervision of the Government to determine what is and what is not Govern-
ment land. The modus operandi of this survey consists of surveyors going to
the district concerned, communicating with the Judge de palx of that district
and with him going around through the district and getting the mutual consent
of the various farmers, who may be squatters or who may be owners — nobody
knows which — as to whose land is theirs and whose is not
Mr. Anoell. Are you speaking now of an actual survey which has been
made?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. I am speaking of actual surveys, such as they make in
order to give these concessions that I mentioned. If you want a concession
there you can not get it without proceeding in the following manner. This
will have a direct and definite bearing on the land laws.
As evidence of his ownership to a particular piece of land the so-called
farmer shows what he thinks is a deed to that land. There have be«i cases
concerning land for which the sugar company has been negotiating in which
the farmer has proudly produced a bill of sale for a horse, thinking and be-
lieving that that was a deed to his property. Under the Haitian law the un-
disputed possession of a piece of land for 20 years is considered as ownership
of the land. Upon the death of a member of the family of this farmUig class
there must always be a more or less elaborate funeral ceremony the expenses
of which are to them fairly heavy and are in a large number of cases borne
by selling a small piece of this land which, as can readily be seen, has com-
plicated the already absurd conditions of ownership; so that in the further
absence of any system of records it is well nigh impossible to know whether
one has bought or leased a certain piece of land or not It is obvious that a
correct title to a piece of land must be based on a correct location of that
land ; that is to say, a correct survey. Up to the present time there has been
no official survey of Haiti, and one of the fundamental and most important
improvements brought about by the American occupation, and very ably and
systematically conducted, has been a complete, up-to-date, scientific campaign
of triangulation and survey of all Haiti by officials lent by the United States
Government — I think the department of the Geological Survey.
Mr. Howe. Is this an accomplished fact?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. An accomplished fact ; yes. This work to be entirely com-
pleted, would require a term of several more years, but until it is completed
it is an absolute physical impossibility for anybody to acquire a definite, final,
recorded o^vnership of a tract of land, except by the mutual consent of all
parties interested as to the established boundaries of this piece of land in
question.
This work was begun and has been continued in the most approved and
scientific manner, starting from a regular base line, being surveyed and most
accurately measured and remeasured on the plains of the Cul de Sac, and has
incli^ded the measuring and marking of all the visible points — that is. the tops
of mountains — over the entire country. A large number of these points has been
triangulated and the angles closed as the surveyors stated. It will be only
from the extension of these lines into all localities and all parts of the map that
definite possession of the various tracts of land can be accurately determined
and recorded.
We now come to the laws concerning the holding of these lands. It is safe
to say that the most serious thought in the mind of the Haitian is the thought
that the foreigner is going to get an actual, physical foothold on his land, which
is a very small country, and in time force him out of an independent existence.
I feel, from the standpoint of my experience with the people that this feeling
Is perhaps the most important feeling to be considered in dealing with the
native Haitians.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 793
It is true that there are vast tracts of land in Haiti, claimed to be and
probably actually owned by various Haitians, on which they never set foot. I
have been told in many cases by Haitians that they own tracts in the north of
Haiti, where the Cacos have always existed, upon which they have never dared
set foot on aocount of the lawless squatters, who are now occupying that land
and claim to own It through the mere fact of being there. It must be noted
that this condition does not comply with the condition of the undisputed
occupation of territory such as a squatter clause in a law would imply. The
present constitution, of Haiti contains a provision for the acquiring of the
ownership of Haitian land by foreigners. It is the claim of the Haitians that
this constitution Is not constitutional ; that it was not promulgated by their
own elective body, and that it contains principles which are absolutely and
forever antagonistic, and to which Haiti, as a body, would never and could
never agree. This clause allows the ownership of Haitian land by foreigners,
but does not, as it originally stands, go into any details. The Haitian Govern-
ment, after that constitution was enacted, some time in 1820 — I do nor remembei
just when — adopted, voted, and passed a law which purported to set forth the
conditions under which that clause was operative. These conditions were so
entirely contradictory- of the spirit of that clause that foreigners who had in
the meantime Invested In property In Haiti, and had been developing the same,
naturally became very much perturbed, and un histant protest was Imlged with
the comi>etent authorities, and this offending law was temporarily suspended.
During the course of my acquaintance with these people, and my travels over
all the country, I can truly say that I have met with nothing but the utmost
courtesy, good feeling, and cooi>eration of every class. The President has often
expressed in the most heartfelt and feeling way liis great sympathy and his
great willingness to help any American enterprise which was based primarily
on the good of Haiti. This spirit of cooperation I find In all the official class of
the Government. I will specify in particular with great pleasure the progressive
spirit and great ability of the minister of public works, Ix)uls Koy, whom I
found to be capable, courteous, intelligent, and a credit to his country. All
work of development of any kind whatever under any form of concession comes
under the jurisdiction of the minister of public works, and the Haitian-American
Corporation has, therefore, through Its various utilities and industries, been
cont nually In touch and subject to that department of the Government, and I
am sure there does not exist any single cause of complaint on that score.
There does exist, however, a universal spirit of complaint and criticism on the
position held and action taken by various American officials In that country.
The causes and the reasons for these complaints were a matter of very careful
study by me, for it Is self-evident that if officials who are carrying out the
physical occupation of a country are in continual friction with the officials of
that country*, the pui-poses of that occupation will never be achieved. I found a
very intense attitude of antagonism existing In all classes of society. The
laboring class, based in all cases that I could observe upon the application of
the law of the corv6e, especially in the building of roads In the north
Mr. Angell. The feeling you are speaking of is the feeling you found at the
time you were there, between 1918 and 1920?
Mr. PrLKiNGTON. Yes. This Is all, of course, from the studies which I made
wh le I was there, and is the result of actual studies, not just Impressions. I
made it mv business while in Haiti to learn the vernacular of the coimtry, and
am capable of maintaining an Intelligible conversation with the actual peasantry,
and I have talked directly with many of these people, principally moimtalneers,
those who live all their lives In the mountains, coming down to the plains only
for market puriK)ses. This class, as well as all other classes In Haiti, definitely
accused the powers In charge of the work on these roads with abuses of this
corv^ law. As to the actual details of these abuses, it was not of Interest to me
to investigate In detail, the lmiH)rtant fact being that the attitude of mind back
of the animus which was clearly shown was the important factor, not neces-
siirllv the exact facts which brought about this state of mind.
wiiat one might call the next class that had been concerned, and that com-
plained of the occupation, would be the former Government clerk, as we might
call him. Of course, in their former government everyone who had the requisite
influence held a government job. It is weU known that many of these jobs
were held by people who did not work at the jobs, but hired some other man
at a much lower pay to do the work, and he pocketed the difference, but, at any
rate, there were a vast number of i)eople thrown out of employment by the
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794 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
c(»ining of the American occupatioDj this, of course, being no fault of the
American occupation whatever, but furnishing a class of malcontents.
The next class one might consider would be the educated civilian class. It
is fair to say that their antagonism was due solely to friction in various ways
between the members of the occupation forces and themselves. This started,
as nearly as I can make out, coincident with the landing of the wives of the
American officers. Up to that time the American officers had free and complete
social intercourse with the Haitians, both in their families and in their clubs,
during which, of course, they freely danced with the Haitian ladies. With
the coming of the women of the occupation this peaceful state of affairs was
completely upset, tlie women having a natural aversion, due to their former
training and method of thinking, to dancing and general social intercourse
with the Haitians, men or women ; the husbands of these women also strongly
objecting for the same reason. Therefore, there came an immediate rift In the
social lute. The exclusive Haitian elubs, which formerly had welcomed the
officers — the American officers — as guests of the club, began to resent this con-
dition of iiffairs, and the American club, which eventually became dominated
by officers of the occupation, at no time within my knowledge as a member of
tJiis club received as guests any Haitians. In spite of this natural and justified
feeling of resentment by the Haitians of this condition, the Cercle Bellevue,
probably the most exclusive Haitian club, continued to receive not only as
guests but as members certain Americans and other white men in whom they
had confidence and trust, showing, to my mind, a marked spirit of lenience in
courtesy in favor of the Haitians,
I might cit« a case of direct abuse which I know contributed in a very large
part, although one might call it trivial in itself, to the general feeling of re-
sentment. There Is among the many talented Haitians a very talented and
finished musician, a graduate of a Paris conservatory of music. After a dinner
which I had the pleasure of attending at this gentleman*s house he told me
of an instance which had occurred shortly before my arrival in Haiti. He
was giving a private piano recital of his own compositions to some of his pupils
and their parents in his home. While playing these compositions, which his
guests were enjoy 'ng from their posit on in his garden, they were bombarded
^^ ith rocks from the neighboring dwelling, which was occupied by an American
officer. This stoning was so continuous and so dangerous that his guests all
were compelled to take flight, and he had to put out the lights and lock up the
house. He made complaint to the competent military authorities. They imme-
diately took prompt action and offered to dLscipline this officer, but at the
interposition of tills gentleman himself punishment was waived. I afterwards
personally became acquainted with this officer and found him to be a very
efficient, excellent soldier, with a very good record, this incident being merely
one of many Instances of the power of the demon rum, which is one of the very
great difficulties with which the commanding officer of the forces in any tropical
country has to deal.
Mr. Howe. Did it turn out that this officer Wmself had thrown these stones?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. Yes; it did. It is easy to see what a state of mind was
brought about among the Intellectual classes of Haitians, for it must be here
noted that the bettjer classes are intermarried to an extent that one could hardly
conceive, and therefore an injury to one is an injury to all.
Mr. Angell. Did you hear of that Incident referred to by other Haitians of
that class, friends of this musician?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON, Yes; this incident thereafter being a topic of universal d's-
cussion whenever the actons of the marines woiv ctm.^ldered. It was my
pleasure and privilege to help this gentleman in his endeavors and final .^success
in having his works published by the music firm of Charles Fisher & Co.. of
New York. The Columbia Phonograph i>e<>ple have also made re<»ords of his
works, as have also the Aefdian Co., in making master rei'ords for their duoart
piano, which is by far the most expensive and the best of the player pianos,
using only rolls made by the composers themselves. I w^as, therefore, fortunately
able to lessen in that particular case the unfoi*tmiate impression of Americans
in general which a large proportion of the Haitians held, and I think it will
be fair to say that, thanks to the personal living and necotiation of cortaiu
Americans who they have in their midst, this class of Haitian has come to
know that such things are not necessarily a common attribute of Americans.
We now come to what, in my mind, may be truly considered as the greatest
and the most Important source of complaint which the Haitian has. In August.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 795
3920, it was brought to my attention by various prominent Haitians that there
was a matter of very serious import pending at the palace.
Mr. Anoell. You were in Haiti at that moment?
Mr. PiLKixoTON. Yes; I wavS there. This information was brought to me in
the office of my company in Haiti and personally told to me by a certain member
of the Haitian Government. He told me personally that the existing contract
between the National Bank of Haiti and the Government of Haiti, being up
for revision, had been dlscusse<l and a certain clause modifle<l to the mutual
agreement of the National Bank of Haiti and of the Government of Haiti.
Mr. Angell. You will remember, Mr. Chairman, that this was the matter
testified to by Mr. Farnham, the first witness before the committee.
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. According to my informant, a draft containing all these
agreeil modifications was to be submitted to the President for his signature.
UiK>n the Presldent*s refusal to sign this document, the financial adviser, who,
under the treaty, is an employee of Haiti, attached to the department of finance
of Haiti, refused to further discuss the pending budget for the year, implying
that he would not go further in the matter until the President of Haiti had
signeil that document. Ui)on his continued refusal the .salaries of the President
and several of his officials were stopi)ed.
Mr. Howe. This Is the financial adviser you are talking about?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. The financial adviser; yes. Upon Inquiries being made as
to the reason for tbls by the President of Haiti, he was definitely given to
understand, thnmgh the minister of tiie i:nite<l States in Haiti, as well as the
financial adviser, that It was demanded by the United States Government.
Mr. Howe. Wlio was the minister? Give his name.
Mr. PiLKiNOTo.x. Mr. Bailly-Blanchard» President Dartlguenave still refused,
juMl It transplre<l that Col. Uussell, the chief of the military forces, upon whom
the actual life of President Dartlguenave depended, the financial adviser, Mr.
Macllhenny, who by this time hail apparently arrogated to himself functlcms
far beyond what are defined in the treaty, and Mr. Bailly-Blanchard, who
diplomatically Is the United States Government as far as Haiti is concerned,
demanded audience directly with President Dartlguenave, In defiance of all
diplomatic usages and ethics, a financial matter, of course, necessarily being
proi)erly under the Jurisdiction of the department of finance and its minister,
and in this Interview, In tlie name of the Government of the United States,
demanded that he sign that (H)ntract as It stood.
This act, whether ju8tltte<l or not by facts which do not appear and have
never been In any way explained, to my knowledge, either to the Haitian people
or to anyone else. Is, to my direct knowledge, an insurmountable obstacle to any
genuine entente l>etween the United States Government and the Haitian people
until It Is definitely and finally explained publicly, and if unwarranted, openly
and officially a|)ologlzed for. It Is a fact, which Is evident to the observation
of all thinkers In any part of the world, that the smaller a nation, or the
smaller a group of |)eople, or the more Insignificant an Individual is, the more
jealous he is of his actual rights, and the more exigent he Is In anything which
ctin aflfect his iiersonal pride, and of all races In the world It Is no doubt the
fact that the feeling is strongest in the I^atin.s, and they are the people who most
resent any Infraction of these rights and of this amour proprC*. It may be, and
If so I would certainly like to personally know, that we, an enlightened people,
and the most aidvanced Nation in the world, as we freely admit ourselves on
all occasions, have such a form of government and such a methixl of procedure
as to allow our direct representatives to act In a manner which, at least to the
eye and the mind of the oi)en observer, appears to be nothing but brigandage.
Immediately ui)ou knowledge of this act becoming public, an Instant and
general protest was filed by all the resjwnslble Interests In Haiti, not only native
but American and foreign. This Insistenc*e by the American Government was
finally withdrawn, but . has never been explained, as hei*etofore said, nor
apologized for, within the knowledge of anybody with whom I am acquainted.
Any scheme of future reconstruction, of course, must be i)redicated upon the
good will of the i)eople, and equally, of course, must be administered by a com-
l)etent assembly. Until aiM>log>' for and reparation of another great outstanding
abuse is made such a constitutional assembly will be almost imi)ossible to
convene in Haiti. I refer to the act described to me personally by certain
Senators concerned at the time as a physical driving out by force of the deputies.
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. I can confidently say, irrespective of the actual pros and
cons of this question, that the feeling which actuated this general protest con-
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796 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
cerning the revised .bank contract was based on the fact that the financial ad-
visor appeared as a court of ultimate resort in this question, as in all others
of a like nature, and by his apparent usurpation of powers not belonging to
him under the treaty, in connection with his forcing of tliis clause, caused a
universal feeling of distrust and a lack of confidence in any action whicb he
might be called upon to take in connection with the finances of Haiti.
Mr. Angell. At this point I should like to offer in the record, Mr. Chairman,
the verbatim protest of the American, foreign, and Haitian business men and
business interests in Haiti against this proposed action, the protest being dated
July 30, 1920, the material portions of which are the last two paragraphs.
(The protest referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)
"The protest printed below, against article 15 of the contract with with-
drawal, was sent to the Haitian secretary of finance on July 30, 1920.
" The undersigned bankers, merchants, and representatives of the various
branches of the financial and commercial activities in Haiti have the honor
to submit to the high appreciation of the secretary of state for finance the fol-
lowing consideration:
"They have been advised from certain sources that pressing recommenda-
tions have been made to the Grovernment of Haiti.
** 1. That a law be immediately voted by which would be prohibited the
importation or exportation of all money not Haitian, except that quantity of
foreign money which, in the opinion of the financial adviser, would be suf-
ficient for the needs of commerce.
**2. That in the charter of the Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti
there be inserted an article giving power to the financial adviser together with
the Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti to take all measures concerning
the importation or exportation of non-Haitian moneys.
"The undersigned declare that the adoption of such a measure, under
whatever form it may be, would be of a nature generally contrary to the
collective interests of the Haitian people and the industry of Haiti. It;
would be dangerous to substitute the will of a single man, however eminent
he might be, however honorable, however infallible, for a natural law which
regulates the movements of the monetary circulation in a country.
"It would be more dangerous yet to introduce in the contract of the Banque
Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti a clause which would assure this estab-
lishment a sort of monopoly in the foreign money market, which constltntes
the principal base of the operations of high commerce, when it has already
the exclusive privilege of emission of bank notes. Such a clause would make
of all other bankers and merchants its humble tributaries, obeying Its law
and its caprices.
"(Signed): The Royal Bank of Canada; American Foreign Banking Cor-
poration; Haitian American Sugar Co.; Raporel Steamship Line; P. C. S.;
Electric Light Co.; Panama Line; Ed. Esteve & Co.; Clyde Line; Comptolr
Commercial; Gebara & Co.; Alfred Vleux; V. G. Makhlouf; N. Sllvera; Slm-
monds Freres ; Roberts, Button & Co. ; West Indies Trading Co. ; J. Fadoul &
Co.; R. Drouard; A. de Matteis & Co.; J. M. Richardson & Co.; Comptoir
Francals; H. Dereix; E. Robelin; F. Cheriez; I. J. Blglo, and George H.
MacFadden."
Senator Oddie. How does the price of silver per ounce compare with the
price of silver per ounce In the world markets?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. There Is no price per ounce. There Is no sliver coin there
at all.
Senator Oddie. I mean the sliver that can be "bought in the markets
Mr. PiLKiNQTON. The silver that Is bought in the market is nothing but old
coins that have been hoarded here and there.
Senator Oddie. On what basis do they sell per ounce?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. They do not sell It per ounce. Nobody sells anything hardly
there. There Is no Industry there. It Is a raw, primitive country. You can
not go and buy sliver per ounce.
Senator Oddie. You spoke of the value per ounce?
Mr. PILKINGTON. Not the value per ounce.
Senator Oddie. Of old coins?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. These silver coins have a value beyond their face Taloe
for souvenirs, but in fact the few that do come in from the country which
have been hoarded by the natives have been acquired by the natives from some-
body else, and they make them up Into neck chains, with pendants on them.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 797
and thereby you have to pay more than the face value of the coin to get it
Silver can not be obtained at the bank, the coins in circulation being nickel
and copper.
Mr. Anoeix. Let me put the question to you in another way. Do you think
that the protest of the business men, which has just been offered in the record,
and to which you referred, was based to any considerable degree on a fear by
those business men that the effect of the operation of the proposed clause would
have been to interrupt by such a legal monopoly the free play of foreign
exchange, depending for its normal free play upon the uninterrupted right
of import and export of foreign money, and that such interruption of the
natural law of exchange would have been detrimental to the individual interests
of these business men and business houses and detrimental to the general trade
and commerce of Haiti?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. Such an attitude was the generally voiced opinion of every-
one with whom I communicated on the subject.
Mr. Anqell. Is it your understanding that subsequently the salaries of the
President, the cabinet, and other Government officials thus suspended for the
month of July, 1920, as you have testified, were finally paid by the financial
adviser?
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. Yes.
Mr. Angell. And if so, when?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. I do uot remember when. It was commonly stated that
these payments were resumed and that the United States Government receded
from this position.
Mr. Anoell. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in the record
the correspondence which passed between the Haitian Government, the Ameri-
can minister to Haiti, the civilian treaty officials, and directly between the
Haitian Government and the American Government In Washington on this sub-
ject. This correspondence which I am introducing now also Includes several
protests made to the Haitian Government on the occasion of this proposed
monopoly to be given to the National Bank of Haiti, emanating from the Brit-
ish, French, and Italian Legations to the Haitian Government.
(The matter referred to is here printed In full, as follows:)
At the session of the Haitian National Assembly on August 4, 1920, the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Haiti and the Haitian minister of finance laid before
that body the course of the American financial adviser which had made it im-
possible to submit to the assembly accounts and budgets in accordance with
the constitution of Haiti and the Haiti-American convention. The statement
which follows is taken from the ofllcial Haitian gazette, the Moniteur, of
August 7, 1920 :
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT.
Gentlemen of the council of state, on account of unforeseen circumstances
It has not been possible for the Government of the Republic to present to you
in the course of the session of your high assembly which closes to-day (Au-
gust 4) the general accounts of the receipts and expenditures for 191^19
and the budget for 1920-21, in accordance with the constitution.
It is certainly an exceptional case, the gravity of which will not escape you.
You will learn the full details from the report which the secretary of finance
and commerce will submit to you, in which it will be shown that the responsi-
bility for it does not fall on the executive power ♦ ♦ ♦.
In the life of every people there come moments when it must know how to
be resigned and to suffer. Are we facing one of those moments? The atti-
tude of the Haitian people, calm and dignified, persuades me that, marching
closely with the Government of the Republic, there Is no suffering which is
not disposed to undergo to safeguard and secure the triumph of Its rights.
Dartiguenave.
REPORT OF the SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE.
Gentlemen of the council of state, article 116* of the constitution prescribed
in its first paragraph: "The general accounts and the budgets prescribed by
the preceding article must be submitted to the legislative body by the secre-
tary of finance not later than eight days after the opening of the legislative
Digitized by VjOOQIC
798 IXQOKY INTO (XVUPATIOX OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
And artide 2 of the American-Haitian convention of September 16, 1915,
stipulates in its second perainnph : " The President of Haiti shali appoint, on
the nomination of the President of the United States, a financial adviser, who
shall be a civil servant attached to the ministry of finance, to whom the secre-
tary shall lend effective aid in the prosecution of his work. The financial ad-
viser shall work out a system of public accounting, shall aid in increasing the
revenues and In their adjustment to expenditures ♦ • •."
Since February of this year (1920) the secretaries of the various depart-
ments, in order to conform to the lett«- of article 116 of the constitution, and
to assure continuity of public service in the matter of receipts and expendi-
tures, set to work at tlie pr^wration of the budgets for their departments for
1920-21.
By a dispatch dated March 22. 1920. the department of finance sent the
draft budgets to Mr. A. J. Maumus, acting financial adviser, for preliminary
study by that oflldaL But the acting adviser replied to the department by a
letter of March 29 : ** I suggest that in view of the early return of Mr. John
Mcllhehny, the financial adviser, measures be taken to postpone all discussion
regarding the said draft budgets between the different departments and the
oflice (of the financial adviser) to permit him to take part in the discussions."
Nevertheless, the regular session was opened on the constitutional date,
Monday, April 5, 1920. Mr. John Mcllhenny, the titular financial adviser ab-
sent in the United States since October, 1919, on a financial mission for the
Government, prolonged his stay in America, detained no doubt by the insur-
mountable difllculties in the accomplishment of his mission (the placing of a
Haitian loan on the New York market). Since on the one hand the adviser
could not overcome these dlflkmlties, and on the other hand his presence at
Port an Prince was absolutely necessary for the preparation of the budget in
conformity with the constitution and the Haitian-American convention, the
Ck>vemment deemed it essential to ask him to return to Port au Prince for that
purpose. The Government in so doing secured the good offices of the Ameri-
can legation, and Mr. Mcllhenny returned from the United States about the
1st of June. The legislature had already been In session almost t\vo months.
About June 15 the adviser began the study of the-budget with the secre-
taries. The conference lasted about 12 days and in that time, after courte-
ous discussion, after some cuts, modifications, and additions, plans for
the following budgets were agreed upon :
1. Ways and means.
2. Foreign relations.
3. Finance and commerce.
4. Interior.
On Monday, July 12, 1920, at aSO, the hour agreed upon between the minis-
ters and the adviser, the ministers met to continue the study of the budget
which they wanted to finish quickly • • ♦. Between 4 and 4.30 the sec-
retary of finance received a letter from the adviser which reads as follows-
" I find myself obliged to stop all study of the budget until certain affairs
of considerable importance for the welfare of the country shall have been
finally settled according to the recommendations made by me to the Haitian
Government.
" Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurance of my highest consideration.
" John McIlhennt."
Such an unantieipateil and unju.Ktifiable decision on the part of Mr Mcllhenny.
an official attached to the ministry of finance, caused the whole Government
profound surprise and warranted dissatisfaction. ♦ ♦ •
On July 13 the department of finance replied to the financial adviser as
follows :
"I l^g to acknowledge your letter of July 12, in which you say, * I find myself
obliged, etc. ♦ ♦ ♦ »
" In taking note of this declaration, the importance and gravity of which
certainly can not escape you. I can only regret in the name of the Government—
* 1. That you omitted to telt.me with the precision which such an emergency
demands what are the affairs of an importance so considerable for the welfare
of the country and the settlement of which, according to the recommendations
-^o by you, Is of such great moment that you can subordinate to that settle-
he continuation of the work on the budget?
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n^QUIBY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 799
''2. That you have taken such a serious step without considering that in
so doing you have divested yourself of one of the essential functions which de-
volves upon you as financial adviser attached to the department of finance.
'* The preparation of the budget of the State constitutes one of the principal
obligations of those intrusted with it by law, because the very life of the nation
depends upon its elaboration. The legislature has been in session since April 5
last By the constitution the draft budgets and the general accounts should be
submitted to the legislative body within eight days after the opening of the ses-
sion, that Is to say by April 13. The draft budgets were sent to your office <m
March 22.
'* By reason of your absence from the country, the examination of these
drafts was posti)oned, the acting financial adviser not being willing to shoulder
tlie responsibility; we refer you to his letters of March 29 and of April 17
and 24. Finally ♦ • ♦ you came back to Port au Prince, and after some two
week& you began with the secretaries to study the draft budgets.
" The Government therefore experiences a very disagreeable surprise on
reading your letter of July 12. It becomes my duty to inform you of that dis-
agreeable surprise, to formulate the legal reservations In the case, and to in-
form you finally that you bear the sole responsibility for the failure to present
the budget In due time.
" Fleury Fequiebe, Secretary of Finance"
On July 19, Mr. Ballly-Blanchard, the American minister, placed In the hands
of the President of the Republic a memorandum emanating from Mr. Mcllhenny,
In which the latter formulates against the Government complaints sufficient,
according to him, to explain and justify the discontinuance of the preparation
of the budget, announced In his letter of July 12.
MEMORANDUM OF MR. M'iUIENNY.
I hiftl Instructions from the D€t>artment of State of the United States Just
before my departure for Ha'tl. In a passage of a letter of May 20, to declare to
the Haitian Government that It was necessary to give Its Immediate and formal
approval —
1. To a modification of the bank contract agreed upon by the Department of
State and the National City Bank of New York.
2. To the transfer of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti to a new
bank registered under the laws of Haiti to be known as the National Bank
of the Republic of Haiti.
3. To the execution of article 15 of the contract of withdrawal, prohiblthag
the lmi)ortation and exportation of non-Haitian money, except that which might
be necessary for the needs of commerce In the opinion of the financial adviser.
4. To the immediate vote of a territorial law which has been submitted to the
Department of State of the United States and which has its approval.
On my arrival in Haiti I visited fhe President with the American minister
and learned that the modifications of the bank contract and the transfer of the
bank had been agreed to, and the only reason why the measure had not been
made official was because the National City Bank and the National Bank of
Haiti had not yet presented to the Government tshelr full powers. He declared
that the Government did not agree to the publication of a decree executing the
TX)ntract of withdrawal, because It did not consider that the economic condition
of the country Justified it at that time. To which I replied that the Government
of the United States expected the execution of article 15 of the contract of with-
drawal as a direct and solemn engagement of the Haitian Government, to which
it was a party, and I had Instructions to Insist upon its being put into execu-
tion at once. ♦ ♦ ♦
THE COUNTER MEMOIR.
To this memorandum the executive authority replied by a counter memoir,
which read, in part, as follows:
" The modifications proposed by the Department of State (of the United
States) to the bank contract, studied by the Haitian Government, gave rise to
coanterpropositlons on the part of the latter, which the Department of State
would not accept. The Haitian Government then accepted these modifications
in nine articles in the form of which they had been concluded and signed at
Washhigton on Friday, February 6, 1920, by the financial adviser, the Haitian
minister, and the (Haitian) secretary of finance. But when Messrs. Scarpa and
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800 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Williams, representing, respectively and officlaUy. the National Bank of Haiti
and the National City Bank of New York, came before the secretary of finance
for his signature to the papers relative to the transfer of the National Bank of
Haiti to the National City Bank of New York, the secretary of finance experi-
enced a disagreeable surprise in finding out that to article 9 of the document
signed at Washington February 6, 1920, and closed as stated above, there had
been added an amendment bearing on the prohibition of non-Haitian money.
The secretary could only decline the responsibility of this added paragraph, of
which he had not the slightest knowledge and which consequently had not been
submitted to the Government for its agreement. It is for this reason alone that
the agreement is not signed up to this time. The Government does not even
yet know who was the author of this addition to the document to which Its
consent had never been asked.
" To-day, gentlemen, you have come to the end of the regular session for this
year. Four months have run by without the Government being able to present
to you the budget for 1920-21. Such are the facts, in brief, that have marked
our relations recently with Mr. Mcllhenny. ♦ ♦ •
" FLF.UBY Fequiere, Secretary of Finance*'
(The corr^spomleiice referre<l to is here printed in full as follows:)
Port au Pkince, August 2, 1920.
Mr. A. J. Maumus,
Receiver General of Customs:
In accordance with the suggestion made to the financial adviser on July 2i
yciur oflice began on the morning of July 30 to pay the salaries for that month
to the ofliiclals and public employees at Port au Prince.
Nevertheless, up to this morning, August 2, no checks have been delivered to
His Excellency the President of the Uepublic. the secretaries of the various de-
partments, the state councilors, and the palace interpreter.
In calling your attention to this fact, I ask that you will please inform me
of the reasons for it.
I<^tj:ury Fequiere, Secretary of Finance.
Port au Prince, August 2, 1920.
The Secretary of Finance and Commhmce:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of August 2 in
which you ask this office to inform you regarding the reasons for the nondeliv-
ery, up to the present time, of the checks for His Excellency the President
of the Republic, for the departmental secretaries, the state councilors, and the
palace interpreter for the month of July.
In reply this oflfice hastens to Inform ygu that up to the present time it has
not been put In possession of the mandates and orders regarding these payments.
A. J. Maumus, Receiver General
Port au Prince, August 2, 1920.
The Financial Adviser:
The department of finance, informed that checks for His Excellency the
President of the Republic, the departmental secretaries, the state councilors,
and the imlace interpreter had not been delivered up to this morning, August
2, reported the fact to the receiver general of customs, asking to be informed
regarding the reasons. The receiver general replied immediately that the dday
was due to his failure to receive the necessary mandates and orders. Bnt
these papers were sent to you by the department of finance on July 21 and
were returned by the payment service of the department of the interior on
July 26, a week ago.
In Inclose copies of the note from the department of finance to the receiver
general and of Mr. Maumus's reply.
I should like to believe that bringing this matter to your attention would be
suflScient to remedy it.
Fleuby Fequiere, Secretary of Finance.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 801
Port au Prince, August 5, 1920.
To the Secretary of Finance and Commerce :
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of August 2
regarding the delay in payment of the salaries of the President of the Republic,
secretaries, and State councilors.
In reply I have the honor to inform you that the payment of these salaries*
has been suspended by order of the American minister until further orders
are received from him.
J. McIlhenny, Financial Adviser,
Port au Prince, August 10, 1920,
To the Financial Adviseb:
I acknowledged receipt of your note of August 5 in reply to mine of August
2 asking Information regarding the reasons for your nonpayment of the
salaries for last July due to his excellency the President of the Republic, the
secretaries, and State councilors, and the palace interpreter.
I note the second paragraph of your letter, in which you say, " In reply, etc."
I do not know by what authority an American minister can have given you
such instructions or by what authority you acquiesced. The nonpayment of the
salaries due the members of the Government constitutes a confiscation vexa-
tious for them and for the entire country. It is not the function of this depart-
ment to Judge the motives which led the American minister to take so excep-
tionally serious a step ; but it is the opinion of the Government that the financial
adviser, a Haitian oflScial, was not authorized to acquiesce.
Fltjbby Fequierb,
Secretary of Finance.
POBT AU PWNCE, August 5, 1920.
Mr. A. Bailly-Blanchabd,
American Minister:
I have the honor to inform your excellency that the ofllces of the financial
adviser and of the receiver general have not yet delivered the checks for the
July salaries of his excellency the President of the Republic, of the secre-
taries. State councilors, and palace interpreter, although all other officials were
paid on July 30.
The secretary of finance wrote to the receiver general asking information on
the subject and was informed that he had not received the necessary mandates
and orders. The fact of the nondelivery of the checks and the reply of the
receiver general were then brought to the attention of the financial adviser,
who has not yet replied.
In Informing your legation of this situation I call the attention of your
excellency to this new attitude of the financial adviser, a Haitian official,
to the President of the Republic and the 'other members of the (Government,
an attitude which is an insult to the entire nation.
J. Barau,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
Port au Prince, August 6, 1920.
Mr. a. Bailly-Blanchard,
American Minister:
I have the honor to inclose a copy of a note from the financial adviser to the
secretary of finance, replying to a request for information regarding the non-
payment of checks ♦ ♦ ♦.
In his reply the financial adviser informs the department of finance that
^* the payment of these salaries has been suspended by order of the American
minister until further orders are received from him."
My Government protests against this act of violence, which is an attack
upon the dignity of the people and Government of Haiti.
J. Barau,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
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802 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
PoBT AU Prince, Augufit 6, 1920.
Mr. J. Barav,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs:
I have the honor to ocknowledge the receipt of your excellency's note under
date of August 5.
In reply I have to state that the action of the financial adviser therein re-
ferred to was taken by direction of tliis legation.
A. Bailly-Blanchabd,
Afnerioan Minister.
Port au Prince, August 7, 1920.
Mr. A. Bailly-Blanchard,
American ^tinisler:
In reply to my letter of Auprust 5, In which I had the honor to inform your ex-
cellency of the nonpayment of checks, ♦ • • your excellency informs me
that it i8 by direction of the I^jratlon of the T^nited States that the financial
adviser acted.
My Government takes note of your declaration.
J. Barait,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
Port au Prince, August 2, 19i0.
To the Secretary of Financk :
I have the honor to inform you that I have been instructed by my Gorern-
ment that in view of the C9ntinual delay in obtaining the consent of the Haitian
Government to the transfer to the new bank of the modified concession as
agreed upon between the Government of the United States and the National
City Bank, the Government of the United States has agreed to let the opera-
tions of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti continue indefinitely on the
French c<mtract at present existing without amendment.
I desire urgently to draw your attention to the fact that it would be raost
desirable In the interest of the Haitian i)eople that the Government of Haiti
should give its imme«liate consent to the proposed modifications of the contrart
and to accept the transfer of the bank rather than to see the present contract
coiitinne with Its present clauses.
John McIlhenny,
Financial Adviser.
Mr. Anqetx. I would like to introduce at this time President Dartiguenave's
protest, made direct to President Wilson, dated August 9, 1»20.
(The communication referred to is to be filed with the clerk of the com-
mittee.)
The Chairman. Continue, Mr. Pilklngton.
Mr. Pilkington. In connection with complaints concerning the financial ail-
viser, it is well to record
The Chairman. Mr. McIlhenny?
Mr. Pilkington. Yes. It \v, well to record a reiterated complaint of the
Government of Haiti that their constitutional body for the regulation and ac-
counting of moneys, called the Chambre des Compts, was abolished by tlie
occupation, the Government of Haiti, therefore, contending that they had
no means whatever of knowing or of keeping track of — that is, controlling. In
the French language, the expenditures of the country, all of these matters beiii;;
left entirely in the hands of the individual who at the time should hold the
position of financial adviser.
Another very large element of annoyance, at least among the business men
and the business interests of Haiti, luus been occasioned through the application
of the customs tariff. When the receiver general and financial adviser came
into office they found In existence a schedule of tariffs, which had been in ex-
istence for many years and under which they operated and collected duti*^.
This tariff is explained by the Haitian Government officials themselves ais
having never been revised by themselves and never been in completely oper-
ative condition.
The Chairman. You mean that at no time was the Haitian tariff enforced?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 803
Mr. PnjciNGTON. I mean they had not as yet brought that up to date. They
had not revised It as time went on to keep it in line. I will show several in-
stances of that. This tariff is in many particulars practically obsolete in its
wording. To take the specific case of automobiles, there- is no more vital or
necessary adjunct to business in Paltl or to progress than the automobile.
The Chairman. To what extent were they used before the occupation ?
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. Before the occupation there was no business at all, and I
do not think the automobile was there at all before the occupation.
The Chairman. You mean it was not possible to use automobiles before the
occupation ?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. No; It was not possible. You see, the automobile now is
iiscfl, of course, over the few roads that they have and almost entirely for
business purposes and, of course, for military purposes.
The Chairman. You mean there were no roads before the occupation?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. No; not to amount to anything.
The Chairman. So It would be immaterial whether the tariff permitted their
importation or not?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. Y'es; but at that time, as I was going on to say, the carriage
was the only vehicle, and that was not a vehicle of commerce, but distinctly
a pleasure vehicle and was, therefore, charged with a high rate of duty. When
the present custom officials applied the rates, as contemplated by this tariff,
tlie result was that together with various surcharges and surtaxes, which the
Haitian Government has from time to time put on the original taxes, the im-
portation of an automobile of any kind into Haiti cost practically 28 per cent
in the way of duty.
The Chairman. The receiver general and his representatives enforced the
customs duties existing?
Mr. PnjciNOTON. Did thy enforce them?
The Chairman. They did when they collected that 28 per cent?
Mr. PILKINGTON. Oh, yes; they enforced them; indeed, they did.
Tlie Chairman. What would you have had them do?
Mr. PILKINGTON. Do just that; but I am going on to that still. This rate
of duty being based upon the clause of the tariff scheclule referring to pleasure
vehicles, it has been the subject for frequent complaints, and it has been pro-
])osed at various times by various people to reduce this to 10 per cent.
I will recite another instance which will also illustrate the idiosyncracles,
at least, of this tariff. It is a fact that in purchasing hardware articles, or
tools, one is confronted vrith an almost infinite scale of prices charged by
the different shopkeepers. On looking into this matter I was shown a specific
case by a merchant in Port au Prince, in which he presented as exhibits the
original bills of lading of a great gross of small screw eyes, such as are used
to suspend small pictures by. The name in French of such a screw eye is
piton, and in his bill of lading these were called piton pour tableaux, screw eyes
for pJctures. His bill showed that he had paid for his great gross of screw
*»yes, $2 or so. and he pni*! a duty on these inslgniflclent screw eyes of more than
$8, bringing the total cost of a great gross of screw eyes to over $10, the same
>lng purchasable in any 5 and 10 cent store six for a nickel.
T^pon examination of the question, I was shown the tariff schedule applying ,
lO this. The only place in the schedule in which the word " piton " appears
*s n relation to piton or hooks for awnings, appearing in the 8c?hedule as
piton pour tentes. These are hand-forge<l hooks, which are driven into the
brick wall.
The Chairman. I think we will take your word fqr it that there are these
anomalies in the tariff. Now, will you tell me what the re<-elver general did
to secure their removal?
Mr. PILKINGTON. This instance was merely illustrative of many incongruities
in the tariff schedule which have brought forth much friction and much added
duty for the receiver general and the collector.
The Chairman. Why was there no friction l)efore the receiver general was
appointed?
Mr. Pn.KiNGTON. That would come in the inside politics of Haiti before I
came there.
The Chairman. Ycm did not arrive until the occupation?
Mr. Pn.KiNGTON. No.
The Chairman. Had you ever heard that the duties w^ere enforced according
to the discretion of the several collectors of the various ports?
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804 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. Such a condition I am led to believe had previously existed
throughout, perhaps, the entire history of Haiti.
The Chairman. TJie foreign importer In Haiti was not inconvenienced by
the tariff, then, until the receiver general applied It equally and literally?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. That Is a fact. *
Mr. Anqell. In this verj* connectitm I would like to offer in evidence, Mr.
Chairman, a letter from the American minister in Port au Prince to the Haitian
Government, dated August 19, in which the demand is made that the Haitian
Government shall immeillately repeal certain laws, one of which was the duty
on motor vehicles, and the reply tliereto of the Haitian Govenuneut, bearinj:
the same date, the 2l£rt of August, in which it appears, if the .statements therein
be true statements of fact, that on May 14, 1919, the Haitian Government,
operating through the conseil d'etat, the legislature having been suppressed,
voted a law fixing a low duty on automobiles imported, but this law was
objected to by the American receiver general, on the ground that the dutiH>
were too low, and he then proposed a duty of 10 \^r cent, and that the legisla-
tive authority, consisting of the conseil d'etat, brought down that tax to 7 per
cent ; that thereafter the American legation, the tinauciul adviser, and the n'-
(jelver genenil, refused to acknowledge or admit the validity of tliat law. [ye-
cause It did not meet apimrently their wishes, and they continued to Impose a
tax of 20 per cent on automobiles.
(Tlie corresjMmdence referred to is on file with the clerk of the committee. »
The Chairman. Do you mean that, in the first instance, the minister de-
manded a reduction of duties: while by inference at least tlie n^viver genenil
objected to it?
Mr. Angell. The minister demanded and the receiver general objected that
the low duty was too low.
The Chairman. The nUnister's letter demanded a reduction of the duty?
Mr. Angell. No, sir ; he demanded the reix*al of the law in question.
Mr. PILKINGTON. I may say for your information that when the duty wns
reiluced to 7 per cent a large importation of automobiles was made by a north-
ern importer in America who paid the duty of 7 \yer cent and sold his automo-
biles. A long time subsequent to that the customhouse, thr(»ugh the receiver
general, or whoever was the competent authority, demanded the difference, and
coini>elled him to pay the difference, which, as I say, totaleil 28 per cent.
The Chairman. Well, if you will give us the instances to which you allude
of conflict between the receiver general and the financial adviser, if there W
any between either or both of tliose and the American minister, w^* should l>*'
interested.
Mr. PiiLKiNOTON. Well, I can not give you any of those becau.se so far as I
know they worked in complete accord.
The (>h AIRMAN. I thought that some time ago you said tliat the receiver
general had asked for an amendment to the tariff act, to which the financial
adviser objecte<l,
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. No; I did not .say that. I say the receiver general. Mr.
Maumus, said to me that at many times he had requested and had asked for
. a revision of that tax. Now. I do not know that he did ask or did object t«^
it, but I suppose that of course, the financial adviser
The ( 'Hairman. So far as you know, there is a close coordination, then, and
cooperation between the American authorities?
Mr. Pilkington. So far as I know, there is, in that respe<'t. And I will say.
furthermore, and I would like to have it go on the record, that I have not in
any instance had tlu* slightest intimation that there liaa been the least of an
infraction of honesty in any way, shape, or manner in any branch of the
America occupation. That is quite important, because that is a very »»rious
thing; and if the Haitians do not even bring up any complaint of that kind,
that means that it does not exist; and if there was any, they would sot^n
tell it.
/ The Chairman. So far as you know, the legation, the office of the receiver
general, and the office of the financial adviser have cooi)erated cordially?
Mr. Pilkington. As far as I know, that Is a fact.
The Chairman. Have those civil officers been able to cooperate with real
cordiality with the commandant of the gendarmerie and the commandant •»!
the marines?
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 805
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. No; there is a very evident conflict between the different
apparently uncoordinated elements of the American occupation.
The Chairman. Now, if you will just answer my question, I will put my
linger on the point.
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. AH right, let us cut that out, then.
The Chairman. I asked the question regarding the relations between these
three civil authorities, and you answered that they cordially cooperated, so far
as you knew?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. As far as I know, they have.
The Chairman. I asked then if there was equally cordial cooperation be-
tween them and the military officers or the commandant of the marines and
tlie commandant of the gendarmerie, and I understood you to say no.
Mr. PILKINGTON. No; there apparently is not.
The Chairman. Can you give instances of friction or a lack of cooperation,
or is it more a general impression?
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. That is more a general impression. I can cite one case
which would seem very serious. It is said and generally believed in Port au
Prince that, immediately after the protest of the business people of Haiti
against this attempted enforcing of the President's signature, Col. Russell, the
chief of the occupation
The Chairman. Enforcing his signature of what?
Mr. Pilkington. Of this clause granting a monopoly on the importation of
foreign gold to the National Bank of Haiti. Col. Russell is said to have
been very much incensed at being implicated In this attempted forcing of
the President's signature, and to have remarked that he would never take
such action again without the authority of his superior officer.
The Chairman. Do you feel that there should be a single chief and responsi-
ble figure among the American officials in Haiti?
Mr. Pilkington. I was going to take that up in detail in a suggested plan
of
The Chairman. If you will answer my question
Mr. Pilkington. I will certainly do that, and any numbet of them. I am
quite sure that some such method, in principle, is the only way to carry out
cooperation in Haiti.
The Chairman. In short that military, administrative functions, civil ad-
ministration functions, in so far as Americans have to do with them, diplomatic
relations between the American and the Haitian Governments — all should be
vested ultimately in the principal American representative in Haiti?
Mr. Pilkington. I would say yes to that, with the possible amendment of
what you refer to as the diplomatic relations. I should be inclined to thhik,
offhand, that the functions of a minister or an ambassador to a country should
be always retained, but strictly within their definite legal limitations, and that
those functions
The Chairman. Have you any precedents in mind where over any consider-
able period a foreign Government has been represented by a diplomatic agent
whose functions were Independent of the administrative agents lent under
treaty to the Government by which they were employed?
Mr. Pilkington. I have not in just that form ; no.
The Chairman. The precedents are the other way. are they not?
Mr. Pilkington. They are; yes; but I believe, after a careful study of the
temperament of the Haitian people in particular, that such a contemplated
arrangement would immediately fall into a certain phase of their psychology,
which Is fundamentally antagonistic to them. They, primarily and funda-
mentally, have this absolute, deep-rooted antagonism to the mere thought of
any actual control of affairs by even one individual. Now, the vesting of
the diplomatic functions which ordinarily are carried out along a certain line
of agreements, and which they well know, in a i)erson who also has more or
less control, even in the way of advice, over civil functions, would look to them
as a form of military control.
The Chairman. Then let me ask you this : Conceive that the minister made
representations to the Haitian Government which the principal administra-
tive agent nominated by the President of the United States declined to enter-
tain. How would you deal with that anomaly?
Mr. Pilkington. The way I would meet that, my idea of that whole problem,
you may fundamentally say would be this : Let us say for the purpose of argu-
ment, that we suspend, not abrogate, the treaty
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806 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
The Chairman. Upon what assumption do you say that?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. On the assumption of this plan which I am about to propose.
You must remember that the radicals are demanding the abrogation of the
treaty.
The Chaibman. Do you consider that as being within the realm of possi-
bility?
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. Well, I think what I say later will perhaps explain that.
The Chaibman. Go ahead.
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. We will look at it in this way, because we must remember
that at the present time they are, from the ground up, antagonistic to every-
thing. Now, the policy, I am quite sure, worth considering would be for the
United States to apparently, at least, put the entire responsibility of everything
up to Haiti. Now, the way that could be done
The Chairman. What would you do with the loan just made?
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. That will have to be attended to, of course.
The Chairman. Have you a plan worked out?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. Yes ; that is what I refer to.
The Chairman. Will you reduce it to the form of a written memorandum
and give it to the committee?
Mr. Pilkington. I will, indeed ; I will be* very glad to do that; yes.
The Chairman. I would rather you would do that.
Mr. Pilkington. All right; we will not mention it at this time. I really
thought of doing such a thing.
The Chairman. I do not believe I would go Into an elaboration.
Now, let me ask you another question. What, in your Judgment, would
happen if we abrogated the treaty, withdraw the constabulary officers and
marines, and left no one there except the receiver general of customs?
Mr. Pilkington. I take It for granted that you mean that the part of the
treaty over which the receiver general has jurisdiction should remain in force;
otherwise the receiver general would not be left there.
The Chairman. Well, he would be there under the iirotocol covering the loan.
There are precedents for that.
Mr. Pilkington. Could you abrogate the treaty and not abrogate the protocol
without another agreement? Anyhow, I gather what you mean. That I would
consider a condition utterly inii)ossible nt the present time.
The Chairman. Why?
Mr. Pilkington. I do not conceive of the possibility of the r>olitical elements
in that country at the present day getting together with sufficient unanimity to
produce a form of government which would satisfy any investor whatever.
The bankers with whom I am associated at the present time In many different
ways, and who were associated with me in this company down there, were
considering the floating of that loan, the original loan, and I know perfectly
well, of course, that I would be the ultimate court of decision on that matter,
and if they would ask my opinion I would instantly say that I wouldi not,
under any condition, advise the investing of one cent in Haiti under a condi-
tion such as you have predicated.
The Chairman. In which merely the customs would be collected by the
American officer?
Mr. Pilkington. Exactly.
The Chairman. Do you mean that it is not possible for the Haitians, un-
aided, at this time successfully to maintain order and to administer, their civil
government?
Mr. Pilkington. Absolutely. There is no question about that. In that con-
nection I might say that I have definitely been told that my many leading
Haitians in practically just so many words.
The Chairman. Would they avow that publicly?
Mr. Pilkington. They would without doubt, I have no doubt. I would be
very glad to give a list of the names of the leading people there
The Chairman. I said publicly, because it has been suggested that certain
Haitian business men who hold that opinion privately might hesitate to declare
it publicly.
Mr, Pilkington. I think I would like to cover that in this memorandum,
along with some other things. I have that perfectly well crystalized.
The Chairman. Do you believe that If the American authorities under the
occupation, so called, military and civil, were coordinated and made responsible
to a single chief, and that if the occupation undertook sympathetically and
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IN'QUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 807
assiduously not only the discharge of its duties under the terms of the agree-
ment, but to secure the good will and accord of the Haitians, that at the end
of a given period of a year or two they can secure that cooperation and accord
from the Haitians?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. I would willingly and freely stake everything on the state-
m&it that they would, under the condition of confidence, supreme confidence,
in that Individual to whom you refer •; but the crux of that whole thing is
the form under which you maintain that military supervision, we will say —
we will leave out the word " control," because if you use the word " control "
in any way, it is off.
The Chairman. You believe, then, that the centralization of responsibility is
necessary?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. Yes,
The Chairman. But you believe that it is no less necessary to find the right
man to fill the post of chief responsibility?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. That is your only chance of success. Everything depends on
that. The Latin race and the Latin temperament demand a direct personal
element, which can be furnished by nothing else.
The Chairman. Are there Hny men who have served there — ^Americans — ^who
have the qualities necessary to fill that place?
Mr. Pn^KiNGTON. Well, I do not recall anybody who has ever been in any
kind of an official cai>acity there that really ought to be intrusted with that.
I think persaps that if you can get under the skin, we will say, of certain
Haitians there, that they will enlighten you to a very large extent on that
matter.
The Chaibman. In your judgment, ought the present officials, Maumus and
Mcllhenny, remain in the service or not?
Mr. PiUviNGTON. I would not have any objection, and I think no Haitian
would have any objection to the retention of Mr. Maumus. Although he is from
Louisiana, from the State of so-called nigger haters, he is a man who has very
evidently attended to his duty as he has seen it, and has not meddled with any-
one, and has only been handicapped by this absurd tariff. He has never openly
meddled or trampled on the self-pride of the Haitians, but it is my earnest
conviction that, although I have the highest regard for the ability of Col.
Russell, and the personalities of both him and Mr. Mcllhenny, I am absolutely
sure that if either of those three men
The Chairman. You have only name<l two.
Mr. Pilkington. Yes ; but I am going on to say that as long as CoL Russell,
the chief of the occupation : Mr. Mcllhenny, the financial adviser, who has arro-
gated all other duties and privileges; and Mr. Bailly-Blanchard, the three who
have violated, in the minds of the Haitians, their greatest sanctity of gov-
ernmental pride — as long as they are retaine<l there, in whatever form, you are
going to have trouble. Further back in the reconl I have explained why, and I
think that great insult was brought to these people, and is not explained, and I
say those facts may be true, and until they are either explained or
The Chaibman. Let me continue on in my own way, because we will have to
adjourn in a few minutes.
Mr. Pilkington. I will be very glad to.
The Chairman. Is there no American officer who has served in a place of re-
sponsibility, military or civil, in which he came into close contact with the
Haitians, who has their good will or who left the island with their good will?
Mr. Pilkington. There is Col. Wise. He is the one we all have in mind. He
was in command of the gendarmerie.
The Chairman. From the beginning?
Mr. Pilkington. Not from the beginning : no.
The Chairman. I have here the names of four gendarmerie commanders —
Butler, Williams, Wise, and McDougal.
Mr. Pilkington. He is the present commander.
The Chairman. Do you care to pass any comment on any others than Wise?
Mr. Pn^KiNGTON. I have no direct personal knowledge of the administration
of others but Wise, and I have a very large fund of
The Chairman. Were you there during Williams's time?
Mr. Pilkington. No ; I was there since 1918.
The Chairman. That was from May 1, 1918, to July. 1919?
Mr. Pilkington. Well, nothing special was heard of him.
The Chairman. Butler was before that time.
62209— 21~pt2 45 '
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808 INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
Mr. PiLKiNGTON, The opinions of the people themselves, of course, are neces-
sary in this thing. As regards the people themselves, the only chief of gendar-
merie that they apparently tolerated has been Wise. Wise has been well
thought of there. When it comes to a question of Wise being left alone with all
the resi)onsibilltles and the* native constabulary, we will say, that is a matter
which I would be very loath to decide offhand. .
Mr. Anoeix. Do you thlnjc that in a revised scheme of affairs in Haiti the
single, coordinated responsibility should rest in the hands of a marine officer,
a military man, or in the hands of a civilian?
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. Absolutely a civilian. If there is a military man there in
any capacity whatsoever his function will have to be so worded and so care-
fully disguised In detinlte colaboratlon and suggestion with the Haitians them-
selves that he does not appear as a marine officer.
(Whereui><)n. at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2.30 o'clock p. m.)
AFTER RECESS.
The commlt.ee reas.nembled at 2.30 o'clock p. m., pursuant to the taking of'
recess. •
Mr. Angell. Now, Mr. Pllklngton, let me ask you what military representa-
tives or military forces of the United States would. In your Judgment, be neces-
sary and wise for the future In Haiti?
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. I believe a mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached
in collaboration with the Haitians whereby an adequate native force, whether
gendarmerie or national army, to maintain law and order, may be organized,
it being my belief here reiterated that any form of foreign military influence
will be resented.
Mr. Anoelu Do you believe that law and order can be maintained to the ex-
tent necessary to protect the collection of Haitian customs, and so far as they
might be pledged for existing or future loans, and to protect the investment of
foreign capital in Haiti, by a native force?
Mr. PILKINOTON. I think it is possible.
Mr. Angeu^ Do you think that that Is a possibility Immediately, and if not.
then what period of time and under what form of transition relations?
Mr. PILKINOTON. It is my opinion that an organization along the lines of a
national army, as previously existing In Haiti, could, with the proper cooperation
and in connection with the existing gendarmerie, become sufficiently operative
for the purimses you mention In a period of two years after the election of a con-
stitutional assembly and Government in Haiti.
Mr. Angell. What do you mean In your answer when you say In coopera-
tion with the existing gendarmerie?
Mr. Pilkington. I mean that In this question, as in all others, this commit-
tee is going to Haiti with the avowed Intention of bringing about this entirely
essential desideratum, namely, a condition of mutual confidence and a mutually
agreed upon plan of collaboration In general which, in my mind, must be coor-
dinated with a definite agreement by the United States Government to unre-
servedly and completely withdraw from Haiti, such withdrawal to be com-
pleted within a period defined by satisfactory guaranties from the Haitian
Government and people as to stability. If a loan Is desired from the United
States a mutually satisfactory guaranty must be furnished for the safety of
this loan.
Mr. Angell. Do you think that the loan could be satisfactorily guaranteed
from the point of view of Investors and the United States Government if dur-
ing the life of the loan all our military forces and military representa tites
were to be withdrawn from Haiti?
Mr. Pilkington. I feel that any guaranty as to the stability of the Haitian
Government which would satisfy your committee would also satisfy any in-
vestor, provided some nominee of the investor — that, of course, means the
man who supplies the loan — be empowered to control the customs.
Mr. Angell. Do you think that the control of the customs would be a suffi-
cient guarantj' to the Investor and to this Government?
Mr. Pilkington. In connection with the guaranty of the Haitians' ability
to maintain the program as set out above.
Mr. Anoi-xl. Then, if I understand you correctly, you believe that, given a
sufficient guaranty of the Haitian Government and the Haitian people, plus
general control over the customs by the United States, there would then be a
sufficient contnU of Haitian alTaIrs to satisfy the Investor and the United
States Government? r^^^^T^
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 809
Mr. Pdlkington. I do ; and in that connection I would like to t*aU attention
to the existing external loan. French investors took up that loan freely at a
time when Haiti had no such assurance of internal stability as she has now.
and they did not in connection with that loan have control over the customs
as now suggested.
Mr. Anoell. How long a period do you think, in your judgment, would be
required to build up an independent native Haitian police or military force
adequate to maintain law and order?
Mr. PiLKiNQTON. I have already testified to that.
Mr. AivGELL. No; the period of time.
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. Two years ; but that two years must begin after they have
gotten their own (Government and a representative constitutional assembly.
Mr. Angeix. Would It be your idea, then, that during this two year period
beginning, as you have suggested, the American military forces, at present the
marines, should be gradually withdrawn, and the Americans who are now
officers of the Haitian gendarmerie should be gradually supplanted by native
Haitians?
Mr. PnjciNGTON. I do, that point being already agreed in the treaty, as
now existing.
Mr. Angell. Will you state what you believe to be the minimum requirements
for a civil commissioner to represent the United States with the Haitian
Government?
Mr. Howe. May I interrupt on this? Before we leave the last branch of
the testimony, Mr. Pilkington, what satisfactory guarantee of stability by
Haiti can you suggest?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. I should expect to obtain from the various political factions
or parties in Haiti, including the present Government, and the Union Patroplque,
an open, frank avowed Intention to collaborate, and, as far as possible, hold
themselves responsible to execute whatever measures may be necessary and ad-
visable in the o;*ganization of such a militarj^ body as has been before mentione<l,
and the reform of the present unsatisfactory court system and legal procedures
now existing in Haiti, so that the laws may be in such a form that they may be
satisfactorily executed, in order to maintain a condition of law and order,
when once obtained. In other words, the Haitian people, and their Government,
In return for the frank and open manner in which they are being approached
and treated by the American Government, through your committee, must, and
should be, equally frank and equally open in proof of the claims they so
frequently and so widely make.
Mr. Howe. On what do you base your belief that the courts can satisfactorily
be reformed?
Mr.* PILKINGTON. The courts in Haiti are presumably operating in conformity
with the French code of Napoleon, which is, as we know, a perfectly satis-
factory code of laws for people of that race and temperament. There is a
large body of well-trained lawyers In Haiti, who have, as I have previously
stated In my testimony, not only a good Haitian law education, but have ex-
tended education resulting from studies In Europe. These men, I am perfectly
confident, could, If protected In their various functions, bring about a state
of complete reform in the courts.
Mr. Howe. Is there anything before the time of the American occupation to
justify that confidence of yours?
Mr. PiLKiNOTON. Yes. The hlstor>- of former administrations in Haiti,
which, of course, In connection with the actual viva voce accounts of those
times, forms the only basis upon which one might judge that question, shows
that at times Haiti has had chief executives who have shown not only ability
but good humanity and a strong desire for law and order and for everything
that is good. I will again state, as I have heretofore put in the testimony,
that at the present time Haiti has in the i>erson of Sudre Dartiguenave an
executive of whom I feel any nation might be proud. Whatever may be the
underlying facts in connection with the incident referred to In previous
testimony — that Is the Incident leading up to the stop]>age of the pay of the
President — he took an attitude which, in the light of facts existing at the time,
was closely bordering on heroism.
Mr. Howe. Do you not believe that it is highly important for the population
of the country to have safely and honestly a<lnilnistered lower courts from
which the people sometimes derive their only knowledge of the courts? Is not
that so?
Mr. PILKINGTON. Yes. ^g,^^, ,y Google
810 INQUIRY INTO OC:CUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO,
Mr. Howe. That is your opinion, is it not?
Mr. I*iiJCiNGToN. Yes.
Mr. Howe. That being so, what, from what you Icuow of the previous hi.story
of Haiti, justifies your confidence that a capal>le and honest system of lower
courts can be evolved within two years after a constitutional government Is
restored there?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. I have had frequent talks on this very subject, due to its
very great importance in the history of Haiti, and due to direct experience in
thi.»? line with the leading members of the legal profession and ex-uieml>ers of
tlie Senate. They are all unanimous in saying that there would be no difficulty
whatsoever in getting a complete coi-ps of efficient lower c«mrts of justic-e, pro-
viding a sufficient salary could be paid to ludu(*e the men of a l)etter stamp to
take the positions.
Mr. Howe. On what do you base your belief that a Haitian national army
and a Haitian gendarmerie, without American oflacers or control of any kind,
can maintain order?
Mr. PiLKiNCTON. The past history of Haiti again .*<hows in many inst^inces
tlie existence of what, to a layman, and what, to many military c»omnientarIes,
(an i)e characterizeil as a genuine militaiT si)irit, which possibly may be in-
herite<l from a French strain in the blood, and h stor>' apparently shows that
for their individual purposes a (|u'te sufficient degret* of organlzatitm and dis-
cipline has at various times existed. At the present time the degree of intelli-
gence among the so-called better class is even Idgher than it was at that time,
and the chances, in my op nioii, are much bett«»r to-day than they have l>een
heretofore.
Mr. Howe. What other guaranties of stability can you suggest than those
you have mentioned, besides the military and judicial reform?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. A natural and very powerful check on any vagaries of the
Haitian CJovernment will come through the investment of foreign <*apital In the
country, this investment of foreign capital being predicate*! only ami i>ossibly
only uiM>n the arrival of a complete understanding between the two countries.
Mr. Anoeix. Following up Mr. Howe's line of questions, let me ask you this,
.Mr. Pilkington : Do you think that an agi*eement such as you have suggested
between the representatives of the American Government on the one hand, and
the Haitian (Tovernment on tlie other, after the election of a ("onstituent and
constitutional assembly, and the representatives of various iwlitical irnrtes and
fa( tions, wcmld be to any eflfe<rtive degree a deterrent upon the i>ossibIlity of
future revolutions and disorders?
Mr. Pilkington. Absolutely, in my opin'on, it would absolutely prevent the
recurrence on any scale of an actual revoluticmary disorder. I will modify it
by saying there will be for many .vears probably si)oradic sases of banditry,
which has always existe<l. but heretofore Ims been quite capably tftkeii care of
by the rural police in Haiti.
Mr. Angkix. Do you think that an agreement between the representatives of
the Uiiited States (Jovernment <m the one hand and the present or then existing
Government of Haiti on the other hand, ignoring the fact of various political
parties and factions existing outsde of the present or then government, would
be as effective a deterrent \\\mu possible future revolutions and disorders?
Mr. Pilkington. I would not I would not myself consider such an arrange-
ment as being sufficiently satisfactory to induce ine personally to advise the
investment of money in Haiti.
Mr. Angell. In other words, you consider that a working agreement with
all parties in Haiti, including the Government, a sine quo non?
Mr. Pilkington. I do. By all parties, I do not mean 100 per cent because
that is impossible, but practically all of the literates, the intellectuals, could
be brought to agree, more than a working majority.
At such period as may be mutually agreeable to both countries the exist-
ing treaty might be suspended, except such clause as will affect the purposes
of a loan, and a commissioner appointed by and responsible to the United
States Senate. Here I am not supposed to know anything about it. He will
be persona grata to Haiti, and he will fimctlon as an adviser on all questions
In Haiti, being an intermediary between the two Governments in an endeavor
to maintain complete hannony. I think that would be completely satisfactory
to Haiti.
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INQUIRY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO. 811
The Chaibman. I will note in the record tbat under the Constitution of the
United States no agreement can be made for the appointment of a commissioner
responsible to the United States Senate.
I want to revert to the civil advisers, because I believe that, in general
terms, those of us who have followed these hearings are of one mind in shar-
ing the hope that the result of American intervention and cooperation may be
the establishment of a Haitian administration, and of Justice in Haiti, which
will preclude the recurrence of revolutions or disorders, so that when we have
<lone our work it will have been well done, and Haiti may stand on her own
feet as an Independent R^ubllc. Do you think that It is necessary for a
period, or an Indeterminate period, because we have no other period fixed
than that fixed by the terms of the treaty — do you think it is necessary that
there should be appointed to the several departments of the Haitian Govern-
ment, American advisers, with the capacity and authority necessary to enable
the Haitians to install an efficient and economical public administration?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. I feel that that would be the practical and logical way:
and those persons or officials would be the logical aids to this commissioner,
and serve under him, and be responsible to him and to the American Govern-
ment, through this comml8.sioner. the point always being kept In mind, the am-
bition of the Haitian In connection with this Amercan relation, that all such
relation shall be of a friendly, advisory, collaborative character, inasmuch as
they have had American civilians down there, and still have among them
Americans whom they respect and admire, and with whom they have complete
friendly intercourse and confidence at the present time, and they take n tot
granted that the best class of Americans is always of that character, therefore,
any proceeding from the Government along that line will meet with respon-
sive treatment at that suggestion of collaboration.
The Chaikman. You believe that if for the department of e<luoatlon, for
example, an adviser be appointed, that he will be assured the authority and
cooperation neces.sary to build up a true school system in the Republic of
Haiti?
Mr. PiLKiNQTON. He will, always provided that he understands and conforms
to the Latin temperament; In other words, that he does not attempt to ride,
roughshod, over their self-pride and over the social status which the present
or any future native government official of any department whatever may be
possessed of. That remark applies to every relation, not only with Haiti, but
with every Latin-American country, the primary consideration being the pvr-
sonality and the appeal of the Individual himself. He will find the Haitians
at all times ready to cooperate, provided they are given their head and allowed
to express their impressions and their sentiments and their changes of opinion
at length, it Jjelng almost fatal to any successful discussion of any matter,
whether It be business, politics, or religion with a Haitian if he is checked
up and compelled to conform to certain preconceived ideas of the more terse
Anglo-Saxon. In other words, the dealings with the Haitians nmst occupy
the necessary amount of time to satisfy the Haitian that he is completely ex-
pressing the opinions, not only of himself, but of the party or the clique he
represents. You see that deraonstratetl everywhere In every Latin country or
«very country where the Latin exists, all over the world, the same precise con-
dition. The Haitian ofticlal Is essentially an orator.
The Chaibman. And not an administrator?
Mr. Pii,KiNGTON. Not necessarily ; but an orator, and when he talks he is
very much concerned over the form in which he pronuilgates his opinions, and
there Is a continuous stream of the flowers of oratory. Now, instead of check-
ing that stream, you should allow it to flow, because, in my experience through-
out the world, I have found that from the ripened seed of the flower of oratory
oftentimes the beans are spilled, and I think one gains very much inside
information, as will be seen by exhibits which I will leave here for your
perusal at your leisure, these exhibits being clippings from, perhaps, the most
conservative newspaper in Haiti, published at a time when the censorship had
l)een removed from the press and there is, therefore, much domestic informa-
tion circulated back and forth.
If I may, Senator, I would like to spread on the record a blanket estimate
of the competence and efficiency of the Marine Corps, Irrespective of person-
alities or anything. I would like to here spread on the record a statement
that, In the light of a very Intimate acquaintanceship with all grades of otli-
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812 INQUIKY INTO OCCUPATION OF HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO.
cers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps, stationed in Haiti, I am glad and
anxious to state that as regards their true and legitimate functions they have
proved themselves to be as good and efficient a branch of the 8er\ice as I
have ever in my experience been acquainted with. All bodies of men of any
kind or condition in any part of the world, banded together in uncongenial
surroundings, and required, whether justly or unjustly, to occupy positions and
undertake work which is out of their line, will at times and in places do things
which are not especially commendable, and which they would not dream of
doing if allowed to confine their efforts to the normal channels.
Mr. Angeix. Mr. Pilklngton, all through your testimony you have apparently
emphasized very strongly the necessity for cooperation on the part of the
Haitians with the Americans in any future work to l>e accomplished dowtr
there. I want to ask you frankly whether you believe that that degree of co-
operation can be secured which you say is necessary to achieve results if, with
all due respect to the plans of the committee and the limitations upon it8 timev
the committee spends a « period of only a few days, as has been announced, in
Port au Prince, and a few more days in the other parts of the island?
Mr. PiLKiNGTON. No; I am quite confident that they can not arrive at a
mutually satisfactory status in any such time as that, and if it is absolutely
necessary that they limit their time in any such way, it would, in my opinion,
be highly desirable that they in some way either convey the knowledge that
they would come back again, or resume with those same people perhaps further
negotiations in this country, because, to cover any one subject would require
quite considerable ceremonies, which those people are very anxious to conduct,
inasmuch as they, without any question at all, now believe that for the first
time in their relations with the Unitjed States of America they are going to
have in their midst an actual, fair representative body of high-class American
intellectuals, empowered to do something, and with the very evident serious-
ness and willingness to achieve this result at whatever expenditure of time
may be necessary.
Mr. Angell. Your answer seems to imply, possibly, Mr. Pilkington, a misun-
derstanding of what the function and powers of this committee may be in
Haiti. It is not, if I understand the purpose correctly, going there to nego-
tiate with the Haitian Government or with the Haitians, but to investigate the
question of the occupancy and administration of the Republic of Haiti by our
forces and representatives. Now, bearing in mind that statement of what is,
at least my understanding of the purpose and intention of the committees' trip
to Haiti, and looking ultimately only and exclusively to a report to be made
to the Senate of the United States, do you believe that the necessary degree
of cooperation on the part of Haitians in the future can be obtained in such a
period of time as I have indicated only be devoted In Haiti?
Mr. Pilkington. I am quite sure that it is physically impossible. J^ will be
absolutely necessary for practically complete harmony on any question, for
the Haitians to assemble from different parts of Haiti. While I have no doubt
that the majority of representative Haitians will be in Port au Prince ready to
greet you, there will be undoubtedly some who will have to come from a dls-
txince after you have arrived, and whose moral support at least will be ex-
tremely necessary. There also will be public functions, some of which at least
the committee will be expected in diplomatic form to attend. They will be. of
course, their own masters as to what they do or what they do not do, what in-
vitations they will accept or what they will not accept, but there win be cer-
tain functions which, in my opinion, every Haitian will expect them tx> aocq5f
as a form of the undoubted respect and the undoubted good faith that those
people have toward this committee which is now going dowTi there. I would,
of course, suggest, which is already without any doubt whatsoever upperraoRt
in the minds of the committee and in the plans of the committee the desira-
bility and advisability of conforming very strictly and very promptly to tie
diplomatic usages in reference to the existing Government, because that not
only will show the real respect due to the actual head of a friencfly power
who has been at all times loyal tx) his originally stated belief in the American
good intentions, but such action on the part of the committee will assure then*
that if they. In turn, come Into power and are true to their trust, and do their
best to maintain a form of government agreeable and acceptable to civil ixed
peoples, they, in their turn, will be granted such preference.
(Whereupon the committee adjourned subject to call of the chairman.)
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